AFRICAN SUB-REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN CONFLICT RESOLUTION: ANALYZING THE CONTRIBUTION OF INTERGOVERNMENTAL AUTHORITY ON DEVELOPMENT (IGAD) IN THE SOUTH SUDAN CONFLICT RESOLUTION 2013-2018

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I declare that this is my original work and has not been presented to any other college, university or other institution of higher learning other than United States International University Africa

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ABSTRACT

The Sudanese conflict began in August 1955 before attaining its independence in January 1956. Numerous efforts made by sequential Sudanese regimes and other actors to resolve the conflict failed. The letdown led the Government of Sudan (GoS) and the Sudanese People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) to invite IGAD, a sub-regional organization in 1993 to assist. The IGAD intervention culminated in the signing of the CPA in 2005 between the protagonists. The main objective of this study was to examine the contributions of IGAD in conflict resolution in South Sudan (2013-2018). This study employed qualitative research approach to examine the role of a sub-regional organization in conflict resolution in South Sudan. The research employed a case study design whereby the contributions of IGAD in conflict resolution in South Sudan between 2013-2018 was the main subject of analysis. In this study, data was collected through secondary sources which included academic journal articles, books, and reports. Data collected was then analyzed qualitatively and by content analysis. The data collected was presented in the form of tables and charts. The main recommendation of this study is that there is need to bolster inclusivity especially of the civil society and other political parties apart from the ruling and opposition party. There is need to cultivate trust between the SPLM and the government of South Sudan through continuous multi-stakeholder engagements. Finally, there is need to enhance dissemination of peace messages and advocacy among the people of South Sudan as a way of entrenching peace and peacebuilding initiatives.
DEDICATION

I dedicate this Thesis to my Father Mr. Bortel Mori, my Late Grand Mother Alice Yambi Farrouk, my family and friends for their encouragement and continuous support, the suffering masses of South Sudan especially to those who lost their lives in quest for equality, justice and human dignity.
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ACRONYMS

AFL : Armed Forces of Liberia
AFRC : Armed Force Ruling Council
AU : African Union
ARCSS : Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan
AWP : Annual Work Plan
CEWARN : Conflict Early Warning and Early Mechanism
CPA : Comprehensive Peace Agreement
EAC : East African Community
EASF : Eastern Africa Stand by Force
ECOMICICI : Economic Community of West Africa States mission in Cote D’Ivoire
ECOMIL : Economic Community of West Africa States mission in Liberia
ECOMOG : Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group
ECOWAS : Economic Community of West African States
ESMC : Economic Community of West African States Standing Mediation Committee
EU : European Union
HLRF : High Level Revitalization Forum
ICPAT : International Capacity Building Program against Terrorism
IGAD : Intergovernmental Authority on Development.
IGADD : Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Desertification.
IMF : International Monetary Fund.
INPFL : Independent National patriotic Front of Liberia
IPF : International partners’ forum
IPU : Inter-parliamentary Union
ISAP : Institutional Strengthening Action Program
JFA: Joint Financing Arrangement
JMEC: Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission
LRA: Lord’s Resistance Army
MVM: Monitoring and verification Mechanisms
NCP: National Congress Party
NGOs: Non-governmental Organizations
OUA: Organization of African Unity
PDF: Protection and Deterrence Forces
RECs: Regional Economic Communities
RTGoNU: Revitalized Transitional Government of National Unity
SAF: Sudan Armed Forces
SPLA: Sudan People’s Liberation Army
SPLA/M: Sudan People’s Liberation Army/Movement
SPLM: Sudan People’s Liberation Movement
SPLM/A-IO: Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/ Army- In Opposition
TGoNU: Transitional Government of National Unity
TWP: True Whig Party
UK: United Kingdom
UN: United Nations
UNAMSIL: United Nations mission in Sierra Leone
UNDP: United Nations Development Programme
UNMIL: United Nations mission in Liberia
UNMISS: United Nations Mission in South Sudan
UNOCI: United Nations Operation in Cote D’Ivoire
UNSC: United Nations Security Council
US: United States
CHAPTER ONE

1.0 INTRODUCTION

This thesis is organized in the following manner: Chapter One presents the background to the study, the statement of the problem, the research objectives the study is seeking to answer, the justification of the study, and the scope of the study. Chapter two of this Thesis examines available literature by different scholars for each of the research objectives, while at the same time, presents the theoretical framework that supported the analysis of the study. Finally, chapter three presents the study methodology that was adopted, including research design, data analysis, and presentation. Chapter four details the findings and analysis of the research while chapter five offers conclusions and recommendations.

1.1 Background of the Study

Sub-regional organizations are created to simplify regional response for ordinary issues. Africa has many sub-regional organizations notwithstanding the increase of the organizations, one could raise a question: what role do sub-regional organizations have or play in Africa? This proposal examines the contributions of Intergovernmental Authority on Development in conflict resolution in South Sudan. Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) constitutes of eight states in the Horn of Africa, with its headquarters in Djibouti. IGAD succeeded the Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Desertification (IGADD) in 1996.

Sudan gained independence from Anglo-Egyptian on January 1, 1956. The northern part of Sudan was composed mainly of Muslims, while the southern region was composed of Christians. The northern part was also composed of political elites, who controlled power and government. As a result of this dominance, the political elites in the north began
imposing Sharia law to the southerners who were Non-Muslims. The southerners resisted Sharia law, which resulted in two long wars between 1955-1972 and 1983-2005, with a short and fragile “peace” from 1972 to 1983, which ended with agreements signed in Nairobi in 2005. The 38 years of war left more than 2.5 million people dead, and southern Sudan completely devastated, impoverished and without basic services and infrastructure (Moschetti, 2017).

Southern Sudanese people, through the Sudan People Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) started agitating for secession from northern Sudan (currently referred as Sudan). In January 9-15, 2011, through the referendum, 98.83 % of Southern Sudanese voted in favor of secession from the Sudan, thereby establishing the state of South Sudan. The Republic of South Sudan emerged as an independent state on 9th July 2011, becoming the 54th Country in Africa and 193rd in the United Nations, after a referendum earlier that same year. The referendum was based on the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) that ended the longest civil wars in the history of the African continent. This left about 2.2 million people dead, others mutilated and many more displaced (Matthew & Matthew, 2013). The peaceful transition didn’t last long, as the country was thrown into another civil war in 2013 because of a dispute between the President Salva Kiir and the former Vice President Dr. Riek Machar. The conflict in South Sudan, which started in 2013, when an attempted coup that was then led by former Vice President Dr. Riek Machar failed, then led to division between two individual and bloody inter-ethnic war between the Nuer and Dinka that took place. (Martell, 2011).

The conflict in South Sudan has been ongoing since 2013, with the latest ceasefire agreement signed in Khartoum on 12th September 2018 by the President Kiir and former Vice President Riek, led by the Sudanese government of Omar el Bashir (Intergovernmental, Authority Development, 2018).
In December 2013, civil war broke out between the forces loyal to the President Salva Kiir and those loyal to the former Vice President Riek. Previously, Kiir accused Riek for attempting a coup; accusation denied by the former Vice President later. As the war intensified, Riek fled the Country to lead the SPLM/A-IO. In January 2014, a ceasefire was reached but the fighting continued in some parts of the Country. In August 2015, they signed an Agreement called Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (ARCSS). Riek Machar arrived in Juba on April 2016 and immediately he was sworn in as the Vice President, which led to the formation of the Transitional Government of National Unity (Daniel, 2014).

In July 2016, a soldier loyal to Machar, Lt Colonel George Gismala was killed by the government security personnel. The killing caused tension within some security forces in Juba. Few days later, soldiers loyal to Machar were attacked at a government checkpoint. This incident left five government soldiers dead and two others injured. On 8th July 2016, a day before the anniversary of the independence, fights broke out near the state house where the peace talks between the President and Vice president were being facilitated. The fight was between the bodyguards of the President and Vice President, meanwhile there were clashes around the army barracks and in the United Nations compound. After the clashes, there was heavy military presence in Juba the Capital and the fight left thirty-five SPLM/A-IO soldiers and eighty government soldiers dead. The fighting majorly concentrated in Jebel and Gudele residential area in Juba, where the rebel bases are located as well as United Nations base. Few days later, Machar fled Juba and the fighting continued. South Sudan’s capital Juba has experienced relative calm since July 2016, violence, though rebellion has slowly spread throughout the Country, further devastating the young nation causing millions of people to flee the country to the neighboring Ethiopia, Sudan, Kenya and Uganda, fearing more bloodshed (Moschetti, 2017).
The most recognized function of IGAD in South Sudan is softening of hardline stands by the government and warring factions by bringing them to the discussion table, which has resulted in the formation of government of national unity, upgrading of governments capacity to keep the peace, and appropriation of national oil resources. Additionally, IGAD facilitated the establishment of local justice mechanisms like the Gacaca court of Rwanda, which will help settle minor local disputes. Capacity building of government, monetary strengthening, and advocating for imposition of rebel functions. IGAD was able to mobilize action from African Union (AU) and United Nations Security council (UNSC) for the deployment of peacekeeping force in South Sudan (Intergovernmental, Authority Development, 2018).

Other measures that IGAD has taken to alleviate the security dangers in South Sudan are; IGAD has set its main goal in South Sudan to help moderate the emergency/Offered fortification, employ early cautioning instruments to avoid struggle, approval of Protection and Deterrence Force (PDF) to come to South Sudan, Special coordination with UNMISS peacekeepers brigade on clashes zones, deployment of Monitors through the Monitoring and Verification Mechanisms (MVM), built dimensions of national security and Built limit of South Sudanese security organs.

IGAD was exceptionally instrumental in the making of the CPA on January 9, 2005. The CPA Includes updates and changes to past conventions. The CPA itself is involved in six conventions that were between 2002 and 2005 for example the far-reaching Peace Agreement. The Machakos Protocol marked in Machakos, Kenya, on 20th July 2002, in which the groups concurred on a wide system, putting forward the standards of governance, the transitional procedure and the structures of government and on the privilege to self-assurance for the general population of South Sudan, and on state and religion. A six-year Interim Period, toward the end of which, the general population of
South Sudan were given the privilege to cast a ballot in a self-assurance choice to choose whether to stay joined with Sudan or to withdraw.

There is, likewise, the Protocol on Security Courses of Action marked in Naivasha, Kenya, on 25 September 2003 which gave a discontinuance of threats between the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) and the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF), and the upkeep of SPLA powers in the south and SAF powers in the north. Before the separation Sudan viewed IGAD as the main agent to bring in local peace activities. The present African Union efforts are being helped by IGAD.

IGAD has been helping South Sudan to incorporate into the territorial peace building design. The Conflict Early Warning and Early Mechanism (CEWARN) system of IGAD has been set up in the South Sudan Peace building Commission. There is a requirement for IGAD to assume a functioning job in advancing quiet conjunction between the two nations remembering its believability and intercession accomplishments. IGAD has composed the organization of about government employees from Kenya, Uganda and Ethiopia to offer specialized help with a few services, commissions and neighborhood governments.

IGAD is furnishing this in a joint effort with United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). The most widely recognized other conceivable answers for the contention in South Sudan was observed in locally established arrangements like those that occurred in Somalia. This was trailed by making a comprehensive government, improve the dimensions of safety efforts, measure up to conveyance of oil assets, uniting of networks through ethnic bigotry driven by political promptings, bottom– up way to deal with deal with goals systems, group joining, having nearby question settlements like gacaca court in Rwanda, production of reduced governance, financial strengthening, sanctions did on renegades and people propagating struggle, return of individuals in diaspora/genuine open
refinement and compromise crusades at the grassroots, stable military that talks with one voice and drawing in IGAD, African Union (AU) and (UNSC) United Nations security council (IGAD, 2018).

The United States of America tried to negotiate a solution between President Salva and former Vice President Riek Machar. Former Vice President Riek Machar conditions for talks were his comrades were to be released from detention and they shall evacuate to Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. In order to ensure a stronger negotiating position, the conflict was mediated by intergovernmental Authority on Development, an East African regional integration inspired premised on Chapter VII of the United Nations Charters, which provides for regional initiatives in the conflict mediation and resolution. On 23 January, 2014, the representatives of the government of South Sudan and representatives of the rebel reached a ceasefire agreement in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia and the official close to the rebel leader Machar should be released, but the conflict continued because the rebel accused the government takeover of Leer, that it was a deliberate attempt to destroy the Second round of talks that were to start in February.

The rebels demanded the release of the four remaining political prisoners and the withdrawal of the Ugandan troops, or they will boycott the second-round talks. On 9th May 2014, the two warring parties signed the second ceasefire in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. A peace Agreement recommitting to the first ceasefire, was aimed to open a humanitarian passage and thirty days of calmness, so that farmers can plant crops and prevent famine. Few hours after the ceasefire was in effect, both parties accused each other of violating the ceasefire.

