GOVERNANCE AND CONFLICT: A CASE OF MALI

BY

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UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL UNIVERSITY-AFRICA

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UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL UNIVERSITY-AFRICA

SUMMER, 2019
DECLARATION

I, undersigned, declare that this is my original work and has not been submitted to any other college, or university other than the United States International University- Africa for academic credit.

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ABSTRACT
Conflict and governance are directly related. The relationship plays out along several attributable parameters such as economic development, resource scarcity, widespread poverty and inadequate access to participation of political decision making. Whereas conflicts are bound to occur in any society in the course of interaction between different conflicting social identities and beliefs, such conflicts cannot escalate into civil War, unless the country's current governance institutions, policies, and ideologies are not sufficiently receptive to the different social identities and instead, tend to promote social disintegration rather than social solidity.

In such a case, the democratic culture of acceptance of social disparities and beliefs is also likely to be lacking. This kind of social framework then becomes a fertile ground that can easily be manipulated and provoked by the existing political leadership into a civil war, which only serves the hegemonic elite interests, rather than the interests of the state.

Mali is a nation that enjoys diverse heritage albeit with a rather sharp divide between the northern population and the southern population. This paper attempts to address the relationship between conflict and governance through the lens of a nation such as Mali which has a history of the two sides, antagonistic in ideals, philosophies and ways of life trying to strike an accord on several occasions as well as an analysis of the government’s actions towards trying to mend the divide. The paper also attempts to address the aspect of marginalization of one side over the other and the roles that various actors had, as well as possible solutions to the same, all in a bid towards not only understanding the complexities of human interaction in general, but more specifically in Mali, whether a better approach may be necessary to resolve the conflict.
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To my Family, whose constant prayers, Love and support helped me succeed I say thank you.

Last but not least to my Friends who went the extra mile to be there for me, I will forever be grateful.
DEDICATION

To Mum, Dad and my loving family,

This paper represents all the belief, hope and dreams that you have in me, and the faith that I have repaid it in kind with effort and determination.

“Knowledge has to be improved, challenged, and increased constantly, or it vanishes.”

Peter F. Drucker
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<tr>
<td>AFMISA</td>
<td>Africa led International Support Mission in Mali</td>
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<tr>
<td>APSA</td>
<td>African Peace &amp; Security Architecture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AQIM</td>
<td>Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AUREP</td>
<td>Autorité Pour La Recherche Pétrolière</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FLNM</td>
<td>Northern Mali Liberation Front</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GSPC</td>
<td>Group for Preaching and Combat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MICEMA</td>
<td>ECOWAS Mission in Mali</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MINUSMA</td>
<td>Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MNA</td>
<td>Mouvement National de l’Azawad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MNLA</td>
<td>National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MUJAO</td>
<td>Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCSR</td>
<td>Common Organization of the Sahara Regions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRF</td>
<td>Patriotic Resistance Front</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNAMID</td>
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

Introduction

Tafida (2019) in his examination of “the role of governance in understanding conflict in Africa” concludes that conflict and good governance are directly related. Most of the time, conflicts are associated by scholars and writers to economic development, resource scarcity, widespread poverty and inadequate access to participation of political decision making.

It is true that poverty creates anxieties as people scramble for scarce resources, such anxieties, however, cannot escalate into war, if good governance institutions and structures exist that provide all citizens a favorable and empowering environment to secure a proper living (Otorofan, 2010).

Correspondingly, whereas conflicts are bound to occur in any society in the course of interaction between different conflicting social identities and beliefs, such conflicts cannot escalate into serious conflict, lest the country's current governance institutions, policies, and ideologies are not sufficiently receptive to the different social identities and instead, tend to promote social disintegration rather than social solidity (Tafida, 2019). In such a case, the democratic culture of acceptance of social disparities and beliefs is also likely to be lacking. This kind of social framework then becomes a fertile ground that can easily be manipulated and provoked by the existing political leadership into a civil war, which only serves the hegemonic elite interests, rather than the interests of the state (Nzomo, 2002).

