"REFUGEES AS CATALYSTS OF REGIONAL CONFLICT: A CASE STUDY OF THE AFRICAN GREAT LAKES REGION"

BY

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UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL UNIVERSITY

SUPERVISOR

PROFESSOR KORWA ADAR GOMBE

FALL 2013
DECLARATION

I hereby declare that this thesis is my own original work and that it has not been published or presented in any college, institution or university other than the United States International University, in Nairobi for academic credit.

Signature........................................ Date................................

Betty M. Kirenga (634851)

This thesis has been presented with my approval as the Supervisor for this student.

Signature........................................ Date................................

Professor Korwa Adar Gombe

Signature........................................ Date................................

Dean, School of Arts and Sciences

Signature........................................ Date................................

Deputy Vice Chancellor, Academic Affairs
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

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Last but not least, I would like to acknowledge the valuable input and support of my partner, Stephen. I would not have done this without you. I will forever be indebted to you.
DEDICATION

I dedicate this thesis to my beloved parents Callixte and Georgine Kirenga for their unwavering belief, love and support.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ACRONYMS</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>ADF</td>
<td>Allied Democratic Forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>AFDL</td>
<td>Alliances des Forces Democratiqnes pour la Liberation du Congo</td>
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<tr>
<td>AIDS</td>
<td>Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome</td>
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<tr>
<td>APEC</td>
<td>Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation</td>
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<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
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<td>AUCGSARPA</td>
<td>African Union Convention Governing Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa</td>
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<td>CAR</td>
<td>Central African Republic</td>
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<tr>
<td>CNDP</td>
<td>Congrès national pour la défense du peuple</td>
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<td>CZSC</td>
<td>Contingent Zairois Pour la Securite dans le Camps démocratique du Congo</td>
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<td>DRC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
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<td>EU</td>
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<td>FAR</td>
<td>Forces Armées Rwandaises</td>
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<td>FARDC</td>
<td>Forces Armees de la Republique Democratique du Congo</td>
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<td>FAZ</td>
<td>Forces Armees Zairoises</td>
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<tr>
<td>FDD</td>
<td>Forces pour la Défense de la Démocratie</td>
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<tr>
<td>FDLR</td>
<td>Forces Democratiques Pour la Liberation du Rwanda</td>
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<tr>
<td>FNL</td>
<td>Forces nationales de libération</td>
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<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
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<tr>
<td>GLR</td>
<td>Great Lakes Region</td>
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<td>HIV</td>
<td>Human Immunodeficiency Syndrome</td>
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<td>HRW</td>
<td>Human Rights Watch</td>
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<td>International Criminal Court</td>
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<td>ICRC</td>
<td>International Committee of the Red Cross</td>
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<td>IDMC</td>
<td>Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre</td>
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<td>IDPs</td>
<td>Internally Displaced Persons</td>
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<tr>
<td>IRC</td>
<td>International Rescue Committee</td>
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<td>IRC</td>
<td>International Rescue Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>KLA</td>
<td>Kosovo Liberation Front</td>
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<td>LRA</td>
<td>Lord's Resistance Army</td>
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<td>M23</td>
<td>Movement of March 23</td>
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<td>MLC</td>
<td>Mouvement de libération du Congo</td>
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<tr>
<td>MONUSCO</td>
<td>Mission de l'Organisation des Nations Unies pour la stabilisation en République</td>
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<tr>
<td>MPLA</td>
<td>Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola</td>
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<td>MSF</td>
<td>Medecins Sans Frontier</td>
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<tr>
<td>NAFTA</td>
<td>North Atlantic Free Trade Agreement</td>
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<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organisation</td>
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<td>NGOs</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organisations</td>
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<td>NRA</td>
<td>New Regionalism Approach</td>
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<td>OAU</td>
<td>Organisation of African Unity</td>
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<td>OAURC</td>
<td>Organisation of African Unity Refugee Convention</td>
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<tr>
<td>PARMEHUTU</td>
<td>Parti du Mouvement de l'Emancipation Hutu</td>
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<tr>
<td>RANU</td>
<td>Rwandan Alliance of National Unity</td>
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<tr>
<td>RCD</td>
<td>Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie</td>
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<tr>
<td>RDF</td>
<td>Rwandan Defence Forces</td>
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<td>RENAMO</td>
<td>Resistancia National Mocambicana</td>
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<td>RPA</td>
<td>Rwandan Patriotic Army</td>
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<td>RPF</td>
<td>Rwandan Patriotic Front</td>
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<td>SADC</td>
<td>Southern African Development Community</td>
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<td>TCNs</td>
<td>Transnational Criminal Networks</td>
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<td>TNCs</td>
<td>Trans-national Corporations</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>UNAMIR</td>
<td>United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNITA</td>
<td>União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNRC</td>
<td>United Nations Refugee Convention</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNSC</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>United States of America</td>
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<tr>
<td>WNBLF</td>
<td>West Nile Bank Liberation Front</td>
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<tr>
<td>WWI</td>
<td>World War One</td>
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<td>WWII</td>
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ABSTRACT

Numerous instances in history have demonstrated that a civil war in one country significantly increases the likelihood that neighbouring states will also experience conflict. One explanation put forward for this phenomenon is that civil war and domestic strife produce large population dislocations and refugee flows across national borders. This puts a strain on the receiving states as they struggle to accommodate the new arrivals who inevitably clash with local populations. The unconstrained nature of internal conflict also means that it will eventually spill from the host country into the receiving country, owing to, among other reasons, the host country’s attempts to pursue its perceived enemies. This study investigates the link between the prolonged presence of refugee populations and the increased risk of conflict, with particular attention to The African Great Lakes Region. The study also looks into how refugee crises cause civil wars to spread across borders. The study is necessitated by the need to understand the role played by refugees in the spread of violence. It is hoped that the study will contribute towards to the better understanding of the refugee-conflict nexus and thus help in seeking solutions to the protracted refugee problem in the Great Lakes Region.
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CHAPTER ONE

REFUGEES AS CATALYSTS OF REGIONAL CONFLICT: A CASE STUDY OF THE AFRICAN GREAT LAKES REGION

1.0 INTRODUCTION

Nation-states are not self-contained and isolated entities; they are influenced by their interaction and exposure to the activities of other states. Spatial proximity increases the opportunities for conflictual as well as cooperative interaction and as such, states are connected by networks that go beyond national borders. (Gledistch, 2007). According to Lawrence Juma (2007), the term network presupposes the existence of complex and fluid patterns of interrelationships between internal and external actors engaged in fields of common interest with little respect for territorial borders. These networks are sustained by a complex system of economic and political alliances that involves states, powerful political establishments, multinational corporations and international institutions. (Juma, 2007). One of the ways through which such networks are sustained is transnational actors, defined as any non-state actor from one country that has relations with any other non-state actor from another country or with an international organization. These include ethnic groups, refugees or Internally Displaced Populations (IDPs), Transnational Corporation (TNCs), Transnational Criminal Networks (TCNs), among others. (Tshiband, 2009).

The spread of conflict as a result of refugee-related crises has been observed numerously in history. Population movements necessitated by refugees fleeing internal conflict in their home countries are an important mechanism through which conflict spreads from one country to another and eventually engulfs an entire region. The Arab-Israeli conflict, the Indonesian conflict, The Great African War of the Great
Lakes Region (GLR), the Balkans War and the various conflicts in the West African Mano River Tri-State Area are cases in point. (Lischer, 2002). In all these cases, conflict was/is spread across the region by large population flows as refugees flee war and persecution in their countries, among other causes. Refugees are to be found in some of the world’s poorest and most unstable regions, and originate from some of the world’s most fragile states. (Milner, 2008). While in the past refugees were seen solely as victims of war, in most cases they play a significant part in the escalation of conflict, in some cases willingly. Arthur Helton, (2002) argues the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) has acknowledged that population displacements pose serious threats to international peace and security. Further, just as conflicts in the countries of origin have become protracted, some two thirds of refugees in the world today are not in emergency situations, but trapped in protracted refugee situations. Such situations - often characterized by long periods of exile, stretching to decades for some groups - constitute a growing challenge for the global refugee protection regime and the international community. (Milner, 2008).

Refugees trapped in such situations often experience suffering and serious human rights abuses, while at the same time contributing to political and security concerns for countries of origin, host states and states in the region. Protracted refugee situations, therefore, represent a significant challenge to both human rights and security. Notwithstanding the growing significance of the problem, protracted refugee situations have yet to feature prominently on the international political agenda. In response, humanitarian agencies, such as the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), have been left to cope with caring for these populations and attempting to mitigate the implications of prolonged exile. These
actions do not, however, constitute a solution for protracted refugee situations and the attending security concerns.

All forms of migration underscore the frequent non-congruence between the state and its citizenry. (Salehyan, 2008). It is assumed in international relations that states are sovereign over a given territory within which they govern the affairs of their citizens, yet migration suggests that this is not always the case. All involuntary migrants - the internally displaced, the stateless, refugees and the environmentally displaced - imply the inability or unwillingness of a state to guarantee the protection of its citizens. Forced migration goes to the core of the nature of state sovereignty and according to Alexander Betts and Gil Loescher (2010), invites a number of other questions relating to international cooperation, security and the international political economy, specifically, the responsibility for whom it is to mitigate the mostly negative implications associated with forced migration.

The conflict in the DRC and the larger Great Lakes Region has been described as one of the worst since WWII, characterised by massive internal and cross-border displacements, looting of mineral resources, the killing and maiming of civilians and general political instability. In the Kivu provinces, civilians are routinely caught up in the frontlines of armed confrontations between the Congolese army (Les Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo, FARDC)¹ and various armed rebel groups, particularly the Rwandan former génocidaire², who comprise The Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Rwanda (FDLR)³. (Rafti, 2006). Refugees constitute an integral part of this conflict dynamic. According to Pierre Jacquemont, (2010), the first significant displacements of the Rwandan population began back in 1937 when the DRC (then Zaire) encouraged immigration of non-indigenous...
Banyarwanda to provide labour on its large colonial plantations alongside existing communities identified as indigenous to eastern DRC. By 1960 there were some 200,000 Rwandans living in the DRC. (Jacquemont, 2010:12). More Rwandan Tutsi and Burundian Hutu emigrated to Kivu following their countries’ independence in 1962; more fled Burundi following the genocide against them instituted by the Bujumbura Tutsi regime in 1972 and later again due to the continuing civil war in 1993. (Mamdani, 2003). The flight of hundreds of thousands of Hutu refugees to Zaire after the Rwandan genocide in 1994 disrupted the complex and already fragile demographic balance. Among the refugees were members of the interahamwe militia who organized and perpetrated the genocide, and soldiers of the Forces Armées Rwandaises (FAR). Hatred between Hutu and Tutsi living in Congolese territory reached a new peak, leading to a vicious cycle of violent conflict and further refugee movements. (Jacquemont, 2010).

Given these events, therefore, the central argument of this study is that refugees are not passive victims of conflict; rather, they are often actively involved in the spread of conflict within a region. Solutions to any regional conflict, therefore - which often has its roots in ethnicity, resource competition and politics - must look to the long term, and, specifically focus on how to deal with the politicisation and militarisation of refugee populations.

1.1 STATEMENT OF RESEARCH PROBLEM

The problem of protracted refugee situations especially in the global south continue to cause untold suffering and contribute significantly to the instability of whole regions, as is the case with the African Great Lakes region, which is the focus of this study.
The mass influx of refugees from Rwanda into Eastern DRC following the 1994 genocide is now well-documented, as is the fact that refugees may cause civil war to spread from one state to another. Refugee flows from conflict areas are associated with spill-over effects that make receiving states more likely to experience conflicts of their own. Further, neighbouring states with latent conflicts are more sensitive to the inflow of refugees, and consequently more likely to escalate into conflict - as illustrated by the events following the movement of large refugee populations from Rwanda to DRC in the 1990s. Moreover, a significant change in the ethnic geography of the host state due to refugee inflows makes ethnic conflict (in the host state) more likely, especially if the host state is already characterised by a precarious ethnic balance. (Salehyan, 2008). It is against this background that this study attempts to look into the specific mechanisms through which refugee crises lead to the spread of conflict. The study focuses on the events preceding the Rwandan genocide of 1994, the subsequent refugee crisis, the First and Second Congo Wars (1996-1998 and 1998-2003 respectively), as well as a mention of other conflicts after 2003, specifically in the DRC, that are deemed relevant to the study.

1.2 RESEARCH QUESTIONS

This study will address the following research question:

1. What role do refugees play in the spread of conflict?

1.3 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES

The study is guided by the following research objective:

1. To investigate the link between refugee populations and conflict.
1.4 SIGNIFICANCE OF STUDY

A reading of the literature suggests that refugee flows can contribute to the spread of conflict, but it is not clear on the exact mechanisms involved. Further, most of the literature on conflict in general and refugee-related crises in particular, tends to see nation-states as self-contained and isolated units of analysis. This means that most studies have approached conflict from a state-to-state perspective and from the point of view of domestic policies. The international system as a level of analysis is therefore for the most part ignored in the study of civil war, with theorists opting to look at such domestic aspects of a state as politics, natural resources, tribal affiliations and the geography of the state in question. The key assumption in these studies is that conflicts are mostly driven by what happens within a state’s boundaries. This approach has several limitations, one of which is that the history of conflict clearly shows that they sometimes follow a regional or international pattern. (Salehyan & Gleditsch, 2006). This is because actors within states interact on social, economic and cultural levels and are therefore connected by networks that go beyond national borders.

This thesis, therefore, investigates the link between the prolonged presence of large refugee populations and the increased risk of instability. Specifically, it seeks to contribute to the emerging literature on refugees and the spread of conflict by focusing on the different mechanisms through which conflict spreads due to refugee movements and activities. It also investigates the conditions under which refugees become involved in conflict, both in the sending and receiving countries. This is necessitated by the observation that not all refugee populations necessarily engage in politicized violence.
1.5 LITERATURE REVIEW

A significant portion of the literature on refugees as a source of conflict views the refugee-conflict nexus as one among several explanations for conflict in general, which is beyond the scope of this study. Other studies see refugees as a major cause of conflict contagion or diffusion. Contagion is defined as a phenomenon where events of a given type in a given polity are conditioned by the occurrence of similar events in other polities at prior points in time. (Most and Starr, 1990). In other words, and with specific reference to conflict, contagion is viewed as a process through which internal conflict in one state heightens the probability of internal conflict erupting in a neighbouring state at a later point in time. For the purposes of this study, the two terms, that is, contagion and diffusion will be used interchangeably and will generally be in reference to conflict.

Of more relevance to this thesis are the scholars who have studied refugees as an important transnational actor, and, specifically as a source and catalyst of regional conflict. This study now proceeds to review these three categories of literature.

1.5.1 CONFLICT DIFFUSION/CONTAGION

According to Nadine Ansorg (2011), regions and regional conflicts are not new phenomena in research. International Relations studies employ the regional dimension as an analytical framework in explaining violence, but often focus on either the national or the international level. This is due to an entrenched methodological nationalism and focus on the nation-state as the main source of war in the international system. In the decades following the end of the World War II (WWII), a change in the characteristics and conditions of warfare has been observed, notably that wars are no longer waged between the armies of sovereign nation-states, but
expand to a multiplicity of transnational actors that correlate in complex relations and often compete for political control and monopoly of violence in a region. (Ansorg, 2011). The militant violence of these actors escalates in both horizontal and vertical directions and diffuses to a multiplicity of different actors at different levels - local, national, regional and international. Further, these regional systems are especially prevalent in the global south, where neighbouring states support rebel groups on their territory (as in Chad, Sudan and the Central African Republic). (Ansorg, 2011). In other cases, such as the African Great Lakes Region, neighbouring governments and rebels use the resources of a weak/failing neighbouring state. Rebels utilise humanitarian aid to support their activities and extort money from the population in return for protection. (Luttwak, 2004). Sierra Leone and Liberia in the 1990s provide a striking example. The production of insecurity and the ensuing economic gains are part of a larger conflict structure. Moreover, trans-border kinship of identity groups can lead to a regional conflict spill-over, as happened in the Balkans during the 1990s. (Ansorg, 2011). Similarly, the Aceh rebellion in Indonesia, where an independence movement simmered for decades and a brief war erupted but was quickly suppressed in 1999. This war then re-ignited in 1999 when East Timor’s referendum on independence emboldened Acehnese resistance. (Sambanis, 2004).

Massive refugee flows and the economic and political weaknesses associated with conflicts, as after the genocide in Rwanda and the war in Burundi in 1993, can cause tensions in a whole region. State actors are still existent in the GLR, but are part of a larger conflict structure together with private, local and transnational actors of violence. (Carayannis, 2003).
Peter Wallensteen and Margareta Sollenberg (1998) confirm the existence of 15 regional conflicts in the international system between 1989 and 1997, which are defined as situations where neighbouring countries experience internal or interstate conflicts, with significant links between the two conflict types. They argue that these links may be so strong that changes in conflict dynamics will have an effect on a neighbouring conflict. Barry Buzan (1991) focuses on regional security complexes that is, a group of states whose security concerns link together sufficiently closely that their respective national security concerns cannot be realistically solved in isolation from each another. A similar idea - regional conflict formation - is explored by Raimo Vayrynen (2003), which is defined as “a set of transnational conflicts that form mutually reinforcing linkages with each other across borders.” (Vayrynen, 2003:31). This model combines the inside-out and outside-in dimensions of civil wars by emphasizing the mutuality of cross-border linkages. Because they feed off each other, conflicts in neighbouring states become interlocked and, consequently, are more difficult to solve. They are dynamic entities and comprise a plurality of overlapping, transnational networks and actors, including refugee populations and transnational alliances between state and non-state actors.

Halvard Buhaug and Kristian Skrede Gleditsch (2008), in their in-depth analysis of internal wars in sovereign states, assess the characteristics of contiguous conflict zones. The findings indicate that a war is more likely to occur in a state that shares a border with another state that is already at war. The risk of regional diffusion of internal wars increases in poor countries with large populations, in cases where there are trans-border kinship ties and separatist conflicts.

Kristian Skrede Gleditsch (2007) observes a high risk of conflict spill-over in autocratic regions, and a low risk of the same in regions with many democracies and
significant inter-regional trade, consistent with the democratic and commercial peace theories in liberalist thinking.

In a study on the effects of conflict spill-overs, Paul Collier, V. L. Elliot, Havard Hegre, Anke Hoeffler, Marta Reynal-Querol, and Nicolas Sambanis (2003) find that if a country is at war, its neighbours may experience economic and social destabilisation and, potentially, the diffusion of conflict across borders. They attribute these to ethnic and historic causes, the economic interests of rebel groups and neighbouring countries, transnational civil war economies, transnational terror networks and massive refugee movements.

Michael Pugh, Neil Cooper and Jonathan Goodhand (2003) look into transnational economic, political, military and social networks and find that they are common to most regional conflicts. Michael Pugh, Neil Cooper and Jonathan Goodhand (2003) posit that economic networks are characterised by the illegal trade and smuggling of minerals and timber, and illegal tax systems. Political systems, on the other hand, comprise cross-border alliances between political groups, while social networks are characterised by trans-border ethnic kinship or Diasporas.

Mark Duffield (2002) looks into complex regional economic conflict formations and finds that participants in civil wars fund themselves through these transnational economic networks. These networks perpetuate conflicts through the economic motives of warlords and other violence entrepreneurs. The networks start off as liberation movements before acquiring economic interests to secure their long-term survival. Civilians in these areas are often forced to participate in these complex networks through illicit trade in valuable commodities, theft and slavery, as the
civilians have no access to alternative sources of income after the protracted periods of civil war and instability in which the civilians find themselves. These developments are, in turn, connected to the disintegration of state structures, the loss of state monopoly over violence and the increasing privatisation of violence. (Ansorg, 2011). For example, in the Casamance conflict, Guinea-Bissau was used as a market for goods and a source for arms. The former Yugoslavia’s wars were all shaped by the rival secessionist nationalisms of Greater Serbia and Greater Croatia, and many of the same groups were active in each other’s wars. In the former Soviet republics, wars were clustered around the Caucasus in the early 1990’s, thriving on the region’s accumulation of war-specific physical and human capital. Sierra Leone’s war started when Charles Taylor’s Liberia provided a safe haven to the rebels, and was sustained by international criminal networks that were involved in the illicit arms-for-diamonds trade. (Sambanis, 2004).

Ideen Salehyan (2008), and Salehyan and Gleditsch (2006) argue that treating civil war as domestic events in the country where the conflict takes place is problematic, as the risk of civil war of may be influenced by participants and processes outside the boundaries of the nation state. The two analysts examine how transnational linkages and interactions across state boundaries influence the likelihood of conflict within states. Consistent with arguments about transnational contagion, the findings show that conflict in neighbouring states increases the risk of civil war in a given neighbourhood. Rebel groups are cited as one mechanism through which conflict spreads through regions. Rebels, according to Idean Salehyan (2008) and Salehyan & Gleditsch (2006) use external bases to plan and launch attacks on their home countries, while neighbouring countries actively support rebel groups in order to
weaken their rivals in the enemy (neighbouring) country. Kristian Gleditsch, Idean Salehyan and Kenneth Schultz (2008) similarly contend that more often than not, the issues and dynamics surrounding civil wars are central to international disputes. For example, external states may threaten to use military force in support of rebels, with a view to affecting the outcome of the war. Alternatively, states experiencing civil war may externalize the conflict by directing military force outwards to retaliate against others for supporting rebels and/or conduct cross-border counter-insurgency operations. Further, the fighting associated with civil wars can create unintended security spillovers that may lead to inter-state tension. Issues from the realm of domestic politics - such as the treatment of minorities, the nature of the regime in power and conduct during civil war - can influence state-to-state relations.

Nathan Black (2012) explores the conditions under which a sub-state conflict - an armed conflict between a state and militarized rebels that has caused at least 25 cumulative battle-related deaths - makes a causal contribution to the onset of a civil war in a nearby state. A civil war is defined here as an armed conflict between a state and militarized rebels that has caused at least 1,000 cumulative battle-related deaths. (Black, 2012: 17). Thus all civil wars are sub-state conflicts, but the converse does not hold. Sub-state conflicts are highly unlikely to spread unless a sovereign state government takes one of three specific, deliberate actions. These state actions - evangelization, the deliberate sponsorship of nascent rebel groups abroad by a state that has experienced a violent regime change; expulsion, which is the deliberate transfer of combatants across borders by a state in conflict; and meddling with overt partiality, that is, the deliberate interference in another state’s sub-state conflict that subsequently leads to conflict in the interfering state. (Black, 2012).
1.5.2 TRANSNATIONAL ETHNIC LINKAGES

Most of the studies on conflicts involving significant refugee movements point to transnational ethnic linkages as an important feature. As Anthony D. Smith writes,

Ethnic conflict follows inevitably from ethnicity. Wherever ethnic nationalism has taken hold of populations, there one may expect to find powerful assertions of national self determination that, if long opposed, will embroil whole regions in bitter and protracted ethnic conflict. Whether the peace and stability of such regions will be better served in the short term by measures of containment, federation, mediation, or even partition, in the long-run there can be little escape from the many conflagrations that the unsatisfied yearnings of ethnic nationalism are likely to kindle. (1993:40).
As such, various international disputes grow out of civil wars when ethnic brethren in other states come to the defence of their kin and irredentist claims lead to interstate violence. Indeed, some civil wars are better understood as regional communal conflicts. Africa is a case in point: The African continent is a case in point — it experiences exceptionally frequent ethnically charged political violence, in part because ethnic diversity is higher than on other continents. This is partly attributed to colonization - the colonial powers demarcated Africa using arbitrary boundaries that cut across ethnic lines. Consequently, contemporary sub-Saharan African states comprise a mixture of ethnic, cultural and tribal groups traversing approximately one hundred and eighty-six different ethnic territories. (Adeboju, 2007). In their study of civil war in Africa, Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler (2000) measure world-wide ethnic fractionalization using an index that measures the probability that two randomly drawn individuals from a given country do not speak the same language. Collier & Hoeffler (2000) rate Africa’s average ethnic fractionalization at sixty-one, whereas the worldwide average is thirty-four. According to Adepoju (2007), the breakup of European colonial empires into multi-ethnic states has precipitated substantial conflict on the continent. As a result, ethnic conflict is more common on the African continent than anywhere else in the world, some of which is attributable to refugee populations. For example, the wars in Rwanda and Burundi are really wars between the Hutu and the Tutsi in the African Great Lakes Region, with significant temporal and spatial dependence connecting civil war outbreaks in the two countries. (Sambanis, 2004).

David Lake and Donald Rothchild (1998) look into mechanisms through which ethnic linkages across borders may lead to the spread of conflict. According to Lake & Rothchild (1998), ethnic-related conflict spreads across states in two ways, diffusion and escalation. Diffusion occurs when an ethnic conflict in one state increases the
probability of conflict in a second state. Escalation occurs when a conflict in one
country brings in new, foreign belligerents - such as neighbouring states or strong
states with global reach.

One way in which diffusion occurs is when events abroad change the ethnic balance
of power in a state, leading to conflict. Consequently, ethnic conflict becomes
contagious, as when refugee flows alter a state’s ethnic composition or when armed
insurgents from a neighbouring state seek refuge in a second state and stir up conflict
in the host state. Further, similar changes in the ethnic power balance may occur when
federal states break up, even when it does not result in actual migration across
borders. When one group fears exploitation in the future as its position weakens, or
beliefs change, conflict can rapidly take hold. Changing balances of ethnic power or
beliefs, moreover, are likely to produce pre-emptive moves by the weaker party that
may lead to conflict; if one is growing progressively weaker or believes that the other
is becoming increasingly strong, it is better to fight sooner rather than later. Once the
potential for future vulnerability becomes apparent, current relations and the state
itself can quickly unravel. The end of communism is cited numerously an important
source of the ethnic conflicts now underway in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet
Union. It significantly altered the balance of power between ethnic groups - in some
cases altering it in favour of one ethnic group, and in others, fundamentally
transforming it by creating new states leaving millions of migrants stranded outside
their ethnic homelands. Depending upon the pre-and post-collapse balances of ethnic
power, and the beliefs of groups about the intentions of newly empowered groups, the
fall of communism had different effects on the types and magnitudes of conflict found
in these regions. (Lake & Rothchild, 1998). More specifically, when the former
Yugoslavia began to disintegrate, the ethnic balance of power shifted from the federal level to the various independent republics. Minority groups, formerly protected by their kin in other regions were rendered weak and threatened, which had the effect of strengthening the new majority in each state, consequently undermining the ethnic balance and leading to violence. This explains how Slovenia’s relatively minor conflict with Serbia spilled over to the neighbouring former Yugoslav republics and became more malignant with each additional succession. (Lake & Rothchild, 1998).

The second mode of diffusion occurs when ethnic conflict in one state leads groups in another country to demand more in terms of rights, recognition and resources, increasing the chances of violent conflict, as does the political success of an ethnic group in a neighbouring state. According to Timur Kuran (1998), this phenomenon, defined as the demonstration effect, that is, how actors may be inspired or triggered into armed conflict when proximate groups are involved, is an important explanation for the spill-over of ethnic-fuelled conflict. Learning that a rebel group has achieved an important victory through violence against a particular government, for example, can provoke similar behaviour in a neighbouring state. Put differently, success by one group may lead another group, under similar circumstances, to believe that similar concessions can be gained in their home country through conflict. The Albanians in Kosovo and Macedonia provide a case in point. After the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) succeeded in gaining autonomy for Albanians in Kosovo, Albanians in Macedonia were inspired to initiate their own struggle. (Forsberg, 2009).

Escalation, on the other hand, occurs through alliances, spillovers, irredentism, diversions and internal weakness. An ethnic group in one state may be motivated by solidarity with their ethnic kin in another state to similarly engage in conflict. Lake
and Rothchild (1998) label it ethnopolitik, and argue that it mainly occurs when ethnic
groups span national borders. India’s intervention in Sri Lanka and Rwanda’s
involvement in Eastern DRC are illustrative of this phenomenon.

Lake and Rothchild (1998) further contend that ethnicity provides a strong basis for
diversionary wars which occur when political leaders engage in aggressive foreign
policies in order to consolidate power and control at home. Leaders beset by
opposition attempt to rally support by inciting conflict in neighbouring countries. The
leaders exploit ethnicity and its emotional appeal to pander to the “us and them”
divide, and this leads to increased support. (Hudson, 2003:31). This was the strategy
employed by the Serbian president Slobodan Milosevic - faced with growing
opposition and agitation for reform at home, Milosevic played the ethnic card with his
“All Serbians in one state” rhetoric, and precipitated the collapse of Yugoslavia.
(Hudson, 2003:33). Moreover, opportunistic wars may be waged, where a state
attacks an enemy state experiencing significant internal conflict. With the other state
obviously weakened by internal dissent, aggressor states may see an opportunity for
success. This was the case when Somalia went in to the Ogaden region in Ethiopia in
1977, following Ethiopia’s own internal war. (Lake and Rothchild, 1998).

Timur Kuran (1998) investigates the escalation of interstate conflicts and find that
states get involved owing to ethnic alliances, especially when the majority ethnic
group is politically mobilized, indicating a higher probability of ethnically charged
violence.

To summarise, internal conflict within one state may motivate groups in neighbouring
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To summarise, internal conflict within one state may motivate groups in neighbouring
countries to assist their ethnic kin across the border. Further, rebel groups or refugees
may enter a region that already hosts an actual or potential ethnic conflict, altering the
balance of ethnicities and thus aggravating pre-existing ethnic tensions or sparking new ones. This influx typically affects ethnic balance two ways - first, the new arrivals may swell an ethnic minority’s ranks. If the now former majority ethnic group perceives a threat, it may take up arms. Secondly, an influx may further enlarge the majority ethnic group, precipitating violence from the minority group to consolidate their position. Northern Kenya’s Kakuma refugee camp illustrates the potency of ethnicity. It is home to about ten nationalities and approximately twenty ethnic groups. It frequently experiences political violence both between different nationalities, for example, Somali and Sudan, and between different ethnic groups of the same nationality, for example, Sudanese Dinka and Didinga. (Loescher & Milner, 2006).

1.5.3 THE ROLE OF REFUGEES IN THE SPREAD OF CONFLICT

The 1951 United Nations Refugee Convention defines a refugee as

any person who, owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable, or owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country. (UNRC, 1951).

Fourteen million refugees have at one time or another sought refuge in about 120 states. About half this number will experience some form of political violence, affecting an estimated 20 states. (Lischer, 2002:9). As mentioned earlier, in the past refugees were considered victims of war and the norm was to assist them in their causes, albeit with the helping parties’ interests as a motivating factor. For example, in the 1980’s, the United States backed Afghan refugees in Pakistan in their fight against the Soviet-backed regime in Kabul. (Lischer, 2002:26). International agencies and state actors supplied aid to African refugees in their quest for self-determination. They were therefore perceived as victims rather than perpetrators of violence and their struggles seen as worth causes. However, after the big refugee crisis of the Great
Lakes Region of Africa, whose genesis was the civil war in Rwanda in the 1994, 
refugees were seen in a new light, specifically as both causes and catalysts of regional 
conflict.

As discussed earlier, Salehyan & Gleditsch (2006) argue that there is a regional 
clustering of civil war around states that border countries already in conflict. This 
means that those countries that share borders with countries at war are more likely to 
engage in war themselves. One of the explanations put forward for this phenomenon 
is that refugees are a major mechanism through which conflict is spread from one 
state to another.

In an attempt to understand how refugees exacerbate conflict, Lischer (2002) 
classifies refugees into three categories, based on their reasons for fleeing their home 
countries. The first category is referred to as situational refugees. Situational refugees, 
Lischer (2002) argues, flee as a result of the destruction caused by war. They have 
little interest in political/ethnic affiliations and do not flee because they have been 
targeted in any way. They are keen on being repatriated as soon as possible to enable 
them carry on with their lives, and are not concerned with who is in power and how it 
was acquired. Situational refugees are the least unlikely, therefore, to engage in any 
political or military organisation, and by extension, to be voluntarily involved in 
conflict.

The second category is referred to as persecuted refugees. Sarah Lischer (2002) 
argues that this group has been subjected to direct persecution or oppression such as 
genocide, ethnic cleansing, or have fled due to oppressive policies such as religious or 
political persecution, discrimination on the basis of ethnicity and language. This 
persecution motivates the refugees to form political and military organisations, which
they then use against their home states to counter the persecution and eventually, where possible, fight their way back to their countries in some cases by employing cross-border violence tactics.

*State-in-exile* refugees comprise the third category, which usually contains political and military leaders, who, in some cases orchestrate the refugee crisis to create chaos as a strategy to avoid losing in a civil war. Lischer (2002) posits that the state-in-exile and persecuted categories are more likely to engage in political violence.