In June 2014, the parties agreed to begin the third ceasefire talks on formation of the transitional government within sixty days. However, the talks collapsed as both parties boycotted the talks and on 16th June, the ceasefire was violated. President Kiir and the
neighbors of South Sudan signed a roadmap leading to a Transitional Government of National Unity. Former Vice President Machar refused to sign up, accusing the IGAD leaders and regional groups saying they are in favor of President Kiir. Both Parties renewed the much-broken ceasefire in November and the IGAD mediators gave them fifteen days to reach a power sharing deal with a threat of sanction if they fail. This ceasefire failed due to the fighting in the oil rich north area.

The peace talks started on 4th of January 2015 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. But the conflict continued. In February the two leaders signed an Agreement on “Areas of Agreement” for future Transitional Government of National Unity and to recommit to the ceasefire. The talks collapsed, and fighting broke out in March. In August 2015, the hope for peace and stability in South Sudan was re-established with the Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (ARCSS) (Intergovernmental Authority on Development, 2015). The Agreement was signed between SPLM/A and SPLM/A-IO, represented by President Salva Kiir and former Vice President Riek Marchar and the Agreement resulted in formation of a Transitional Government of National Unity (TGoNU) in April 2016. TGoNU included James Wani Igga as second Vice President of South Sudan, even though he is not a signatory to the ARCSS. After the signing of ARCSS, the fighting continued in South Sudan and resulted in a deteriorating humanitarian situation in the country.

The Agreement was to make Riek Machar the Vice President again and it would also establish the Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission (JMEC) responsible for monitoring and overseeing implementation of the Agreement. In June 2016 former Vice President Riek Machar returned to Juba with troops loyal to him and was sworn in as Vice President. Two months later, violence erupted in Juba, South Sudan and few days after the
conflict former Vice President fled Juba and the conflict continued in the areas outside Juba.

In June 2018, President Kiir and former Vice President Machar signed another ceasefire where they agreed to form a Revitalized Transitional Government of National Unity (RTGoNU) for thirty Transitional period in order to establish a democratically elected government. (Intergovernmental Authority on Development, 2018).

1.2 Statement of the Problem

In 2013, two years after the birth of Africa’s youngest nation, violent conflicts broke out in South Sudan after a political disagreement between the President Salva Kiir and the former Vice President Riek Machar and the dispute continues to this day. The civil war has forced millions to flee their homes. 1.9 million People are internally displaced, over two million fled to the neighboring countries (Ethiopia, Kenya, Sudan and Uganda), thousands of people were killed and led to wanton destruction of properties (Jenik & Sarah, 2014).

Efforts to contain the conflict by various players have had mixed result. Entities have tried to reconcile the warring parties in South Sudan both at state and individual level, with little success and therefore, the involvement of IGAD in the resolution effort raises the issue about Sub-regional organizations engagements in the conflict of the region.

1.3 Objectives of the study

The general objective is to examine the contributions and challenges of IGAD in conflict resolution in South Sudan (2013-2018).
1.3.1 Specific Objectives

The study will utilize the following specific objectives:

i. To examine IGAD’s challenges in implementing South Sudan conflict resolution.

ii. To analyze IGAD’s contributions towards the resolution and management of the South Sudan conflict (2013 and 2018)

iii. To assess the significance of regional institutions (IGAD) in addressing state fragility in South Sudan over the long term.

1.4 Research Questions

This study will be guided by the following questions

i. How has IGAD navigated the challenges in implementing South Sudan conflict resolution?

ii. What are IGAD’s contributions towards the resolution and management of South Sudan (2013-2018)?

iii. What is the significance of regional institutions (IGAD) in addressing state fragility in South Sudan over the long term?

1.5 Justification of the Study

This study is critical to the realm of Peace and Conflict studies, as it provides students and enthusiasts with a background knowledge on the work of Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) as an institution. Furthermore, this study assesses the significance of regional institutions (IGAD) in addressing state fragility in South Sudan. Central in this study is the provision of insight into the contributions of IGAD in the South- Sudanese peace process. Challenges faced by IGAD, the milestones, successes
achieved by the regional body form a background upon which its contributions in the peace process can be outlined for future studies.

This study serves as an introduction to a new theoretical analysis of the situation and it also serves policy makers – both governmental and non-governmental – and scholars alike interested in Peace and Conflict in the sub-regional and beyond. The findings of this study provide useful knowledge in formulation of policies and a regulatory framework for reconciliation for regional bodies globally but particularly in South Sudan. Researchers and scholars use the information generated from this study to add to their understanding of the reconciliation process in South Sudan.

1.6 Scope of the study

The title of the study is the African Sub-regional Organizations in conflict Resolution: Analyzing contribution of Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGADF) in the South Sudan conflict between 2013-2018. Thus, IGAD is the independent variable while her contribution in South Sudan is the dependent variable. The study covers South Sudan from when the Comprehensive Peace Agreement was signed to 2018. It focuses on attempts of attaining lasting peace championed by IGAD in collaboration with other regional bodies. The focus is on IGAD and her contributions thereof. This study originated from the Secondary sources such as journals, published work and reports that are related to this study. The study covered the period between 2013 up till date and to enable the researcher to base it on actual situations that are ongoing and events that have only been concluded recently, and their implications.
1.7 Chapter Summary

This chapter has presented the background of the study, the statement of problem, and the research questions the study seeks to answer. The Justification and the scope of the Study is also provided. This thesis is divided into five chapters. Chapter one introduces the topic of the study; chapter two presents literature review of scholars’ perspectives on the topic and theoretical framework. Chapter three presents the research methodology that was used to collect, analyze and present data and findings of the study. Chapter four presents the results, analysis and findings, while chapter five presents the study conclusion, recommendations.
CHAPTER TWO

2.0 LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 Introduction

The main goal of this chapter is to review the substantive theoretical explanations of the contributions of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development in the conflict resolution process in South Sudan. Therefore, this literature review is presented in themes organized in a chronological order. The literature review of the previous findings by other scholars on the role of Intergovernmental Authority on Development in conflict resolution is also presented in context of the South Sudanese Peace Process.

2.2 Establishment of IGAD

The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) is an intergovernmental body that was created in November 25th, 1996 to replace the Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD) which was founded in 1986. The frequent and severe droughts and other natural disasters between 1974 and 1984 triggered widespread famine, ecological degradation and economic hardship in the Eastern Africa region (Intergovernmental, 2018).

Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development was founded by Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda. In January 1986, the Assembly of heads of state and government signed the agreement that officially launched Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD) with headquarters in Djibouti (IGAD, 2018). In April 1995 in Addis Ababa Ethiopia, the Assembly of Heads of State and Government met and agreed to strengthen the Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD) and increase cooperation among member states. On 21 March 1996 in Nairobi, Kenya, the Assembly of Heads of State and Government signed
the Letter of instrument to amend the Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD) Charter / Agreement” establishing a new name “The Intergovernmental Authority on Development”. The regeneration of Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), a new organization structure, was launched in Djibouti.

Later then Eritrea became the seventh member after attaining independence in 1993. In 2011, South Sudan also joined the organization (Rolandsen, 2009).

2.3 Role and principles of IGAD

IGAD has various functions and is a multipliers and courses of worldwide plans concerning management, human rights, majority rule government, peace and security. IGAD has risen a vital specialist in the political relations of the locale on issues of provincial peace, steadiness and security. As the previous clarifies, the new target of IGAD fused in 1996 was to advance peace and solidness in the sub-area and make components inside the sub-district for the counteractive action, management and goals of entomb and intra-State conflicts through discourse. The establishing individuals’ conditions of IGAD consented to take some measures to wipe out dangers to local participation, peace and soundness, to set up a component for the pacific settlement and to manage debate between part states inside this sub-provincial system before they were alluded to other internationally organizations (Healy, 2011).

As the institutional system of the association, IGAD Secretariat built up a division in charge of peace and security to satisfy the new command. Some of the major objectives of IGAD are; firstly, promote joint development strategies and gradually harmonize macro-economic policies and programmes in the social, technological and scientific fields. Secondly, harmonize policies regarding trade, customs, transport, communications,
agriculture, and natural resources, and promote free movement of goods, services and people within the region. Thirdly, create an enabling environmental for foreign, cross-border and domestic trade and investment and lastly, achieve regional food security and encourage and assist efforts of member states to collectively combat drought and other natural and man-made disasters and their natural consequences by initiating and promoting programmes.

As the piece of security regionalism in Africa, IGAD's tranquility and security design can be contextualized with reference to the African Union's and United Nation's tranquility and security engineering. It was the UN Secretary-General; Boutros-Ghali explained the 'Plan for Peace' in June 1992 as a proactive peacemaking and compassionate intercession by distinguishing four noteworthy territories of movement of preventive discretion, peacemaking, peacekeeping, and post strife peace building. The Agenda for Peace suggested by UN is the neorealism peace proposal and it is pervasive in most approach documentation related with peace and security issues (United Nations, 2004).

IGAD through its Secretariat likewise bought in to the neorealism peace plan for compromise. IGAD is relied upon to assume a functioning role in executing the African Union's tranquility and security engineering. It has been attempting to satisfy its tranquility and security duties depended to it by the African Union by grasping the UN's worldwide standards of human rights, popular government, and the standard of law, and the obligation to ensure as regulating underpinnings (MacFarlane, 2014)

The 1996 IGAD Agreement included among its guiding principles, the peaceful settlement of conflicts, the maintenance of local peace, creating stability and security in countries that have experienced conflicts, and the protection of human and individuals' rights. Another goal was to promote peace and stability in the sub-region and make systems within the sub-region for the prevention, resolution and management of inter and
intra-State clashes through dialogue. The IGAD Secretariat was rebuilt to satisfy the new order and at the appointed time it set up a division in charge of peace and security.

The institutional mission and vision of IGAD was to end up the chief provincial association for the advancement of peace, thriving, and joining by helping and supplementing the endeavors of part states to accomplish through expanded participation (a) sustenance security and natural insurance, (b) advancement and support of peace, security, and compassionate undertakings, and (c) financial cooperation' (Solomon, 2014).

Out of these depended commands, a lot of IGAD's most noticeable work has been in the territories of peace and security engineering. The IGAD bargain noticed that a key target of the association is the serene settlement of entomb and intra-state conflicts through discourse and support of territorial peace and security (Murithi, 2009).

This way, this area evaluates the execution of IGAD in guaranteeing territorial security in the Horn of Africa since the mid-1990s. As the presentation segment clarifies, peace and security command of IGAD developed in 1996 in the 'setting of a wide global accord that provincial organizations should add to the management of contention and the upkeep of worldwide request (Healy, 2009). With the end goal to evaluate IGAD's commitment to peace and security in the district, this area center around the peacemaking role of IGAD in Sudan (1993-2005) and Somalia (2002-2004) in this way it has been effectively engaged with endeavors to determine the two conflicts. This was on the grounds that, these two noteworthy conflicts, those of Sudan and Somalia, have more than some other enormously tried and tested the activities and limit of IGAD and the capacity of its individuals to act freely.

By taking a gander at IGAD's asset report in guaranteeing security in the Horn of Africa, one can contend that IGAD emerges among other African Regional Economic
Communities (RECs) for its proactive peace and security exercises (Healy, 2011) in both Sudan and Somalia peace process. This provincial association is credited with assuming an instrumental role in both these nations. This notoriety of IGAD 'has been based on its achievement in accomplishing two noteworthy peace bargains, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) for Sudan and the Mbgathi Peace Process for Somalia. The marking of the Sudan and Somali peace understandings with hardly a pause in between, in late 2004 and mid 2005 gave the feeling that IGAD was out-performing others in its compromise role. This was on account of both 'settlements appeared to be particularly critical in that both tended to be long and complex conflicts that had challenged past endeavors to anchor settlement. While the significance and effect of these settlements ought not be denied, IGAD's tranquility and security exercises have just possessed the capacity to make progress conditions, typically harmonizing with the interests of key part states.

From its order of keeping up territorial peace and security, in any case, on the off chance that it took a gander at with regards to the in general local conflict condition obviously IGAD is a long way from giving an institutional premise to local security in the Horn of Africa' (Healy, 2009). This was seen from different conflicts in the district. IGAD as security engineering has been not able act in an impartial or mediatory limit. It assumed no role in endeavoring to determine the Ethiopia–Eritrea war of 1998–2000 or its repercussions (Healy, 2011).