Based on the above backdrop, it is apparent that where good governance is established, conflict seems to vanish into the surrounding area. This is confirmed by Chinua Achebe in one of his credits to Murtala Administration in Nigeria. For Achebe (1983), “When Murtala took power in 1975…Even the known „go slow” of Lagos vanished overnight”
(Glenn, 1983). For a better understanding, this study aims at examining the relationship between governance and conflict by reviewing the conflict situation in Mali and the nature of its governance.

1.1 Background of the Study

Oxford Dictionary describes governance as the way a state is governed. That is the method of leadership in the state. It is the official taking charge of matters of a state, region or a place and to have the accountability of making laws, managing the economy and other resources and managing the public service. In other words, it is the form of leadership of a certain place.

It is very hard to determine the yardstick of assessing good governance from bad, more often, because of social and cultural disparities. For some states, good governance is a monarchy while for others, it is a democracy. However, one mutual denominator they all share is that, the type of government should be able to provide for its citizen, deliver security and protection; give social facilities and good welfare; they also preserve law and order and encourage economic activities in which the government can solicit the aid and support of others in the achievement of a joint task (Tafida, 2019).

Mali’s growth towards a modern State comprises the complex unification process of its region into a single Nation, which first can be seen in the effort to form the Mali Federation (1959-1960). The federation, shaped by two majoritarian Muslim states, was a political, economic and religious attempt assimilating the Sudanese Republic (current Mali) and Senegal into a homogeneous nation under the French Community, adopting the name Mali Federation (Diallo, 2011).
Such development may be understood as part of a continuous development that unified the whole of francophone Africa. According to Diallo (2011), this Federation was a turning point for the rise of the African states in the region, particularly for Mali, even if such political organization was under French rule when it came to protection and international relations issues. This is due to the fact its political leaders saw the Federation as the beginning of a reconstruction of what was once the great Mali Empire. Nonetheless, it became clear that such a project could not emerge under the rule of a foreign dominator hence, the Federation became independent from France in June 1960, by a power transfer agreement signed on the 4th April.

However, due to the many discrepancies that arose between the leaders, in August 1960 the Federation was dissolved. Several of its causes are related to religious and political (exterior and interior) divergences between the parts. In regard to religious issues, it was not clear how the Federation, a secular State, should conduct its relationship with the Muslim leaders (Clark, 1999). At the same time, the political lack of convergence between both States posed serious difficulties: at one side, Federation's Prime-Minister Modibo Keita, of Mali, defended a socialist option towards a radical Africanization, at the other, deputy Leopold Senghar, of Senegal, had preference for an economic liberalization, guided by the French Franc (Diallo, 2011). Under these circumstances, the Federation eventually reached an end and the Sudanese Republic became the independent Republic of Mali. The same happened with Senegal, turning into the independent Republic of Senegal.

The political events that came after Mali’s independence from France are associated with its internal stabilization and the state's external aims. To attain international stability, Modibo Keita, the first leader of the independent state, turned to the USSR for political patronage and, hence, led Mali to become a socialist regime. Such a regime, sustained
between 1960 and 1968, established a sense of nationalism, strengthening the Mali State and its territory. Nevertheless, the government could not entirely stabilize its institutions yet (Granada, Roberto & Closs, 2013).

In 1968, the Lieutenant Mousa Traoré came to power through a military coup, obtaining popular legitimation through the promise of economic and political transformations. However, with the passing of the years, unemployment, high birth rates, and economic inefficiencies increased, placing Mali as one of the poorest countries in the world (Keita 1998). Traoré’s government, though, was retained through strong authoritarianism and extreme corruption until the beginning of the 1990s. During this period, with the collapse of the bipolar world order, rising demand from the civil society emerged, pressing for more freedom and for political reform. The opposition to the regime stemmed in several crackdowns, which generated more rigorous separatism between the minorities in the north of the country and the government in the south (Smith 2001). The geographical and ethnical polarization of this civil uprising is one of the many historical unresolved differences of the country (Granada, Roberto & Closs, 2013).

