CONFLICT IN AFRICA AND THE NEED FOR PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

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UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL UNIVERSITY NAIROBI
STUDENT’S DECLARATION

I, the undersigned, declare that this is my original work and has not been submitted to any other college, institution or university other than the United States International University in Nairobi for academic credit.

Signed: Ada Udogwu-Rotich  Date: 26/3/04

This thesis has been presented for examination with my approval as the appointed supervisor.

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DEDICATION

To my mother, the late Victoria A.Udogwu...you always told me to work hard to achieve goals in life, you believed that I could and I have fulfilled that goal.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

First and foremost, I thank Almighty God; who has guided me through this thesis- without Him nothing is possible.

My love and sincere gratitude goes to my father, Benjamin Roxy Udogwu for his lifetime support and love to me, in more ways than I could ever imagine. I thank my brothers and sisters; Obiechina, Amechi, Chike, Chidiebele and Ikenna for their love and support. I love you all.

Thanks to my husband David Rotich who through thick and thin was by my side urging me to move on to the very end.

My thanks also go to my father-in-law and mother-in-law, Mr. and Mrs. Peter K. Rotich for their encouragement.

To Aunty Tina Ajibade for her encouraging words when the going was tough.

Thank you to my class mates.....what can I say ....“Nimefika”

My deepest gratitude to my supervisor Professor Okello for his dedication, suggestions and encouragement in ensuring that I complete this thesis.

Thank you all.
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<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACRF</td>
<td>African Crisis Response Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>ACRI</td>
<td>African Crisis Response Initiative</td>
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<tr>
<td>ANAD</td>
<td>Accord de Non Aggression et d’Assistance en Matiere de Defence</td>
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<tr>
<td>AU</td>
<td>African Unity</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIS</td>
<td>Commonwealth of Independent States</td>
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<tr>
<td>EAC</td>
<td>East African Community</td>
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<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECOMOG</td>
<td>Monitoring Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>FPA</td>
<td>ANAD Peacekeeping Force,</td>
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<tr>
<td>Frelimo</td>
<td>Frente de Libertacao de Moçambique</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GPA</td>
<td>General Peace Agreement</td>
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<tr>
<td>IFOR</td>
<td>Implementation Force UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR)</td>
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<tr>
<td>ISC</td>
<td>international social conflict</td>
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<tr>
<td>MISAB</td>
<td>Mission to Monitor the Implementation of the Bangui Agreement</td>
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<tr>
<td>MPF</td>
<td>Multinational Protection Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>MPLA</td>
<td>Movimento Popular de Libertacao de Angola</td>
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<tr>
<td>MIPONHU</td>
<td>UN Civilian Police Mission in Haiti</td>
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<td>MONUAUN</td>
<td>Observer Mission in Angola</td>
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<td>MONUA</td>
<td>UN Observer Mission in Angola</td>
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<td>MRNDD</td>
<td>National Republican Movement for Democracy and Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGOs</td>
<td>Non-government Organisations</td>
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<tr>
<td>OAU</td>
<td>Organization of African Union</td>
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<td>ONUC</td>
<td>United Nations Operations Congo</td>
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CHAPTER ONE

“For the United Nations, there is no higher goal, no deeper commitment and no greater ambition than preventing conflict”

Kofi Annan

The role of UN Peacekeeping Operations in conflict resolution in Africa

1.0 Introduction

Conflict is omnipresent in modern life. Currently one sixth of humanity is engaged in political or military strife. Since 1970, Africa has had more than 30 wars fought on its territory, the vast majority of which have been intra-State in origin. A number of Africa’s countries were afflicted by armed conflicts in 1966 alone. This accounted for more than half of all war-related deaths worldwide, resulting in millions of refugees, returnees and displaced persons.

The consequences of these conflicts have seriously undermined Africa’s efforts to ensure long-term stability, prosperity and peace for its people. No one not the United Nations, not the international community, not Africa’s leaders can escape responsibility for the persistence of these conflicts.

Conflicts continue to constitute one of the greatest challenges facing the African continent in the 21st Century, and will no doubt be with us well into the 22nd Century. If issues of governance, identity, resource allocation, and power struggle coupled with personality cults and the problem of state sovereignty continue to conspire, not only in causing staggering losses of human lives, destruction of property and environmental degradation. The past years have provided Africa with the unenviable record of hosting millions of refugees and displaced persons, due to conflicts.

While conflicts are a constant in history, and are part and parcel of the dynamics of society, African conflicts should be viewed in their specific historical context.
According to this dynamic perspective, the nature and intensity of African conflicts are the results of a complex, dialectic relationship between internal social factors and the structure of the external environment. What changes is the nature and intensity of conflict, as a result of two main factors: internal social factors, such as ethnicity, class and religion, and changes in the subregional, regional, and international environment, which have various degrees and levels of influence on the internal situation.

The end of the Cold War signalled the demise of ideology-based and motivated conflicts between capitalism and socialism. It ushered in a new, co-operative mood for the management and resolution of African conflicts. There was progress towards a peaceful transition to democratic governance in Namibia, Ethiopia, Angola, Mozambique and South Africa. At the same time, subregional, ethnic, and religious conflicts have flared up in Southern Africa, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Rwanda, Sudan, Somalia, Congo, the Comores and the Democratic Republic of Congo. Under the dual influence of a policy of 'benign neglect' pursued by the major world powers, and increased arms transfers to Africa, the number and intensity of African conflicts have increased over the last six years. Old conflicts and long simmering disputes have been allowed to come to the fore and run their full course (Zartman, I.W.)

In this era, during which Africa is seen as being at the crossroads, we have to focus on the way in which Africa will travel particularly in terms of the capacity of Africans to manage their own conflicts and to conduct peace operations.

These conflicts present a challenge to the society and frequently involve external powers who are sometimes called to intervene or out of their own personal motives do get involved with the conflict for their own interests. Since regional conflicts involve serious
stakes for the parties and carry with them the danger of transcending the original actors and becoming no longer regional, thus there is need for conflict management. Zartman a scholar in his book says that the conflicts should not go unattended instead they deserve serious attention in order to reach a resolution.¹

The first chapter of this study will give the background and statement of the problem followed by the justification and objective of the study. The literature review on the peace keeping operations, conflict and its role in conflict resolution and management giving case studies of various countries and the role the UN plays will be the next chapter. In conclusion the study will point out the methodology to be used in carrying out the research of the thesis.

1.1 The Problem

Africa has been by far the most important regional setting for the peacekeeping operations of the United Nations. Of the thirty peacekeeping operations established by the UN since 1988, fourteen, or nearly half, have been in Africa. Several of these operations, such as the UN's role in monitoring the 1994 elections in South Africa, have been minor in scope, and would scarcely qualify as 'peacekeeping' in the normal sense of the word. But others, such as those in Angola, Mozambique, Namibia, Rwanda, and most of all in Somalia, have been among the organisation's most important initiatives in peacekeeping and conflict resolution since the end of the Cold War.

For better or worse, Africa has a critical impact in defining the limits and possibilities of the post-Cold War global order, and the place of the UN within it. As a result of the

numerous conflicts, an unbiased force needs to intervene for solutions and resolutions. An assessment of this events should therefore help to provide some understanding of the role of the UN, of peacekeeping, and even of Africa in the emerging global order or disorder.

The obvious place to start is with the UN itself, even though it must immediately be pointed out that much of its record cannot fairly be ascribed to the organisation, but has reflected the dilemmas that any attempt to resolve often intense and intractable problems would have confronted. Even in cases where the UN may be regarded as having failed and it has also had some important successes, there is generally little to suggest that another organisation, such as the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) now the African Union (AU), would have done any better. Nonetheless, the UN does bring to the task not only some distinctive capabilities, but also a number of weaknesses.

On the positive side, it has the enormous advantage of constituting the world’s sole global political organisation, with the authority to act to the extent that it is able to obtain agreement among its leading members on behalf of the international community as a whole. In so far as there is anything that can be described as ‘the international community’, the UN is its voice. Against that, its weaknesses, to a large extent, are the mirror image of its strengths. The end of the Cold War, while liberating the UN to play something approaching the task envisaged by its founders in 1945, has also revealed the constraints under which the task would inevitably have to be carried out in the process disappointing many of the exaggerated expectations that arose in the immediate aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union. In the wake of this, it is important to study the implications of the peacekeeping forces, whether positive or negative.
The UN must obtain broad agreement to its actions in the first place, if not among all its members, then at least among the most important of them, and especially the five permanent members (P5) of the Security Council. Deployment of any force requires the support of two-thirds of the members of the Security Council currently nine out of fifteen, and the absence of a veto from any of the P5. The UN is thus not an autonomous actor, but the expression of an international consensus, to the extent that it is possible to obtain. This issue on the whole, has been less problematic in Africa than in much of the rest of the world. The continent did not form one of the major focuses for superpower hegemony or competition unlike, Central America and Central Europe on the one hand, or the Middle East and South-east Asia on the other, so that compromise between the superpowers was more readily obtained here than elsewhere. This helps to account for the relative success of both United Nations Operation Congo (ONUC) despite some major differences between the United States and the Soviet Union, and of the Angola-Namibia accords of 1988. 2

It is also worth noting that, although Africa’s two major former colonial powers, the United Kingdom and France, are among the P5, no major UN operation among which would be included those in Angola, Burundi, Congo, Liberia, Mozambique, Namibia, Rwanda, Somalia and Western Sahara has taken place in former French or British colonies, except for Somalia which includes the former British Somaliland. While the British or especially French presence on the Security Council has sometimes been significant, for example, in obtaining UN authority for the controversial Opération Turquoise in Rwanda in 1994, it has affected the role of the UN in Africa far less than might have been expected. The role of the US, on the other hand, has been critical on occasion, most obviously in Somalia, but also in the tragically misguided decision to withdraw the bulk of forces deployed in the UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) from the country at the outbreak of the genocide in April 1994.

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The internal politics of such a large and peculiarly constructed organisation as the UN have also affected the management of peacekeeping operations in Africa. These have not only included the relationship between the secretariat especially the Secretary-General and the P5 states, but also that between headquarters in New York and operations on the ground. Secretaries-General, invariably drawn from fairly small states, tend to favour a more activist role than the major powers, and one which the US in particular has been reluctant to pay for. Nor has the standing of the Secretary-General himself been entirely beyond question: regional perceptions of Boutros Boutros-Ghali’s actions in the Horn of Africa were deeply affected by policies with which he had been associated in his previous position in the Egyptian Foreign Ministry. In the case of the two of the most traumatic experiences of attempted peacekeeping in Africa that were in Somalia and Rwanda the UN found itself both at odds with the leader of its operations on the ground (Mahomed Sahoun in Somalia, Romeo Dallaire in Rwanda), and on other occasions unable to exercise operational control over forces of the US Rangers in Somalia, the French in Rwanda which were at least technically deployed under its authority.

The UN, moreover, has had to act in collaboration with both major member states and with regional organisations and powers. This was indeed envisaged in the UN Charter, but in practice has meant that, rather than laying down the framework of a global order that would be implemented through other organisations at the regional level, it has had to put together coalitions of states and organisations in order to operate at all, in the process becoming the prisoner of its allies to some extent. At least in Africa, this has been most the evident in Liberia, where the UN only entered the scene as an adjunct to the regional initiative put together by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) which, in itself, was heavily under the influence of the hegemonic ambitions of its major state, Nigeria, and indeed the personal contacts and economic interests of Nigeria’s rulers.
That Nigeria had a government that was both military and notoriously corrupt added to the embarrassment, but did nothing to alter the fact that no settlement was possible without Nigerian engagement.

In the abortive Arusha agreement on Rwanda, the UN was brought in to assist in guaranteeing a settlement negotiated in association with the OAU, whose Secretary General, former Tanzanian Foreign Minister, Salim Ahmed Salim was anxious to use it to enhance the organisation’s standing in the resolution of conflicts within African member states. On some occasions, as for example in Mozambique, the UN’s ability to work with a broadly united set of regional states has greatly enhanced its capacity. On others, as in Somalia, the endemic conflicts of the Horn meant that there was no effective regional security structure to back up the UN intervention, a deficiency scarcely rectified by attempts to bring, in addition to the OAU, the Arab League and the Organisation of the Islamic Conference in on the act. In short, regional partnerships are often unavoidable, and are usually essential to success, but also place constraints on the kind of settlement that the UN is able to seek.

The United Nations is thus a cumbersome participant in the attempted settlement of Africa’s fluid and complex conflicts. Hampered by its peculiar decision-making mechanisms, chronically short of cash, constantly having to look over its shoulder to the demands of major powers, it is characteristically under pressure to find cheap and quick-fix solutions to conflicts, the ruthless factionalism of Liberian or Somali warlords, for instance, or the appalling ethnic divisions of Burundi and Rwanda, which are almost impossible to understand from distant New York. But it is likewise inconceivable, on the other hand, that such conflicts could be resolved without any involvement on the part of the global organisation.
Whatever the appeal of ‘African solutions to African problems’, neither the OAU nor individual African states or sub regional organisations have the resources required to reach and implement such solutions. Nor have attempts by individual external states to create frameworks for regional security in Africa led to anything more than a match between the two most prominent of these states, the US and France. Some African conflicts have generated an extraordinary proliferation of ‘special envoys’ from all manner of regional organisations including entirely non-African ones such as the European Union, attempting to negotiate settlements, at best only in partial collaboration with one another. The UN, for all its problems, is the only body capable of superimposing any global coherence on the search for regional order.

Various writers and scholars agree that there is no single cause of conflicts but are of multiple causes. Some scholars like Mwagiru argues that “conflicts at whatever level have many different causes which are as diverse as the conflicts themselves” he also continues to say that causes of conflict are essentially a question of the motives and reasons for conflict and there is no mono-causes of conflict. With this in mind, one cannot avoid asking what can be done in the common interest to reduce and prevent such conflict and the sufferings that causes it.

Conflicts are part of everyday life and as Dusan argues, ‘it makes as much sense to wish to suppress conflict as it does to try halt the ageing process. He continues to argue that conflict is neither good nor bad, but is part of every social interaction, in marriage just as in diplomatic relations. The real issue facing the conflict manager is how conflicts should

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4 Dusan Reljic, Media and Conflicts in the Transcaucuses: The european Institute for the Media http://www.internews.ru/books/transcaucus/5.html)
be managed. This brings in the aspect of peacekeepers, their unbiased attitudes and aids in the resolution of the conflicts.

1.2 Objective of the study:
The broad objective of the study was to examine the role played by the peacekeepers in conflict resolution.

1.3 Specific objective:
In particular the specific objective was to critically examine the contribution of the peacekeepers in conflict Resolution, and establish the roles played by the peacekeeping organizations in Africa specifically the United Nations peacekeepers. Secondly was to analyze the African Union as a Peacekeeping operation, giving various countries as case studies. The peacekeeping operations play a positive role in settlement and resolution of conflicts but can also play a negative role depending on how it is perceived on the part of the receivers thus can also be an agent of escalation of conflicts.

1.4 Justification:
Conflict has been said to be endemic in society and an important ingredient in the society. Mwagiru points out that of all the issues that cry for attention in the Post-Cold War era, that of how internal conflicts can be managed effectively is one of the most pressing, if not the dominant challenge.5

M Mwagiru, Conflict and Peace Management in the Horn of Africa, op. cit.
See M. Mwagiru,/Between a Rock and a Hard Place: Africa and the changing United Nations’ Paradigms

9
Through Internationalization of conflict, the previously ‘internal’ conflict becomes endowed with many international characteristics, which render it no longer purely internal. This is well illustrated by the loss of life this including genocide and violations of human rights which occur in internal conflicts such as those in Burundi, Angola Somalia, Rwanda, and giving rise to international concern, since human rights are now considered to be an international and even universal concern.

Similarly, "where ethnic communities straddle the territorial borders of two states, a conflict on one side of the border will necessarily affect the same ethnic community living on the side of the border and this in itself immediately internationalizes the conflict, with the internalization of conflict comes the almost immediate need to provide a forum or party that can oversee any talks to resolve conflicts. The study dwelt on how these parties for example the UN and O.A.U, conducted these roles, and is thus essential towards understanding better if their presence leads us to benefit or retard development.

1.5 Methodology:
This study uses mainly secondary sources of data collection as carrying out primary data is not applicable because most of the peacekeeping activities are carried out in war torn areas which are not accessible as they are in danger zones, therefore interviews of the peacekeepers was difficult. Information is from past reports on peacekeeping as most of the peacekeeping forces are outside Kenya, but information is readily available in libraries and Internet. As the focus is on the United Nations peacekeeping operations visits where made to the UN offices in Nairobi, East African Community (EAC), United Nations Development Organization (UNDP) and the Centre for Conflict Research in Nairobi, whereby information was gathered.
Secondary sources or data are mainly through literature that are available in books, periodicals such as journals, daily newspapers, pamphlets, audio visual materials, posters and more current due to improvement of science and technology the internet. This study therefore relied on materials that were available in University Libraries specifically University of Nairobi, United States International University, Catholic University of Eastern Africa and Daystar University.
2.1 Literature review

The problems that the UN has to face in Africa also reflect the peculiar difficulties of peacekeeping itself, and the wide divergence between what may be regarded as the 'classic' role of peacekeeping and, especially in Africa, the kinds of conflict which the UN and other would-be peacekeepers have been called on to resolve. Classic peacekeeping, as James has defined it, "refers to the international help which is sometimes sent to an immediate problem area when disputing states wish, at least for the time being, to live in peace." Critical to this conception of peacekeeping are that the peace to be kept is one between disputing states, and that these states that are at provisional and not permanent have agreed on some basis for living in peace, which external forces are then called on to help police. This agreement, in turn, creates the conditions for what Margaret Carey has identified as the basic principles of peacekeeping:

- that it should take place with the consent of the states in conflict;
- that the peacekeepers should act as impartial brokers; and
- that force should be used only in self-defence.

No major African peacekeeping operation, whether undertaken by the UN or by anyone else, has met these conditions. Most importantly, no such operation has involved any conflict between states at all. Direct conflicts between states in Africa have been relatively rare, and none of those that have taken place have involved any substantial commitment of resources to peacekeeping operations. At most, they have involved only relatively low-level attempts at mediation or demarcation, by the UN in the case of the Nigeria-Cameroon and Chad-Libya border disputes, and by other states and organisations in the dispute between Eritrea and Yemen. Virtually all African conflicts which have involved external peacekeepers or peacemakers have been

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6 A. James, peacekeeping in international politics, Macmillian, London, 1990, P.1
7 Carey M. 'Peacekeeping in Africa' Recent evolution and prospects, in Furley and May, op. cit, p13
conflicts within states, even though such conflicts have often involved as a result of the permeability of Africa’s state frontiers, and tacit or overt support for conflicting parties by external states an international dimension.

Such conflicts not only create major operational difficulties, which will be touched upon in later in this article, but they also raise critical issues of standing. The UN, like other international organisations, is an organisation of states: it is indeed the global ‘trade union’ of states. The UN Charter rests on the distinction between ‘domestic’ and ‘international’ spheres at critical points, and the organisation has only very limited powers to intervene in matters which concern the domestic jurisdiction of states. Chapter VII of the UN Charter does permit the UN to concern itself with any issue that presents a threat to international peace and security, a formula that has been used to enable it to involve itself in a number of essentially internal conflicts, including the issue of apartheid in South Africa, for example, but that it should become involved at all in the issues that have captured its attention in Africa is at least paradoxical.

The state-centeredness of the UN instantly renders the premise of impartiality extremely problematic. While it is possible for an institution formed in this way to remain impartial in issues concerning two or more of its own member states, it is scarcely possible for it to remain so with regard to conflicting parties which are states and ones which are not. For a start, it normally requires the consent of the state concerned to become involved in the conflict in the first place if it can identify such a state and in Somalia it could not; and such consent is only likely to be given if the government concerned believes that such involvement will benefit itself. Furthermore, the operating principles and assumptions of institutions formed by states will almost inevitably incline them towards solutions conceived in statist terms, notably the maintenance of the territorial integrity of an existing state, and the extension of effective state control over the whole of its territory. This obviously does not vitiate the
possibility of the UN becoming involved in conflict-resolution in Africa, or at least sometimes, of such involvement being successful. It does mean, however, that it is only likely to be successful if the parameters of the eventual resolution are implicitly accepted from the outset.

It was implicit, for example, in the resolution of the conflicts both in Mozambique, where it was generally successful and in Angola, where it tragically failed that the respective incumbent governments of the Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (Frelimo) and the Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (MPLA) would stay in power, and that the conflict resolution processes would essentially involve the negotiation of appropriate ‘side payments’ such as specified positions in central government, or a limited degree of autonomy in running the governments of particular regions to the main opposition group. It is barely possible to conceive what would have happened had Frelimo or the MPLA lost their respective elections to the National Resistance Movement in Mozambique (Renamo) or the União Nacional para a Independência de Angola (UNITA), and the insurgents had consequently demanded the right to form new governments in Maputo or Luanda. One can safely assume, however, that no smooth handover would have occurred.

Indeed, it was the recognition by key elements in the incumbent National Republican Movement for Democracy and Development (MRNDD) power structure that the full acceptance of the Arusha Peace Agreement would have involved their exclusion from power that triggered the Rwandan genocide of 1994. It is almost equally inconceivable that the UN much less the OAU could carry the responsibility for a peace settlement that involved the dismemberment of the territory of an existing state. Once the separation of Eritrea from Ethiopia had been agreed to by the two governments concerned, for example, it was possible for the UN to become involved in a very limited capacity to validate the results of the subsequent referendum through which
the division was formally legitimated. For the UN to propose such a separation in the first place, against the opposition of the Ethiopian government, would scarcely have been possible.

