UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL UNIVERSITY

(AFRICA)

A THESIS SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE FACULTY OF THE SCHOOL OF ARTS
IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
MASTER OF ARTS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF THE ARUSHA PEACE AND RECONCILIATION
AGREEMENT IN THE BURUNDI CONFLICT

PRESENTED BY

CHANTAL NINTERETSE

USIU-A

SPRING 2013
STUDENT'S DECLARATION

I declare that this is my original work and has never been written or submitted to any University or learning institution other than USIU-A for academic credit.

STUDENT

SIGNATURE:............................................ DATE: 27/02/2013

Student's Name: Chantal Wintertase ID Number: 612235

This project has been presented for examination with my approval as the appointed supervisor:

SUPERVISOR

SIGNATURE:............................................ DATE: 27/2/13

Supervisor's Name: Prof. K. Omeje

DEAN, SCHOOL OF ARTS & SCIENCES

SIGNATURE:............................................ DATE: 1/3/2013

Professor Munyae M. Mulinge
Dean, School of Arts & Sciences

DEPUTY VICE-CHANCELLOR ACADEMIC AFFAIRS

SIGNATURE:............................................ DATE: 3/10/1/13

Deputy Vice Chancellor (AA)
DEDICATION

This thesis is dedicated to my parents Dr. Gervais Ninteretse and Mrs. Nathalie Ndayisenga, my loving husband and soul mate René-Frank Kagimbi and my siblings Jocelyne Ninteretse, Nicole Ninteretse, Diane Ninteretse and Pascal Ninteretse.

Your endless love, support and encouragement have enabled me to complete this masters program with great success.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

## 1.0 INTRODUCTION

1.1 Statement of the Problem .................................................... 1
1.2 Research Questions .......................................................... 5
1.3 Objectives of the Study ....................................................... 5
1.4 Significance of the Study ..................................................... 6
1.5 Literature Review .............................................................. 8
   1.5.1 Conceptual Meaning and Origin of Peace Processes .......... 9
   1.5.2 The Role Played by Political Elite in Fomenting Instability and Civil War in Post-Colonial Burundi ......................... 18
   1.5.3 Stakeholders Involvement in Achieving Post-Conflict Reconciliation and Peacebuilding in Burundi ......................... 21
   1.5.4 Identified Gap in the Literature ...................................... 22
1.6 Hypotheses ................................................................. 23
1.7 Methodology ............................................................... 24
1.8 Organization of the Study .................................................. 24

## 2.0 POLITICAL ELITE, INSTABILITY AND CIVIL WAR IN POST-COLONIAL BURUNDI

2.1 Introduction ........................................................................... 30
2.2 Political Elite, Peace Negotiation Processes and Prolongation of Civil War .................................................... 33
2.3 Political Parties, Militia Groups and the Civil War ............... 36

## 3.0 THE ARUSHA PEACE AND RECONCILIATION AGREEMENT AND POLITICAL INSTABILITY IN BURUNDI

3.1 Introduction ............................................................................ 43
3.2 Restructuring of the National Army and Peace Process ........ 44
3.3 The Electoral Process and Democratic Consolidation ............ 49
4.0 ACTIVITIES OF KEY STAKEHOLDERS IN POST-CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION AND PEACEBUILDING IN BURUNDI

4.1 Introduction .......................................................... 58
4.2 The Role of the United Nations ..................................... 60
  4.2.1 The United Nations Peacekeeping Mission .................. 60
  4.2.2 The United Nations Support Towards the Return of Burundian Refugees ........................................... 64
4.3 The Role of Bilateral and Multilateral Donor Agencies ........... 65

5.0 CONCLUSION

5.1 Summary Findings .................................................... 74
5.2 Recommendations ................................................... 80

BIBLIOGRAPHY ............................................................ 84
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACCORD</td>
<td>African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMIB</td>
<td>African Mission in Burundi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BINUB</td>
<td>United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BNUB</td>
<td>United Nations Office in Burundi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CENI</td>
<td>Commission Electorale Nationale Independante</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CNDD-FDD</td>
<td>Conseil National pour la Défence de la Démocratie-Forces pour la Défence de la Démocratie</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DDR</td>
<td>Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAO</td>
<td>Food and Agriculture Office of the United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FNL</td>
<td>Forces Nationale de Liberation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRODEBU</td>
<td>Front pour la Démocratie au Burundi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GOB</td>
<td>Government of Burundi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HDI</td>
<td>Human Development Index</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICG</td>
<td>International Crisis Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDPs</td>
<td>Internally Displaced Persons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NDF</td>
<td>National Defence Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PALIPEHUTU</td>
<td>Parti pour la Liberation du Peuple Hutu</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
UN United Nations
UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNOB United Nations Operation in Burundi
UNOCHA United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
UNSC United Nations Security Council
UPRONA Parti de l’Unité et du Progrès National
USAID/OFDA United States Agency for International Development, Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance
IMC Implementation Monitoring Committee
JCM Joint Ceasefire Commission
NCDRR National Commission on Demobilization, Reinsertion and Reintegration
NPDRR National Program on Demobilization, Reinsertion and Reintegration
APPMs Army and members of Armed Political Parties and Movements
IFES International Foundation for Electoral Systems
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I am heartily thankful to my supervisor Professor Kenneth Omeje whose engagement; support and guidance from the initial to the final stage enabled me to conduct this research to completion.
CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION

1.1 Statement of the Problem

The period following the Second World War was marked by a surge of intra-state conflicts on the African continent, and studies show that there have been more than thirty wars recorded in Africa since 1970 (Nhema, 2008). Burundi, a landlocked country located in East-Central Africa was of no exception. Since its independence in 1962, Burundi has been plagued by series of inter-ethnic conflicts caused by political instability and ethnic violence. The population of Burundi is made of three ethnic groups; 14 percent Tutsi, 85 percent Hutu, and one percent Twa. Conflict in Burundi has, since the end of colonialism been characterized by the unequal access to political power, especially between the two main groups, Tutsi and Hutu. The central thesis of this research focuses on the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement of August 20, 2000 and the role it has played in addressing the main causes of incessant instability in Burundi. It therefore focuses on three primarily objectives. The first objective aims at examining the involvement of political elite in fomenting instability and civil war since the end of colonialism. The second objective of this study focuses on assessing the suitability of the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement in redressing the issues underlying the civil war and political instability in Burundi. Finally, this study makes an outline of the efforts made by different stakeholders in achieving post-conflict reconciliation and peacebuilding in Burundi.
Burundi leadership from the period of independence in 1962 to the early 1990s has been under the Tutsi elite, with limited access of Hutu majority, into both the government and military force. Several attempts by the Hutu majority to forcibly cease power have been tried with limited success (Lemarchand, 1994: 34).

In 1972, an attack by Hutu rebellion in which an estimated 300,000 Tutsi were killed, resulted in a retaliation of Tutsi-led military. An approximate 200,000 Hutu lost their lives and more than 150,000 are reported to have fled to the neighboring countries. With a large number of Hutu in exile, the event of 1972 became a major trigger of the conflicts between the two ethnic classes. Fear of suppression among Hutu living in Burundi and a belief among Tutsi minority that the military is the only protection available against any resurgent of Hutu rebellion constituted the main causes of insecurity across the country. The leadership of the country remained in the hands of Tutsi-majority military and in an effort to seize the political power, two more attempts by Hutu rebel groups launched attacks against Tutsi population in 1988 and 1992, killing Tutsi civilians (Lemarchand, 1994:130). Consequently, the military force was called upon to restore order in the regions under attack, causing the loss of human lives to rise with the killing of Hutu rebels in the retaliation process.

However, in an effort to move the country towards democracy and slowly address the question of unequal access to power, the incumbent government led by President Buyoya started the process of inclusion and a new constitution was adopted in 1992. The new constitution called for a multiparty system while at the same time forbidding ethnic-
based political parties (ICG, 2008). Since then, several political parties were created, and a general election was held in June 1993, with Melchior Ndadaye, a Hutu, being the first democratically elected president of Burundi. The election of a Hutu member was an immense victory among the Hutu community in Burundi as well as among the Hutu diaspora (Daley, 2008: 81).

The victory among the Hutu community did not last for long, since after four months into presidency; low-level soldiers executed president Ndadaye along with his close dignitaries. The killing triggered Hutu members of the president’s party, the Front Pour la Démocratie au Burundi (FRODEBU), now deprived of their long awaited victory to a massacre of innocent Tutsi across the country. Acts of revenge followed, leading to an escalation of a 13 years civil war. As a result, an approximated three hundred people lost of lives, and another four hundred became refugees in Tanzania and other neighboring countries.

More importantly, the killing of Ndadaye led to a political and power vacuum that led to the restoration of Tutsi elite to power. According to the constitution of Burundi, the Speaker would take over as interim president, in the event of the death of the Speaker, then, the deputy-speaker would take over this role (Daley, 2007). Unfortunately, the speaker and deputy-speaker had been killed and this situation prompted the National Assembly to vote for an election of a new interim speaker, who was sworn in the office on February 5th, 1994 (Bentley and Southall, 2005:51). Unfortunately, the latter was
killed in the plane crash in which he was travelling with former Rwandan President, Juvenal Habyarimana on April 6th, 1994.

Another attempt was made to establish a functioning government with two leading political parties, Parti de l’ Unité et du Progrès National (UPRONA) and the Front pour la Démocratie au Burundi (FRODEBU) but because of incessant infighting, mistrust between the two parties and their inabilitys to rule the country; former Burundi president Buyoya overthrew the government in 1996.

The effects of the war were overwhelming and devastating, not only to the country itself, but also to the East African and Great Lake region. In an attempt to restore a peaceful cohabitation between the two ethnic groups and reinstate stability in the region, African Heads of states initiated a peace process that culminated into the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement (ICG, 1998). The initial phase of the process began in November 1995 under the auspices of the Great Lakes Regional Peace Initiative. This attempt was very significant in the sense that it signaled that the region was going to take the leadership in the mediation process while the United Nations and the rest of the international community would play a supportive role (Ayebare, 2009).

Peace processes, are defined as conflict resolution mechanisms to mitigate conflicts emanating from intra-state wars. The practice has been successful in bringing opposing leaders to the table of negotiation and to reach a compromise. However, scholars of peace studies such as Roger Mac Ginty have increasingly argued that political
accommodations resulting from peace agreements have failed to lay the foundation for
questions contemporary peace processes, which he calls “liberal democratic peace”, for
systematically failing to produce positive peace in war-torn countries. It is therefore
against this background that this study makes an attempt to assess whether the Arusha
accord has been successful in laying the foundation for durable peace and stability.

1.2 Research Questions

This analysis will address the following research questions:

1. What is the role played by political elite in fomenting instability and civil war in
   post-colonial Burundi?

2. How suitable was the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement in redressing
   the issues underlying the civil war and political instability in Burundi?

3. What were the efforts made by different stakeholders in achieving post-conflict
   reconstruction and peacebuilding in Burundi?