To better comprehend the growing separatism in Mali, it is necessary to take into account the history of the Tuareg people also known as "Blue Men of The Desert". They are spread in a region which comprises not only Mali, but also Algeria, Burkina Faso, Libya, Niger and, in a smaller part, Nigeria (Keita, 1998). Seen as a minority by the government, the Tuareg faced political and cultural isolation, when the denunciation of their needs (integration within the State and land reforms) resulted in many revolutions (Lecocq, 2010). By the beginning of the 1960s, such crackdowns kindled a short rebellion, which resulted in a period of guerrilla warfare between such a minority and the new-established socialist regime. Notwithstanding the small number of combatants, this was one of the
first uprisings against the Malian government and it led to a harsh hatred from the Tuareg, which resulted to a constant instability between the two sides (Keita, 1998).

Owing to the geography, climate and lay of the land in Mali’s northern region, which is predominantly Tuareg territory, the area is largely dependent on livestock, agriculture and tourism, coming to about 42.7% of the GDP, whereas the south mainly relies on the exploitation of cotton (1% of GDP) and mineral deposits (gold mining) which accounts for 7.6% of the GDP and about 75% of Mali’s export revenue ("OECD iLibrary | African Economic Outlook 2013: Structural Transformation and Natural Resources", 2013). This geographic distribution of economic sectors exposes the northern region and makes it more vulnerable to exogenous shocks such periods of droughts experienced through diverse years such as in the 1970s or the 1980s, or the food crises of 2005, 2010 and 2012, seeing that the north is heavily dependent on cereal purchases and self-production as contributors to their total consumption mix.

Historically though, the northern region was very integral towards Mali’s development and regional wealth. At the times of the great empires, circa 11th century to 16th century, the northern cities of Timbuktu or Gao were considered the most influential cities of the day, as they were centers of educational and economic dominance. Indeed, the Sankore mosque or the University of Sankore, what is better known as the University of Timbuktu was one of the first universities ever built and vastly superior to any other university in its time and even after for quite a considerable while. Under the patronage of Mansa Musa, widely regarded as the richest man to have ever walked the face of the earth, Timbuktu, in its prime especially in the 13th and 14th centuries became the world’s greatest economic and academic centers (Moore, 2015).
Following Morocco’s invasion in the 16th and 17th centuries, couples with the rapidly declining stature of Timbuktu and its non-viable nature as a commercial trade route stop owing to challenges in accessibility, the northern region started heavily fragmenting. This led to a shift of power to the southern region of Mali that had been enjoying relative long periods of stability (Chauzal & Van Damme, 2015). By being relegated to the outer edge of the perimeter politically, the northern region became open to marginalization by the southern region, which had long sought to distance itself from the north, which was considered too hostile to co-exist with.

In addition, after the establishment of a French colony in the region, French officials asked for the assistance of one Tuareg ethnic confederation in establishing control of the region and protecting trade routes. The Kel Adagh confederation, particularly the Ifogha clan, maintained superiority with French assistance until the time of independence. When the Malian government began imposing new taxes on northern clans and attempting to sedentarise northern nomads (the process by which nomads are forced to become farmers), the Tuaregs revolted. During this rebellion, which was primarily political in nature, the Malian government responded with disproportionate violence. The violent response has increased Tuareg animosity toward the central government for decades (Whitehouse, 2015).