For example, IGAD has not made a move to determine a few genuine conflicts that have ejected as of late, incorporating into Darfur, the Ogaden, Mogadishu, Kenya and South Sudan. Over the above IGAD drove peace forms, as the piece of its role in compromise and peacemaking in the district, this local association has additionally worked cooperatively with contributors to develop an early cautioning framework in the area. The Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism (CEWARN) was built up in January
2000 to fill in as the area's component to analytically foresee and react to savage conflicts in an opportune and productive manner. When contrasted with other sub locale in the landmass, IGAD's CEWARN has been perceived as the primary extensive institutional system on struggle early cautioning and reaction in Africa, drawing on the different assets of non-express performing artists.

2.3.1 Development role of IGAD

The Inter–Governmental Authority on Drought and Desertification (IGADD) was set up in 1986. It at first centered around the issues of dry season, desertification and sustenance security. In March 1996, sub–territorial pioneers changed IGADD into the Inter–Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD). IGAD’s order incorporates peacemaking, anticipation and goals. It has a Contention Early Cautioning and Reaction Instrument (CEWARN) whose methodology is to pro–effectively avert and react to strife. Alternate commands of IGAD incorporate natural security, rural research, water asset management, correspondence, transport, and labor improvement. The establishing individuals from IGAD are Somalia, Sudan, Djibouti, Federal Republic of Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda. Some key attributes of the IGAD area can be disengaged. Firstly, the individuals from IGAD shape what can be known as the Greater Horn of Africa. This is an area that is inclined to intermittent dry season and it along these lines depends vigorously on a peaceful economy and irrigation–nourished farming (Byiers, 2016).

Secondly, Ethiopia and Uganda are the catchment zones for the Nile. Without a doubt, the Nile has raised issues of water rights which are an issue of high governmental issues territorially. The Nile is the longest waterway on the planet, and various African nations rely upon it for their employment.
Its sources are controlled by Ethiopia and Uganda. Natural debasement of these catchment regions has expansive results in the IGAD district and for the far north. As of now, there is a political inquiry on the legitimacy of the settlement marked by the provincial managements of Uganda, Kenya and Tanzania on the using and control of River Nile.

Thirdly, the idea of fizzled states has been for all intents and purposes showed in the Horn of Africa. Somalia, with its irredentist goals, is a fizzled state. It involves five pseudo states in which a manageable peace appears to be remote. Somalia has been the wellspring of the illicit stream of little arms and displaced people which are specifically identified with weakness in the area. It has likewise been professed to be an asylum for terrorist groups that has enormously influenced tourism in East Africa. At last, the IGAD district includes nations with negligible monetary development portrayed by low industrialization, resource based, political, religious and ethnic conflicts (Asnake, 2015).

2.3.2 Conflict Resolution

An IGAD peacemaking action in Sudan was sought after in two stages. The main stage covers IGAD's mediation in Sudan through its standing board of trustees on peace. In 1997, IGAD started a discretionary and political hostile to resuscitate the peace talks in Sudan by designating the then President Daniel Arap Moi of Kenya as a Special Envoy to the Sudan peace process. The IGAD peace process under Kenyan management brought the warring gatherings into closer discourse and united the peace procedure. The IGAD-encouraged peace process made a soul of discourse and trust in the likelihood of goals of the common war (Francis, 2006).

Be that as it may, IGAD standing advisory group encouraged peace forms scarcely deliver critical gains up until the point that another parity of intensity made between the two
belligerents. The second period of IGAD's intercession activity started in October 1997. Following this, there had been up and downs in the peace procedure. The IGAD encouraged peace process in Sudan in the long run satisfied and the gatherings drafted and consented to a Comprehensive Peace Arrangement (CPA) in Nairobi on January 9, 2005, successfully concluding the IGAD peacemaking activity (Murithi, 2009).

Consequently, the facilitating of the peace procedure that prompted the marking of the CPA between the Government of Sudan and the SPLA is among IGAD's noteworthy accomplishments. This was on the grounds that the resultant assertion was thorough in extension, and its arrangements on influence and riches sharing are by and large recognized as being both expansive and sound.

2.4 Review of the East African Community (EAC)

The East African Community is an intergovernmental organization of five Partner States so far which are Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda. Some of the Partner States have experienced long or short periods of civil war which jeopardized their internal security. Most of the case, civil wars in these countries were due to refusal to abide by the principles of democracy, good governance, rule of law and respect of human rights amounted in endangering intra-States stability. Even for a country like the United Republic of Tanzania where turmoil’s have not yet happened at a large scale, issues of peace and security remain fundamental for some reasons. (Anadi, 2005).

First, due to its geographical position, the country is exposed to terrorism and piracy. Another reason is that the concept of community relates, in a way or another, to liberalization of movement which can have an impact on the stability of the United Republic of Tanzania whose neighbors still have some threats to their internal security
Aware of that, the EAC Partner States set forth in the Treaty establishing the Community that, for a foreign country to become a member of the EAC, the applicant shall adhere to universally acceptable principles of good governance, democracy, rule of law, observance of human rights and social justice. A country which abides by such principles has a potential contribution to bring the strengthening of integration within the East African region.

The EAC Treaty states that one of the objectives of the common foreign and security policies is to strengthen the security of the Community and its partner States in all ways. To that end, the Strategy on Regional Peace and Security was put in place in 2006 with a clear vision and mission.

In addition to the Strategy for Regional Peace and Security in the EAC, Ambassador Juma V. Mwapachu who was the EAC Secretary General until April 2011 reveals efforts deployed at the EAC Secretariat level to consolidate the security dimension of the integration. He mentions the establishment of the Peace and Security Unit at the Secretariat to coordinate inter-States security matters, the development of a Peace and Security Protocol and the expected Directorate thereto, the establishment of a Sectoral Council to guide inter-States security co-operation undertaken at the continental and regional level as well in the effort to implement the 4th EAC Development Strategy particularly in matters pertaining to peace and security, the EAC Protocol on Peace and Security was approved and signed.

The approval of that Protocol during the 14th Ordinary Summit of the EAC Heads of State and it signature by the Sectoral Council for Defense, Internal Security and Foreign Affairs in Dar Es Salaam are of great value to this study for they show how the EAC is committed to strengthen the legal and institutional framework in the sector of peace and security. A further expected step from the EAC Partner States is the ratification as
provided for by the EAC Protocol on Peace and Security14 and in accordance with international law requirements for States Parties to be bound.

There is a limited literature specifically relevant to the EAC legal and institutional framework in matters of peace and security. Only few authors have attempted to understand the issues pertaining to peace and security in the EAC.

Juma V. Mwapachu, the former EAC Secretary General, in his paper on achievements, challenges, and prospects of the EAC after 10 years of its integration he discusses the causes of human insecurity. He names good governance challenges, unemployment, under development, climate change and competition for limited natural resources as main causes of crime in the EAC Partner States. Mwapachu elucidates that the EAC has established the Peace and Security Unit at the Secretariat to coordinate inter-States security matters, developed a Peace and Security Protocol and the expected Directorate thereto, established a Sectoral Council to guide inter-States security co-operation and other co-operations undertaken at the continental and regional level as well. To the researcher, the Secretariat establishment of bodies and the commitment to co-operation in matters of Peace and security are noble achievements. However, one can question the efficiency of those bodies if conflicts between or within Partner States were to happen in the EAC space.

Musambayi Katumanga developed a research paper which examines common insecurity concerns in the EAC. He notes that instabilities in the EAC region can be contained within the regional politico-security framework in order to maximize regional integration.

Tom Ojienda, while in 2004 the Summit resolved to fast track the Political Federation as the goal of the Community, carried out a research study with the focus on the structures and the functioning of federations. Among other suggestions, Ojienda proposes the
establishment of a common defense in the EAC in order to respond to security requirements for the Federation to stand the test of time.

Kennedy Agade Mkutu carried out a doctorate research on the small arms and how they affect peace in Kenya and Uganda, two Partner States of the EAC. His thesis is important to our research though it focused on pastoralist conflicts between communities in the North Rift Valley. The author contends that the insecurity in the region is caused by lack of good governance amounting into corruption, inefficient management of public resources and reluctance or failure to involve the poor in the development of the country. According to Mkutu, when states fail to protect lives and properties of the population, such a situation compels people mostly the youth to join armed groups of criminals who see the weapons as a necessary way to ensure access to human security and resources. As he winds up his thesis, the author notes that draconic legislations and regulations on arms are ineffective to curb trade of small arms. For him, there must be in the region governments’ attention to the basic human needs of security and livelihood in order to maintain peace and security.

Alfred Nhema and Paul Tiyambe Zeleza also tried to understand deep causes of the African conflicts including in Kenya and Uganda. The authors also note that the main cause of conflict is the lack of good governance and state that democratic governance as the best solution to conflicts.

Kale Ewusi and Ebenezer Akwanga discuss the root causes of African conflicts with an emphasis on the causes of Burundi conflict and Burundi peace process. The authors support that the mediation, implementation of ceasefire agreements, installment of a transitional government and organization of elections reflect the AU resolution of conflicts in Burundi which brought about negative peace in the sense that it is not the sustainable peace or the peace of the mind. Their work is significant to this research since
it gives an idea on how EAC Partner States which went through hard times of intra-States conflicts are likely, in a short or long run, to relapse in into conflicts which can have a negative impact on the EAC region

Ewusi and Akwanga hold that the Arusha Peace Agreement was concluded on an erroneous ethnic basis while the actual cause of the Burundian conflict is not ethnicity but rather the competition for scarce resources. The authors argue that even when issues of land, poverty, education and unemployment are solved, Burundi is still facing challenges to sustainable peace.

Geoff Berridge buys Ewusi and Akwanga’s point of view. As he expounds on the four sources of conflicts worldwide which are economic, ideological, racial, and structural sources, Berridge argues that the international conflict is mainly rooted in economics, especially in the needs of advanced capitalism as a feature of Marxist-Leninist thought.

Michael Lund discusses the prevention of violent conflicts. Contrary to Ewusi and Akwanga’s view on the poverty being the cause of conflict in Burundi, he contends that poverty does not start the war. For him, people fight to preserve their privileges, or seek to violently reverse their oppression and misery. Lund further mentions that key indicators of intra-states conflicts and regional instability in Africa are the abuse of power which amounts into coup d’état, the ethnic politics and the exclusionary practices based on citizenship, the human rights violations, bad governance, institutional corruption and the proliferation of small arms.

Jolly Ntungire examined cross border security challenges in the EAC posed by Les Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda (FDLR) and the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) within the east African region. Her findings proved that those Non-States Actors commit massive violations of human rights in the region which, in her view, can be
legally redressed through the empowerment of the East African Court of Justice (EACJ). The researcher agrees with Ntungire’s opinion since even the UN system of pacific settlement of disputes recognizes the legal settlement as a general rule and gives an important place to the International Court of Justice (ICJ). However, the question arising here is what the other recourse by the Community can be if the legal avenue has proved to be non-successful.

Njeru Tumaini Muthiga discussed the regional integration peace and security in Africa. He states that peace and security are essential ingredients for regional integration success. With a specific emphasis on the EAC, his research findings conclude the EAC needs to take a common and stronger position in promoting peace and security in the region to allow Partner States benefit in sharing the EAC peace, security and conflict resolution framework.

The literature from the researchers mainly hints on causes of conflicts in the EAC region. The above-mentioned researchers do not show how the EAC can efficiently address causes of breach to peace or threat to security in the Community.

2.4.1 Role of Peace and Security in the Achievement of the EAC Objectives

Peace and security create a conductive environment in order to achieve the EAC objectives. They constitute a sine qua non condition for the integration process to be successful. For example, trade operations, free movement of persons, capital and services are not possible if there is no peace and security in the EAC. The Treaty for the establishment of the East African Community puts it clear and stipulates that “Partner States agree that peace and security are pre-requisites to social and economic development within the Community and vital to the achievement of the objectives of the Community.
Examining common insecurities in the EAC, Katumanga holds the view that those insecurities can be contained within a regional politico-security framework in order to maximize regional integration. While the political framework is a necessity, the researcher argues that it is not enough to address all issues pertaining to peace and security in EAC. In case of conflicts, political negotiations and preventive diplomacy measures would be accompanied by effective legal instruments binding on political entities.

2.4.2 EAC Peace and Security Legal Framework

The EAC peace and security legal framework is based on the EAC Treaty, the Regional Strategy on Peace and Security, the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on Defense, the instrument on the Panel of Eminent Persons (PEP) and the EAC

2.4.3 Mechanism on Conflicts Prevention, Management and Resolution (CPMR).

The EAC has been also developing a Protocol on Peace and Security. The Protocol has been signed and now pending for ratification by Partner States.