1.3 Objectives of the Study

This study is guided by a number of objectives:

1. To comprehend the role played by political elite in fomenting instability and civil
   war in post-colonial Burundi.

2. To assess whether the Arusha Agreement framework was suitable to address the
   underlying causes of the civil war and political instability in Burundi.
3. To evaluate the efforts made by different stakeholders in achieving post-conflict
reconstruction and peacebuilding in Burundi.

1.4 Significance of the Study

An analysis of the impact of the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement is very critical at the moment when peace agreements have become the commonly used mechanisms for conflict resolution worldwide. Darby and Ginty (2000:50) contend that over the course of the 11 years between 1988 and 1998, at least 38 formal peace accords were signed which aimed at resolving internal conflict in 33 states. Peace agreements are based on the principle of liberal democracy, where representation of all is the central theme. Peace processes involve creating a neutral ground for dialogue between warring parties, and according to Hopkins (2000), it involves a rational dialogue and produces the most enduring and just solutions to national conflicts.

The end of Burundi ethnic civil war came as a result of a long series of negotiations aimed at bringing the warring parties to a common understanding on the most appropriate power-sharing mechanism. The negotiation period was a very long process and this was not only caused by protagonists failing to come to an agreement but also to numerous international actors acting to protect their vested interests (Daley, 2007).

The establishment of a power-sharing government between the two main ethnic groups, the Hutus and Tutsis was the main mandate of the Arusha peace process and
when the Agreement was signed in 2000, it received wide acclamation from the international community (Daley, 2008). Of great importance was the consensus by all conflicting parties to draft a new constitution that would guarantee ethnic representation into government institutions. Seats in the National Assembly would be allocated according to a ratio of 60 percent to 40 percent in favor of the Hutu majority, while an equal representation of 50 percent would be guaranteed in military forces. These major developments culminated in a 92 percent vote to a referendum on the new Constitution in 2005, and consequently to a general election in August 2005 that brought President Nkurunziza to power, as the second democratically elected president of Burundi (Daley, 2008: 221).

However, the acclaimed peace agreement was characterized by numerous deficiencies, which, according to several scholars in peace and security studies represent the root causes for a slow post-conflict reconstruction and peace building. While the international community congratulated Burundian elites for agreeing on a power-sharing political accommodation, it failed to bring to a halt cessation of hostilities. Two rebel groups remained adamant to the Arusha protocols and continued to launch attacks and causing civilian casualties until late in 2005 (Daley, 2007: 333).

Another indication of the deeply flawed peace offered by this Accord is that twelve years later, Burundi is still ranked among the poorest countries worldwide, with limited prospects for economic recovery. Francis (2008:182) argues that liberal peace-building processes in post-conflict states are yet to improve the social indications of the
African poor, and this finds evidence with the World Bank Burundi country report (World Bank, 2012) that “an estimated two-thirds of Burundi’s eight million people live on less than US$ 1.25 a day.” The same report indicates that socioeconomic progress has been much slower than it was hoped in 2005 and attributes this slow development to the country’s dependence on international donors and extremely limited options for realistic and independent development strategies.

In view of the above, the rationale for this study is therefore to demonstrate that the Arusha Accord, while widely acclaimed by the international community has failed to restore peace and stability for ordinary Burundians. A thorough analysis of this Accord through the set objectives will be conducted and will help inform political leaders on the best conflict intervention mechanisms necessary to attain sustainable peace and political stability.

1.5 Literature Review

The literature review of this study will explore the writings and researches conducted in this area and will focus on three issue areas. The first category will explore the origin of peace agreements as a step forward towards understanding the making of the Arusha Accord. The second category of this literature review will assess available literature on the role of political elite in fomenting instability that led Burundi conflict to last more than a decade. Finally, the third issue area will cover the involvement of different stakeholders in achieving post-conflict reconstruction and peacebuilding in Burundi. The
three main issue areas will be critically analyzed and linked to the peace process that led to the signing of the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement on 20 August 2000.

1.5.1 Conceptual Meaning and Origin of Peace Processes

Peace process is a mechanism for conflict resolution, which involves mediation techniques to bring opposing parties to an agreement. It involves a rational dialogue and produces the most enduring and just solutions to national conflicts (Hopkins, 2000). Conflict, which is the main trigger for any peace process to begin, is defined as a struggle or a contest between people with opposing needs, ideas, beliefs, values or goals. Conflict resolution scholar, Kriesberg (2004:2) defines conflict as a general term that “arises when two or more persons or groups manifest the belief that they have incompatible objectives.”

Persistence of conflict and the lack of peace in a given state constitute a threat to a country’s development. The devastating effects of a conflict (number of human lives losses, emigration as a result of insecurity or persecution; decrease of economic activities, etc) prompt external actors (mediators) to the conflict to intervene in an attempt to help warring parties to reach an agreement. Omeje (2008), in his article “Understanding Conflict Resolution in Africa”, argues that the intervention of a third-party becomes pertinent when conflict goes beyond the resolution capacity of the direct disputants. He indicated that external actors bring additional resources, skills and perspectives to the conflict process. External parties could be mediators, arbitrators, or facilitators, hence making the process of conciliation between opposing parties a peace process.
Literature on the concept of peace process is founded on liberal democratic peace, a theory that has been the foundation for several peace agreements worldwide. According to liberalism theory, the world is not just composed of state actors as being unitary actors, but also of other non-state actors such as international and non-government organizations, individuals and groups (Viotti and Kauppi, 2010:11).

The collapse of communism and the rise of an increasing number of fledging democracies to replace authoritarian regimes provide a good test bed for democratic peace theory (Viotti and Kauppi, 2010:139). Peace processes also find their basis on Kantian principle that liberal democracies are the most efficient approaches since they enable shared values and common approach to be established through peaceful relations (Viotti and Kauppi, 2010: 143). Robert Keohane, a neoliberal scholar, places a keen interest on the role of international institutions, and argues that states use international institutions for self-interested reasons, and these institutions perform important tasks that enhance cooperation. In other words, institutions allow states to accommodate differences and upgrade the interests they share in common (Viotti and Kauppi, 2010: 135). The leading agents of peace processes are very often regional and sub-regional organizations and according to Olonisakin (2000) “people from outside an environment may be judged to be better mediators simply because they are not perceived to be stakeholders in the society.” He posits that these organizations tend to have specific advantages over actors from outside their region, since they often have a greater interest in the affairs of their neighborhoods and a desire to manage regional conflicts.
Darby and Ginty (2000) define peace process as distinguished from a treaty by its duration, and posit that above all, it is a process. They argue that it must be able to sustain numerous pressures from the intervention of diverse actors; is often suspended, or sometime halted for a substantial period. The outcome of a peace process therefore depends largely on the extent to which key actors regard it as a feasible approach to resolving their differences (Darby and Ginty, 2000: 3).

The concept of peace process places an important emphasis on democracy, a process through which people’s interests and their willingness to be governed are reflected in the way collective decision-making is made (Tukumbi, 2005:12). Tukumbi (2005) defines liberal democracy as the system of governance that in principle, protects citizens’ rights and privately-owned instruments of production, such as factory building, natural resources, land, machinery among many others.

Peace processes are also best understood when analyzed in the realm of Galtung’s concept of negative and positive peace (Galtung, 2004: 189). Positive peace, according to Galtung (2004), is filled with positive content such as restoration of relationships, the creation of social systems that serve the needs of the whole population and the constructive resolution of conflict. Negative peace on the other hand, occurs when something undesirable stops happening such as cease-fire. In his analysis on the possible approaches of finding peace, Galtung argues that you cannot have positive peace without negative peace. It will be torn to pieces (Peace Direct, 2012).
However, in spite of the above strong arguments in favor of liberal peace for their potential to resolve conflicts, it is becoming quite apparent that some forms of Western-style democratic systems are struggling to take root on the African continent (Nhema, 2008: 2). Scholars of peace and conflict studies are increasingly arguing that liberal peace have failed to produce positive peace in war-torn countries. While most of the African states have adopted constitutions that aim to serve the needs of the people through periodic elections, the majority of them are still struggling to establish effective frameworks necessary for a viable democratic order (Nhema, 2008). An analysis published by the African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD) on the coherence dilemma in post-conflict reconstruction systems indicates that an estimated quarter of all peace agreements fail in the first five-years after they have been signed (Coning, 2008:19).

According to Ginty (2006:120), numerous contemporary post-peace accords reached in civil and intra-state wars have failed to deliver durable peace and provide high-quality peace. Rather than peace, many post-peace accord societies experience a 'no war, no peace' situation (Ginty, 2006: 126). His central thesis is based from a peace perspective and demonstrates why contemporary peace accords have failed to deliver durable and high-quality peace. He highlights his concern on the quality of peace in post-peace accords and stalled peace process societies. His argument is that peace will remain elusive and fragile in post-peace accord societies as long as these latter fail to address the core conflict contributing problems in deeply divided societies (Ginty, 2006: 131).
Another factor, according to Ginty (2006), that renders peace processes to be deficient is the fact that western driven peace accords lead to a devastating impact on the economy of post-accord societies. International financial institutions lay down rigorous market reform conditions in return for economic assistance, which usually prompt governments to implement austerity packages, such as sacking government employees. Such developments yield to peace deficit resulting from a decline in inhabitants’ living standard (Ginty, 2006: 185). He goes further with this analysis and posits that priorities of the local population is subordinated to the needs of the international community and this is more explicit by the international support for electoral processes, as means of validating the success of a peace accord (Ginty, 2006:163). In a similar vein, Nhema (2008) echoes Ginty’s remarks by highlighting that while the role of external actors is laudable; Africa will have to rely heavily on its own to provide long-term solutions to its own problems (Nhema, 2008: 3).

More available literature continues to posit that contemporary peace agreements in Africa have failed to lay solid foundation for post-war reconstruction. Patricia Daley (2007) argues that peace negotiations have had limited success in Africa because they have been unable to transform the social system within which violence and inequalities are embedded. Using the Burundi peace agreement as evidence and a case study, she indicated that while rebel groups rejected the agreement, political parties reluctantly signed the agreement, hence resulting in a peace agreement without a cessation of hostilities. What followed was a power-sharing agreement that appeared to put more
emphasis on dividing the institutions of governance among political parties and rebel movements, while the security and living standard of ordinary people remain in tact.

In a similar vein, the International Crisis Group (2000) indicated that three months after the signature of the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement, prospects of a permanent resolution of Burundi conflict were very dim. The main rebel group, which had rejected the agreement joined president Kabila's military forces in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), hence making the peace agreement, the beginning of a resurgence of violence (ICG, 2000).