After the end of the Cold War, the switch to a multiparty democracy turned out to raise various internal and regional conflicts. Nevertheless, the political transition of the authoritarian regime to democracy was possible, leading to the first presidential elections in 1992, bringing Alpha Oumar Konaré to power. Notwithstanding its democratic institutions, Mali was facing economic volatility which resulted from Traoré’s structural adjustments to the IMF (International Monetary Fund) norms (Heisbourg, 2013). Such economic insecurity enhanced inequality and, by the beginning of the 1990s, resulted in
numerous demonstrations from students and professors throughout the state. Also, leveraging the situation, new Tuareg uprisings prolonged the regional instability in Northern Mali, which was only minimized in 1997 by State force (Keita, 1998).

In its new political phase, during the last three decades, Mali has been encountering numerous social and institutional problems. The democratic procedure can be described by the constitution of weak institutions and strong leaders, both associated with high corruption rates (Smith 2001). Thus, Mali entered the millennium with a democratic government and rising political freedom but facing frequent rebellions and minor demonstrations.

In 1997, Oumar Alpha Konaré was reinstated with a large percentage of votes. The election was marked by national enthusiasm as well as contentions of corruption by Konaré's opposition to the elected candidate. The new President inherited an unstable state of affairs in the country. The 1992 April National Pact between the Malian government and several Tuareg groups which gave more independence to northern Tuareg provinces and, instantaneously, tried to assimilate the ethnicity in Mali's economic and social reality, renewed and re-inflamed the debate around the Azawad state due to the relative decentralization granted by Bamako. Internal violence once again intensified, leading to almost 8000 deaths (Devon, 2013).

In 2002, the ex-military Amadou Touré was nominated as President of Mali, backed by the previous President Konaré. Touré. This mandate marked a period of democratic evolution in Mali (Smith, 2010), where he pushed for a consensus government as well as trying to strengthen national unity through the dialogue between the different national groups in order to build Mali’s stability (Visentini, 2012). Thus, Touré named a Tuareg as his Prime-Minister; nevertheless, according to Visentini (2012), Touré couldn’t
strengthen the politics he aimed to. The result of Touré’s failure was the Tuareg’s insurgency of 2006, when groups attacked Malian military installations in Kidal, a city of Mali, demanding greater self-rule and development assistance (Devon, 2013).

President Touré was reinstated with 71% of votes in the 2007 elections (Visentini, 2012). Nevertheless, once more he was not capable of retaining a political-institutional system solid enough to control and hold together the complex condition of the state. In March 2012, Touré was overthrown by a coup led by a military junta in the capital Bamako, while insurgent Tuareg groups seized strategic parts of Northern Mali, giving a free rein to the current crisis and eliminating from the country the status of one of the most democratic African States (Roberto, Closs & Ronconi).

During the conflict leading to the 2012 coup, both the government and Tuareg and Islamist rebels committed a variety of human rights violations, including extrajudicial killing, forced disappearance, rape, torture, and the use of child soldiers. Though the coup ended quickly, the country is still experiencing sporadic fighting and terror attacks. Many rebel fighters have been imprisoned for their behavior during the uprising. However, the new Malian government, headed by Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta, has been slower to punish its own army officials accused of similar abuses (Sears, 2015).

The strategic reversal of these roles by central Bamako over time in asserting its political and economic might over the north has provoked and continued the rift between the two regions. Partial and biased foreign influence, general weakness in Malian authority as well as several difficulties encountered whilst in the pursuit of exploiting the northern regions mineral resources ultimately resigned the northern region to bearing the brunt of unfavourable economic policies (Ravnkilde, 2013). Several instances of insecurity in the north, such as in 2003 when 32 European tourists were kidnapped by the Group for
Preaching and Combat (GSPC) have served to make the economic disparity situation even worse as it makes the north less viable.

1.2 Problem Statement

Once an evolving force for democracy in West Africa, Mali has struggled in recent years to preserve governmental stability. A coup in 2012, following military intervention in the north, and frequent uprisings by rebel and terrorist groups throughout the state have left the nation of about 18 million people susceptible (Reid, 2019).