2.4.4 Treaty Establishing the East African Community

The Treaty refers to peace and security in articles 5, 123 and 124. As already indicated above, article 124 spells out that peace and security constitute a condition to achieve objectives under article 5. The latter also provides that “the Community shall ensure the promotion of peace, security and stability within, and good neighborliness among, the Partner States”. As far as article 123 is concerned, it states that “the Community shall ensure the objectives of foreign and security policies by peaceful resolution of disputes and conflicts between and within the Partner States.”
2.4.5 Regional Strategy on Peace and Security

The EAC Regional Strategy on Peace and Security is a working document which provides for the general peace and security guiding framework. This document is loose in the sense that it is inclined to adjustment to accommodate any new arising security challenges. As Kiraso indicates it, the Strategy was adopted by the EAC Council of Ministers with the intention to guide EAC level of interventions in the arena of peace and security. The Regional Strategy outlines fifteen (15) goals. It delineates objectives and lays down strategies to fulfill those goals that we briefly mention below:

1. Enhance the exchange of criminal intelligence and other security information between Partner States;
2. Enhance joint operations and patrols;
3. Install common communication facilities for border and inter-States security;
4. Adopt the UN model law on mutual legal assistance on criminal matters;
5. Implement EAC Protocol on combating illicit drug trafficking;
6. Exchange visits by security authorities;
7. Exchange training programs for security personnel;
8. Establish common mechanisms for the management of refugees;
9. Establish regional disaster management mechanisms;
10. Formulate security measures to combat terrorism;
11. Establish measures to combat cattle rustling;
12. Establish measures to combat proliferation of illicit small arms and light weapons;
13. Develop mechanisms to combat security challenges on Lake Victoria;
14. Develop a mechanism for conflict management and resolution.

15. Develop Conflict Early Warning Mechanism

2.4.6 EAC Instruments on Cooperation in Defense Matters

The EAC instrument guiding the cooperation in defense is basically the MoU on Cooperation in Defense. This document was signed in 1999 and revised in 2001. The MoU is a Treaty based instrument. In fact, the EAC Treaty provides that “in order to promote peace, security and stability within, and good neighborliness among Partner States, the latter agree to closely cooperate in defense affairs and establish a framework for that cooperation. The MoU focuses on four areas of cooperation namely: the joint military training, joint operations, technical assistance visits and exchanging programmes.

To the EAC peace and security officer, those areas of cooperation engender the spirit of comradeness and East Africaness among the EAC defense forces. The MoU also mentions that Partner States shall undertake joint formulations of mechanisms aimed at peace support operations in accordance with the UN Charter and the AU Constitutive Act.

In the same line of cooperation in defense, the EAC developed in April 2010 a Draft Protocol on Cooperation in Defense Affairs but this instrument has almost the same content as the MoU on Cooperation in Defense particularly in the four areas of cooperation.

2.4.7 EAC Instruments on Peaceful Settlement of Conflicts

The EAC peace and security is mainly geared to peaceful resolution of conflicts. For this reason, the EAC developed two different documents namely the instrument on Conflicts Prevention, Management and Resolution (CPMR) Mechanism and the instrument on the Panel of Eminent Persons (PEP). The two documents frequently refer to one another and are likely to address the same issues using the same way to settle conflicts in EAC. For
example, under the CPMR Mechanism instrument, the EAC intended to operationalize article 124, par 1 and 2 through facilitation and support of negotiation and mediation capacity. Likewise, under the instrument on PEP, the EAC Panel of Eminent Persons has the goal to come up with preventive diplomacy to diffuse tensions and ensure the peaceful resolution of disputes by means of good offices, mediation, conciliation and facilitation based on dialogue, negotiation and arbitration. In addition, the CPMR Mechanism has an Annex on the PEP in which it refers to the role of the EAC Secretary General in the selection and appointment of members of the Panel while there is a specific instrument on the Panel of Eminent Persons and whose Title X refers to the same role of the EAC Secretary General.

According to Prof. Roland Adjovi, the Program Coordinator at Nyerere Centre for Peace Research, the fact that the EAC peace and security framework develops different instruments aimed at addressing the same issues may be a way that the EAC secretariat is using to bring on board Partner States to put in place a unique and strong instrument able to tackle EAC peace and security issues efficiently. He states however that, as of now, the existing EAC peace and security system would prove to be powerless especially if there were a situation of conflict which requires more than prevention, negotiation and mediation such as genocide.

2.4.8 EAC Protocol on Peace and Security

The EAC Protocol on Peace and security was approved during the 14th Ordinary Summit of Heads of State on 30th November 2012 and was signed on 16th February 2013 during the 5th Sectoral Council for Defense, Internal Security and Foreign Affairs in Dar es Salaam. The Protocol is currently pending for ratification by Partner States. The Sectoral Council directed Partner States to ratify and deposit the instruments of ratification with the EAC Secretary General by 28th February 2014.
2.4.9 EAC Peace and Security Department

The EAC Peace and Security Department is established under the Office of Political Federation. In practice, the Department works hand in hand with the Early Warning Mechanism but it is not given primary responsibility over EAC matters relevant to peace and security.

When in 2007 the EAC started to work on the development of the Protocol on Peace and Security, the goal was to have an all-encompassing instrument to guide the cooperation in the arena of peace and security. In other words, the Protocol was meant to be an instrument of reference showing who is to do what in case of conflicts arising or tending to arise in between or within EAC Partner States.

2.4.10 EAC Early Warning Mechanism

In implementing goal thirteen of the EAC Regional Strategy on Peace and Security, an EAC Early Warning Mechanism was developed. The EAC Protocol on Peace and Security provides that the Early Warning has the purpose to facilitate the anticipation, preparedness and early responses to prevent, contain and manage situations which are likely to affect peace and security in the region. Although the Protocol is not yet in force, the EAC Early Warning Mechanism is operational.

2.4.11 EAC Defense Liaison Office (DLO)

The DLO is established at the EAC Secretariat and comprises high-ranked officers with at least the grade of colonel. It has the responsibility to coordinate cooperation in matters of defense except in matters of an operational nature. In addition, the DLO carries out research on military issues that are agreed upon in defense cooperation. Finally, depending on the needs of the Secretary General, the DLO may be required to perform as deemed necessary by the secretariat. The military in EAC is among the very fast-growing
areas of cooperation between Partner States. The EAC Peace and Security officer stresses this assertion by stating that “the current military activities have gone beyond what is provided in the MoU

2.4.12 Conclusion

This chapter has reviewed the EAC peace and security framework, due attention being given to the role of peace and security in the attainment of objectives of the EAC, the legal instruments and the institutions of the EAC in matters of peace and security, the quorum in the decision making process of the EAC peace and security organs and the funding mechanism of the EAC peace and security activities.

2.5 Review of Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)

None of the ECOWAS peacekeeping interventions in West African countries, although they might have saved some lives, fulfilled their missions, and thus, can be categorized as failures.

ECOWAS as an economic organization so far is not prepared to assume the role of the region’s peacekeeping force because of several reasons, including the lack of harmony among the foreign policies of the governments member of ECOWAS, the dependence of the sub-regional organization on Nigeria’s military and economic resources, and the apparently irreconcilable differences between the English-speaking and the French-speaking countries within the organization, because of their different culture and viewpoints, had opposing policies about how to resolve the sub-regional crises. In addition, the ECOWAS peacekeeping troops were poorly trained and badly equipped to fulfill their missions. (Bangura, Yusuf, 2002).

ECOWAS started in May 1975 as an economic organization for the sub-region. It represented the materialization of diplomatic efforts made mostly by Nigeria to promote
the economic development of the region and to facilitate trade among the African nations. The organization faced daunting tasks: the region’s transportation system was primitive, and it was difficult to get from one African capital to the others. In addition, most of the products in the region were the same, or of the same kind, what made trade among the organization members more difficult. The 16 founding member states were Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Côte d’Ivoire, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo. However, in this early beginning the organization restricted itself only to economic issues. This tradition changed in 1990, when ECOWAS decided to intervene in the civil war in neighboring Liberia. The economic organization re-hatted itself as a security organization with the objective of making and enforcing peace. Making peace involved negotiation, mediation and arbitration. Enforcing peace involved the deployment of a 3,000-strong military force to supervise the ceasefire in August 1990. In 1999, Mauritania withdrew its membership, leaving the total number of member states in the organization at 15 (Olankounle, 2010)

However, ECOWAS was not equipped to play a military role. It did not have the institutions or the capacity to deploy military forces on the ground with the objective of enforcing any peace agreement, even if all the parties to the agreement cooperated and did what they said they would do. ECOWAS was an economic organization, financed mostly by Nigeria, still poorly integrated in relation to decision-making and execution. Until that moment, ECOWAS had been mostly a forum where the African delegates could express the economic problems of their respective nations, where important resolutions were passed but where little economic development occurred. When ECOWAS decided to create a Cease-Fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), in 1990, the serious political divisions between the Anglophone nations led by Nigeria and the
Francophone nations represented by Burkina Faso and Côte d’Ivoire became apparent. This division, which eventually included most Anglophone countries on one side and most of the Francophone countries on the other side, not only hindered the implementation and the effectiveness of the operation, but also strained the cohesion of the organization.

ECOMOG was the name given to the force created by ECOWAS to intervene as peacekeepers in the sub-region’s conflicts. ECOMOG was created in a meeting of the organization in Banjul, capital of Gambia, on August 6-7, 1990, with the objective of intervening (citing humanitarian grounds) in the civil war in neighboring Liberia. It was the first attempt by a sub-regional organization to affect the mantra of Africans taking care of their own problems. However, not all the member states of ECOWAS agreed about the roles and functions of ECOMOG, or even whether it was reasonable for the organization to intervene in one of its member states.

2.5.1 The Anti-Coup African Policy

In 1999 in Algiers, the Heads of State of the West African governments passed what was called the Algerian Declaration. This became an important document by which the nation members decided to take a no tolerance stand against coups, which had become quite frequent in the region and that threatened many countries in the organization. Esterhuysen published a list of military coups in Africa in the period from 1960 to 1969 and came up with 33 coups that took place in West Africa. After the military coup in Côte d’Ivoire in December 1999, ECOMOG represented an effort to show that military coups in West Africa would not be further tolerated. This policy continued with ECOWAS’ response to the coup d’état in Sierra Leone, where both Nigeria and ECOWAS severely criticized the takeover. After this statement ECOWAS started taking actions against all member states
that had been the target of coups. These coups were condemned and the countries where the coup had occurred were suspended from membership in the organization.

In 2005 in Togo, after the death of the president, the army put in power the ex-president’s son Faure Gassingbe. However, this succession was not legal under the Togo Constitution. Instead, it was considered a plot to usurp power and install a hereditary kingdom. Many international organizations, such as the UN and the AU condemned the coup, and ECOWAS joined in this condemnation, as did France and the United States. Similarly, in early 2009 in Guinea, after the death of the president Lansana Conte, another coup took place. ECOWAS suspended Guinea’s membership in the organization and announced that national representatives could not participate in its meetings until democratic elections were conducted and the Constitution was restored. The African Union joined in the condemnation, announcing that unless the Guinea military junta committed itself to democratic elections before the end of the year, the provisions of the Lome Declaration would be enforced by having Guinea suspended from the continental organization.

In March 2012, in Mali, another coup overthrew President Amadou Toure. The militaries that overthrew him claimed that the government had proven unable to face the ongoing Tuareg rebellion and that this was the reason why they decided to overthrow him. ECOWAS reacted by issuing a strongly worded statement, saying that the organization’s position about coups was clear and that it would not tolerate the use of violence to resolve problems.

2.5.2 Guinea-Bissau

The root of the conflict in Guinea-Bissau was the struggle for power between President Joao “Nino” Viera and the chief of the Armed Forces Ansumane Mane, and was
produced in a political environment in which Guinea-Bissau changed its international orientation from Portugal, the colonial power, to France and the Francophone states in the region. When President Viera suspended Anumane Maneas of his responsibilities in the armed forces, (supposedly because the later had been involved in the supply of weapons to one of the fighting groups in northern Senegal - the Mouvement des forces democratiques de la Casamance) the civil war started. The people of Casamance in Senegal have cultural and ethnic ties with the Diolas of northern Guinea-Bissau and it was widely believed that this rebel group was obtaining its resources from the illicit arms trade in Guinea-Bissau.

In June 1998, members of the military rebelled against the government and attempted to get control of the government. To contain the situation, the neighboring countries of Guinea and Senegal sent contingents of 2,500 and 500 soldiers respectively to support the government of Guinea-Bissau. These troops did not deploy under an international mandate, but they were able to neutralize the situation on the ground. In November 1998, the military rebels agreed to a peace agreement that included a cease-fire, the withdrawal of the foreign troops of Senegal and Guinea and the acceptance of ECOWAS peacekeepers. In March 1999, the foreign troops departed and were replaced by the ECOWAS contingent. At this point, the United Nations endorsed the ECOWAS initiative giving the operation the character of an internationally approved intervention.