According to Salehyan (2008) refugee flows contribute to regional conflict in two major ways. On one hand they constitute a negative externality which has to be borne by receiving states. This may then lead to the receiving state taking measures to seal its borders to contain the influx of refugees. Alternatively, the receiving state may threaten the sending government with violence if the flow of refugees into its territory is not checked, or in extreme cases it may invade the territory of the sending state to prevent further refugee flows. On the other hand, refugee-sending states may violate the sovereignty of their neighbours by invading them to pursue their political or ethnic rivals, or to show discontent with the receiving state for harbouring its enemies.

Lake and Rothchild (1998), as aforementioned, distinguish between escalation and diffusion in an attempt to show potential linkages between refugee movements and conflict. Diffusion describes the changes in the balance of power in the demographics by altering the country’s ethnic composition or affecting access to scarce resources of the receiving state as a consequence of a refugee influx. This diffusion, it is argued, can lead to violence in the host country and even spread through an entire region. James Fearon (1998), in his explanation of diffusion, describes a chain reaction in which war generates refugees and refugees further destabilize the region and in turn
cause more conflict and more refugees and the cycle continues thus. Another argument is that refugee populations spread ethnic conflict across borders, creating an uncontrollable chain of ever-widening involvement of host communities and embroiling and accumulating antagonists and strange bedfellows, thereby growing larger and more irrationally out of control. (Premdas, 1991).

Escalation occurs when new belligerents are drawn into the conflict. Foreign or external participants become party to the conflict either through ethnic alliances across borders or through spillovers of cross-border violence that draw in neighbouring states. It can also take the form of combatants using the host country as a base from which to attack their home country, a phenomenon referred to as refugee warriors. (Zolberg, Suhrke and Aguayo, 1989). This then leads to antagonism between the two states in question, and where hot pursuit operations are employed, the result may be direct border clashes that may eventually lead to full-blown war.

Salehyan & Gleditsch (2006) posit that once they flee their countries of origin, refugees maintain ties with their kin, and more often than not tend to settle in the vicinity of their countries. Refugees therefore continue playing an active role in the politics of their countries. Refugees also join forces with opposition groups in the host countries, especially those of similar ethnicity or political affiliation, in some cases even providing resources and support, and, more importantly, arms. Once the opposition groups are sufficiently strengthened, they can then begin challenging the government in power. In this way, then, refugees can cause or facilitate conflicts or cause political instability both in their host countries and their countries of origin. For example, ethnic Somali separatists in the Ogaden region of Ethiopia have worked in collaboration with Somali refugees in their quest for secession.
Salehyan & Gleditsch (2006) further emphasize the politicisation of refugees as a mode of conflict exacerbation. Salehyan & Gleditsch (2006) argue that refugee flows imply the importation of combatants, arms and ideologies that facilitate the spread of conflict. Refugees fleeing conflict areas expand the geographical scope of social networks to the receiving countries. The refugees are then able to set up complex political structures in exile, and challenge the host country. Some refugee communities have been in their host countries for decades and are, therefore, engaged in economic as well as political activities, such as the formation of rebel movements. Thus, they come into conflict with their host governments over their opposition to their home government and their desire to maintain rebel networks and engage in militant activities across borders. Cross-border fighting between them and their home country governments may threaten civilians, the host country's sovereignty and security and bilateral relations between neighbours. (Salehyan & Gleditsch, 2006).

As mentioned earlier on in the discussion, refugees, mainly in the persecuted or state-in-exile categories, engage in political opposition to their country of origin due to their ability to organise politically and militarily. This is in response to the suffering and victimization they may have endured and in some cases the only way they see violence as the only resort. Refugee camps therefore become a fertile breeding ground for rebels and fighters, and cross-border attacks are launched onto the sending state. If the sending state retaliates, the conflict then escalates into a war. (Zolberg, Suhrke & Aguayo, 1989).

Murdoch & Sandler (2002) contend that refugees may also cause conflict by creating resentment in the local population of receiving states as they compete for resources and jobs. The host country bears the burden of accommodating and maintaining the refugee population as they require humanitarian assistance. The refugees, unlike
economic immigrants, are not selected for their skills and abilities and since they have suffered trauma as a result of their experiences, are unable to or less likely to contribute economically to the community in which they are absorbed. In most cases refugees may also have lost their assets as they flee the war in their countries. The refugees instead become a draining force as they compete with locals to survive. According to Murdoch and Sandler (2002), civil wars in one country have a significant negative aspect on the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth of neighbouring states due to the influx of refugees and their subsequent inability to contribute positively to the host economy.

Refugees also pose a public health concern as they live in squalid conditions in the camps. The camps are crowded and have inadequate sanitary facilities. This leads to the spread of diseases like cholera, malaria and HIV/AIDS which spread domestic medical resources thin and divert health resources from the care of the local population. Refugees may also need expensive specialised care due to the trauma they suffer as a result of the war. All of these factors may overwhelm the host state and cause resentment in the local population, and in the extreme, lead to outbreaks of violence against the refugees. (Salehyan, 2008).

Escalation, as discussed earlier, is seen to upset the balance in the host country through changes in demographic patterns. The host community may sometimes view the refugees as unwelcome foreigners who pose a threat to their cultural balance. (Weiner, 1996). Myron Weiner (1996) argues that ethnic tensions may become especially pronounced in cases where the refugees share the same ethnic group with some members of the local population. In countries that have deeply entrenched ethnic differences, such as the Great Lakes Region, massive refugee influxes can worsen ethnic relations. In the case of the conflict between Rwanda and The
Democratic Republic of Congo in 1996 and 1998, (then Zaire), the arrival of many Hutu refugees from Rwanda clashed with the Zairian Tutsi population also referred to as the Banyamulenge\(^2\), which served to further escalate the conflict, as the Rwandan government soldiers, who were mainly Tutsi, then allied themselves with their fellow Tutsis in Zaire (who had been subjected to human rights violations over the years by the Mobutu regime) in their quest to flush out genocide perpetrators in the mainly Hutu refugee population.

Cross-border violence between sending and receiving states and refugee groups may involve the local population, threatening the security of the host state. (Salehyan, 2008). For example, in the civil war in Nicaragua, the Nicaraguan National Army constantly clashed with the contra\(^3\) rebels who lived among Nicaraguan refugees in Honduras. This led to the killing of some Honduran border guards and refugees. Honduran locals were also caught up in the cross-fire and as a result, thousands of them fled further inland due to the insecurity at the border caused by Nicaraguan government forces hunting down the contra rebels. (Salehyan, 2008).

Lischer (2002) summarizes conflict involving refugees as manifesting itself in several ways. The first one is as a form of violent cross-border attack between the sending state and refugees. She cites bombing raids on suspected African National Congress (ANC) refugees in Angola by the apartheid South African (SA) government during SA’s fight for majority black rule and Hutu interahamwe militia raids on Rwanda from refugee camps in Eastern Zaire in attempts to overthrow the Tutsi-led Rwandan government as an example.

The second manifestation is when violence breaks out between the host state and the refugees as happened in Jordan in the 1970’s between Palestinian refugees and the
Jordanian government in what came to be referred to as the Black September, nearly leading to civil war. Ethnic or factional conflict may originate amongst the refugee population and spread into the host population is the third way in which refugees can cause conflict. This is demonstrated by the fighting between Burundian Hutu refugees in refugee camps in Western Tanzania which threatened the security of the Tanzanian state on numerous occasions in the 1990’s.

Yet another way in which refugees are involved in conflict is when their arrival into a host country precipitates internal conflict by upsetting the existing ethnic balance, which may encourage a previously oppressed minority or an opposition group to confront the state. Lischer (2002) cites Albanian refugees in the Balkans - they were viewed as a potential trigger of civil war in Macedonia as they were bound to increase the composition of ethnic Albanians in Macedonia, as against the Slavs, which would upset the ethnic balance and lead the minority Albanians to agitate for their rights.

Lastly, violence may also erupt when refugees act as catalysts for interstate war or when one state intervenes in another to halt the movement of refugees into its territory. Lischer (2002) argues that the 1994 intervention by the United States in Haiti was partly motivated by the need to stop Haitian refugees from entering the US through Florida. Her research findings further indicate that attacks between the sending state and refugees are the most likely to escalate into international war between the host and sending states, and the subsequent involvement of other actors as demonstrated by the Rwanda - DRC wars of 1996 and 1998. These attacks usually begin with refugees attacking the sending state, or the sending state carrying out an attack on the refugee camps. The host state is then drawn in as it retaliates to the attack on its territorial integrity. It may do so by openly engaging in the attack itself or by supporting the refugees materially and with arms to facilitate attacks. If the
receiving state gets directly involved, it does so either to expel the refugees or in
alliance with them against the sending state. For example, Tanzania allied itself to
Ugandan rebels to attack Uganda in 1979 to topple the then president Idi Amin
Dada (Whitaker, 2003). The receiving state may also opt to back the refugees in the
invasion of the sending state without involving any of its troops. Rwanda’s invasion
by the Rwandese Patriotic Front in 1990 took this form - it invaded from inside
Ugandan territory, with the help of Yoweri Museveni, the president of Uganda. The
sending state may then invade the receiving state if it sees the alliance between the
host state and the refugees as threatening its security. If the host’s government is
weak, the sending state may use the refugee crisis to its advantage as an invasion
would eliminate the threat posed by refugees by attacking them and flushing them out
of the camps or killing them. The sending state may also interfere in the running of
the host state’s government by, for example, facilitating its demise through an alliance
with a viable opposition group. Rwanda’s invasion of DRC followed this pattern.
(Lischer, 2002).

In conclusion, the literature reviewed has shown that refugees are often active rather
than passive actors in the regional conflict dynamic. It is, however, vague on the exact
mechanisms through which this happens, and in particular, the conditions in the
sending and receiving states that facilitate refugee-related conflict. This study,
therefore, seeks to contribute to the emerging literature on refugees and the spread of
conflict by focusing on the different mechanisms through which conflict spreads due
to refugee movements and activities. It also investigates the conditions under which
refugees become involved in conflict, both in the sending and receiving countries.
This is necessitated by the observation that not all refugee populations necessarily
engage in politicized violence.
1.6 HYPOTHESIS

Refugees are not only a consequence of insecurity, but may also contribute to instability and conflict. As long as the refugee problem in the Great Lakes Region remains unsolved, conflict will continue to plague the countries in the region. The hypothesis of this study will, therefore, be as follows:

1. The more the refugee problem in the Great Lakes Region remains unresolved, the more conflict will prevail in the region.

1.7 NEW REGIONALISM: A THEORETICAL FRAME WORK OF ANALYSIS

This thesis is founded on the theory of new regionalism, whose origins lie in the early theoretical debate on regional integration influenced by the European integration experience. (Gomez-Mera, 2008). As a concept, it is predominantly a post-WWII phenomenon and is generally seen as comprising two waves, that is, the old and the new regionalism in International Relations literature. According to Fredrik Soderbaum (2004), the first wave (also referred to as classical or first generation regionalism) was rooted in the devastating experience of interwar nationalism and the Second World War. It was centred on the peaceful existence of former wartime enemies and was primarily seen as a process of economic integration and security alliances. It has been defined as “a theory of cooperative hegemony” and “a planned merger of national economies through cooperation” with the state and interstate frameworks as the central objects of analysis. (Hettne, 2005: 547). This is a liberalist view that believes that increased economic cooperation leads to increased political cooperation between two or more nations and that states are less likely to go to war if they have high levels of economic and commercial interdependence. (Pendersen, 2002). The old regionalism emerged in Western Europe in the late 1940s but died out
in the late 1960’s and early 1970s, owing to the excessive Eurocentric nature of its dominant integration theories - namely functionalism and neo-functionalism as advocated by David Mitrany (1943) and Ernst Haas (1958) respectively - which are biased towards formal, institutionalised and market-led processes, implying the transfer of political authority from nation-states to supranational entities. (Hettne, 2005; Gomez-Mera, 2008).

The second wave, on which this study is based, started in the latter part of the 1980s within the context of the major structural transformation of the global system in which non-state actors also became active at several levels. (Söderbaum, 2004). It differs from the old regionalism in several ways, one of which is its geographical scope due to its “worldwide reach, extending to more regions, with greater external linkages.” (Mittelman, 2000:113). While the old regionalism was inward oriented and protectionist in economic terms, the new regionalism is open and thus compatible with an interdependent world economy.

1.7.1 DEFINITION OF TERMS

There have been many attempts by different scholars - including Vayrelenen (1984), Hettne (1989), Telo (2001) and Soderbaum (2004) - to define regions and regionalism. The terrain has always been fluid and has arguably become more complex since the scope of both these terms is continually contested and subject to different interpretations. (Fawcett & Hurrell, 1995). While regions have been typically defined as geographically proximate and interdependent states; and regionalism as attempts at formal cooperation between such states, it is evident that these definitions are too limiting in an increasingly interdependent and globalized world. (Fawcett & Hurrell, 1995). As such, regional institutions cannot be viewed purely in terms of formal organization. As much of the literature on the ‘new
regionalism' demonstrates, other actors other than states evidently have important roles to play in regional institutions. (Fawcett & Hurrell, 1995). A growing number of scholars, including Telo (2001), Soderbaum (2004) and Hettne (2005), acknowledge that there are no natural or scientific regions but that all regions are socially constructed and hence politically contested. (Söderbaum, 2009; Bøås, Marchand & Shaw, 2005.) In regionalism studies, macro-regions refer to territorial units between the national and the global level, whereas micro-regions exist between the national and local level, but are increasingly extending across borders rather than being confined within the boundaries of nation-states. (Söderbaum, 2009).

Regionalism refers to the body of ideas, identities and ideologies that are aimed at creating, maintaining or modifying the provision of security, wealth and other goals within a particular region or as a type of world order. As such, regionalism is usually associated with a formal programme and a regional project and often leads to institution-building. (Hveem, 2000).

Regionalization, on the other hand, illustrates the actual (empirical) processes of forming regions, whether they are consciously planned or caused by spontaneous occurrences. According to Hettne (2004), it signifies the ideas, dynamics and means that contribute to changing a geographical area into a politically-constructed community.

1.7.2 THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES

Mainstream theories on regionalism are predominantly positivist - old regionalism is essentially rationalist in nature and is grounded in neo-realism, liberal institutionalism and market integration theories. (Soderbaum, 2005). Steve Smith (2001) contends that rationalist theories are based on rational choice. Further, he argues that
rationalists take the interests, ideas and identities of actors as given. The New Regionalism Approach (NRA) on the other hand relies on an anti-foundationalist epistemology, combining insights from a variety of reflectivist, critical and constructivist theories. (Gomez-Mera, 2008). These theories focus predominantly on the inter-subjectivity of actors and how interests, ideas and identities are formed during social interaction. Among the main proponents of the NRA approach are Barry Buzan (1983), Raimo Väyrynen (1984) and Björn Hettne (1989). (Ansorg, 2011).

Despite these innovative approaches to regionalism, research on regional phenomena was, until recently, still dominated by the classical theories of neorealism (Waltz 1979; Vasquez 1993) and liberal institutionalism (Keohane, (1984) and Keohane & Nye 1989). These conventional theories deal only marginally with the concept of regions and maintain the nation-state as their primary point of reference. (Ansorg, 2011). In neorealism, it is generally conceivable that nation states form alliances at the regional level. The structural anarchical international system makes states, which are seen as unitary and rational egoists, predisposed towards competition and conflict often because their interests do not converge. Any attempt at integration, therefore, is for survival purposes, and is purely motivated by self-interest, for example for geopolitical reasons or when the distribution of power calls for cooperation, or, alternatively, through alliance formation in order to counter a powerful state or group of states. (Gilpin 1987).

Liberal institutionalism, on the other hand - whose traits include actor rationalism, pluralist assumptions, a liberal view of the state and the regulating influence of institutional frameworks - emphasizes interdependence between nation states. Like neorealists, they see the international system as characterized by anarchy, in which states are the most important actors. (Mansfield & Milner, 1997). They argue that the
state acts as negotiator at the intergovernmental and supranational level, limited by national political considerations, firms and pressure groups. Non-state actors influence regional politics from the bottom up and in relation to their national governments. (Soderbaum, 2004). Institutions can help states to solve coordination and collaboration dilemmas and hence achieve and sustain cooperation. The deeper the cooperation between states, the stronger the need to manage the externalities and problems associated with increased interdependence. (Gomez-Mera, 2008). Regional regimes provide information, reduce uncertainty, monitor behaviour, and permit issue-linkage, all of which reduce these problems and foster deeper regional integration. (Keohane, 1984).

However, in the two schools of thought, the region is not the focus of analytical interest. Rather, as aforementioned, the nation-states and governing elites in the international system remain the main focus, the implication of which is that regional dynamics are, therefore, inadequately captured by these theories. According to Soderbaum (2004), the main weakness of liberal institutionalism as far as regional integration is concerned, is its heavy emphasis on interstate frameworks, such as the European Union (EU), North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA), and Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), among others. Soderbaum (2004) argues that this bias is accentuated by the fact that regional organizations, especially as derived from Europe as mentioned earlier, are portrayed as the point of reference for understanding regionalism, wherever it may be in the international system. This is misleading because, first, not all forms of regionalism follow the European model, or are based solely on economic considerations. Secondly, such generalizations do not take into consideration the power asymmetries in the international system, and, moreover, they ignore such important issues as by whom, or for what purpose regionalism takes
place. (Soderbaum, 2004). Of more relevance to this study is that these theories for the most part ignore Africa and its dynamic regionalism processes.

1.7.3 MAJOR ASSUMPTIONS

In mainstream regionalism theories, regions were often delineated and compared in time and space based on the economic and institutional ties between states. Currently, most trade economists take regions as institutionally granted and only use them to study changes in the shares of intra- and interregional trade, which is seen as a myopic outlook in terms of its contribution to the study of the dynamics of regionalism in general. (Vayrynen, 2003).

In contrast, the constructivist approach, as mentioned elsewhere with regard to NRA, sees regions as arising from the redefinition of norms and identities by governments, civic groups, business firms and other entities. The implication, therefore, is that regions are shaped by the collective perception of identities and meanings with blurred and ever shifting boundaries. (Vayrynen, 2003). This view rejects the earlier static and state-centric conception of regions and considers them to be changing cognitive structures cemented by common institutional and economic ties. Constructivism stresses the instrumental uses of regionalism to promote specific political and economic ends. To constructivists, actors create social facts by assigning functions to various spatial units. These functions “are never intrinsic; they are assigned relative to the interests of users and observers.” (Searle 1995:19). According to Raimo Vayrynen (2003), functions assigned to social facts can be either agentive or non-agentive; the former serve the intentions of actors, but the latter happen independently. It follows, then, that the physical location of a region is non-agentive while the establishment of, for example, a regional military alliance, has an agentive function. Vayrynen (2003), therefore, contends that the major difference between the
old and the new approaches to regionalism revolves around two major aspects, that is, level of analysis and the physical - functional distinction. Physical regions refer to territorial, military, and economic spaces controlled primarily by states, but functional regions are defined by non-territorial factors such as culture and the market that are often the creations of non-state actors. (Vayrynen, 2003).

In International Relations, specifically in neo-realism, the study of physical regions has been predicated on the notion of anarchy, which leads sovereign states to work to control specific territories and to form regional security complexes. As a result, regional formations depend on the logic of anarchy, which, positively or negatively, renders states dependent on each other for their survival. In contrast, the constructivist school of thought - on which NRA is predicated - the driving force in functional regions is the economy, the environment or culture, among others. In other words, physical definitions of regions are usually provided by states in an attempt to reaffirm their boundaries and to organize into territorially exclusive groups. Functional conceptualizations of regions, on the other hand, emanate from the interplay of sub-national and transnational economic, environmental, and cultural processes that the states are only partially able to control. (Vayrynen 2003). Consequently, NRA is applicable in the study of refugees and the spread of conflict as it acknowledges the role of transnational state non-state actors as well as the informal and organic process involved in the formation of regions.

The new regionalism approach (NRA) starts from the proposition that in order to understand regionalism today, it is essential to realize that it is a qualitatively new phenomenon occurring in a new context and with a new content. (Soderbaum, 2004). With respect to context, new regionalism needs to be related to the current multipolar world order - which is to a large extent shaped by globalization - rather than the old
bipolar order. The decline of US hegemony and the end of Communism created a space for new regionalism to flourish, as it would not have been compatible with the Cold War system, since its quasi-regions reproduced bipolarity within themselves. (Hettne, 2003). As far as content is concerned, while the old regionalism was imposed from above and outside through superpower intervention, the new is emerging spontaneously from the regions themselves, where the constituent countries opt to engage in cooperative arrangements with the aim of dealing with the challenges posed by globalization as most states are ill equipped to manage on their own. It is also driven by both state and non-state actors who work together to create formal and informal associations, for both positive and negative purposes. This means that new regionalists challenge the traditional theories of realpolitik in International Relations by recognizing new, multidimensional actors, with varied and complex interests, on whom the threat of coercion has little effect. (Hettne, 2005). New regionalism is, thus, a complex process of change, taking place simultaneously at multiple levels of analysis: the global system level; the level of interregional relations and the intra-regional level (comprising nation-states, sub-national ethnic groups and trans-national micro-regions among others). (Manboah-Rockson, 2000). NRA is, therefore, characterized by the erosion of the Westphalian nation-state system and the growth of economic, social interdependence and trans-nationalism, leading to new modes of interaction between state and non-state actors. Further, unlike the old regionalism which is seen as having specific objectives (such as trade or security), the scope of new regionalism is more diverse and comprehensive, encompassing the environment, social, political and cultural aspects as well as security and trade. According to Fredrik Soderbaum (2004:31), unlike mainstream regionalism which has more or less fixed and static definitions of regions and states,
The NRA is more eclectic and more focused on the processes and consequences of regionalization in various fields of activity and at various levels, i.e. the processes through which regions are being made and unmade. The NRA by no means suggests that regions will be unitary, homogeneous or discrete units. Instead there are many varieties of regional subsystems, with different degrees of ‘regionness’. There are no ‘natural’ or ‘given’ regions, but these are made and unmade - intentionally or unintentionally - in the process of global transformation, by collective human action and identity formation. Regionalism is a heterogeneous, comprehensive, multidimensional phenomenon, taking place in several sectors, and at least potentially pushed by a variety of state and non-state actors, both within and outside formal regional institutional arrangements. We are likely to experience regionalization at various speeds in various sectors as well as regionalization and de-regionalization occurring at the same time.

1.7.4 SHADOW REGIONALISM

Of specific relevance to this study is shadow regionalism, which is an informal category of regionalism dependent on the lack of transparency of the state and the exploitation of existing border disparities. (Soderbaum, 2004). It is by nature informal and fluid, and is tied to general state decay, declining financial capacities and territorial control. It comprises a vicious cycle in which the decline of the state is further magnified by the privatization and retreat of the state, which in turn increases shadow regionalism. Shadow activities are not isolated domestic phenomena, but contain strong transnational and cross-border dimensions. (Soderbaum, 2004). Further, shadow regionalism is shaped by the special characteristics of African statehood and its insertion in the global political economy. Most African states are not constructed on robust social bases. Instead the elite exploit the state apparatus for personal accumulation, often through the involvement of international economic actors and businesses. According to Mario Telo (2001) shadow regionalism is characterized by transnational networking, overlapping decision levels, declining distinction between the sources of authority and growing uncertainty about where sovereignty is located. This results in political apathy, the growth of sub-national regionalist movements, the privatization of power, among other characteristics that diminish the strength of the state. Moreover, particularly in Africa, private domestic
and international violence and criminal networks mean the decline of state monopoly of force.

The weight of transnational links and growing functional loyalties are transforming the landscape of most states. States are no longer able guarantee territorial integrity and are increasingly being forced to share their authority. The result is a kind of an unclear multilevel global system of authority where states are involved with other entities such as multinational companies, sub-national and transnational inter-regional bodies, private and public networks and international organizations but no longer as dominant actors. (Telo, 2001). The GLR is a case in point - foreign intervention in the region is seldom about preserving national security and defeating enemies, as Rwanda and Uganda have often claimed. It is also about securing access to resource-rich areas and establishing privatised accumulation networks that can emerge and prosper under conditions of war and anarchy. In this sense, war assumes the characteristics of a regionalized business venture, the beneficiaries of which are important agents in the incessant conflict. (Soderbaum, 2004). This logic illustrates the regionalized political economy of conflict at work, in which both state and non-state actors come together in diffuse and volatile informal networks of plunder in order to profit from violence and underground economies, usually as a result of weak governments and porous borders. (Soderbaum, 2004).

In this sense, therefore, conflicts can be regionalized. The regional nature of the conflicts in the GLR has much to do with the availability of weak institutions of governance which are highly contagious to conflict vectors. This region comprises relatively weak states in close geographic proximity through which local crises are
able to transform into regional ones, owing to the absence of solid state systems capable of checking conflict generation and/or lacking the will or ability to facilitate the cessation of conflict. In this environment, transnational actors are able to move easily across borders. As such, the expanding geographic space of the conflicts in the GLR is significantly influenced by the presence of large numbers of refugees in each country with collective ethnic ties and memories of violence. National borders are extremely porous and internal conflicts easily spill-over into neighbouring countries, facilitated by refugee populations, where they connect with existing animosities or are reinvented. The regional situation in the Great Lakes remains volatile, therefore, mainly due to the persistence of incompatible interests among the various actors, notably refugees.

1.8 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
The study will rely on qualitative data collected from secondary sources, namely published and peer reviewed journal articles, text books, relevant legal instruments, the mass media and the internet. Other sources will include policy reports from international and civil society organisations, monographs and magazines. The wide variety of sources of data will allow access to diverse opinions and contribute to the better understanding of the topic under study.

1.9 ORGANISATION OF STUDY
The study will comprise five chapters and will be structured as follows:

Chapter One serves as the general introduction to the thesis. It also outlines the problem statement, the research questions and objectives, the hypotheses and finally, a detailed review of the relevant literature.
Chapter Two will entail an in-depth analysis of specific mechanisms through which refugees act as catalysts of conflict as well as the conditions in both sending and receiving countries that precipitate and facilitate the spread of refugee-related conflict. As mentioned earlier on, not all refugee populations engage in violence, and this suggests that there may be country-specific characteristics on the ground that determine the onset (or lack thereof) of refugee-fuelled conflict.

Chapter Three will be a detailed case study of the Great Lakes Region, specifically the Democratic Republic of Congo, to illustrate the phenomenon of refugee-related violence - the genesis, the process and the solutions - in an attempt to understand how refugees have contributed to that particularly protracted conflict and the attending humanitarian crises.

Chapter Four will be an investigation into the actions (or lack there-of) of states and non-state actors in the mitigation of the effects of refugee-fuelled violence. It has been argued numerously that the international community stood by while more than one disaster unfolded in the Great Lakes Region between 1994 and 1997. The UN was especially vilified for being ineffectual during the refugee crisis. To this end, then, this section seeks to look deeper into the little that was done by state and non-state actors in response to the humanitarian disaster that followed the Rwandan genocide, that is, the massive refugee movements and the problems they encountered as well as caused, notably, the spread of conflict.

The selection of the western actors under study, specifically Belgium and France, is justified by their historical/colonial ties to the DRC and the region in general as well as the actors’ continuing endeavours to compete with other actors for commercial control in the region. The others, such as the United States and Britain are selected
because of their continued involvement in the region, for both political and economic dominance. The regional actors under study are selected because of their centrality to the conflict in the region as well as the time they have been involved in the region in different capacities. In some cases (such as Uganda and Rwanda), their continued involvement in the GLR conflict either directly or through proxies at the time of writing in 2013 is further justification for their selection.

Chapter Five sums up the findings of the preceding chapters, and provides conclusions and recommendations.
CHAPTER TWO

REFUGEE-RELATED CONFLICT: MECHANISMS AND INCENTIVES

2.0 INTRODUCTION

Refugee crises across the globe have resulted from, and increasingly contributed to, the spread of civil war. In many cases as people flee violence, the ensuing refugee exodus can exacerbate conflict as refugees become incorporated into a wider strategy of war. Sarah Lischer (2005) argues that traditionally, refugees were seen as passive victims of insecurity rather than active perpetrators. During the Cold War they were used in the ideological struggle and proxy wars and it is only after the end of the Cold War that they have come to be seen as a core security problem. Further, Edward Mogire (2011) argues that the dominance of security studies by realism, with its narrow focus on security as primarily militaristic, meant that refugees were not seen as a threat. Rather they are seen as "the tragic, but politically irrelevant by-products" of war. (Mogire, 2011:23). More recently, following the refugee crisis in the Great Lakes Region (GLR) and the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States of America (USA), among others, refugees and asylum seekers are increasingly being seen as presenting an existential threat to individual, societal and national security. (Mogire, 2011). In line with the study’s central argument, therefore, far from being passive victims of war, refugees are often actively and willingly involved in war. Refugees can cause or exacerbate interstate conflict which may take various forms, from diplomatic disputes (such as the expulsion of diplomats or the complete severance of diplomatic relations) to outright war. As such, the hypothesis of this thesis is that the more the refugee problem in the GLR remains unresolved, the more likely that conflict will prevail in the region.
According to Gavin White (2006), for exiled military forces, refugee populations lend international legitimacy to their cause as well as provide human shields, new recruits, food and medical care. Refugee camps in such circumstances serve as rear bases of operation in attacks across state borders. Support or indifference to such realities within the host state, or the support of external patrons, contributes significantly to the proliferation and escalation of conflict across borders, risking open international conflict that has the potential to draw in additional states and destabilize a whole region. (Forsberg, 2009). Recurrent refugee flows are, therefore, a source of international as well as regional conflict, causing instability in neighbouring countries, triggering intervention, and sometimes contributing to the militarisation of refugee communities within camps. However, not all refugee movements lead to conflict. For example, refugees who fled Rwanda during the 1990s went into the Democratic Republic of Congo, a state that was to become the site of numerous cross-border raids, while those who went into Tanzania remained relatively unaffected by refugee violence, at least among the Rwandan refugees on its territory during the same time period. (Lischer, 2005; Whitaker, 2003). In an attempt to understand refugee-related conflict in the GLR, the study’s main research question is: What role do refugees play in the spread of conflict? The study’s central argument is that refugees are not always passive victims of conflict, but are sometimes willingly and actively involved. The study is necessitated by the fact that, while a reading of the literature suggests that refugee flows can contribute to the spread of conflict, it is not clear on the exact mechanisms involved. Further, most of the literature on the subject views nation-states as self-contained entities, while the history of conflict clearly demonstrates that events in one state, such as war, do affect neighbouring countries, and in some cases, a whole region, as demonstrated by the refugee crisis of the GLR under study. As
such, the objective of this study is to investigate the link between refugee populations and the spread of conflict. To this end, therefore, this section of the study looks into the mechanisms through which refugees spread conflict. It will also investigate the conditions in the host states that seem to precipitate and facilitate the spread of refugee-related conflict. The discussion begins with analysis of what it entails to be a refugee and the various reasons for flight. Next is an analysis of the different categories of refugees based on the reason they flee. The third and fourth sub-sections look into the various types of refugee-related violence and the mechanisms through which refugee-related violence spreads, respectively. Finally, the discussion delves into the unique dynamics within the host countries that determine whether a given refugee population will precipitate and/or spread conflict.

2.1 CONCEPT DEFINITIONS AND CASE SELECTION

This section sets out the geographical scope of the area under study and defines what it entails to be a refugee under international law.

2.1.1 THE GREAT LAKES REGION

According to Stean Tshiband (2009:2), The African Great Lakes Region (GLR) refers to a sub-region in the African Rift Valley comprising a number of states surrounded by several lakes stretching on a north-south axis along the Congo-Nile crest, from Lake Tanganyika in the south to Lake Edward in the north. Some of the other lakes include Victoria, Kivu, Malawi, Turkana and Albert. The region hosts the second largest fresh water lake in the world in terms of surface area (Lake Victoria) as well as the second largest in terms of both depth and volume (Lake Tanganyika), hence the label Great Lakes Region. There is some consensus on which states comprise the GLR but Rene Lemarchand (2006) contends that while it may include Kenya, Zambia, Malawi, Mozambique and Ethiopia, it is generally agreed that a minimal
definition should include Rwanda, Burundi, eastern DRC and south-western Uganda as the core area. For the purposes of this discussion, this minimal definition will apply, with particular attention to Rwanda and eastern DRC. The choice of the GLR as a case study is based on the region’s predisposition to incessant conflict, the escalation and spread of which is significantly influenced by the presence of large numbers of refugees, particularly in the period following the Rwandan genocide in 1994.