In January 2012, Tuareg ethnic rebellion in the north sets off massive dislocation as people flee from war. President Toure was overthrown by military officers in March. Then in April, Tuareg rebels confiscated northern Mali and proclaimed independence, calling the state Azawad. From June to July, other rebel groups confiscated the territory and there was continued conflict in the north. In November, the African Union deployed troops to quash violence in the north. By then, more than 112,000 Malians had fled the violence as refugees to Burkina Faso, Mauritania, or Niger and at least 250,000 more residents were displaced within Mali (Reid, 2019).

In January 2013, French and Malian forces recaptured much of the north. On May 15th, international donors pledged more than $4 billion to help Mali get back on its feet. On June 18th, rebels and the Malian government signed a peace agreement that prepared the way for elections. In July, a 12600 strong U.N military and police force took over to help stabilize the country. In August 2013, the Malian people peacefully elected Ibrahim Boubacar Keita as their new president in a runoff election. Before the coup, Mali’s democracy was considered a success story among West African nations (Reid, 2019).
However, in 2014, fighting continued between the Mali government and militias in the north. In 2015, the Mali government negotiated peace with militias and allowed more regional autonomy for the Tuareg ethnic group in a peace deal aimed at ending years of civil conflict in the northern regions. In 2017, the people of Mali continued to experience the effects of violence and insecurity from multiple attacks by extremist groups and clashes between rebel factions and communal groups. At this point, about 142,000 Malians still lived as refugees in neighboring countries. In 2018, Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta was re-elected as the president of Mali. Insecurity and the terrorist attack continued. An increase of insecurity and ethnic conflicts in Central Mali made some areas inaccessible to nongovernmental aid groups (Reid, 2019).

Based on the backdrop of this study, where good governance is established, conflict seems to vanish into the surrounding area. Whereas conflicts are bound to occur in any society in the course of interaction between different conflicting social identities and beliefs, such conflicts cannot escalate into serious conflict, lest the country's current governance institutions, policies, and ideologies are not sufficiently receptive to the different social identities and instead, tend to promote social disintegration rather than social solidity (Tafida, 2019). In such a case, a democratic culture of acceptance of social disparities and beliefs is also likely to be lacking. This kind of social framework then becomes a fertile ground that can easily be manipulated and provoked by the existing political leadership into a civil war, which only serves the hegemonic elite interests, rather than the interests of the state. This case describes the situation in Mali which is described by continued violence and political instability. The puzzle of this study is why despite Mali being a democratic government continues to endure violent conflict. Is the democratic culture of acceptance of social disparities and beliefs being exercised? This
study aims at answering this question by scrutinizing the governance of Mali as well as the conflict situation.

1.3 Purpose of Study

To demonstrate how poor Governance leads to conflict.

1.4 Objectives

1.4.1 General Objective

To examine the relationship between governance and conflict in Mali.

1.4.2 Specific Objectives

1. To identify the failures of the Malian Government in preventing and solving the conflict.
2. To analyze the possible link between marginalization and conflict in Mali.
3. To analyze the effectiveness of the external players in resolving the Malian conflict.

1.5 Research Questions

1. What are the failures of the Malian Government in preventing and solving the conflict?
2. What is the relationship between marginalization and conflict in Mali?
3. What is the role of external players in resolving the Malian conflict?

1.6 Justification of Study

Africa has a history blotted with instances of violent eruptions, both domestic and regional. These have been instigated by a host of several issues including but not limited to marginalization & exclusion socially, politically and economically, competing self-
interests, competition for natural resources and interference by external actors pushing their own ulterior motives. Both the consequential long term and short term effects have been quite detrimental to some nations, with some capitulating so much, almost to the point of being permanently failed states. These instances have occurred at separate points in time hence lending credence to the fact that it is an area insufficiently explored towards attaining lessons necessary towards not only understanding the root causes of conflict, but also finding lasting solutions to the same.