The fact that peacekeepers or the states that send them inevitably arrive with implicit agendas of their own creates difficulties in the relationship between the peacekeepers and the 'peace kept'. In particular, those whose prospects for success are diminished by the presence of peacekeepers will treat them with suspicion or hostility, even if they have been induced by external pressure to agree to their arrival in principle. In turn, this is likely to lead to incidents, often of an apparently quite trivial kind, which serve to deepen suspicions on either side, and may eventually lead as most obviously in the breakdown of relations first between the Unified Task Force (UNITAF) and subsequently the UN Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) and Mahomed Farah Aidid – to the outbreak of open conflict between the peacekeepers and one of the domestic parties. It was likewise evident that the UN Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM) was implicitly hostile to Savimbi and UNITA and for very good reason, many would add, and that relations between the two were always liable to break down, whereas relations between UNAVEM and the government in Luanda, however strained they sometimes may have been, rested on the solid understanding that both were ultimately trying to achieve the same objective of a settlement to the war that would leave the MPLA in power.

Engagement in peacekeeping operations in civil conflicts, inherently more invidious and usually also more hazardous than the simple interposition of a peacekeeping force between states that have already agreed to the conditions for its deployment, also raises tricky questions about the composition of the force itself. Operations of this kind, of which the former Yugoslavia and Cambodia provide non-African examples, are less likely to be restricted to forces provided by the generally small, distant and neutral
states which have formed the backbone of 'classical' peacekeeping operations. They are more likely to draw on major states which have hegemonic ambitions which also, of course, involve hegemonic responsibilities that, in turn, affect perceptions of their neutrality. The extreme case of such hegemonic involvement is that of French forces in Opération Turquoise, but the leading roles of the US in UNITAF, and of Nigeria in the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) force in Liberia, are equally clear.

It should be emphasised that there is nothing inherently wrong with hegemony, which may indeed be necessary to ensure the stability of potentially highly unstable regional systems, and which characteristically requires any would-be hegemonic to assume the often considerable costs involved in maintaining order. However, it does move peacekeeping firmly out of the sphere of pure benevolence and global good citizenship in which it is often placed, and into that of power politics. Hegemonic peacekeeping, which involves participation by an alliance of states under the leadership of a dominant power, also raises issues within the alliance itself, since other players may be pursuing agendas at least partially at variance with those of the leader.

The Italian forces engaged in Operation Restore Hope, for example, evidently had as their primary objective the restoration of Italian influence in a former colony, which in turn led to an extreme reluctance to become involved in any activity which might create political difficulties and to a preference for handling potentially tricky problems by bribery rather than force. Forces from Guinea and Sierra Leone in ECOMOG, obviously concerned about the impact of the Liberian war on their own neighbouring territories, likewise had agendas, which did not always coincide with those of the Nigerian leadership of the operation.
In summary, peacekeepers in Africa have been plunged into the most intractable problems in attempting to maintain some kind of order on one of the world’s most violent and unstable continents. For them the relatively straightforward tasks of merely policing agreements between states are not an option. They have been called on, rather, to prop up or re-create collapsing states; to intervene in vicious civil wars; and to negotiate and, if need be, enforce peace settlements among conflicting parties whose commitment to any peaceful resolution of conflicts was often at best extremely uncertain, and at worst no more than a façade behind which to prepare a resumption of hostilities. The situations which they encountered on the ground, have often been quite different from what they had expected, and the twists and turns of the conflicting parties have required the managers of operations on the ground to redefine their missions, in frantic communication with a political leadership outside the conflict zone which saw things in a very different light. Their own motives plausibly enough, sometimes have been called into question, and the motives of different states engaged in the same operation have not always been consistent. The support of a united international community could not be taken for granted. In short, it has been a veritable can of worms.

2.1.1 Tales of Triumph and Disaster

Margaret Carey suggests four eminently sensible conditions which must be in place, for UN peacekeeping operations to succeed:⁸

⁸Carey M. ‘Peacekeeping in Africa’ Recent evolution and prospects, in Furley and May, op. cit, p13
• The warring parties must be ready to put aside the military quest for power and pursue the settlement of the conflict through peaceful means.

• A clear political strategy is necessary to address the underlying causes of the conflict and prescribe steps toward national reconciliation.

• An operation’s mandate must clearly set out the tasks entrusted to it.

The international community must be ready to provide both its political and financial support to the operation.

Sensible though these conditions are, it is doubtful whether they can be met, and it is not even clear whether they should be. The situations into which peacekeepers are liable to be thrust, are necessarily messy and insecure. The motives of warring parties are almost invariably suspect, and their willingness to pursue a settlement through peaceful means is likely to be slight, unless their arms can be sharply twisted in the process. The underlying causes of conflict will usually lie deep centuries deep in some cases and the ideal of national reconciliation will be one that only the most naive can have any hope of achieving. Indeed, the very phrase ‘national reconciliation’ itself begs the question whether anything plausibly describable as a ‘nation’ exists, and incorporates the characteristic assumption of international institutions that problems can be settled within the structure of the existing state system.

However carefully one may try to set out the tasks of the peacekeeping operation, the peacekeepers will find themselves, once they arrive, enmeshed in fluid situations, in which their own actions cannot be circumscribed by resolutions, no matter how carefully these may be drafted in New York. The ‘international community’, finally,
exists only when all of the states significant to an operation are of broadly the same mind; and even though securing consensus is a very important task that has to be pursued with diplomatic skill and dedication, to insist on its achievement as a precondition for undertaking a peacekeeping operation would be to give any potentially awkward state a veto over UN participation. Sometimes it may be necessary to jump in and without self-delusion, hope for the best.

To show how these general considerations have been realised in practice, and to draw some conclusions about the factors essential to success or failure, it is necessary to look, however briefly, at some of the actual experiences of the UN in African peacekeeping. What seem to be the five most important operations, those in Namibia, Mozambique, Angola, Rwanda and Somalia, have therefore been selected, and ranked in descending order of 'success', from the most successful at the start to the least successful at the end will be the case studies of this thesis.

Conflict resolution has been championed by the pluralist approaches to international relations and particularly World Society. Burton who belongs to this school of thought argues that the imperative to war does not come from the nature of the state or its external relations but from the way in which the environment acts on the individual. He further argues that individuals have certain needs they try to fulfill and if their quest is frustrated then there is conflict.⁹

In terms of conflict management, resolution views the structure not as a win-lose one, but as a win-win one. Since the latter is not zero-sum, both parties in conflict can participate in the design of a legitimized post-conflict relationship. Conflicts having been managed through an analytical process is said to be resolved rather than merely settled. These two theories will therefore guide me in this research project.
CHAPTER THREE

3.0 PEACEKEEPING IN AFRICA- TRENDS AND RESPONSES

3.1 INTRODUCTION

Underpinning the concept of an African Renaissance is an increasing determination to find 'African solutions to African problems'. In the realm of peace and security, this sentiment has been clearly expressed by His Excellency Dr Salim Ahmed Salim, Secretary General of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU). For example, in his opening address to the Second Meeting of the Chiefs of Defence Staff of Member States of the OAU Central Organ, Salim stressed that, "OAU Member States can no longer afford to stand aloof and expect the International Community to care more for our problems than we do, or indeed to find solutions to those problems which in many instances, have been of our own making. The simple truth that we must confront today, is that the world does not owe us a living and we must remain in the forefront of efforts to act and act speedily, to prevent conflicts from getting out of control."

Nowhere have these sentiments been more loudly and clearly echoed than in the burgeoning debate on the future of peacekeeping in Africa - a debate which is increasingly focused on efforts to enhance African capabilities for the conduct of peace operations. The purpose of this paper is to take stock of current trends in international peacekeeping vis-à-vis the perceived problem of peacekeeping in Africa, and to briefly outline progress and prospects towards the resolution of this problem.

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1 Edited Version of a talk presented by the author at a ISS Seminar on Building African Peacekeeping Capacity, Midrand, 20 May 1998

2 Address by HE Dr. Salim Ahmed Salim, Secretary General of the OAU at the Second Meeting of Defense Staff of Member States of the OAU Central Organ, Harare, 25 October 1997
3.2 TRENDS IN INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING

Peacekeeping is perhaps the most promiscuous word in the world of international relations. She is everybody's whore and yet somehow retains her magic when her lover sees that her favours are being illicitly shared by many another. Indeed, even amid our pain at being denied her exclusive fidelity, we are proud of her adaptability to all sorts of circumstances, to all sorts of company - from Sinai to Sarajevo, from Cyprus to Cambodia, Liberia, and Somalia. 3

The threats and opportunities arising from the equally hackneyed 'changed post Cold War security environment' undoubtedly contributed to the mutation of international peacekeeping practice. However, the former United Nations Secretary-General played a key, though obviously unintentional role in the 'prostitution' of peacekeeping, through the publication of his An Agenda for Peace in 1992. In all fairness, Boutros Ghali did attempt to distinguish between a new array of 'conflict management tools' supposedly available to the international community, including 'preventive diplomacy', 'peacemaking', 'peacekeeping', 'peace enforcement', and 'peace building'. However, most of these 'tools' did not come with clear instruction manuals, and most actors remained comfortable with the principles and practices established during half a century of UN peacekeeping.

Peacekeeping has thus remained the favoured term to describe a diverse range of latter day multinational interventions, many of which have borne little or no resemblance to traditional blue helmet operations conducted with consent, impartiality and without resort to force. Indeed, aberrations have included air strikes against recalcitrant parties, a man-hunt for factional leaders, and even a naval bombardment of the capital of a 'host country'. Without dwelling on the morality or efficacy of forceful third-party

3 Bernard Crick, "Defence of Politics", London, 1964, p. 56
interventions, suffice it to say that the time is ripe for greater conceptual and semantic clarity on what is and is not peacekeeping.⁴

Despite the supposedly broad array of conflict management techniques, international attention remains fixed on peacekeeping, or the utility of multinational military interventions as an essential element in the amelioration or resolution of armed conflicts. The frustrating aspect of this approach is that, as the perceived demand for peacekeeping increases, the capacity of the UN to deliver peacekeepers seems to have diminished.

For example, the UN was able to provide neither the mandate nor the means to assist in terminating the destructive civil war which racked the Republic of Congo during 1997. UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan approached the Security Council with a plan for a force of no fewer than 1 600 to 1 800 peacekeepers, plus support units and UN military observers. He looked especially to the countries of the region to provide soldiers to try and stabilise the situation and ensure that there is a cease-fire.

However, he also made it clear that the UN would not act before there was a firm cease-fire and evidence that the warring parties were determined to seek political conciliation. With Annan still pleading with the Security Council to prepare to send in a peacekeeping force, Brazzaville fell to the forces of General again President Denis Sassou-Nguesso on 15 October 1997. This concluded the presidency of democratically-elected Pascal Lissouba, and crowned yet another violent and unconstitutional regime transfer in Central Africa.

The Congo example reinforces the notion that international peacekeeping is in a state of crisis in terms of finances, doctrine, co-ordination, and quality troop contributions. Indeed, Kofi Annan was forced to admit in his UN Report on Reform, released three months before the fall of Brazzaville that, "the United nations does not have, at this point in its history, the institutional capacity to conduct military enforcement measures under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. The Organisation still lacks the capacity to implement rapidly and effectively decisions of the Security Council calling for the dispatch of peacekeeping operations in crisis situations."\textsuperscript{5}

This reality is reflected in the declining number of UN missions and peacekeepers worldwide. While the number of troops deployed on UN operations ballooned from 10 000 in 1989 to 70 000 in 1995, this number has dwindled over the past two years to some 13 000 today, and will probably stabilise around levels more common in the eighties.

On the other hand, the number of non-UN 'peacekeeping' missions has increased in recent years. Substantial and forceful missions have been conducted since 1990 by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in West Africa, and since July 1992 by Russia and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) in Georgia, Azerbaijan and Tadjikistan. However, it is since the 40 000-strong NATO Implementation Force (IFOR) took over from the over-extended UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in the former Yugoslavia at the end of 1995, that the idea of regional peace operations has steadily gained ground. In 1997, a 6 000-strong Italian-led multinational force intervened in the civil turmoil in Albania. This ad hoc multinational protection force (MPF) had a Chapter VII UN mandate to "facilitate the safe and prompt delivery of humanitarian assistance and to help create a safe environment for the missions of

international organisations in Albania." The relative effectiveness of NATO in Bosnia and the MPF in Albania has lent credence to the argument that regional capacities for conducting peace operations allow for effective multinational intervention where the UN lacks the capability or the will to act.

The UN now seems willing to hand over responsibility for peace and security to any form of 'coalition of the willing', without necessarily having any clear notion of legality, higher direction, or requiring the concerned support of the international community. For example, the precedent was set for stretching Chapter VIII of the UN Charter to its limits in the Central African Republic when, on 6 August 1997, the Security Council retrospectively authorised the 800-member Inter-African Mission to Monitor the Implementation of the Bangui Agreements (MISAB) under a Chapter VII mandate. The UN member states were not assessed for any portion of the mission costs, which had to be borne by participating countries.

After a brief experiment with large scale, multifunctional peacekeeping and 'peace enforcement' operations (1989-1995), the UN is now conducting much smaller and more specialised monitoring missions, while delegating the large scale, personnel intensive functions to regional organisations and arrangements. On the other hand, where more robust 'peacekeeping' is being done by regional organisations and alliances, UN missions have been deployed to observe the 'peacekeepers' as well as the belligerents for example UNOMIL in Liberia, UNOMIG in Georgia, and UNMOT in Tajikistan. Contemporary UN observer missions also have an increasing slant towards

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7 Under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, MISAB was entitled to use force in order to implement its mandate, which included the disarmament of rebellious factions of the CAR military.

8 The Security Council finally succumbed to pressures for the UN to take over responsibility for the CAR peace process from the hard-pressed MISAB contributors with effect from 15 April 1998.
specialisation most notably in the area of policing.

According to the UN handbook, the mission of Civilian Police is to "undertake the supervision or control of local civil police in order to ensure that law and order are maintained effectively and impartially, and that the human rights and fundamental freedoms are fully protected." While many multifunctional peace operations since UNTAG have included a significant civilian police component, the role of the police is now eclipsing that of the military in a number of ongoing UN operations. For example, the two most recently established missions are dedicated exclusively to issues of policing, the UN Civilian Police Mission in Haiti (MIPONHU), and the UN Police Support Group in Croatia. Of course, MIPONHU follows on two previous UN missions which were also dedicated to the professionalisation of the Haitian National Police - UNSMIH (July 1996 to June 1997) and UNTMIH (August to November 1997).

The mandate of the longer-standing UN Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (1995 to present) is also concerned exclusively with law enforcement activities, and it is executed by some 2,000 civilian police from forty countries with only three military support personnel. And, while not exclusively devoted to policing matters, the UN Observer Mission in Angola (MONUA) has some 361 civilian police. With the gradual withdrawal of military personnel, the mission's police component continues to verify the neutrality of the Angolan National Police, the incorporation of UNITA personnel into the national police, as well as the quartering and occasional deployment of the rapid reaction police.

These broader trends in international peacekeeping seem to be ignored, however, when

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it comes to efforts to resolve conflict on the African continent. More so than any other region, Africa is seen as presenting a unique challenge to those concerned with the maintenance of international peace and stability. The initial post-Cold War success stories of UN peacekeeping in Namibia and later Mozambique have been overshadowed by the tragedies of Somalia and Rwanda, and the ambivalent outcome of extensive UN involvement in the sticky Angolan peace process.

3.3 THE PROBLEM OF 'PEACEKEEPING' IN AFRICA

The UN and the rest of the international community face seemingly insurmountable hurdles in trying to bring stability to conflict-ridden African states. The problem of effective intervention is almost as complex as the type of conflicts that demand efforts at amelioration, and the obstacles are conceptual, contextual, political, and practical in nature. In the absence of political will and public support, of financial and other resources, and of a 'recipe' for success which is acceptable to their own populations and to Africa, lukewarm Western commitments to the resolution of African conflicts are fast growing cold.

For the past decade, African conflicts have been characterised by the combination of an internal or international conflict with serious human rights violations and large scale suffering among the threatened civilian population, which has inevitably resulted in large numbers of refugees and displaced persons. Many of these conflicts have deep-rooted causes, such as:

- a lack of coincidence between nation and state, ethnic tensions and the suppression of minorities;
- corrupt and dictatorial regimes;
- support for such regimes by international arms traders;
• chronic poverty and underdevelopment; and

• a grinding debt burden.

However erroneously, the resources and energies of the international community tend to be mobilised around the symptoms, rather than the causes of such conflicts particularly when these include genocide or civil war. The situation is further complicated by the fact that most of Africa's actual and potential conflicts are internal ones within the state, which impedes international attempts to broker peace. The perceived futility of attempting to solve African crises was finally realised when the international community tried to save the people of Somalia from self-destruction in an operation which lasted from 1992 to 1995.

The three-year UN intervention in Somalia cost the international community over $1 685 million. A total of 150 peacekeepers died - 114 as a result of hostile acts. The death of eighteen United States soldiers on 3 October 1993 had an indelible impact on US policy on multilateral peace operations. In May 1994, the Clinton Administration's Presidential Decision Directive 25 (PDD 25) decreed that the US would not intervene in future crises unless American national interests were clearly at stake, and the mission had clear and limited objectives, including a well-defined exit strategy.10

UN officials involved in the mission were left with a conviction that the use of force should be avoided in future peace operations, as the degree of destruction in Somalia was not matched by the achievement of overall political mission objectives. The US, on the other hand, ascribed mission failure to the fact that not enough force was used. The UN Secretary-General was left with the black and white options of either defensive peacekeeping or high-intensity enforcement. Somalia was thus the turning-point, at

10 According to PDD 25, the Administration will consider various factors when deciding whether to vote for a proposed new UN peace operation (Chapter VI or Chapter VII) or to support a regionally – sponsored peace operation
which the international community lost all desire to experiment further with 'middle ground' operations in Africa. 11

Nowhere was this Somalia effect so dramatically and tragically demonstrated as in the nearby tiny country of Rwanda.12 In the presence of a weakly supported and grossly under-resourced UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda, as many as 500 000 civilians were killed between April and August 1994. Throughout the worst of the massacre, UNAMIR had fewer than 500 soldiers deployed. It is estimated that, of a total population of approximately seven million, a further three million were internally displaced, and more than two million fled to neighbouring countries. As the then UN Secretary-General observed, the international community's delayed reaction to the genocide in Rwanda demonstrated graphically its extreme inadequacy to respond with prompt and decisive action to humanitarian crises entwined with armed conflict in Africa.

3.4 BUILDING AFRICAN 'PEACEKEEPING CAPACITY'

After the debacle in Somalia and the shame of Rwanda, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) soon became the focal point for a number of initiatives to devolve responsibility for responding to African crises to African players themselves. By January 1995, the OAU Secretary General observed that there was a proliferation of initiatives coming from outside Africa, all with the aim of supporting OAU efforts in the area of peacekeeping. He noted in particular that the British government had convened peacekeeping seminars in Camberly, Accra, Cairo and Harare, with the aim of examining various ways of enhancing the OAU's capabilities to prepare and deploy African peacekeepers.13

11 J. Chopra, A Eknes & T. Nordbo, " Fighting for Hope in Somalia, Peacekeeping and Multinational Operations, 6, (Norwegian institute for International affairs),

12 United nations, "Rwanda – UNAMIR, unofficial record of events, United Nations Department of public information, September 1996

A French proposal for an African Intervention Force had also emerged from the Biarritz Francophone Summit of 1994. In essence, the French proposal aimed at the creation of a modest standing force, with possible contributions from African countries, which could be utilised during times of crisis. It was further proposed that this force would be mobilised under the auspices of the OAU and its member states. The French initiative included plans for an assessment of the capacity of member states in a particular subregion to intervene during crisis situations, the training of contingents in peace maintenance, and the training of a high command staff.  

The main thrust of both the British and French initiatives related to the setting up of a Multi-National African Rapid Deployment Peace Force. These initiatives, which enjoyed European and American support, further envisaged the pre-positioning of equipment at logistics bases in strategic points in Africa, with Europe, the US and others providing logistics while Africa would supply the personnel. There were also a number of long term capacity-building initiatives with an educational slant, mainly from Nordic countries, but these were subtle enough not to generate alarm.

Aside from these externally inspired initiatives, it was noted that a significant number of African countries had their own dedicated peacekeeping training programmes at the national level. A June 1996 Meeting of the Chiefs of Defence Staff of the OAU Central Organ, called for a working group of military experts to "come out with practical and realistic recommendations on the technical issues raised" on the concept and conduct of African peace operations. A study was subsequently commissioned to provide the OAU with a comprehensive overview of the training efforts of select countries which had either participated in peace operations, or which appeared to be imminent.

\[14\] Ibid
\[15\] Ibid
potential participants, and to provide the OAU with recommendations for the enhancement and co-ordination of such efforts.16

The primary recommendation of this survey was concerned with addressing the urgent need to develop a common concept, guidelines and doctrine for participation in peace operations by OAU member states. Other recommendations dealt with the provision of guidance and support from the OAU for the ongoing efforts of member states to train and prepare for participation in peace operations, and the harmonisation of sub-regional and continental efforts to manage conflict and maintain peace and security.