Paris (2009) in his article on the effects of liberal peace building on post-conflict countries argue that the effectiveness and appropriateness of promoting liberal democracy and market economics in volatile conflict-prone societies are contested and that the concept of liberal peace building and the manner in which it is promoted in fragile and divided societies are problematic. He questions the neutrality of peace building activities in their economic orientations and the role of international organizations in attempting to put an end to civil conflicts through promotion of certain political and economic models (Paris, 2009: 76). He observed that “the process of political and economic liberalization is inherently tumultuous: it can exacerbate social tensions and undermine the prospects for stable peace in fragile conditions that typically exist in countries just emerging from civil war.”
Using the case of Afghanistan Justice sector reform, Paris (2009) argues that western donors were the principal architects of the design of justice sector reform as well as other public policy areas. In doing so, they have put more emphasis on reform rather than reconstruction. Prior the 2001 western intervention in Afghanistan, the practice of legal reform was characterized by negotiations and consensus among diverse legal traditions. However, Western judicial reform assistance not only negated the Islamic law but has engaged little efforts to consult with the Afghan population. As a result, instead of an integrated and agreed upon judicial system, division arose between Islamic law and Western statutory law (Paris, 2009). In other words, international organizations have paid inadequate attention to domestic institutional conditions for successful democratization and marketization, and as a result, liberalization has the potential to exacerbate conflict. In the same analysis, it was concluded that contemporary practice of peace building were fundamentally flawed since they are overly intrusive, arguing that they represent a new form of imperialism or colonialism.

Susan Willet (2005:569), in her assessment of liberal peace in Africa, brings evidence to support that neo-liberal policies have been instrumental in establishing domestic and economic tensions that have contributed to violent conflict in Africa. She argues that liberal peace is loosing the ground in Africa, since liberal democracy principles brought by the West have failed to secure sustainable peace. The liberal peace, which is based on Immanuel Kant's principle that economic interdependence, democracy and the rule of law constitute sustainable foundations for world peace, thrives to address Africa intra-state conflicts with power-sharing solutions (Willet, 2005:510). During
power sharing negotiations, international organizations are focused on freezing conflicts at a certain point and fail to deal with the root causes of conflicts, most specifically those dealing with social and economic inequalities. The outcome of such negotiations has been unsustainable peace processes and frameworks for renewed violence (Willet, 2005:570). She uses John Darby’s findings (2001) that “out of the 38 formal peace accords signed between January 1988 and December 1998, 31 failed to survive more than three years”. In her analysis, the rationale for this failure is attributed to the fact while power-sharing negotiations emphasize on redistribution of political accommodations, issues of social, economic injustice and inequalities are still off the agenda.

More literature goes further in examining the impact of liberal peace process on the development of post-peace accords societies. Mindful of the fact that no peace can take root in any given society unless the country is developed and its inhabitants have the means to survive, with prospects of a future hope. Daley (2007), in her analysis of Burundi conflict resolution process, deplores the fact that peace negotiations are perceived to be arenas of political struggles between a multitude of supporting actors seeking to advance vested interests. According to her assessment, the role of mediation in the hands of non-state organizations and consultants has turned peace processes into a veritable industry (Daley, 2007: 343). In a similar vein, Daley (2007:348) reported that Structural Adjustment Program (SAP) was reintroduced in Burundi after the signing of the peace agreement under the new name of Poverty Reduction and Growth Strategy but with the same neo-liberal reforms: monetary and exchange rate policies, liberalizing external trade, privatizing public enterprises and reforming the civil services. She argues
that these reforms have had negative implications for the provision of social welfare policies in the post-conflict situation at a time of acute demand of health and other social services (Daley, 2007:355). The result of such failed and deficient peace agreements is a situation where conflict persists and a failure of the national economy to recover from great depression. Twelve years since the Arusha Accord was signed, Burundi is still ranked among the poorest countries worldwide (UNDP, 2012). Burundi Human Development Index (HDI) is 0.316, which gives the country a rank of 185 out of 187 countries with comparable data (UNDP, 2011).

Stiglitz (2000), in his analysis of liberal policy reform such as free markets, argue that market liberalization do nothing other than exacerbate social inequalities and feed social tensions in the worlds poorest developing countries. According to Willet (2005: 581), this issue is supported by several other leading analysts who provided strong evidence that the effect of neo-liberal policies have intensified horizontal inequalities, weakened indigenous institutional capacities, increased indebtedness, and rendered countries more prone to external shocks of currency and commodity price fluctuations.

Adekanye (1995:89) extends his assessment on the impact of liberal peace in Africa. He posits that International Monetary Fund’s short term stabilization policies designed to reduce inflation, restore currency convertibility and renew debt servicing, have all occasioned loan recipients into deep public expenditure cuts, tightening of fiscal, credit and monetary policies. He therefore argues that these measures have weakened
states' capacity to provide social safety nets, health, education, law and order, and thus resulting in the eroding of public institutions.

1.5.2 The role played by political elite in fomenting instability and civil war in post-colonial Burundi

A review of the causes of post-colonial civil strife in Burundi indicates that political elite have played a tremendous role in fomenting and instigating violence among ordinary Burundians. For the purpose of this study, political elite is defined as representatives of political parties, top officials of the incumbent government, as well as the military regime

While the literature is not extensive on this subject, Patricia Daley (2008), in her extensive research on Burundi history of violence, revealed certain levels of violence instigation from the elite class. Starting from the period of 1993, when the first democratically elected president was assassinated, it is believed that the Government of Burundi (GoB), led by then president Ndadaye, leader of Front Pour la Démocratie au Burundi (FRODEBU) is thought to have acted in a manner that instigated the military to exercise a coup d'état that led to his assassination. In the aftermath of the national elections that brought him to presidency, president Ndadaye’s reform of the state security services and civil service may have prompted Tutsi military officials to remove him from office (Daley, 2008:98). Gahama (1999), a well-known historian from Burundi has attributed the beginning of tensions by the exclusionary nature of FRODEBU’s political and economic policies. Gahama’s research findings indicate that:

All governors of the 15 provinces and the mayor of Bujumbura were from FRODEBU and that Tutsi and Hutu UPRONA civil servant were replaced by militants from FRODEBU right through the levels as low as the communal secretaries or the market security guards (Gahama, 1999:23).
According to Daley (2008), the military was Tutsi-dominated, of 20,000 soldiers, only 1,024 were Hutus and only three Hutus were among the 700 senior officers. President Ndadaye reform of the security services sent negative signals to the Tutsi dominated military, who saw control of the security forces as their guarantor against genocide (Daley, 2008: 82).

Another explanation of the military coup highlights the lack of understanding of democratic politics and elections among the Hutu community, who exhibited a "winner-take-all" approach after their massive victory. This assumption reveals that in order to rectify several years of discrimination from accessing both political and economic arenas of the country, FRODEBU members felt entitled to adopt an exclusionary attitude, which is believed to have created a revolt among the Tutsi, refusing to accept the re-organization of the state and their eventual loss of power (Daley, 2008: 83).

Political parties from both sides have also significantly contributed on fomenting chaos in order to gain political advantages and advance their political agenda. They embarked on establishing militia groups to create insecurity and fight against their adversaries. Tutsi-affiliated political parties on the one hand established youth paramilitary groups, which closed down urban areas in a ville morte (dead city) campaign. This move to close down the city prompted a forced displacement of Hutus from certain districts of Bujumbura city and other major towns (Daley, 2008). On the other hand, the Parti Pour la Liberation du Peuple Hutu (PALIPEHUTU), which was
against the democratic elections had already launched attacks against the regime. Daley (2008) posits that between 1993 and 1995, it had a strong presence in Kamenge and Kinama suburbs and supported Hutu militia attacks against Tutsi after the assassination of president Ndadaye.

The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) established a commission in 1995 to investigate on facts relating to the assassination of the President of Burundi as well as on the massacres and other related acts of violence that followed. Results of the commission denounced the implications of political parties and the military in the killing of ordinary Burundians. Leaders of FRODEBU party are reported to have instigated killings of Tutsi minority as reported by the UNSC:

Evidence is sufficient to establish that acts of genocide against Tutsi minority took place on 21 October 1993, and the days following, at the instigation and with the participation of certain FRODEBU functionaries and leaders up to the commune level (UNSC, 1996).

The same report indicated a lack of impartiality from military authorities in preventing the killings of Hutus by Tutsi civilians and Burundian army:

The evidence shows that indiscriminate killing of Hutu men, women and children was carried out by members of the Burundian army and Gendarmerie, and by Tutsi civilians. Although no evidence was obtained to indicate that the repression was centrally planned or ordered, it is an established fact that no effort was made by the military authorities at any level of command to prevent, stop, investigate or punish acts (UNSC, 1996).
1.5.3 Stakeholders involvement in achieving post-conflict reconciliation and peacebuilding in Burundi

The signing of the Arusha Accord was greeted with a wide acclamation from the international community, congratulating representatives of the government of Burundi, the opposition parties as well as facilitators to the process for coming to an agreement that would bring to an end a decade plus of violent ethno-political conflict. The Burundi peace process was very long, lasted for more than ten years, a period during which several stakeholders had mobilized to find the best way to institute a power-sharing agreement between all belligerents.

The president of the Security Council, in a meeting held on 29 September 2000, welcomed the signature of the Arusha Peace Accord and expressed its warm appreciations to the President Nelson Mandela in his capacity of facilitator of the Burundi peace process. Similarly, he congratulated Burundian parties, including the Government of Burundi for its commitment in the negotiation process. This meeting marked the beginning of different stakeholders involvement in the Burundi post-conflict reconstruction phase. During this meeting, the president of the Security Council welcomed a call for progressive resumption of assistance to Burundi to alleviate urgent humanitarian and economic needs (UNSC, 2000).

The desire of the international community to help Burundi overcome its political and social decline became more evident at a donors' round table in Paris, France in December 2000. During this meeting, USD 440 million was pledged for urgent
humanitarian, rehabilitation, reconstruction and long-term development needs of Burundi (Relief Web, 2001). More funding continued to be released in a response to Burundian authorities' considerable progress in advancing the peace process since the signing of the Arusha Accord of 20 August 2000. According to IMF (2004), Burundian authorities had exerted a strong implementation of the post-conflict program that has contributed towards improved economic conditions, achieved the objectives of controlling inflation and mobilizing financial support from other multilateral and bilateral sources.

In an attempt to continue advancing the country towards a sustainable post-reconstruction path, the Government of Burundi (GoB) designed a three-year Poverty Reduction Strategy aimed at stabilizing the economy, implementing financial and structural reforms as well as restoring social service. The international community positively reviewed the implementation progress of this strategy, and many more donors, both multilateral and bilateral donor agencies pledged to continue their support in achieving post-conflict reconciliation and peacebuilding in Burundi. It was also a result of this significant progress that Burundi was granted a Debt Relief of USD 826 Million under the Enhanced Initiative for Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (World Bank, 2009).

1.5.4 Identified Gap in the Literature

Several scholars have devoted much attention on the viability of peace agreements, focusing on their successes as well as on their limitations. The Burundi peace accord has attracted several scholars in peace and security study, and have investigated on its entire process as well as on the role of numerous actors in reaching the
agreement that was signed on 20 August 2000. However, this literature, while significant in providing a thorough understanding on the origin and mechanisms shaping the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement, as well as on the role of political elite and that of external donors to support brokered agreements, it does have a significant gap in assessing its overall impact. The rationale of this study is therefore to address this identified gap by conducting an assessment of institutional reforms born out of the Arusha Accord and determine whether such an agreement has been able to achieve its intended objective, that of restoring peace and establish a viable post-conflict reconstruction.