The genocide precipitated a massive influx of refugees into the then eastern Zaire which contributed to the outbreak of two wars in the DRC, one in 1996 and another in 1998 and the ensuing chaos and insecurity still prevalent to date. In the last two decades, the region has experienced considerable bloodshed and loss of life - according to the 2007 IRC Mortality Report, the conflict and its aftermath with regard to fatalities has surpassed any other since WWII. Consequently, the GLR has been aptly described as exhibiting “all the symptoms of a Hobbesian universe.” (Lemarchand, 2006:27). The region’s peculiar dynamic with regard to the different cultural identities and ethnic groups also makes it a suitable choice for this discussion, as this dynamic has an important part to play in the prevalent instability and insecurity. According to Rene Lemarchand (2006), it makes more sense to think of the GLR crisis not as one protracted conflict but as several historically distinct crises occurring in specific national contexts and precipitating violent chain reactions in neighbouring states. Some of the crises in this period include the Burundian Civil War and attendant massacres, the Rwandan civil war and subsequent genocide, the two Congo wars and the conflict in Northern Uganda, among others. The discussion will adhere to this notion, and will, therefore, analyse three of the GLR conflicts, namely
the Rwandan civil war, and the First and Second Congo Wars, in an attempt to illustrate the role of refugees in both the precipitation and spread of conflict.

Figure 1: MAP OF THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO

2.1.2 THE REFUGEE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW

According to Myron Weiner (1996), contemporary refugee migration involves millions of people from all continents, although there are wide variations in terms of origin and destination. The vast majority originate and remain in the global South, owing to the high prevalence of protracted conflicts in the region. Edward Mogire (2011) posits that of the estimated 10, 396,600 refugees in the world by 2009, Africa hosted 2,300,100, that is, 22.1%. (Mogire, 2011:1).

Some of the reasons for which people flee, as identified by the African Union (AU) and the United Nations (UN) conventions include violent conflicts, external aggression, occupation or foreign domination or events seriously disturbing public order. (Mogire, 2011; Muriithi, 2005). Others are a well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of race, religion, membership of a particular social group or political affiliation and serious violation of human rights. It is important to note that unlike the 1951 UN Refugee Convention (UNRC), Article 1 of the AU Convention Governing Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa (AUCGSARPA), formerly the 1969 OAU Refugee Convention (OAURC), has widened the definition of refugee to include a variety of people in diverse situations who need protection and assistance. Article 1 defines a refugee as (AUCGSARPA:1969)

every person who, owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country, or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.

Article 2 goes on to state that (AUCGSARPA:1969)

The term refugee shall also apply to every person who, owing to external aggression, occupation, foreign domination or events seriously disturbing public order in either part or the whole of his country of origin or nationality, is compelled to leave his place of habitual residence in order to seek refuge in another place outside his country of origin or nationality.
This expansion of the definition has made it possible for millions of Africans to reach safety and receive protection and assistance. The intention of this wider definition was to extend refugee status to persons fleeing colonial domination and anti-colonial warfare. (Muriithi, 2005). Alexander Betts and Gil Loescher (2010) contend that from the end of the twentieth century, the narrow, legal definition in the 1951 UNRC has been challenged further in the policy circles of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) to include people of concern such as those fleeing environmental disaster, state collapse and Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs). According to Assefaw Bariagaber (2006), the main cause of the vast majority of refugee movements is violent conflict, specifically protracted warfare, international wars and ethnic tensions. All these apply to the conflicts in the GLR, and given the cycle of unending wars which generate refugees, who then further destabilize the region and in turn cause more conflict and more refugees, it is unlikely that conflict will end as long as the refugee problem in the region remains unresolved.

As mentioned earlier, not all refugees constitute a security threat. The propensity for engaging in conflict depends significantly on their level of militarization and politicization, both of which in turn depend on the reasons the refugees fled in the first place and the policies of the states in which the refugees seek refuge. (Zolberg, Suhrke & Aguayo, 1989; Bariagaber, 2006). Political violence among refugees is to be distinguished from simple criminal violence, as it entails organized violent activity for political goals. Further, it occurs in the context of a militarized refugee population. (Bariagaber, 2006). Consequently, one of the most pertinent questions in the context of refugee-related violence is refugee militarization. This is because it contributes to lawlessness in and around the refugee camps and often leads to retaliatory attacks on host states by the refugees’ home state. Refugee militarization “derives from the
concept of militarization which involves a rush to armaments, the growing role of the military in national and international affairs and the use of force as an instrument of supremacy and political power.” (Mogire, 2011:2). It is also characterised by the increasing influence of the military in civilian affairs. Refugee militarization refers to non-civilian attributes of refugee populations such as weapon procurement, participation in military training and recruitment, armed rebellions and the use of camps as bases for military operations, rest and recuperation. (Bariagaber, 2006; Mogire, 2011). It also includes any activities by refugees and/or exiles that are non-civilian in nature, which take place outside the refugee camps, but which are inadvertently or sometimes with full knowledge, sustained by humanitarian agencies. (Lischer, 2005). Integral to the refugee militarisation phenomenon are the so-called refugee warriors, defined as the organized elements of exiled communities, typically intermingled with a refugee population and based in a country of asylum, and are engaged in a wide range of armed campaigns against their countries of origin. The refugee warriors typically use refugee camps as a source of supplies and recruits to support campaigns against their country of origin. (Loescher, Milner, Newman & Troeller, 2007). Refugee warriors are a dominant feature of refugee movements since the 1950s, examples of whom include the Afghan mujahidin in Pakistan, the Khmer Rouge in Thailand, and the Nicaraguan Contras in Central America. (Milner, 2008).

In Africa, refugee warrior communities were the product of proxy wars in the Horn of Africa and in Southern Africa, wars of national liberation, especially in Southern Africa, and post-colonial conflicts, especially in the African Great Lakes region. (Mogire, 2011). According to Howard Adelman (2003), refugee warriors are citizens of a state who flee into a neighbouring state and seek refuge, usually in refugee camps close to the border with their home countries, from where they launch attacks against
the regime in power in their home state, using the camps of their operational bases. Refugee warriors, for the most part, seen as a security threat as the insecurity they precipitate by their presence is compounded by the fact that refugee warriors invite retaliation, complicate relations with other states, and threaten the host state and the security of their citizens, as well as entire regions. (Loescher & Milner, 2006). The direct threats faced by the host state due to conflict spill-over and the presence of refugee warriors are “by far the strongest link between refugees and conflict” as, the refugees themselves are actively engaged in armed campaigns typically, but not exclusively, against their home states. (Milner, 2008:12). Such campaigns have the potential of regionalizing the conflict and dragging the host state into a potential interstate conflict.

Edward Mogire (2011) raises a pertinent question with regard to refugee militarization, that is, whether or not refugees are coerced/manipulated into it or whether they participate voluntarily. He argues that the UNHCR and other humanitarian organizations are of the opinion that refugees are, in fact, manipulated into joining or supporting armed rebellions by armed elements and political leaders in their midst within the camps “through the use or threat of force, propaganda, and/or denial of relief assistance.” (Mogire, 2011:31). Manipulation may also occur when host or third party states threaten to withdraw assistance with the aim of forcing refugees to instigate armed conflict or join certain rebel groups. During the Cold War, for example, the West supported refugee militarization as a tactic to serve its strategic, political and ideological interests. This entailed the unrestricted and continuous supply of arms and other forms of aid to refugee groups in their numerous proxy wars. (Milner, 2008; Mogire, 2011). On the other hand, refugees join or support armed
rebellions willingly because they see it as the only avenue through which they can bring about change in their home countries. Indeed, refugees in most cases are part of highly conscious communities with armed leaders that are engaged in warfare for political objectives. (Perera, 2011). This suggests that some refugees are politically very savvy and sophisticated, and will, therefore, willingly support or join insurgent groups because they refuse to accept their refugee status as a permanent condition.

According to Sarah Lischer (2002), three major factors explain the link between refugee populations and the spread of conflict, and most importantly, why some refugee groups do not get involved in violent conflict. The first is the reason for fleeing, or differently put, the origin of the refugee crisis. Lischer (2002) argues that refugees who flee targeted persecution or state-in-exile refugees will usually be more politically and militarily organized than those who escape the general chaos and destruction wrought by war, which means they are more likely to engage in cross-border violence. In other words, to determine refugees’ propensity for violence, it is necessary to look into the reasons for which they flee in the first place, as these will influence their political goals, and consequently, their level of political and military organization. The second aspect pertains to the ability and willingness (or lack thereof) of the host state to secure its borders and demilitarize the refugees; these determine to a great extent whether or not the refugees have an environment in which they can engage in violent conflict. Thirdly, the roles of third party states, international humanitarian agencies and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are important as their actions can and often do facilitate and exacerbate refugee-related conflict by intentionally or inadvertently providing the militarized refugees with operational bases (from which they can attack, re-arm and recuperate) and resources (with which they can feed combatants and procure weapons). Specifically,
interference by external actors may favour the host state or the refugees, prompting one or the other to instigate violence. For example, a powerful donor state or organisation may pressure the host state to allow refugees to arm. Sometimes, humanitarian agencies ignore military activity among refugees, and continue to offer aid.

During the Rwandan refugee crisis in 1994 for example, the Chief Executive of CARE International, Charles Tapp publicly acknowledged that “we are going to feed people who have been perpetrating genocide.” (Lischer, 2005:79). Conversely, external parties may discourage the spread of war by strengthening the host state’s capability to police its borders and demilitarize the refugee camps to reduce or halt refugee-related violence. (Whitaker, 2003).

2.2 REFUGEE CLASSIFICATION

In a detailed analysis of refugee-related conflict, Sarah Lischer (2002) classifies refugees into three categories\(^\text{13}\), based on their reasons for fleeing their home countries and consequently, their level of politicization and militarisation. The first category is referred to as situational refugees. Refugees in this category flee, in a disorganized manner, the intolerable conditions and general destruction wrought by civil conflict. They are not specifically targeted by the fighters for any reason, such as ethnicity or political opinion, and will usually leave the country in a panic to escape the threat of death and the chaos associated with war. Their homes become frontlines in a civil war they have little to do with, except as victims of attacks or as pawns of militant leaders. (Lischer, 2005). Situational refugees have little interest in political/ethnic affiliations and are keen on being repatriated as soon as the hostilities cease to enable them carry on with their lives, and will usually have little concern with who is in power and how it was acquired. The refugees in this category are the

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least unlikely, therefore, to engage in any political or military organisation, and by extension, to be voluntarily involved in conflict. The situational refugees’ lack of interest in politics is partly as a result of the type of conflict they seek to escape. Often, conflicts which create situational refugees garner very low levels of popular support from the masses due to the high levels of brutality that the combatants subject their own people to. Differently put, such conflicts significantly contribute to the alienation of any potential supporters due to the brutality suffered by civilians.

Mozambican refugees in Malawi offer a fitting illustration of the phenomenon of situational refugees. During the civil war in Mozambique in the 1980s, approximately 1 million refugees fled into Malawi. (Chabal, Engel & De Haan, 2007:108). Despite the large size of the refugee population, the location of the camp on the border and the poor living conditions, the refugee population did not engage in any militarization. Consequently, there was negligible armed conflict and only a few cross-border attacks occurred. During the civil war, the Marxist/Socialist Mozambican government engaged the South African-backed Resistencia National Moçambicana (RENAMO)14 rebels in a bitter war over power. Afonso Dhlakama’s RENAMO terrorized the population, leading to the mass exodus of refugees into Malawi. The rebels also demolished much of Mozambique’s infrastructure, including schools, clinics and roads. During this period, Mozambican refugees constituted 10% of the population in Malawi and lived in villages and camps less than ten miles from the Mozambique border. (Chabal, Engel & De Haan, 2007:109).

The refugees generally stayed out of the conflict and did not support either of the warring parties. RENAMO made no attempt to win over the support of the refugees as it did not seem to have any concrete political goals, safe for the overthrow Samora Machel’s government at whatever cost. According to Tim Allen & Hubert Morsink
Due to the causes of their flight, persecuted refugees are more vulnerable to propaganda and manipulation than are situational refugees. Refugees who have experienced persecution also fear repeated attacks by the sending state. Therefore they will be more willing to take measures perceived as defensive or preventive. These refugees may find that ambitious leaders manipulate a defensive desire for survival for offensive purposes. Persecuted refugees also face a higher probability of cross-border attacks by the sending state than do situational refugees. The cause of their flight demonstrates that the sending state views the refugees as a threat for reasons of ethnicity, religion, or political affiliation. Thus, even if the refugees do not organize politically or militarily while in exile, they remain vulnerable to continued attacks.
The Burundian Hutu population in Tanzania is a good illustration of persecuted refugees who have actively engaged in political violence. (Whitaker, 2003). Since 1993, ethnic civil war in Burundi has led to the deaths of hundreds of thousands of civilians and the displacement of many more. The conflict is an ethnic based one and is between the Tutsi-dominated government and Hutu rebel forces. As of December 2002, 370,000 Hutu refugees from Burundi lived in camps near the Tanzanian-Burundian border. (Whitaker, 2003:221). The ethnic polarization that led to the refugee flows facilitated the mobilization of support from the refugee camps, resulting in the politicisation and militarization of Burundian Hutu refugees in large numbers. Many extremist political parties with military wings sprung up in the camps, and subsequently cross-border raids into Burundi began, with the aim of destabilizing the country. The Tanzanian government threatened to attack the refugee camps following claims from the Burundian government that Tanzania was sympathetic to the Burundian Hutu cause. This led to diplomatic tensions between the two countries and Tanzania eventually brought in its troops to guard its side of the border. (Mogire, 2011). This example clearly illustrates the politicised and militarized nature of persecuted refugees, and how their activities directly or indirectly threaten to destabilize both the home and host states. This stems from the nature of the conflict from which they flee (ethnic conflict in this case) and the cause of their flight (persecution).
Table 2.1 REFUGEE STATISTICS IN THE GREAT LAKES REGION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>BURUNDI</th>
<th>DRC</th>
<th>KENYA</th>
<th>RWANDA</th>
<th>TANZANIA</th>
<th>UGANDA</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
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<td>352,423</td>
<td>6000</td>
<td>883,250</td>
<td>346,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
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<td>1,433,760</td>
<td>234,665</td>
<td>7792</td>
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</tr>
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<td>1996</td>
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<td>223,640</td>
<td>25,257</td>
<td>498,732</td>
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<td>232,097</td>
<td>34,227</td>
<td>570,367</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
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<td>238,187</td>
<td>33,403</td>
<td>543,881</td>
<td>204,545</td>
</tr>
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<td>1999</td>
<td>22,199</td>
<td>285,270</td>
<td>223,400</td>
<td>34,365</td>
<td>622,203</td>
<td>218,191</td>
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<tr>
<td>2000</td>
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<td>206,106</td>
<td>28,398</td>
<td>680,862</td>
<td>236,622</td>
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<tr>
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<td>239,221</td>
<td>34,786</td>
<td>646,900</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
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<td>30,863</td>
<td>689,373</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
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<td>234,033</td>
<td>237,800</td>
<td>36,608</td>
<td>649,770</td>
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</tr>
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<td>2004</td>
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<tr>
<td>2006</td>
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<td>208,371</td>
<td>272,500</td>
<td>49,192</td>
<td>485,295</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
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<td>263,310</td>
<td>53,577</td>
<td>435,630</td>
<td>228,959</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
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<td>155,162</td>
<td>320,510</td>
<td>55,062</td>
<td>321,909</td>
<td>162,132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
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<td>185,809</td>
<td>358,950</td>
<td>54,016</td>
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<td>127,345</td>
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<tr>
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<td>55,398</td>
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<tr>
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<td>566,487</td>
<td>55,325</td>
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<td>139,448</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>41,811</td>
<td>65,101</td>
<td>564,906</td>
<td>58,197</td>
<td>101,021</td>
<td>197,867</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 2.1 shows the country statistics of refugees in the Great Lakes Region. Each of the countries in the table is a significant country of asylum, given the numerous protracted conflicts in the region. As the table shows, all the countries save for Rwanda, experienced a marked increase in the number of refugees in 1994 owing to the large exodus from Rwanda during the 1994 genocide. The DRC took in the most refugees, followed closely by Tanzania. There were also increases between 1996 and 2003, that is, the period during which the First and Second Congo Wars took place. Notably, the number of refugees who fled into Burundi, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda, all of which share borders with the DRC increased as a result of the said
wars. The table shows another increase in the refugee numbers in 2008. This is attributed to the heavy fighting between the national DRC army, the Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo (FARDC) and the Laurent Nkunda and later Bosco Ntaganda's Congrès National pour la Défense du Peuple (CNDP) between 2008 and 2009. (Kasaija, 2011:190). The increase in the refugee numbers in the region between 2010 and 2011 is attributed to attacks on the eastern DRC population and serious human rights violations such as rape and killings by elements of the FARDC, CNDP and Forces Démocratiques de Liberation du Rwanda (FDLR) and Mouvement du 23 Mars (M23), all of which are armed rebel groups operating in the DRC according to the United Nations Security Council Report of May 2011. The groups' violent attacks on civilians have led to untold suffering in eastern DRC, as well as massive displacement, with some civilians being displaced within the DRC itself and others being forced to flee into neighbouring countries.

State-in-exile refugees comprise the third and most violence-prone category and consist of both the refugees and a highly organized political and military leadership. The refugees' leaders hold aggressive goals, such as a radical change in the regime of their home state. The Rwandan Hutu refugees in eastern DRC provide an example of the state-in-exile phenomenon. These refugees are descendants of the mainly Hutu refugees who fled Rwanda under pressure from the leaders of the genocide. The refugees comprise the bulk of a formidable rebel group formed in 2000 and that is still actively involved in the conflicts in eastern DRC at the time of writing this thesis in 2013, that is, the FDLR. (Doyle, 2013). The state-in-exile category is the most likely to resort to war and the refugee crisis coupled with humanitarian intervention it attracts will usually be used as a war strategy by the refugee leaders. (Lischer, 2005).
State-in-exile refugees will usually return to their home countries either as a result of being the victorious party in a conflict or due to forced repatriation, rejecting power-sharing or amnesty offers from the home government. For example, the FDLR has refused all attempts by the Rwandan government to orchestrate their return because they argue that they can only return if they are allowed to be politically active as a party, a condition the Rwandan government refuses to consider. (Perera, 2011). Further, state-in-exile refugees pose a greater risk to the sending state than do other types of refugees in terms of violence, thus increasing the chance of preventative and retaliatory cross-border attacks against them.

Owing to their large numbers, the state-in-exile category of refugees serves as an indictment of the home state’s regime as well as a constant threat to the home state’s security. Sarah Lischer (2005) posits that “state-in-exile refugees challenge the legitimacy of the sending state’s government, providing fodder for domestic and international critics.” (Lischer, 2005:93). Despite the attendent strong, politicized leadership structure among state-in-exile refugees, most refugees do not become militarized out of their own volition. Rather, their leaders coerce and control them into taking part in the conflict by exaggerating the threats to the refugees’ safety by the home state, maintaining an iron grip on the information that reaches them, as well as controlling the distribution of humanitarian aid. (Stedman & Tanner, 2003). Leaders emphasize real and imagined injustices to blackmail and discourage the refugees from returning to their home countries. For example, the military and political leaders of the refugee camps in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) successfully nurtured a belief in Hutu victimhood and solidarity, distorting or erasing information about the genocide and exaggerated the injustices perpetrated by
the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA) in Rwanda. (Rafti, 2006). This indoctrination continues within the FDLR where the leaders employ myths and selective historical narratives that exaggerate their suffering as a people. In this way the refugees form an ideology that reflects their values and beliefs and that explain their conviction to resort to violence as an avenue of return to their homeland. (Rafti, 2006). According to Suda Perera (2011), the FDLR ideology revolves around the injustices suffered by the Hutu people as well as a belief that the Hutu were subjected to double genocide, first in Rwanda in 1994 and, after 1996, against Hutu refugees in the Congo. This rebel discourse has created a common ethnic history that is continuously being disseminated by extremist Hutu leaders to all the Rwandan Hutu movements formed in the DRC. The refugees appear to be aligned to their leaders’ cause as illustrated by their continued recruitment into the FDLR, among other rebel groups in the GLR. The fear created in the refugees by their leadership that the Hutu people are at risk means that many Hutu refugees in the GLR have become willing recruits for the numerous rebel movements in the region to protect their kin. (Perera, 2011).

In conclusion, the various categories of refugees as discussed contribute significantly to understanding the link between refugee populations and conflict, which is the study’s objective. The discussion thus far has also tried to answer the main research question of the study, which is: What is the role of refugees in the spread of conflict? This knowledge is important in understanding the conflicts in the GLR as they are often related to refugee movements because, as the study’s hypothesis suggests, the longer the refugee problem remains unresolved in the GLR, the more likely that conflict will prevail in the region. Indeed, the outbreak of conflict and the ensuing genocide in the region serves as an example of the potential implications of protracted
refugee populations. Hutu refugees who fled Rwanda in 1994 and their descendants formed the FDLR in 2000, which continues to cause insecurity in the region. Most of the refugees who joined FDLR have been living in the larger GLR for a long time and the inability or unwillingness of the international community to find a long-term solution for the refugees is a significant contributing factor in the intractable conflicts that continue to plague the Great Lakes region of Africa. (Perera, 2011).

2.3 FORMS OF REFUGEE MILITANCY

Refugees, as aforementioned, can willingly and actively cause or exacerbate interstate conflicts and are, therefore, no longer considered passive victims as was the case traditionally. These conflicts may take various forms, from diplomatic disputes (such as the expulsion of diplomats or the complete severance of diplomatic relations) to outright war. (Mogire 2011). Sarah Lischer (2005) sees conflict involving refugees as manifesting itself in several ways. The first one is as a form of violent cross-border attack between the sending state and refugees. This is the most frequent and intense form of refugee related violence, as well as the most likely to pull in the host state, thus precipitating an interstate war. These types of attacks pose a greater risk to sovereignty and are viewed by both the sending and the host state as threats to national security. For example, even if Rwanda withdrew from the DRC in 2003, there has been animosity between Rwanda and the DRC with Rwanda threatening to re-invoke the DRC in 2007 if the DRC did not eliminate the FDLR, which the RPF sees as posing a security threat to Rwanda. (Bihuzo, 2012). This category of refugees also involves a lot more casualties and takes longer than the other types of refugee-related violence. (Lischer, 2005).

The second manifestation is when violence breaks out between the host state and the refugees. It often takes the form of riots between the refugees and the local
population, or in some cases, the local police forcibly attempt repatriation by subjecting the refugees to violence. Often, the locals join in the violent attacks, leading to riots and consequently, the police become more severe in their attacks. Another variation of this type of violence occurs when rebel groups in the host state, with the support of the sending state, attack refugees as happened numerous in northern Uganda where southern Sudanese refugees were attacked by Sudanese-funded Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) rebels in 2004. (Kasaija, 2011). Conflict between refugees and the host state may be, for instance, be precipitated by refugee agitation for better treatment, and at its worst, can lead to many deaths. These first two modes of refugee-related conflict transmission are what Lischer (2002) sees as the initial stages of spread, that is, before other states are drawn into the conflict. In the two scenarios, refugees attack the sending state or the sending state attacks the refugees either as a preventative or retaliatory measure, and at these stages it is essentially still a civil war.

Ethnic or factional conflict may originate amongst the refugee population and spread into the host population, which constitutes the third way in which refugees can cause conflict. This is demonstrated by the fighting between Burundian Hutu refugees in refugee camps in Western Tanzania which threatened the security of the Tanzanian state on numerous occasions between 2000 and 2002. (Loescher & Milner, 2006). It is the third most common type, often involving violence between competing ethnic or political groups in the refugee camps. Quite apart from putting the lives of both refugees and aid workers at risk, this form of violence leads to general lawlessness in the camps. It seldom draws in the sending or host states, unless either or both of the ethnic/political groups engaging in violence against each other have supporters in the host state, in which case civil war could potentially erupt in the host state. According
to Beth Elise Whitaker (2003), this type of violence for the most part occurs in tandem with the other types of refugee-related violence discussed earlier.

Yet another way in which refugees are involved in conflict is when their arrival into a host country precipitates internal conflict by upsetting the existing ethnic balance, which may encourage a previously oppressed or disenfranchised minority or an opposition group to take up arms. A good illustration would be the sudden influx of Hutu refugees into eastern DRC which gave a numerical boost to Hutu within the area. The Hutu from Rwanda and those that were previously in the DRC, together with other indigenous Congolese groups (who make up the Mai Mai rebel group) joined together to attack a common enemy, the Congolese Tutsi, whom they view as foreigners, and dispossess them. Such violence continues sporadically to this day, that is, 2013. (Kaana, 2013). Further, the international community’s indifference to the plight of thousands of Tutsi during the genocide has led to the assertion by Rwandans that if Rwanda does not protect the Congolese Tutsi, no one will. Such issues have informed Rwandan intervention in the DRC and make up official justifications for the presence of the Rwandan military in the DRC. (Perera, 2011).

Lastly, violence may also erupt when refugees act as catalysts for interstate war or when one state intervenes in another to halt the movement of refugees into its territory. Further, the attacks between the sending state and refugees are the most likely to escalate into international war between the host and sending states, and the subsequent involvement of other actors as demonstrated by the Rwanda-DRC wars of 1996-1997 and 1998-2003 as well as more recent attacks by the FDLR after 2004. These attacks usually begin with refugees attacking the sending state, or the sending state carrying out an attack on the refugee camps. The host state is then drawn in as it
retaliates to the attack on its territorial integrity. It may do so by openly engaging in
the attack itself or by supporting the refugees materially and with arms to facilitate
attacks. If the host state gets directly involved, it does so either to expel the refugees
or in alliance with the refugees against the sending state.

The host state may also opt to back the refugees in the invasion of the sending state
without involving any of its troops. Rwanda's invasion by the Rwandan Patriotic
Front in 1990 took this form - it invaded from inside Ugandan territory, with the help
of Yoweri Museveni, the president of Uganda. The sending state may then invade the
host state if it sees the alliance between the host state and the refugees as threatening
its security. If the host government is weak, the sending state may use the refugee
crisis as a pretext for invading the host state to eliminate the threat posed by refugees
by attacking them and flushing them out of the camps or killing them. The sending
state may also interfere in the running of the host state's government by, for example,
facilitating its demise through an alliance with a viable opposition group in the host
state. Rwanda's invasion of DRC followed this pattern when it formed an alliance
with the Banyamulenge.19 (Perera, 2011). Interstate or international war caused or
spread by refugees is the least likely to occur, at least in the recent past. This is
attributable to the Cold War; interstate wars were for the most part contained and
controlled by the interests of superpowers, that is, the US and the then Soviet Union.
The contemporary international system is multi-polar and is characterized by passivity
on the part the stronger states and the disengagement of former colonial masters.
Consequently, interstate conflicts like those in the GLR represent a new, albeit
dangerous trend in refugee-related violence. (Mogire, 2011). The last three scenarios
constitute escalation, and, unlike the first two, are characterized by the involvement of
other belligerents. (Liescher, 2005).
2.4 AGENTS OF REFUGEE-RELATED CONFLICT

As per the study’s central argument, far from being passive victims of violence, refugees are often actively involved in both the cause and spread of conflict, in particular cross-border violence. Refugee movements are increasingly seen as posing a threat to international peace and security owing to their demonstrated potential to regionalise conflict. It is also the case that most protracted refugee populations often originate from the very states whose instability lies at the heart of chronic regional insecurity such as Somalia, Afghanistan, Burma and the DRC and in which conflict and human rights violations have persisted for years. (Milner, 2008). The presence of large, often protracted refugee populations is closely linked to weak states, and consequently, part of any solution to long-term regional conflicts must involve resolving refugee situations as mentioned earlier, particularly given the porous nature of these states’ borders which facilitates conflict regionalisation. Most of the literature on refugee-related conflicts sees states as separate, independent entities immune to the events happening outside them. However, events in history show that what happens in one state more often than not affects its neighbours. Moreover, the literature on refugee-related conflict, while suggesting that refugee flows contribute to the spread of conflict, is not clear on the exact mechanisms involved. This section looks into the various mechanisms through which refugees cause and spread conflict regionally. Further, given that not all refugee populations engage in violence, the unique conditions in the host states that are conducive to refugee-related conflict are also discussed. The section attempts to answer the study’s research question: What role do refugees play in the spread of conflict? The section also goes some way in meeting the study’s main objective, namely, to investigate the link between refugee populations and conflict.
2.4.1 DIFFUSION AND ESCALATION

According to David Lake and Donald Rothchild (1998) diffusion and escalation are important mechanisms through which conflict spreads across borders. They contend that diffusion occurs when conflict in one state increases the probability of conflict in a second state while escalation occurs when a conflict in one country brings in new, foreign belligerents such as neighbouring states or strong states with global reach, as in the case of intervention. One way in which diffusion occurs is when events abroad change the balance of power in a state, leading to conflict. Consequently, conflict becomes contagious, as when refugee flows alter a state’s ethnic composition, leading to tensions or when armed insurgents from a neighbouring state seek refuge in a second state and stir up conflict in that host state. Further, Dennis Sandole (2012) contends that similar changes in the ethnic power balance may occur when federal states break up, even when it does not result in actual migration across borders. When one group fears exploitation in the future as its position weakens, or beliefs about their prevailing and future position vis a vis their opponents change, conflict can rapidly take hold. Changing balances of ethnic power or beliefs, moreover, are likely to produce pre-emptive moves by the weaker party that may lead to conflict; if one is growing progressively weaker or believes that the other is becoming increasingly stronger, it is better to fight sooner rather than later. Once the potential for future vulnerability becomes apparent, current relations between the rivals and the state itself can quickly unravel. (Lake & Rothchild, 1998; Ansorg, 2011).

The second mode of diffusion occurs when conflict in one state leads groups in another country to demand more in terms of rights, recognition and resources, increasing the chances of violent conflict, as does the political success of an ethnic
group in a neighbouring state. According to Dennis Sandole (2012), this phenomenon, which is defined as the demonstration effect, that is, how actors may be inspired or triggered into armed conflict by the actions of proximate groups (also referred to as emulation) is an important explanation for the spill-over of conflict. Learning that a rebel group has achieved an important victory through violence against a particular government, for example, can provoke similar behaviour in a neighbouring state. Put differently, success by one group may lead another group, under similar circumstances, to believe that similar concessions can be gained in their home country through conflict. For example, The Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD), a rebel group operating in eastern DRC Congo made up predominantly of the Congolese Tutsi managed to win seven ministerial seats in the government, a number equal to the seats won by Laurent Kabila’s government in the 2002 Inter-Congolese Dialogue to establish a transitional post-conflict government. Its representative, Azarias Ruberwa served as Vice President of the DRC until the 2006 elections. (Perera, 2011:9) This achievement is attributable to its armed activities in the DRC in a bid to be recognised as having genuine grievances and therefore demanding what RCD perceives as its rightful place in the DRC’s political arena. Consequently, the FDLR continues to engage in violent activities aimed at destabilising both Rwanda and DRC in the hope that it will likewise eventually be recognised as a legitimate political actor either in Rwanda although FDLR’s efforts have not been successful so far, owing mainly to Rwanda’s reluctance to allow the FDLR to be a political party in Rwanda due to FDLR’s ideology and its part in the genocide. (Perera, 2011).

Third, conflict abroad may lead groups in a given state to update their beliefs about “the efficacy of the political safeguards contained in their existing ethnic contracts.”
(Lake & Rothchild, 1998:18). For example, if events in a neighbouring country suggest that the economic power wielded by wealthy minority groups is less than previously believed, the poorer majority may become emboldened and the minority threatened, leading to conflict without any manifest changes in the underlying conditions at home. (Sandole, 2012).

Finally, conflict in a neighbouring country may lead groups to re-examine their beliefs about the costs of violence and their chances of success. If groups abroad are successful in achieving their goals through violence, groups at home may believe that they too may be able to meet their needs by employing the same tactics. Similarly, if groups perceive that the international community is unlikely to intervene to punish a group of aggressors abroad, they will update their beliefs about the cost of using force - that is, they will likely see violence as a viable option in terms of costs - and are, therefore, more likely to employ it as a tactic. In these four ways, then, ethnic conflict in one country may precipitate similar conflict in another. Whether events have this effect, however, depends upon local conditions, the initial beliefs of groups on the scene, and the lessons drawn by these groups. (Lake & Rothchild, 1998; Sandole, 2012). Conversely, Adelman & Suhrke (1996) and Lake & Rothchild (1998) contend that successful conflict management abroad can reduce the direct spill-overs and lead groups to moderate their own demands and recognize the high costs of violence.

To summarise, the beliefs of groups, which are shaped by the availability of information, are central to the outbreak and the diffusion of conflict across countries. Conflict occurs in those countries in which the underlying conditions are most ripe, that is, the balance of ethnic power is threatened, the demands made by opposing sides
are perceived as unreasonable, and the costs of conflict are small. In the GLR, all these aspects seem to apply, with refugees playing a significant role in the region’s conflicts. Consequently, the longer the refugee problem in the region remains unresolved, the more likely that conflict will prevail.