However, the function of this ECOWAS operation was limited to provide security to the country’s international airport and to assist in the delivery of humanitarian aid. The mission was also charged with the disarmament of the rebel group but was unable to that. The general mandate of this operation was to monitor the cease-fire and to facilitate the holding of elections. However, the ECOWAS troops were not experienced in this type of operation and suffered from lack of logistical support. General Mane, sensing the
weakness of the ECOWAS peacekeeping mission, broke the cease-fire agreement and removed President Viera from his office, what made ECOWAS withdraw from this country. The Diel and Bruckman framework would again characterize this operation was unsuccessful because its long-term objectives of bringing permanent peace to this country were not achieved (Cooper & Eric, 2004).

On May 6, 1999, the Mane junta launched an offensive to disarm Viera’s soldiers and took Guinea Bissau the following day, putting an end to the almost two-decade long presidency of Vieira. These events rendered the activities of ECOMOG irrelevant. In its ministerial meeting held in Lome on May 24-25, 1999, the ECOWAS organization explained that the reasons why they had decided to withdraw their troops just five months after their deployment was because of their own financial difficulties and because of the coup d’etat.

Overall, 712 ECOWAS troops from Benin, Gambia, Niger and Togo intervened unsuccessfully in Guinea Bissau in February 1999 before being withdrawn four months later. Once again, as in previous peacekeeping operations, ECOMOG was relieved by another UN peacekeeping operation authorized by the UN Security Council, this time UNOGBIS, the Peace Building Support Office in Guinea Bissau, which continues through 2014. The UN did not deploy any military personnel into Guinea Bissau and the country did not experience the same level or duration of protracted conflict as the other cases. The Security Council has informed that Guinea-Bissau has had two rounds of the presidential elections that are perceived as fundamental to restore the country’s constitutional order.
2.5.3 The Liberian Civil Wars: 1989-1996 and 1999-2003

The Liberian conflict has its origins in the private American Colonization Society that was started to “free men of color to the dark continent.” For 24 years after the 1947 Liberian independence, this nation had only one president, William Tubman, who ruled what was effectively a one-party state. His party, the True Whig Party, was the focus of all the political, economic and social activities and was at the center of a patrimonial network. Political power was firmly in the hands of the Americo-Liberian elite and political activity was either discouraged or suppressed. Beginning in the 1960s, every leading family had to have one of its members in government, because public employment alone secured agency contracts and sinecure jobs.

After Tubman died in office in 1971, he was succeeded by his long-time vice-president William Tolbert. This new government tried to integrate the interior of the country into the national politics, but his period in power was eclipsed by the oil crises of the 1970s. In 1979, the so-called “Rice Riot” was followed in April 1980 with a coup d’état in which 17 semi-literate soldiers of the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) murdered William R. Tolbert Jr., the 19th president of Liberia, then the Chairman of the Organization of African Unity (OUA) and the standard bearer of the ruling True Whig Party (TWP).

The successor to the government of Tolbert was the regime of Doe, which destroyed the officer corps of the AFL and its integrity and professionalism. The coup d’état intensified Liberia’s endemic political instability, thoroughly undermined an already weak government, exacerbated perennial fiscal indiscipline, aggravated economic mismanagement and expanded capital flight. By the end of the 1980s, Liberia was a police state with some of the world’s worst human-rights abuses. Eventually, the brutal suppression and worsening poverty led to a civil war, in which four warring factions waged reciprocal tribal vendettas, looted public and private assets and destroyed the

Samuel Doe was the first non-Americano-Liberian leader. He was a member of the Krahn tribe and head of the People’s Redemption Council; as soon as he took power, he suspended the Constitution and assumed dictatorial powers. He did not fulfill the promises that the people expected and proved himself “incompetent, capricious and corrupt.” He made enemies of a large part of the indigenous population as well as of the Americo-Liberian elite by the blatant manner in which he favored the members of his Krahn tribe. His behavior led the U.S. to end American aid to Liberia, aid that the country had become greatly dependent since the early 1980s. This caused grave repercussions for the Liberian economy. The standard of living continued to decline and opposition to Doe’s regime grew (Adeleke, 1995).

On December 24, 1989, a rebel force called the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) invaded the north-east of the country from Cote d’Ivoire led by American-educated Charles Taylor, who had been prominent in the Doe regime as Director General of the General Service Agency before being dismissed in 1984 for corruption. Taylor was a member of the Americo-Liberian elite and the brutality of the Doe regime allowed Taylor to gain supporters among Liberia’s Armed Forces. Other segments of the Liberian population, such as the Gio and Mano tribes, also supported Taylor. Unfortunately, the NPFL action began a bloody civil war that lasted over eight years and resulted in more than 200,000 deaths and a refugee population of about one half of Liberia’s 2.5 million population.

The armed rebel groups of Charles Taylor and Prince Johnson entered Liberian territory in Dadane and Nimba County from neighboring Côte d’Ivoire with the expressed objectives of overthrowing the dictatorship of Samuel Doe and conducting free
democratic elections. On May 7, 1990, after suffering several losses, the Liberian President made an appeal to Nigeria and Togo for help, which led on August 25, 1990 to the creation of a West African peacekeeping force. Initially, ECOWAS responded by creating a Standing Mediation Committee on 28 May 1990 to mediate the conflict. On July 6, 1990, this Committee produced a peace plan that provided for an immediate cease fire, the creation of a peacekeeping mission, the creation of an interim government for Liberia and the holding of fair and free elections within a year under the supervision of the international community, a plan which would return Liberia to peace. This peace plan became the mandate of the ECOWAS operation and, while its specific steps were implemented, peace was not achieved until the UN took over from ECOWAS several years later. The ECOWAS operation did not produce permanent peace which made this operation unsuccessful according to the simplified Diel and Bruckman framework.

On July 20, 1990, almost immediately after the ECOWAS Committee approved its peace plan for Liberia which included sending troops, Charles Taylor rejected this plan and proceeded to capture roughly 95% of the Liberian territory; and on July 27, 1990, declared himself as President of Liberia. The international community, however, did not recognize Taylor as President and ECOWAS proceeded to form an interim government that did not include any of the leaders of the fighting factions pending free and fair elections. The reaction of Charles Taylor, as expected, was extremely hostile.

When the Liberian civil war erupted, action in the UN Security Council was blocked by three African members: Côte d’Ivoire, Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of Congo) and Ethiopia. These nations opposed UN intervention in what they considered the internal affairs of a member of the Organization of African States (now the African Union). Although the African nations cannot veto any action of the UN Security Council, the members of the Security Council generally defer to their African peers when discussing
issues related to Africa. Côte d’Ivoire also opposed any intervention because it was supporting the rebel faction of Charles Taylor. It was only after ECOWAS had taken the decision to intervene in Liberia and sent its mission called ECOMOG to Liberia that the UN Security Council issued a statement praising the efforts of ECOMOG in January 1991 at the request of Nigeria. At that point some ECOWAS countries, such as Nigeria, strongly opposed a potential UN presence in Liberia because they thought that the UN was going to take the glory from the sacrifices made by ECOWAS. In reality, the glory of the operation was more a Nigerian perception than a reality.

In 1989, following the rebellion of Charles Taylor and Prince Johnson against the government of President Samuel Doe, Liberia was finally plunged into a terrible civil war. The ECOMOG intervention, according to some scholars and member states, ran counter to the principle of noninterference in the internal affairs of states, as stipulated in the first paragraph of the ECOWAS’ Protocol in relation to mutual assistance and defense.

At the beginning, Charles Taylor had the support of Houphouet-Boigny of Côte d’Ivoire, Blaise Compaore of Burkina Faso and Muammar al-Gaddafi of Libya. Also, Taylor was able to use the natural resources of Liberia to entice the cooperation of American and French business interests, and he also obtained support from these governments. In addition, ECOWAS was not able to control the borders of Liberia or ensure that the NPFL did not receive weapons or military support. Taylor was able to export minerals and timber and receive armed shipments through Côte d’Ivoire.

Although Dictator Samuel Doe was unpopular within Liberia and had antagonized large segments of the Liberian population, he counted with a special relationship with the president of Nigeria. He also had good relations and received support from the governments of both Côte d’Ivoire and Burkina Faso. Then, after ECOWAS was already
entertaining the idea of intervening in the Liberian conflict, one of Taylor’s lieutenants, Prince Yormie Johnson, broke away to form a rival independent faction, the Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia (INPFL). In August 1990, with the war now having reached the capital city of Monrovia and with no apparent prospect of settlement in sight, ECOMOG was deployed.

To end the fratricide, the ECOWAS Standing Mediation Committee (ESMC) held its first meeting in Banjul, Gambia on August 6-7, 1990 calling for a national conference of all the Liberian political parties and other interest groups to be held as soon as possible for the “establishment of an interim government of Liberia.” Charles Taylor, the leader of the NPFL rejected Gambia’s invitation to participate in the First All Liberia Conference, although six political parties, ten interest groups and a number of individuals accepted the invitation and participated in the event. Taylor felt he would achieve military victory imminently and upon withdrawing from the mediation meetings, he vowed to attend the June 1991 OUA Summit as President of Liberia, but his absence from the previous conference raised questions about his political objectives in the civil war.

In Liberia, ECOMOG (established as a “peacekeeping force”) intervened to restore peace – since there was no peace agreement in place to “keep.” In the initial ECOMOG operation, Ghana, Guinea, Sierra Leone and Nigeria contributed troops. Later, Benin, Burkina Faso, Gambia, Côte d’Ivoire, Mali, Niger and Senegal also participated. However, throughout the operation, Nigerian management and dominance raised questions about whether Nigeria should emerge as the more powerful actor within ECOMOG and within West Africa.

The initial commitment of 3,000 soldiers for the ECOMOG peacekeeping operation was made without a proper analysis of the real situation that these soldiers would have to confront on the ground. The first ECOMOG contingent, a few hundred soldiers and
supporting staff of a later estimated force of 3,500 were contributed by Nigeria, Gambia, 
Sierra Leone, Ghana and Guinea. It was led by Ghana’s Lt. General Arnold Quainoo as 
Force Commander and landed at Monrovia on August 24-25, 1990. Taylor called the 
ECOMOG force “a foreign occupation force,” fired on the first ECOMOG contingent as 
it attempted to land and killed a number of soldiers and civilians. However, in response 
to Taylor’s demand that he would cooperate with ECOMOG if it integrated some 
Francophone nations, Senegal sent a large contingent in late 1991, and a little bit later, 
Mali also supplied troops. However, although ECOMOG in August 1992 was 9,000-
troops strong, full hostilities broke out again in September 1992. As reported by the UN 
Secretary General, ECOWAS troops had to be withdrawn from Liberia several times 
because they were menaced by numerically superior rebel troops. Indeed, during most of 
its presence in Liberia, only about 16% of ECOMOG troops were fully deployed.

Many Liberians perceived ECOMOG as an occupation force that was protecting a 
president they no longer wanted. After President Doe was captured at ECOMOG 
headquarters and subsequently assassinated by Prince Johnson, ECOMOG redefined its 
mission. The killing of President Doe severely undermined the credibility of ECOMOG, 
because the peacekeepers did not act to save Doe. Also, ECOMOG undertook the 
enforcement action and intervention action in Liberia before obtaining authorization from 
the Security Council, which set a dangerous and disturbing precedent for international 
law.

ECOWAS declared an economic embargo against the NPFL on November 7, 1992, which 
was followed by a Security Council arms embargo. After both steps were taken, Charles 
Taylor was isolated both territorially and diplomatically. In mid-1992, Ivorian President 
Houphouet-Boigny began limiting arms shipments from Ivorian territory to the NPFL, 
and as a result, ECOMOG became more successful monitoring the embargo.
At the height of the Liberian civil war at the beginning of the 1990s, there were about eight different rebel groups struggling for power, some of them supporting factions along ethnicity or personalities and others either supporters of the Doe regime or groups financed by neighboring countries with interests in the civil war. It was in this chaotic environment that ECOWAS showed its best colors by being able to have the different groups reach out to each other and sign a peace agreement in September 1996. This Agreement had both a military and a political component, which formed the basis of subsequent arrangements for ending Liberia’s civil war.

The military section called for an immediate cease-fire, followed by disarmament, encampment and demobilization of the warring factions, to be monitored by the Joint Cease-Fire Monitoring Committee (JCMC), composed of representatives of the warring factions, ECOMOG and the UN. The agreement also called for the formation of a transitional government to rule the nation for six months followed by free and fair elections. The elections were held on 19 July 1997 and Charles Taylor won the presidential elections with his National Patriotic Party winning 21 of the 26 seats in the legislature with 75.3 percent of the total vote. On August 2, 1997, Charles Taylor was sworn as President of Liberia.