1.6 Hypotheses

1. Political elites have played a significant role in fomenting instability and civil war in post-colonial Burundi.

2. Mechanisms created under the auspices of the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement have produced flawed peace and little prospects for post-conflict reconstruction.

3. Several actors including local civil society organizations, United Nations organizations, donor agencies as well as regional heads of states have strongly contributed towards achieving post-conflict reconciliation and peacebuilding in Burundi.
1.7 Methodology

This research study will be conducted through secondary sources of data. Information will be gathered and assessed from published books, reports from the Government of Burundi, published journals, policy reports and research reports from international bodies. Publications from donor agencies as well as local and international news reports will also be studied to provide a thorough understanding of this study. The Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement has received wide international interest and there is a wide literature on the subject as well as on the concept of peace process. The conduct of this study by the use of this methodology will be very vital for the successful completion of this work. It will enable an extensive analysis of diverse opinions from the above-mentioned sources and as such, viable conclusions and recommendations will be elaborated.

1.8 Organization of the Study

This study is structured into five chapters. Chapter One of the study serves as the general introduction with a historical background of the study. It also outlines the objectives, hypothesis, literature review and the research methodology to be used in this thesis.

Chapter Two will make an analysis of the role played by political elites in fomenting instability and civil war in post-colonial Burundi.

Chapter Three of this study will consist of an assessment of whether the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement has successfully created mechanisms for sustainable post-conflict reconstruction.
Chapter Four will outline efforts made by different stakeholders in achieving post-conflict reconstruction and peacebuilding in Burundi.

Chapter Five will provide conclusions and recommendations for the study.
2.1 Introduction

The period following the end of colonialism was marked by recurrent turbulence due to inter-ethnic conflicts between the Hutu and Tutsi, two main ethnic groups in Burundi. Right from independence in 1962, tensions between Hutu and Tutsi had begun, especially during the elections period of 1961 that brought to power Prince Louis Rwagasore. Since then, political tensions in Burundi have always been centered on ethnicity, causing all contests for political power to be organized and linked directly to ethnic affiliations.

In 1992, President Buyoya, in response to multiple pressure from the international community to institute a democratic system in Burundi, called for a referendum to introduce multi party politics and elections. A new constitution was voted by referendum at 92 percent and encouraged political parties to subscribe to the Charter of National Unity under Article 55 of the new Constitution (Daley, 2008). This period marked the beginning of a second wave of multi-party politics since the assassination of Prince Rwagasore on 13 October 196. Several political parties were hence established, and all of them were believed to be aligned with specific ethnic groups, thus making politics in Burundi, a struggle for ethnic representation in major political institutions.
The political history right after independence brings light to the involvement of political elite in fomenting instability and civil war. The leadership of the country from the period of independence in 1962 to the early 1990s has been under the Tutsi elite, with limited access of Hutu majority, into both the government and military force. Several attempts by the Hutu majority to forcibly cease power have been tried with limited success (Lemarchand, 1994: 34).

In 1972, an attack by Hutu rebellion in which an estimated 300,000 Tutsi were killed, resulted in a retaliation of Tutsi-led military. An approximate 200,000 Hutu lost their lives and more than 150,000 are reported to have fled to neighboring countries. With a large number of Hutu in exile, the event of 1972 marked major conflicts between the two ethnic classes, fear of suppression among Hutu living in Burundi, and a belief among Tutsi minority that the military is the only protection available against any resurgent of Hutu rebellion. The leadership of the country remained in the hands of Tutsi-majority military and in an effort to seize the political power, two more attempts by Hutu rebel groups launched attacks against Tutsi population in 1988 and 1992, killing Tutsi civilians (Lemarchand, 1994: 118-130). Consequently, the military force was called upon to restore order in the regions under attack, causing the loss of human lives to rise with the killing of Hutu rebels in the retaliation process.

The newly adopted constitution of 1992 opened doors for a new political dynamics where several political parties became established, and a general election was held in June 1993, with Melchior Ndadaye, a Hutu, being elected president of Burundi.
The political history right after independence brings light to the involvement of political elite in fomenting instability and civil war. The leadership of the country from the period of independence in 1962 to the early 1990s has been under the Tutsi elite, with limited access of Hutu majority, into both the government and military force. Several attempts by the Hutu majority to forcibly cease power have been tried with limited success (Lemarchand, 1994: 34).

In 1972, an attack by Hutu rebellion in which an estimated 300,000 Tutsi were killed, resulted in a retaliation of Tutsi-led military. An approximate 200,000 Hutu lost their lives and more than 150,000 are reported to have fled to neighboring countries. With a large number of Hutu in exile, the event of 1972 marked major conflicts between the two ethnic classes, fear of suppression among Hutu living in Burundi, and a belief among Tutsi minority that the military is the only protection available against any resurgent of Hutu rebellion. The leadership of the country remained in the hands of Tutsi-majority military and in an effort to seize the political power, two more attempts by Hutu rebel groups launched attacks against Tutsi population in 1988 and 1992, killing Tutsi civilians (Lemarchand, 1994: 118-130). Consequently, the military force was called upon to restore order in the regions under attack, causing the loss of human lives to rise with the killing of Hutu rebels in the retaliation process.

The newly adopted constitution of 1992 opened doors for a new political dynamics where several political parties became established, and a general election was held in June 1993, with Melchior Ndadaye, a Hutu, being elected president of Burundi.
According to the British Broadcast Corporation, the election of a Hutu member was an immense victory among the Hutu community in Burundi as well as among the Hutu diaspora (BBC Monitoring, 2012).

The victory among the Hutu community did not last for long, since after four months into his presidency; low-level soldiers executed president Ndadaye along with his close dignitaries. The killing triggered Hutu members of the president’s party, now deprived of their long awaited victory to a massacre of innocent Tutsi across the country. Acts of revenge followed, leading to an escalation of a 13 years civil war. The civil war caused an approximate three hundred loss of lives, and another four hundred refugees in Republic of Tanzania and other neighboring countries.

The effects of the war were overwhelming and devastating, not only to the country itself, but also to the entire East Africa and Great Lake region. In an attempt to restore a peaceful cohabitation between the two ethnic groups and reinstate stability in the region, African Heads of states initiated a peace process that culminated into the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement (ICG, 1998). The initial phase of the process began in November 1995 under the auspices of the Great Lakes Regional Peace Initiative, and not the African Union or the United Nations. This attempt was very significant in the sense that it signaled that the region was going to take the leadership in the mediation process while the United Nations and the rest of the international community would play a supportive role (Ayebare, 2009).
2.2 Political Elite, Peace Negotiation Processes and Prolongation of Civil War

The Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement of 20 August 2000 is a peace process that sought to bring all political parties to the table of negotiations. In consideration of the above literature, representatives of political parties, who were the major stakeholders in the peace process, were aligned with specific ethnic groups, hence resulting in a power-sharing system characterized to be serving the needs of political elite (Tieku, 2012).

At the onset of the civil war in 1993 that followed the assassination of President Ndadaye, the United Nations sent a special envoy, Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah to Burundi with a mandate to negotiate a power-sharing agreement between two parties, pro-Hutu Front Pour la Démocratie au Burundi (FRODEBU) and pro-Tutsi Parti de l’Unité et du Progrès National (UPRONA). The negotiations occurred during the period of January and September 1994 and both parties signed an agreement, the Convention of Government. Of major importance, the objective of this Convention was to establish a set of arrangements that allowed for a political accommodation with power-sharing between Hutu and Tutsi-dominated political parties (Falch and Becker, 2008:15). Results of this agreement were therefore a grand coalition government with decision-making bodies whose representatives emanated from all major political parties. As such, the opposition parties (Tutsi) were allocated 45 percent of ministerial posts in the government, including the post of Prime Minister. Further, in the same proportion, the opposition would fill the posts of governors of provinces, local administrators and
ambassadors of Burundi to foreign countries (Curtis, 2003:15). According to Rene Lemarchand (2006:45), this new power sharing agreement brought the Hutu and Tutsi political parties together in decision-making institutions both at the local and national levels, and carried the principle of parity. However, while the main objective of this agreement was to institute a power-sharing political system in which the contesting ethnic groups would be represented, these negotiations were exclusively at an elite level. The rebel groups, which were formed at the beginning of the civil war, were not included in the negotiation talks, and fighting against the army continued in spite of the brokered power-sharing agreement.

Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah (2000:67), in his report, indicated that signing parties to the agreement failed to abide by several agreements of the Convention of Government and this was mainly caused by the unwillingness of both parties to settle the disputes in due time. The same report revealed that both sides strategized to prolong the negotiations and tried to bid their time in the negotiation process. According to Ould-Abdallah (2000), his experience as a third party made him to analyze that on the one hand, the inexperience FRODEBU leadership, the main pro-Hutu party was unsure on how to divide power and was waiting to see how events unfolded in the Rwandan conflict, hoping that the government would gain victory over the Tutsi-dominated opposition party. On the other hand, UPRONA leaders, under pressure from Tutsi dominated parties wanted to weaken the adverse party by delaying the process while at the same time hoping to obtain more concessions on their side from the negotiations.
Similarly, the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement of August 2000, while widely acclaimed by the international community for being a successful attempt in Africa, was only brokered between political elite, the incumbent government and representatives of 17 political parties. Two main rebel groups, the Conseil National pour la Défense de la Démocratie et Forces de Défense de la Démocratie-Forces pour la Défense de la Démocratie (CNDD-FDD) and the Forces Nationale de Liberation (FNL) remained outside the agreement, and continued to launch attack on civilians and causing several casualties even after the signature of the Accord (Daley, 2007:340).

Another important aspect that illustrates how the political elite was responsible for prolonged instability is the luxurious perquisites, commonly known as perks paid to delegates during the negotiation process. Kwasi Tieku (2010:12), in his analysis of the impact of perks on peace processes reported that extravagant perks such as daily allowances allocated to delegates have distracted participants from their original objective of the negotiation talks. Having realized that they could save an equivalent of a five-month salary in one period of just one week, Burundian delegates started to engage in ways that would prolong and delay the negotiations in order to earn as much as possible (Reyntjens, 2000:22). The International Crisis Group (2000:16) reported on the same phenomena by indicating that Burundian delegates invested more efforts in resistance strategies than in participating in the peace process. This tactic was more favored by those who felt that they could make more money to invest in long-term projects or build own houses.
An analysis from these peace-negotiation attempts reveal that political elite, had they focused and devoted more time and energy on resolving the grievances of the civil war by including all stakeholders and interested parties, the civil war on Burundi would have not lasted for more than a decade and peace and stability would have restored quickly.