While this survey was in progress, the US announced its intention to contribute African peacekeeping training in a dramatic fashion. In October 1996, former US Secretary of State Warren Christopher travelled to Africa to promote a proposal for the establishment of an all-African military force. The African Crisis Response Force (ACRF), as it was then known, was to deal with African crises where insurrections, civil war or genocide threaten mass civilian casualties. The intermediate objective of the ACRF was to develop a rapid reaction capability for such contingencies. It was hoped that the ACRF would be used for humanitarian intervention in Burundi. However, this 'quick fix' solution was met with widespread scepticism, and the US transformed the idea of an African intervention force into a longer term capacity-building initiative. By mid-1997, the original ACRF idea had evolved into the African Crisis Response Initiative, or ACRI.

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According to the US State Department, "the African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI) is a training program which envisions a partnership with African and other interested nations to enhance African peacekeeping capacities, particularly the capacity to mount an effective, collective response to humanitarian and other crises."\(^\text{17}\) The US wasted no time in implementing the ACRI programme. By the end of 1997, infantry battalions in Senegal, Uganda, and Malawi had participated in two-month ACRI training sessions presented by US Third Special Forces Group, under the command of Colonel David McCracken. On 7 February 1998, an ACRI team began the fourth round of two-month engagements, when it started training an 837-strong battalion in Mali.\(^\text{18}\) In May 1998, the US began training a Ghanaian battalion, and similar training has been scheduled for Ethiopia later this year.\(^\text{19}\)

Parallel to the earlier ACRI training sessions, a regional battalion peacekeeping exercise was presented by the Zimbabwe Defence Forces in conjunction with the British Army from 1 to 20 April 1997. Exercise Blue Hungwe involved a combined total of some 1 400 members of the armed forces of ten of the then twelve Southern African Development Community (SADC) countries, as well as civilian police observers and international humanitarian non-government organisations (NGOs) and agencies. The troop contributions varied from 400 Zimbabweans and 300 South Africans to one or two observers from Botswana and Zambia. Mozambique, which recently emerged from civil war with the assistance of a UN peacekeeping mission, contributed a company of 130 troops from their new national army.


\(^\text{19}\) J. Fisher-Thompson, "OAU Advise Paved Valuable in Formulating ACRI, McCallie, USIS Washington File, 12 May 1998, p.1
Also in Zimbabwe, a group of military experts and observers from 45 African nations met in Harare, from 21 to 23 October 1997 to draft peacekeeping proposals for consideration by the Second Meeting of the Chiefs of Defence Staff of the Central Organ of the OAU (24 to 25 October 1997).

The meetings in Harare reflected the findings of the 1996 survey, and produced some significant results. No fewer than fifty substantive and specific recommendations were approved for consideration and adoption by the political organs of the OAU. Importantly, there was agreement on the need for African efforts to strengthen UN capacity for peace operations by providing the bulk of a ready force package for utilisation by the UN, and for the OAU to be more assertive in placing African crises on the UN agenda.

It was decided that the OAU concept for peace operations should be firmly linked to the operationalisation of its Early Warning System within the Conflict Management Division, which will include a network linking in the early warning cells of the various sub regional organisations in Africa, as well as research institutes, academics and civil society. The proposed concept for the conduct of OAU peace operations includes the use of sub regional organisations, as a possible first line of reaction where the OAU is unable to act. The Chiefs of Defence Staff also recommended a brigade-sized contribution from each of the five African sub regions as a starting point for a standby arrangements system, which could then be adjusted upwards or downwards according to evolving circumstances.

This recommendation accords with an April 1997 resolution of the armed forces chiefs of staff of West African states belonging to the sub regional non-aggression and defence co-operation pact known as ANAD: Ivory Coast, Burkina Faso, Mali, Mauritania,
Niger, Senegal and Togo. Meeting in Niamey, Niger, the chiefs of staff called for the creation of a joint force to prevent or end conflict and to help with humanitarian operations within or beyond the region. According to the communiqué, "the armed forces chief of staff, convinced of the opportunity and the need for the FPA (ANAD Peacekeeping Force), reaffirm their determination to work under the authority of their heads of state for the success of what is an historic initiative for the African continent." 

According to Niger's chief of staff, Amadou Moussa Gros, the envisaged force would be "a permanent force of specialist units on standby in their countries of origin, which would assemble on demand whether for crises in ANAD's zone of influence or outside member countries." The command of the standing force could be given to a civilian or military person depending on the circumstances of its deployment. It was proposed that the force and its operations would be funded by contributions from ANAD member states, from friendly nations and international institutions. Significantly, the meeting followed joint manoeuvres earlier in the year between several ANAD members and France, the former colonial power, which were aimed at handling such volatile situations.

France, Britain and the US began to address African sensitivities to the lack of co-ordination in the conduct of these exercises and in external capacity-building initiatives in general. In the latter part of 1997, the three powers announced the launching of a 'P3' initiative, which would co-ordinate the ongoing and future efforts in the realm of peacekeeping training in Africa by the UK, the US and France. ACRI is the US

20 ANAD, or the Accord de Non Aggression et d'Assistance en Matière de Défense (Treaty of Non-Aggression, Assistance and Mutual Defence) was signed in June 1997 by Burkina Faso, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, the Ivory Coast, and Togo. Benin and Guinea Conakry were granted observer status at meetings. ANAD is basically a non-aggression and mutual defence and assistance agreement, for the purpose of maintaining peace and security in the region, and for consolidating the political independence of the signatories. It has a sizable permanent secretariat based in Abidjan.


22 Ibid.
component of this joint initiative, while the French element is known as RECAMP (Reinforcement of African Military Peacekeeping Capacity). The British element is known as the UK African Peacekeeping Training Support Programme.

It appeared as if the three powers were indeed starting to co-ordinate efforts during a ten-day RECAMP exercise, code named Guidimakha, which was hosted by Senegal at the end of February this year. African forces made up the bulk of the 3 700 troops, which included four battalions of troops from Senegal, Mali, Mauritania, Cape Verde, Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Ghana and Guinea. France provided trainers and logistics, as well as a marine battalion, 100 paratroopers, Mirage fighter-bombers, helicopters, and field hospitals. As a symbolic gesture, the US sent a platoon of marines, and Britain provided a platoon from the Royal Regiment of Fusiliers. However, this was clearly a French show, with France donating brand-new vehicles and equipment which will be stored in sealed tents as a pre-positioned equipment package.23

The initiative framed during the 1997 Niamey meeting of ANAD chiefs of defence staff also seems to have inspired another major peacekeeping exercise in the region. From 15 to 22 April 1998, a six-nation West African military exercise, code named Cohesion Compienga 98, was held for the purpose of preparing troops for peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance operations. Held in Burkina Faso, this exercise involved some 4 000 troops from Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad, Niger, Nigeria and Togo.24 While Benin enjoys observer status at ANAD meetings, it is interesting to note the presence of Chad and especially Nigeria in the force configuration.


Nigeria would obviously be interested in breaking down the ANAD/ECOWAS divide and participating in exercises outside the P3 framework.25

On the opposite side of the continent, the ACRI idea seems to be gaining in popularity. A further regional peacekeeping exercise is scheduled for East Africa in June this year. Code named Natural Fire 1998, the exercise will be conducted in Kenya, and will involve some 2 000 combat troops from Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda, as well as those of the US Central and European Commands.26

Not to be outdone, the armies of the SADC region are also planning a large follow-on to Blue Hungwe for 1998. During November, the South African National Defence Force will host the second regional peacekeeping field exercise at its Army Battle School in Lohatla. The aim of Exercise Blue Crane will be "to enhance the capacity of SADC military forces for peace support operations." It is envisaged that there will be a brigade headquarters with three battalions under command. As far as vehicles are concerned, the SANDF will have to provide for all contingents except Zimbabwe, Namibia and Lesotho. Aircraft will also be scarce, with limited contributions from Zimbabwe.

25 ECOWAS membership comprises Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, the Ivory Coast, Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo. There have also been calls from several OAU member states for the ECOMOG intervention force to be transformed into a permanent African peacekeeping force readily available for deployment in crisis areas. See, for example, T Sannah, Envoy Wants ECOMOG Transformed into African Peace Force, PANA, 21 May 1998.

26 PANA, 15 April 1998, op. cit.
The SANDF will have to provide the rest (light aircraft, transport and helicopters), tailored according to the exercise scenario.\textsuperscript{27}

Increasingly sensitive to the issue of foreign domination, the Southern Africans seem determined to prevent external powers from dictating the size and shape of the exercise, although they would obviously welcome outside support according to needs identified by the regional exercise planning committee.

3.5 RESPONDING TO THE ‘RESPONSE’

The Second Meeting of the Chiefs of Defence Staff of the Central Organ of the OAU Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution (Harare, October 1997) dealt not only with modalities for enhancing African peacekeeping capabilities, but also discussed the impact of foreign capacity-building initiatives such as some of those outlined above. The participants decided that African training for peace operations should not be held hostage to the availability of foreign donated equipment. Africans should train with what they have available on inventory in their armed forces and adapt their concepts for the conduct of peace operations accordingly.

Deep concern was expressed about the emerging trend towards intensive bilateral foreign initiatives aimed at contingent-level training for peace operations. Where

\textsuperscript{27} The participants of a SADC Seminar on Military Peacekeeping Co-operation, held in Harare from 9 to 10 May 1998 recommended the establishment of a SADC peacekeeping brigade (along the lines of the Danish-led Standby High Readiness Brigade (SHIRBRIG)) within the next five years. This seminar followed on an earlier seminar in Harare (2 to 4 May 1998) and a Danish-sponsored military 'fact-finding mission' to Denmark and Bosnia over the period 2 to 10 May 1998.
national contingents are trained for employment in a multinational environment, it was felt that the end users (the UN, OAU or subregional organisations) should play a key role in determining the parameters of such training. It was therefore recommended that all foreign training assistance for peace operations should be within the parameters and concepts of the UN and OAU, and that these should be of general benefit to the entire region or subregion.

As if to address such concerns, towards the end of 1997, P3 representatives announced plans to create an Africa Peacekeeping Support Group, open to all interested states, that would meet regularly under UN and OAU aegis to facilitate international coordination on peacekeeping training activities. The first such meeting, on Enhancing African Peacekeeping Capacity, was convened by the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) in New York on 5 December 1997. It was chaired by Mr Bernard Miyet, Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, and was attended by official representatives from 59 member states.

The primary objective was to provide an open platform for candid discussion regarding the enhancement of African peacekeeping efforts among the UN, the OAU, regional, subregional groups and interested states. Bearing in mind the limitations of existing resources, the DPKO offered to serve as the focal point for the overall coordination of initiatives and encouraged all delegations to submit their ideas and intentions towards strengthening Africa's preparedness for peacekeeping.

The OAU representative reiterated the Organisation's priorities in terms of peacekeeping and conflict resolution, that is, early warning systems, with concerted peacemaking and peacebuilding efforts. While the OAU welcomed any initiatives in support of these goals in principle, it emphasised that African priorities must guide
such efforts above all else. The Organisation wishes to avoid any activities which might result in creating spheres of influence in Africa or in dividing the continent linguistically, or otherwise. The OAU envisioned its role as absolutely central to the definition of all requisite needs and parameters for the implementation and monitoring of any initiatives. Fully expecting the UN to act in accordance with its obligations, the OAU expressed its concern over the reluctance of the Security Council and the international community to react to African crises with timely support.

In so far as there remained several areas requiring further clarification for example, funding, logistics, command/control, etc., the formal position of the OAU on external capacity-building initiatives had yet to be finalised. Indeed, despite the laudable efforts of the meeting in New York, the attitudes of several key OAU member states towards foreign capacity-building initiatives seemed to harden at the 67th ordinary session of the OAU Council of Ministers meeting which ended on 28 February 1998.

At this meeting, Nigeria led three other states in strongly opposing Western initiatives for enhancing African peacekeeping capabilities, saying the manner in which it was construed was an attempt to divide Africa and weaken its efforts to take charge of its own security. Nigeria's foreign minister, Tom Ikimi, expressed grave concern at what he perceived as an attempt to weaken the OAU and collective African efforts by drawing countries into initiatives designed to divide the continent into Anglophones and Francophones.

Other delegates also opposed the P3 initiative on the grounds that it favoured selected countries for training in peacekeeping, instead of leaving the decision to the OAU, the

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28 Executive Summary of a Meeting on Enhancing African Peacekeeping Capacity, Trusteeship Council Chamber, New York, 5 December 1997
continent's foremost political body. The debate led the Council to revise the draft decision before it that had expressed support for the Western initiative. In the revised version, the Council took note of the initiative, but said that any initiative aimed at enhancing Africa's capacity should take into account the primary responsibility of the UN Security Council, and that it should also be within the framework of the Central Organ of the OAU Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution.

In its final decision on the issue, the Council asked Secretary General Salim to continue monitoring the various initiatives aimed at enhancing Africa's peacekeeping capacity. The Ministers also asked Salim to work closely with the UN in this respect, with a view to ensure that the OAU's views and concerns are addressed in the implementation of these initiatives.29

Despite the apparent OAU intransigence, which is obviously fuelled by a few influential member states, the 'building-block' approach to African peacekeeping capacity-building removes many political obstacles to external assistance. It has become increasingly popular to work at the grassroots level, rather than pursue a top-down approach. In the case of ACRI, the focus is squarely on unit-level assistance, and the battalion is essentially the building block of any army. But this approach does have its disadvantages - it relieves politicians of the responsibility to address pressing policy issues pertaining to peace support operations and the need for an integrated approach to the maintenance of international peace and security. It certainly does not address broader issues of military professionalism as these pertain to the entire armed forces of the host nation.

Zimbabwe, for example, has been accepted as the lead nation for peacekeeping training in the SADC region, and its military staff college houses the Southern African Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre, as well as the SADC Clearing House for Peacekeeping Training and Education. However, a recent parliamentary report has condemned the neglect of the country's armed forces, which are said to be suffering from an acute shortage of transport, food and uniforms, as well as overcrowded barracks and deplorable health services. Force morale has been further afflicated by a recently introduced system of forced leave which is designed to save rations. The air force is only able to keep its small and dwindling fleet of aircraft flying through the use of parts 'cannibalised' from grounded and condemned aeroplanes.

The demoralised defence force, which now numbers some 35,000 after personnel cuts of 16,000 over the past five years, can take little comfort in official government pronouncements that Zimbabwe needs a "small but well equipped force."¹⁰ If this dismal general military situation prevails in a regional centre of excellence for peacekeeping, then perhaps Africa is building capacity upon extremely shaky foundations.

Thus far, all foreign peacekeeping capacity-building initiatives have emphasised adherence to Chapter VI training an increasingly irrelevant typology. However, regional operations have also found it necessary to use some enforcement powers, and are increasingly being authorised under a Chapter VII mandate. This proved extremely useful in the Italian-led Operation Alba, which deployed to Albania with a limited mandate and an extremely robust force posture. In this case, 'overkill' quite conceivably produced the positive result where the authority of the peace force was not challenged.³¹

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³¹ Kostakos and Bourantonis, op.cit
Perhaps the greatest flaw in the whole African capacity-building response is the failure to establish a credible linkage between capacity-building and capacity utilisation. The de-linkage was perhaps necessary in order to create the political space to move forward with externally sponsored training initiatives. However, by dropping the idea of creating a force, or at least a standby brigade or division, these initiatives lose much of their meaning. An inordinate amount of resources are spent worldwide on military training including, latterly, peacekeeping training. But this has not solved the problem of lack of political will to act on the part of the UN Security Council and potential troop contributing countries in the face of man-made crises in Africa.

In other words, the various training initiatives may make a contribution to potential peacekeeping capacity, but potential capacity in the form of more infantry battalions is clearly not the problem at hand. There is, theoretically, an abundance of infantry battalions already available on standby for peacekeeping deployment.\(^\text{32}\)

It could be argued that energies would be better devoted to making the UN system work, rather than attempting to create potential capacity for an alternative system in Africa which as yet is unknown. If the only global institution of international security is incapable of mounting an effective peace operation, it is surely fallacious to expect this of a regional organisation such as the OAU, or of African subregional organisations which were formed for the purpose of promoting economic integration.

On the other hand, if the West is crying 'no more Somalias', then Africans should surely be rallying around a cry of 'no more Rwandas'. If indigenous capacity-building could be linked to a no-nonsense approach to rapid reaction and timely and robust interventions, then future tragedies may well be averted. However, this is impossible

\(^{32}\) UNDPKO, United Nations Standby arrangements: Status Report as of 02 February 1998
while the focus of capacity-building initiatives is on the infantry battalions. African militaries can only do what they are well equipped and trained for, and can only go where their political masters send them. When the politicians choke basic military virility and professionalism, the armed forces become a useless instrument for peace or for war. Perhaps the unity of political and military will is, after all, the key to Nigeria's success as the pioneer of regional peacekeeping in Africa.

3.6 CONCLUSION

It is clear that the UN 'peacekeeping family' will remain extremely reluctant to intervene in African crises for the foreseeable future. A large part of this family is already immersed in the SFOR operation in the former Yugoslavia, and will likely remain engaged in the inevitable follow-on mission. European peace and security is, after all, far more pertinent to the major powers and traditional peacekeeping countries than resolving pernicious conflicts in Africa. Moreover, there is a perceived way out - through teaching select African soldiers basic military skills and the finer points of UN peacekeeping practices, and perhaps supplying them with a bit of equipment.

Cynicism aside, there has been considerable progress over the past few years in building African capabilities for the conduct of peace support operations as evidenced by developments at the level of the OAU and in the conduct of major subregional peacekeeping exercises. External powers have also begun to realise the necessity for co-ordinating bilateral training initiatives. However, the great flaw in African capacity-building initiatives is the very element that makes them more politically acceptable to Africans - the failure to establish a credible linkage between capacity-building and capacity utilisation.
The alternative, of course, is for Africa to accept the necessity to form regional coalitions if it is willing to take care of its peace support operations. But this requires a strong military alliance such as NATO in the former Yugoslavia, or a lead nation willing to play a role akin to that of Italy in Albania, Russia in the CIS, and Nigeria in West Africa. Beyond token participation in 'safe' UN missions, Africans will only be able to convert peacekeeping capacity into meaningful outcomes when the prevalence of national interests is openly acknowledged, when a measure of partiality is accepted, and when countries are willing to employ force against armed resistance to a legitimate mandate. Very few countries are willing to acknowledge this fact, let alone to make the sacrifices required by a more robust concept for intervention.
CHAPTER FOUR

4.1 Current Peacekeeping Operations in Africa: CASE STUDIES

To show how these general considerations have been realized in practice, and to draw some conclusions about the factors essential to success or failure, it is necessary to look, however briefly, at some of the actual experiences of the UN in African peacekeeping. What seem to be the five most important operations, those in Namibia, Mozambique, Angola, Rwanda and Somalia, have therefore been selected, and ranked in descending order of 'success', from the most successful at the start to the least successful at the end.

4.1.1 Namibia\(^1\)

The Namibian settlement, and the role of peacekeepers within it, fell well outside the general run of peacekeeping operations discussed in this article, and its inclusion helps to point to the very different circumstances generally found elsewhere. The robustness of the settlement, which enabled it to survive major weaknesses in the peacekeeping operation itself, rested on its unambiguous location in the politics of decolonization. The idea that colonial territories were entitled to become independent, following an election in which rivals for the control of its post-independence government competed for support from indigenous voters, has formed the bedrock for the creation of the African state system and, in most cases, its implementation has been completely unproblematic.

However, problems arose in three cases of Eritrea, Namibia and Western Sahara where the territory of a former colony was controlled by a neighbouring state, which sought tacitly in Namibia after the 1960s, explicitly in the other two cases to incorporate it into

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its own territory, and where this incorporation was resisted by a movement which claimed to represent the people of the colony itself. All that was needed for a normal decolonisation process to be implemented was for the occupying state to agree to it, a breakthrough achieved in the Namibian case with the Angola-Namibia accords of December 1988.²

The UN Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) subsequently had the task of supervising an apparently uncontentious transition. It’s smaller than envisaged size and slow deployment, both the result of weaknesses within the UN structure already identified notably cumbersome decision-making, and the reluctance especially of the P5 states to provide the necessary funds, would probably have resulted in the derailment of a less robust settlement. Forces of the South-West African Peoples’ Organisation (SWAPO) crossed the border from Angola on the day the cease-fire leading to the transition was due to come into effect, and were bloodily suppressed by South African forces with the consent of the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General (UNSGSR) who was in charge of UNTAG.³ The UNSGSR himself, astonishingly, had only arrived in Namibia the day before, and the deployment of the UN force to northern Namibia, where the most difficult problems were obviously likely to arise, had not yet taken place.

That the whole peace process did not collapse, was due to the continuing commitment of all the major parties, including South Africa, SWAPO, Angola and a united

² In all three cases, considerable violence took place, and Eritrea especially, the breakthrough occurred only after a traumatic thirty-year war

³ Whether the SWAPO/PLAN forces were seeking to establish effective military control in advance of the elections, or whether they were as claimed merely looking for UNTAG stations at which to register and demobilise, is contested but immaterial.
international community. Though UNTAG subsequently got its act together, and some elements of the operation worked extremely well, the achievement of Namibian independence was not a triumph of UN peacekeeping, but a success by default.