Escalation, on the other hand, occurs through alliances, spill-overs, irredentism, diversions and internal weakness, in other words, when new belligerents are drawn into an on-going conflict. In the case of refugees, this usually takes the form of the host government trying to intervene in the home country to stem heavy refugee flows, for example, or refugees using the host country’s territory as a base from which they attack their home country. This can lead to tensions which have the potential to escalate into full-blown war between the two states. Ethnic ties may also play a part in conflict escalation - an ethnic group in one state may be motivated by solidarity with their ethnic kin in another state to similarly engage in conflict. Lake and Rothchild (1998) label it *ethnopolitik*, and argue that it mainly occurs when ethnic groups span national borders. Rwanda’s ongoing involvement in Eastern DRC (as recently as July 2013) ostensibly to protect the Congolese Tutsi - Rwanda has been accused of being the force behind the M23 Congolese Tutsi rebels currently (in 2013) engaged in war with the DRC army- is illustrative of this phenomenon. (Doyle, 2013).

Lake and Rothchild (1998) and Kate Hudson (2003) further contend that another form of escalation is diversionary wars which occur when political leaders engage in aggressive foreign policies in order to consolidate power and control at home. Leaders beset by opposition attempt to rally support by inciting conflict in neighbouring countries. They exploit ethnicity and its emotional appeal to pander to the ‘us’ and ‘them’ divide, and this leads to increased support at home. (Hudson, 2003:58). The issues at stake in the external conflict will usually have nothing to do with the internal
unrest, as leaders engage in diversionary wars as a way to silence dissent. In this way, war spreads from one state into others, and inevitably, refugees fleeing war in one state will usually be one medium through which this happens.

Another form of escalation occurs when opportunistic wars are be waged, that is, where a state attacks an enemy state experiencing significant internal conflict. With the other state obviously weakened by internal dissent, aggressor states may see an opportunity for success. Differently put, predatory states within a region may consider neighbouring states struggling with internal conflict as easy targets and may, therefore, attack them. In other words, opportunistic wars occur when a given state attacks an enemy state experiencing civil unrest to take advantage of the second state’s moment of weakness. (Gleditsch, Salehyan & Schultz, 2008). Civil wars and insurgencies expose and exacerbate weaknesses in the state’s military capabilities and divert resources away from defence against foreign enemies. This may invite opportunistic attacks against the state, which otherwise would not have taken place. In such cases, the attacker is not concerned with the outcome of the civil war and does not necessarily sympathize with rebel aims, but is primarily motivated by capturing territory or resources. (Salehyan, 2008). In effect, therefore, what was previously a civil war transforms into an interstate war, and in this way, conflict spreads from one state to another.

Randolph Siverson and Harvey Starr (1991) find that states join on-going wars when they share borders with a state at war as this avails them the opportunity. In other words, the closer one state is to another, the higher the likelihood that the first state will be drawn into an on-going war with its neighbour, as opposed to states that are far away from each other. Moreover, a pre-existing alliance with a state at war is also motivation for joining an on-going war, as the security of an ally is important to other
place but still be unable to protect itself entirely from the outcomes of events outside its territory such as civil wars. (Ghobarah, Huth & Russett, 2003).

Akin to David Lake and Donald Rothchild’s (1998) ethnic power balance in the larger diffusion concept, Idate Salihyan and Kristian Gleditsch (2006) argue that refugee movements can change the demographic pattern of a host state. Specifically, the influx of refugees into an area may alter its ethnic balance by either increasing the numbers of the minority ethnic group in the area or by enlarging the majority even further, thus tipping the ethnic balance over. Put differently, if the refugees are of the same ethnicity as the minorities in the host state, the majority may perceive a threat to their dominant status; if however the refugee influx comprises members of the same ethnicity as the majority in the host country, the minority may perceive a further dilution of their strength as against the majority ethnic group. Such balance of power effects are especially significant in countries with antagonistic racial, ethnic, religious or political groups - a sudden refugee influx can exacerbate existing internal tensions in the host country.

Refugees may also cause real or perceived negative economic externalities in the host country as they compete for scarce resources such as housing, land, water and jobs, all of which constitute an economic threat to the local population and are, therefore, likely to exacerbate tensions and, potentially, cause conflict. Further, refugees can have a negative effect on wages once they join the labour force due to their willingness to accept relatively low pay in comparison to the locals, owing to their desperate circumstances. They may cause an increase in the cost of living as levels of inflation rise in the local economy, leading to a general decline in the living conditions of the host country. Refugees are also scapegoats for breakdowns in law and order. All these may lead to violence between the refugees and the locals due to the locals’ perception that the
refugees are responsible for the worsening political and economic and security conditions. (Salehyan, 2008).

Further, the host country bears the burden of accommodating and maintaining the refugees as they require humanitarian assistance. The refugees, unlike economic immigrants, are not selected for their skills and abilities and since they have suffered trauma as a result of their experiences, are unable to, or less likely to contribute economically to the community in which they are absorbed. In most cases they may also have lost their assets as they flee the war in their countries and will therefore have no means with which to invest in the host country. They become instead a draining force as they compete with locals to survive. (Gleditsch, 2007). According to James Murdoch and Todd Sandler (2002), civil wars in one country have a significant negative aspect on the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth of neighbouring states due to the influx of refugees and their subsequent inability to contribute positively to the host economy.

Moreover, refugees also constitute a public health concern for the host state as they live in squalid conditions in the camps. The camps are crowded and have inadequate sanitary facilities. This leads to the spread of infectious diseases like cholera, malaria and HIV/AIDS which spread domestic medical resources thin and divert health resources from the care of the local population. Refugees may also need expensive specialised care due to the trauma they suffer as a result of the war. All of these factors may overwhelm the host state and cause resentment in the local population, and in the extreme, lead to outbreaks of violence against the refugees. Several research findings indicate that civil wars lead to the increase of morbidity and mortality rates in the affected countries as well in the neighbouring states owing to spill-overs and the attendant negative externalities. (Ghobarah, Huth & Russet 2003; Iqbal, 2006).
24.3 EXPANSION OF REBEL NETWORKS

Another important mechanism through which refugees spread conflict is the expansion of social networks into neighbouring states. According to Idean Salehyan (2008), refugees fleeing persecution maintain ties to their homelands and continue taking active roles in the conflicts taking place in their home countries “thereby physically extending rebel networks across space through their geographic mobility.” (Salehyan & Gleditsch, 2006:341). Refugees may also expand their social networks by establishing and keeping in contact with their political or ethnic kin in their home countries. In this way, then, the refugees’ social networks are not confined to the home country; rather, these refugee social networks spread throughout the region due to refugee movements. Salehyan and Gleditsch (2006:342) explain this further:

The immigration of people implies that politically relevant populations live outside the boundaries of the state, where they are beyond the security jurisdiction of the government. In the case of refugees, such emigration can be especially problematic because they are particularly likely to engage in political opposition to their country of origin, including rebellion. Through the process of being uprooted from their homes and livelihoods, refugees have a direct grievance and experience of victimization; furthermore because of losses suffered, they have low opportunity costs for fighting. Refugee camps across national boundaries, therefore, often provide sanctuary to rebel organisations, a base of operations and fertile recruitment grounds.

One way in which these networks expand into host states is through the importation of combatants, ideologies and arms, all of which facilitate the spread of conflict. Refugees also form political organizations and engage in economic activities in exile, especially if they have been in their host countries for decades. These political organizations, such as rebel groups, may be employed to influence the domestic political process, often with the help of dissidents within the home country, which antagonizes the home government. Refugees also come into conflict with the host governments due to their hostile activities against their home countries as well as their political and military organization. As mentioned earlier, refugee warrior groups often settle near the borders of their mother
countries and carry out cross-border attacks against their home countries. This may invite retaliatory attacks from the home state threatening the security of the home and host country populations, the sovereignty of the host country and souring bilateral relations between the two states involved; as host states see such attacks as impinging on their sovereignty and territorial integrity, especially given the weak border controls in most countries in the global South. (Milner, 2008). To prevent cross-border attacks by refugee warriors on their home states, the host states are often forced to intervene by eliminating the trans-national social networks of the refugees, which may lead to conflict between the refugees and the host state. For example, DRC army, FARDC have on numerous occasions clashed with the FDLR in an attempt to eliminate them as the FDLR rebels continue to cause friction between Kigali and Kinshasa. Rwanda argues that the FDLR rebel group is a security threat to Rwanda and has numerous (between 2004 and 2009) threatened to invade the DRC to eliminate the FDLR if the DRC or the international community does not intervene to stop the FDLR’s violent activities against Rwanda. (Perera, 2011).

As discussed earlier, refugee warriors often seek foreign sanctuaries by fleeing across borders. These external rebel bases may be welcomed and supported by the host states who may encourage and aid dissident activities on their territory to undermine their rivals- in some cases the host state may issue threats and warnings or confront the sending state to demand the cessation of hostilities and human rights violations that cause the refugee flow in the first place. It may also close its borders or increase its border fortification, which may perceived as provocative by the sending state, or in extreme cases invade the sending state to prevent refugee spill-overs and other negative externalities or even remove the regime in power, thus precipitating an interstate conflict. Thus, what was previously conflict between the refugees and their home state becomes a
transnational civil war that spans international borders. For example, the invasion of the DRC by Uganda in 1996 and 1998-2003 was partly an attempt to flush out the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) forces in the Garamba National Park in north-eastern DRC. This led to the military occupation of the DRC by Uganda for about a decade. (Kasaija, 2008:193). In December 2008 Uganda’s army, backed by Congolese and South Sudanese troops, launched a military offensive against LRA bases in the DRC. (Bihuzo, 2012:5).

In other cases, rebels are able to operate from the external bases owing the host states’ inability to police its borders. In either case, rebels who have their bases on another state’s territory more often than not invite retaliatory attacks on the external rebel positions and “hot pursuit” raids across the border. (Gleditsch, Salehyan & Schultz, 2008:14). Rwanda’s invasion of the DRC in 1996-1997 and 1998-2003, and numerous threats to attack the DRC in subsequent years has been motivated by the need to eliminate the ex-FAR and Hutu militia as well as the FDLR, whom they accuse of posing a serious security threat to Rwanda. (Perera, 2011). These types of raids may be accidental due to porous borders but they may nevertheless lead to conflict between states. (Gleditsch, Salehyan & Schultz, 2008).

Refugees can also provide resources and support to domestic opposition groups with a common ethnic or political affiliation. Refugee movements facilitate the exchange of ideas and the sharing of resources between the refugee warriors and rebel groups in the host state. In this way, their social networks are widened through their relationship with the locals. Refugees often have access to arms which they avail to local rebels to enable them fight their government. Further, refugees often flee from countries in which there is conflict; this may motivate, inspire and encourage local rebels to take up arms, particularly if the refugees and the local rebels share a common outlook as far as their goals are concerned. (Salehyan, 2008). The collaboration between the mainly Hutu FDLR
friction between Kigali and Kinshasa. Rwanda argues that the FDLR rebel group is a security threat to Rwanda and has numerous times (between 2004 and 2009) threatened to invade the DRC to eliminate the FDLR if the DRC or the international community does not intervene to stop the FDLR’s violent activities against Rwanda. (Perera, 2011).

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In conclusion, the discussion has shown that the support of military and political activities by the host state, coupled with the existence of external rebel bases among refugee populations are risk factors in the precipitation and escalation of refugee-related international conflict.
2.4.4 CONDITIONS IN THE HOST STATE

Beth Elise Whitaker (2003) and Sarah Lischer (2002) identify three important factors in the host country that determine the extent to which, if at all, refugees will engage in cross-border conflict. The most important one is the political stability of the host state's government. This will determine the capability and/or willingness of the government to contain the refugee situation and avoid the outbreak of conflict. If a host government is able to secure its borders and closely monitor the movements and activities of the refugees within its borders, the likelihood of refugee-fuelled conflict is low. The government must also be willing to demilitarise the refugees to deter them from engaging in violence either against the host state or the sending state. Beth Elise Whitaker (2003) argues that if the host government is in any way allied with the militant refugees against the sending state, it may be unwilling to curb militarism in the refugee camps and this may then facilitate refugee involvement in political violence and hence the spread of cross-border conflict.

A highly capable and willing host government that has no sympathy with the refugee militants' grievances and can therefore demilitarise them has a higher chance of preventing the outbreak and spread of civil war. The handling of the Rwandan refugee crisis by Tanzania and DRC offers a good illustrative comparison according to Beth Elise Whitaker (2003). In the DRC, Mobutu's collapsing political system facilitated a climate in which opposition groups and rebel movements could easily destabilise his regime. The situation was chaotic and Mobutu was serving his own interests in letting the refugee problem fester. Notably, Mobutu used the refugee crisis to access humanitarian aid, which he then used to consolidate his power. Mobutu also used the mainly Hutu refugees against their ethnic rivals, the Banyamulenge, who Mobutu saw as a threat to his power and played a crucial role in facilitating the establishment of a
Rwandan state-in-exile on the then Zairian territory. (Prunier, 1997). This chaotic situation provided fertile ground for the outbreak and escalation of cross-border conflict, which eventually led to Mobutu’s ousting from power and led to many deaths and massive displacements of populations in eastern DRC. In contrast, Tanzania had a fairly stable government, which had only recently embarked on economic reform and democratisation and it was therefore in its best interests to contain the refugee crisis and maintain peace and stability. It closely monitored the Rwandan refugees and ensured they were not militarized, eventually facilitating their return to Rwanda. The way Tanzania handled the refugees, therefore, significantly contributed to the containment of refugee-related cross-border conflict. (Lischer, 2002; Whitaker, 2003).

The other important determining factor is the political/ethnic cohesion of the refugees and the host communities. That is to say, to what extent do they share strong ethnic/political bonds? The domestic political/ethnic dynamics on the ground play a part in determining whether a refugee-related conflict will break out or not. If the refugees are in the state-in-exile or persecuted categories, they tend to have a stronger bond and common goals and are therefore the most likely to organise militarily and politically and instigate conflict against their home state. If they are hosted in an area in which the locals are of the same ethnicity, they are likely to be allied with them, consequently boosting their strength as against the rival ethnic group, hence facilitating their engagement in violent conflict against the sending or host state. If however the refugees are hosted in an area with a rival ethnic group as in the case of the Hutu refugees in eastern DRC being amongst the (Tutsi) Banyamulenge, tensions may arise and conflict will then break out within the host state between the refugees
and the local community. This may then invite other groups that support each of the two rivals, increasing the likelihood of cross-border conflict. (Salehyan, 2008).

According to Gerard Prunier (1997) and Mahmood Mamdani (2001), Mobutu attempted to use the ethnicity factor in the already complicated politics of the Kivu province into which the refugees fled by claiming that the Banyamulenge, who had migrated into DRC in the mid-nineteenth century, were not, in fact, Zairian, but part of the larger Tutsi Diaspora, essentially declaring them foreigners on Zairian soil. Mobutu proceeded to announce their expulsion from the DRC, which further justified the Banyamulenge’s alliance with the newly installed RPF government in attacking the refugee camps to flush out Hutu militia and ultimately, overthrow Mobutu’s regime. (Rafti, 2006). In contrast, the leadership in Tanzania did not politicize the refugees’ ethnicities, because ethnic identities “had little salience in the Tanzanian political context,” largely due to Nyerere’s efforts to cultivate a broad Tanzanian identity, and to discourage ethnic politics. (Whitaker, 2003:222). The refugee influx, it has been argued, served to further strengthen the hosts’ identification as Tanzanians, and according to Loren Landau (2003), Tanzanians in areas that hosted refugees expressed strong nationalist, which was facilitated to a great deal by their use of the Swahili language, which set them apart from the refugees.

Latent conflict in the host state may also make it particularly vulnerable to refugee-related conflict. (Forsberg, 2009). If refugee warriors are part of the refugee flow, they may facilitate the eruption of latent conflicts in the host state by strengthening the capacity of the local rebels to engage in military mobilization. As mentioned earlier, refugees can be used by the host country’s opposition groups as a recruitment and resource base. A refugee influx may, therefore, provide the momentum needed by the opposition groups in the host country to mount an armed rebellion against their
government. The actions/involvement of external state and non-state actors also determines the likelihood of cross-border conflict. Interference by external actors may tip the balance in favour of either the host state or the refugees, forcing one or the other to instigate violence. For example, a powerful donor may pressure the host state to allow the militarisation of refugees to enable them attack the sending state.

Further, non-state actors such as the United Nations and other non-governmental organisations may inadvertently or with full knowledge empower military elements/criminals/killers among the refugees by allowing them unfettered access to humanitarian aid. The refugees then use these resources to feed combatants and acquire weapons, thereby increasing the likelihood of cross-border violence. Some humanitarian agencies opt to ignore the military activity in the refugee population and continue to offer aid in full knowledge that the aid may be diverted towards war efforts. The refugee camps thus provide cover for militant groups like the interahamwe\(^{20}\) and serve as bases for organising and launching violent political attacks. Such organisations can contain the spread of war by assisting the host state in the demilitarisation of refugees and strengthening its ability to secure its borders and closely monitor refugee movements and activities.

Finally, Michael McGinnis (2001) and Sarah Lischer (2002) argue that the establishment of refugee camps near the border of the home state leads to regional destabilization, particularly when host states, humanitarian agencies and external state actors allow rebel groups to operate in the refugee-populated areas. Socio-economic conditions such as the location and size of the refugee camps as well as the living conditions therein are important determinants of the behaviour of refugees, specifically, whether or not they will be involved in violent activity. (Mogire, 2011). Refugee-related violence is more likely to occur in camps which are located close to
the border with the sending state because the refugees are more likely to instigate cross-border attacks due to the short distances involved. Large refugee camps, especially if they hold many idle young men, are more prone to militarisation as they are more difficult to manage and control and are, therefore more susceptible to social problems such as crime. The young, idle men are an easy target for militarisation due to boredom and due lack of opportunities to engage in meaningful economic activity.

In conclusion, the discussion thus far has shown that, as per the study’s central argument, refugees are often willing and active participants in conflict, and not just passive victims of their circumstances. It has looked into the mechanisms through which refugee-related violence is precipitated and spread. It has also discussed the incentives that seem to facilitate the spread of conflict by refugees. A detailed definition of the refugee has been presented as have the various categories of refugees, based on their reason of flight. The various types of refugee-related violence have also been analysed in an attempt to understand the refugee-conflict nexus better in a bid to meet the study’s objective, which is to investigate the link between refugee populations and conflict and answer the research question, which is: What role do refugees play in the spread of conflict? Finally, an in-depth analysis of the specific mechanisms involved in the spread of refugee-related violence and the conditions in the host state that seem to favour violence has been undertaken. This has been necessitated by the omission in most of the literature on refugee-related conflict of the exact mechanisms through which refugees spread conflict. The discussion has confirmed that far from being the passive victims of violent conflict, refugees often actively and willingly take part in it as an avenue to attain their goals, usually to facilitate a return to their home country. The assumption inherent in most of the literature on conflict that states are independent entities which are immune to external
events and that conflicts are driven mostly by what happens within a state, seems inapplicable in the GLR case, as clearly, conflict does spread from one state to another and in some cases engulfs a whole region, and one of the reasons for this is refugee movements. It is, therefore, imperative that the phenomenon of refugee-related conflict is well understood, because, in line with the study’s hypothesis, the longer the refugee problem in the GLR remains unresolved, the more likely that conflict will prevail in the region.
CHAPTER THREE

THE REFUGEE-CONFLICT NEXUS IN THE GREAT LAKES REGION: A CASE STUDY

3.0 INTRODUCTION

The aftermath of the 1994-1996 refugee crisis in the Great Lakes Region following the 1994 Rwandan genocide and the subsequent wars in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in the recent past serve as fitting illustrations of the potential implications to the Great Lakes Region (GLR) in particular, and the international community in general, of not finding long-term solutions for refugee populations. As a result, eastern DRC has become the epicentre of a regional war involving more than a dozen states and rebel groups, causing the deaths of 5.4 million people and plunging the resource-rich state into chaos and chronic underdevelopment. (International Rescue Committee Mortality Report, 2007:16)\(^2\). The central thesis of this study is: refugees are not merely victims of conflict, but are often willingly and actively involved in war. The hypothesis is: The more the refugee problem in the GLR remains unresolved, the more likely that conflict will prevail in the region.

This section is a detailed case study of the GLR and some of the conflicts therein. Its aim is to illustrate the role of refugees in the precipitation and spread of conflict. It is expected that the case study will contribute significantly towards answering the study’s research question, which is: What role do refugees play in the spread of conflict? A reading of the literature on refugee-related conflict shows that nation-states are for the most part treated as independent entities, with the assumption that conflicts are mostly driven by what happens within a state’s boundaries. The GLR crisis, among other conflicts, however, illustrates that events in one state, such as war, can affect a neighbouring state and indeed spread throughout a whole region. Most of
the literature also suggests that refugee flows can cause conflict but is not clear on the exact mechanisms involved. The section begins with a brief history of Rwanda and the events leading up to the 1994 genocide. Next, a discussion of the refugee crisis in eastern DRC before and during the genocide and the attendant militarisation and politicisation of the refugees is undertaken. The two Congo wars and other conflicts in the region relevant to the study are analysed next, as is the ethnic dynamic in eastern DRC before and after the arrival of the refugees to illustrate the involvement of refugees in conflict. Finally, an analysis of the mechanisms and incentives involved in refugee-related conflict with regard to the events in the GLR is undertaken, the objective of which is to show the link between refugee populations and conflict in the region. Given the various overlapping conflicts in the region over the last two decades, it is paramount that the refugee problem be resolved if peace is to prevail in the region.

3.1 RWANDA: A HISTORICAL TRAJECTORY

Rwanda is a hilly, densely populated, landlocked country located in the Great Lakes sub-region. It borders Uganda to the north, Burundi to the south, Tanzania to the east and the DRC to the West. (Tshiband, 2009). Its population is made up of three major ethnic groups, one of which is the Twa pigmy tribe, thought to comprise 1% of the population. The Tutsi form the second largest group at 15% and are described as Hamitic or Ethiopid, while the Hutu are the majority, comprising 84% of the Rwandan population and are generally described as Bantu, whose origins are in the Congo Basin. (Tshiband, 2009:3). According to Paul Magnarella (2002), the Hamitic/Ethiopid reference is a myth perpetuated by the colonialists to depict the Tutsi as superior to the other tribes based on their having originated from ancient Egypt or Abyssinia. (Magnarella, 2002:29). This inevitably led to resentment against
them by the Hutu majority and planted the racial or ethnic seed that was to see the unravelling of Rwanda in 1994. (Magnarella, 2002). Gaudens Mpangala (2004) further argues that the assigning of moral, intellectual and political character based on a given people's physical characteristics was a distorted, racist and divisive ideological notion that meant that, as in the case of the Hutu and the Tutsi, one racial/ethnic group was condemned to inferiority while another was defined as superior.

From 1894 to the end of WWI, Rwanda was part of German East Africa together with Tanzania and Burundi. After the defeat of Germany in WWI, Rwanda became a mandate territory of the League of Nations, with Belgium becoming the administering authority from 1924 until independence in 1962. The colonialists (both German and Belgian) administered Rwanda through indirect rule, using the so-called superior Tutsi monarchs and their chiefs. (Magnarella, 2002). Indirect rule is defined as “the incorporation of native authorities into state-embraced customary order, and to the benefit of the colonial power.” (Mamdani, 2001:18). Prior to colonisation, Rwanda was a feudal society based on land ownership and social status, with a Tutsi Mwami22 as the head, whose authority was absolute and final and whose job was to maintain order and cohesion among his people. (Tshiband, 2009).

As mentioned earlier, the colonial powers exploited the ethnic differences between the Banyarwanda23, overtly favouring the Tutsi minority over the Hutu majority, who were denied access to positions of leadership, jobs in the administration and the military and opportunities for education. (Kinzer, 2008). According to David Newbury (2001), the colonialists helped the Tutsi aristocracy to increase its power
and control over the Rwandan territory through, for example, the annexation of small Hutu kingdoms in the north-west of Rwanda. Other peripheral regions of the country were also forcefully brought into the centralised command of the king. The Tutsi also gained access to what was perceived as the white man's sources of power and privilege, namely his language and religion as well as the introduction to a money-based economy. (Newbury, 2001).

In 1935, the Belgian colonial administration conducted a census and introduced a national identification system based on ethnicity - the identity cards indicated each person's ethnic group, that is, Hutu, Tutsi or Twa - a strategy that resulted in the very inflexible and inaccurate categorisation of the Rwandans into ethnic groupings and which had the unfortunate consequence of facilitating the killings during the various cycles of ethnic violence that took place over the years. (Omeje, 2013). The institutionalisation of this destructive strategy (artificial ethnic divisions) also helped reinforce the feelings of resentment that were associated with the negative legacy of the colonialists which in turn had the effect of consolidating the dominance-subordination dichotomy, further fuelling ethnic rivalry between the Hutu and the Tutsi and leading to various deadly conflicts over the years, and eventually to the genocide in 1994. (Rutanga, 2011; Omeje, 2013). The ethnic classification by colonizers was based upon physical characteristics that can be measured and observed such as colour, height, nose and skull shapes and sizes. (Mpangala, 2004). The colonisers viewed the Tutsi as physically more like them and, therefore more intelligent, hardworking and reliable than the Hutu. (Uvin, 1997). The white colonial masters ignored the blatant inaccuracy of the classification as well as the fact that the two groups for the most part intermarried extensively, shared the same language,
culture and religion and lived side by side, eroding most of the ethnic groups’ perceived differences. (Tshiband, 2009).

3.1.1 THE SOCIAL REVOLUTION

As aforementioned, the ethnicity-based discriminatory system created resentment among the Hutu elite, who, through their Parti du Mouvement de l’Emancipation Hutu (PARMEHUTU), revolted in 1959, eventually overthrowing the Tutsi Monarchy in 1961 and replacing it with a presidential republic with Gregoire Kayibanda as the president of what was to be known as the First Republic. (Prunier, 2009). This comprised the social revolution as seen by the Hutu, and with the acquiescence and connivance of the departing Belgians - the process of decolonisation was by then at an advanced stage, and indeed Rwanda was declared independent on July, 1, 1962. (Uvin, 1997: 99). This change in allegiance by the Belgians from the Tutsi to the Hutu was due to the agitation for independence by a more radical, leftist group of Tutsi elite who were openly against Belgian colonial rule, as well as the Belgians’ supposed interest in introducing democratic rule to Rwanda. Further, there was a wave of agitation for independence on the African continent in general in the early 1960s, and this also contributed to Belgium’s move to open up political space in Rwanda to allow democracy. (Kinzer, 2008).

The social revolution entailed the removal of the Tutsi from power, the installation of true democracy as the Hutu elite understood it, that is, majority rule by the majority Hutu, and the emancipation of the Hutu from Tutsi enslavement. (Perera, 2011). Consequently, between 1959 and 1963, thousands of Tutsi were killed while others lost their homes and livelihoods and were forced to flee into Burundi, Uganda and the then Zaire. (Perera, 2011). At the same time, Tutsi refugees launched unsuccessful,
low-level guerrilla attacks from Burundi and Uganda aimed at forcing their return into Rwanda, notably in October, 1990 and in February 1993, resulting in the deaths and displacement of many Rwandans (Kinzer, 2008:33) These assaults led to further mass revenge killings of innocent Tutsi civilians by Habyarimana’s regime, leading to more flight by more Tutsi into neighbouring countries. These events cumulatively marked the beginning of an anti-Tutsi campaign which culminated in genocide in 1994 (Adelman, 2003). The regime applied an institutionalised structure of discrimination against the Tutsi who remained in the country. Kayibanda also continued to apply the ethnic identification system introduced by the Belgians, which was used to systematically exclude the Tutsi from schools, jobs and the army, as well as kill them (Kinzer, 2008). Therefore, the location of, and competition for public resources was based on ethnic identity and discrimination like it had been in pre-colonial Rwanda, one of whose effects is how the shifting ethnic balance of power is reproduced in the socio-economic sphere and in the allocation of political power in present day Rwanda (Omeje, 2013).

Gregoire Kayibanda was eventually ousted by another Hutu, Juvenal Habyarimana, in 1973, who maintained the previous regime’s anti-Tutsi campaigns and suppressed any form of political opposition. Habyarimana killed Kayibanda and all Kayibanda’s high-ranking supporters and filled high-level government and military positions with Habyarimana’s kin and supporters, essentially making the regime a one-party dictatorship. (Kinzer, 2008). Habyarimana also continuously refused to allow the return of exiled Tutsi refugees in neighbouring countries, arguing that Rwanda was too crowded, and there was, therefore, very little land available on which to settle any returning refugees. (Magnarella, 2002). A combination of factors, however,
eventually forced Habyarimana to allow the formation of other political parties, one of which was pressure from the West, especially France, to allow democracy and press freedom. (Tshiband, 2009). There was also general internal discontent due to the economic crisis between 1985 and 1992 which led to slow development and increased poverty levels. Notably, there was a fall in tin prices in 1985 - tin is Rwanda’s second-highest foreign exchange earner after coffee. (Malunda & Musana, 2012). Further, in 1989, world coffee prices fell by 50%, resulting in a decline in coffee exports from $144 million in 1985 to $30 million in 1993. (Malunda & Musana, 2012:10). In the same year, that is, 1989, the Rwandan franc was devalued by 40% which resulted in a severe decline in state revenue and a sharp increase in prices and well as a decrease in the purchasing power of the Rwandans. (Kinzer, 2008:54). There were famines in 1987, 1989–1990, 1991, and 1993 which resulted in a severe decline in food production which in turn led to a sharp increase in food prices, simultaneously leading to wage stagnation and acute unemployment. Meanwhile, real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) fell by 10% between 1989 and 1993. (Malunda & Musana, 2012:11). These events coincided with a sharp increase in Rwanda’s population growth from over 5 million in 1980 to 7 million in 1990. (Malunda & Musana, 2012:11). Pressure on the economy thus increased considerably due to the combination of the rapid increase in population and the attending economic crisis after 1985, resulting in more poverty and unemployment, which in turn made future economic prospects bleak especially for the younger population. These circumstances made Rwandans more susceptible to manipulation by the Hutu elite and extremists, which explains the high rate of participation especially by young Rwandans during the genocide. (Kinzer, 2008). Further, disgruntled Hutu from the south who had all along been excluded from power started actively opposing Habyarimana. (Kinzer, 2008).
Meanwhile, against this backdrop, the refugees who had fled over the years formed the Rwandan Alliance of National Unity (RANU), in 1979 which later became the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) in 1987, led by Fred Rwigyema, and later by Paul Kagame, and invaded Rwanda from Uganda in 1990. (Kinzer, 2008). According to Howard Adelman (1998), the bulk of the RPF soldiers were refugee warriors by virtue of having been refugees, or descendants of refugees from Rwanda over several decades, and by using violence as a mechanism for the destabilisation or the removal of the regime in power in their home country, Rwanda. To take the mounting pressure off, the regime in Rwanda resorted to ethnicity which it employed to rally the people around it and rebuff RPFs attacks, leading to the deaths and displacement of hundreds of thousands of people. Habyarimana retaliated by increasing internal repression against, and indiscriminate killings of, the Tutsi. (Magnarella, 2002).

Despite strong opposition from the rising Hutu political parties, Habyarimana signed the Arusha Accords with the RPF, which stipulated that the government share power with the Tutsi, allow the return of Tutsi refugees, and implement the integration of RPF into the armed and police forces. (Magnarella, 2002). The Arusha Accords, launched in July 1992 and whose preliminary step was the Arusha Cease-fire Agreement, were part of a series of high-level negotiations held in Arusha, Tanzania, aimed at a comprehensive peace agreement between the Rwandan regime and RPF. The negotiations were facilitated by Tanzania and the OAU with other regional actors, notably Burundi, Zaire (now DRC), Senegal and Uganda sending participant-observer delegations. (Kinzer, 2008). Western countries namely France, Belgium, Germany and the United States were also actively involved. Tanzania became actively involved due, in part, to the realization that at the very least, a conflict in Rwanda
would precipitate a large inflow of refugees into Tanzania. (Whitaker, 2003). The negotiations covered a range of issues aimed at averting conflict, some of which were the implementation of rule of law, the establishment of transitional institutions, the repatriation of refugees and the resettlement of the internally displaced, as well as the integration of the Rwandan armed forces and the RPA into one integrated national army. (Prunier, 2009). The Accords culminated in a comprehensive peace agreement in August 1993, calling for, among other things, an interim coalition government and a power-sharing arrangement. (Omeje, 2013). The terms of the Agreement signaled an inclusive, pluralist state, an active civil society, and the idea of a people united by a common nationality rather than a nation divided along narrow ethnic lines. (Adelman, 2003). Both parties, however, promptly ignored the agreement, with the government alleging that too much power had been ceded to the RPF. (Magnarella, 2002). Soon after, the hundred days of genocide began in April 1994, set off by the killing of President Juvenal Habyarimana and his Burundian counterpart, Cyprien Ntaryamira in a plane crash. Approximately 800,000 Tutsi and moderate Hutu were killed. (Lischer, 2002:103). The RPF intervened to stop the massacres and eventually toppled the Rwandan government, which was at the time being run on an interim basis by Dr. Theodore Sindikubwabo. The actual power behind the interim government, however, was a Hutu military strongman, Colonel Theonestre Bagosora. (Omeje, 2013).