2.3 Political Parties, Militia Groups and the Civil War

A review of the causes of post-colonial civil strife in Burundi indicates that political elite have played a tremendous role in fomenting and instigating violence among ordinary Burundians. For the purpose of this study, political elite is defined as representatives of political parties, top officials of the incumbent government, as well as the military regime.

While the literature is not extensive on this subject, Patricia Daley (2008), in her extensive research on Burundi history of violence, revealed certain levels of violence instigation from the elite class. From the period of 1993, when the first Hutu elected President was assassinated, it is believed that the Government of Burundi (GoB), led by then President Ndadaye, leader of Front Pour la Démocratie au Burundi (FRODEBU) is thought to have acted in a manner that instigated the military to exercise a coup d’État that led to his assassination. In the aftermath of the national elections that brought him to presidency, President Ndadaye’s reform of the state security services and civil service may have prompted Tutsi military officials to remove him from office (Daley, 2008:45). Gahama (1999), a well-known Burundian historian has attributed the beginning of
tensions by the exclusionary nature of FRODEBU’s political and economic policies. Gahama’s research findings indicate that:

All governors of the 15 provinces and the mayor of Bujumbura were from FRODEBU and that Tutsi and Hutu UPRONA civil servant were replaced by militants from FRODEBU right through the levels as low as the communal secretaries or the market security guards (Gahama 1999:23).

The military was Tutsi-dominated, of 20,000 soldiers, only 1,024 were Hutus and only three Hutus were among the 700 senior officers (Reyntjens, 200:12). President Ndadaye’s ethnic representation reform of the security services sent negative signals to the Tutsi dominated military, who saw control of the security forces as their guarantor against genocide (Daley, 2008:82).

Another explanation of the military coup highlights the lack of understanding of democratic politics and elections among the Hutu community, who exhibited a “winner-take-all” approach after their massive victory. This assumption reveals that in order to rectify several years of discrimination from accessing both political and economic arenas of the country, FRODEBU members felt entitled to adopt an exclusionary attitude, which is believed to have created a revolt among the Tutsi, refusing to accept the re-organization of the state and their eventual loss of power (Daley, 2008:83).

Political parties from both sides have also significantly contributed in fomenting chaos in order to gain political privileges and advance their political agenda. They embarked on establishing militia groups to create insecurity and fight against their adversaries. Tutsi-affiliated political parties on the one hand established youth paramilitary groups, which closed down urban areas in a ville morte (dead city)
campaign. This move to close down the city prompted a forced displacement of Hutus from certain districts of Bujumbura city and other major towns (Daley, 2008). On the other hand, pro-Hutu political parties have also contributed in creating insecurity across the country. For example, the Parti Pour la Liberation du Peuple Hutu (PALIPEHUTU), which was against the democratic elections launched attacks against the regime. Daley (2008) posits that between 1993 and 1995, it had a strong presence in Kamenge and Kinama suburbs and supported Hutu militia attacks against Tutsi after the assassination of President Ndadaye.

The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) established a commission in 1995 to investigate on facts relating to the assassination of the president of Burundi, as well as on the massacres and other related acts of violence that followed. Results of the Commission denounced the implications of political parties and the military in the killing of ordinary Burundians. Leaders of FRODEBU party are reported to have instigated killings of Tutsi minority according to the UNSC (1996):

Evidence is sufficient to establish that acts of genocide against Tutsi minority took place on 21 October 1993, and the days following, at the instigation and with the participation of certain FRODEBU functionaries and leaders up to the commune level (UNSC, 1996).

In a similar way, the same report indicated a lack of impartiality from military authorities in preventing the killings of Hutus by Tutsi civilians and Burundian army:

The evidence shows that indiscriminate killing of Hutu men, women and children was carried out by members of the Burundian army and Gendarmerie, and by Tutsi civilians. Although no evidence was obtained to indicate that the repression was centrally planned or ordered, it is an established fact that no effort was made by the military authorities at any level of command to prevent, stop, investigate or punish acts (UNSC, 1996).
In conclusion, the above literature proves with sufficient evidence that political elite, which comprised of leaders of political parties, paramilitary groups, leaders of rebel groups, and the military have strongly contributed in creating an environment for instability and continued violence across the country. The Arusha Accord peace process, which lasted for 4 years, turned into a lengthy and tedious process as a result of political elite searching to advance ethnic representation while at the same time securing their political privileges. One criticism emanating from this phenomenon argues that power-sharing agreements fail to account for cases of fragmentation (Vorrath, 2009:8). For the case of Burundi, because of several benefits from participating in the peace process, Burundi political structure experienced a sequence of political parties’ fragmentations where new parties emerged and strong divisions within existing parties occurred (Vorrath, 2009). Vorrath’s research on political conflict lines in Burundi, she found that while Burundi only had two relevant political parties representing the two ethnic groups before the civil war in 1993, the period of negotiations and transition saw a significant fragmentation. At the beginning of the peace process, there were 6 participating parties, but the number of political parties had more than doubled, reaching 17 by 1998. (Vorrath 2009:12). An analysis of this phenomenon leads to conclude that power-sharing accommodation in Burundi has failed to secure peace and stability but rather created avenues for prolonged insecurity. In addition, this brings to light criticisms from several scholars who argue that liberal peace does not result in positive peace, but rather in negative peace, where peace agreements are signed in spite of ongoing insecurity as it was the case for Burundi. Consequently, processes for democratization failed to control actions of political elite and the latter used peace negotiations forum as avenues to
advance personal privilege while at the same time luring ordinary Burundians to engage in massacres against one another and promote sporadic attacks across the country as a means to voice their positions.
3.1 Introduction

The Arusha Peace Agreement was a result of a peace process designed in line with liberal democratic peace, a theory that has been the foundation for several peace agreements worldwide. According to neo-liberal theory, the world is not just composed of states actors to be unitary actors, but also of other non-state actors such as the international and non-government organizations, individuals and groups (Viotti and Kauppi, 2010:11). Goldstein and Pevehouse (2009) elaborate on the neo-liberal theory assumptions and indicate that the latter place a keen interest on the role of international institutions, and that states use international institutions for self-interested reasons, and these institutions perform important tasks that enhance cooperation. As a result, neo-liberal approach argues that war and violence appear as irrational deviations that result from defective reasoning and that harm the interests of warring parties (Goldstein and Pevehouse, 2009).

The liberal democratic peace theory finds its origin in neo-liberal theory because it argues that democracies do not fight each, tend to be more peaceful and create models for peace resolution of conflicts. Liberal peace has been developed as one of the approaches that promote settlement of disputes through institutions, which create avenues for peaceful negotiations between conflicting parties. For the purposes of
this study, liberal approaches established to end the war will be examined and a relationship between liberal institutional reform and the quality of peace delivered to Burundians as a result of the Arusha Accord will be at the center of this chapter. This analysis will examine the restructuring of Burundi National Army as well as the democratization process adopted at the signing of the Arusha Accord.

From the beginning of the 20th century, this approach has been the leading engine behind some successful stories and merits and is associated with noble causes (Ginty, 2006:33). However, many scholars of peace and security studies are increasingly arguing that liberal peace has failed in many instances to deliver durable peace and sustained development in post-war conflict states. Using the case of Burundi conflict, this study attempts to highlight some of the major institutional reform failures that were established under the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement.

3.2 Restructuring of the National Army and Peace Process

The Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement, which was signed on August 28, 2000 was based on the principle of restoring peace and stability through the creation of a new framework for Burundi’s political institution. Under the Agreement, a new constitution was adopted by referendum (92 percent vote) with specific provisions for proportional and equal access to political power by all ethnic groups. Parties to the agreement agreed to adopt a distributive agreement, making the government to contain 60 percent Hutu and 40 percent Tutsi both in parliament, senate and public enterprises as a way to ensure
ethnic balance in all political institutions (Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement, 2000).

The same political accommodation was also applied to reform the security sector, and this was considered to be the most crucial element of the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement. In the spirit of fostering durable stability and ethnic balance in the security sector, the Agreement provided for a Demobilization, Reinsertion and Reintegration program (DDR). The DDR process was spearheaded by the African Mission in Burundi (AMIB) and its operations continued to be under the control of the United Nations Office in Burundi (UNOB) at the end of AMIB mission in Burundi. The DDR program took place from 2004 to 2008 (Bryden and Schrerrer, 2012) and involved all parties to the conflict except for Palipehutu-FNL, one political party, which was still outside the table of negotiations at the time of its establishment.

Restructuring the army, as stipulated by Marley (1996) is a process of adding the representation of ethnic and political groups into a nation’s armed forces by deliberately increasing recruitment of previously under-represented groups and by absorbing former opposition forces. For the case of Burundi, the restructuring of national army consisted of absorbing former opposition forces into the army and demobilizing excess number of armed forces to 25,000 members to form a new National Defense Force (NDF) (CIGI, 2011).

The Arusha Accord and subsequent agreements established several structures to support the implementation of the DDR program and these included the Implementation
Monitoring Committee (IMC), the Joint Ceasefire Commission (JCM), the National Commission on Demobilization, Reinsertion and Reintegration (NCDRR) and the National Programme on Demobilization, Reinsertion and Reintegration (NPDRR) (Gilligan et al, 2010:20). The IMC, which was composed of members of the international community, civil society and Arusha signatories had the mandate to ensure that the Arusha provisions were provided for throughout the implementation of the DDR. The JCM had the responsibility to ensure that the DDR process was in full compliance with the ceasefire and that provisions for military reform were respected. This body comprised of members of the national army and members of Armed Political Parties and Movements (APPMs).

While the JCM and the IMC consisted of ensuring that provisions of the Arusha and other agreements were respected, the NCDRR and NPDRR had the mandate to conduct the different stages of DDR. They had the responsibility to demobilize an estimated 55,000 ex-combatants from armed forces, members of APPMs, and support their reintegration into civilian life. Another major important aspect of these structures was to support the reinsertion of an estimated 20,000 members of the Gardiens de la Paix government militia and approximately 10,000 combatants militants from various APPMs (MDRP Burundi, 2004).

The process of demobilization, reintegration and reinsertion (DRR) is an approach that has been designed to complement peace agreements, which have proved over the years, to be incomplete as long as former combatants remain outside the newly
established political institutions (Schrerrer and Bryden, 2012:79). It is a Western, liberal approach aimed at providing durable peace in war-torn countries by providing security and stability to former combatants. In the absence of such programs, any peace brokered becomes vain, since this group represents a window of vulnerability for the brokered peace to be sustained. The overall objective is therefore to distance former combatants from rebel forces and integrate them into civilian life, the national army or the national police force (Gilligan et al, 2010).