4.1.2 Mozambique

Mozambique, by contrast, is the clearest example of the success of the peacekeeping process itself, accompanied as this was and indeed had to be by a massive range of coordinated diplomatic and humanitarian activities. The war in Mozambique, unlike that in Namibia, was a classic example of the extremely messy kind of conflict which was part domestic, part international, part ethnic, part ideological, and militarily irresolvable with which modern Africa has been plagued. That it should have given way to a peace settlement which, no matter how fragile it may be, has so far brought one of the most war-shattered countries in Africa some five years of peace, is a remarkable achievement. In that achievement, equally, the UN, and especially the UN Peacekeeping Mission in Mozambique (ONUMOZ), has had a central place.

Oddly, that place did not include any major role in the negotiation of the General Peace Agreement (GPA) signed between the Frelimo government of Mozambique and its Renamo rival in October 1992. Though the involvement of international organisations in implementing settlements which they have had no part in reaching has understandably been identified as a significant source of subsequent problems, this happens to have been precisely the case in the UN’s most successful experience of

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peacekeeping in Africa. Still more remarkably, a critical role at this stage was played by an unofficial mediator, the Roman Catholic Sant’Egidio community, while the Italian government provided most of the necessary diplomatic resources. The UN was brought in at a relatively late stage, in order to assure the verification of an agreement which had already been reached in its essentials by the conflicting parties.

Once established, however, ONUMOZ was able to assume a core co-ordinating position. One element in this was that the UNSGSR in charge of the operation, Italian Aldo Ajello, was ideally placed to link the informal processes through which the GPA had been negotiated to the subsequent, much larger scale and more complex operation of assuring its implementation. Another was that the UNSGSR was able to exercise control not only over the peacekeeping aspects of the settlement in the more limited sense of the term, but also over the related and extremely important humanitarian programme, including the co-ordination of assistance for the internally displaced and returning refugees, and the integration of demobilised soldiers. The provision of humanitarian assistance, especially to areas of the country controlled by Renamo, was a critical element in the ‘side-payments’ needed to keep Renamo on board.

More important than all of these, however, was the ability of the UNSGSR to call on the support of a remarkably united international community. Given the end of the Cold War in which Mozambique, unlike Angola, had been only marginally involved, the absence again unlike Angola of substantial resources within the country, and especially the settlement in South Africa, no major external actor, whether global or regional, had any interest in helping to maintain the conflict. This meant that the UNSGSR could call on the leverage provided by each combatant’s major external supporters to help bring them in line when necessary. This process was symbolised by the foray into Renamo-held territory of the British aid minister, Lynda Chalker, to persuade Renamo leader, Dhlakama, to participate in the elections, after he had threatened to pull out of the
process only shortly before they were due to be held in October 1994. It also enabled him to call on donors to help provide the funds for a Netherlands proposal for subsidies to former soldiers, while the US helped to fund Dhlakama’s election campaign.

The success or failure of peacekeeping operations always looks inevitable in hindsight. The success of the Mozambique operation by no means looked inevitable at the time. The war in Mozambique had been among the most vicious in Africa, not least in the horrors inflicted on innocent people, and Dhlakama was by no means ‘obviously’ more sincere in his approach to the peace process than, say, Savimbi. Even though Renamo’s electoral success in central Mozambique came as a surprise to many observers, and a considerable shock to the Frelimo government, this success did serve to give the movement a continuing stake in the peace process. There were nonetheless elements in the conflict, notably the relative weakness of Renamo and the absence of external support for continued fighting, which enabled skilled mediation and the effective implementation of the GPA to lead to a peaceful outcome. The same outcome could scarcely be expected, regardless of the quality of the UN operation, in situations in which equivalent underlying conditions were not present.

4.1.3 Angola

Of all the peacekeeping operations discussed with ruthless brevity in this article, the one in Angola suffers the most from the constraints of the occasion. It has now lasted for nearly ten years, during which UN involvement has been expressed through four distinct missions: the first United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM I) was established following the Angola-Namibia accords of December 1988, with the

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limited goal of verifying the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola, a task successfully achieved by June 1991. Its successor, UNAVEM II, was formed to verify the implementation of the Bicesse Agreement, which had been signed between the MPLA government of Angola and the UNITA opposition in May 1991, and collapsed following UNITA's rejection of the election results in October 1992, leading to massive devastation and loss of life in the resumed civil war. UNAVEM III sought to pick up the pieces, following the revival of the peace process with the Lusaka Protocol of November 1994, and was superseded in June 1997 by the more modestly resourced UN Observer Mission in Angola (MONUA). Over this long period, UN peacekeepers in Angola have attempted to do completely different things under very different circumstances.

The Angolan case also raises the most intense controversies over whether its most traumatic failure, the collapse in 1992/93, was due to mistakes on the part of the UN, or whether it was due to the structure of the situation itself, and the behaviour of participants, notably Savimbi over whom the UN had no control of controversies which are all the more pointed in the light of the apparently inexorable slide to renewed war at the time of writing in August 1998. For those who see the breakdown as an avoidable tragedy, the key mistakes lay in the drastically reduced scale of the UNAVEM II operation, resulting from financial constraints, and the eagerness to find a quick-fix solution to the Angolan imbroglio especially of the US. For them, the involvement of the UN at a relatively late stage as in Mozambique, in implementing an agreement without playing any significant part in its negotiation, also resulted in a flawed agreement, with the UN being given little more than an observer role.
The success of UNAVEM I, which involved no more than the supervision of an agreement between states within a 'classic' peacekeeping scenario, encouraged the belief that the vastly more difficult task of implementing a peace accord between the parties to the civil war in Angola could be equally easily accomplished. Despite its inherent flaws, however, Anstee believed that UNAVEM II came "tantalisingly close to success." 6

From a 'structuralist' viewpoint, on the other hand, the failure of UNAVEM II could be regarded as the inevitable result of the untimely insertion of a peacekeeping operation into a situation in which there was no peace to keep. All the way down the line, the comparison with Mozambique points to the foolhardiness of expecting a similar outcome in Angola. The major movement, UNITA, possessed a range of resources notably through its control over much of Angola's diamond trade far greater than its Mozambican counterpart, Renamo. Its leader, Sayimbi, had ambitions or pretensions far greater than those of Dhlakama. Angola's wealth, by no means entirely to be found in oil and diamonds, made it a far more inviting target than dirt-poor Mozambique by World Bank measures the poorest country in the world, and correspondingly encouraged fishing in troubled waters, not only by states but also by a range of corporations and dodgy entrepreneurs.

Most important of all, perhaps, the international chemistry was different. The Angolan war was far too readily seen merely as the result of Cold War rivalries on the one hand, and of apartheid destabilisation on the other, a scenario that encouraged the delusion that the Angola-Namibia accords and the South African transition would cut off the oxygen which had kept the fires burning. Whereas the Mozambican blaze could be relatively easily isolated, however, that in Angola was also fuelled by wider conflicts, and especially developments in Congo-Kinshasa, with which Angola has a long and

6 Anstee, ibid., p. 527
completely unmanageable border. Given that 'peacekeeping' in this context essentially meant trying to persuade Savimbi to stop fighting, the plentiful resources with which to keep going, meant that he could not be made to do so. A larger UNAVEM II operation, from this perspective, would not have made much difference.

UNAVEM III, with its tortuous attempts to implement the Lusaka Protocol, provides only a partial test of the competing interpretations of the failure of UNAVEM II. Certainly, every care was taken to ensure that previous mistakes were not repeated. The scale of the operation, with a peacekeeping force of some 7000 troops, was vastly greater. Much more care was taken with the sequencing of the different phases of the peace process, with the incorporation of UNITA nominees into the government in Luanda, the implementation of the cease-fire, and the integration of UNITA troops into a unified national army. The Security Council was ready to bring additional pressure to bear on Savimbi when needed, including UN sanctions which are a rare but not unique example of these being imposed on a non-state entity. At the same time, the international setting for the implementation of the peace process improved with the overthrow of Savimbi's major remaining ally, Mobutu in Congo-Kinshasa, and the displacement of Lissouba by Sassou-Nguesso through the direct military involvement of the Angolan government, in Congo-Brazzaville. That peace should remain so uncertain, even with the improvements to the peacekeeping operation itself and in the international context, points to the extraordinary difficulties of the Angolan situation.
4.1.4 Rwanda

The experience of peacekeeping in Rwanda has clear parallels with Angola. Again, the UN was brought in at a fairly late stage of the proceedings, in order to help guarantee a peace settlement reached under international mediation between the incumbent government and an insurgent movement. Even more so than in Angola, the settlement rested on an extraordinarily naive assumption that parties engaged in an intense conflict, who had agreed to participate in peace talks for essentially tactical reasons, could be expected to abide by the provisions of a complex agreement that required them to work closely and harmoniously together.

The Arusha Peace Agreement was negotiated in the period July 1992 to August 1993 between the Rwandan government itself at the time consisting of a precarious coalition of parties and the insurgent Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), and called for a UN Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR) to help assure security while the transitional arrangements were being put in place. In the event, external pressure on Rwanda’s President Habyarimana to implement the accords, which would seriously have imperilled the position of his MRNDD party, led in April 1994 to his assassination by MRNDD militants, and the immediate unleashing of an organised programme of genocide which probably caused close to a million deaths. The failure of the Rwandan peace process resulted, not from the shortcomings of UNAMIR which had been deployed in a futile attempt to guarantee the unworkable, but from the assumptions that underlay the attempt to apply a ‘liberal’ ideology of peacemaking, power-sharing.

human rights guarantees, free and fair elections, and so forth was a situation in which none of them applied.

The tragedy of UNAMIR, and the heavy shadow that it cast on the credibility of UN peacekeeping operations in Africa, arose not from its failure to carry out its original mandate, but from the refusal of UN headquarters in New York to permit it to attempt a completely different one. At the start of the genocide, UNAMIR commander General Dallaire desperately sought UN backing for a strengthened operation designed simply to protect human life. Instead, the Security Council ordered UNAMIR’s withdrawal, except for a token 270 troops, abandoning hundreds of thousands of Rwandans to a grisly death at the hands of murder squads orchestrated by high officials in the MRNDD. For this decision, which was strongly influenced by a determination to avert the problems encountered over the previous year and a half by UN peacekeepers in Somalia, both the US and then Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali appear to have borne a heavy share of the responsibility.

There is, of course, no saying how much a strengthened UNAMIR might have been able to achieve, and at what cost to its own forces; it is equally the case that its success or failure could not have been described as ‘peacekeeping’. Its desertion of Rwanda at its time of greatest need nonetheless left a lasting impression, and soured relations especially with the RPF government which took over after its victory in the resumed civil war. The subsequent UN operation, UNAMIR II, performed some useful functions, notably in helping to mediate relations between the new Rwandan government and the international community, but it was never a peacekeeping operation in any meaningful sense of the term, and was withdrawn in 1996.
4.1.5 Somalia

The UN operations in Somalia, finally, and notably the US-led UNITAF intervention (1992/93) and its UNOSOM II successor (1993/95), represent the extreme cases among UN-orchestrated attempts to create peace where there was none to keep.

As in Angola, there is room for dispute over the extent to which the failures of the intervention were due to what Lewis and Mayall, two thoroughly moderate and unexcitable commentators describe as "this inordinately expensive, poorly led and coordinated, and incredibly cumbersome UN operation," as against the extent to which they were the result of the structural conditions within which any attempt to bring peace and a measure of humanitarian relief to Somalia and its suffering population would have had to work.

On the one hand, the conditions were as unpropitious as could be imagined. Unlike any of the other four cases discussed above, there was not even the pretence of a peace settlement between the conflicting parties which the UN could have helped to implement. Such agreements as were reached in meetings of rival warlords convened by would-be mediators outside the country usually in Addis Ababa were no more than tactical gestures designed to be jettisoned as soon as the participants returned home.

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Nor did these warlords and their factions represent a real source of leverage that could have been used by mediators in order to construct a viable political order, if they had even been induced to accept one. Little more than coalitions put together for purposes of self-enrichment, with a fairly feeble binding of clan solidarity, they were always liable to fragment if any of their leaders sought to induce his followers to accept any course of action that was not to their immediate advantage. The combination of high levels of militarization and social fragmentation made it a nightmare environment for any peacekeeper to operate in.

On the other hand, the catalogue of ineptitudes displayed in Somalia lead firmly back to the UN itself. The organisation’s first attempt to grapple with the issue through the modestly resourced UNOSOM I mission led by Mahomed Sahnoun the only one of the numerous figures involved in the operation to emerge from it with enhanced credibility, failed as a result of a well-publicised disagreement over tactics between Sahnoun and UN headquarters, which essentially turned on headquarters’ determination to seek a quick-fix solution, in place of Sahnoun’s desire to work over the long term through insidious diplomacy. It was a mistake that was to cost the UN very dear. Once the US became deeply involved, during the ‘lame duck’ period which followed Bush’s defeat in the November 1992 US presidential election, the operation certainly could not be faulted for two of the failings which have often been criticised in other peacekeeping missions, a shortage of funds and slow decision-making.

70 Lewis & Mayall, ibid., p. 123.
It did raise, however, in the most intense form, the problem of the relations between the UN and its single most important member state.\textsuperscript{11}

Many of the subsequent failures, though readily classed as tactical and rectifiable mistakes, followed from problems inherent in the operation itself to a large extent. In particular, the US government was unable or unwilling to carry the political costs which could have resulted from any attempt to use its apparently overwhelming military force in order to impose a settlement, while lacking both the skills and the long-term commitment that would have been needed to negotiate one. The most important of these costs was the need to avert casualties. The failure to disarm the major combatants at an early stage of the operation can be ascribed to this need; and the deaths of a small number of American servicemen following a failed attempt to arrest the most important faction leader, Mahomed Farah Aidid, led to the US' precipitate withdrawal. In the event, the whole operation not only enhanced the standing of the very faction leaders who had created the conflict in the first place, but greatly enriched them into the bargain.

4.2 U.S. Policy toward Africa

Cataloging contemporary conflict and tension in sub-Saharan Africa is a difficult task. The array of conflicts facing Africans today is long the risk of increased conflict remains high in Algeria, Angola, Burundi, DRC, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Liberia, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, and Zimbabwe and presents Western policymakers with a daunting task: how to design foreign policy

\textsuperscript{11} Carey, op. cit., p. 26.
toward a region with the breadth and depth of socio-economic trouble and political instability that is currently found in Africa?

Conference participants in a UN meeting in 1999 agreed that the "lack of political will" by Western powers is the major impediment hindering the deployment and success of UN peacekeeping missions in Africa. Yet as one conference participant said, "It is just not here in the United States where political leaders have to sell peacekeeping missions to their populations, it happens in all democracies." In short, few foreign leaders are willing to risk the loss of soldiers in poorly understood lands where there may be no perceived national strategic or economic interests.

The aversion to peacekeeping among the American military and policymakers runs deep. American critics of peacekeeping missions, and of conflict prevention programs in general, often chastise the United Nations for its unrealistic planning, weak mandates, and feckless command and control procedures. For these critics the ill-fated UN mission to Somalia (1992-94) confirmed their cynicism and became emblematic of international peacekeeping efforts. Moreover, the death of 18 Army Rangers in the streets of Mogadishu had a profound and traumatic effect on the way American foreign policymakers in general looked at peacekeeping, especially in Africa.

Since the tragedy in Somalia, the trend has been for Western nations to refuse to send troops into Africa's hot spots. Jordan recently underscored this point when it expressed
frustration with the West's failure to commit soldiers to the UNAMSIL mission as a reason for the withdrawal of its troops from Sierra Leone.\textsuperscript{12}

America's aversion to peacekeeping in Africa also reflects broader U.S. foreign policy on the continent. Africa occupies a marginal role in American foreign policy in general.\textsuperscript{13}

Today, the foundation of U.S. policy toward the vast sub-Saharan region with its 48 states is being built on relations with South Africa and Nigeria. Secretary of Defense William Cohen stressed the importance of these two relationships earlier this year on a trip to Cape Town when he said: "South Africa and Nigeria will be critical for the stability and the future prosperity of African nations, and we estimate that their participation in maneuvers and joint training programs, seminars, exchanges in military personnel and also academic exercises aimed at military/civilian relations will strengthen ties between these nations."\textsuperscript{14}

Despite the apparently fruitful cooperation between the United States, South Africa, and Nigeria, the road ahead for broader U.S. and Africa relations is unclear.

The future for much of Africa looks bleak. As war and humanitarian disasters continue to unfold across the continent, they are accompanied by growing numbers of refugees, spreading instability, and in some places anarchy. The rise of lawlessness and stateless

\textsuperscript{12} www.usip.org/library/topics/peacekeeping.html

\textsuperscript{13} a point highlighted by conference participants

\textsuperscript{14} Armed Forces Journal International 138:2, September 2000, p. 30

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societies in Africa brings the risk of the development of new terrorist and drug networks. Weak economic growth, the AIDS pandemic, the degradation of Africa's physical environment, and the spread of humanitarian crises in sub-Saharan Africa combine to create a depressing regional portrait.

Each of these realities poses a unique threat to peace everywhere on the continent. Thus, conference participants agreed: Given the menacing socio-economic setting in Africa today, the United States must be encouraged to re-engage in both the United Nations and African affairs.

4.3 Conclusion

The conference participants were unanimous in their conviction that the Brahimi Report is a landmark document on the American foreign policy scene. Not as a source of seminal theory or original analysis of peacekeeping operations—indeed, much of what is contained in the report has been known and talked about for years—but rather for its straightforward simplicity, candor, and ability to synthesize timely and urgent issues. The report should thus be seen as more than a plan for improving the technical capacity of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations; it is also a project around which the multitude of concerned actors can coalesce to construct a unifying vision and effect change. In the atomized and unharmonious world of international policymaking, one must seize upon the rare opportunities to work together and concentrate resources in pursuit of a common goal.

While conference participants were unable to reach a consensus on what next steps should be taken by U.S. and international policymakers in support of Brahimi, numerous recommendations were put forward. One former government official argued for a direct
link between poverty and conflict in Africa and advocated a redoubling of aid and development efforts on the continent by Western governments. Others from the academic community suggested that the United States adopt a policy of selective engagement in Africa that focuses on vital interests and achievable goals. Several participants recommended that U.S. policymakers should continue to strengthen key African allies such as Nigeria and South Africa, support regional organizations like ECOWAS and SADCC, the Southern African Development Coordination Conference, strengthen the American embassies and diplomatic corps, collect better intelligence on the continent, and bring economic and other pressures to bear on warlord governments. Although none of these proposals received unconditional support from the group, consensus was reached over the continued importance of the democratization process in Africa.

The group also agreed that the agenda put forth by the Brahimi Report offers numerous points of entry for members of the international community. As the report states, "Peacekeeping and peacebuilding are inseparable partners". The U.S. Institute of Peace and other concerned organizations have a longstanding record and ongoing programs that have taken concrete steps toward conflict prevention on the continent.

The Brahimi Report both confirms the importance of this work and illuminates new areas of need.\textsuperscript{15}

The United Nations is playing an increasingly critical role in preventing and resolving conflicts that have broken out across the globe. We welcome this expanded mission envisioned in the original U.N. charter but impeded by the Cold War. While the U.N. has

\textsuperscript{15} Brahimi Report, A United Nations Report on peacekeeping (p.ix)
not proved a panacea, it has achieved remarkable successes in countries such as Namibia, in El Salvador and in Cambodia.

International peacekeeping is not an altruistic endeavor; it directly serves U.S. security, political and commercial interests. As U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. Madeleine Albright has stated: "Whether measured in arms proliferation, refugees on our shores, the destabilization of allies, or loss of exports, jobs or investments, the cost of runaway regional conflicts sooner or later comes home to America. In 1993, the U.N. will spend over $3 billion to stem or stop those conflicts, and we will pay one third of that. But without the U.N., both the costs and the conflict would be far greater."

However, the fate of peace operations hangs in the balance, in part due to crippling funding shortfalls and decreasing national political support for the United Nations as it seeks to reform and to meet new challenges. Although the U.N. is often a first line of crisis response overseas, the United States and other nations consistently fall behind in paying dues and peacekeeping assessments. These overdue bills serve to cripple the U.N.'s ability to respond rapidly to crises and implement needed reforms. In addition, Congressional critics have singled out U.N. peace operations as a vehicle for expressing their dissatisfaction with broader issues, from the defense budget and military readiness to U.S. interests abroad, and have sought to curtail already limited participation of U.S. armed forces in U.N. peace operations.

We endorse multilateral, burden-sharing approaches to preventing and resolving conflicts. In particular, we support strengthening the United Nations' ability to conduct peace operations. To encourage these approaches, we strongly urge the U.S. and all nations to pay on time their dues and peacekeeping assessments, and to pay all their
arrearages to the United Nations. The United States must avoid the costs and dangers of a unilateral role as world policeman.

A policy that provides only weak financial and political support for peacekeeping jeopardizes the United Nations' long-term future. If the U.N. is not given the resources and encouragement to improve its capabilities, confidence in it will be undermined. The world community will have sacrificed the chance to establish a truly effective multilateral peacekeeping process, with emphasis on conflict prevention. The world will become more dangerous, to the detriment of our own security.