The nexus between conflict as a concept and how it plays out, either instigated on its own or through certain triggers such as marginalization and bad governance as a reaction to conflict and marginalization form the backbone of the study. Contextually, through an analysis of the conflict in Mali, the diverse population and the several reactions that the government have had, the paper’s importance becomes apparent as it seeks to shift the focus from a traditional military retaliatory intervention which looks over the root causes of the issue in an attempt at controlling the violent reactions to a more holistic approach, more interested in how the root cause of the matter can be addressed.

The paper can be relied upon as a guide towards having a different outlook on some of these root causes and give clarity over some misconceptions on the same. Additionally, the paper will act as a litmus paper given that it will explore underlying issues in terms of conflict, marginalization and governance so that other states facing similar issues may use it as a gauge for what to look out for and more appropriate responses. The paper also seeks to fill the literature gap by shedding more light on triggers, prevention of violence and the effects of bad governance in creating a domino effect of issues in Mali.
1.7 Scope of the Study

The area of study is Mali.

1.8 Definition of Terms

Conflict Prevention: For the purpose of this study, the term conflict prevention is applied to mean prevention of deadly armed conflicts (Sear, 2015).

Security: The concept of security in this study is understood as mainly linked to national security and external military threats to a state. In this case Mali (Winston, 2016).

External Players: Based on this study, external factors refer to a third party that intervenes in the conflict of another state to help in solving the conflict. This can be an international organization, other states or national or international private organizations (Reeve, 2013).

Tuareg: The term “Tuareg” refers to a broad group of “warriors, religious groups and vassals Descended from Berbers and Arabs who crossed the Sahara in the 15th and 16th centuries” (Randall, 2005).

1.9 Chapter Summary

This paper consists of five chapters.

Chapter One gives a brief introduction to the research. It also contains the statement of the problem, objectives of the study, research questions & significance of the study, definitions of terms as well as the chapter break down.

Chapter Two looks at the theoretical foundations and literature review. The research gap is also identified.
Chapter Three discusses the methodological approaches used to collect data for this study. It outlines the research design, the population, and sample, data collection method, data analysis method, as well as the ethical considerations for the study.

Chapter Four analyses the data collected and provides the answers to the research questions of the study.

Chapter Five offers a conclusion and recommendations.
CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 Introduction

This section presents a literature review on the topics in questions, which are; the failure of governments in preventing conflicts, the relationship between security and development and the role of external players in solving conflicts in general and in the Mali conflict in particular. The theoretical framework is also reviewed.

2.2 Literature Review

2.2.1 Failure of Governments in Preventing Conflicts

According to Wallensteen (2002), the prevention of violent conflicts became significant early after the end of the Cold war. Cases such as the genocides in Rwanda, ethnic wars in Bosnia-Herzegovina and state failure in Somalia pointed to the inevitability of finding means to prevent conflicts from mounting into war, human disasters and regional instability. The purpose of international action to deal with such a situation was to reduce the spread of violence and find a resolution at an early stage. It is these aspirations that oftentimes are portrayed as conflict prevention.

Annan (1996), also argues that attempts to resolve conflicts before violence has risen too far indicate that taking early action is of great value. Conflicts should be prevented early on if a major conflict is to be avoided. Acting in a full-blown war is the priciest and most dangerous way of intervening and the one least likely to succeed. If the possibility for conflict prevention is to be enhanced, the sources of its achievements and failures must be better understood.

According to Bercovitch and Jackson (2010), one of the main hindrances to preventing conflict is that it is hard for third parties to sway or manipulate domestic politics within the states where a violent conflict is to be prevented. Preventive diplomacy entails the
identification of the problem areas, then a well-timed intervention by suitable third parties in order to change the course of the conflict. The adversaries, however, may understand this as an intervention into their internal affairs and therefore totally and utterly unwarranted and unjustified. To respond to a potential conflict situation before it becomes manifest means to trample on the norm of sovereignty and this is no easy thing to do in international relations. By the time resources for preventive diplomacy are rationalized, it may well be too late, and too hard to influence the leaders of conflict parties. Even if the third parties succeed in swaying the leadership, radical groups may marshal the support of the population against any outside intervention. Timely intervention in the case of preventive diplomacy means very early intervention by third parties; yet early intervention may disrupt the inviolable principle of sovereignty. This is a key predicament with all facets of this approach.