The ECOMOG peacekeeping operation was characterized by its troop composition, which included mostly Nigerian and Ghanaian troops, a characteristic that hindered its capacity to secure effectively the cooperation of the rest of the members in the organization. When the peacekeeping operation started in August 1990, it was launched without any agreement among the Anglophone and the Francophone blocks within the organization. It was precisely for this reason that the United States and other countries supported the participation of troops from Senegal in this operation, on the belief that by expanding the number of participating countries the operation would gain more
legitimacy, plus Charles Taylor had also said that he would accept ECOMOG if at least one Francophone nation would join this operation.

The United States used an American private company named Pacific Architects and Engineers to provide drivers and trucks. The Americans also transported some of the ECOMOG troops in five C-130 Hercules. However, the decision on the part of ECOWAS to deploy a military force in Liberia to intervene in the conflict created a serious disagreement among its nation members. On one hand, the Anglophone countries, led by Nigeria, strongly supported the intervention; while the Francophone nations opposed the operation. Thus, on one side, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Nigeria and Sierra Leone, and on the other Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Mali and Togo, each group pulling in opposite directions. The Francophone opposition to the intervention had several reasons, but the reason most advocated at the international meetings was that they were against the violation of the sovereignty of one of the member states.

In reality, the Babangida/Doe friendship limited the capacity of the former. He was unacceptable to the NPFL as a mediator. The NPFL alleged that Nigeria had supplied Doe with arms and was one of the last countries condemning Doe’s brutalities; and that these actions demonstrated a Nigerian alliance with Doe. In addition, NPFL antipathy aside, Babangida probably would have found it difficult to rally the Armed Forces Ruling Council (AFRC) of Nigeria for what seemed, even then, a daunting undertaking. President Houphouet-Boigny and many senior Ivoirians were personal friends of Tolbert and his colleagues killed on April 22, 1980 by the Doe regime. Personal antagonisms between Houphouet and Doe intensified when AFL soldiers dragged Houphouet’s foster son-in-law, Adolphus B. Tolbert, from the French Embassy in Monrovia and killed him in 1980.
2.5.4 The Re-hatting of the ECOWAS Forces by the UN

The re-hatting of the ECOWAS forces continued to have the same serious problems that the forces had before re-hatting. Changing the leadership of the forces could not improve issues related to lack of preparedness, although some equipment issues were improved. The ECOWAS Mission in Liberia (ECOMIL) in 2000 became UNMIL. ECOMOG became part of the UN Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) in 2003 and in Côte d’Ivoire; the ECOWAS Mission in Côte d’Ivoire (ECOMICI) was transformed into the UN Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI). The UN also took over the mission of the African Union in Burundi and the ECOWAS mission in Côte d’Ivoire in 2004 as well as the AU mission in Darfur in 2007. In each of these cases, the UN had less than two months to prepare and execute the transformation. In Liberia, DAF trucks from UNPROFOR donated by the United States could not be serviced because parts for such trucks were no longer manufactured. In both Liberia and Côte d’Ivoire, the troops at the beginning received insufficient provisions such as rations, water, fuel and lubricants. There were insufficient vehicles early in the mission to support logistics as well as operational tasks.

The UN expanded peacekeeping operations and the ECOWAS intervention were not the answers to resolve the Liberian crisis. The only solution that had some possibility of success would have been a military operation to invade the country and arrest Charles Taylor, which was an action too radical for the international community to take. Absent the political will to do that, the international community attempted to resolve the crisis using less costly methods. On the other hand, a case can be made that if ECOWAS, and later the UN, had stayed out of Liberia and simply let Charles Taylor get power, that thousands of Liberian lives would have been saved. The UN and ECOWAS did not improve the situation in Liberia. The civil war killed between 100,000 and 150,000
people and forced 700,000 to seek refuge in neighboring countries. As in Rwanda (1994-5), but on a smaller scale, murderous elements in Liberia benefited from weak regional and international leadership and neglect.

In Liberia, the UN played a limited, but useful, role by monitoring the West African force, ECOMOG, and providing oversight for the country’s 1997 elections. The world organization, pressed mostly by the United States, also sent a mission to Liberia which had been plagued by two decades of civil war. In Sierra Leone, the world body played a similar important role, as it had done during the first intervention in Liberia when it took over peacekeeping efforts from ECOMOG in 2000. British troops also helped stabilize a crumbling UN mission in 2000. In Côte d’Ivoire, the UN took over ECOWAS’s peacekeeping responsibilities in 2004, while between 900 to 4,600 French troops supplemented UN peacekeepers. These were not the only cases where European troops helped to stabilize conflicts in Africa. In 2003 and 2006, an EU force also helped stabilize parts of the Democratic Republic of Congo.

The idea that Africans should take care of their own problem sounds good because theoretically, Africans understand their environments and politics better than anybody else, but such hypothesis yields at least two negative results: (a) it provides an excuse for the developed Western states to leave the fight to the Africans and avoid sending their well-trained and equipped soldiers to fight other people’s wars; (b) it isolates African dictators from international oversight and potential criticism. Rather than making the Africans responsible to solve their own crises, the international community should make a serious attempt to use its financial and technological muscle to develop effective solutions for the complex issues created by Africa’s armed conflicts.

A major lesson learned during the West African conflicts is that conflicts tend to easily spread across the national boundaries and quickly grow to become a region-wide threat.
The crisis in Liberia, for example, had a “domino effect” on its closer neighbors such as Sierra Leone and Guinea, and affected even the coups that occurred in Guinea Bissau, Côte d’Ivoire and Gambia. Rebels from Liberia and Sierra Leone were involved not only in the crises in their respective countries, but also in the conflict in Côte d’Ivoire. The security problems in West Africa will not be solved until ECOWAS and the international community realizes that socio-economic aspects of development, such as high unemployment and mortality, and poverty in general, constitute fundamental aspects of security.
2.6 Theoretical Framework

This study depends on the neorealism theory, Neorealism is a theory of international relations that says control is the most critical factor in global relations (Baldwin, 2003). As neorealism or neo realists contend, organizations are the result of state interests, hence, they can't freely work, rather, it is state interests, which decide the choice whether states participate or contend (Baylis, 2001). UN, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the European Union (EU) are worldwide organizations through which states defend their interests. Contending that they are shaped based on self-intrigue figuring, neorealism dismisses the significance of global organizations in serving to accomplish peace and security (Nathan, 2012). Global organizations couldn't have the role to avoid war (Nugroho, 2008). For neorealism, organizations are impressions of the interests of states and states are reluctant to surrender their capacity. Subsequently, the sum impact of these compelled the free role of international organizations (Waltz, 2008).

Neorealism is skeptical about the likelihood of global collaboration as they trust that states exceptionally care for their relative position. A critical point, which portrays neorealism' presumption, is their attention on relative additions. In such manner, Burchill (2005) notes as pursues, Neorealism, for example, Waltz, contend that states are worried about 'relative additions’ which means gains evaluated in similar terms. It is conceivable to derive from this that, states care for their relative position for their better position contrasted with others in participating with others and if collaboration does not serve this extreme intrigue, collaboration will be delicate.
CHAPTER THREE

3.0 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

3.1 Introduction

This chapter outlines the methodology employed in conducting the research. The chapter details the research approach, research design, and how was data collected, analyzed and presented, ethical considerations observed during the research.

3.2 Research Approach

This study was guided by qualitative research approach. According to Creswell, (2014, p.4) “qualitative research approach involves emerging questions and procedure, data analysis inductively building from particulars to general themes and the researcher making interpretations of the meaning of the data”. This study employed qualitative research approach to address the African sub-regional organization in conflict resolution with a specific reference to IGAD. This approach was deemed suitable because it allowed the researcher to conduct an in-depth investigation on the contribution of IGAD in the South Sudan conflict resolution.

3.3 Research Design

Research design as mentioned by Kothari, (2014), refers to the overall strategy used to incorporate the diverse mechanisms of the study in a rational and articulate manner that promotes and ensures effective presentation and analysis of the research problem. This research employed case study design whereby the contributions of IGAD in South Sudan was the main subject of analysis. Further, the design was used because it enabled the conducting of in-depth research in this study and helped in investigating the topic extensively. Besides, the method did not require sampling whereas materials were
gained from all possible and relevant sites, books and journals to enhance the objective of the study.

3.4 Data Collection

Data collection is a process that entails the collection of gathering information that is guided towards answering questions on various issues and situations regarding various events or actions as they occur. Data can be collected using a few strategies such as interviews, filling of questionnaires by various respondents in a study, textual or visual analysis, getting information through observation and using understanding various theories and models that explain and examine such events and circumstances (Paul & Stanley, 2008). In this study, data was collected through secondary sources which included academic journal articles, books, reports and organizational reports.

3.5 Data Analysis

Data analysis method is the systematic examination of raw or secondary data for emerging themes, facts, observations that are used to answer research questions (Saunders, Lewis, & Thornhill, 2009). Data collected was then be examined qualitatively and by content analysis. This was achieved by grouping secondary data into homogenous themes in the format of paragraphs and subsections or sub themes in order to enhance the flow of the analysis process which then could be used to arrive at summary, conclusions, and recommendations as per findings of the study. Secondary data analysis method was used to review and analyze data from secondary literature sources. The selection criteria for data was based on the relevance to the topic of contribution of IGAD in conflict resolution in South Sudan.
3.6 Ethical Consideration

Ethical considerations began from the initial design of the study, the researcher exercised high level of professionalism, reliability, confidentiality and honesty to ensure that the information given was only used for its purposes. The researcher also made sure that all sources of information were cited to avoid plagiarism.

3.7 Chapter Summary

The research methodology has been presented in this chapter. A qualitative study design has been presented highlighting how each approach helped realize the objectives of this study. Data collection tools have been presented as well. Finally, research methods, data analysis methods, and ethical considerations have been submitted.
CHAPTER FOUR

4.0 PRESENTATION, ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

4.1 Introduction

This chapter explores the core objective of the study. It introduces key actors who came together to broker peace in 2013 when the initial conflict within the presidential guard sparked off albeit briefly. The chapter then introduces IGAD as a key regional outfit which has since sought to broker peace in South Sudan. In the context of IGAD and the challenges faced, this chapter explores the civil war in Sudan and the war between Sudan and South Sudan. External actors in the civil war are as well interrogated with the aim of establishing how they affect the IGAD process in South Sudan.

Further, this chapter investigates how IGAD navigated the challenges faced in the South Sudan process. Focus is given to IGAD’s contribution to the entire peace process. The chapter concludes by drawing the overall significance of the regional body in South Sudan’s peace process. Graphs and diagrams are used to enhance submissions in a summative way.

Since December 2013, when conflict began within the presidential guard, there has been efforts to contain the situation and avert a national disaster. The conflict which began unexpectedly saw various actors rush into South Sudan to address the issue. Most of these actors were initially involved in brokering the Sudan-South Sudan peace deal and were keen to see South Sudan start off as a new state in the best way possible. The president of Kenya, Uhuru Kenyatta, Uganda’s President Museveni and Ethiopia’s Prime Minister visited Juba on 26th December to facilitate talks between President Salva Kiir and the deputy president Riek Machar (Jok, M. 2014). The East African region close proximity to South Sudan translated into equally great threat to the economy and wellbeing. This could
explain the fast response from leaders from the region. Importantly, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) whose role in the region cannot be overlooked played a crucial role through her members towards seeking lasting peace in South Sudan.

Founded in 1996 and with members drawn from the East Africa and Horn of Africa region, IGAD has been a key player in the South Sudanese conflict. Members who include Djibouti, Kenya, Uganda, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Somalia, Sudan and South Sudan have through time played important roles as individuals and through IGAD to foster peace in one of their member’s country. IGADs role in restoring peace in the youngest nation in the world has become a point of varying commentaries by International scholars as well as peace and conflict practitioners.

Whether IGAD has positively helped realize peace or not in South Sudan has placed its ability as a regional body in focus. The dynamics, actors and roles played by the actors within the body in the period between 2013 and 2018 are examined in this chapter. Ultimately, this chapter seeks to interrogate the challenges faced by IGAD in trying to restore peace in South Sudan and how it has navigated through them, the contributions it has made in that period and importantly find out how the process of regional integration has performed among neighboring nations.

4.2 Challenges facing IGAD in South Sudan’s Peace Process (2013-2018)

Development and conflict are heavily dependent on each other especially in the African context. The practice of regionalism in the continent is seen as having significantly contributed to economic growth which has in turn prompted.
A map of South Sudan Depicting the severity of conflict in the country in 2014.