We should take advantage of the post-Cold War situation and apply the lessons of peacekeeping from the past several years to reform and expand U.N. peace operations and make them more effective. Peace operations, which give the U.S. an opportunity to help in reducing the worldwide level of armed violence with minimum risk and cost, are squarely in our national interest.
Endnotes:

Participants at the United Nations conference on the Brahimi Report

1. Brian Atwood, Citizens Energy Corporation; Kurt W. Bassuener U.S. Institute of Peace; Daniel Benjamin U.S. Institute of Peace; Richard Bogosian U.S. Department of State; Donna Boltz U.S. Institute of Peace; Allison Boyer Cohen and Woods International; Holly Burkhalter Physicians for Human Rights; Mark Clack House Committee on International Relations; Roberta Cohen Brookings Institution; Chester A. Crocker Georgetown University; Patrick Cronin U.S. Institute of Peace; Tom Dempsey U.S. Army War College; Steven A. Dimoff United Nations Association of the United States of America; Tim Docking U.S. Institute of Peace; Carlos dos Santos Permanent Mission of Mozambique to the United Nations; William Durne Henry L. Stimson Center; Stewart Eldon Permanent Mission of the United Kingdom to the United Nations; Heather Flynn Senate Committee on Foreign Relations; Paul Foldi Senate Committee on Foreign Relations; Christopher Fomunyea National Democratic Institute for International Affairs; Kendray Frazer Harvard University; Patrick Hayford Executive Office of the UN Secretary General; Harriet Hentges U.S. Institute of Peace; Herbert Hsu-Georgetown University; Dennis Jett University of Florida; Judith Karl United Nations Development Program; Edwin King Hall Senate Committee on Foreign Relations; Alex Laskaris U.S. Mission to the United Nations; Jeff Laurenti United Nations Association of the United States of America; Edward Marks Center for Strategic and International Studies; Raymond Marutille Embassy of South Africa; Douglas Mercado International Medical Corps; Mike Miller Office of Senator Bill Fris; Sheila Murphy United Nations Information Center; Susan Myers Better World Campaign; Catherine O'Neill United Nations Information Center; Robert Oakley National Defense University Robert Orr U.S. Department of State; Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah Global Coalition for Africa; Francis C. Record House Committee on International Relations; Donald S. Rothchild University of California at Davis; James A. Scheer U.S. Department of Defense; Kamaleesh Sharma Permanent Mission of India to the United Nations; Thomas Sheehy House Committee on International Relations; David Smock U.S. Institute of Peace; W. R. Smyser Georgetown University; Stephen Stiefman Stanford University; William Stuebner United Nations Association of the United States of America; Toby Trister Gati Akin, Camp, Strauss Hauer & Feld; Matt Vacarro U.S. Department of Defense; Kathy Ward U.S. Department of State; Barbara Wien U.S. Institute of Peace; Eric Witte International Crisis Group; James Woods Cohen and Woods International; Ken Yates Jefferson Waterman International; I. William Zartman School of Advanced and International Studies, Johns Hopkins University.
CHAPTER FIVE

5.0 Critical Analyses of Conflict Resolution and Peacekeeping

5.1 Introduction

This chapter provides an assessment of how analysts have defined the changing nature of peacekeeping in the post Cold War world, particularly within the context of changing ideas of humanitarian intervention. They argue that peacekeeping provides the international community with the best means for the application of minimum standards of international humanitarian law and the alleviation of human suffering in violent suffering. At the same time, it is realised that the peculiar nature of many contemporary conflict complicates the role of the peacekeeper. Drawing on the disciplines of conflict resolution and conflict analysis, they offer the term 'international social conflict' as a description of the type of conflict which is becoming prevalent in the post Cold War period; these international social conflicts do not respond well to traditional methods of inter-state management. They also tend to produce large-scale humanitarian emergencies. The existing international humanitarian system has been strained to the limit, and the military forces operating under UN mandates have been increasingly involved in providing assistance and protection for a wide range of agencies working to alleviate suffering in war zones. They argue that the traditional concept of humanitarian intervention forcible action by states across internal borders to protect human rights is no longer adequate to respond to contemporary problems and offer a new broader concept of non-forcible humanitarian intervention, which combines the actions of military peacekeepers, official aid and assistance by governments, and the actions of transnational, intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations in areas of conflict. UN peacekeeping is a vital component of this broad concept, though its efficacy has been contested.
5.2 Introduction, and summary of main themes

It is remarkable how the imagery of navigation - maps, route signs, crop up in the current literature on peacekeeping. It may be that the imagery was suggested by Alan James, whose influential book *Peacekeeping in International Politics* explored the highways and by-ways of peacekeeping, referring to the "international high street", "the back yard", "the neighbourhood" and the "crossroads of international politics" to identify the various types of peacekeeping missions. Subsequently, William Durch entitled the concluding chapter of his book "Peacekeeping in uncharted territory"; Cedric Thornberry remarked that in the new environment of intervening in civil wars there are not many maps; and that peacekeepers and humanitarian aid organizations have to work "under stressful conditions, under the eye of the camera lens, and with no instruction leaflets". For Hugo Slim, UN peacekeeping is a large "new kid on the block", the subject of intense debate about the role of the military in humanitarian emergencies. When the mapmakers of the old world came across terra incognita, they sometimes wrote on their maps, "beyond here be dragons". For peacekeepers and others working in contemporary conflict zones, there are dragons aplenty in the terra incognita of complex emergencies and civil wars. This paper considers how analysts have assessed and defined the changing nature of peacekeeping, as confrontation with the dragons of post cold war conflict, particularly in Bosnia, Somalia, Rwanda, Angola, and Liberia, has forced rapid re-evaluation of what it is realistic to expect of peacekeeping deployments.


One broad aim of the paper, therefore, is to review the current debate about UN peacekeeping, which, following an analysis of humanitarian intervention options available to the international community, which is roughly defined as the middle ground between two other options are abstention or the withdrawal of military forces, and enforcement. As Alan James made clear in his study, "in relation to the control of international conflict, peacekeeping is one of the more fruitful developments of the twentieth century". The issue now, following the experiences of the large scale expansion of peacekeeping between 1988 and 1995, is to assess its relevance for contemporary and future conflict management. Should this 'middle option' be confined to traditional 'first generation' peacekeeping functions, as characteristically exercised during the cold war, or does the virulence and confusion of much contemporary conflict with its devastating humanitarian implications and threats to regional order, demand that a capability for collective 'second generation' peacekeeping operations should also be kept open? It can be concluded that, despite all the problems encountered so far in attempts to mount wider peacekeeping operations in conflict zones in the 1990s, too hasty a foreclosing of this option would unnecessarily deprive the international community of an important possible tool of international conflict management.

Following this conclusion, it is necessary to consider some of the implications for future UN peacekeeping from a conflict resolution perspective. It is common to find assertions in the literature, whether by military analysts or academics, that peacekeeping, being based on principles of consent and impartiality, is self evidently a form of conflict resolution. However it is only very recently that peacekeeping has been treated within the literature of conflict resolution, which has its own distinctive concepts and assumptions about conflict processes and which has emerged from a tradition of research

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6 A. James, 1990, p. 370
over the last thirty years or so. In this paper we review this literature in order to define
more clearly how peacekeeping is seen within the conflict resolution theory field; and
conversely look at how recent military doctrine on peacekeeping defines its links with
conflict resolution. Out of this analysis will be a clearer idea of what each expects from
the other, and what are the potential benefits of a closer dialogue between peacekeepers
and academics around issues of conflict resolution. It should not be assumed, that all the
talk of 'legitimacy', 'consent', and 'impartiality' as words from a common vocabulary
amongst academics and practitioners, that the same language is being spoken. In a
recently held a seminar in Bradford which was addressed by a high level American army
officer with experience in Somalia, who stressed the importance of conflict resolution in
peacekeeping. When asked what he thought was the ideal mode of conflict resolution, he
replied "negotiations and the consent of all parties backed up by the overwhelming use of
force"!. Following a review of these issues it was concluded with a summary of areas
where conflict resolution thinking might help to illuminate and interpret the changing
nature of peacekeeping.

5.3 Changing contexts: the nature of the contemporary conflict environment

It is axiomatic in conflict theory, that, before determining optimum modes of positive
intervention, it is necessary to have a clear understanding of the nature of the conflict
which interveners hope to affect for the better. Clearly, this is a highly complex task
which can be outline here. For example, how many conflicts within any given period can
be said to come to an end? What proportion of these is decided outright by force majeure?
And what proportion is ended by negotiated settlement? How many of the settlements
hold? And what is the role of peacekeepers in all of this? Can the success or failure of
peacekeeping missions be quantified or objectively assessed? According to Wallensteen
and Axell's analysis, fewer than half (41) of the 90 conflicts active between 1989-1993 had

experienced some form of conflict termination. Of the 41 conflicts terminated between 1989 and 1993, six ended as a result of some form of peace accord in Lebanon, Mali, Morocco/Western Sahara, Mozambique, El Salvador and Nicaragua. However 17 of the 41 cases resulted in victory for one side over its adversaries. In a further 20 cases there was neither victory, nor agreement, and the conflicts were terminated in the sense either that they fell below their threshold for inclusion of fewer than 25 battle related deaths and/or because cease-fires or other reasons meant a decline in activity of the warring parties in 1993. From these figures it appears that victory through domination and defeat of the opponent is more common than mutual agreement through peace accords; however, taking the 1993 'still active' conflicts into account (47), the overall picture is that 'non-victory' outcomes are the most commonplace.  

'Non-victory outcomes' is an academic sounding phrase: what does it mean? The reality behind this phrase is the most intense and widespread human misery, compounded of every element in the humanitarian repertory: unspeakable war crimes, gross crimes against humanity from ethnic cleansing and rape to genocide, terrible deprivation of basic essentials through siege or starvation. As always, it is the innocent who suffer most. In the early 1990s there has been a succession of refugee crises as people have fled from conflicts: in 1992 alone over 3.5 million people were forced to flee across an international border. In the former Yugoslavia the number of people dependent on humanitarian assistance rose from 500,000 to 3.6 million in the sixteen months between December 1991 and June 1993. In 1992 over 10% of the population of Somalia were refugees in neighbouring countries. By the end of 1992 the conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia created more than 800,000 refugees, while the civil war in Tajikistan had displaced a further 500,000. In February and March 1993 over 280,000 people fled from Togo to Benin and Ghana. During 1994 the problem erupted devastatingly in Rwanda, and in early 1995

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refugees fleeing from Burundi into Tanzania signaled yet another humanitarian crisis. Can conflict theory shed any light on how the international community might be able to address this kind of problem? We can begin to look for an answer to this question by considering the work of a group of academics who have pioneered the field of conflict resolution and have taken a comprehensive approach to conflict analysis. A concern of this conflict resolution approach has been to identify the social and domestic causes of conflicts which escalate to become civil wars.

The work of Edward Azar and his colleagues at the University of Maryland's Center for International Development and Conflict Management has been of particular significance. Azar has defined a type of conflict which he terms 'protracted social conflict' (PSC) which 'originates when communal groups defined by shared ethnic religious linguistic or other cultural characteristics are denied their distinct identity or collective developmental needs'.

In Azar's analysis PSCs emerge from the interaction of four causal categories, which he terms communal content, human needs, governance and the role of the state, and international linkages. Societies with multicommunal composition provide the starting point for PSCs. The second factor in the model, human needs, is a central one in conflict resolution analysis in general. In Azar's formulation, the denial of access needs participation in the superstructural institutions of society, of acceptance needs recognition of identity defined as shared cultural values and heritage, and of security needs physical welfare, opens up the fault lines. The provision or denial of collective goods is dependent on the role and nature of the state. States which experience PSCs, or which are prone to it, will have 'incompetent, parochial, fragile and authoritarian governments that fail to satisfy basic human needs' for the whole community. Azar's fourth factor, international linkages, refers to the non-domestic influences on PSCs and

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the way in which the nature of the state and its behavior in internal conflict is conditioned by its relationship with other states in the international system. Once conflict is triggered in a multicomunal society, weak, rigid, and sectarian states will seek to contain it, in part by cutting off external support for domestic conflict actors, in part by seeking external support for itself. In this way the scope and intensity of the conflict becomes magnified and internationalized.

This analysis reflects what has been distinctive about conflict resolution since its inception in the mid 1950s. Conventionally, conflicts have been separated into internal and external types. A range of social scientists study internal conflicts that is the variety of domestic conflicts within states: historians, sociologists, anthropologists, systems and organizations specialists, while external conflicts like wars, invasions, blockades etc. have been the concern of international relations scholars. Within these distinctions scholars have also defined different types of conflict including ideological conflict, authority conflict, resource conflict, environmental conflict, and identity conflict. Burton has used the term "deep rooted conflict"\textsuperscript{11} Kriesberg writes of "intractable conflict",\textsuperscript{12} and Azar, as has been seen, refers to protracted social conflict.

Building on this work, and combining it with categories from international law, they have elsewhere employed the term 'international social conflict' (ISC) to define more closely the type of conflict syndrome which emerges when cultural identity groups and systems of governance are disarticulated.\textsuperscript{13} They define international social conflict as conflict which is neither purely inter-state conflict such as the Iran-Iraq war, nor confined within the normal institutionalized rules and procedures of domestic conflict


\textsuperscript{12} L. Kriesberg et. al., Intractable Conflicts and their Transformation, Syracuse, Syracuse University Press, 1989.

\textsuperscript{13} O. Ramsbotham and T. Woodhouse, Humanitarian Intervention, Chap. 3.
management such as the aftermath of the Los Angeles riots, but which sprawls somewhere between the two.

There are many other terms for this level of conflict, most commonly 'internal conflict' or 'civil war', but these do not capture the further twin characteristics of ISCs: (a) that they are rooted in relations between communal groups within state borders which is the 'social' component, and (b) that they have broken out of the domestic arena and become a crisis for the state itself, thus automatically involving the wider society of states which is the 'international' component. A characteristic mark of (b) is militarization beyond the capacity of state police forces to control. International-social conflicts are communal conflicts which become crises of the state. They typically cause massive human suffering and invite international intervention. A fuller name for this class of conflict would be 'international-state-social' conflict, because they operate at three levels, and thus require three levels of explanation: system level, state level and communal level. This in turn roughly corresponds to two broad approaches in conflict analysis: structural and relational. It is at state level, which mediates between the other two, that the critical dynamics are played out. An ISC is a crisis of the state, whether this takes the form of state-formation conflict (Bosnia), struggle for state control (Rwanda), or eventual state collapse (Somalia).

In relation to Azar's work, we accept that the most useful unit of analysis in international-social conflict (ISC), as in protracted social conflict (PSC), is the communal group or identity group, whatever may be seen to be its base - race, religion, ethnicity, culture. But in this case I part company in also recognizing the continuing potency of the state as the main organizing principle in the international arena, not only as an extraneous causal or complicating factor, but also as intrinsic to the aspirations of the conflicting parties themselves. The communal group is the 'social' base in which the conflict is rooted; the
state is the 'international' prize which is being fought for. Given the current international system, where sovereignty and all that goes with it is reserved for existing states, embattled disaffected communities are often in the end driven to aspire to statehood themselves - either independently or through amalgamation with neighbouring cognates. Even in a 'failed' or collapsed state like Somalia, the mainly Issaq Somaliland in the North daims independent statehood, while fluid and fragmented kinship and clan groups provide the basis for the implacable drive by 'warlords' to inherit and reconstruct the former post-colonial state. It is only sovereignty that is seen to guarantee the very needs identified by Azar and referred to above - security, recognition, access to sources of power. So it is that the struggle for power in the service of interest, characteristic of the 'old' thinking criticized by needs theorists, takes its place beside the drive for communal identity and recognition as integral to what defines international-social conflict.

There is no space here to provide empirical underpinning to the ISC concept, beyond remarking that in broad terms, using data -bases such as that provided by the Uppsala project, we group post-cold war conflicts into three categories. Type 1 conflicts are inter-state wars over control of strategic territory, borders and resources. There were four type 1 conflicts between 1989 and 1993, and none in 1993. Type 2 conflicts are intra-state conflicts related to control of government or authority structures, fuelled by political, ideological or religious differences. There were 20 of these over the 1989-1993 period, including conflicts in Algeria, Cambodia, Haiti and Mozambique. The rough pattern here seems to be that ideological (class) conflict of the classic cold war kind is in decline (Cambodia), but religious conflict is on the increase (Algeria). All conflicts are at the same time political conflicts for power, some almost purely so (Haiti). The focus here is on Type 3 conflicts, or ISCs, which covers the remainder of the data set. Of course these categories are not watertight. Type 3 conflicts may have some of the objectives and characteristics of type 1 conflicts (territorial acquisition) and of type 2 conflicts (religious or political programmes imposed upon government), but they are fundamentally about enduring identity groups which are organized to insist on the satisfaction of their needs,
interests, and beliefs and which do challenge the integrity or stability of a state. When states, posed with such challenges, disintegrate a crisis not only of the state but also of the state system ensues. It is important for what follows to note that at any one time ISC's can in turn be broadly divided into: (a) those which seem to be at the threshold stage, such as in Zaire or Sierra Leone in 1993; (b) those which are already at the severe stage, of which there were 17 countries in 1993 and 1994; and (c) those whose overt phase is over or in abeyance and are at the settlement stage, such as in Croatia, Israel/Palestine, Lebanon, Northern Ireland, South Africa in 1994. The 17 severe ISC's in 1993-1994 were in Afghanistan, Angola, Azerbaijan, Bosnia/Hercegovina, Burundi, Russia/Chechnya, Georgia/Abkhazia, Indonesia/East Timor, Iraq (Kurds/Shi'a), Liberia, Myanmar, Rwanda, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Tajikistan and Turkey (Kurds).

The type 3 conflicts are the most important in the analysis in this paper, because they represent a species of conflict which is already presenting severe challenges for the international community. Type 1 conflicts are clearly in decline, although we cannot rule out the prospect that they might increase in significance in the future. As Holsti has pointed out, while the pursuit of economic, trade and territorial interests may not be a major generator of warfare in the future, major powers may well come to intervene increasingly if their economic interests are threatened by "turmoil, civil wars, and interstate wars in the third world". In addition there are a large number of dormant border conflicts between states which could flare up in an international environment of economic depression and resource scarcity. States will move decisively to protect trade routes and resources threatened by any possible spill-over from international social conflict. Type 2 conflicts, driven by ideological, religious, and power-political dynamics, capture both the class-ideology conflicts characteristic of the cold war period, and the

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14 Before the threshold stage is the latent stage, which is that of potential ISC's. After the settlement stage comes the resolved stage, when the underlying structural and relational roots of the conflict have been successfully addressed.
newer religious conflicts which some say will emerge as the furnace of global conflict post cold war. In general in this category it is true to say that the class-ideology conflicts are declining, and it is still uncertain how significant religion (Algeria, Egypt, Iran) will be as a conflict generator, while domestic revolutionary activity may well flare up again in Central and Latin America (Mexico, Peru, Colombia).

The concept of international-social conflict (type 3) is not intended to account for all armed conflicts. Rather it offers an analysis of a type of conflict which is increasing in frequency and it provides some explanation for why this kind of conflict becomes protracted and embittered, causes large-scale human suffering and poses the sternest test for the international community when the question of intervention is considered. Conflict causes are likely to remain complex and multi-faceted and the specific locations of the outbreak of conflict in the future are difficult to predict. Holsti’s profile of issues that have generated civil and international conflict between 1648 and 1989 nevertheless confirms the emerging significance of the ISC type:

"Despite all the rhetoric about global interdependence, the shrinking world, and the presumably unifying impact of technological innovations on social and economic life, a more primordial sentiment seeks to assert autonomy, separateness, uniqueness, cultural survival, and, ultimately, sovereignty. Since most of the states of the world are composed of multiple ethnic/language/religious groups, we could expect the future international agenda to be crowded with cases of civil wars, wars of secession and the breakdown of multicomunal states all with the possibility of foreign intervention.”16


One of the main arguments in this paper is that the nature of these international-social conflicts needs to be understood in order to see both why they invite third party intervention and why it is so difficult for outsiders, including UN peacekeepers, to respond adequately. Three points can usefully be made here.

First, international-social conflicts cannot easily be ignored by the international community. Whatever the temptation for those living in other regions to respond in the spirit of Neville Chamberlain's 1938 reported reaction to the Czech crisis that it was a dispute "in a faraway country between people of whom we know nothing", several factors characteristically combine to draw outsiders in. Following Marc Trachtenberg, we may distinguish two broad historical normative traditions of state intervention: (a) intervention to preserve the balance of power, and (b) intervention to uphold internationally accepted values in the past, and, in some eyes still today, Western values.17 This roughly corresponds with what Lori Fisler Damrosch has called the two "clusters of values" which underpin the UN Charter: (a) state system values, and (b) human rights values.18 Each is invoked as an urgent reason for intervention in severe ISCs, which both threaten regional disorder,19 and cause massive human suffering.20 For some informed commentators 'wars of interest' and 'wars of conscience' cannot be separated. These crises may not "immediately threaten national security", nevertheless outsiders are drawn in not only "to help people because they are hungry and because


19 For example, through spread of weaponry, economic dislocation, links with terrorism and international crime, floods of refugees, as well as 'spill-over' into regional politics.