In conclusion, the history of Rwanda since colonisation - specifically the oppression of the Hutu by the Tutsi before independence, the persecution of the Tutsi by the Hutu after independence, the exclusion of the Hutu from political participation from 1994 to date, that is 2013 - laid the foundation for the proliferation of the refugee warrior
communities that were involved in refugee-related conflict, and as the discussion will show, continue to cause insecurity and instability in the GLR.

3.2 REFUGEE WARRIORS AND CONFLICT IN THE GREAT LAKES REGION

The killing of Habyarimana sparked a massive refugee exodus as millions of Hutu fled for fear of revenge killings by the RPF. This refugee exodus was encouraged and orchestrated by the former *Forces Armees Rwandaises* (ex-FAR) and the *interahamwe*\(^{27}\) militia, who very early on after arriving in eastern DRC politically and militarily organised and established a government-in-exile, complete with a prime minister and defence minister with a view to liberating Rwanda from the RPF. (Lischer, 2005). The organisation of the refugees’ flight from Rwanda, the resourcefulness of the refugee leaders and the strong political cohesion within the group illustrates that the refugees were strongly motivated to engage in violence against the new RPF regime in Rwanda. (Rafti, 2006). Eastern DRC, specifically Goma and Bukavu, was the destination of the largest proportion of the refugees, (about a million) with the rest (approximately 300,000) being absorbed mainly by Tanzania. (Whitaker, 2003:215). The massive refugee influx led to a humanitarian crisis, with outbreaks of cholera and dysentery killing about 50,000 refugees. (Whitaker, 2003:216). Officials of the former Rwandan government dominated the camps and sought to control the distribution of resources by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and other humanitarian agencies. Heavily-armed ex-FAR soldiers and *interahamwe* militia mobilized and trained the refugees near the camps, preparing for an attack on Rwanda. Armed militia in uniform freely roamed the camps and erected roadblocks and carried out security patrols within the
camps to monitor all refugee activity. The militia barred refugees from trying to return to Rwanda and killed or threatened those who tried to. (Rafti, 2006).

The government in the DRC was neither able nor willing to control the activities of the refugees, letting Ex-FAR and the militias run riot and militarise the refugees. (Juma, 2007). Further, the humanitarian aid agencies gave aid to the refugees, which inadvertently helped the militarisation efforts of the ex-FAR and interahamwe, and in the process also helped shelter and feed the perpetrators of the genocide. (Lischer, 2005). The aid agencies also ignored, and by implication, enabled the ex-FAR and interahamwe to procure and store arms within the camps, which were used to terrorise the refugees and the local Congolese Tutsi (Banyamulenge) population, who were by then already engaged in violent conflict with the Hutu refugees. (Lischer, 2005). Mobutu’s government appeared to ally itself to the ex-FAR and even helped the ex-FAR transport arms into eastern DRC, which made the situation more complex by increasing the belligerents, potentially escalating the conflict. (Salehyan, 2008). The government-in-exile carried out cross-border attacks on Rwanda to destabilise the RPF government, and meanwhile the situation escalated further when the RPF decided to eliminate the camps and halt the militarisation of the refugees by ex-FAR soldiers. (Adelman, 2003).

3.3 THE FIRST CONGO WAR

The RPF eventually decided to take action owing to the international community’s unwillingness and inability to demilitarise the camps, which, Rwanda argued, threatened its national security. Paul Kagame, the then RPF leader gave three reasons for Rwanda’s intervention, the first of which was to save the Banyamulenge, then dismantle the refugee camps, repatriate the refugees back to Rwanda and destroy the
ex-FAR and the *interahamwe* militia; and thirdly, to remove Mobutu from power. (Lischer, 2005). Rwanda promptly armed the *Banyamulenge* to enable them to fight the Hutu refugee militants and Mobutu’s *Forces Armees Zairoises* (FAZ) forces. Rwanda also allied itself with *Alliances des Forces Democratiques pour la Liberation du Congo* (ADFL), a group of exiled Congolese political parties led by Laurent Kabila, proceeding to arm and support the group with the aim of ousting Mobutu in what became the First Congo War. (Salehyan, 2008). Other countries, notably Uganda, Angola and Burundi joined in motivated by the fact that Zaire had offered an operational base for rebel groups which were fighting against the said governments and they were, therefore, keen on eliminating Mobutu. (Williams, 2013). Mobutu’s government was toppled soon after in May 1997, and Laurent Kabila took over. Some semblance of control returned to the refugee camps, which were eventually cleared out and destroyed, and most of the refugees were forced back into Rwanda. (Adelman, 2003). This demonstrates that the refugee crisis was a source of conflict between Rwanda and DRC. The objective of this study is to investigate the link between refugee populations and conflict. The research question is: What role do refugees play in the spread of conflict? The events discussed thus far contribute towards meeting the study’s objective, and attempt to answer the research question. That is, they illustrate that refugee militarisation and politicisation act as a major link between refugee populations and conflict, which confirms the study’s central argument, that is refugees are not just passive victims, but are in some cases willingly and actively involved in conflict. The refugee crisis, as discussed, led to the militarisation and politicisation of camps which harboured ex-FAR and *interahamwe* militia and precipitated the conflict between Hutu refugees and the local *Banyamulenge* population. It also led to conflict between Mobutu and Kabila’s forces.
and the retaliation against Mobutu by Rwanda for his support of ex-FAR militants in the refugee camps, effectively igniting what was to become an international war in the GLR. (Lischer, 2005). This clearly demonstrates that large refugee movements across borders can cause as well as spread transnational violent conflict, which is in line with the study's hypothesis, that is, the more the refugee problem in the GLR remains unresolved, the more likely that conflict will prevail in the region. The literature on refugee-related conflict tends to view states as self-contained units that are not affected by events outside their borders, but as the case study has demonstrated, this is not the case. The case study thus far has shown that what happens in one state will often influence the events in neighbouring states and in some cases the whole region, especially where war is concerned. The conflict in Rwanda started off as a civil war between RPF and the Habyarimana regime but gradually morphed into an international war involving numerous belligerents within the GLR.

3.4 THE SECOND CONGO WAR

Soon after the end of the First Congo War, the ADFL and its allies disintegrated into separate opposing factions due to disagreements amongst them, precipitating what was to become The Second Congo War. The ADFL's main aim was to oust Laurent Kabila, and once that was accomplished, it was weakened by the lack of clear direction, poor leadership and internal wrangles. According to Christopher Williams (2013), Kabila did not have a strong power base within the DRC as he had been propelled to power through significant help from Uganda, Rwanda and the Banyamulenge. Kabila was also unwilling to create an inclusive national consensus - Kabila excluded his former allies as well as other key political groupings within the DRC from power-sharing arrangements, specifically the Banyamulenge who were instrumental in his bid to topple Mobutu, which created resentment among them.
(Williams, 2013). Further, the presence of Rwanda in Congo was seen as a form of occupation and for this reason the Congolese wanted Kabila to free himself and the DRC from Kagame’s control and influence. Moreover, Kagame saw Kabila as increasingly incapable of preventing the ex-FAR and interahamwe militia from attacking Rwanda. On his part, Kabila was suspicious that the Rwandans would facilitate a coup to oust him for sidelining the Banyamulenge. (Baregu, 2006; Adelman, 2003). Consequently, in an attempt to consolidate his power, Kabila expelled the Rwandan and Ugandan forces from Congolese territory and distanced himself from his former Banyamulenge allies, even stripping the Banyamulenge of their Congolese citizenship. (Whitaker, 2003). Kabila also established ties with Sudan, which antagonized Uganda because Sudan, according to Museveni, had backed several Ugandan rebel groups such as the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), the West Nile Bank Front and the Lord’s Resistance Army in their fight against Kampala. (Kasaija, 2011). Soon after the Rwandans were expelled from the DRC, the mainly Banyamulenge 10th Brigade stationed in eastern DRC declared itself no longer loyal to Kabila and allied itself to Rwanda. Meanwhile, Rwandan forces crossed the border into the DRC claiming a threat to Rwanda’s security, precipitating the second war, less than one year after the first war ended. (Tshibanda, 2009).
Table 3.1: IDP STATISTICS FOR THE GREAT LAKES REGION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>COUNTRY</th>
<th>BURUNDI</th>
<th>DRC</th>
<th>KENYA</th>
<th>RWANDA</th>
<th>*TANZANIA</th>
<th>UGANDA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>89,900</td>
<td>250,000</td>
<td></td>
<td>350,000</td>
<td>400,000</td>
<td></td>
<td>500,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>89,900</td>
<td>250,000</td>
<td></td>
<td>300,000</td>
<td>1,200,000</td>
<td></td>
<td>500,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>216,400</td>
<td>250,000</td>
<td></td>
<td>300,000</td>
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<td>500,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>882,900</td>
<td>400,000</td>
<td></td>
<td>350,000</td>
<td>596,000</td>
<td></td>
<td>500,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>608,366</td>
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<td>532,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>534,606</td>
<td>500,000</td>
<td></td>
<td>210,000</td>
<td>652,113</td>
<td></td>
<td>535,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>818,645</td>
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<td></td>
<td>210,000</td>
<td>650,000</td>
<td></td>
<td>555,668</td>
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<tr>
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<td>2,000,000</td>
<td></td>
<td>100,000</td>
<td>600,000</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>350,000</td>
<td>3750</td>
<td></td>
<td>659,561</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>375,509</td>
<td>2,700,000</td>
<td></td>
<td>350,000</td>
<td>3750</td>
<td></td>
<td>660,373</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>381,052</td>
<td>2,000,000</td>
<td></td>
<td>230,000</td>
<td>3750</td>
<td></td>
<td>660,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>216,799</td>
<td>2,330,000</td>
<td></td>
<td>230,000</td>
<td>3750</td>
<td></td>
<td>1,609,744</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>160,000</td>
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<td></td>
<td>300,000</td>
<td>3750</td>
<td></td>
<td>1,891,732</td>
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<tr>
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<td></td>
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<td>2007</td>
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<td>200,000</td>
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<td>1,235,992</td>
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<td></td>
<td>339,000</td>
<td>3750</td>
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<td>853,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>157,167</td>
<td>2,052,677</td>
<td></td>
<td>312,000</td>
<td>3750</td>
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<td>446,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>157,167</td>
<td>1,721,382</td>
<td></td>
<td>312,000</td>
<td>3750</td>
<td></td>
<td>140,102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>157,167</td>
<td>1,709,278</td>
<td></td>
<td>312,000</td>
<td>3750</td>
<td></td>
<td>73,239</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>78,948</td>
<td>2,669,069</td>
<td></td>
<td>312,000</td>
<td>3750</td>
<td></td>
<td>70,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 3.1 above shows the number of internally displaced persons (IDPs) in the GLR between 1993 and 2012. IDPS are individuals who have been forced to leave their places of habitual residence as a result of armed conflict, situations of generalized conflict, and other situations.
violence, violations of human rights or natural and/or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an international border\textsuperscript{31}.

The displacement that occurred in Burundi in 1993 was due to the violence that followed the assassination of the then president, Melchior Ndadaye between the Hutu and the Tutsi. The violence further escalated leading to further displacement, which peaked in 1999, coinciding with a return of refugees fleeing the war in the DRC, who then became IDPs themselves. After 1999, the numbers fell again as the government established control of the country and the displaced begun to return to their homes. (Global IDP Report, 2009). Between 2004 and 2009, fighting between Forces Nationales de Libération\textsuperscript{32} (FNL) rebels and the government caused further displacement, but this time it was not as extensive as the period covering 1993-2003. The years after 2006 saw a period of relative peace following a ceasefire agreement between the government and the FNL rebels, after which most of the IDPS were able to return to their homes. As the table shows, there were only 78,498 IDPS in Burundi by 2012, down from 882,900 in 1999. (Global IDP Project Report, 2009).

The IDPs in the DRC between 1993 and 1996 were as a result of the human rights violations committed by Mobutu’s regime in the final years of his rule. Mobutu used widespread violence and forced deportations to silence his opponents. There was also fighting between the Banyarwanda and Congolese communities, notably the Nande, over land, in the same period. (Mamdani, 2003). This fighting coincided with a large influx of refugees from Rwanda following the genocide in 1994, which worsened the violence in the Kivus. This was further exacerbated by battles between FAZ and the Mai Mai as FAZ intervened in the conflict between the Banyarwanda and the Nande.
The marked increase in IDP numbers between 1996 and 1998 is attributable to the First Congo War. The numbers continued to rise considerably between 1998 and 2003 owing to the Second Congo War. The incessant fighting by the various rebel groups and belligerents, notably The Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of Congo (FARDC), Mai Mai, The Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), The Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), National Congress for the Defence of the People (CNDP) and M23, as well as the different attempts by FARDC and MONUC to disarm them, led to further displacement of civilians in the Kivus between 2004 and 2012. The high number in 2012 is mainly due to the human rights violations inflicted on eastern Kivu by Bosco Ntaganda’s M23 rebels. (Global IDP Report, 2012).

With regard to Kenya, the IDP figures between 1993 and 1999 are attributed to election-related land clashes in the Rift Valley in 1992 and 1997, during the transition from one party rule to a democratic system. There were also clashes in 1997 of the same nature in Likoni in the Coast Province. (Global IDP Report, 2009). Between 2001 and 2002, there were clashes in the Tana River District in the east between two communities the Orma and the Pokomo over resources, specifically land and water, in which about 4000 people were displaced. In 2007-2008, approximately 400,000 people were displaced owing to post-election violence. Other IDPs between 1993 and 2012 are due to conflicts magnified by small arms proliferation, which continue to cause sporadic population displacement in Northern and North Eastern Kenya. The conflict between the Orma and Pokomo recurred in 2012-2013, causing the displacement of a further 112,000 people according to the Kenya Red Cross. The current number of IDPS in Kenya stands at approximately 300,000, according to the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre’s Global IDP Report for 2012.
In the case of Rwanda, internal displacement in 1993 was a consequence of the invasion of the RPF in 1990. The displacement escalated in 1994 as the population fled from the fighting between the RPF and the Rwandan government forces. (Global IDP Report, 2009). Once the RPF began to take control of the country, the IDPS began to slowly and gradually decrease. After 1996, the RPF government started forcibly placing IDPS in government-run villages, ostensibly to ensure the safety of the citizens, reduce conflict over limited land resources and offer shelter to the displaced and returning refugees. The exercise continued until 2000, when the Rwandan government claimed that there were less than 4000 IDPS remaining, a decision supported by the UN, but condemned by Human Rights Watch (HRW) as a violation of the people’s human rights and a means to quell potential insurgency. (Bihuzo, 2012). While the IDMC estimates that there were about 600,000 IDPS after 2000, the Rwandan government and the UN continues to argue that there were very few (less that 4000) IDPS left in Rwanda after 2000. (Global IDP Report, 2009).

Uganda has also experienced internal displacement on a significant scale owing to the activities of the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) and the Allied Defence Forces (ADF). There have also been conflicts in the West Nile region, caused by former soldiers of Idi Amin’s government between 1971 and 1979. The West Nile group was active between 1986 and 2002, when a peace agreement was reached between them and the Ugandan government. (Kasaija, 2011). A very small number of rebels remain, but about 54,000 IDPS from the conflict are yet to be relocated by 2012. (Global IDP Report, 2012:17).

The IDPS between 1993 and 2005 are attributed to people fleeing the killings and abductions committed by the LRA as well as attacks by Ugandan army forces on
suspected LRA rebel positions specifically in 2002 and 2004. (Kasaija, 2011:182). At its height in 2005, the LRA caused the displacement of approximately 1.9 million people. (Global IDP Report, 2012:15). In the same year, 2005, the ICC issued an arrest warrant for Joseph Kony, LRA’s leader, on charges of crimes against humanity and war crimes. (Kasaija, 2011). In 2006, the Ugandan government and the LRA signed a ceasefire agreement in Juba, with Sudan’s mediation, after which the security situation in Uganda improved significantly, allowing the majority of IDPs to return to their homes. As of 2012, the IDMC reported that only 30,000 IDPs remain in Uganda. (Global IDP Report, 2012:20). In July 2011, the US deployed 100 Special Forces to help Uganda pursue and eliminate Kony and the LRA, while in March 2012, Uganda, with the help of the AU, launched an operation to fight the LRA in the DRC and the Central African Republic (CAR). (Global IDP Report, 2012).

The ADF was also active in the Ruwenzori region of western Uganda between 1996 and 1999, and therefore, also contributed significantly to internal displacement in Uganda. However, joint operations by Ugandan army forces and the DRC in 2004 have since significantly reduced the strength of the ADF and consequently, their violent activities. The ADF has nevertheless continued to attack Uganda from the DRC, the latest of which occurred in 2010. (Global IDP Report, 2012). Some displacement has also been caused by the Karamojong warriors in north-eastern Uganda, who carry out sporadic but violent attacks on the civilian population during cattle raids. The violence in the area was especially intense in 2001, which coincided with the highest displacement levels (close to 90,000 IDPS) in the northwestern region alone region by 2012. (Global IDP Report, 2012:16).
*Due to the relatively stable security situation in Tanzania, no internal displacement has been reported between 1993 and 2012, hence the absence of IDP data in Table 3.1.

The Second Congo lasted nearly five years (1998-2003), cost three million lives and resulted in the displacement of over two million persons in the DRC at its height in 2002. (Baregu, 2006:64). Commonly referred to as Africa’s First World War owing to the number of African countries involved, the conflict became an international one, pitting Rwanda, Uganda, and Burundi together with the Rwandan-backed Congolese rebel groups collectively called *Rassemblement Congolais pour la Democratie*\(^{33}\) (RCD) against the DRC government, supported by Angola, Zimbabwe, Tanzania, and Namibia and Sudan. (Williams, 2013). The South African Development Community (SADC) which had sent some of the countries to fight on Kabila’s side began peace negotiations with the warring parties, which eventually led to the signing, in July 1999, of the Lusaka Peace Accord. The Accord’s key provisions included the immediate cessation of hostilities and military disengagement, the cessation of violence against civilians; the withdrawal of foreign troops and the deployment of a United Nations force tasked with disarming the rebel groups. Soon after, the UN authorized the deployment of the *Mission de l’Organisation des Nations Unies en Republique Democratique du Congo*\(^{34}\) (MONUC). (Baregu 2006). The parties however did not adhere to the agreement and eventually Rwanda and Uganda fell out with each other, and turned against their respective allies within the RDC. Further, Kabila was assassinated in 2001 and succeeded by his son and former Chief of Staff, Joseph Kabila. In 2002, at a regional summit in Lusaka, Zambia in which the former president of Botswana, Ketumile Masire was the lead negotiator, the belligerents in the DRC conflict agreed to withdraw their troops from DRC territory.
as per the aforementioned 1999 Lusaka Peace Accord (Baregu, 2006). Similar agreements were reached with Ugandan, Angolan, Namibian, and Zimbabwean troops at the Lusaka summit. (Baregu, 2006). These efforts, however, have not managed to quell the violence in eastern DRC and it continues at the time of writing in 2013, with different configurations of rebel groups acting on behalf of, or against Burundi, DRC, Rwanda and Uganda. (Doyle, 2013). This is an illustration that refugees are not passive victims of conflict and once they are militarized and politicized, their propensity for engaging in violent conflict increases significantly.

3.5 THE DEMOCRATIC FORCES FOR THE LIBERATION OF RWANDA (FDLR)

At the heart of the conflicts in eastern DRC are Rwandan refugee warriors fighting in a number of rebel and militia groups. For example, the *Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda*35 (FDLR) comprises Hutu refugees for the most part, together with some suspected genocide perpetrators and ex-Rwandan army officers. It was formed in 2000 and is described as a Hutu Power movement - that is to say that its stated aim is to re-install Hutu majority rule in Rwanda. (Rafti, 2006). Akin to the former RPF refugee warriors, the FDLR’s professed objective is to use force to oust the regime in Rwanda as well as to fight for their right to return to their homeland - to which end the FDLR has invaded Rwanda on several occasions. Notably, Rwanda claimed that in 2004 alone, the FDLR attacked Rwanda on at least eleven occasions, although international observers only confirmed three low-level incursions. (Rafti, 2006:76). The FDLR is also responsible for attacks on civilians in villages in South Kivu province in May 2009 in which hundreds of civilians were killed. Clashes between the FDLR and the FARDC in 2009 also led to the death and displacement of civilians in the region. (Perera, 2011:6).
The FDLR has a wide base of refugees from which to recruit, including Rwandan refugees in Uganda, Tanzania, Congo Brazzaville and Central African Republic as well as Rwandan citizens. (Perera, 2011). Young refugees who have no economic or education opportunities join the rebel group in search of a way out of an uncertain future. Further, the FDLR has been known to join forces with other groups thought to be sympathetic to their cause, notably the anti-Banyamulenge Mai Mai militia that comprises indigenous Congolese communities. The FDLR also joined ranks with the Burundian Forces Nationales de Libération (FNL) led by Agathon Rwasa in 2010 to attack Burundi. (Kasaija, 2011). The FDLR has also at different times - notably in September 2007 and September 2008 - joined ranks with the FARDC to fight the Rwandan-backed RCD-Goma and thus break Rwanda’s grip on the Kivus. (Perera, 2011). (RCD-Goma is a faction of the RCD that was led by Laurent Nkunda until January 2009 when he was placed under house arrest by Rwandan authorities. RCD-Goma later became the CNDP under Bosco Ntaganda. CNDP’s stated objective is to protect and defend the rights of Congolese Tutsi, especially with regard to the threat posed by the FDLR and other groups such as the Mai Mai). (Kasaija, 2011). The FDLR is, therefore, considered to be a formidable and competent rebel group, and has numerous times sought for alliances by other less experienced or weaker rebel groups in the region. In this way, the FDLR has been strengthened and has continued to thrive from the fighting and the insecurity in the region. (Raffi, 2006).

Attempts to dismantle the FDLR by Rwanda and DRC, among which were a joint operation by the two countries in January 2009, a joint operation between FARDC and MONUC in the same year, and a third also with the help of MONUC in 2010, have so far been unsuccessful. (Kasaija, 2011). The FDLR, though significantly
weakened, continues to be a security threat to both Rwanda and the DRC at the time of writing in 2013. (Williams, 2013).

The CNDP rebel group was also active in the DRC, with constant fighting between CNDP and the FARDC between 2006 and 2009, with particularly heavy fighting reported in August 2008 against the backdrop of FDLR attacks on Banyamulenge interests in Kivu. (Kasaija, 2011). The fighting was presented by Kinshasa as an attempt by the DRC government to force the CNDP to demobilize and integrate into FARDC, that is, the DRC national army. (Bihuzo, 2012). However, according to Philip Kasaija (2011), the fighting was an attempt by the DRC to assert its authority over the eastern part of the country, as, in DRC’s perception, CNDP had created a state within a state in some parts of the east, specifically Masisi and Rutshuru in North Kivu province, where it exercised military and political influence and continued to exploit DRC’s natural resources. (Kasaija, 2011). In 2009, after Nkunda’s arrest by Rwanda, CNDP troops were due to be integrated into FARDC following a peace treaty between the DRC government and CNDP. The agreement provided an amnesty for acts of war committed by members of the CNDP and transformed the rebel group into a political entity. However, the peace agreement collapsed in April 2012 due to the fact that it was not immediately implemented. Consequently, some of the CNDP troops mutinied, led by Bosco Ntaganda and formed the M23, a group that continues to cause death, terror, instability and insecurity in the region as recently as November, 2012 when the group captured Goma and engaged the FARDC for Goma’s control. (International Alert, 2012). There have been allegations by the UN, among others, that Rwanda is the main force behind M23. Rwanda has been accused of providing military support, facilitating recruitment and providing political advice. According to a UN Security Council report, the Rwanda Defence Forces (RDF) also supported M23
in a series of attacks in North Kivu in July 2012. Rwanda, however, continues to deny the allegations. (UNSC, 2012).

With regard to the refugee-conflict nexus in the GLR, the FDLR continues to illustrate the security implications of protracted refugee situations. Among the GLR’s problems is a protracted refugee problem which lies at the heart of the incessant conflicts in the region. Specifically, the persistence of the Rwandan Hutu rebellion in the form of FDLR must be seen in the context of the unresolved refugee question. Refugees in the region continue to provide a wide pool from which the FDLR is able to recruit its troops and supporters and thus continue to contribute to the unending conflicts and insecurity in the GLR. Many refugees and combatants would prefer repatriation but they are genuinely afraid of reprisals by Kigali or are forcibly prevented from going home by their hard-line leadership. (Rafti, 2006). While Rwanda remains concerned about the activities of the FDLR and, as discussed, has invaded/threatened to invade the DRC on numerous occasions, Rwanda and the international community continue to ignore the reasons for FDLR’s existence. (Rafti, 2006). One of those reasons according to Rigobert Bihuzo (2012), is that the Rwandan government, more specifically, the Tutsi elite are consolidating a monopoly of political power and are intolerant to any political opposition. Further, the legal system is rife with corruption and procedural irregularities, which means that any meaningful and comprehensive disarmament of the FDLR and the safe return of refugees are difficult to achieve. (Bihuzo, 2012).

Rwanda understandably underscores the fact that the FDLR has genocidal connections - some of the leaders of the FDLR such as Sylvestre Mudacumura and Paul Rwarakabije are ex-FAR while others, notably Callixte Mbirushimana and
Ignace Murwanashyaka have been indicted by the International Criminal Court (ICC) - and is wary of the rebel group’s Hutu power ideology. It is for this reason that Rwanda has resisted attempts to negotiate with the FDLR. In other words, Kigali considers all Hutu refugees and combatants in the DRC to be perpetrators of genocide or descendants thereof. However, this blanket condemnation of all refugees and combatants is employed by Kigali partly to discourage political dissent. Put differently, genocide has become a powerful discourse with which to constrict political space in Rwanda. (Perera, 2011). FDLR disarmament and repatriation has been addressed as a security issue that requires a military solution by Rwanda, DRC and the international community. This ignores the fact that Rwanda is essentially hostile, albeit understandably, to FDLR and will therefore not negotiate. This also ignores the fear that the refugees have for their safety on repatriation. (Perera, 2011).

In order for Rwanda to begin working towards finding a workable solution for the FDLR problem, the government should guarantee the safe return of carefully vetted refugees and combatants willing to return, as well as allow the international community to oversee the repatriation process to reassure those who wish to return in future. (Rafti, 2006). Rwanda should also consider opening up the political space in the country as an alternative to militancy. While it is the case that some of the leaders and combatants of the FDLR are responsible for gross human rights violations both in Rwanda and the DRC, not all Hutu refugees and combatants are guilty of genocide and other crimes against humanity. The blanket criminalization of the entire FDLR and their complete banning from any political activity only serves to increase the FDLR’s militarization and hence their propensity to engage in violence, consequently prolonging refugee-related conflict in the region. (Perera, 2011).
In conclusion, peace remains a distant dream in the GLR, partly because of the protracted refugee situation in the region. This is part of the justification for study’s objective, which is to investigate the link between refugee populations and conflict. The research question is: What role do refugees play in the spread of conflict? In an attempt to answer the research question, the discussion has shown that, as per the central argument of the study, refugees are not passive victims of conflict; rather they are often willingly and actively involved. The military and other government security forces, coupled with the myriad rebel groups in the region, continue to subject civilian populations to serious human rights violations such as killings, torture, displacement, and sexual violence. Some of these rebel groups comprise refugees from the various conflicts in the region who see violence as the only viable option to their circumstances. As such, and in line with the study’s hypothesis, the longer the refugee problem in the GLR remains unresolved, the more likely that conflict will prevail in the region. As the case study has demonstrated thus far, conflict may spread from one country to another and even engulf an entire region. The assumption in most conflict studies that conflict is driven mainly by events within a country has therefore been challenged, and as a consequence, the case study has filled a gap in the literature. Another way in which the study has contributed to the literature is by demonstrating that militarization and politicization are among the mechanisms through which refugees are involved in the spread of conflict.

3.6 ETHNIC TENSIONS AND REFUGEE WARRIORS IN THE GLR

The DRC is a geographically vast country in the GLR covering an area of 2,345,309 square kilometres with a population of approximately 66 million people. (Lange, 2010:48). The DRC shares borders with Angola and Zambia to the south; Tanzania, Burundi, Uganda and Rwanda to the east; Central African Republic, Sudan and
the Kivu are driven by cross-border alliances. (Bihuzo, 2012). Further, the indigenous Congolese harbour strong grievances against the Rwandan immigrants for what they perceive as the theft of Congolese ancestral land as they see it as a form of occupation as well as competition for resources. (Turner, 2007).

Before the arrival of the Hutu refugees from Rwanda in 1994, nationals and migrants far outnumbered the refugees, but after 1994 the nationals and migrants' number was significantly increased and the situation was, therefore, reversed. That is to say that the refugees became more in number than the nationals and migrants. (Mamdani, 2001). According to Mahmood Mamdani (2001), prior to the refugee influx in the early 1990s, eastern DRC exhibited conflict on two levels. The first conflict pitted the indigenous majority against the Banyarwanda minority, whether immigrant or not. The second conflict was internal to the Banyarwanda, that is, between Hutu and Tutsi, and has been significantly exacerbated especially in the aftermath of the Rwandan genocide. The Congolese Hutu, who had lived in the area since the colonial era, claimed indigenous status and saw the Tutsi as foreigners, the majority of whom arrived after 1959. (Mamdani, 2001). The number of Kinyarwanda-speaking people in Kivu increased significantly with the 1994 genocide in Rwanda and the subsequent refugee influx into the DRC, adding to the already volatile and complex indigenous/foreigner debates in the area. All these population movements significantly altered the political, economic and social landscape of the Kivu, and were instrumental in precipitating the numerous localized power struggles and violent conflicts amongst the numerous communities in the region, which later escalated following national and regional events, specifically the Rwandan genocide in 1994. (Adelman, 2003). Put differently, the 1994 genocide in Rwanda worsened the migratory influx which resulted in the Banyarwanda outstripping
perceived as lacking an indisputable historical link to Kivu. The debate about who is indigenous to the area and who is a foreigner, therefore, revolves around issues of citizenship rights and is especially pertinent in areas where resources are highly contested, such as the Kivu provinces. The foreigner/indigene debate determines who gets access to resources, and who is included or excluded politically. According to Marie Lange (2010), violent conflicts in eastern DRC have been linked to competition for land and political control as well as the affirmation of ethnic identities. It is against this backdrop that the refugee influx into Kivu prompted the tendencies of many indigenous Congolese (notably the Nyanga, Hunde, and Nande) to refuse to distinguish between the newly arrived Rwandans and those who had arrived decades or even centuries earlier, leading to more tensions in eastern DRC. (Lange, 2010).

The Banyarwanda of the DRC can be categorized into nationals, migrants and refugees, based to a large extent on when they arrived in Kivu. (Mamdani, 2003). Nationals arrived prior to colonial occupation in 1885; migrants crossed the border sometime during the colonial era (beginning in the 1930s) either due to persecution or to find work on the Congolese plantations while the refugees shortly before independence and continued arriving at various times after independence. (Kasaija, 2011:181). For example, immediately after the social revolution in 1959 in Rwanda, many Tutsi refugees fled to Kivu, and did so again in 1963 and 1972 following persecution by Kayibanda and Habyarimana respectively. (Kasaija, 2011). Put differently, those present in Kivu prior to the 1885 Berlin Conference in which Africa was partitioned consider are considered indigenous to Kivu while those who arrived after 1885 are considered to be foreign and are therefore perceived as lacking a legitimate connection to the land. (Lange, 2010).
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The *Kinyarwandans* speakers, specifically, are perceived as foreigners to Kivu. The Congolese tribes who are indigenous to Kivu attribute the various protracted wars in eastern DRC (which are still ongoing at the time of writing in 2013) to cross-border identity allegiances, specifically with regard to the *Banyarwanda* (Hutu and Tutsi) and the Congolese Tutsi (*Banyamulenge*), who are perceived as being foreign. (Lange, 2010). The two invasions by the RPF in 1996 and 1998 to dismantle the refugee camps harbouring Hutu militia suspected of committing genocide; and subsequently in 2004 and 2009 in pursuit of the FDLR are seen as confirming this perception. Rwanda’s perceived support for the mainly *Banyamulenge* M23 rebel group and its predecessor, the CNDP between 2006 and as recently as 2012 further consolidates the perception that conflicts in the Kivu are driven by cross-border alliances. (Bihuzo, 2012). Further, the indigenous Congolese harbour strong grievances against the Rwandan immigrants for what they perceive as the theft of Congolese ancestral land as they see it as a form of occupation as well as competition for resources. (Turner, 2007).