However, in spite of the fact that this process is a complex program with the potential to deliver durable peace and stability, results continue to prove insufficient. The implementation and management of DRR programs are very complex and very expensive programs that post-conflict countries cannot execute without the support of the international community. Not only are they designed by Western donors, they usually do not deliver on their promises as a result of the lack of sufficient funding to make them successful. In the case of Burundi, the MDRP Burundi (2004) reported that the overall budget allocated to the DDR program was USD 76 million and out of 55,000 estimated combatants to be demobilized, only half of them received a demobilization package. Those who benefited from this program were able to receive a reinsertion package of a minimum of USD 600, which was allocated in conformity with their official rank status (Boshoff and Waldemar, 2006: 40). This financial assistance was designed to enable former combatants to reintegrate into their homes of origins and regain a dissent and productive life into their communities (Peace Security and Development Network, 2010).
The above data offer an indication that the institutional reform of restructuring of the national army did take place in accordance with the Arusha Accord due to the support of the international community. However, challenges remained within the new institutions to operate effectively and ensure national security. The Civilian disarmament as a result of the DDR continued to pose serious threat to national security even after the completion of the DDR program (CIGI, 2011). This is because the Arusha Accord was signed without cessation of hostilities and at the time when the DDR started its operation, one opposition party, the FNL still remained outside the negotiations. As a result, insecurity continued and public confidence in Burundi’s security institutions persisted.

Furthermore, the newly established National Defense Force, which received laudable comments for successfully integrating and representing all ethnic groups does experience significant internal problems. Burundi lacks financial and material resources and suffers from poor management of existing resources (CIGI, 2011). Accordingly, the lack of human capacity due to lack of education comes to exacerbate the situation, hence making the Burundi security sector reform deficient and questionable.
3.3 The Electoral Process and Democratic Consolidation

The lack of a democratic process in political institutions is believed to have been at the root of Burundi civil war. The civil war which erupted in 1993 after the assassination of a democratically elected President marked a leap backward in Burundi democratization process. The 1993 elections were held as a result of a reestablishment of multi party political system, and was perceived by many as the beginning of a process towards consolidating democratic reforms in Burundi. When president Ndadaye was elected at 65 percent, it was not only a victory for the FRODEBU party, but also to millions of Hutu who had been outside Burundi political institutions for a very long time (Daley, 2008).

The Arusha Accord, which sought to bring various parties to the table of negotiation emphasized on laying the foundation for equal opportunity in governmental institutions, as well as the re-establishment of democracy. It is therefore under the auspices of this Accord that the Government of Burundi (GoB) was called to organize presidential and legislative elections upon the end of power-sharing transitional government. In June 2005, a four-phase electoral process began under which President Nkurunziza from Conseil National pour la Défense de la Démocratie et Forces de Défense de la Démocratie (CNDD-FDD) was overwhelmingly elected at 64 percent. The election process was conducted in a relatively calm atmosphere, and results were acknowledged both by domestic and international observers (CENI Report, 2010). Five years later, as stipulated by the constitution, the incumbent government of Pierre Nkurunziza adhered to the rule of law and organized a second round of elections in 2010. According to national and international observers as well as the media and civil society,
the elections adhered to international standards and more or less reflected public opinion. Although they all agree it was a free and fair election, there were admittedly some irregularities and intimidation between the different parties (African Press Organization, 2010).

However, while the two rounds of presidential and legislative elections have been organized pursuant to the constitution since the year 2005, the financial and institutional framework required under the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement to hold nationwide presidential and legislative elections deserves particular attention. According to the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) (2011:44) in Burundi, an estimated $35,000 was required to support the entire 2010 electoral process. Out of this amount, the contribution from the GoB was $5,600, which represents 17 percent of the required budget, leaving the largest funding requirement to be fulfilled by the international community. One of the key components for ensuring that the 2010 elections were free and fair, was the establishment of the Commission Electoral Nationale Indépendante (CENI), which is a permanent and independent electoral management body. The creation of such an important institution required a heavy investment to ensure and promote its credibility and independent character. The same institution was responsible for the management of 2005 elections but since it lacked its permanent nature, its operations were closed after the election process, hence making the 2010 elections preparations to be a new start and heavy process to re-establish (IFES 2010).
The reopening of the CENI was an intensive and very expensive process. Burundi is subdivided into 17 provinces and 129 communes, and the CENI had to open its offices from the capital Bujumbura all the way to the communal level. Being ranked as one of the poorest country in the world, the GoB did not have the capacity to fully fund the establishment of such a prestigious institution. The international community, through the UNDP and other bilateral donor agencies became the key engine behind the successful management of the electoral process. For example, the UNDP supported the process through the coordination process and upon receipt of an official electoral assistance request from the GoB, initiated a basket fund, under which several donors were requested to contribute.

At the institutional level, the international community, through the basket fund, provided support to the CENI by building the capacity of newly recruited staff in the management and understanding of the entire electoral cycle (UNDP 2011:24). The International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES), an American-based organization with the expertise in the management of elections, helped CENI commissioners to design and launch a nationwide voter education campaign aimed at educating the populace on the different stages of the electoral cycle. Similarly, IFES recognized the already existing local civic watchdogs organizations and supported their efforts to ensure transparency and electoral integrity (IFES, 2010). Of great importance was also the UNDP contribution in assuring electoral materials were transported across the country, a task that required significant logistic operations.
Burundi’s electoral process of 2010 could not have succeeded without the support of diverse donors. The CENI was officially launched on 29 February 2009 and within a year, it was mandated to recruit its commissioners and open branches across the country in all the 17 provinces (CENI Report, 2010:98). Similarly, the CENI had to develop and design a framework of the electoral process such as codes of conduct for all political parties and national election observers. According to the International Crisis Group (2010), the 2010 elections were reported to be free and fair, and the GoB was able to achieve this success through considerable support of the international community.

An analysis of the requirements for the management and conduct of democratic and transparent electoral process leads to the assumption that while democratic government based on citizens’ right to vote their representatives is a surest and reliable roadmap to restoring and sustaining peace, the government of Burundi, just like many other third world countries, is not in a position to fulfill this obligation on its own. Out of an estimated $713,500,000 of state revenues in 2011, fifty percent of it came from international financial aid (Republic of Burundi Senate, 2011).

The liberal democracy propounded by western countries is a form of governance that prompts African nations to engage into institutional reforms that require astronomical financial capabilities. The requirement to institute democratic government through elections, is an example of the many institutional reforms that are well beyond government’s ability to implement, hence making African nations into continued grip of foreign aid support. Moyo (2009:49) in her analysis of international aid in Africa
demonstrates that foreign aid is the source of continued poverty in Africa despite several millions of US dollars spent on African states in form of financial assistance. The case of Burundi gives evidence to Moyo’s analysis since more than USD 110 million have been granted to the GoB by the World Bank under the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF) agreement. The main objective of this financial aid being was to stabilize public expenditures, increase customs and tax revenues, boost economic growth and curb inflation since 2007. Yet, the country remains one of the poorest countries in the world; its human development index is 0.316, which gives the country a rank of 185 out of 187 (International Human Development Indicators, 2011).

In conclusion, the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement Accords have not been able to deliver a positive peace to the population of Burundi. After more than of 10 years since its signature, Burundi is still plagued by recurrent insecurity and low quality of life for the majority of its population. The restructuring of the army, through the DRR program has produced negative results due to lack of sufficient funding to implement the program. Only half of targeted beneficiaries were covered by the DDR program, leaving the other half deprived from economic sources of opportunities, hence the increase of insecurity both in the rural and urban areas. The democratization process, while a very pertinent aspect of political stability, needs to be adapted to the means and capacity of local governments. Nhema (2008) argues that most of the African states have adopted constitutions that aim to serve the needs of the people through periodic elections, but the majority of them are still struggling to establish effective frameworks necessary for a viable democratic order. Ginty (2006:163) also deplores the lack of efficiency of the
Liberal democracy and posits that priorities of the local population is subordinated to the needs of the international community and this is more explicit by the international support for electoral processes, as means of validating the success of a peace accord. Given the situation of Burundi, efforts to advance Burundi democratization process as propounded by the Arusha Accord, are hampered by the inability of the GoB to sustain established institutions.
CHAPTER FOUR

ACTIVITIES OF KEY STAKEHOLDERS IN POST-CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION AND PEACEBUILDING IN BURUNDI

4.1 Introduction

Post-conflict reconstruction, according to Cullen and Forman (1998), is a critical step in the continuum between humanitarian relief and longer-term development assistance. It requires all the responsiveness of an emergency operation, as well as a vision of how interventions fit into the longer-term development scheme (Cullen and Forman, 1998: 35). A focus on post-conflict reconstruction in Africa is of the essence since research on the incidence of civil wars on the continent indicates a decrease from an average of 7.5 civil wars per year in the period of 1990-1999 to 3.4 civil wars per year in the period 2000-2007 (Nkurunziza, 2008). According to the same source, there were only three active civil wars in 2007 as opposed to the period between from 1960 to 1999 when the incidence of civil war was the highest on the African continent.

Post-conflict reconstruction projects are vital in the sense that they help to establish mechanisms aimed at preventing post-conflict societies from relapsing into violence. The duration of war in any given country is usually a key determinant on what type of post-conflict reconstruction projects are needed. The longer the period of war, the more economies of these countries are depleted and deteriorated; hence the need for the external intervention to rebuild post-conflict societies. The civil war in Burundi lasted for 14 long years, causing a deterioration of the national economy but also causing a
deterioration of the humanitarian situation across the country. According to the IMF (2011:20), Burundi experienced a positive growth rate and a moderate increase of its Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in the period before 1992. However, Burundi economy declined sharply and by 2007, it had not recovered to its 1992 GDP level. On a humanitarian front, several hundred of Burundians fled the country to neighboring countries, and many more were internally displaced. According to the United State Agency for International Development, Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (USAID/OFDA) (USAID/OFDA, 2004), there were an estimated 770,000 Burundian refugees in Tanzania refugee camps, and 1.3 million displaced population across the country in the year 2004.

The signing of the Arusha agreement in 2000 by the warring parties was highly welcomed by the international community, for the belligerent had come to a consensus on the need to end the war and work towards developing the country. Several donors committed to intervene in Burundi post-conflict reconstruction projects and the signing of this Agreement marked the beginning of a long post-conflict period. This chapter will therefore discuss the intervention of major stakeholders in helping the Government of Burundi rebuild its political institutions to ensure stability.
4.2 The Role of the United Nations

4.2.1 The United Nations Peacekeeping Mission

The United Nations has been one of the greatest stakeholders in helping Burundi to rebuild itself from a civil war that has claimed more than three hundred lives and displaced 1.3 million people (USAID/OFDA, 2004). Tarimo and Manwelo (2007:23) contend that the international peacekeeping mission is generally recognized as a methodology of political transformation and peace enforcement, and this is the approach the United Nations has opted in its strategy to support Burundi. A deployment of a peacekeeping mission to Burundi became imperative in order to help Burundian leaders rebuild their country; and the need for a peacekeeping mission was strongly highlighted during the peace process that led to the signature of the Arusha Accord. Article 8 of Protocol V of the Arusha Agreement provided that “immediately following the signature of the Agreement, the Burundian Government shall submit to the United Nations (UN) a request for an international peacekeeping force” (Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement, 2000). Restoring peace and security are deemed to be very crucial for any post-conflict reconstruction to take place, and the presence of a UN peacekeeping mission was perceived to be the solution to ensuring that all ethnic groups across the country were secure and well protected. Many of the leaders of political parties, who participated in the Arusha peace process lived outside the country at the time of peace negotiations, and demanded that individual protection be provided as a pre-requisite for their return in the country. In this regard, an African Mission in Burundi (AMIB) was deployed from the African Union in April 2003 and political elite, mainly the heads of political parties and members of the transitional government were all offered a special
protection unit (ACCORD, 2004). This security service, in the hands of foreign troops was also aimed at encouraging the elite class to work towards developing and rebuilding their country without fear. One year later, a United Nations peacekeeping mission was launched in Burundi under the United Nations Security Council resolution 1545, and as such, the African troops were rehatted as the United Nations Operation in Burundi (UNOB) in 2004 (ICG, 2004).