20 Whereas in World War I some 5% of casualties were civilians, in ISCs it is 'normally about 80% - most of them women and children', Grant J. 1992: The State of the World's Children. New York: UNICEF, p.26. Whereas when
If they are not fed they will die" but also because "countries which are racked by famine or civil war will be unsafe neighbors in the world village"\(^{21}\)

Second, international-social conflicts do not respond to the traditional methods of interstate conflict management, largely because most international-social conflicts have elements of both interstate and deep domestic divisions. Yet, even though they do not respond to traditional inter-state management, neither can they be resolved purely internally. For this reason they may require international intervention, which is a further reason why the term 'international-social' is preferable to other descriptions of this type of conflict. The complex conflict-related humanitarian emergencies which will inevitably result from such a pattern of conflict, involving large numbers of refugees and internally displaced people, as well as victims of war and famine, requires a new range of response from the international community. The existing international humanitarian system has been strained to the limit,\(^{22}\) including multilateral military peacekeeping forces (UN peacekeeping operations covered 25 of the 90 conflicts active between 1989 and 1993) increasingly becoming involved in providing assistance and protection for a wide range of international aid agencies working in war zones.\(^{23}\)

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UNFICR was set up in 1950/51 the main cause of the exodus of refugees was repressive government, now it is 'the product of vicious internal conflicts', Ogata, S. 1993: The State of the World's Refugees. New York: Penguin, p.iii.

\(^{21}\) Hurd, D. 1992: Speech at RUSI, 13 October. ACDQR.

\(^{22}\) Although, as John Seaman notes, at the moment the international 'system' of humanitarian relief "is not, in the ordinary sense of the word, a system at all. The term is applied to a large number of organisations and individuals which, although they declare similar objectives, operate within vastly different financial, political, organizational and technical constraints", 'The international system of humanitarian relief in the "New World Order"' in J. Harriss (ed.), The Politics of Humanitarian Intervention, London, pp. 17-31 at p.17.

\(^{23}\) For example, 10 of the 12 UN peacekeeping operations initiated since 1991 and still in operation at the end of 1994 included major humanitarian functions, all of them in internal wars of one sort or another. Seven were in type 3 ISCs (UNAVEM, UNPROFOR, UNOSOM, UNOMIG, UNOMIL, UNAMIR, UNMOT). Three were in type 2 conflicts (ONUSAL, ONUMOZ, UNMIH). The two PKOs with no significant humanitarian component were in response to the two type 1 conflicts (UNIKOM, MINURSO).
some humanitarian organizations oppose military involvement in humanitarian work because they fear that it jeopardizes its non-political nature. Others concede that the need for relief and the chaos and insecurity prevailing in conflict zones justifies and requires the protection that military peacekeeping forces can provide.

Third, given the nature of ISCs, if peacekeepers are deployed, they are unavoidably caught up in both the structural and the relational dimensions of the conflict. It is as well for this to be understood at the outset. In general, in terms of the analysis outlined above, the overall aim of the interventions within which peacekeepers function is: (i) to prevent conflicts at the 'threshold' stage from becoming 'severe' ISCs; (ii) to move existing 'severe' ISCs on to the 'settlement' stage; and (iii) to prevent conflicts already at the 'settlement' stage from relapsing back into the 'severe' phase. Peacekeeping can and in the 1990s does play a significant role in all of these despite the apparent terminological incompatibility implied in the name. Task (i) has not been traditional for peacekeepers, but is now quite widely advocated as an important option for the international community in collective conflict management, for example, in the case of the deployment of UNPROFOR III in Macedonia. Task (ii) is likely to involve peacekeepers in turbulent conflict situations where the distinction between consensual peacekeeping and non-consensual peace enforcement may be ambiguous and difficult to sustain. Task (iii) may appear more familiar from the perspective of 'first generation' peacekeeping, but, given the volatile nature of ISCs, is also likely to imply 'second generation' functions. Certainly, a conflict at the threshold and settlement stage can only be permanently prevented from collapsing forwards or backwards into a severe ISC if measures suitable for shifting the latter into the settlement stage are supplemented by further measures which address the underlying conflict causes. Here is a further reason why an adequate understanding of the structural and relational roots of ISCs is important. For example, in terms of structural causes, peacekeepers are deployed within a nexus which in one way or another affects the deep issues of: social heterogeneity; weakness of state institutions; economic underdevelopment; and cross-border politics. In terms of relational causes, peacekeepers
are integrally affected by: intense relations of identity and interest, for example, the fact that there is no room in ISCs for political neutrality, impartiality or disinterestedness, by quantitative and qualitative asymmetries in relations of power, for example, the fact that both the use and non-use of coercion or force impacts on the dynamics of the struggle, by impassioned relations of belief, for example, the fact that, whatever interveners may think they are doing, their actions will be variously interpreted, often in mutually incompatible ways, by the conflict parties, and by vicious relations of attitude and behavior, for example, the fact that the unpredictable twists and turns of the conflict, including the formation and break-up of new alliances, may mean that the situation on the ground when a mission is launched bears little resemblance to the situation a few months later, and the role of interveners is materially altered accordingly.

If peacekeepers take on these roles, such questions cannot be ducked and difficulties of this kind should be well understood from the beginning. But, before returning to consider some of the further implications of all this, we must first undertake a brief consideration of the contemporary debate about whether peacekeepers should be undertaking these kinds of tasks in the first place.

5.4 Changing interpretations: quick fixes, sunset clauses, or long hauls

Perhaps surprisingly, for an institution which won the Nobel Peace Prize in 1988, UN peacekeeping has not gone on to enjoy a uniformly good press. Former UNPROFOR commander in Bosnia, General Sir Michael Rose, commenting on this, wrote:

"Sadly, in the 50th year of UN peacekeeping operations, the perceived failures and costs of the UN mission in former Yugoslavia, and recent experiences in Somalia, have led to widespread disillusionment. Yet if the world loses faith in peacekeeping, and responses to the new world disorder are limited to the extremes of total war or total peace, the world will become a more
dangerous place. Rather than lose faith in the whole peace process, we need to analyze the changed operational circumstances and try to determine new doctrines for the future."  

In the debates about the changing nature of peacekeeping, three options for intervention are distinguished. Firstly persisting with peacekeeping, in such a way that the political, humanitarian and military components are better integrated. However, the counter case that the UN is a weak and inadequate institution for responding to contemporary conflict, has been strongly put and has gained considerable support, especially in the United States. We consider this debate below, looking especially at criticisms which suggest that military, political, and humanitarian objectives should not necessarily be inextricably combined. One strand of this argument suggests that civil wars, the context for so many UN operations, might best be left to their own dynamic. Only when they have played out and a victor emerges can political and humanitarian processes be deployed to assist in rebuilding the war damage. This argument leads to favoring the second option in international conflict, which is to withdraw or abstain from intervention. The third position is to accept the need for intervention, but to leave this within the province of more powerful actors than the UN. This leads to the argument for effective enforcement through military intervention which may be approved by the UN but which is conducted by strong states or a coalition of states. While we briefly consider below the cases made by those advocating either abstention and a return to classical peacekeeping or more vigorous enforcement and the use of combat ready peace enforcement deployments, the main concern in this part is to consider some of the literature which suggests that the middle option is indeed valid and sustainable.

5.4.1 Critiques of peacekeeping: withdraw, or enforce?

The argument that impartial and limited intervention in post Cold War civil wars is a "destructive misconception" and a "delusion" is cogently put by Richard K. Betts. In Bosnia the attempt at limited and impartial intervention resulted, he argues, in abetting "slow-motion savagery". In effect the result of the UN presence on the ground was that the interveners refused to let either side, Bosnian government or Bosnian Serbs, win.

"If outsiders such as the United States or the United Nations are faced with demands for peace in wars where passions have not burned out, they can avoid the costs and risks that go with entanglement by refusing the mandate -- staying aloof and letting the locals fight it out. Or they can jump in and help one of the contenders fight to defeat the other."

The clearest options are, for Betts, either not to intervene at all, or alternatively to enforce a solution. The enforcement option, he concludes"is a tall order, seldom with many supporters, and it is hard to think of cases where it actually works". The option of persisting with peacekeeping in civil wars, is a course of action which leads to "compromises that kill".

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26 Betts 1994, p. 28.
27 Betts 1994, p. 29.
Disillusionment with the experience of UN peacekeeping has led others to advocate abandoning peacekeeping, except in its limited and classical pre-1988 form, in favor of regional and great power conflict management. This attitude is evidenced in recent American policy towards peacekeeping.

The experience of the United States in Somalia, from which it withdrew when 18 American Rangers were killed there in October 1993, led to changes in the attitude of the Clinton administration to UN peacekeeping. President Clinton came into office with a foreign policy characterized by what his officials called "aggressive multilateralism", with talk of increasing US support for peacekeeping. According to David Rieff, this optimism about what UN peacekeeping could achieve was shared by the British and French governments, and by some in the UN Secretariat, whose "infatuation with peacekeeping as an almost infinitely plastic panacea for the world's conflicts is summed up in Boutros Boutros-Ghali's astonishingly sanguine policy statement on preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, and peacekeeping, Agenda for Peace". According to Rieff such optimism as far as peacekeeping is concerned was profoundly misplaced. Rieff presents the case against peacekeeping as a tool capable of having any impact on intrastate conflict. The high morality of the Agenda for Peace is, he claims, belied by the miserable failure in Bosnia. His case against UN actions and policy in this conflict is worth examining carefully, since it makes the case for enforcement. The UN took refuge in the idea that its mission was humanitarian, a position which allowed the organization both to claim that what went wrong was both the fault of everyone but the UN; and to avoid examining the political effects of its self-proclaimed impartial intervention. The main effect of their presence has been to forestall outside military intervention on behalf of the Bosnians an intervention which would have been a more effective protection of the peoples of a recognized multiethnic state against aggression.

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"If UN peacekeeping is helpless in Bosnia, an inappropriate vehicle for protecting Tutsis in Rwanda, and so on - and if the practitioners of peacekeeping do not believe it can be transformed - then the question that needs to be asked is why peacekeeping is needed at all, or, at least, why its activities should not be radically scaled back."30

In this scenario what follows is not abstention or withdrawal from conflicts, but enforcement where intervention will be conducted by the great powers pursuing interests in their own regions. It is, therefore, in this view, likely that peacekeeping and humanitarian aid "will become the exclusive province of regional hegemons and the G-7 countries plus the Russian Federation". The role for UN peacekeeping will be located in the post-conflict phase, after the military situation has been stabilized. The American influence to rein back peacekeeping was indicated by the issuing of Presidential Decision Directive 25 (PDD 25) in May 1994, which specified a cautious and limited commitment to peacekeeping operations.

5.4.2 The defense of peacekeeping: persist and reform

The lessons to be learned from both the Bosnian and Somali situations is that, faced with the violence, confusion, and complexity of contemporary conflict, the international community is only beginning to learn how to respond. None of the options for responding to post cold war conflicts considered here are free of problems or dilemmas: Bosnia, through to 30th August 1995, is an example of an attempt at an essentially non-forceful though complex peacekeeping operation: Somalia with UNOSOM I started out in this way but became an enforcement operation. Sweeping condemnations of both are easy to make, implying as they do that there are clear cut and manifestly superior alternatives. The danger here is that moods are likely to swing violently under the

impulse of the most recent experience. It is all too easy to criticize every option that has been tried, blaming the use of too much force in Somalia and too little force in Bosnia and Rwanda. Certainly the temptation to dismiss peacekeeping hastily as an option runs the risk of closing off the middle ground between enforcement and abstention when it is by no means clear that enforcement delivers either quick or neat solutions, or that abstention is morally acceptable or politically wise.

The future of peacekeeping as a middle ground option between abstention and enforcement will depend on the capability and willingness to reform and strengthen peacekeeping, and to reconceptualise its role in conflict transformation. The abstention and enforcement options depend on the validity of a particular conceptualization of conflict. Betts based his critique of impartial intervention in civil wars on the argument that those who advocate it have a misconceived notion of the nature of war. Wars start when people perceive that there is more to gain by fighting than by conceding, and once they start compromise becomes even harder. Wars end when one side wins, or both perceive that they have more to lose than to gain by carrying on.

For this reason well intentioned intervention in the early stages of a civil war may well do more harm than good. However there is an alternative conceptualization from the field of conflict resolution which suggests that comprehensive intervention involving the UN, regional organizations, and non-governmental organizations, and more effectively linking the political military and humanitarian components of peacekeeping, is crucial if the international community is to have any prospect of assisting communities trapped in the horror of civil war.
Although a large number of obvious operational and financial difficulties remain to be addressed, there is growing support for the view that Rose expressed in the quote above, that we need to map out a middle ground between what he calls "total peace" and "total war" and to understand and apply new doctrines and theories capable of supporting peace initiatives and humanitarian standards in civil wars. The need for such an approach in post cold war conflict has been well put by Mackinlay, who warned against attitudes in the American military which favored the use of "decisive force" in future UN operations as a response to severe intercommunal violence:

"The social damage of intercommunal violence on the scale of Bosnia, Angola, or Somalia is so deep and divisive that these conflicts will require healing processes that are measured in decades not months not only is the long term approach more realistic, it is cheaper, more humane, and internationally stabilizing than allowing intercommunal violence to flourish in an abhorrent and threatening manner in these circumstances the use of decisive force on an overwhelming scale that initially subdues and marginalizes any factions that may oppose the peace is not an option. The history of intervention shows that the intrusive arrival of a powerful and aggressive third-party force, particularly one that comprises largely foreign troops, will incite an equally determined and aggressive reaction and rejection by local people". (Mackinlay, no date, 29-50.)

It is important therefore to persist with the middle ground option between withdrawal and enforcement. We begin this defence of the middle ground with some discussion of recent literature which suggests that the failure of peacekeeping was nowhere near as abject as some of its critics have argued. Reflecting on the general expansion of peacekeeping post 1988, and on his own experience within UNPROFOR, Cedric Thornberry described a number of concrete situations where "humanitarian personnel" peacekeepers and UNHCR and ICRC staff were faced with difficult problems in hostile environments. Underlying all these dilemmas is the issue faced by all the agencies involved in the humanitarian enterprise.
what are international peace and humanitarian personnel to do in the absence of the parties' consent, or in an environment of qualified consent? UNHCR and ICRC have at various times indicated that force is not the answer; one cannot achieve humanitarian goals by fighting one's way through. If withdrawal, also, is not an alternative how does one function in the dangerous shifting sands in the middle? Neither flight, nor paralyzed rumination, being acceptable options.\textsuperscript{31}

Each case required negotiation and compromise to produce a practical and defensible solution in advancing humanitarian objectives: he comments that it was "rare to find a morally perfect solution to the kind of dilemma habitually met in the actuality of humanitarian action". Out of a series of decisions made in relation to specific difficulties in Bihać, or Mostar, or Sarajevo, choices were made by peacekeeping and aid agency personnel in the pursuit of even minimal humanitarian standards, and the cumulative effect of these was, again minimally, the saving of life and the mitigation of suffering. To move from this level of impact to outright conflict resolution will require a long learning curve: we deal with what this learning curve might involve in our concluding section.

There is also evidence that more, not less, peacekeeping would have had a positive effect on conflicts in for example Angola and Rwanda. For Angola, Margaret Anstee (from February 1992 to July 1993 the UN Secretary General's Special Representative there) was critical of the low key approach there in that the resources made available to UNAVEM II were inadequate, even for a mandate which she regarded as already too limited, involving observation and verification, rather than the implementation, of the Bicesse Peace Accords of May 1991. Initially this mandate involved the demobilization and disarming of the two conflicting parties, and it was extended in March 1992 to cover observation and verification of the elections of September 1992. At its fullest deployment, UN international personnel in Angola numbered c. 1,000; the Namibia operation,

regarded as a success, had around 8,000 UN personnel for a population and an electorate less than one sixth the size of Angola's. When she arrived in Angola in February 1992 Anstee expressed alarm at the discrepancy between the complexity of the task and the resources available and was told that what was wanted by the international community was "a small and manageable operation"; in her colourful phrase, she claimed that she had been asked "to fly a 747 but had been given the fuel only for a DC3". 32 Perhaps inevitably the civil war broke out again late in 1992. Anstee's 'lessons learned' are illuminating:

"what can be done in these tragic and forbidding circumstances? The counsel of despair espoused by some is that the two sides should be left to slog it out until a solution is found. Such an approach seems to me to be quite indefensible as it prolongs intolerable suffering for a people who have undergone untold agony for many decades .... The international community and the United Nations have a responsibility and they also have an interest in trying to break the deadlock. This is not only because Angola is important geopolitically and economically, but also because the credibility of UN peacekeeping is at stake."33

For Anstee, then, something in between the two extremes of maximalist intervention and the minimalist approach opted for in Angola under UNAVEM II is the desirable way forward, not only to protect the reputation of the UN and of peacekeeping, but more importantly to send the right message to endeavors around the world generally where the UN and the international community are engaged in assisting the resolution of


33 Anstee, 1993, p. 503.
internal conflicts, the transition to democracy, the building of civil and economic society and respect for human rights.

In Rwanda a study by OXFAM argued that a properly equipped and quickly deployed peacekeeping force could have prevented the genocidal violence which broke out in the summer of 1994. The fact that this did not happen was not the fault of the UN, which wished to take such action, but was the responsibility of powerful states on the Security Council which opposed the commitment. Nevertheless the decision under UNSCR 912 to reduce the UNAMIR force in Rwanda from 1,700 to 270 personnel, at a time when massacres of Tutsi by Hutu erupted in the capital Kigali, was deplored by the OAU Secretary-General Salim Ahmed Salim, who said that it would be interpreted as a "lack of sufficient concern for African tragic situations." This type of criticism, related to concern about the consistency, degree, and impartiality of international response to suffering goes to the heart of the debate about humanitarian intervention and conflict resolution by the UN.

Therefore, despite the general case we can make for strengthening the middle ground intervention options, there are very real problems in the way of such a development. Firstly, despite the apparent liberation of a new humanitarian era from 1992, the UN does not have any effective standing capacity to implement such comprehensive intervention; secondly it does not have an agreed and universal set of criteria for non-coercive military humanitarian intervention; and thirdly there remains to be developed a clearer political definition of peacekeeping as a part of a broader conflict resolution process. The objectives of such a process are to move from peacekeeping in a situation of conflict, to


35 Vassal Adams 1994, p. 36.
post conflict peacebuilding. For this to happen, and some might well argue that it should not, that peacekeeping should only deployed after political agreements to make peace have been made by the main parties to a conflict, then the military doctrine which has been developed recently to redefine the nature of peacekeeping needs to be brought into some form of communication with the knowledge field of conflict resolution. For the remainder of this article, then, we discuss this issue, having first devoted some time to an examination of the need for an agreed and universal set of criteria for non-coercive military humanitarian intervention. We do not comment here on the first type of difficulty mentioned above, the development of effective capacity within the UN system to support comprehensive intervention. The argument is that such capacity is likely to be needed because of the prevalence of a type of post Cold War conflict which will manifest itself as civil war and state collapse, in which the basic human needs and rights of mass populations will be at risk. Whether or not the member states of the UN will respond to provide effective capacity is an important question which nevertheless can be avoided. if the case is made convincingly for a capability for comprehensive intervention in conflict related humanitarian emergencies, then it is a matter of political will to provide resources and capabilities.

5.5 Peacekeeping and conflict resolution: reflections on the relationship

One of the striking features or recent analyses by practitioners of peacekeeping has been the frequency with which reference is made to the relevance of conflict resolution. Conversely it has become more common for conflict resolution theorists to refer to peacekeeping as an important instrument of positive conflict transformation. We consider each of these points in turn.

Peacekeeping as conflict resolution

A challenge for peacekeeping as a mode of non-forcible military intervention is to develop a UN joint doctrine or operational concept of how the new peacekeeping should
function in the semi-permissive or non-consensual environments in which they have increasingly been called to operate since 1988. While specific analysts within peacekeeping have begun to discuss what form this might take, and while some defence ministries have elaborated their own doctrine, for example the wider peacekeeping idea of the British Army, this has yet to be translated into a generally agreed doctrine for UN multilateral peacekeeping forces.

There has already been a humanitarianisation of the military as peacekeeping operations have taken on humanitarian mandates and have progressively got drawn into serving in a variety of humanitarian roles. Difficult questions remain about this fusing of military, humanitarian, and political objectives. Most difficult of all is the degree to which peacekeeping should move beyond the classic guiding principles of the early interposition missions: impartiality, consent, and non-use of force. The strain and confusion created by struggling with these problems has created a peacekeeping fatigue, as disillusionment spreads about the inadequacies of peacekeeping in Bosnia and Somalia, and the failure to deploy effectively in Rwanda, or to deploy at all in, for example, the Sudan. These are the kinds of conflicts which cause the greatest threat to peace and cause the greatest human misery. Without a clear doctrine providing guidance for peacekeeping intervention in ISCs or civil wars, and the reforms and resources which need to follow such a definition, the fatigue will spread and the intervention options will shrink to non-intervention on the one hand, or coercive military enforcement with few supporters on the other. The emerging debate about the lessons learned from Somalia, Bosnia, and Rwanda, and the implications of these lessons for the principles of peacekeeping is therefore a crucial one.

One of the most comprehensive statements about the new peacekeeping is based on British Army experience and appears in its British Army Field Manual on Wider
The manual defines peacekeeping as "operations carried out with the consent of the belligerent parties in support of efforts to achieve or maintain peace in order to promote security and sustain life in areas of potential or actual conflict". Wider peacekeeping is used to describe "the wider aspects of peacekeeping operations carried out with the consent of the belligerent parties but in an environment that may be volatile". Despite the post Cold War conflict experience of Somalia and Bosnia especially, the manual insists on the retention of the principle of consent and on a clear separation between peacekeeping and peace enforcement. Peacekeeping requires consent, peace enforcement does not. A distinction is made between the tactical-field operations level where consent may be partial, subject to change and poorly defined. At the operational theatre level consent comes from formal agreements by recognized parties and is relatively stable. Particularly at the tactical level consent does not mean seeking universal approval for every action taken, but it does involve "a general public attitude that tolerates a peacekeeping presence and represents a quorum of co-operation". This definition has implications for the degree to which force can be used in an operation which is essentially non-forcible. Force can be used where local opinion supports its use against banditry or looting for example. It may also be used in a way which Dobbie describes as "breaching the tactical edge of the consent divide", and gives as an example the shooting down of three Serb aircraft which violated the Bosnian no-fly zone in April 1994. It is only when force is used in a way which "breaches the tactical and operational levels of consent" that wider peacekeeping lurches into peace enforcement.