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genocide. The Congolese Hutu, who had lived in the area since the colonial era, claimed indigenous status and saw the Tutsi as foreigners, the majority of whom arrived after 1959. (Mamdani, 2001). The number of Kinyarwanda-speaking people in Kivu increased significantly with the 1994 genocide in Rwanda and the subsequent refugee influx into the DRC, adding to the already volatile and complex indigenous/foreigner debates in the area. All these population movements significantly altered the political, economic and social landscape of the Kivu, and were instrumental in precipitating the numerous localized power struggles and violent conflicts amongst the numerous communities in the region, which later escalated following national and regional events, specifically the Rwandan genocide in 1994. (Adelman, 2003). Put differently, the 1994 genocide in Rwanda worsened the migratory influx which resulted in the Banyarwanda outstripping the indigenous Congolese communities in what should be the Congolese communities’ ancestral homeland. (Omeje, 2013).

Political leaders and the various ethnic groupings in eastern DRC have variously exploited ethnicity when it has been in their political interests to do so. The influx of Hutu Rwandan refugees into eastern DRC was one such opportunity. Firstly, as mentioned elsewhere in the study, the arrival of refugees altered the ethnic balance in the Kivu region. A large number of Hutu refugees went in, the effect of which was the further destabilisation of the region. Rival Congolese indigenous communities in the area such as Hunde and Nande allied themselves to the newly arrived Hutu refugees to settle old grievances with the Banyamulenge that mainly had to do with land acquisition - over the years the Banyamulenge had acquired land previously owned by white settlers as well as some community land from the chiefs. (Mamdani, 2003).
The Banyamulenge, on their part, sought help from Rwanda, a request which came at an opportune moment as Rwanda also needed help to counter the major security threat posed by the Hutu refugees in the camps. Secondly, in an attempt to garner support from indigenous Congolese communities to counter Kabila’s advancing ADFL, Mobutu stripped all Banyarwanda and Kinyarwanda speaking groups of their Congolese nationality and promptly expelled them altogether from Congolese territory. Rwanda retaliated by invading DRC and destroying the refugee camps leading to the deaths of thousands of Hutu refugees and in the process carrying out indiscriminate mass killings and torture of Congolese Hutu - who were perceived by the RPF as aiding and abetting the activities of the militant Hutu refugees - as well as the newly arrived ex-FAR and interahamwe militia. Rwanda also invaded the DRC ostensibly to fight on the side of the Banyamulenge. (Mamdani, 2003). Further, as the discussion has shown, the ADFL alliance included the Banyamulenge, as Kabila had sought their help in his attempt to oust Mobutu. In this case Mobutu was a common enemy to both Kabila and the Banyamulenge as Mobutu had oppressed and marginalized the Banyamulenge over the years. Again, both sides exploited ethnic alliances and animosities to achieve their own separate goals. In the Second Congo War, however, Kabila cut ties with the Banyamulenge in favour of the Hutu militia and other Congolese allies when it became clear that most Congolese resented what they perceived as an occupation by Rwanda and its allies, among who were the Banyamulenge. (Ndikumana & Kisangani, 2003). The FDLR has also struck alliances with different rebel groups/belligerents in the region when it has been in the FDLR’s interests. For example, it has aligned itself to the FARDC, the Mai Mai and the Burundian mainly Hutu rebel group, FNL. (Rafti, 2006).
The discussion thus far has attempted to analyse the different classifications of the communities in the Kivu and the tensions therein. The fact that the differences have numerous exploits been exploited for political gain has also been mentioned. According to Suda Perera (2011), the GLR-specifically, the Kivu provinces of eastern Congo-is rife with refugee warrior communities from different eras. The Rwandan-backed RCD, comprising mainly rebels from the Banyamulenge community is a good illustration. The RCD has evolved over the years due to mutinies and defections to become RCD-Goma, CNDP and eventually M23 at the time of writing in 2013 (Doyle, 2013). The Banyamulenge also made up the bulk of the pro-Kabila ADFL in the First Congo War. As discussed, the Banyamulenge are considered migrants and/or refugees to the Kivu depending on when they arrived. For this reason, and based on their militant activities in the region and the protracted nature of their exile, they can be considered refugee warriors. (Perera, 2011). While the Banyamulenge’s aim is not to oust the regime in their home country unlike other refugee warrior communities, they continue, at the time of writing in 2013, to use force to gain political recognition and representation in the DRC. The M23, the Banyamulenge-affiliated group continues to cause terror and death to civilians in eastern DRC at the time of writing in 2013 (Doyle, 2013).

The FDLR is another refugee warrior rebel group in the region, made up mainly of Hutu refugees and their descendants. As discussed earlier, their stated objective is to oust the regime in Rwanda and facilitate the safe repatriation of the refugees. The FDLR has been active in the GLR since 2000, and is still causing suffering in eastern DRC at the time of writing in 2013. (Kanna, 2013). Both these groups continue to use violence as a way to achieve their objectives. Suda Perera (2011) argues that giving political space to such refugee warrior groups in the region may help alleviate
violence in the region. Militarily dismantling them, which Rwanda and DRC have tried to do with regard to the FDLR in particular as mentioned earlier, is an option open to states as well, but, as in the case of the FDLR, this is not always possible.

In conclusion, as long as such refugee warrior groups feel existentially threatened by their home countries and the international community, they will continue to perpetrate incessant cycles of violence. (Perera, 2011). Of more pertinence, however, is a long-term solution to the protracted refugee crisis that continues to plague the GLR; while dealing with refugee warrior groups goes some way in alleviating refugee related violence, the international community needs to find a lasting solution to the refugee problem in the region, as it is among the refugees that the rebel groups continue to recruit troops as well as supporters. Further, the refugee warriors constitute a security threat to both host and home governments as hosting them is a political decision that has implications for inter-state relations. (Perera, 2011). The refugees in Kivu, as the discussion has shown, are not just passive victims of violence; rather they are highly conscious of their circumstances and are therefore, taking a pro-active stance by becoming politicised and militarised with a view to achieving their stated objectives.

3.7 MECHANISMS FOR REFUGEE MILITANCY IN THE GLR

Howard Adelman (1998) characterises a refugee warrior as a person or the descendant of a person who fled their country of origin and settled in a refugee camp or refugee community in a neighbouring country, usually near the border with the home state. Refugee warriors will usually wage war against their homeland in an attempt to oust the regime in power and go back home. The main distinguishing feature between refugees and refugee warriors is that refugees are protected under international law, while refugee warriors are not, because they are, essentially, unlawful combatants and...
do not, therefore, qualify for refugee status. (Dinstein, 2004). The RPF soldiers who invaded Rwanda in 1990, the ex-FAR and interahamwe who conducted cross-border attacks on Rwanda during and immediately after the 1994 genocide as well as the FDLR who continue to fight in the DRC at the time of writing in 2013 are fitting illustrations of refugee warriors. The refugee warriors act as a major link between refugee populations and conflict and also serve to illustrate that refugees are not just passive victims of war as previously believed; they are often times willing and able participants. For this reason, therefore, the more the refugee problem persists and remains unresolved in the GLR, the more likely that conflict will prevail in the region. This section looks into the various mechanisms and incentives that may have fuelled refugee-related violence in eastern DRC. Certain unique conditions in the DRC facilitated the militarisation and politicisation of refugees. (Whitaker, 2003).

The history of Rwanda and two Congo wars have shown that refugees from Rwanda (those who fled between 1959 and 1990; and those who fled the RPF invasion and subsequent genocide in and after 1994) were able to politically and militarily organise, and eventually attack their home country. The main differences between the two sets of refugees is that while the RPF refugee warriors achieved the goal of ousting the previous Rwandan government, the efforts of the ex-FAR and the interahamwe as well as the FDLR have not achieved their goals by the time of writing in 2013, that is, to oust the Kagame regime and to facilitate the return of all Rwandan Hutu refugees in the region. Some of the militia and refugees and their descendants have joined different rebel groups in the DRC which continue to destabilize the region. For this reason as well as the fact that they offer a better illustration of how refugees cause and spread conflict, the analysis of the refugee-conflict nexus will
henceforth focus on the second set of refugees, that is, those who fled Rwanda into the DRC following the 1994 genocide and their descendants.

According to Sarah Lischer (2005), the Rwandan refugees in Zaire (now DRC) fit in the state-in-exile category. The refugees were very highly organised, both militarily and politically from the very early days after fleeing. Their leaders, who included military and political leaders from the previous (Habyarimana’s) regime, were actively involved in the sometimes violent and forceful process of physically moving the refugees from Rwanda to eastern DRC. (Prunier, 2009). Further, the leaders looted most of the country’s assets on their way out, which were then used to finance the militarisation activities in the refugee camps. The leaders also exercised complete control over the activities and movements of refugees within the camps by carrying out comprehensive patrols, putting up road blocks and barring any refugees from returning to Rwanda. (Prunier, 2009). The refugees’ political organisation involved adhering to the same local government structures they had prior to fleeing, namely districts, sub-districts, and neighbourhoods, which were named after the original ones in Rwanda. (Lischer, 2005). The refugees also formed political parties and proceeded to engage in heavy recruitment and training drives as a result of which their troop numbers continued to grow. The refugee leaders were also able to procure arms with the help of FAZ, with which they carried out increasingly frequent and lethal cross-border attacks on Rwanda with a view to eventually ousting the RPF regime and returning home in victory. (Rafti, 2006). Rwanda responded by carrying out retaliatory attacks, which in turn antagonised DRC. Eventually, claiming security concerns, Rwanda crossed the border into DRC and carried out attacks on suspected interahamwe and ex-FAR bases. The conflict then escalated as other states and rebel
groups were drawn in. Rwanda has also, as mentioned earlier, invaded and/or threatened to invade the DRC at various times between 2004 and 2009 to get rid of the FDLR refugee warrior group, which, according to Rwanda, continues to pose a security threat. This has negatively affected inter-state relations between the DRC and Rwanda, and threatened to destabilise the GLR as a whole.

These events are illustrative of the fact that, as per the central thesis of the study, refugees are not just passive victims of conflict; rather they are often willingly and actively involved. This section has also discussed the mechanisms through which refugees cause and spread conflict interstate conflict. The literature on refugee related conflict, while clear on the fact that refugees are involved in conflict, is not clear on the exact mechanisms involved. This section of the study has contributed towards filling a gap in the available literature by attempting to discuss some of the mechanisms involved. The discussion thus far has also shown that events in one state influence events in neighbouring countries, an assumption usually overlooked by most of the literature on conflict. Further, the case study thus far has contributed to finding answers to the study’s research question, which is: What role do refugees play in the spread of conflict? The objective of the study is to investigate the link between refugee populations and conflict. Part of the answer to the research question is that refugees become militarised and politicised, and are thus able to engage in violent conflict. Politicisation and militarisation provide a link between refugees and conflict. The hypothesis of the study is: The more the refugee problem in the GLR remains unresolved, the more likely that conflict will prevail in the region. One of the ways in which the refugee problem can be resolved is by preventing the militarisation and politicisation of the refugees in the camps.
3.7.1 CONDITIONS IN THE HOST STATE

Following the refugee influx after the genocide, existing political tensions in eastern DRC were rekindled and new ones came up, leading eventually to a full-blown international war. Part of the reason for this escalation was Mobutu’s inability and unwillingness to secure Zaire’s borders and disarm the refugees. (Lischer, 2005). As aforementioned, Mobutu was already experiencing growing opposition and his government was showing signs of weakening. According to Beth Elise Whitaker (2003), when the refugees arrived, the DRC was disintegrating and Mobutu was, therefore, not in a position to provide even the most basic government services to the Congolese people. Mobutu was also losing control of over the Kivu provinces in the east - all these factors provided fertile ground for the refugee warriors to operate unchecked in eastern DRC. Further, Mobutu appeared to ally himself with the ex-FAR officials with whom Mobutu had enjoyed warm relations while Habyarimana was in power in Kigali and for this reason, made no effort to disarm the refugees, move them further inland or secure the border. (Salehyan, 2008). Mobutu also manipulated the refugee crisis to suit his interests by encouraging the perception among the international state and non-state actors that his leadership was essential in solving the refugee crisis, with a view to improving Mobutu’s standing amongst them. The international community responded by resuming humanitarian assistance but eventually realised that Mobutu’s interests were not served by a solution to the crisis as, among other things, they served as a shield against a possible uprising in the east from the disgruntled Banyamulenge. (Whitaker, 2003). As mentioned earlier, Mobutu manipulated the differences in ethnicity in an already volatile eastern DRC to suit his interests - Mobutu instigated and encouraged anti-Banyamulenge sentiment and even attempted to expel the Banyamulenge from Congolese territory in a desperate bid to
strengthen Mobutu’s increasingly weakening position. (Perera, 2011). The DRC has also exploited the FDLR when it has needed to. The FARDC has sought the help of the FDLR to fight other rebel groups in the DRC, but at the same time, it has been involved in operations, notably in 2009, to eliminate the rebel group in collaboration with Rwanda and MONUC. The contradictory treatment of the FDLR by the DRC points to Kinshasa’s reluctance or inability to deal comprehensively with the group enables the FDLR to continue its violent activities in the region. (Rafti, 2006).

In summary, the combination of the category of refugees (state-in-exile) and an incapable and unwilling host state significantly facilitated the armed activities of the refugees, as did the acquiescence of the Mobutu regime. This contributed significantly to the refugees’ involvement in violent conflict against Rwanda and within the DRC and the GLR as a whole.

3.7.2 NEGATIVE EXTERNALITIES AND RELATED SOCIOECONOMIC FACTORS

With regard to negative externalities, one of the effects of the refugee influx as discussed previously was the effect it had on the ethnic balance of the eastern DRC region, specifically the ignition of latent conflict between the foreigners and migrants. The changes in numbers and the existing divisions were also manipulated by Mobutu and other leaders, notably Kagame and Kabila, who also, like Mobutu, fomented new and existing animosities to benefit their perceived allies or harm their perceived foes. (Whitaker, 2003). The influx also worsened existing grievances over land ownership between the various ethnic groups, as discussed, and led to resentments to do with political appointments - specifically after Laurent Kabila took over power with the help of the Banyamulenge, they were excluded from Kabila’s government, which
resulted in the *Banyamulenge* allying themselves to the opposing side during the Second Congo War. (Salehyan, 2008). Another negative externality was the outbreaks of cholera and dysentery that killed about 50,000 refugees. (Lischer, 2002:107). The outbreak was, however, contained within the camps and there is no evidence that it spread out to the local population. Although there were many deaths associated with the disease outbreak, the general mortality rate in the camps dropped once the epidemic was contained. (Lischer, 2005).

The location and size of the refugee camps, according to Edward Mogire (2011) may influence the behaviour of refugees with regard to engaging in violent activity. Refugee settlement is important because it determines interaction opportunities for the group members, which is important for political and military organisation, and subsequent involvement in conflict. Large refugee camps are difficult to manage and control and they also avail ample opportunity for recruitment. This was the case in eastern DRC after the refugee influx as the discussion has shown. The ex-FAR’s numbers significantly increased because they had a large base of refugees from which to recruit. The proximity of the refugee camps to the border, often made it easier for both Rwandan army and the Hutu refugees to carry out cross-border attacks on each other, and eventually facilitated the invasion of DRC by Rwanda to dismantle the camps and forcefully repatriate the refugees. (Mogire, 2011). The cross-border attacks were made easier by the fact that the DRC borders were not secured. With regard to the living conditions in the refugee camps, deplorable living conditions led the refugees to engage in violence as a way out of their circumstances. Young refugees who are economically marginalised for long periods of time are also cited as easy targets for militarisation. In the case of the refugees under study, the fact that the ex-
FAR was able to recruit many soldiers is because there were many young refugees in the camps whose meagre and tentative existence meant that the refugees were willing to join the cause as a way out of their circumstances. (Rafti, 2006).

While the FDLR does not rely on refugee camps for recruitment - troops are recruited among refugees scattered in villages in the region - the rebel group takes advantage of the high poverty levels among the refugees, while the refugees perceive joining the rebel group as an opportunity to escape poverty, and in the long run, an avenue through which they can eventually return to Rwanda. The FDLR also thrives in eastern DRC partly because of the mainly porous borders in the region, coupled with the fact that the central government in Kinshasa has limited control over the Kivus. (Perera, 2011).

3.8 CONCLUSION

In conclusion, the discussion has looked into the history of Rwanda and the events leading up to the genocide, the genocide itself as well as the two Congo wars. It has also looks into some recent violent activity by rebel groups in the region. The militarisation and politicisation of refugees have been identified as the link between refugees and conflict. The study’s objective, that is, to investigate the link between refugee populations and conflict has therefore been met. The refugee crisis following the genocide had also been looked into to illustrate the involvement of refugees in the transnational spread of conflict. This has supported the study’s central thesis, which is that refugees are not passive victims; rather they are sometimes actively and willingly involved in conflict. The research question of the study is: What role do refugees play in the spread of conflict? The case study has contributed to answering the research question by illustrating that once refugees become politicised and militarised, they
become actively involved in the war, either by coercion by their leaders or out of their own volition as a way out of their circumstances. As such, and in line with this study’s hypothesis, the more the refugee problem in the GLR remains unresolved, the more likely that conflict will persist in the region. Further, the case study has helped to fill a gap in the available literature by identifying the exact mechanisms through which refugees spread conflict, and by challenging the assumption that states are independent entities that are seldom influenced by events outside their borders.

The ethnic dynamic in eastern DRC has also been discussed with a view to understanding the effect of the refugee influx on the ethnic balance and its implications as far as refugee violence is concerned. The discussion has also looked into the processes of refugee militarisation and politicisation in the period immediately following the genocide as well as some rebel activity in the recent past - that is 2004-2013 - and has attempted to show the factors that facilitate these processes, specifically the conditions prevailing in the DRC. While such socioeconomic conditions as the location, size and composition of the camps are instrumental in determining whether or not refugees will be engaged in violence, they focus mainly on the characteristics of the refugee situation once the refugees have fled and to a large extent ignore the reasons the refugees fled in the first place. More often than not, however, the origins of the refugee crisis significantly influence refugees’ propensity for engaging in violence. The other important factors include the attitude of the host state toward military activity and the actions of state and non-state actors. International actors and humanitarian agencies can influence the activities of the sending and host states as well as the refugees themselves by availing funds and material resources, which make the difference between militarisation and lack thereof, and by implication, enable the refugees to engage in violence.
CHAPTER FOUR

THE ROLE OF STATE AND NON-STATE ACTORS IN THE REFUGEE MILITANCY IN THE GREAT LAKES REGION

4.0 INTRODUCTION

Refugees are not the passive and helpless victims of conflict they were previously believed to be but are often willing and active participants. According to Sarah Lischer (2006), three major factors explain the link between refugee populations and the spread of conflict, and most importantly, why some refugee groups do not get involved in violent conflict. The first is the reason for fleeing, or differently put, the origin of the refugee crisis. Lischer (2006) argues that refugees who flee targeted persecution and state-in-exile refugees will usually be more politically and militarily organized than those who escape the general chaos and destruction wrought by war, and by implication, more likely to engage in violence. The second aspect pertains to the ability and willingness (or lack there-of) of the host state to secure its borders and demilitarize the refugees. Thirdly, the roles of third party states, international humanitarian agencies and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are important as their actions often do facilitate and exacerbate refugee-related conflict by intentionally or inadvertently providing the militarized refugees with operational bases (from which they can attack, re-arm and recuperate) and resources (with which they can feed combatants and procure weapons).

As James Milner (2008) argues, refugee-related violence occurs due to the prevailing situations in the country of origin and the policy responses of the host state and other external actors. Specifically, interference by external state and non-state actors may favour the host state or the refugees, prompting one or the other to instigate violence. (Lischer, 2006). Conversely, external parties may discourage the spread of war by
strengthening the host state's capability to police its borders and demilitarize the refugee camps to reduce or halt refugee-related violence. As such, one of the intended contributions of this study to existing literature is to show that, unlike in most of the literature on conflict, states are not viewed as self-contained and isolated units. The study acknowledges that what happens in one state is influenced, or can influence events in a neighbouring state, and in some cases a whole region as illustrated by the conflicts in Great Lakes Region.

The use of refugee populations by various actors to further their own goals - and in the process, escalate an ongoing conflict - is not uncommon, and the Great Lakes Region (GLR) crisis is no exception in that regard. Further, refugee-related conflict escalates due to the inability of the various international actors to adequately address the source of conflict in the country of origin, the implication of which is that the refugees cannot, therefore, return. The general disinterest and inertia exhibited by the international community and regional actors with regard to the countries to which the refugees flee means that the refugees become a social and economic burden as well as a security concern. This may lead to the severe restriction of the activities of the refugees by the host country, poor living conditions, and, as a last resort, forced repatriation. Consequently, humanitarian agencies, such as United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), are left to compensate for the inaction or failures of those actors responsible for maintaining international peace and security, which may be too little too late, as was the case in the aftermath of the Rwandan genocide.

The first part of this chapter examines the actions (or lack there-of) of the humanitarian organisations in the GLR refugee crisis, specifically with regard to the refugee-related violence immediately following the 1994 Rwandan genocide and the
continuing conflicts (at the time of writing in 2013) in the region in which refugee warriors, notably the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) have played a significant part. This is guided by the study's hypothesis which is: the more the refugee problem in the GLR remains unresolved, the more likely that conflict will prevail in the region. Next, it looks into the possible strategies applicable by the humanitarian agencies to check the spread of conflict in the region. The third part analyses the roles of regional and western state actors in the Great Lakes Region refugee crisis. The analysis is done in an attempt to investigate the link between refugee populations and conflict. The study as a whole is guided by the following research question: What role do refugees play in the spread of conflict? The research is compelled by the need to understand the specific mechanisms through which refugee crises lead to the spread of conflict.

4.1 THE ROLE OF HUMANITARIAN ORGANISATIONS

The fundamental philosophy of humanitarianism is the selfless duty to help the suffering as personified by Jean Henri Dunant on the battlefield of Solferino in 1859\textsuperscript{38}. (Fox, 2006). Humanitarian action, by definition, must be provided by independent actors who have no stake in a given crisis, who seek no profit from their work, and who provide assistance based on need alone. (Delaunay, 2011). The concept was institutionalised with the formation of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in 1863, which has as its core principles neutrality, impartiality, humanity and independence. (Passant, 2009). Neutrality maintains that relief agencies should avoid taking sides in conflicts or engaging in political, racial, religious or ideological matters. Impartiality requires that agencies do not discriminate on the basis of nationality, race, religious beliefs, class or political affiliation. It also directs that the provision of humanitarian assistance be based solely on need.
Universality on the other hand means that all societies are equal, and, by implication, have equal responsibility to help the suffering anywhere in the world. It also denotes a worldwide right to humanitarian intervention. The principle of independence states that humanitarian agencies must continuously strive to maintain their autonomy as this enables the agencies to act in accordance with their principles at all times. (Thurer 2007). Strict adherence to these principles has as its aim to depoliticise humanitarian action and create a neutral environment in which to provide relief to the suffering. (Passant, 2009). Since the establishment of the ICRC, the international political landscape has changed, as has the nature of war. The end of the Cold-War saw disinterest by the superpowers in conflicts occurring in countries that held no strategic value for them. The number of conflicts also increased, the bulk of which were civil wars as opposed to inter-state conflicts. Consequently, the responsibility fell on humanitarian agencies to intervene to save the lives of civilians. (Milner, 2008).

The complex GLR crisis was a turning point in the history of humanitarian work, as, for the first time, the principles of humanitarianism came under intense scrutiny. After the Rwandan genocide in 1994, there was a large influx of mainly Hutu refugees into eastern DRC who were fleeing reprisal attacks from the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), which has recently take over Rwanda. Among those who fled into the DRC were ex-Armed Forces of Rwanda (ex-FAR) and interahamwe\textsuperscript{39} militia, who were suspected of having orchestrated the genocide. (Kinzer, 08). Relief agencies proceeded to offer humanitarian assistance to both the refugees and the suspected killers amongst them. Consequently, the agencies were seen to be complicit in the human rights violations that took place in the region by aiding the activities of the suspected Rwandan genocide perpetrators among the refugees through the provision
of food and shelter as well as by ignoring the suspects’ efforts to arm and engage in violence. (Lischer, 2006).

Edward Luttwak (2004) argues that wars come to an end because the belligerents and their supporters become exhausted and disillusioned. Access to humanitarian assistance however, gives belligerents hope and strength to continue fighting. Relief handouts and medical care not only sustain militants, but help maintain and consolidate sectarian identities in the long run, as the militants see no need to integrate into mainstream society or accommodate opposing points of view. Humanitarian aid, therefore, acts as an actual incentive for violence. (Luttwak, 2004). According to Clea Kahn and Elena Lucci (2009), humanitarian assistance to refugees can exacerbate conflict in a number of ways.

First, the relief agencies avail food and supplies to the militants amongst the refugees, as happened in eastern DRC after the Rwandan genocide in 1994. In some cases the relief agencies do so intentionally, citing neutrality and impartiality. Other agencies rationalise that if the militants are not fed, they will forcefully take away much-needed supplies from the refugees. The second way is by availing resources to the militants with which the refugee militants finance their activities. The militants do this by taxing the refugees, extorting relief supplies from the refugees and operating income-generating activities within the camps, such as transport services to and from the camps. (Lischer, 2006). The leaders in the camps also divert large amounts of aid by inflating the refugee numbers and proceed to sell the surplus on the black market. The militants often raid the agencies’ warehouses to steal supplies, prompting aid organisations to suspend their relief operations. (Kahn & Lucci, 2009). These activities contribute significantly the growth of a war economy. Thirdly, the camps
also avail a means to the militants of supporting their relatives, leaving the militants to concentrate on their violent activities. Humanitarian organisations inadvertently availed help to the refugee militants who fled to the DRC in all the forms mentioned. Lastly, humanitarian assistance renders legitimacy to the combatants’ cause.

The aid agencies, often ignorant about the political context of the crisis, are wont to give an oversimplified picture to their audiences abroad in the agencies’ attempts to raise funds for their operations. For example, the Rwandan Hutu refugees (among whom were suspected killers) were depicted as helpless victims in dire need of assistance, which, as it turned out, was not an accurate picture, but which nevertheless attracted the attention, and the subsequent donations from Western audiences. (Kahn & Lucci, 2009). Further, state and non-state actors use aid to improve their political standing. Differently put, actors such as rebel groups manipulate humanitarian agencies to bolster their standing and profile internationally. For example, the ruling party in Angola, the Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola\(^4\) (MPLA), during the civil war, gave the impression that the MPLA was the one providing humanitarian assistance to the Angolans as the MPLA controlled the aid’s distribution. This inevitably skewed the electorate’s perception when it came to the elections. (Chabal, Engel & De Haan, 2007). Further, to gain access to a needy population, humanitarian agencies are often compelled to negotiate with rebel or government groups to enable them reach those who most need assistance, inadvertently legitimizing the group’s cause. (Kahn & Lucci, 2009). The militant refugee leaders of the camps in Goma, eastern DRC, established complete control over the camps, maintaining the old political authority structures that existed in Rwanda such as villages and communes\(^4\). This meant that the relief agencies had to negotiate with the refugee leadership order to be allowed to operate in the camps. (Lischer, 2006).
The optimal response to the presence of armed elements within a refugee population, such as the one that fled into refugee camps in eastern DRC after the Rwandan genocide in 1994, is physical separation from genuine refugees and legal exclusion from refugee status. (Milner, 2008). This, however, did not take place in eastern DRC and instead, the relief agencies were seen as complicit in the militarization and politicisation of the refugees, among who were the *interahamwe* who had perpetrated the genocide and ex-*Forces Armees Rwandaises* (ex-FAR). The state-in-exile leadership terrorised the refugees and banned them from returning to Rwanda, and in an intensive propaganda campaign, spread fear among the refugees of revenge attacks by the advancing Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA) troops. Any return was controlled by the extremists and used for the purpose of infiltrating Rwanda to commit further atrocities with the eventual aim of overthrowing the government. (Rafti, 2006).

The refugee leaders also carried out recruitment drives and training exercises within the refugee camps to increase and strengthen their troops, and procured arms, all in preparation for cross-border attacks on Rwanda. Further, the leaders imposed taxes on the refugees and extorted a portion of their relief supplies to support the leaders’ militarisation and politicisation activities and to exert control over the refugees. (Adelman, 2003). Meanwhile, within the same period, humanitarian organisations spent an estimated $1.3 billion to sustain the refugees and the genocide perpetrators amongst them but were unable and/or unwilling to take any part in attempts to disarm the militants and separate the refugees from the genocide perpetrators. (Lischer, 2006:80). Clea Kahn and Elena Lucci (2009) contend that without the goodwill and well-intentioned role of international agencies, the crisis would not have escalated to the point it did, that is, to a full-blown international war. The actions of the relief agencies were a major catalyst for regional insecurity in the GLR, as they contributed
to the onset of two wars between 1996 and 1998, and by extension, to the ongoing conflicts in the region at the time of writing in 2013. The humanitarian organisations inadvertently offered a safe haven for the people who had committed atrocities in Rwanda and shielded them from having to face justice. (Passant, 2009).

While attempts were made to separate suspected killers from genuine refugees by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), there was a lot of reluctance and procrastination from the international community. Eventually when the UNHCR and the then Zaire signed an agreement to deploy 1500 Zairian soldiers to carry out the separation exercise and ensure security and order in the camps, the Contingent Zairois pour la Sécurité dans les Camps\textsuperscript{43} (CZSC), the contingent was not expressly given the mandate to disarm the militia and ex-FAR or apprehend suspected criminals. (Lischer, 2006:152). The troops were undisciplined and sympathetic to the Hutu in the camps, and the CZSC eventually became a back-up force for the Hutu militia and ex-FAR when Rwanda invaded eastern DRC in 1996. (Rafti, 2006).

The CZSC was only minimally successful, and even then only in the first few weeks after deployment and did not, therefore, deal with the broader security issues in the camps. One of the failures of the CZSC was it continued to let the ex-FAR soldiers and leaders live in separate camps and carry out their activities undeterred. Further, the ex-FAR and the interahamwe militia had unlimited access to the regular refugee camps from which they continued to recruit and train new troops. The ex-FAR were able to easily procure more arms with the help of Zairian national and provincial authorities and armed forces, Forces Armées Zairoises\textsuperscript{44} (FAZ). (Rafti, 2006). The ex-FAR’s ability to carry out cross-border attacks on Rwanda and eventually pose a serious security threat to the border area and the new government of Rwanda was
unhindered, and was indeed significantly boosted by the Zairian authorities and the CZSC whose mandate was to ensure this did not happen. Put differently, with Zaire’s help and, inadvertently, humanitarian assistance, the defeated forces could regroup, retrain and rearm freely in and outside the camps. (Rafti, 2006).

The consequences of the inability of Zaire and the larger international community to disarm the militants in the refugee camps in Goma continues to be felt in the GLR at the time of writing in 2013, as exemplified by the insecurity caused by the FDLR. (Doyle, 2013). The FDLR is a rebel group that is active in eastern DRC. It is a politico-military movement that originates from ex-FAR troops, interahamwe militiamen and Hutu civilians who fled revenge attacks by the RPF in 1994. However, the composition of the FDLR today is not made up entirely of the ex-FAR and interahamwe militia - while a powerful core group of the FDLR movement still consists of Hutus involved in the 1994 genocide (some of their leaders such as the Chief of Staff, Sylvestre Mudacamura and Vice President of the political wing Idelphonse Nizeyimana are wanted by the ICC for their part in the genocide), the large majority of its membership was not involved in the genocide. (Spittaels & Hilgert, 2008). Most of the members are young rebels who were children at the time of the Rwandan genocide, while others are descendants of mainly Hutu refugees who fled Rwanda after the genocide. (Rafti, 2006).

There remains a link, however, between the FDLR and the ex-FAR and interahamwe militia due to the involvement of the rebel group’s top leadership in the genocide in Rwanda as well as the fact that the FDLR inherited most of the ex-FAR’s weaponry. The FDLR was relatively well armed and equipped, until recent attempts in 2009 and 2010 by the DRC, Rwanda and Mission de l’Organisation des Nations Unies pour la
stabilisation en République démocratique du Congo (MONUSCO) to disarm the rebels. (Kasaija, 2011). The former Rwandan army carried with it a sizeable arms cache during its exodus from Rwanda to Zaïre in 1994, a large part of which was passed down to the new generation of Hutu refugee warriors, that is to say the FDLR. Until late 2002, the FDLR also received weapons from Laurent Désiré Kabila and his successor, Joseph Kabila for service in the Second Congo War between 1998 and 2003. (Spittaels & Hilgert, 2008). The implication, therefore, is that because the ex-FAR and interahamwe militia were able to acquire arms undeterred while in the camps, which they then passed on to the FDLR in 2000 when the FDLR was formed, the humanitarian organizations in charge of the camps at the time are partly responsible for the ongoing violence against civilians by the FDLR in eastern DRC and the larger GLR. (Perera, 2011).