The concept of peacekeeping mission worldwide falls under the UN Peacekeeping Commission, which was created in 2005 by the United Nations Security Council resolution 60/180 and resolution 1645. Its main mandate is to prevent a relapse into conflict in post-war societies and focuses its attention on the reconstruction and institution-building efforts necessary for recovery from conflict. It also has the mandate to support the development of integrated strategies in order to lay the foundation for sustainable development (Biersteker, 2007). In the case of Burundi, restoring peace and security became a crucial provision under the Arusha Agreement and as stipulated under Article 8 of Protocol V, a UN peacekeeping mission was established in Burundi in 2004. Burundi was chosen as one of the first two clients of the newly established UN Peacekeeping Commission and peace consolidation strategy in Burundi went through three different phases, which depended largely on how implementation of the Arusha Accord evolved (CIC, 2008:97). In 2004, a first phase of peacekeeping mission was established by the UNSC, by its resolution 1545 of 21 May 2004. The rationale for this mission was motivated by the fact that the UNSC realized that the situation in Burundi continued to present a threat to international peace and security in the region. The
mandate of this mission was quite large and extensive, and one of the main objectives of this mission was to ensure the respect of the ceasefire agreement by monitoring their implementation and investigating their violations. Of great importance as well, this mission was mandated to provide security in troubled areas in order to facilitate the provision of humanitarian assistance and facilitate the voluntary return of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) (UNSC, 2004). During this period, the Government of Burundi (GoB) initiated a campaign aimed at encouraging all refugees to return to their homes and this coincided well with refugees’ strong desire to regain their integrity and respect by returning to their homeland. In 2004, there were some 777,000 Burundian refugees in Tanzanian refugee camps and an estimated 141,192 IDPs across the country, whose settlement was vital for long-term stability and durable peace (UNHCR, 2004). The UN peacekeeping mission became vital during this critical phase of repatriating refugees and its efforts were commendable in providing a secure environment in the areas of return. According to UNHCR (2004), the deployment of some 5,650 peacekeeping forces has greatly facilitated the repatriation process. The UN peacekeeping mission in Burundi was also of great importance during the process of Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR). Its main responsibility in this program was to secure pre-disarmament assembly points and oversee the movement of ex-combatants to pre-disarmament centers (Boshoff and Very, 2006:41).

The second phase of the UN peacekeeping mission was the establishment of the United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi (BINUB) after successful completion of the UNOB mandate on 31 December 2006. The UNSC, by its resolution 1719, decided to establish another mission with the purpose of supporting the GoB in its efforts towards
long-term peace and stability. This mission had the responsibility to ensure that all UN agencies were well coordinated across the country and this integrated approach of the UN peacekeeping proved to be successful with commendable results (United Nations Peace Operations, 2008). The BINUB mission successfully designed a cohesive UN approach to peace consolidation through the development of a framework for the activities of the entire UN activities in Burundi. Similarly, a UN integrated peace consolidation support strategy for the period 2007-2008 was developed and approved by the GoB, and this served as the basis for the allocation of US$35 million by the United Nations Secretary-General, drawn from the Peacebuilding Fund (PBF). This funding enabled the GoB to support its priority plan which was identified in the area of good governance, strengthening the rule of law within security forces; strengthening of justice; and the land issue in the context of the reintegration of affected populations (United Nations Peace Operations, 2008:10).

The United Nations continues to support Burundi in its post-conflict reconstruction, and since 2010, the UNSC by resolution 1959 established the United Nations Office in Burundi (BNUB). In a meeting of 7 December 2011, the UN Secretary General proposed that upon completion of the BINUB mandate in Burundi, this latter be succeeded by the BNUB. During this meeting, the Special Representative of the Secretary General, Karin Landgren noted that Burundi had made considerable progress in its peacebuilding efforts. Some positive developments cited were the normalization of relations between the government and the extra-parliamentary political parties due to the launch of quarterly meetings between the government and the registered political parties.
However, in spite of this progress, the need for socio and economic development was highly emphasized if the peace is to be maintained (Security Council Report, 2012). It is therefore against this background that while Burundi has made significant strides towards consolidating its democracy, the BNUB continues to offer support to the GoB to rebuild its economy so that all citizens can live in peace and freedom.

4.2.2 The United Nations Support Towards the Return of Burundian Refugees

A return of all Burundian refugees represented an important signal towards the normalization of the national security situation, and one of the main tenets of the Arusha Agreement was to establish mechanisms necessary for the repatriation of all refugees who migrated to neighboring countries. Upon signing of the Accord in 2000, the Government of Burundi (GoB) adopted a policy of voluntary return of all refugees, with a special target to those who had migrated to neighboring country, Tanzania. As soon as the UN peacekeeping mission was deployed to Burundi to help secure the transport of returning refugees and providing security in their homes of origin, the GoB initiated a massive campaign to inform all refugees that peace and security had been restored, and conducted several visits in refugee camps to encourage some 680,000 refugees to return to their homeland (UNHCR, 2000).

The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), which is the UN agency in charge of refugees worldwide, became the leading partner to the GoB in this massive and ambitious program. Conducting a repatriation of thousands of Burundians was a very expensive project that the incumbent government could not have achieved without the support of the international community. The UNHCR, by its
mandate, had the responsibility to conduct a registration of all refugees residing in refugee camps; provide transport from Tanzania up to their communes of origins in Burundi; and distribute return packages, which comprised of an equivalent of a six-month food ratio; some basic items for initial settlement; documents required to obtain a national identity; as well as documentation for unaccompanied minors (UNHCR Burundi, 2004). The repatriation program was a very intense and sensitive project, failure of which could have jeopardized the viability and integrity of the new government. However, in spite of the sensitive nature of this project, the UNHCR conducted the repatriation process of over 500,000 refugees from 2002 to 2012 with due diligence and proved to be efficient in coordinating its efforts with the GoB’s institutions and other non-governmental organizations that were in charge of implementing reintegration programs for the returnees (UNHCR, 2012).

4.3 The Role of Bilateral and Multilateral Donor Agencies

Bilateral and multilateral donors have traditionally been the key engines behind reconstructions of post-conflict societies. Depending on the duration of a civil war, economies of post-conflict societies are often depleted and reduced to a level of bankruptcy; and hence are not in a position to address societal shocks such as humanitarian crisis, nor respond to long-term development needs of their populations. In most cases, these countries are characterized by budget deficits, and often depend on the assistance of the international community, through bilateral and multilateral donors. According to the IMF (2011), Burundi is today one of the poorest countries in the world, with per capita income just over $100 per year on a purchasing power parity basis. Until
1992, the growth rate was positive, and the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita increased moderately. However, between 1993 and 1996, a period of intense fighting between the GoB and rebel groups, Burundi’s economy contracted sharply. In 1997, some progress in economic recovery were made for the first time in many years, but by 2007, Burundi’s GDP had still not recovered to its 1992 level (IMF, 2009:20). The case of Burundi is supported by evidence to Collier’s research (1999) who indicated that countries inherit ravaged economies with depleted physical and human capital; very limited financial resources to fund their development efforts; and diversion of resources to non-productive activities. More findings in this area indicate that the average financial opportunity cost of armed conflict in Africa over the period 1990-2005, in addition to the human tragedy of the conflicts, was estimated at $18 billion or 15 percent of GDP per year. This calculation, which is computed on the basis of the difference between a country’s GDP and its projected level if the country had not experienced conflict; indicates that the cumulated opportunity cost over the 15-year period is estimated at $300 billion (International Action Network on Small Arms, 2007).

It is therefore against this background of depleted economies of governments in post-conflict societies that the international community intervened to support Burundi. Several donors have supported and continue to support the GoB in its efforts to rebuild the country, but for the purpose of this study, only major donors’ contributions will be discussed. International support to Burundi can be put into two categories; the first being humanitarian and relief assistance; and the second category being developmental assistance. Several years of conflicts resulted in massive displacements of some 1.3
million people, with sporadic attacks, which temporarily displaced an average of 25,000 to 70,000 residents each month (UNOCHA, 2005). According to the Food and Agriculture Office of the United Nations (FAO) (FAO, 2012), 90 percent of Burundians live on subsistence farming, and such a constant population movement resulted in a non-exploitation of the agriculture sector and hence causing food deficit across the country.

The GoB, unable to meet the growing demands of food and non-food items, depended heavily on the efforts of both bilateral and multilateral donors in the country. Two major bilateral donors have worked hand in hand with the GoB in alleviating the suffering of people in need; and these were the United States of America and the European Union.

The United States Government, through the United States Agency for International Development/Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (USAID/OFDA) was one of the leading bilateral donors in addressing emergency humanitarian situation in the country. OFDA is the office within USAID responsible for providing non-food humanitarian assistance in response to international crises and disasters, and its contribution was very vital to Burundi as a whole. When warring parties signed the Arusha Agreement in August 2000, fighting continued between government forces and rebel group movements. The lack of cessation of hostilities was the basis of a continued insecurity and a deterioration of the living conditions of ordinary Burundians, especially in rural areas. The main focus of USAID/OFDA was to offer support in the area of agriculture; food; nutrition; health; and water sanitation. These programs were
implemented across the country through implementing partners, whose expertise were to operate and provide emergency relief to vulnerable populations. OFDA funding level was very significant in Burundi, at an average of USD 15 million a year for the entire post-conflict period until it closed down its offices in 2009 due to an improved humanitarian situation in the country. In 2003, the GoB signed an agreement with one of the main rebel group, the Conseil National pour la Défense de la Démocratie-Forces pour la Défense de la Démocratie (CNDD-FDD) and this marked the beginning a remarkable improvement in humanitarian conditions as the security situation gradually improved across the country (OCHA, 2007).

Another leading bilateral donor in humanitarian assistance was the European Union (EU). The EU’s intervention to Burundi was in line with the European Commission’s strategy of prioritizing support for victims of humanitarian crisis. Burundi being ranked as one of the poorest countries in the world, the EC became committed to supporting the GoB in meeting humanitarian demands of its citizens. From 1999 to 2003, the EU committed a generous funding support of 61 million euros and maintained an annual funding level of 15 million euros until 2012 (European Commission, 2011).