It is important to notice that the severity of the conflict in South Sudan varied across regions. Despite the major conflict between Sudan and South Sudan having been ended by secession of the latter, conflict in the new country has continued to date. The fallout between President Salva Kiir and opposition leader Riek Machar has seen the antagonizing sides continue to fight. The conflict according to the map above has varying intensity with areas rich in oil resources being hot spots. The conflict has seen many South Sudanese lose lives, with over a million crossing into Uganda and many more into Kenya. Today, the formation of a transitional government is seen as the best attempt at realizing peace, but the process is faced with ultimatums from either side which impede progress (Lako, 2018).

Efforts towards the CPA were largely inspired by IGAD member states owing to the effects of the civil war in Sudan. Uganda was affected by the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) in the North while Kenya suffered refugee influx together with increased
Islamization of the region which was perceived as a security threat. Ethiopia was affected by refugee influx and decided to flush out Sudanese rebels in 1991. Eritrea was involved in Ethiopia seeking her independence and the Sudanese menace was getting in the way of the much-needed independence. These countries though not directly fighting in the civil war in Sudan sought external aid towards achieving peace in the region in IGAD and foreign powers (Adar, 2000).

A graph showing approximate number of the South Sudanese civil war from 2014-2018

Source: Lako, J.2018

Lako, 2018 graphically (above) presents approximate numbers of the number of people who have lost their lives owing to the continued crisis in South Sudan. The graph shows an increased rise in casualties from 2014 to 2017. This is attributed to primarily the lack of attention creation about the real situation in South Sudan. With the media and other actors not painting the correct picture in the country, it is deemed that attention was given to other war-torn nations. Meanwhile, the strife in South Sudan escalated.
Major reasons for deaths are lack of food security, disruption of vital supplies including healthcare, homelessness, overcrowding in refugee camps and war related tragedies. The United Nation’s 2018 report on the country pointed out that over 4.5 million citizens of the world’s youngest nation had left the country while more than 6 million suffer acute food shortage and risk death. Creation of awareness and the inclusion of death tolls in South Sudanese reports are deemed as important factors that have slowly began to push victim numbers downwards as more actors have begun actively engaging in the situation and are part of the UN group advocating for a transitional government (Lako, 2018).

4.3 External Actors in Sudan’s Civil War

IGAD’s main challenge in mediating the civil war in Sudan is submitted as the influence from foreign actors whose interests were not mostly neutral. In 1993, the then Kenyan President Moi was picked by IGADD to head a peace committee for the region aimed at containing the threats from Sudan’s Civil conflict. Later, the IGADD partners’ forum (IPF) which included representatives from Europe, Japan and the United States was established. Activities including the bombing of the World Trade Center in 1993, the attempted assassination of Egypt’s Hosni Mubarak in 1995 and the bombing of the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998 which were linked to Khartoum are seen to have led to increased foreign actor interest in the Sudan crisis (Aleksi, 2013).

Activities happening in the 1990’s in the Horn of Africa dictated that the US gets heavily involved in Sudan for security reason. Khartoum was largely seen as an enabler to radical Islamists and the US invested in a relationship with the Sudanese Peoples Liberation Movement (SPLM) in a bid to neutralize the Islamic front (Woodward, 2006). Indonesia, Malaysia and China had commercial interests in Sudan’s oils and natural resources. China’s interest in oil and arms deals from the Khartoum government saw her adopt a neutral stand in the war against the regime.
The US was left as the main player and it advanced a security-oriented approach to towards Sudan. In 2006, it is listed that the US advanced over USD20million in non-lethal military aid to Ethiopia, Uganda and Eritrea with a target of having them overthrow the then government of Sudan (Young, 2007). Important to this study is that the US influenced IGAD’s actions and pushed hard for a peace process to occur. The US pushed IGAD members to take diplomatic and security measures against Sudan. Later in 2001, the US appointed an envoy to specifically address Sudan’s issue and a week later the world Trade center was attacked, again linking Sudan in the planning of the attack. More Western players joined the push for peace talks in Sudan and for IGAD to implement the CPA.

The United Kingdom and Norway backed the US in pushing for Khartoum to accept a peace process and this was achieved in 2002 with the final signing of the CPA being done on January 9th, 2015. The CPA though heavily externally influence enjoyed minimum external influence at the implementation stage. Although the CPA proved hard to fully implement with both parties continuously arming and anticipating violence, there was peace and the country held together until South Sudan seceded in 2011.

Aleksi (2013) submits that IGAD’s failure to mitigate conflict after 2011 between Sudan and South Sudan and within South Sudan speaks to the shell role it played in being used by foreigners to advance their veiled national interests especially in the realm of security. This is seen as IGAD’s main challenge.

4.4 Challenges Facing IGAD in South Sudan

After South Sudan gained independence in 2011, IGAD was soon tasked with the role of mediating conflict between president Kiir and supporters of the former vice president Riek Machar. Parties to the conflict which ensued not so long after independence
threatened the peace found in a region which had for long suffered conflict. Consultative meetings headed by IGAD led to the formation of the high-level revitalization forum on South Sudan (HLRF) in 2017. This forum was mandated to bring together the transitional government, Kiir’s government and other stakeholders. The transitional government complained of not being recognized in the forum and discontent was born (Benny, G. 2017).

Further fractions emerged within the framework when a component of the transitional government, the Former Political Detainees issued their desire to engage with IGAD separate from the transitional government. This shed doubt on the structure of the HLRF which was then seen as having been engineered by external actors whose interests in South Sudan superseded the countries national interests. This formed the first hurdle for IGAD in South Sudan (Benny, 2017).

Secondly, the lack of a clear and inclusive understanding of the peace agreement championed by IGAD presented a huge challenge. Each party viewed the peace process as being in their favor and interpreted it in their own terms. There was a lack of understanding of the bigger picture consisting of a stable country suitable for economic development. This translated into the factions keeping on arming themselves to defend their perceived rights of the peace agreement as opposed to them coming together to achieve a common agenda which according to IGAD was either cessation of hostilities, return to the implementation of the peace agreement and then the realization of democratic elections in the country (Benny, 2017).

Thirdly, the withdrawal of confidence from IGADs ability to serve as a neutral arbitrator works as a setback in South Sudan. Actors in South Sudan overtime have experienced the foreign influence in IGAD and majority of them are not committed to an IGAD led
process. Some actors have had strained relationships with some external influencers in IGAD and thus do not respond positively to IGAD ideologies (Benny, 2017).

The lack of framed expectations by IGAD presents the fourth major challenge. Whilst leading member states to help restore peace in South Sudan, the regional outfit has not given specific, measurable, attainable and timely objectives to stakeholders. Despite giving timelines for ceasing hostilities, other implementations have been left to the interpretation of stakeholders who have often pushed their own national agendas.

Important to this study is the submission that IGAD- led peace process was premised on the wrong foundation. The process was initially a power sharing formula as opposed to a problem-solving formula. This explains why through negotiated political processes; South Sudan is able to experience temporary peace. This is because a power sharing formula cannot amount to a sustainable problem-solving formula which develops sustainable remedies regardless of who or which party is in office. To this end, IGADs formula is faulted as not taking into account the key causes of conflict, the drivers and possible ways to transform as opposed to resolving the conflict (Benny, 2017).

The alienation of the South Sudanese people in crafting and implementing peace agreements is a major challenge facing the IGAD process. Observers have accused the regional body of failing to include citizens in crafting ways to enforce peace and stem political stalemates. High dependence on foreigners and experts about peace building is seen as adopting foreign policies in a local setting with the result being continued lack of peace (Benny, 2017).

Beyond IGAD, the East Africa region has the East African Community (EAC) and the Eastern Africa Stand by Force Secretariat (EASF). The latter is tasked with determining which force will be deployed in which part of a region which is heavily invested by
conflict and terrorism threats. These bodies have engaged in South Sudan in various ways which have significantly contributed to the peace and cohesion within the nation and in the region.

IGAD played a key role through Kenya in overseeing the 2005 peace agreement in Sudan. This agreement is what lay ground for South Sudan’s independence in 2011. A key challenge for IGAD is however seen as the lack of mandate in the region’s security issue. The African Union (AU), has in the past taken a lead role in African conflict with IGAD being reduced into a reporting organ through Ethiopia the headquarters (Lako, 2018).

The dynamics however changed in South Sudan and IGAD is seen to have taken a major and more direct role in the conflict. IGAD for the first time took a role in appointing three envoys tasked with ensuring mediation. A guiding structure was set up at the peace and security department. It is however recorded that the agreement began operations once foreign representatives from the European Union, China, United Kingdom and the US were enjoined. Foreign mission involvement remains heavy in South Sudan especially through the especially through the Monitoring and Verification Mission that it set up to verify compliance with the peace agreement (Lako, 2018).

Towards fighting terrorism, IGAD has taken a rather neutral stand in engaging the local terror group, the Al-Shabaab. Instead, it has invested more in knowledge centers aimed at stemming radicalization and disseminating information through the establishment of a research center in Djibouti (2016) The International Capacity Building Program against Terrorism (ICPAT), whose mandate has expanded to include intelligence and police networking is key in the fight on terror. Operational collaboration has also been deepened with the adoption of conventions on joint criminal extradition that make it easier to extradite criminals between member states, another measure that can be useful for
counter-terrorism purposes. IGADs role in strengthening the governance structures in Somalia has helped in averting more terror activities (Lako, 2018).

A major impediment for IGAD is the size of the organization compared to the tasks that it is expected to take on. The small organization is tasked with roles in all her member states with more than one member involved in conflicts sometimes at the same time. The funding and good will from member states has continued to vary with the issue at hand and majorly informed by national interest hence disadvantaging the organization’s actions in South Sudan and the region.

IGAD is viewed as being a biased arbitrator in the conflict in South Sudan. In September 12, 2018, in Addis Ababa the revitalized peace agreement also known as Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (R-ARCSS) was signed. This great milestone towards Peace in South Sudan was however met with mixed reactions nationally and internationally. The main challenge was the large number of stakeholders opposed to the substantial ground on which the agreement was build (Lako, 2018).

Lako (2018) submits that the whole process was marred by bias, coercion, intimidation, and ultimately using threats to obtain compliance and signatures. Uganda, a very influential IGAD member State is partial one way or another following its military intervention on the side of the government in 2014. Kenya does possess significant sway over IGAD’s decisions and has taken sides with the government of South Sudan. With the South Sudan President and Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, participating regularly in IGAD Heads of State and Council of Ministers meetings respectively, the outcomes were seen as deeply skewed towards those actors. IGADs decision to hold Riek Machar in South Africa against his will has also put the body under
scrutiny for its lack of fairness. Further, IGAD has been blamed for condoning atrocities committed during Kiir’s reign.

The graph below illustrates the 2014/2015 budget allocations in South Sudan. Above fistrty percent of revenue is spend in the military with other basic needs of the populace overly ignored. This offers IGAD a huge challenge as beyond working to attain peace between the two camps, its work is spread to cover humanitarian needs of the populace.

A graphical representation of the South Sudanese Government 2014/2015

Source: (Crisis Group, 2015).

4.5 Navigating the Challenges facing IGAD in South Sudan

The previous section in this chapter has made submissions on the challenges facing IGAD in South Sudan before and after the country’s independence. IGAD has however kept her involvement in South Sudan active. Whether engaging in a way that is accepted by all actors in the conflict remains questionable, but this section acknowledges methods the regional body has used to remain relevant to its cause in South Sudan.

The main challenges include regional rivalries and power struggles, challenges in expanding the peace process past the South Sudanese elite and a centralized decision making at the head of state level and lack of strong institutions within IGAD. These
challenges manifest in many ways through the intricate process of finding lasting peace in Sudan. IGAD has found ways around some of them enabling it to forge forward with its agenda (Crisis Group, 2015).

Leveraging on support from foreign missions has been common in IGAD. Foreign powers especially the US which seeks to advance a security agenda in the Horn of Africa region has been instrumental in aiding IGAD initiatives. Other foreign actors include the United Kingdom, Norway and China. Although this study submitted earlier that these foreign actors push their national agendas, it is important to notice that they often fund or influence IGADs position on key issues internationally hence enabling progress (Crisis Group, 2015).

At a continental stage, IGAD has sought help from the African Union towards enforcing peace agreements. Internationally, the United States has called for the United Nations Security Council to impose sanctions and an arms embargo on South Sudan. This approach has often enabled stakeholders and especially conflicting one’s tone down and allow IGAD push through with certain agendas. Educating the masses on their rights through advocacy and the media has also been widely used as a tool by IGAD to gain ground in South Sudan. It is however evident that a lot more needs to be done and especially by external actors towards enabling IGAD achieve its mandate (Crisis Group, 2015).