As mentioned, Zaïre was unable and unwilling to stop the militarization of the refugees in the camps between 1994 and 1996 under Mobutu. This trend continued with Mobutu’s successors, Laurent Kabila and Joseph Kabila, both of whom did little to disarm the FDLR prior to 2009 but on the contrary, helped arm the FDLR when it was in the DRC’s interest to do so. One such example was in 2009 when the DRC army joined forces with the FDLR to fight another rebel group, the M23. (Kasaija, 2011). As such, the humanitarian agencies continue to experience difficulty in delivering assistance to the needy in eastern DRC at the time of writing in 2013, owing to the violent activities - often against the relief workers themselves - of the FDLR, due to the fact that the DRC has been unwilling and/or unable to disarm the FDLR rebels. (Doyle, 2013).
The UNHCR\textsuperscript{47} was unable to view the refugee crisis in eastern DRC holistically, that is to say that, as Fiona Fox (2006) argues, the UNHCR's insistence on neutrality and impartiality blinded the body to the political and military context of the refugee population, and the UNHCR instead concentrated only on legal protection issues, as did most NGOs operating in the camps such as the ICRC and \textit{Medecins sans Frontières}\textsuperscript{48} (MSF). The UNHCR left the physical protection of the refugees, and the wider general security issue to the host state, with disastrous consequences - that is, the militarisation of the refugees and subsequent conflicts in the region - owing to Mobutu's inability and unwillingness to guarantee the security of Zaire. According to international law, it is the responsibility of host state to ensure the refugees' safety and to maintain the civilian nature of the refugee camps.\textsuperscript{49} Specifically, the host state is also charged with disarming and demobilising any non-civilians who choose to be sheltered in the camps and preventing the flow of weapons into the camps. Further, it is the responsibility of the host state to separate persons who do not qualify for protection under international law, such as unlawful combatants and war criminals from genuine refugees, as well as to protect the refugees from any form of attack and intimidation. (Thurer, 2007). Once the security of the refugee camps has been guaranteed, the relief agencies can then operate in an impartial and neutral manner, with a reduced chance of combatants using humanitarian aid as an instrument to further their militant activities. However, as was the case in the camps in Goma after the Rwandan genocide, Zaire was neither able nor willing to ensure the security of the camps. Consequently, the humanitarian agencies were forced to operate in a highly militarised environment, in which genuine refugees were mixed in with suspected criminals - being impartial and neutral meant aiding the activities of suspected criminals and refugee warriors. Further, the UNHCR, even given its willingness to
act, neither had the mandate, nor was it equipped to deal with the 50,000 strong ex-

While some NGO’s and intergovernmental organizations such as MSF France,
International Rescue Committee (IRC) and CARE International chose to leave rather
than support the activities of the Hutu extremists in the camps, others chose to stay.
According to Howard Adelman (2003), the decision to stay was based on a
combination of several different factors. OXFAM, for example, argued that it would
be counterproductive to withdrawal because backing out would subject the refugees to
more suffering than they were already experiencing at the time. Secondly, as
discussed earlier, the agencies argued that the humanitarian imperative, coupled with
the principles of impartiality and neutrality took precedence over the political and
military activities of the ex-FAR and Hutu militia. Thirdly, some organisations such
as MSF Holland and Belgium believed that they could change the status quo in the
camps and reduce the harm caused by the militants through such actions as putting in
mechanisms to reduce theft and conducting their own census to determine the real
number of refugees in the camps. Fourth, the organisations were keen on delivering
the aid as quickly and efficiently as possible and went to great lengths to avoid being
mired in the politics of the conflict. (Delaunay, 2011).

Quite apart from matters of neutrality and impartiality, humanitarian organisations
will usually ignore signs of militarisation among refugees because under international
law as aforementioned, it is the responsibility of the host state to provide security and
maintain the civilian nature of the camps and their environs as well as separate
genuine refugees from those who do not qualify for protection, such as war criminals.
As discussed earlier, humanitarian agencies are not equipped to deal with military activity and, therefore, without the support of the host state, the agencies will generally ignore any military activity and carry out their mandate of offering material assistance. (Totten, 2013). However, given that most refugee crises are in the global south, most host states lack the will and capacity to fulfil their mandate with regard to refugees due to poverty. In such cases, refugees and humanitarian assistance become part of the militants’ war strategy. (Kahn & Lucci, 2009). Further, some states may be sympathetic to the cause of the refugees, in which case they will allow, or in some cases actively support the refugees’ military activities and refuse to secure the borders to enable the refugee warriors to carry out cross-border attacks on the sending state.

In such a situation, the host state will bar any international intervention by claiming that it is a violation of the host state’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. Humanitarian organizations are then rendered helpless as the host state uses the assistance to further its self-interests and those of its allies, in turn escalating the ongoing conflict further. (Adelman, 2003). Both these scenarios are applicable in the eastern DRC case, where Mobutu overtly supported the Hutu refugee warriors in their cause and, due to the weakness of the state at the time, Zaire was unable to adequately police the border with Rwanda, which facilitated cross-border attacks from both the Rwanda and the DRC. (Rafti, 2006). Similarly, the government of the DRC at the time of writing in 2013 has not been able to assert authority over the eastern region of DRC where the FDLR is based for the most part. Kinshasa also continues to overtly collaborate with the FDLR - both scenarios suggest Kinshasa’s unwillingness and/or inability to neutralise FDLR, consequently facilitating their violence both on Rwanda and within the DRC. (Doyle, 2013).
Humanitarian agencies are also constrained by ethical considerations. This is illustrated by cases in which, for example, it is necessary to force refugees to return to their home countries when it is the only solution to militarisation. In the DRC case, there was general consensus in the international community that the refugee camps were a major source of regional insecurity and, therefore, needed to be eliminated, and the refugees repatriated as soon as possible. (Kinzer, 2008). The UNHCR and other humanitarian agencies involved were unable to make timely decisions as they disagreed over the speed and mode of repatriation, how to ensure the safety of the refugees once back in Rwanda and the willingness of the refugees as well as the relief organizations to take the necessary risks involved, given the volatility and instability of Rwanda at the time. This procrastination was in part attributable to the fact that humanitarian organizations (and international law) are, in principle, against *refoulement* as they believe refugee repatriation should be voluntary. (Lischer, 2006). Most NGOs also see the presence of armed personnel on humanitarian missions as antithetical to humanitarianism as *refoulement* is essentially coercive, and in direct opposition to the humanitarian philosophy. (Thurer, 2007).

Viewing refugee crises in a purely humanitarian perspective allows actors to ignore the political activities of the refugees and the humanitarian agencies can thus avoid any political response, which the humanitarian actors outside their mandate. It is important that the humanitarian organisations are seen to be apolitical, and to this end, the humanitarian organisations ignore the political and military aspects of refugee populations, partly to avoid the responsibility of having to find a solution as well as the fact that the aid agencies are not equipped to deal with the said aspects of the populations to which they are providing humanitarian aid. (Passant, 2009). This neutrality more often than not, leads to the escalation of the crisis as the refugee
militants are free to engage in violence, as was the case in eastern DRC. Having an impartial, neutral and apolitical intent does not automatically mean that humanitarian actions cannot have military and political consequences. In other words, humanitarian assistance sometimes contributes to violence, and as in the case of refugee militarisation in the GLR, escalates refugee-related conflict. To prevent such conflict, military and political solutions are required, one of which is disarming refugee-warriors and separating civilians from combatants. This requires the involvement of the host state and the help of the international community. (Delaunay, 2011).

With regard to the FDLR, the circumstances are different as the rebels are not recruited from refugee camps but from villages in the DRC, Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda and the Central African Republic (CAR). (Kasaija, 2011). Nevertheless, the disarmament of the rebel group has proved unsuccessful thus far (in 2013) with the latest attempt by the DRC and MONUSCO in 2010 failing in neutralising and disarming the FDLR. (Bailey, 2011). One of the reasons for this failure is attributed to the perceived unwillingness of the DRC to disarm the FDLR - the DRC army and FDLR have collaborated on numerous occasions, an example of which is their joint attack against another rebel group, the M23, in July, 2013. (Doyle, 2013). This collaboration illustrates the unwillingness of Kinshasa to disarm the FDLR, as the FDLR is of strategic importance to the DRC. The mountainous terrain of eastern Congo, coupled with the fact Kinshasa has limited political authority over eastern DRC, on the other hand, demonstrates the DRC’s inability to control the activities of the FDLR or neutralise and disarm the rebel group. (Bailey, 2011).

Another reason that was integral to the poor performance of the humanitarian agencies in eastern DRC was poor coordination. Due to the inability and
unwillingness of Mobutu to effectively run Zaire, there was no order to the activities of the over 450 international NGOs in the region. (Fox, 2006:286). The relief agencies engaged in fierce competition for aid contracts and visibility, which led to the indiscriminate distribution of aid to both militants and refugees, and this escalated the international conflict. According to Alexander Cooley and James Ron (2007), the inability of the humanitarian organisations to respond adequately to the militarisation of refugee camps in Goma was due to competitive pressures and strategic logic - that is to say that competition for contracts from the UNHCR was fierce and therefore, the aid agencies were keen to be involved in the relief effort in Goma with a view to raising their fundraising capabilities in the agencies’ home countries. The UNHCR on the other hand did not launch a stronger and more public effort at advocacy to deal with the militarisation of the camps owing to its eagerness to run a smooth relief operation. The UNHCR was careful not to jeopardise its contracts or the broader international it commanded for its humanitarian work in the refugee camps of Goma and for this reason, the UNHCR and other relief agencies did not protest nor criticise the abuse of their relief efforts by the Hutu militias and ex-FAR. (Cooley & Ron, 2007).

4.2 STRATEGIES TO CURB REFUGEE MILITARISATION

The discussion thus far has shown that humanitarian organisations did not fulfil their obligations with regard to the protection of civilians during the GLR refugee crisis immediately following the Rwandan genocide. In particular, the relief agencies chose to ignore - for reasons of neutrality and impartiality - the militarisation of the refugees. However, ignoring refugee militarisation and politicisation, as most humanitarian agencies are wont to do is not the optimal solution, and as discussed, may cause a conflict to escalate into a full-blown international conflict. This section
discusses some of the options available to humanitarian agencies when trying to prevent and/or deal with refugee militarisation.

It is imperative from the outset that humanitarian actors be conversant with the origin of the crisis as it is a good indication as to the propensity for refugee-related conflict. As discussed earlier, refugees can be classified into three groups based on their reason for fleeing, that is, situational refugees, persecuted refugees and state-in-exile refugees. (Lischer, 2006). The latter are the most likely to engage in violence as they are the most politically and militarily organised, as was the case with the refugees that fled into the DRC from Rwanda in 1994. To prevent refugees from engaging in conflict, humanitarian organisations and other actors should know what category of refugees they are dealing with, and thus come up with relevant solutions. For example, it would be risky to send relief workers into a camp that is holding state-in-exile refugees without some form of security just as it would be poor use of resources to send a contingent of armed forces into a camp with situational refugees, given that they are the least likely to engage in violence. It is, therefore, important that everyone in a crisis understands the source, and hence, the likelihood (or lack there-of) of the crisis to turn into war. (Delaunay, 2011).

After the level of propensity for violence has been established, and as per international law, the refugees need to be separated from the militants as soon as possible to prevent the militants from consolidating their power over the refugees and using the refugees to further the militants’ violent cause. In the DRC case, this was delayed due to problems of funding and disinterest/inertia by the international community, even after numerous pleas by humanitarian organisations. (Kinzer, 2008). Eventually, as discussed earlier, the CZSC was deployed but was not successful in the
separation and disarmament exercise. In hindsight, a larger, more disciplined contingent such as an international police force or a military force, as had been suggested before by the UNHCR and rejected by the Security Council, would have been more effective. (Adelman, 2003). Such a solution requires a lot of time and money - in the DRC case, there were over 1 million refugees among whom resided approximately 100,000 ex-FAR. The screening exercise and separation from the genuine refugees would have cost approximately $125million, which was beyond the UNHCR’s capability at the time, given that the international community was unwilling to help. (Boutroue, 1998:54). Despite the difficulties involved in such an exercise, it can be done with the help of a willing and able host state, a fully mandated international force and funds from the international community because, as Sarah Lischer (2006) argues, the costs of not carrying out the separation and demilitarisation exercise are higher as demonstrated by effects of the GLR refugee crisis and attendant wars.

The international community and humanitarian organisations should also be cognisant of the importance of time, that is to say that a quick resolution of the crisis is required if the militarisation of the camps is to be checked. The more time state-in-exile groups are left intact, the more time the refugee leaders have to recruit and train more troops, organise militarily and politically, expand their networks and consolidate their power over the refugees - all of which prepares the state-in-exile militants for violent attacks against the home countries. Over time, the refugees also become disillusioned by the status quo and begin to see violence as the only option available to change their circumstances. (Mogire, 2011). The international community, therefore, needs to repatriate the refugees to their home country, resettle the refugees in a third country or
integrate the refugees into the host state to reduce the chances of the refugees engaging in violence and posing a security threat to the host or home countries, or, as in the GLR crisis, to a whole region. (Milner, 2008).

Further, to check refugee militarisation, humanitarian organisations can get into security alliances with other actors - the CZSC was one such partnership between the UNHCR and the Zairian government. As discussed earlier, the CZSC was a camp security guard force comprising 1500 FAZ troops from President Mobutu's Presidential Guard. (Lischer, 2006:152). CZSC was deployed in early 1995, with the objective of providing security in the camps for refugees as well as relief workers. Specifically, the force was charged with improving public order, escorting refugees to the border, protecting relief workers and their facilities in the camps and facilitating safe voluntary repatriation of refugees to Rwanda. The CZSC, however, did not have the mandate to disarm the militants in the camps. (Rutinwa, 2010). The initiative was judged as unsuccessful by the international community because the force was ill disciplined - soon after deployment the CZSC forces were involved in crime and extortion in the refugee camps, hence abdicating their responsibility to protect the refugees. (Milner, 2008). Further, when Rwandan troops crossed into the DRC to deal with what Rwanda perceived as a security threat, that is the ex-FAR and Hutu militia in the camps, the CZSC forces fought on the side of the militia instead of carrying out their mandate, which was to protect the refugees. (Lischer, 2006).

Another security alliance was the so called security package which was an agreement between the UNHCR and the Tanzanian government in 1999 to police the camps holding Burundian and Congolese refugees and curb any refugee-related military activity. (Milner, 2008). The primary objective of the security package was to ensure
that the civilian and humanitarian character of refugee camps was maintained, as well as to enforce law and order in and around the refugee camps. The genesis of the security initiative was persistent allegations by Burundi that the refugee camps in Tanzania acted as rear bases, recruitment centres and training facilities for Burundian rebel groups. These allegations, although denied by Tanzania, were a source of serious diplomatic tensions between Tanzania and Burundi and a potential threat to the security of both states as well as that of the refugees and asylum seekers in the camps. (Rutinwa, 2010). Despite the efforts of the UNHCR and Tanzania, however, the police force was unsuccessful in separating the militants from the refugees. Further, 40% of the militants escaped from detention. (Lischer, 2006:212). The initiative was also beleaguered by indiscipline, bureaucratic incompetence, corruption and political maneuverings, all of which rendered the initiative unsuccessful. (Rutinwa, 2010).

To address the question of refuge-related security threats in host countries, the UNHCR has designed an initiative dubbed the “ladder of options” which offers different solutions depending on the severity of the security situation. (Milner, 2008:15). The first solution, referred to as the soft option, focuses on contingency planning and preventive measures on behalf of potential host states and the international community coupled with building the capacity of key institutions such as the judiciary in the country of asylum. The medium options focus on monitoring and policing the activities of the refugees while the hard options refer to forceful intervention under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, applicable only in special circumstances, that is, when large refugee movements massive pose a considerable threat to international peace and security. (Milner, 2008).
While the norm among humanitarian organizations is to be impartial and neutral in their work, this strategy has not always been successful as demonstrated by the agencies’ failure to solve the GLR refugee crises. Robert Maletta and Joanna Spear (2012) argue that one of the options available to humanitarian agencies with regard to security in refugee-related conflict situations is to use humanitarian assistance as leverage. That is to say that when other options fail to work, relief agencies should insist on demilitarization of refugee camps as a condition for the distribution of humanitarian aid. According to James Milner (2008), indiscriminate and unconditional humanitarian assistance contributes significantly to the success of refugee rebel movements, thereby posing an increased security risk for the refugees, the local population and the relief workers. The unconditional humanitarian assistance enables the refugees to organise politically and militarily. The refugee militants then carry out cross-border attacks against their home countries, as demonstrated by the Rwandan refugees who fled into the DRC. The refugee leaders were able to plan attacks on Rwanda because they had a base from which they could plan and carry out violent activities as well as recruit and train troops. This is consistent with the central thesis of the study which is that refugees are not passive victims of conflict; rather they are often willingly and actively involved.

The analysis also contributes towards meeting the study’s objective which is to investigate the link between refugee populations and conflict. The research question is: What role do refugees play in the spread of conflict? The study is guided by the need to look into the specific mechanisms through which refugee crises lead to the spread of conflict. Humanitarian agencies offer refugee militants an avenue through which they can engage in the spread of conflict by enabling the refugees to organise militarily and politically undeterred while in the camps. Refugee politicisation and
militarisation offer the main link between refugee populations and violence. Given the relief agencies’ philosophy of neutrality and impartiality, the agencies will usually ignore any militarisation and politicisation efforts by the refugees. This means that refugees are then able to procure arms and proceed to engage in violence against their home countries.

The Rwandan refugees who fled to the DRC after the genocide, and the refugee warriors that later formed the FDLR are a fitting illustration of how humanitarian organisations contribute to the refugees’ involvement in conflict. The GLR has experienced numerous conflicts - which are still ongoing at the time of writing in 2013- since the refugee influx into the DRC following the Rwandan genocide. This is consistent with the study’s hypothesis which is: The more the refugee problem in the GLR remains unresolved, the more likely that conflict will prevail in the region. Moreover, the bulk of the literature on conflict tends to view conflict as being driven by events inside a state’s borders and that a state is for the most part unaffected by what happens externally. But the regionalised nature of the GLR conflicts under study demonstrates that states are not immune to events outside their borders. Conflict, particularly, often takes a regional pattern, suggesting that states are not self-contained and isolated entities.

In conclusion, relief agencies wield a lot of leverage because they have access to a much-needed resource, which they can use to demand that militants cease and desist from their violent activities. Relief agencies should however be careful not to make other political demands, such as regime change or democracy, as their primary concern is the welfare of the refugees. Further, once the desired security levels have been achieved in the refugee camps, the relief agencies should ensure that the
assistance they offer does not in any way aid and abet the activities of militants in future.

4.3 THE ROLE OF REGIONAL STATE ACTORS
A number of African countries were involved - and still are at the time of writing in 2013 - in the Great Lakes Region's various conflicts. Most of the state actors' involvement is for self-interest reasons, notably to ensure the security of their own territories and to take advantage of the DRC's vast natural resources. Some of the regional state actors and their motivation for involvement in the conflicts are discussed in the following section.

4.3.1 DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO
As the discussion has shown, Zaire (now DRC) was not only unwilling but unable to deal with the large refugee influx from Rwanda. One of the reasons for this inability is the fact that Zaire was experiencing economic decline in the early 1990s. Specifically, the economy shrunk by 40% between 1990 and 1995, while inflation levels rose from 56% in 1990 to 657% in 1996. (Clark, 2002:43). Moreover, government revenue fell from $900m in 1990 to $134m in 1994. Between 1995 and 1996, prices in Zaire rose by a factor of 35 while the currency depreciation stood at 99.9% in 1994. (Clark, 2002:44). The economic decline was brought on by a prolonged political crises characterised by Mobutu's opposition to multiparty democracy, and exacerbated by a marked increase in government spending financed by almost entirely by printing currency, leading to high inflation rates and reduced external trade and national revenue due to falling commodity prices. Consequently, many government enterprises ceased to function, infrastructure fell into acute disrepair and the government was unable to offer basic social services such as health and education. (Clark, 2002). Zaire was therefore not in a position to deal with the large influx of refugees from Rwanda.
continues to provide military support to the M23 rebels, facilitating recruitment, encouraging and facilitating desertions from the FARDC and providing arms, ammunition, intelligence and political advice. The chain of command of M23 includes the Defence Minister of Rwanda, General James Kabarebe58.

In summary, apart from economic interests, Rwanda’s role in the GLR refugee-fuelled crisis was also motivated by the need of the new RPF regime to consolidate its power in its early days. Other reasons include the elimination of the security threat posed by the ex-FAR, the interahamwe militia and the FDLR, as well as the desire to exact revenge on the perpetrators of genocide.

4.3.3 UGANDA

The RPF refugee warriors attacked Rwanda in 1990 from Uganda and with the help and acquiescence of Yoweri Museveni’s regime. Once the RPF came into power, Uganda continued backing the RPF and after the genocide in 1994 and subsequent flight of the Hutu refugees into DRC, availed military support to Rwanda to eradicate the security threat posed by the Hutu extremists. To this end, Uganda was instrumental, with Rwanda’s help, in the formation of such rebel groups as the Alliances des Forces Democratiques pour la Liberation du Congo59 (AFDL), Mouvement de libération du Congo60 (MLC) and Wamba dia Wamba’s Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie61 (RCD) in 1998. (Kasaija, 2011). Pierre Bemba’s MLC, in particular, was essentially Uganda’s project to help Uganda fight Laurent Kabila as well as exploit DRC’s mineral resources - according to Philip Kasaija (2011) Uganda controlled large parts of DRC territory in eastern Congo in which the MLC operated. Museveni trained Pierre Bemba in a Ugandan military facility, openly allowed the MLC to use the Entebbe airport in Uganda to transport minerals and other commodities such as timber into
Uganda, and to ferry arms to the DRC. The rationale behind the formation of the MLC involved ostensibly empowering the Congolese people politically and militarily to enable them overthrow Kabila themselves. (Kasaija, 2011).

Further, Uganda, like Rwanda, has security concerns stemming from rebel groups that have launched cross-border attacks from the DRC, notably the Allied Defence Forces (ADF), the Lord’s Resistance Army and the West Nile Bank Liberation Front (WNBLF), and is therefore, compelled to conduct cross-border pursuits into the DRC to neutralise the rebel groups. For example, in 2008, the Ugandan forces launched an operation to remove the LRA from its base in Garamba National Park in north east DRC. (Kasaija, 2011).

According to Howard Adelman (2003), another motivation for Uganda’s involvement in the GLR wars is that the Rwandan Tutsi and the Banyamulenge were instrumental in Museveni’s fight against the Obote regime, who Museveni eventually succeeded in overthrowing in 1985. It is also in Museveni’s interests to keep the RPF regime in power as RPF’s fall would pose Uganda security problems, given the regional nature of the GLR insecurity and the fact that Uganda and Rwanda essentially shared the same enemies following the neorealist logic of viewing the enemies of allies as enemies. Differently put, Uganda became involved in the war because it perceives its security and stability as closely tied to that of Rwanda’s. Instability in Rwanda would mean an influx of refugees into Uganda, a challenge Uganda has had to deal with for the past four decades, and which has over the years caused friction in Uganda, mainly due to competition for resources between Ugandans and refugees. (Williams, 2013). A fourth motivation is Uganda’s interest in the exploitation of DRC’s natural resources especially by top officials in the Ugandan military. To this end, Uganda, according to the UN, continues to
support the M23 with of troop reinforcements, weaponry, technical assistance, political advice and facilitation of external relations, among others.\textsuperscript{62}

More importantly, Uganda was concerned with the waste taking place in the DRC - Mobutu’s reign “had created an economic black hole in the centre of Africa.” (Adelman, 2003:126). Far from being Africa’s powerhouse given its wealth, the DRC has been conflict-ridden since independence and has been the victim of massive looting and exploitation. This has contributed to more cycles of resource-driven conflict as well served to deter foreign investment. As such, Museveni and his allies felt the need to remove Mobutu from power in the hope that the DRC would be revived to serve as the economic centre of the region on particular and Africa in general. (Bellamy, 2012).

In summary, it is evident that Uganda has played, and continues to play a significant role in the insecurity in the GLR, both for security and economic reasons.

4.3.4 BURUNDI

In as far as security threats, Burundi’s motivations for involvement in the GLR conflict are the same as Rwanda’s. The two countries have the same ethnic divisions (Hutus and Tutsi), and just like in Rwanda, the ethnic groups have been in conflict since independence. The two countries were also both colonized by Belgium. (Mamdani, 2003). The \textit{Forces pour la Défense de la Démocratie}\textsuperscript{63} (FDD), a Burundian Hutu rebel group, used the DRC’s Uvira-Bukavu area as a sanctuary throughout the 1990s with Mobutu’s consent. When Rwandan and Ugandan forces attempted to overthrow Laurent Kabila in the Second Congo War (1998-2003), Kabila responded by arming all Hutu groups throughout eastern Congo, among which was the Burundian FDD. (Williams, 2013). Consequently, all pro-Kabila forces, including the FDD, fought against Burundi and its allies, that is, Rwanda, Uganda and the Congolese \textit{Banyamulenge} in the Second
violation of the refugees’ human rights. This was demonstrated by Rwanda’s vicious attacks on refugee camps and Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) camps, starting with what came to be known as the Kibeho massacres\textsuperscript{56}, in which an estimated 4000 refugees were killed by the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA). (Bellamy, 2012:62). Rwanda saw the refugees and their leaders as a continuing source of insecurity and instability, hence the decision, by Rwanda’s admission, to dismantle the camps, destroy the state-in-exile comprising ex-Far and Hutu militia, protect the Banyamulenge and eventually, dislodge Mobutu’s regime. (Bellamy, 2012). The FDLR refugee militants also continue to pose a security threat to Rwanda, prompting several attempts by the Rwandan defence Forces (RDA), notably in 2004 and 2009 to cross into DRC territory to neutralise the rebel group. (Kasaija, 2011). These incursions into the DRC by Rwanda are a cause of tension between the two countries and in the worst case scenario, may escalate into a full-blown war similar to the international wars (in 1996-1998 and 1998-2003) from which the DRC is still recovering. In this sense therefore, Rwanda continues to play a significant, even central, role in the GLR’s refugee-related instability and attending insecurity.

Another of Rwanda’s important motivating factors is the exploitation of the DRC’s enormous natural resource base. The Rwandan army, according to the UN, continues to operate largely uninterrupted (by the time of writing in 2013) in the DRC through proxy rebel groups, notably the M23, which Rwanda uses to extend its economic control over the DRC’s resources. A report by the UN implicates Rwanda in the illegal exploitation of the DRC’s minerals, which has availed the RPF and the government an abundance of financial resources\textsuperscript{57}. UN investigations also show that the Government of Rwanda continues to provide military support to the M23 rebels, facilitating recruitment, encouraging and facilitating desertions from the FARDC and
providing arms, ammunition, intelligence and political advice. The chain of command of M23 includes the Defence Minister of Rwanda, General James Kabarebe\textsuperscript{58}.

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the FDD, fought against Burundi and its allies, that is, Rwanda, Uganda and the Congolese Banyamulenge in the Second Congo War. However, despite being on Rwanda and Uganda’s side in the fight against Kabila, Burundi did not share Rwanda and Uganda’s ambitions of ousting Laurent Kabila from power or exploiting DRC for financial gain. (Adelman, 2003). Burundi’s chief aim was to ward of the FDD, hence the presence of Burundian forces in the DRC and its alliance with Rwanda and Uganda. (Williams, 2013). Other Burundian rebel groups operating in the DRC as recently as 2012\(^4\) include the *Forces Nationales de Libération*\(^5\) (FNL), *Front National pour la Révolution au Burundi*\(^6\) (FRONABU) and *Front du Peuple Murundi*\(^7\) (FPM). According to the UN, the rebel groups continue to make and break alliances with the various rebel groups in the DRC - for example the FPM allied itself with M23 in South Kivu - and thus continue to perpetuate conflict in the region\(^8\). Burundi meanwhile continues to make attempts to neutralize the rebel groups as recently as November 2012, inevitably leading to even more instability in the region. (UN Report, 2012).

**4.3.5 ANGOLA**

Angola’s involvement in the DRC is a classic case of self-interest and the formation of alliances as per realist thought. During the First Congo War in 1996 in which Mobutu was unseated, Angola fought on the side of the ADFL and its allies, Rwanda and Uganda, because Mobutu had provided a sanctuary for *União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola*\(^9\) (UNITA) against Angola, which in turn fought on Mobutu’s side. (Bellamy, 2012). Before the onset of The Second Congo War in 1998, however, UNITA sought the help of Rwanda and Uganda, a move that forced Angola’s President Jose Eduardo Dos Santos to switch alliances and help a beleaguered Laurent Kabila in the Second Congo War against the ADFL, Rwanda,
Burundi and Uganda, a move that contributed to Kabila’s victory. (Williams, 2013). The Kitona Operation\textsuperscript{70} also convinced Angola that it was necessary to intercede on the side of Kabila for the security of Angola, whose dominant security imperative, as mentioned, was its ongoing war with UNITA rebels. (Stejskal, 2013). Dos Santos was also wary of Uganda and Rwanda’s presence so near one of Angola’s territories, the resource-rich Cambinda enclave, and, therefore, felt the need to fight in the Second Congo War to ensure Cambinda’s security. (Stejskal, 2013).

Angola officially withdrew from DRC in 2002, and Dos Santos has since stated that Angola will not be involved militarily in the conflicts in the DRC, but will instead concentrate on diplomatic efforts to bring peace to the region. (Tran, 2008). However, in 2008, there were allegations by the UN that Angolan troops were reinforcing the FARDC in the fight against Laurent Nkunda’s CNDP, which Luanda denied. (Tran, 2008). There have also been incidents along the DRC-Angola border which have caused diplomatic spats between the two governments due to allegations by Kinshasa that Angola is forcibly expelling Congolese refugees en masse and subjecting them to torture and rape. (Ledgard, 2011). This has led to tension between the two countries and while they have not been involved in military conflict, relations remain cool between the two erstwhile allies at the time of writing in 2013.

4.4 \textbf{WESTERN STATE ACTORS}

A number of Western countries were, and continue to be involved at varying levels and for a variety of reasons in the GLR crisis at the time of writing in 2013. This next section is an analysis of some of these states and the motivating factors behind their involvement.
4.4.1 FRANCE

France had all along enjoyed close ties with the Habyarimana regime, and was, therefore, instrumental in supporting Habyarimana as against the RPF since the RPF’s invasion in 1990. France obstructed any moves by the international community that the French perceived as fortifying the new RPF regime in Rwanda as it saw the new government in Rwanda as hostile to France. France also used the situation in Rwanda to try and Mobutu in power in the DRC -specifically, France supported the repatriation of the refugees back to Rwanda only if it heralded the return of the Habyarimana government, which it considered an ally. These moves by France were aimed at strengthening its waning influence in the GLR. (Prunier, 2009).

According to Howard Adelman and Astri Suhrke (1999), France offered military assistance to Rwanda soon after the RPF invaded in 1990 and thus bore some responsibility for the genocide that ensued. In 1993, France lobbied the Security Council to deploy a UN force in Rwanda to counter the RPF’s advance and provide the Habyarimana regime some time to regroup and strategise. The UN force, in France’s view, would position itself between the RPF and FAR. The UN force would also monitor the border between Uganda and Rwanda. At the same time, the French calculated that a United Nations force would be an answer to RPF’s insistence that French forces withdraw from Rwanda. With a UN force in Rwanda and a French veto on UN peacekeeping operations in the Security Council, France saw an opportunity through which it could still exert some influence on Rwanda even after the withdrawal of French troops. (Prunier, 2009).