In the classic principles of peacekeeping, consent is probably the cornerstone. With consent, the principles of impartiality and the non-use of force are easier to apply. Without consent from all belligerents, they become problematic. For Mackinlay both UN


specialists and academics have failed to realise that the Cold war peacekeeper was not equipped to deal with internal conflicts, where consent is challenged, and that neither the UN nor UN peacekeepers have sufficient knowledge to deal with intercommunal conflict. This deficiency has been addressed recently with the British, American, French, Dutch, and Australian militaries producing their own field manuals which according to Mackinlay identified an area between traditional peacekeeping and enforcement. Above all the issue of co-ordination is paramount. The military component is required to operate effectively with the civil and humanitarian components, and the key task of the military “will be to create the conditions for others to succeed”. For the military to be able to do this Mackinlay defines a mid-level operational concept different from traditional peacekeeping, which utilized a low level operational concept. These mid-level operations he refers to as Second Generation Multinational Operations, a concept of peacekeeping similar to the wider peacekeeping of the British Army, and similar also to Second Generation Peace Operations used in the Australian context. All these terms are attempts to define the new contexts in which peacekeeping forces are now deployed in "messy, value based intra-state conflicts".

In this redefinition a distinction has emerged between American views and Euro-Australian approaches to peacekeeping which defines when that threshold is crossed, that is the point at which peacekeeping becomes enforcement. This emerges most clearly

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40 Mackinlay, 1994, p. 158


42 Smith, 1993, p. 32
in American doctrine on peace support operations. While accepting the principles and concept of peacekeeping, and the need to maintain a clear distinction between peacekeeping and peace enforcement, senior US Army staff, Mackinlay suggests, "are intuitively uncomfortable with being subordinated to a mission that cannot rely on the use of overwhelming force to achieve its ultimate success". This discomfort showed up clearly in the tensions between the European and Australian contingents in UNOSOM II on the one hand, and the Americans on the other. In the debate about reconceptualising peacekeeping doctrine, and including the approach of those who wish to develop more muscular forms to deal with what we have called ISCIs, great care is taken to preserve the separation between consent based peacekeeping and coercion based peace enforcement. When John Mackinlay visited Somalia in May/June 1993 he found near unanimity at battalion level that 'overwhelming use of force' did not work in these conditions and that the success of peacekeeping as a humanitarian enterprise depended upon fostering local co-operation. The same conclusion emerged from Australian observations about the experience of their battalion force deployed within Operation Restore Hope (Operation Solace) in the area of Baidoa.

"By opening up dialogue with the reasonable members of the Somali community in Baidoa, the Australians were able in a small but effective way to focus on the human rights question and address it with the means to hand tangibly through the courts and the auxiliary force, intangibly by listening to all comers, especially the weakest members of society. The Australian Army always took time to explain to the clan elders or the NGOs involved, why it had to postpone or deny a request for assistance" 45


44 Mackinlay 1994, p. 155

45 Kieseker in Smith (ed.), 1993, p. 72
There are approaches now by people who are experienced practitioners of military peacekeeping to combine their analyses with insights from academic conflict resolution. Three examples are of particular interest and relevance here. Firstly it is noticeable how much of the peacekeeping doctrine of the British Army, elaborated in Wider Peacekeeping, is suffused with the language of conflict resolution. Here, the managing of consent, based on the principles of impartiality, legitimacy, mutual respect, minimum force, credibility, and transparency is also related to the techniques of promoting good communication, of negotiation and mediation, and of positive approaches to community relations through an active civil affairs programme which is amply resourced to win "hearts and minds". A second example is in the work of David Last, a Canadian officer with experience in the UNFICYP and UNPROFOR operations. Last set out firstly to review the contribution of peacekeeping to conflict resolution as practiced in the past; secondly he wished to identify "what new techniques may be used to help peacekeepers work more actively with civilians to eliminate violent conflict": his general proposition is worth noting, that

"To argue by analogy, I believe the situation of peacekeepers today is much like the situation of commanders on the Western Front in 1916, who were bogged down in defensive operations. To push the analogy somewhat, new tools of war were becoming available to commanders in 1916 that would permit them to take the offensive if they could only adjust their thinking about how to use their forces. In the same way, new techniques of peacekeeping, taken from conflict resolution theory and civilian experience, now permit peacekeepers to take the offensive to restore peace."46

A third example is provided by Alao and Mackinlay's analysis of the UN operation in Liberia, in which they provide a number of significant observations relevant not only to the situation in Liberia, but also to the way in which UN activity in peace processes in general and the role of peacekeeping forces in such processes is conducted. They pointed out that the Cotonou Agreement, which provided the framework for an agreed peace process to end the civil war in Liberia in 1994, was based on a formula from other intercommunal conflict resolution attempts, going back to the original formula embodied in the Zimbabwe Independence Agreement of 1979: "in essence the concept is to freeze hostilities by a ceasefire, reduce the capacity of the factions to continue fighting by regrouping them into cantonment sites, impose arms embargoes, resettle the displaced elements of the population and in the relative calm achieved by these measures conduct an election". In Liberia a plan was launched to get to the point of elections which was based on progress in distinct but interdependent stages of disarmament, demobilization, and economic restoration. The return of refugees depended on some prospect of individual security; but such security depended on disarmament and the reduction of the power of the armed factions; this could not happen without some economic prospects for the disarmed fighter, but individual economic security itself depended on a revived economy, which itself could not happen without some level of security to encourage economic investment and activity.

The UNOMIL operation plan was, according to Mackinlay and Alao, well conceived in that there was good provision for the rehabilitation of each fighter and programmes existed at community and village levels to encourage resettlement and reconciliation. However, partly because of the unsatisfactory relationship between ECOMOG (the regional peacekeeping force) and UNOMIL there was a failure to coordinate the security and disarmament efforts with the related humanitarian/reconstruction objectives. The result was, following conventional thinking among UN officials and diplomats, to invest

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too much into the value of disarmament, because "unless faction fighters have reasonable expectations of employment, shelter, a community structure, and personal security, they will probably retain their weapons and remain part of a local gang". 49 Too much was left to the interim authority, which was too weak to apply the interlinked disarmament, demobilization, and reconstruction objectives. Given this weakness, there needed to be a much stronger executive capability within UNOMIL to drive the process forward. Despite the quality of its staff, UNOMIL never had the numerical presence to have such a decisive impact and in the absence of such direction the peace process stalled disastrously. Alao and Mackinlay's conclusion which is worth highlighting is their suggestion that the general gearing of the efforts of the international community and its various agencies to short term perspectives, and the lack of thinking about sustaining long term conflict resolution, means that in these kinds of conflicts "relief providers and peace process supervisors, now face challenges which no longer respond to tried UN peace formulas". 50 It is not then that peacekeeping has failed in any fundamental sense; the failure is one of general understanding about how the international community should react to and organize itself in a humanitarian disaster of this kind.

5.6 Conflict Resolution as Peacekeeping

According to Richard Rinaldo of the US Army's Training and Doctrine Command at Fort Monroe, Virginia, where the US Army manual FM 100-23: Peace Operations was prepared, "the goal of peace operations is not military victory. The conflict is the enemy, rather than specific enemy forces". 51 Similarly Canadian General Clayton Beattie argues

49 ibid., p. 49

50 ibid., p. 47.

that training for peacekeeping should differ considerably from conventional military combat training, because:

"It involves the psychological change from an adversary to a pacific role; from confrontation to third party interposition. In peacekeeping there is no enemy: the object is to avoid hostilities, to improve communication between the parties, and to advance the process of reconciliation. This necessitates a full understanding of the causes of the conflict be it political, military, or economic as well as the social and cultural environment. It demands a fair-minded and impartial approach while operating in an atmosphere of distrust and suspicion among the protagonists, often under difficult and provocative conditions." 52

These two main requirements, to understand the nature of the conflict, and to understand the responsibilities of the third party role, coincide with the long standing aims of conflict resolution research. Inspired by earlier conflict theorists, including Quincy Wright and Lewis Richardson in the 1920s and 1930s, Kenneth Boulding, who with Norman Angell coined the term 'conflict resolution' in the 1950s, described the new discipline as one which combined the analytic-descriptive science of 'polemologie' conflict study with the 'minimum normativeness' of positive conflict management, the theory and practice of peaceful resolution. 53

UN peacekeeping and conflict resolution as a distinct discipline are not only closely related conceptually, but originate in the same historical period. The Hammarskjold-Pearson principles for the United Nations Emergency Force I (UNEF I, 1956-67) were

For these reasons it is suggested in the conclusion that peacekeeping doctrine and conflict resolution theory have points of contact which can be beneficially developed to provide the refinement of technique if this middle option is to persist. Our argument has been that it should, and while we recognize the enormity of the step and the complexity of the task we follow the view of many in the field of humanitarian assistance that there is an urgent need to rethink the concepts we use to describe and explain conflict related humanitarian disasters. What can the academic area of conflict resolution contribute to this?

Stephen Ryan argues that there has not been a very fruitful relationship between peace and conflict research and peacekeeping. With only a few exceptions (Galtung, Harbottle, Fisher) there has been little analysis of peacekeeping in the conflict analysis and conflict resolution literature. Conversely the academic literature on peacekeeping rarely refers to peace and conflict theory. This is now changing, as we review below, partly in response to the call, also made by Ryan, of the need to go beyond the pragmatic approach which has been typical of the history of peacekeeping operations. Alan James warned against looking for an underlying cause to explain the upsurge in new peacekeeping operations since 1988, arguing that "peacekeeping is chiefly the reflection of specific political circumstances, of a decision, in the light of the facts of the individual case, that third party aid should be employed to help to defuse a crisis, stabilize a situation, or move towards a

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It has been argued above that new patterns and types of conflict suggest that such cautious pragmatism may need to be exercised alongside, or within, a radical revision of the principles and processes which determine how humanitarian intervention, and peacekeeping as its military arm, should take place. Where it has been touched upon in the conflict resolution literature, peacekeeping has been seen as a device of an older form of conflict management, conflict containment, or conflict suppression, dealing within symptoms and not concerned with fundamental resolution. In general in the work of new conflict theorists, therefore, certainly in the 1970s and 1980s, the stress was placed on discovering new processes of resolution, especially developed from the theory of problem solving in international relations, or from theories of mediation, and peacekeeping was not seen to have a part play in this. Signs of changes in this way of thinking came when Bercovitch et. al. and Fisher and Keashly began to define conflict resolution as a process involving the use of different forms of intervention at different stages of conflict escalation and de-escalation. Within this broader process, based on ideas of contingency and complementarity, peacekeeping was seen to have a part to play, in that it was claimed as one of the peaceful intervention strategies whose long term goal was not conflict containment but resolution. This idea was developed later by Fetherston who argued that because of the historical origins of peacekeeping as an ad hoc adaptation to specific international crises, writing about peacekeeping has tended to be functional and descriptive rather than conceptual. Traditional definitions of peacekeeping have tended to be narrow and have failed in particular to address the question of how peacekeeping can be related to the processes of peacemaking and peacebuilding. They have also, correspondingly, neglected to relate the techniques of peacekeeping to broader


models of third party peacemaking linked to the concept of positive peace rather than to negative peace the containment of hostilities.58

Yet the reality of what peacekeepers do on the ground, especially in the internal conflicts in which they have been deployed post 1988, means that they are engaged de facto, in many missions, in peacekeeping, peacemaking, and peacebuilding activities at the micro level; traditional peacekeeping continues in the monitoring and implementation of ceasefires, and in the demobilization and disarmament of rival factions etc; peacemaking exists in the negotiations and mediation in which peacekeepers become involved in a variety of efforts to implement mandates and in the various tasks of political reconstruction in which they have become involved; in the process of delivering humanitarian aid they become part of a broader enterprise with a variety of agencies of the international community involved in the economic and political reconstruction which is peacebuilding. It may be that the record of peacekeepers, in terms of how well they carry out this work, is open to criticism and that military personnel, trained for combat, have a great deal to learn about working in conflict environments as impartial interveners. But this is true for the whole collection of groups, agencies and institutions which are called the international community.

One common lesson is that violent civil wars are not amenable to quick fix solutions or to surgical strikes by military forces. In the case of former Yugoslavia, the DG 1A of the European Union has judged that conflict resolution there involves long term tasks; that military stabilization taking 1-2 years will need to be paralleled by a process of infrastructural reconstruction taking ten years; and by a process of reconciliation taking more than a generation. While peacekeeping forces will be most relevant to the task of

military stabilization, they also have a role to play in reconstruction. In general there is now a greater recognition that peacekeeping should have a place within a broader model of conflict resolution. The details of how peacekeeping should function in such a model are still to be elaborated, and there is a need now, as Fetherston suggests, to carry out a programme of empirical research in order to build up a contingency model of peacekeeping which would enable greater understanding of how forces can be prepared and configured, to meet the challenges of the particular conflict for which they are deployed.59

CHAPTER SIX

6.0 CONCLUSION, DISCUSSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

6.1 Principles of Peacekeeping in Africa

France, the United States of America and the United Kingdom have all been active in recent years in pursuing efforts to enhance African peacekeeping capacity. Among them are the United States' African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI), the commitments made at the 1995 France-United Kingdom summit in charters and the efforts undertaken by them within the European Union. These three countries have now agreed to work together in promoting a joint initiative to strengthen the capacity of African countries to participate in peacekeeping under the auspices of the Organization for African Unity (OAU) now African Unity (AU) and the U.N.

This joint initiative follows the ongoing discussions within the OAU on its role in conflict prevention and management on the African continent, as well as from the United Nations Secretary General's report of 1 November 1995 on improving preparedness for conflict prevention and peacekeeping in Africa, and the recommendations of the UN General Assembly's Special Committee on Peacekeeping in its 1997 report.

The joint initiative is based on four principles:

6.1.1 Long-term capacity enhancement: The objective of the initiative is the enhancement of African peacekeeping capacity, particularly the capacity to mount rapid and effective collective responses to humanitarian and other crises, consistent with the objectives and the parameters established within the UN stand-by arrangements. This goal will be achieved through coordinated and sustained efforts to increase interoperability through

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1 Usinfo.state.gov
training, joint exercises and the development of common peacekeeping doctrine. There is no intention of creating a standing African force. The activities undertaken under this initiative should be ones which enjoy the support of the African countries themselves.

6.1.2 Legitimacy: These activities will be carried out in consultation and coordination with the OAU and UN. The OAU and UN secretariats will be involved in the coordination of training activities.

6.1.3 Openness: All African states will be eligible to participate, with the exception of those states subject to sanctions imposed by the United Nations Security Council. Potential international donors will also be invited to associate themselves with the initiative. Such donors will be free to determine the states with which they intend to cooperate in specific projects without being constrained to contribute, financially or otherwise, to a project with which they do not agree.

6.1.4 Transparency: There will be full transparency vis-à-vis the international community and, in particular, to African and other donor states. We will seek to establish an African peacekeeping support group, bringing together the OAU, UN, African member states and potential donors in New York.

6.2 The Dilemmas of Regional Peacekeeping in Africa

Humanitarian intervention in Africa represented one of the major challenges of the 1990s. The first impact with a harsh outcome was the intervention in Somalia in the early 1990s. Somalia was not only the first real occasion for the Western military to understand the implications of dealing with complex civil wars, but it was also the first opportunity to
understand that culture is an important element to address in peace operations. Tamara Duffey noted in her essay 'Cultural Issues in Contemporary Peacekeeping' that the problems of the intervention in Somalia were mostly cultural. 'The operations in Somalia exposed serious organizational culture differences between the military and the diversity of civilian agencies' and yet 'the most significant problems were those resulting from the failure to understand Somali culture'. This lack of understanding involved the highest level of decision-making. In addition 'many contingents arrived in the mission area without knowledge of Somalia, its history and culture, or the conditions on the ground'.

Somalia became a 'syndrome'. It certainly represented an important case to identify what kind of troops would be more successful in complex scenarios such as those that were going to proliferate in Africa in the decade. Somalia also posed another problem: it became clear that short-term commitment, such as the US deployment of troops in the Horn of Africa, was not of any significant benefit. It is evident today that the types of conflicts that cause state collapse in Africa require a longer and more expensive commitment than was initially proposed in the early 1990s. The failure in Somalia had a powerful impact on the international community and some of the main peacekeeping contributing countries: the US, France and the UK. On more than one occasion they manifested their intention not to get involved directly in African troubles or to deploy troops unless to protect their citizens and national interest.

Already in May 1994, a few months after the withdrawal of the US contingent from Somalia, President Clinton signed Presidential Decision Directive 25. The Directive established the parameters required for future US participation in peace support operations. It posed the questions about whether, when and with what degree US troops should get involved in these sorts of missions. The directive also set a number of parameters for US involvement in peace operations - such as leadership of the mission
and rules of engagement. In simple words it made American participation in peace operations extremely difficult. At the same time the Clinton administration began pressurizing major African states to commit themselves to establishing some sort of peacekeeping measures. Secretary of State Warren Christopher promoted an unsuccessful initiative for the creation of an All African Crisis Response military capability that was meant to deal with complex emergencies. The initiative did not achieve any significant results, mainly because at the time several Western countries did not believe that it might represent an effective response to African crises.

However a clear message was sent to African leaders - an African crisis was the business for fellow Africans. The 'isolation' of Africa became more obvious from the middle 1990s as the strategic interest of those countries that had some sort of commitment to stability focused more on regions of the world that directly affected their national interest. NATO's major concern was the difficult peace process in the former Yugoslavia and the implementation of the Dayton agreement. Thus, NATO's troops were deployed in significant numbers in the former Yugoslavia. As a result the debate about the need to develop a regional peacekeeping capability among sub-Saharan states became increasingly strong.

Rwanda, even more than Somalia, became a real turning point as the slaughter of a large number of civilians was surrounded by the indifference of some major world leaders. The withdrawal of Belgian troops of the UN force, the US concern not to get involved in another 'Mogadishu nightmare' (i.e. Somalia), the unclear role of France, and the inability of the UN to reinforce its mission and deal with genocide strengthened the perception that Africa's crises could be dealt with properly only by Africans themselves. Africans, more than anybody else in the international community, felt the burden of not having been able to provide some response to stop the genocide in Rwanda.
6.3 Finding African Solutions for African Complex Emergencies

Chris Landersberg, of the Centre for Policy Studies in Johannesburg maintained that, ‘the notion of African solutions for African problems is easier stated than realised in practice’. There are several difficulties in dealing effectively with conflicts and complex emergencies in Africa. On the one hand over the last decade, Africa has experienced a proliferation of bloody warlords, as John Mackinlay notes, ‘a virus of the new strategic era’. Warlords enjoy a situation of anarchy in which they can threaten the local population and engage in illegal business. They often use a condition of illegality to exploit, as in the case of Sierra Leone, the country’s economic resources. As a consequence they have no interest in participating in a serious peace process. On the other hand, at the regional level, there has yet to be an agreement among Africa’s major powers on a common strategy. The large majority of African states follow diverging political agendas. Thus in several cases, such as the Democratic Republic of Congo, it has been difficult to find uniting efforts among regional powers to promote an effective process of conflict resolution. A further complication of regional military intervention in Africa is its armed forces’ lack of logistical and financial means. The size of countries and the complexity of crises where interventions are mostly necessary, do not allow for a deployment similar to that undertaken by NATO in Bosnia for example. Western states and NATO members can rely on military budgets that, although constantly shrinking, remain much larger than those of African states. One of the smaller members of NATO, Portugal, in 1998 and 1999 had a defence budget of 1.6 billion US dollars per year. Kenya, which is considered one of the major peacekeeping contributors in Africa, had a defence budget of 0.5 million US dollars for both 1998 and 1999.

On the technological side the gap between African states and Western armies is even greater. Professor James Miskel of the US Naval War College emphasizes that, ‘whenever US forces are deployed on humanitarian missions they use equipment that

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2 Naval War College Review, Vol. No. 2 Sequence 358, Spring 1997 pg. 79-91

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was designed to prosecute and support a war against a technologically advanced adversary. Military equipment is considerably more rugged and sophisticated than humanitarian missions ordinarily require. Needless to say this is in stark contrast to the requirements of any coalition of African states which are in constant need of reliable weapons, good communications equipment, and more efficient logistics. These considerations raise serious doubts about Africa's potential to deal with complex crises that previously represented a real problem even for the most sophisticated and skilled armies. Regional actors like the AU (African Unity), the Economic Community of West African States, the Economic Community of Central African States, the Southern African Development Community, and the Intergovernmental Authority for Development, mainly economic organizations, are facing difficulties as they have to rely on relatively little resources. Mark Malan's suggestion that Africa's 'regional security arrangements need to focus on modest measures for the prevention and containment of conflicts rather than utopian ideals and complex mechanisms' is therefore of little surprise.