4.6 IGADs Contribution in the Peace Process of South Sudan

Regardless of the challenges faced by IGAD during the Sudan Peace Process and later in South Sudan, the regional body has played a critical role which cannot be overlooked in the peace process of the young nation. By enabling the 2005 peace process and through her involvement in political, security and governance spheres of the country and region
IGADs major contributions are critical in highlighting the relevance of regional institutions.

4.6.1 Governance and Democracy

Whether IGADs members are democracies or not is debatable. IGADs role in fostering structures which advocate for democracy and good governance are manifest in South Sudan as well as the region. The drafting of documents such as the *IGAD Protocol on Democracy, Governance, and Elections*, the *IGAD Election Code of Conduct*, and *IGAD Guidelines for Election Observers* show that the organization actively seeks to promote democracy and good governance. This initiative has however faced challenges as individual states including South Sudan have diverse political agendas pioneered by the ruling elite who may not embrace democracy (Camilla & Adriana, 2011). Key for IGAD was and has been a continued mapping of the actors in the South Sudanese conflict. The graphical representation captures such mapping.

A graphical Representation of IGAD’s Mapping of South Sudanese Conflict.

Source: (Camilla & Adriana, 2011)
Crucial in any conflict is the ability of an arbitrator to correctly map out the actors in the conflict. IGAD thus in its agenda to mediate in the South Sudanese conflict has over time mapped the conflict with actors, alliances and demands shifting often. SPLM-IG refers to the arm of SPLM in government led by Salva Kiir while SPLM-IO refers to the arm in opposition which is led by Riek Machar from South Africa. The graph shows key people and key groups in the antagonizing relationship. For IGAD, this mapping out of hostilities has over time enabled the body craft responses to emerging and existing conflict situations with increased success.

4.6.2 Peace and Security

IGAD's role in peace building in South Sudan is paramount. The role played by IGAD in facilitating the 2005 Peace agreement in Sudan is what set the base for the formation of South Sudan years later. The effort at following through and offering forums through which dialogue was carried out by IGAD is clear. The IGAD early warning system, Conflict Early Warning and Early Response (CEWARN) of 2012 has an expanded mandate geographically. Guiding principles of IGAD include peaceful settlement of conflicts, the maintenance of regional peace, stability and security, and the protection of human rights (Judith, 2011).

IGAD has succeeded in promoting peace and stability in the sub-region besides creating mechanisms within the sub-region for the prevention, management and resolution of inter and intra-State conflicts through dialogue. IGAD has further led the implementation of the 2005 CPA and its six protocols. The Machakos Protocol was signed in July 2002 in which the parties agreed on a broad framework touching on transition process, governance, religion and the right to self-determination of South Sudan. A referendum gave the people of South Sudan the chance to secede after a six-year Interim Period (Judith, 2011).
The security protocol was signed in Naivasha, Kenya, on 25 September 2003 provided a cessation of hostilities between the SPLA and the SAF and the provision that the SPLA would stay in the South and the SFA in the North to avoid conflict. A protocol on the resolution of conflict in southern Kordofan/Nuba Mountains and the Blue Nile States was signed on 26 May 2004. The Protocol on Power-sharing was signed on 26 May 2004 and provides for power sharing arrangements between Sudan’s two major political parties while the Protocol on wealth-sharing signed on 7 January 2004 provide that, among other things profits from oil extracted in southern Sudan were split 50-50 between the national and southern Sudan levels of government.

The Protocol on the resolution of conflict in Abyei signed on 26 May 2004 led to the establishment of a special administrative status for the disputed Abyei area, as well as a referendum for the “residents” of Abyei. These protocols underpin the noble task undertaken by IGAD in South Sudan. It is important to note that although South Sudan is independent, very important aspects of the CPA are yet to be implemented. IGAD has further played a major role in integrating South Sudan into the regional peace building structures through CEWARN (Judith, N. 2011). Further, IGAD facilitated in Khartoum a meeting which brought together the antagonizing parties in South Sudan to sign a declaration of agreement in June 2018.
The Khartoum Declaration of Agreement between conflicting parties in South Sudan, June, 2018

Under IGAD’s facilitation, Salva Kiir, Riek Machar and Omer, Al Bashir of South Sudan met and agreed on a cease fire which would greatly enhance peace and improve the lives of the entire Sudanese people of the two countries. As summarized in the diagram above, the leaders with the presence of Uganda’s president H.E Museveni agreed on a ceasefire,
common security arrangements that targeted the building of a national army, a revised bridging proposal and detailed security for oil fields. This agreement though not implemented to the letter helped improve relations between the two nations and in South Sudan where rebels especially in the oil rich zones were restrained by the common security agreement (www.voltairenet.org/article201872.html).

4.7 The Significance of IGAD in addressing the fragility in South Sudan

The conflict in South Sudan is not driven by ethnicity, but rather by a power struggle between two individuals, President Salva Kiir and former Vice President Dr. Riek Machar, who are using ethnicity to sustain or gain power. IGAD has been working to broker a power sharing agreement between the two sides, with limited success. This study has identified the challenges IGAD has encountered in trying to broker lasting peace in South Sudan. Although differing voices indicating the inability of IGAD as a mediator to deliver peace, the regional body remains very significant in addressing the fragile conflict in the young nation.

Central in its importance is that IGAD offers a forum upon which antagonizing parties, member countries and foreign missions interact on the subject of peace. Withdrawing IGAD would automatically spell doom to an already advanced process. Further, the formation of IGAD-plus, a body which includes IGAD members plus the US, UN, UK, AU China and Norway offers by far the most potent tool at addressing the conflict. IGADs significance in South Sudan can thus not be overstated (www.wilsoncenter.org).
4.8 Conclusion

This chapter has submitted the challenges faced by IGAD in South Sudan and the greater Horn of Africa regions in the quest mitigate conflict especially in Sudan and South Sudan. Major challenges range from foreign influence, lack of capacity and differing interests among members. IGAD has however managed to navigate through most of the challenges and is credited for not relenting on the agenda to deliver peace in South Sudan. Seeking alliances with partners from IGAD-Plus has turned to be a major way through which IGAD gets around the challenges. Regardless of the challenges faced, the regional body is credited with delivering major contributions in South Sudan. IGAD spearheaded the CPA of 2005 which set down the protocols which led to the referendum six years later in 2011. Beyond independence, IGAD has actively participated in brokering peace between Salva Kiir and former vice president Riek Machar and their supporters. With increased dissent from some researchers on IGAD’s ability to deliver lasting peace in South Sudan, this study has identified that IGAD’s significance is paramount in maintaining peace in South Sudan and more so in the long run. Below is a graphical representation of different types of conflicts in South Sudan since 2011 to 2018 and how IGAD’s presence has influenced each. The graph shows a decreased level of overall violence activity with increased involvement of IGAD and other actors (www.voltairenet.org).
A graph showing the number of conflict incidences from 2011 to 2018 in South Sudan.

Source: Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED).
CHAPTER FIVE

5.0 SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 Introduction

This study has been on African sub-regional organizations and their role in conflict resolution with focus on IGAD’s contribution in the South Sudanese conflict. The journey towards independence in Sudan captured through the CPA agreement acts a launch pad for the study. The period immediately after independence in South Sudan and the conflict thereafter is central in this study.

5.2 Summary

Chapter one of this study includes the research proposal which outlines the background of the study, objectives, methodology and scope of the study. A chronological account of the conflict in Sudan with focus on South Sudan is outlined. The main players in the conflict and the contending issues are outlined chronologically. The main players in the conflict are as well identified. This sets a great background of the study allowing the introduction of IGAD, the body tasked with maintaining peace in the young nation in the next chapter.

Chapter two submits literature review on IGAD. The origins of IGADD, the metamorphosis into IGAD, member states and its mandate are clearly outlined. The peace process championed by IGAD in Sudan and later South Sudan, the challenges and milestones are documented with the aim of setting a background upon which either the successes or failures can be interrogated in chapter four.

Chapter three of this study on IGAD presents the research design and methodology of the study. The study adopts the descriptive approach and outlines methods of data collection which are employed in the study. The expected study outputs are as well discussed and are later tested in chapter four. The chapter outlines anticipated ethical considerations
Chapter four forms the bulk of this study and focuses on establishing the role of IGAD in the South Sudanese Conflict. To achieve this end, the study interrogates three key things which include the challenges faced by IGAD in South Sudan, how the regional body has navigated the challenges to keep its relevance and its major contributions in the young nation. The chapter concludes by identifying the significance of the regional institution IGAD in addressing the fragility in South Sudan.

5.3 Conclusion

This study has made various findings about the conflict in South Sudan that have either promoted conflict or that aid achieving peace. Firstly, South Sudan, my country is largely not viewed as an independent state by many actors in the world. Rather, the conflict therein since independence has been viewed through ethnic lens. This has had the effect that the conflict has been reduced from that of a national level to one in which various communities in Africa continue to fight over grazing land and oil fields.

Whilst IGAD, the Regional Protection Force, (RPF) and the Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Committee (JMEC) continue to try to implement various internal, regional and international agreements concerning the conflict, they face lack of support especially financially. Secondly, these organizations lack structures to carry through their mandates and worse their mandates often conflict or are similar, causing friction in implementation. Thirdly, there is an evident lack of commitment especially from the political class in South Sudan. While they sign cease fires, they often have abused them. In 2018 September, Salva Kiir and Riek Machar declined to sign a clause indicating how defaulters of ceasefire would be punished, clearly indicating their lack of commitment towards peace, a truth that hurts my countrymen. The military in South Sudan has had
skewed loyalties to different political actors as opposed to serving the nation. This further encourages conflict between militia who support the opposition and the military who support the incumbent despite the selfish and flawed national choices they make.

5.4 Recommendations

IGAD was founded in 1996 and succeeded IGADD which was formed in 1986 and consists of eight members drawn from the Horn of Africa region, the Nile valley and the great lakes region. Some members of this organization have been entangled in conflicts which have required the intervention of the organization. Sudan has been in conflict within herself and through IGAD, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement drawing rules of engagement between the Arab dominant North and the African dominant South.

The CPA protocols led into secession of South Sudan in 2011. The new country however was plunged into turmoil stemming from political differences between the president and then vice president. This study has focused on IGAD’s journey at maintaining peace in South Sudan and fronts several recommendations which would highly boost the effectiveness of IGAD in South Sudan. Although this study focused on the role of IGAD in the South Sudanese conflict, it remains objective to be cognizant of other multiple actors working towards the same either together with IGAD or on parallel basis. This study fields major recommendations which if adopted could alter the South Sudanese narrative.

Major changes which can strengthen IGAD’s position in achieving its agenda in South Sudan include boosting inclusivity especially of the civil society and other political parties apart from the ruling and opposition party. The outcome will be a wholly owned process of mediation which will yield lasting results. The need to cultivate trust between
the SPLM and the GoS is critical. This is because the process and structure of mediation is viewed as being Eurocentric and thus lacks local ownership.

Secondly, the role of the media in South Sudan and must be realized and amplified especially by IGAD and IGAD-Plus allies. This will enable dissemination of peace messages and advocacy among the people of South Sudan. Currently the media is gagged hence rescinding on these gains.

The CPA is viewed negatively by majority of the political actors in the country. This is because the drive towards democracy is underlined by the rule that parties who do not support the CPA cannot field candidates. This works to further divide the country and a robust agenda on civic education must be undertaken to change the existing notion.

Thirdly, mediation efforts are seen as fueling secessionist sentiments in the country as they have in the past allocated preference to the SPLM and NCP and overlooked smaller actors in the Darfur region who need a framework for resource sharing. This must be reversed by having all-inclusive mediation processes. A framework must be established to control the involvement of foreign countries in South Sudan to curtail fears that the country will fall into neo-colonialism.

Further, establishing a transitional government under a Security Council Resolution which is all inclusive will begin a journey towards peace in Sudan. The transitional government must be inclusive of political nominees from both sides of the divide, international actors, religious representatives, business people, education and policy experts and cultural representatives from the entire South Sudan. A functional court must precede any other structures. Having established in the study that the legal system is weak, a proposal for a hybrid court system with foreign and locals could tame the
problem. A hybrid executive and a hybrid advisory committee are the two major structures that should be considered.

Though critical, the failure of both Riek Machar and Salva Kiir to willingly abide by commitments to achieve peace in our country put them on the spot as the highest responsibility holders of the current situation. A negotiated exit for both of them from political power could be the last option at attaining a new beginning. The Security Council could lead the process while IGAD and other regional bodies could help implement the proposal.
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