The French continued to give aid to the Habyarimana regime throughout the period of the war between 1990 and 1994, citing the RPF invasion as justification. In this way,
France was helping to bolster a regime that was deeply implicated in serious human rights violations, and some of whose members were subsequently accused of perpetrating genocide such as the former Prime Minister Jean Kambanda and the former mayor of Kigali, Jean-Paul Akayesu. (Bellamy, 2012). Further, the French became more directly involved in the genocide by training the Hutu militia and by the fact that some weapons provided to the FAR were diverted to the militia despite the imposition of an arms embargo against Rwanda in May 1994, and subsequently used to carry out the mass killings of the Tutsi and moderate Hutu. (Prunier, 2009). In June 1993, Operation Turquoise, a supposedly humanitarian operation, was launched by the French, under their command and control, with the endorsement of the UN. The operation’s mandate was to enforce a safe zone to which refugees could flee and be protected as well as have access to humanitarian assistance. It was also aimed at checking the massive outflow of refugees into DRC. (Carayannis, 2003). However, according to Sarah Lischer (2006), the operation was seen by some as a safe haven for the retreating Rwandan government forces, which negated the operation’s description as a safe humanitarian zone especially given that the French allowed the ex-FAR access to weapons. (Bellamy, 2012). The defeated government forces’ key leaders were also to allowed conduct meetings and draw out strategies aimed towards escaping into the DRC and forming a government in exile. In other words, the French contributed to the establishment and consolidation of the Hutu state-in-exile in the DRC. (Lischer, 2006). Further, the RPF forces were denied entry into the safe zone, which served to antagonize the new Rwandan government even more, further worsening the relations between the French and new RPF regime.
Another important motivating factor for French involvement in the GLR conflict is that France was worried about the increasing Anglo-Saxon domination of Africa, by which is meant the influence of the US and the UK. (Boutroué, 1998). France was keen not to lose its influence in Central Africa, and RPF’s victory only served to increase France’s fears that there was an Anglophone conspiracy to remove France from the region. (Prunier, 2009). France’s continued support for the decaying Mobutu regime and Habyarimana point to the allegations that France was wary of growing Anglophone hegemonic interests in the region and tried to counter US and UK’s interests. (Adelman, 2003). According to Howard Adelman (2003) “French policy in Rwanda was hardly the result of a grand design. More likely, it evolved as the outcome of multifarious and partly uncoordinated initiatives, each of which was shaped by the prevailing sense of France’s purpose and role in Africa.” (Adelman, 2003:56). Differently put, French involvement in the GLR was for the most part motivated by its desire to expand its political influence in the region.

Finally, The French, like most major state actors in the GLR conflict, are also motivated by economic interests. France is involved in mineral extraction in the DRC, and has been implicated in the perpetuation of war in the region as a result. For example, a French transport company known as Bolloré and that has offices in Rwanda and Uganda, is involved in the illegal transportation of coltan to Europe. France is also involved in the mining and transportation of uranium through a French public multinational energy company called Areva, of which the French government owns 90%. (Custers, Cuvelier & Verbruggen, 2009:37). Areva is the largest uranium producer in the world and is a leader in the provision of civil and military power systems, and for this reason is deeply invested in the DRC to guarantee a constant supply of uranium. (Custers, Cuvelier & Verbruggen, 2009).
4.4.2 THE UNITED STATES

The United States of America (USA)’s government remained consistent throughout most of the GLR crisis, especially in the beginning, in its reluctance to take the lead in any initiative or solution in the region. The role of the US (or lack there-of) was important, being the world’s economic and political superpower at the time, (and given USA’s veto power in the Security Council) and having repeatedly demonstrated its ability to take action even without the UN’s consent. (Bellamy, 2012). The USA’s inability to take decisive action during and after the genocide is therefore regrettable and points to the fact that Rwanda was of no strategic interest to the USA at the time. Further, the appeals by NGO’s to the US only worked if the relief agencies’ opinions coincided with those of officials in the US government, otherwise, the US government procrastinated over important decisions or left them to the UNHCR. (Prunier, 2009).

The USA’s reluctance has also been attributed to its ill-fated deployment in Somalia in the early 1990s - 18 US soldiers were killed and their bodies dragged through the streets of Mogadishu by Somali militia. (Bellamy, 2012). Notable too were the mostly conflicting messages and policies coming from the different departments within the Clinton administration. Joel Boutroue (1998) argues that “the potential for real influence may have been lost among the many conflicting positions within the State Department.” (Boutroue 1998:48).

Despite the procrastination and reluctance to get involved in Rwanda in the beginning, the US offered the RPF tacit military support in its invasion of the DRC in 1996 and throughout the First and Second Congo Wars. (Bowie, 2013). This support meant that Rwanda was able to get rid of the refugee camps without the international community’s denunciation of the human rights violations by the RPA - the US, like
other western states, did not openly condemn the atrocious human rights violations committed by the RPA on innocent IDPs in 1995. (Adelman, 2003). Further, Rwanda could count on US support in as far as Rwanda argued that violence was the only means to eliminate the security threat posed by the refugee camps, given that the international community had been unwilling to eliminate the refugee camps. Moreover, the US did not condemn any of the other atrocities committed by the RPA against the Hutu refugees in Rwanda and the DRC after the genocide as well as Congolese communities in the DRC during the First and Second Congo Wars (1996-2003). (Bellamy, 2012). Neither did the US object to Rwanda militarily training the Banyamulenge in Rwanda’s quest to unseat Mobutu and secure its borders; on the contrary, the US offered military assistance as mentioned earlier. (Bowie, 2013). This diplomatic and political assistance from the US to Rwanda played a key role in overthrowing Mobutu and the attending general insecurity and human rights violations in the region. Ousting Mobutu was in the US interests all along as Mobutu was increasingly seen by the West as a liability due to Mobutu’s increasingly corrupt rule. (Clark, 2002).

US involvement in the GLR conflict is also increasingly about its fierce competition for Africa’s resources with China. In 2012, the US tried to suppress a UN report implicating Rwanda in the ongoing resource plunder in eastern DRC71. Rwanda controls a vast, mineral rich area in eastern DRC, and Washington’s continued military and development assistance to Rwanda and Uganda, as well as US attempts to shield Rwanda from international censure suggest attempts to consolidate its presence in the region in the wake of China’s deepening economic engagement in Africa72. (Bowie, 2013). The US is uncomfortable with Kabila’s close ties with China, as well as an increase in Chinese commercial activities in the DRC. China is
significantly involved in the DRC’s telecommunications and mining sectors - between 2007 and 2008, the DRC exported $1.5b worth of cobalt, for example. Further, (Bowie, 2013:4). A significant amount of other raw materials such as copper ore and a variety of hardwoods are exported to China for further processing, while 90% of the processing plants in the resource rich south-eastern Katanga province are owned by the Chinese. (Bowie, 2013:6). The US perceives China’s economic strategy as monopolising Africa’s minerals market and the US is, therefore, taking steps, one of which is its alliance with Rwanda and Uganda, to find ways to gain access to the DRC’s vast mineral resources. (Bowie, 2013).

In summary, the US was initially reluctant to get involved in the GLR crisis owing to the lack of strategic interest in Rwanda, squabbling within the various departments in the US government as to the best way forward, and its disastrous experience in Somalia a few years before. More recently, the Washington’s involvement in the region, mainly through the support of Rwanda and Uganda, is a strategy to access the DRC’s natural resources.

4.4.3 BELGIUM
Belgium was the former colonial power in Rwanda and the DRC and, therefore, had and continues to a stake in the events of the GLR. Firstly, Belgium’s indirect rule using the Tutsi in the beginning of its occupation of Rwanda, then Belgian support for the Hutu later prior to independence pitted the Hutu and the Tutsi against each other and served to exacerbate their differences. The national identification system which indicated every person’s ethnic group, introduced by Belgium in 1935, served to consolidate the often inaccurate differences between the two communities, further fuelling the rivalry between the Hutu and Tutsi, consequently leading to various conflicts between 1959 and 1990, and eventually culminating in the 1994 genocide.
(Omeje 2013). In this way, therefore, Belgium played a significant part in the conflicts in the GLR.

In the period during which the genocide was taking place, 10 Belgian peacekeepers were murdered by Rwanda’s presidential guard, together with the then Prime Minister Agathe Uwilingiyimana. (Prunier, 2009). Belgium, unlike its Western counterparts, notably the US, also withdrew its aid from Rwanda following the Kibeho massacres in which refugees were killed by the RPA in an attempt to clear out the refugee camps. Further, together with France, Belgium was among the first countries to deploy troops to Rwanda during the genocide, although Belgium later withdrew its contingent after the 10 Belgian soldiers were killed. Belgium, nevertheless, was not very active in the failed attempts of the international community to deploy a strong and capable multi-national force to Rwanda to help disarm the Hutu militia and ex-FAR after the genocide and subsequent refugee crisis. (Adelman, 2003).

Belgium, like most other state actors continues to be involved in the region for financial gain. Several Belgian companies, notably Traxys and Trademet, have been accused by a UN report of being involved in the illegal exploitation of DRC’s natural resources 23. Specifically, the two companies have been implicated by a 2012 UN report as being among the most important foreign buyers of cassiterite and coltan in Bukavu and Goma in eastern Congo in collaboration with the FDLR and the CNDP, that is to say the said companies’ minerals originate from rebel-controlled mines. (Custers, Cuvelier & Verbruggen, 2009). In this way, then, Belgium continues to be involved in the economic strengthening of rebel groups in the DRC, and thus continues to contribute to refugee-related conflict in the larger GLR region.
Belgian’s actions, are, therefore, shaped significantly by its position as the former colonial power as well as the trauma Belgium suffered following the assassination of its soldiers in Rwanda. More importantly, Belgium’s presence in the region is driven by economic interests, particularly the exploitation of the region’s vast mineral resources.

4.5 CONCLUSION

The discussion has looked into the role played by humanitarian organisations in the GLR refugee crisis immediately following the Rwandan genocide of 1994 and subsequently in the conflicts that continue to plague the region. The discussion has shown that the humanitarian organisations were complicit in the violent activities of the refugee warriors owing to organisations’ inability and unwillingness to disarm the refugees (and the ex-FAR and Hutu militia amongst them). The relief agencies were also unable to separate the killers from the genuine refugees, the implication of which was that the agencies were offering a safe haven and material assistance to people who had committed grave crimes. The sustenance offered to the militant refugees enabled them to continue their violent activities, and in this way, therefore, relief agencies contributed to the spread of conflict in the Great Lakes Region. In 2000, a refugee warrior group, the FDLR was formed and was able to access the weapons used by the ex-FAR and interahamwe partly because the humanitarian organisations were unable to disarm the ex-FAR and Hutu militia, who then availed the weapons to the FDLR. The FDLR continues to perpetrate serious human rights violations the DRC and poses a security risk to Rwanda. This observation contributes to answering the research question of the study which is: What role do refugees play in the spread of conflict? The objective of the study is to investigate the link between refugee populations and conflict.

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The study has looked into the specific mechanisms through which refugee crises lead to the spread of conflict. As the discussion has shown, humanitarian organisations can inadvertently facilitate refugee participation in violence by failing to stop the militarisation and politicisation of the refugees in the camps. The main link between refugees and violence is the ability to organise militarily and politically, as demonstrated by the state-in-exile refugees who fled Rwanda into the DRC. Once the refugees have a base from which they can organise and strategise militarily and politically, they are then able to launch cross-border attacks against the home state. Put differently, the humanitarian organisations offered the refugees (among whom were ex-FAR and Hutu militia), as well as the FDLR a way through which they could and continue engage in violence by enabling the refugee warrior groups to organise politically and militarily, and eventually attack Rwanda, which has significantly contributed to the precipitation of the various ongoing wars in the region at the time of writing in 2013.

The section has also discussed some of the solutions available to the humanitarian organisations to deal with refugee militarisation and politicisation, paramount of which is the separation of the refugees from the militant elements among them and, where necessary, the use of humanitarian assistance as leverage to ensure the militants cease and desist from their subversive activities. A number of state actors who were/are involved in the crisis have also been analysed with particular attention to the factors that motivated and continues to motivate their involvement. All in all, and in line with realist theory, the state actors are motivated mainly by self-interest, a factor that contributed to the overall failure of the international community in preventing, mitigating or stopping the Rwandan genocide, and in checking the refugee-related
conflict that engulfed the region following the genocide. In other words, the international community’s inaction can be seen as a propensity of states to be guided by narrow self-interest rather than the moral obligation to uphold international justice. The major western states were initially uninterested in Rwanda owing to the fact that Rwanda was marginal to the West’s economic and political concerns. Regional states were unable and unwilling to maintain a sustained presence due to interference from the Western states as well as the inability to mobilize the requisite resources due to poverty. Humanitarian organizations were keen on maintaining neutrality and impartiality in their work, and opted not to be involved in the militarization and politicization of the refugees. The result was that genocide of immense proportions took place unchecked, as did a massive refugee exodus from Rwanda into DRC. The refugees were accompanied by the organisers and perpetrators of genocide, who regrouped in the DRC with the help of humanitarian organisations and state actors. This then precipitated a series of wars involving various belligerents in the GLR that are still on-going. More recently, as the discussion has shown, the state actors have a renewed interest in the region due to the region’s vast natural resources, and their interest continues to fuel conflict in the region. Some, as discussed, are involved in the illicit exploitation of minerals in rebel-controlled areas, notably the FDLR, which is a formidable refugee-warrior group operating in the region. This is an illustration that refugees are not passive victims of conflict; rather they are often willingly and actively involved. Moreover, the given the regional nature of the protracted GLR conflicts and the role played by refugees and the international community’s reluctance to deal with the refugee problem once and for all, the discussion supports the study’s hypothesis which is: The more the refugee problem in the GLR remains unresolved, the more conflict will prevail in the region. Further, the discussion has shown that
what happens in one state can affect events in neighbouring states. It has therefore contributed to available literature by negating the notion that states are independent entities and that conflict is driven mainly by what happens within a state’s borders by demonstrating that conflict can sometimes follow a regional or international pattern.
CHAPTER FIVE

SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.0 SUMMARY

Protracted refugee situations and the attendant insecurity, instability and human rights violations continue to plague the African Great Lakes Region (GLR). In particular, Rwandan refugee warriors in the form of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), the ex-FAR and Hutu *interahamwe*\(^\text{74}\) militia and the *Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda*\(^\text{75}\) FDLR were/are at the heart of the vicious cycle of wars in the region. That is to say that refugees have played a significant part in the genesis and escalation of conflict within the GLR. The conflicts are characterised by massive internal and cross-border displacement, the illicit exploitation of natural resources, the killing of innocent civilians and serious human rights violations such as rape and torture.

The porosity of borders in the GLR means that conflicts can easily spill over from one state to another where they connect with existing tensions or are reinvented. Refugee flows across national borders, particularly if characterised by militant groups, constitute one of the mechanisms through which conflict spreads across borders. It would, therefore, be inaccurate to depict refugees as hapless victims of conflict. As such, this study was necessitated by the need to understand the role played by refugees in the cause and spread of conflict in the Great Lakes Region. The central premise of the study is that refugees are not passive victims of war; rather they are often active and willing participants in the conflict dynamic. The study was aimed at answer the following research question: What role do refugees play in the spread of conflict? The objective of the study was to investigate the link between refugee populations and conflict. The study hypothesized that the more the refugee problem in the GLR remains unsolved, the more likely that conflict will prevail in the region. The
study was also an attempt to contribute to previous research on the subject - a reading of the literature on refugee-related conflict shows that nation-states are for the most part treated as independent entities, with the assumption that conflicts are mostly driven by what happens within a state’s boundaries. The GLR crises, however, illustrate that events in one state, such as war, can affect a neighbouring state and indeed spread throughout an entire region. Further, given that most of the literature suggests that refugee flows can cause conflict but remains unclear on the exact mechanisms involved, this analysis has hopefully shed light on the subject. The study showed that it is imperative that any solutions to the conflicts in the region focus specifically on how to deal with the politicisation and militarisation of refugees.

Chapter Two entailed an in-depth look into the mechanisms through which refugees act as catalysts of conflict. The section argued that there are different categories of refugees depending on their reason for flight, namely situational refugees, persecuted refugees and state-in-exile refugees. State-in-exile refugees have the highest propensity for violence owing their high levels of militarisation and politicisation. Militarisation and politicisation, therefore, are the main links between refugees and violent conflict. Once the refugees are militarised, the violence in which they get involved takes several forms such as cross-border attacks between the sending state and the refugees, violence between the host state and the refugees or the ignition of latent violence by the arrival of refugees into a host state, usually by skewing the ethnic balance in favour of a previously oppressed minority or an opposition group. This then encourages the previously oppressed group to confront the state, leading to conflict. Alternatively, refugee-related violence may be precipitated by a state’s intervention in another state to halt the influx of refugees into the second state’s territory, leading to interstate war.
Chapter two also examined the channels through which refugees spread conflict. One of these channels was identified by the study as diffusion, which occurs when conflict in one state increases the probability of conflict in another state. The other channel is escalation, which may occur through alliances, spill-overs, irredentism or diversionary wars. Put differently, escalation occurs when new belligerents are drawn into ongoing conflict. For example, escalation may take the form of refugees using the host country’s territory as a rear base from which to attack their home country; the home country may then attack the host state, leading to war. Further, refugees constitute a negative externality of civil war by negatively affecting the economy of host countries, altering the demographic balance of the host country or spreading diseases in the host population, due to, for example, poor living conditions in the refugee camps, all of which may ignite conflict between the refugees and the host population. Inherent in the concept of negative externalities is the notion that nation-states are interlinked by networks that transcend national boundaries, and are, therefore, not self-contained units that are immune to events outside their boundaries. Refugees may also expand their social networks into neighbouring states through geographic mobility - refugee flows facilitate the spread of arms, ideologies and organisational structures that are conducive to war. Refugees also establish links, share information and provide resources to domestic rebel groups with compatible aims, significantly increasing the risk of conflict in the host country. Further, the conditions and strategies of the host state with regard to the treatment of refugees may determine the extent to which, if at all, refugees engage in violence. For example, if a host government is willing and able to secure its borders and comprehensively disarm the refugee militants as well as separate genuine refugees from war criminals and combatants, the refugees’ propensity for violence may be considerably diminished.
Chapter 3 set out to show the refugee-conflict nexus in the Great Lakes Region. The section outlined the historical trajectory of Rwanda and analyses the various civil conflicts therein between 1959 and 1990, as well as the various rebel groups in the region at the time of writing in 2013 with a view to illustrating the implications of leaving the refugee problem unsolved. Refugees fleeing the various civil conflicts in Rwanda became refugee warriors in the form of the ex-FAR, the interahamwe militia group and the FDLR, all of whom attacked/continue to attack Rwanda and cause instability and insecurity in the larger GLR. The First and the Second Congo Wars were outlined in detail to demonstrate how refugees become involved in conflict and how refugee-related conflict can escalate into a full-blown international war. The uniquely volatile Kivu region and the effect of the massive refugee influx from Rwanda in 1994 into the region were discussed to show how refugees can cause conflict by interfering with the demographic and ethnic balance of power. The chapter’s goal was to illustrate that refugee warriors constitute a security threat to both host and home governments as hosting them is a political decision that has implications for inter-state relations. The refugees in Kivu, as the discussion demonstrated, are not just passive victims of violence; rather they are highly conscious of their circumstances and are therefore, taking a pro-active stance by becoming politicised and militarised with a view to achieving their stated objectives. The chapter also delved into the militarisation and politicisation of the refugee warriors in the GLR, notably how the refugee leaders exercised complete control over the refugees who fled Rwanda in 1994 - the leaders used the refugee camps as a recruitment base for their cause. The leaders also procured weaponry while stationed in the camps, which is to say that there was no hindrance to their militarisation either by the humanitarian organisations in-charge of the camps or the Mobutu government.
This made it easier for the refugee warriors to carry out cross-border attacks on Rwanda from the refugee camps, to which Rwanda responded by conducting retaliatory attacks on the refugee camps, and by extension, on Congolese territory. The conflict then escalated to an international war into which other states and rebel groups were drawn. After 2003, the FDLR refugee rebel group took over the violent activities of the ex-FAR and Hutu militias and is still active in the DRC at the time of writing in 2013, illustrating, as per the central thesis, that refugees are not just passive victims of conflict; rather they are often willingly and actively involved. The chapter showed that the main link between refugees and conflict in the GLR is the refugees’ ability to be militarily and politically organised, a process that has been facilitated by the DRC’s inability and unwillingness to disarm the ex-FAR and *interahamwe* and separate them from genuine refugees. The DRC has also been unable and unwilling to neutralise the FDLR, and as a result the group continues to commit atrocities in the DRC and cause instability in the region.

The role of humanitarian organisations and regional as well as western state actors in the refugee-conflict relationship in the GLR was the subject of Chapter 4. As alluded to in Chapter 3, humanitarian organisations were seen to be complicit in the militarisation and politicisation of refugees because the relief agencies allowed the refugee leaders to carry on with their activities undeterred. Put differently, the refugee militants were allowed access to food, shelter and other amenities such as health care for themselves and their families; at the same time the refugee militants were allowed to carry out their subversive militant activities within the camps. This inadvertently gave some degree of displaced legitimacy to the refugee militants’ cause in the eyes of the international community, which in turn continued to generously fund the humanitarian efforts of the relief agencies as well as unintentionally aiding the war.
economy of the ex-FAR and *interahamwe* war criminals. The section argued that the relief agencies, in an attempt to maintain their philosophy of neutrality, impartiality and independence, ignored the activities of the refugee militants, essentially contributing to the ongoing refugee-related instability in the GLR.

Chapter 4 also looked into the strategies available to relief agencies to curb refugee militarisation. The study showed that time is of essence if demilitarisation is to be curbed successfully, to deter refugee leaders from consolidating their power over the refugee population. As such, genuine refugees need to be separated from the criminal elements and the militants amongst them at the earliest opportunity. Further, the relief agencies need to be informed as to the category of refugees they are assisting, as this will usually be a good indication as to their level of propensity for violence. These two strategies were not adhered to in the refugee camps in eastern DRC, which led to the refugees engaging in violence, and thus posing a security threat to the states in the region. Other options include security alliances like the Zairian Camp Security Operation (CZSC) which was deployed in the refugee camps in the DRC, the security package applied in the Tanzanian refugee camps as well as the UN’s ladder of options, all of which entail cooperation between the humanitarian agencies, the host state and the international community. In worst case scenarios, the relief agencies may choose to suspend their operations, for example if their work becomes more harmful than helpful to the refugees.

Chapter Four also examined the role of regional and western state actors in the proliferation of refugee-related conflict in the GLR. The discussion demonstrated that the regional states’ involvement in the GLR is driven mainly by security and economic concerns. Some of the actors such as Rwanda and Uganda have been implicated in the illegal exploitation of minerals in the DRC through the use of proxy
groups such as the M23, an indication of the economic interests that some of these states have in Congo’s minerals. Western states also harbour economic ambitions as far as the DRC is concerned, which explains the involvement of the United States, France and other western states. Notably, French involvement in the region since 1990 is driven by the need to prevent the Anglo-Saxon states, that is, the US and Britain, from gaining dominance in the region. The US is also wary of China’s increasing economic influence in the region, hence US support for Rwanda and Uganda.

5.1 RECOMMENDATIONS
The overlapping conflicts in the GLR are a clear demonstration that if left unattended, refugee problems of this kind spell further conflict. Moreover, there are international norms in place that provide state and non-state actors with guidance for the way forward as far as curbing refugee militarisation is concerned. As such, state and non-state actors should seek this guidance as well as remain vigilant about protracted refugee situations. It is imperative that the refugees are repatriated to their home countries, resettled in third party countries or integrated into the host state where possible to avoid refugee-fuelled insecurity and instability. To this end therefore, from a policy standpoint, generous refugee and asylum programs both in host countries and third party developed countries can go a long way in curtailing the genesis and spread of refugee-related armed conflict.

Pressure should also be brought to bear on Rwanda to seek a long-term solution to the FDLR rebel group by prosecuting those deemed to have committed crimes within the FDLR, allowing innocent refugees to return home and opening up the political space as ignoring the FDLR has so far not been successful; rather the FLDR continues to
pose a security threat to Rwanda, and to the GLR in general. Further, states that have been implicated by the UN to be complicit in the illegal exploitation of the DRC’s minerals, and those that continue to illegally occupy DRC territory through proxy rebel groups, notably Rwanda and Uganda ought to be reprimanded by the international community.

A lasting solution to the fighting in the GLR will take the active input and involvement of the refugees themselves. That is to say that any initiative to bring peace to the region must give refugees a voice because, as the study has shown, refugees are active participants as well as victims in the conflict dynamic in the region. Refugees should have representation in any framework for peace in the GLR as they constitute the best source of solutions to the problems they face. The involvement of refugees in peace initiatives is likely to reduce militia activity by the refugees and garner their support for disarmament exercises. The refugees are also likely to offer useful information that would enable the relevant authorities to apprehend the suspected war criminals and the masterminds of refugee-related violence amongst them. This can potentially contribute to a reduction in the militarisation of the refugees, and consequently, lead to a marked decrease in refugee-fuelled conflict in the region.

Given the overriding regional dimension to the GLR conflict, and the fact that refugees will usually flee to countries within the region as illustrated by the study, it is imperative that the East African Community (EAC), the regional intergovernmental organisation - comprising Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda - should play an active role in conflict resolution in the region, and specifically, resolve the
protracted refugee issue in the region. Given the complexity of the situation and the implication of the governments of Rwanda and Uganda in the conflicts, the EAC must ensure that any solutions put forward reflect a neutral agenda aimed solely at ending the fighting and restoring peace and security in the region, as well as ensuring the safe resettlement, repatriation or integration of refugees. It is recommended that search for a solution to the crisis should take a more regional shape to create the necessary legitimacy and ensure that peace initiatives go beyond military responses.

Of more pertinence, however, preventative strategies to contain civil wars from escalating into international wars should be emphasized. As the discussion has shown, civil wars and human rights violations, among other events, can spread from one state to another, and this should therefore not be ignored by regional states or the wider international community - where necessary, the international community should intervene to contain civil wars before they escalate into international wars.

In conclusion, proactive steps should also be taken by host countries in cooperation with bodies such as the UNHCR and humanitarian agencies to manage refugee camps, as in the case of the CZSC, and thus reduce the possibility of refugee violence. Specifically, the unique needs, priorities and concerns of Third World states, who host the majority of the world’s refugees cannot be ignored if refugee-related violence is to be checked. Given the changing nature of conflict after the Cold War, conflict-induced forced migration of the scale of the Rwandan exodus in 1994 remains a possibility in Africa. Given the regionalisation of conflict and the domestic instability caused by a mass refugee influx, forced migration left unaddressed is likely to continue to have security implications for the host state. Refugee protection must,
therefore, develop an approach that addresses host-state security if it is to remain relevant in cases of refugee militarisation. This convergence of refugee protection and host-state security is both necessary and possible if refugees are to be prevented from engaging in armed conflict.
ENDNOTES

1 The Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of Congo.

2 The term *genocidaire* has come to refer to those guilty of the mass killings of the 1994 Rwandan genocide, specifically, the Hutu militia.

3 Forces for the Democratic Liberation of Rwanda.


6 Armed forces of Rwanda.

7 The term literally translates as ‘from Mulenge’. The Banyamulenge are a group of ethnic Tutsi who live in the South Kivu region of Eastern DRC. They are believed to have settled around the Mulenge Mountain Region of Zaire. See Lemarchand (2006).

8 Contras are members of a revolutionary force that sought to overthrow Nicaragua’s left wing government. The US Central Intelligence Agency played a significant role in training and funding the group and its activities. See Lischer, Sarah Kenyon (2002) *Catalysts of Conflict: How Refugee Crises Lead to the Spread of Civil War*. Cambridge: MIT Press.


11 The term “mujahidin” translates literally as “holy warriors”, that is, those who fight in a jihad or “holy war.”


13 For a different classification of refugees, see Loescher, Gil (1992) *Refugees and the Asylum Dilemma of the West*. Pennsylvania: Penn State Press. Loescher (1992)’s classification covers other types of refugees other than those fleeing conflict, such as environmental refugees and the internally displaced.

14 RENAMO is The Mozambican Resistance Army.

15 Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of Congo.

16 National Congress for the Defence of the People.

17 Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda.
The M23 or The Movement of 23 is a splinter group of the CNDP, and it derives its name from the date the CNDP signed a peace agreement with the DRC government on March 23 2009. Its leaders include Laurent Nkunda and Joseph Ntaganda, both of whom are in the hands of the International Criminal Court (ICC).


Interahamwe translates literally as “those who attack together” and refers to the Hutu militia group that was responsible for the Rwandan genocide in 1994. See Anna Obura (2003) "Never Again: Educational Reconstruction in Rwanda. Report prepared for Institute of Educational Planning, UNESCO.

The countries involved include Rwanda, Uganda, Burundi, Angola, The Republic of Sudan, Chad, Zimbabwe and Namibia. Some of the rebel groups include *Rassemblment Congolais pour la Démocratie* (RCD), The Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), *Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda* (FDLR), M23, National Congress for the Defence of the People, (CNDP), Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), Mai Mai, Movement for the Liberation of Congo (MLC), and The Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo (AFDL).

Mwami is the official title of the traditional King of the Banyarwanda.


PARMEHUTU-The Party of the Hutu Emancipation Movement.


FAR refers to The Rwandan Armed Forces who were in power before the 1994 genocide in Rwanda.

The term literally translates as ‘from Mulenge’. The Banyamulenge are a group of ethnic Tutsi who live in the South Kivu region of Eastern DRC. They are believed to have originated from the Mulenge Mountain Region of Rwanda. See Mamdani, Mahmood (2003) "Kivu, 1997: An Essay on Citizen and the State Crisis in Africa,’ in Aaron Gana & Samuel Egwu (eds.) *Federalism in Africa: The Imperative of Democratic Development*. Asmara: Africa World Press. pp. 3-36.

FAZ denotes The Zairean National Army.

ADFJ refers Alliance of the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo.


National Forces for Liberation.

RCD refers to Congolese Rally for Democracy.

Kinyarwanda is the main language spoken by the people of Rwanda.


The term means “those who attack together” in the Kinyarwanda language.

MPLA is The People’s Movement for the Liberation of Angola

The basic political and administrative unit in Rwanda, administered by an elected communal council presided over by a mayor.

FAR refers to The Rwandan Armed Forces

CZSC refers to The Zairian Camp Security Operation.

The Armed Forces of Zaire


Movement of 23rd March.

The UNHCR is the global humanitarian branch of the United Nations that ensures the wellbeing and protection of refugees. The agency’s mandate is to co-ordinate international action to protect refugees and resolve refugee problems worldwide. Its primary objective is to safeguard the rights and well-being of refugees. It strives to ensure that everyone can exercise the right to seek asylum and find safe refuge in another state, with the option to return home voluntarily, integrate locally or to resettle in a third country. See www.unhcr.org. (Accessed on 12/09/2013).

Doctors Without Borders.

The 1969 OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa, Article III. Also see UN Doc. S/RES/1265 (1999), Par. 6. The Security Council in 1999 reaffirmed “the primary responsibility of states to ensure refugee protection, in particular by maintaining the security and civilian character of refugees and IDPs in camps.”

Forced return.

The official language of Rwanda, usually spoken by the Banyarwanda, that is, the people of Rwanda or those originating from Rwanda.
In May 1994 the UN Security Council, through Resolution 918, imposed an arms embargo on the sale or supply of arms Rwandan territory. A Security Council Sanctions Committee to monitor the embargo’s enforcement was also set up. This was in response to the ongoing violence and genocide in Rwanda at the time. In June 1995, Resolution 997 extended the embargo to non-state actors in the states bordering Rwanda with the intention of using arms and other matériel within and against Rwanda. See Adelman, Howard & Surhke, Astri (1996) “Early Warning and Response: Why the International Community Failed to Prevent the Genocide.” Disasters Vol. 20, No. 4, pp. 295-304.

Banyamulenge literally translates as ‘from Mulenge’. The Banyamulenge are a group of ethnic Tutsi who live in the South Kivu region of Eastern DRC. They are believed to have originated from the Mulenge Mountain Region of Rwanda. See Mamdani, Mahmood (2003) “Kivu, 1997: An Essay on Citizen and the State Crisis in Africa,’ in Aaron Gana & Samuel Egwu (eds.) Federalism in Africa: The Imperative of Democratic Development. Asmara: Africa World Press, pp. 3-36.

The Kibeho massacres took place in April 1995 when RPF troops surrounded the Kibeho IDP camp in Rwanda, near the border with the DRC. The aim was to forcibly repatriate the IDPs into their homes. Some of the IDPs attempted to flee in panic, upon which the RPF soldiers fired at them with guns and mortars. UNAMIR estimated the death toll to be 4000 to 8000, which is thought to be a very conservative estimate as the RPF is believed to have covered up the details of the massacre. Rwanda blamed the massacre on provocation by the IDPs and the general confusion that ensued, and puts the death toll as 300 civilians. See Bellamy, Alex (2012) Massacres and Morality: Mass Atrocities in an Age of Civilian Immunity. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Front for the Murundi People.


National Union for the Total Independence of Angola.

The Kitona Operation was a risky but strategically decisive operation undertaken by Rwanda and Uganda against the DRC. In August 1998, the Rwandan and Ugandan armies, in an attempt to capture Kinshasa and overthrow Laurent Kabila, flew 1500 soldiers into DRC’s Kitona air base near Angola’s enclave, Cambinda, which they seized and from which they recruited the FAZ army deserters. They proceeded towards Kinshasa but their advance was stopped by the formidable and experienced Angolan army, essentially repulsing their advance. See James Stejskal (2013) “The Kitona Operation: Rwanda’s Gamble to capture Kinshasa and the Misreading of an ally. Joint Force Quarterly, Vol. 68, No. 1 pp. 99-104. http://www.ndu.edu/press/jointForceQuarterly.html (Accessed on 09/08/2013).

The term interahamwe translates as “those who attack together.”

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