While the GoB was in the process of negotiating with the remaining rebel groups to bring to an end hostilities; the interventions of bilateral donors enabled to bring peace and stability by ensuring that emergency needs of Burundian populace were met in due time. Similarly, multilateral donors have worked directly with government institutions in their efforts to establish democratic principles. The largest multilateral donors in Burundi
were the World Bank and the European Union, and have provided 66 million Euros and 69 million Euros respectively in 2010 (UNDP, 2012). The contribution of these donors have been very vital to the GoB, and this can be assessed by the numerous successes achieved within an unstable political environment in which the country has been plagued since the beginning of the civil war in 1993. In 2005, the GoB was able to conduct presidential and legislative elections in accordance with the constitution, and these elections, according to both international and national observers were reported to be free and fair (CENI 2005). Five years later, another round of elections was organized in 2010, and while the opposition called for a boycott due to allegations of a non-transparent electoral system, the international community as well as election observers all declared that Burundi 2010 presidential and legislative elections were conducted according to the rule of law (African Press Organization, 2010). Other major achievements include the improvement in public financial management, which resulted in a 30 percent increase in revenue collection from 2010 to 2011; and improvement in establishing a favorable business climate, which made Burundi to be rated among the top 10 reformers in the “Doing Business”, and to be the only African country on that list (Trade Mark East Africa, 2012).
CHAPTER FIVE

CONCLUSION

5.1 Summary Findings

The outbreak of Burundi civil war in 1993 prompted African Heads of States within the East African and the Great Lake region to intervene in an attempt to help Burundians restore peace and security in their country. Their efforts were later joined by the international community, which spearheaded the negotiations process that led to the signing of the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement of 20 August 2000. During the negotiation period, warring parties held long series of discussions in order to reach a consensus on the most appropriate power-sharing mechanism.

The establishment of a power-sharing government between the two main ethnic groups, the Hutus and Tutsis was the main mandate of the Arusha peace process and when the Agreement was signed in 2000, it received wide acclamation from the international community (Daley, 2008). Of great importance was the consensus by all conflicting parties to draft a new constitution that would guarantee ethnic representation into government institutions. Seats in the National Assembly would be allocated according to a ratio of 60 percent to 40 percent in favor of the Hutu majority, while an equal representation of 50 percent would be guaranteed in military forces. These major developments culminated in a 92 percent vote to a referendum on the new Constitution in 2005, and consequently to a general election in August 2005 that brought President Nkurunziza to power, as the second democratically elected president of Burundi (Daley, 2008: 221).
However, the acclaimed peace agreement was characterized by numerous deficiencies, which, according to several scholars in peace and security studies represent the root causes for a slow post-conflict reconstruction and peace building. While the international community congratulated Burundian elites for agreeing on a power-sharing political accommodation, it failed to bring to a halt cessation of hostilities. Two rebel groups remained adamant to the Arusha protocols and continued to launch attacks and causing civilian casualties until late in 2005 (Daley, 2007: 333). Another indication of the deeply flawed peace offered by this Accord is that twelve years later, Burundi is still ranked among the poorest countries worldwide, with limited prospects for economic recovery. Francis (2008:182) argues that liberal peace-building processes in post-conflict states are yet to improve the social indications of the African poor, and this finds evidence with the World Bank Burundi country report (World Bank, 2012) that “an estimated two-thirds of Burundi’s eight million people live on less than US$ 1.25 a day.” The same report indicates that socioeconomic progress has been much slower than it was hoped in 2005 and attributes this slow development to the country’s dependence on international donors and extremely limited options for realistic and independent development strategies.

In chapter one, the study problematizes Burundi ethnic conflict from the time of colonization as a step forward towards understanding the genesis of the outbreak of the ethnic civil war of 1993. Sporadic ethnic conflicts occurred from the time of independence in 1962 but the 1993 conflict culminated into a long civil war and has
claimed more than 300 lives and an estimated 1.3 million Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs). It was under such dire humanitarian conditions that African Heads of states and the international community facilitated the Arusha peace negotiation process. In this chapter, an analysis of the concept of peace agreements is conducted for being the most commonly used mechanisms for conflict resolution worldwide. Darby and Ginty (2000:50) contend that over the course of the 11 years between 1988 and 1998, at least 38 formal peace accords were signed which aimed at resolving internal conflict in 33 states. However, while peace agreements are widely used to resolve intra-states conflicts, scholars of peace and conflict studies contend that these agreements result in deeply flawed peace and argue that liberal peace-building processes in post-conflict states are yet to improve the social indications of the African poor (Francis, 2008:182; Ginty 2006:120; Coning, 2008:19; Paris, 2009:76).

Chapter two discusses the involvement of political elite in Burundi peace negotiation processes and their role in the prolongation of the civil war. The Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement was a result of a long peace process between representatives of political parties and the Government of Burundi (GoB) under the mediation of the international community. Findings from this research reveal that the negotiation process, which led to the signing of the Agreement on 20 August 2000, was only brokered between political elite, and left two main rebel groups outside the process. While the international community congratulated Burundians for successfully reaching an agreement, rebel groups continued to launch attacks on civilians and causing several
casualties, hence making the Arusha Accord a peace agreement without a cessation of hostilities.

This chapter illustrates that political elite have also contributed in the prolongation of civil war, which lasted for 14 years. The negotiation process, which took place in Arusha, Tanzania, was conducted under the United Nations (UN) international travel and per diem standards, and all participating parties were remunerated accordingly. This research provided evidence that extravagant perks paid to political elite distracted participants from their original objective of the negotiations. The Burundian elite, in order to earn as much money as possible, engaged in resistance strategies than in participating in the peace process in order to prolong and delay the negotiations. This chapter also highlights the involvement of the political elite in fomenting instability and instigating violence among ordinary Burundians. The chapter concludes by illustrating how the elite class, which comprises of representatives of political parties, the incumbent government and the military, has been one of the causes of persistent insecurity and instability across the country.

In chapter three, the research was geared towards examining the effectiveness of the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement in bringing positive peace to Burundians. The Arusha Agreement recommended institutional reforms that were novel to Burundi political system and these latter proved to be a failure in establishing long term stability and positive peace, which all Burundians were expecting. The restructuring of the national army, which called for a Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration
(DDP) of former combatants proved to be an ambitious program that could not be implemented without strong support of the international community. However, in spite of the full implementation of the DDR program, the civilian disarmament continued to pose serious threats to national security, because one rebel group, the Forces Nationale de Liberation (FNL) remained outside the negotiations.

More criticisms were highlighted in this chapter in regards to the democratization process, which was not adapted to the means and capacity of the Government of Burundi (GoB). Two rounds of presidential and legislative elections have so far been organized since the signing of the Arusha Accord and this research provided evidence that the entire process depended largely on the contribution of bilateral and multilateral donors. In other words, all institutional reforms propounded by the liberal democratic peace are proved to be beyond the capacity of local governments, hence making African nations into continued grip of foreign aid support.

Chapter four examines the involvement of key stakeholders in supporting the GoB’s efforts towards post-conflict reconstruction and peacebuilding programs. The signing of the Arusha Accord was widely acclaimed and commended by both regional and international community. Continued insecurity in Burundi not only posed a serious threat to the Great Lakes and the East African Region but also to the rest of the international community. African Heads of States were the initiators of the Burundi peace negotiations and these latter have worked hand in hand with the international community in ensuring that warring parties reach a consensus. Upon signing the
Agreement, several bilateral and multilateral donors mobilized to support Burundi in its efforts to rebuild itself and restore peace and security. Of great importance, was the return of Burundian refugees in exile in Tanzania and the restructuring of the national army to include former combatants. Since the army had long been perceived to be Tutsi-dominated, the restructuring of the national army was one of the reforms to guarantee equal opportunity and security for all. In a similar way, a return of refugees to their homeland was an approach to promote social cohesion and a major milestone towards long-term peace and stability.

This chapter brings to light that after more than 10 years since the Agreement was brokered, Burundi is still ranked among the poorest countries in the world, and continues to depend largely on foreign aid support. The liberal democracy model encourages warring parties to come to a consensus and establish institutional reforms for long-term political stability, but this research indicates that such an approach does not reach the intended results. Prospects for a strengthened democratic political system are still dim, and the lack of harmonious relationship with the opposition continues to be the main cause of insecurity across the country.
5.2 Recommendations

Foremost, mediators of all peace agreements should ensure that all warring parties are included in peace negotiations, and cessation of hostilities should be the primary focus. Restoration of peace and security for citizens in any post-conflict society represent an important milestone and a prerequisite for future post-conflict reconstruction and development. Peace negotiators tend to emphasize on settling unequal distribution of resources among opposing parties and develop institutional reforms that will help belligerents to ensure there is equal opportunity for all citizens. However, as long as certain groups are marginalized and not included or given incentives to join the table of negotiations, any brokered peace will not stand a chance to last long. In other words, no one group should be marginalized and the grievances of all ought to be considered during the peace negotiation process.

Second, the conduct of peace processes should be organized within the framework and financial capacity of local governments. This would ensure that participants in the negotiation roundtable are indeed interested in seeing their country moving from a war-state to a peaceful society. This research proved that extravagant perquisites paid to political elite during the peace process have contributed to the prolongation of the war. Instead of engaging in strategies to bring peace to ordinary Burundians, participants to the peace process adopted tactics to prolong the negotiation process to advance and safeguard their vested interests.
Third, post-conflict states inherit a significant decline in economic activities and limited financial resources due to long periods of war. As a result, these states are in great need of foreign aid to re-launch their economies and improve the living conditions of their citizens. However, for any post-conflict reconstruction program to be effective, there is need for a shared responsibility, between the donors and the recipient countries. At one hand, governments in post-conflict societies ought to ensure that the root causes of the conflict have been resolved, to ensure that an environment with a sense of security and equity is spread across the country. For no development can take root in any society without the assurance that peace and security is guaranteed to all citizens. On the other hand, international donors, in their efforts to help these countries emerge out of conflict, should emphasize on supporting these governments develop policies aimed at strengthening macroeconomic policies. While post-conflict states may be successful in bringing about social cohesion among all the population, unless there is a good measure of economic security among the people, peace agreements will not be able to uphold the brokered peace.

In conclusion, the Arusha Agreement marked the beginning of new direction towards an improved security in Burundi. Institutional reforms aimed at redressing the social inequality were adopted by warring parties and incorporated into the government political system. However, the implementation of this Accord was greatly hampered by opposing parties who were non-participant to the peace process. They continued to fight the government in place, causing insecurity and civilian casualties in areas where they sustained a stronghold. On the other hand, post-conflict reconstruction programs did take
place, and these internationally supported programs have helped to legitimize the government by alleviating the sufferings of Burundians and laying the foundation for an economic recovery.
References


BIBLIOGRAPHY


International Monetary Fund (2009) How Can Burundi Raise Its Growth Rate?


York: Pearson Education, Inc.