At this point, it is important to question the dictum 'African solutions to African problems' when we consider African resources. Salim Ahmed Salim, a former OAU Secretary General,\(^3\) stressed that a successful regional framework to contain outbreaks of conflict depends primarily on the nature of the conflict to be dealt with. The clear advantage of regional security mechanisms is that member states tend to understand their sub-regions better than others and have a real stake in resolving the conflict, not out of sheer altruism or moral obligation, but due to the threat of instability affecting their own countries. Indeed regional organizations enjoy proximity to potential sources of conflict in the area, familiarity with the main actors, knowledge of cultural values and environmental conditions. In Africa however these are not always factors to be counted.

\(^3\) HE Dr Salim Ahmed Salim, Secretary General of the OAU at the Second Meeting of the Chiefs of Defence Staff of Member States of the OAU Central Organ, Harare, 25 October 1997.
on the positive side, as often the disadvantage is that states can be too closely involved with the disputing parties.

The misjudgments that led to the Sierra Leone disaster could have been avoided if the United States, its Western allies and the United Nations had had the political will to confront the crisis. But despite President Clinton’s commitment not to repeat the mistakes made in Rwanda, the West remained too frightened to commit significant resources and soldiers to bring peace to Sierra Leone. The shallow and opportunistic diplomatic attempts to stop the conflict brought no results. Sierra Leone has never rated high on the West’s list of priorities. Few countries really cared about Foday Sakoh’s, the leader of Sierra Leone’s brutal Revolutionary Front, army of teenage and child fighters spreading savagery across the country, murdering and mutilating tens of thousands. According to The Economist4 ‘the UN must be given enough troops, with enough equipment, training and sophisticated leadership, to quell the rebels. Realistically, that means that some of them must be first-world soldiers, drawn at least initially from the British force already there, with a mandate to fight’. Indeed events in Sierra Leone, where in May 2000 rebels held some 500 peacekeepers hostage, raise questions about whether the United Nations has learned from the mishandled catastrophes of the past. They also cast a shadow of doubt on the commitment of wealthy democracies to help Africa.

Some 37,000 mostly NATO peacekeepers are stationed in Kosovo, an area slightly more than one-seventh the size of Sierra Leone. It is hardly surprising that the poorly trained, ill-equipped and outnumbered Zambian, Kenyan and other peacekeepers in Sierra Leone got into trouble, and sometimes couldn’t fight their way out of it. In an analysis of the crisis in Sierra Leone and the UN involvement, Professor Michael Clark5 observed that although these ‘coalitions embody international legitimacy; militarily they tend to be

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4 The Economist, May 2000; www.economist.com/world/Africa
5 www.ziaggusa.com/history/2000 article by Prof. M. Clark, May 2000
technically weak'. According to Clark the most worrying aspect of it is that 'many of the regular troops contributors, particular regional neighbors in crisis-prone areas such as West or Southern Africa, are keen to send troops to collect the $1000 per-man-per-month UN rate of pay'. The comparison with the $5000 average salary of NATO's soldiers brings Clark to the conclusion that 'it is not surprising that UN military missions are often higher on quantity than quality'. It would therefore be of greater relevance to analyze African soldiers' motivations, as it is arguable whether their main and only reasons are financial. So far there has been no investigation of this issue.

In Mozambique a unique approach to an African complex crisis was implemented. Three major elements worked in collaboration: peacekeeping, conflict resolution and economic development. The peace process in Mozambique started in a difficult period following a twenty-year civil war in which the two major actors, FRELIMO and RENAMO, were very much at each other's throats. It was mostly the commitment of the Catholic Church that promoted a number of talks and negotiations.

At the same time a few states gave their full support to the process offering troops to be deployed in Mozambique and therefore also contributing to the implementation of the peace process. The Comunita' di Sant'Egidio in Rome was extremely active in keeping FRELIMO and RENAMO representatives at the peace table, while the Italian government offered diplomatic assistance in Rome and in Maputo and a 1,000 troops contingent to be deployed in Mozambique, as part of the newly established UN mission ONUMOZ. However these two elements would not have been sufficient without a serious commitment of the international donor community to economic development in the East African country. Mozambique has been so far, and despite a number of natural disasters, a successful example of economic development and integration of former fighters back into society.
Africans can play an important role in solving African problems, as they know their societies and culture better than any outsider does. Yet they still need assistance from the more developed Western nations, and not only military, but also economic and technological support. These types of commitments do represent significant costs that often are not just monetary, but can involve human lives. In addition the commitment should be long-term, as solutions for Africa's complex crises require a protracted time and consistent involvement. Indeed the international community, the developed and more stable states of the world should take up this sort of commitment so as not to 'Give War a Chance'.

In recent times, the African continent has been plagued by many interstate and intrastate conflicts. Whereas the Cold War era witnessed mostly interstate and liberation wars, post-Cold War Africa continued to experience intensive intrastate conflicts, including genocide, as evident in the civil war in Rwanda in 1994. Some African countries that had to fight for their independence experienced very sharp divisions among their leaders after the attainment of independence. These differences led to the formation of various factions that continued to fight each other. In other cases, poor governance, coupled with greed on the part of African political leaders, plunged countries into the depths of despair, penury and destitution. Africa is today the continent afflicted by the misery of thousands of women and children in refugee and internally displaced camps and thousands more in over-crowded prisons, with no hope of ever being given a fair trial.

In 1994, the United States Government became so concerned about insecurity in Africa that it requested an investigation into Africa's conflicts. The findings of this investigation were reflected in the Africa Conflict Resolution Act of 1994 (HR4541), which clearly indicated that Africa was afflicted by war to a greater extent than any other continent, having experienced more than twenty major civil wars since 1960. The
Act also states that, in the last decade alone, there have been between 2,000,000 and 4,000,000 refugees and some 13,000,000 displaced people in Africa. War has caused untold economic and social damage to the countries of Africa. Food production is impossible in conflict areas and famine often results. Widespread conflict has condemned many of Africa’s children to lives of misery and, in certain cases, has threatened the existence of traditional African culture. Africa’s conflicts take their root from a combination of many factors. Principal among these are the following:

- Issues relating to religious and ethnic differences;
- Religious fundamentalism;
- disputes over traditional boundaries and resource sharing;
- inequitable distribution of political and economic power;
- struggles for the reform and democratisation of political and economic systems;
- negative legacies of colonial rule; and
- ethnic competition stemming from the collapse of the old patterns of relationships that provided the framework for collaboration among the many ethnic groups of which African countries are composed.

Desperate situations ensuing from such conflicts have continued to engage the attention of the international community and the United Nations, which has the ultimate responsibility for maintaining peace and security in the world. The lessons learned during peacekeeping operations in Africa are derived from the way such conflicts have been handled, the conditions leading to the establishment of peacekeeping missions, and the way such missions have been finally executed.
CONFLICT MANAGEMENT AND PEACEKEEPING IN AFRICA

When conflicts begin, the increasingly infamous principle of 'non-interference in the domestic affairs of a sovereign state' is often invoked, particularly in the case of intrastate conflicts. Neighbouring countries, sub regional groupings, regional organisations, and the United Nations therefore stand by to see whether the various parties to the conflict can find their own solution. Historically, most African countries would have used traditional rulers and elders in society to solve such problems amicably, but colonial methods of administering justice or solving problems seemed to have eroded confidence in these measures. Instead, there has developed what could be described as a 'mixed-cultural solution to problems', which has proved to be singularly ineffectual. Conflicts now persist until the situation becomes explosive, before an attempt is made to stabilise the situation. The warning signals are never clearly analysed, and the fire truck often arrives when the fire has already scorched the country. If only intensive diplomacy at sub regional and regional levels, as well as at the level of the UN, could clearly establish when to intervene, peacekeeping operations may be unnecessary. For example, when the Lesotho uprising was contained by members of the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the positive results that timely intervention could produce, were clearly witnessed.

A clear example of intervention at the wrong time was in Rwanda. It may be recalled that when the civil war broke out in April 1994, the UN reduced its forces on the ground to an unacceptably low level, and only expanded the force after the genocide had taken place. In the case of Liberia, the ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) arrived in Monrovia in September 1990, after bitter fighting had assumed uncontrollable dimensions. The case of Somalia was no different. The warlords had been allowed to entrench themselves before the American-led coalition force arrived on the scene. The UN force which was subsequently sent to Somalia, also failed to achieve
its aim, partially because the UN operation did not fully appreciate the cultural background of Somalis.

Despite the fact that many conferences continue to discuss early warning signals and systems, the international community has not yet succeeded in identifying the signals that will call for intervention. A case in point is Burundi. The international community has long been aware that Burundi is teetering on the brink of civil war. Many opportunities have been lost in arresting the situation, while regional leaders and the international community have continued with a seemingly endless series of meetings and discussions. When will the world find a lasting solution to the conflicts in that country?

It is clear that most of Africa's conflicts escalated beyond control because of the poor and inadequate manner in which they were handled in the first place. Nipping such conflicts in the bud would save many lives and reduce the cost of eventual intervention. In recent times, delays in reacting to most of Africa's conflicts have meant the loss of the opportunity of stopping them through early warning, preventive action and peacemaking, and have necessitated the injection of peacekeeping forces into conflict-torn countries. According to the International Peace Academy, peacekeeping is a method of conflict management that is employed when a conflict escalates beyond the point where preventive action can be successful.

'Traditional' peacekeeping involves the interposition of lightly armed forces between hostile parties after the cessation of hostilities in order to assist in the implementation of a cease-fire agreement, troop withdrawal or the establishment of a buffer zone as part of a negotiated settlement between the hostile parties. Both (or all) parties would normally have agreed to the presence of a peacekeeping force and to its mandate.
Accordingly, traditional peacekeepers play both a diplomatic and a military role. Essential principles of this form of peace support operation are consent of the parties, impartiality of the peacekeeping force, and the non-use of force except in self-defence.

In recent years, a 'second generation' of multidimensional peacekeeping operations has evolved which involves the implementation of complex peace agreements. This form of peacekeeping is often necessary in internal conflicts where a state has failed in many of the functions it would normally perform. 'Second generation' peacekeeping may include, in addition to traditional military observation and confidence-building functions, various civilian tasks such as re-establishing state and civil institutions, and assisting in the processes of demobilisation, demining, disarmament, repatriation of refugees and socio-economic rehabilitation. The consent of the parties, impartiality and the non-use of force remain the fundamental principles of this form of peacekeeping, although in certain circumstances these principles may be challenged, as when a humanitarian convoy being escorted by a peacekeeping force is attacked or its free movement is hampered. In such cases, the reaction of peacekeepers lies in a 'grey zone' and may vary from little or no action indicating a strictly limited definition of self defence to more robust responses which require a more expansive notion of self defence, including actions undertaken in defence of the mandate of the peacekeeping force.

The first attempt to manage conflict in sub-Saharan Africa by using the UN peacekeeping tool was in the Congo now Zaire. On 12 July 1960, the Congolese Government cabled the UN Secretary-General for the urgent dispatch of military assistance to protect the national territory of the Congo against the Belgians. In this instance, the establishment of a UN peacekeeping force was clearly on request of an established government. This was also the case in Rwanda. Following the signing of the Arusha Peace Accord by the then government of Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic
Front, both parties approached the UN for assistance with the transition to democratic rule.

In the case of Somalia, on the other hand, the UN force did not have the consent of the parties. The same can be said of ECOMOG in Liberia. The latter force entered the port of Monrovia with neither an invitation nor the consent of all the conflicting parties. However, the sub regional organisation could not remain idle when one of its members was in a distress. Whether or not consent was received by the UN or a sub regional organisation such as ECOWAS, there were both failures and some degree of success in the above examples.

In the Congo, the UN was able, with much difficulty, to establish a modicum of sanity. In the case of Rwanda, the performance of the UN is still being debated. Was the organisation fully aware of the complexity of the problem before setting up its mission? Was the force level right? Was the UN committed to the success of the mission in terms of administrative and logistics support? Why was the mission thinned out during the beginning of the civil war, only to be expanded after large numbers of Rwandans had been killed? Truthful answers to these and many other questions will certainly unearth some useful lessons.

In the case of Somalia, several thousand UN troops were deployed without significant achievement. Was this because the consent of all the parties was not given, or was there other fundamental errors in the UN’s own approach to the problem? Did the Security Council pass its resolutions on Somalia at the appropriate time, and were the terms of reference clear to those who had to execute them?
Even assuming that all preconditions for the passing of resolutions by the UN, regional or sub regional organisations have been met, a number of other factors have detracted from the effectiveness of peacekeeping operations as a tool for the management of conflict in Africa. More often than not, member states of the UN or indeed regional or sub regional organisations are hesitant in contributing troops to peacekeeping missions. This is especially the case in Africa, where the bodies of American soldiers have been dragged through the streets of Mogadishu in full view of the world's media cameras. Likewise, the murder of ten Belgian soldiers in Kigali on the first day of the Rwandan civil war in 1994 sent a strong signal to potential troop contributors in the international community.

There have also been problems with the administrative and operational control of UN operations. Most UN missions have a Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) as head of the mission and a force commander who is responsible for the command of the military component of the mission. Neither of these two top appointees have control over the finances of the mission. It is the chief of Administration, who is controlled by a director in New York, which decides on the priorities of expenditure for the mission. Owing to the complex, multinational nature of UN operations, the force commanders have been constrained by the need for extensive consultation before ordering troops from different countries to execute tasks which are crucial to the success of their missions. Consultations tend to waste vital hours and days, eventually resulting in the loss of lives.

Some problems of control relate directly to inadequate training and linguistic diversity. The military in all the independent countries of the continent have inherited the languages of their formal colonial masters, as well as their different military cultures and standards of training. These diverse backgrounds need to be harmonised for smooth co-ordination during multinational operations. In this regard, it is gratifying to
note that many efforts are being made by major Western powers, and some select African countries, in creating joint training institutions, and running workshops, seminars, conferences and map exercises to ensure that some common denominators are established.

Problems of control have also been exacerbated by a lack of meaningful intelligence. It is common knowledge that for any operation to succeed there is the need for adequate intelligence which will enable cohesive planning. In almost all African peacekeeping operations, troops have been dispatched to the mission area with very little information about the people, their culture, their beliefs, traditions and customs. Basic geographic information has also been scarce, as few African countries have up-to-date maps, especially those of the military variety which are essential to any meaningful planning.

Perhaps the most crucial of all the handicaps has been the inadequate logistic support provided to African peacekeepers. With poor and often failing economies, most African countries can hardly meet their own domestic demands, let alone provide logistic support for a peacekeeping operation. A number of African contingents were deployed to Rwanda in 1994 without the necessary logistic support. More than six months after these contingents arrived in the theatre, they still did not have basic items such as tents, flak jackets, ballistic helmets or ambulances to carry their sick and wounded to the field hospital. The UN Charter correctly assigns the responsibility for peace and security in the world to the Security Council, but the response to Africa's conflicts, in terms of logistics, leaves much to be desired. After six years in Liberia, ECOMOG forces are still in desperate need of logistics support. It is perhaps time to ask whether Africa will keep on waiting until the UN provides essential resources, or whether African countries should begin to contribute more of their own scarce resources in the hope of drawing support from the international community.
Logistics ultimately converts into money, and vice versa. Some member states of the UN and, for that matter, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) have not been honouring their financial obligations to these organisations. There is no other way the UN can support its operations, except from the contributions of member states. Some countries in the developed world appear unwilling to give support to peace support operations, yet when a real tragedy develops due to an inadequate military response, as was the case in 1994 in the Rwandan civil war, enormous resources are put at the disposal of NGOs and UN agencies for humanitarian relief operations. Whether or not these resources serve a useful purpose, or whether it would have been cheaper in both human and material cost if the peacekeeping operation has been given the necessary support to execute its objectives, continues to be an issue for hot debate.

Some UN agencies, notably the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the UN Children's Fund (UNICEF), and the World Food Programme (WFP), as well as a number of NGOs may indeed be considered valuable partners to the military in the saving of lives. These organisations have financial and material resources that peacekeeping forces do not have. In many UN operations, however, friction has developed between the peacekeeping troops and NGOs. With adequate and coordinated training, the differences in culture and *modus operandi* can perhaps be sorted out and the gap between these groups bridged for the benefit of those who are affected by conflicts. After all, the ultimate aim of peace operations is to restore peace and stability which will enable people to return to a normal way of life.

There has also been friction between the military components of peacekeeping missions and the media. It is said that the media portrays a partial and myopic understanding of the nature of possibilities and constraints, successes and failures, which has often resulted in a distorted public perception of the peacekeepers' role. This, in turn, is having a negative effect on the national policies of some Western countries towards
peacekeeping operations. Military commanders often choose to ignore the media. This is a dangerous strategy. The duty of the media is to inform and educate. If the correct issues are concealed from them, they will find some information to occupy the space in any case. On the other hand, when handled properly, the media can be a very powerful tool for commanders in a distressful and desperate situation. In a land-locked country like Rwanda, where borders were sealed off and airports closed, the UNAMIR force would have been completely stranded had the media not projected to the world the circumstances under which the operation was taking place. In this regard, Africa's media needs to play a more active role, despite the obvious financial constraints. With proper organisation and determination they can perhaps achieve meaningful results in the realm of accurate reporting.

6.5 LESSONS LEARNED FROM PEACEKEEPING IN AFRICA

The preceding overview of conflict management and peacekeeping in Africa highlights a number of lessons which may be learned, and prompts a number of recommendations for the improvement of future peacekeeping endeavours. The more pertinent of these are listed briefly below.

- Poor governance on the part of African politicians creates fertile grounds for disunity, conflict and coups d'état.

- When ethnic and religious identity becomes a basis for the struggle for political power, Africans must realise that, unless all the various factions in a society are willing to share power, peace will continue to elude the peoples of the continent.

- Warning signals must be heeded, and traditional African methods of solving disputes should be balanced with whatever useful lessons are available from elsewhere.

- In establishing peacekeeping missions, it is necessary to study and analyse
the background to the conflict carefully before passing any resolutions to establish such a mission.

- Peacekeeping operations must be based on unambiguous resolutions.

- Having learned from past operations, the international community and all other regional or sub-regional groupings must learn to intervene at the right time, before conflicts escalate beyond control.

- Conditions that enable successful operations should be carefully weighed. Lack of consent on the part of the various factions could prolong peacekeeping operations, leading to a stalemate in certain cases.

- Financial obligations must be honoured by member states of the UN and regional and sub-regional organisations.

- In order to be effective, it is necessary to remove bottlenecks in the organisational structure of UN peacekeeping operations.

- Intelligence gathering is a serious business and must be carried out by trained and competent staff in order to achieve coherent planning.

- Effective logistics support, as an essential element of UN peacekeeping operations, cannot be over-stressed. Without it, contingents will always feel abandoned and unable to operate at their optimum. In this regard, the proposal for the pre-positioning of essential logistics items in the sub-regions of Africa is a step in the right direction.

- African leaders must show a strong political will in resolving conflicts on the continent. To place every problem at the foot of the UN because it is the world body responsible for peace and security, is not a positive attitude.

- The role of the media must be understood, and never be ignored.
• The OAU’s Mechanism for the Prevention, Management and Resolution of Conflict must be vigorously supported.

• Co-ordinated training for peacekeeping troops and civilian staff alike is necessary for success in future operations.

• Periodic conferences, seminars and workshops should bring UN agencies, NGOs and peacekeeping troops together for a common good.

6.6 CONCLUSION

The fact that Africa is the continent most afflicted by conflicts is indisputable. Both past and ongoing peacekeeping operations in Africa have exposed some weaknesses in the way conflicts have been and continue to be handled. If only timely intervention could be carried out, the escalation of such conflicts could be prevented and many precious lives saved. The lessons which have been brought to the fore require further careful study, analysis and refinement. This should be aimed at identifying appropriate and feasible measures for the implementation of meaningful recommendations. The lessons briefly enumerated in this chapter are certainly not exhaustive. What is required, is a collaborative effort on the part of the UN, regional and sub regional organisations to make effective use of these and the many other lessons which have emerged from a variety of peacekeeping forums in recent years, for the purpose of truly improving attempts to prevent and manage conflicts in Africa. If this is to materialise, the AU and African leaders must show greater resolve and exhibit much stronger political will in their effort to end the conflicts on the continent. Without this will, Africa cannot develop socially and economically.
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PDD 25, the Administration will consider the factors below when deciding whether to vote for a proposed new UN peace operation (Chapter VI or Chapter VII) or to support a regionally-sponsored peace operation:

- UN involvement advances US interests, and there is an international community of interest for dealing with the problem on a multilateral basis.
- There is a threat to or breach of international peace and security.
- There are clear objectives and an understanding of where the mission fits on the spectrum between traditional peacekeeping and peace enforcement.
- For traditional (Chapter VI) peacekeeping operations, a ceasefire should be in place and the consent of the parties obtained before the force is deployed.
- For peace enforcement (Chapter VII) operations, the threat to international peace and security is considered significant.
- The means to accomplish the mission are available, including the forces, financing and mandate appropriate to the mission.
- The political, economic and humanitarian consequences of inaction by the international community have been weighed and are considered unacceptable.
- The operation’s anticipated duration is tied to clear objectives and realistic criteria for ending the operation.
- The Administration will continue to apply even stricter standards when it assesses whether to recommend to the President that US personnel participate in a given peace operation.
- For an extensive summary, see PDD 25: Key Elements of the Clinton Administration Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations, US Department of State, 22 February 1996, <ccnet.com/suntzu75/pdd25.htm>


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