Zartman (2005), also contends that another hindrance to conflict prevention is that it is not always easy to sustain the long-term support needed for it to succeed. It is vital to bear in mind that conflict prevention is a long, expensive and delicate course that, even with initial achievements can be easily derailed especially if the root causes of the conflict are not addressed. Zartman argues that at every step of the process there are hard choices to be made that entail taking risks and that the securest choice is usually to do nothing. However, even in cases where the hard choice to initiate action is made, the greatest cause of preventive failure, once an action has begun, has been intervenor fatigue and early satisfaction with results. For this reason, once the initial preventive effort is initiated, the interested parties must follow up on that process. Hence, long-term approaches and instruments are necessary to prevent a relapse into violence (Paris, 2004). Conflict prevention requires strategic and working resources; it entails attention to many problems. It is not a cheap investment. On the contrary, many of the institutions that are
best equipped to undertake preventive actions that are regional and international organizations do not have the resources to maintain their support for following up or establishing long-term strategies, especially when there are so many conflicts with the potential to become violent occurring in the world.

In the aftermath of a conflict, it is not always easy to assemble the resources essential to undertake preventive efforts. Who will lead the efforts in prevention? Who will shoulder the financial burden of a given preventive effort? Who will decide how the resources are to be disbursed? There are but some of the unnerving questions challenging the practice of conflict prevention. Preventive efforts need the development of orderly and synchronized long-term engagement, as well as the integration of political, social, economic, military and human rights measures. Such coordination is hard to attain and expensive to maintain. There are no assurances of success, and few institutional enticements to enable the practice of conflict prevention (Bercovitch & Jackson, 2010).

According to Ackerman and DuVall (2000), there is a strain of measuring when preventive efforts are no longer necessary. When has preventive diplomacy been fruitful? How can we govern when the policy goals of prevention have been attained? It is easy in such cases to think of failures, but unbearable to think of success. As the preventive effort is a constant process and evaluating when the effort should be considered successful is problematic, it becomes hard to assess the process itself and when it should be completed. In addition to the strain of determining the period of the effort, it is also difficult to govern which the third party should undertake the lead in prevention, what criteria should be used to make such a decision and which actors should decide whether these criteria are met.
Kofi Annan (2005) proposes in his Millennium Report that new norms and values that are gradually shared by the international community are also a hindrance to the prevention of conflicts. These new norms permit international organizations such as the UN to gauge global trouble spots and then act upon these evaluations. It also asks the international community to come together to avert deadly conflict by interceding into the domestic politics of states where there is a danger of an acceleration in conflict. This new approach, "the responsibility to protect" emphasizes human sovereignty and puts it on par with state sovereignty. It expands the UN authority and sets standards for other states to participate in domestic politics under the name of preventive diplomacy, which presents a serious challenge to established international norms and ideas of state sovereignty. As the idea of the "sovereignty of states" is one of the building blocks of international law and the international system, states are cautious about the effects of any precedent that might weaken this norm. Therefore, many states are cautious to allow such intervention to become a norm, especially as no state is impervious to conflict.

The major impediment to conflict prevention is the absence of a political will. There seems to be a resistance to the use of force internationally even in cases where humanitarian crises are obvious e.g. in Darfur, Zimbabwe. Those states most susceptible to conflict, those most in need of development, aid, civil society, and efficient governance, are also the very same states that would resist any aid or meddle in their affairs. The wealthy Western powers that may embark on preventive efforts are usually hesitant to do so for fear that they may offend political sensibilities. Early warnings are there abundantly, but international organizations do not have enough resources to undertake serious preventive measures, developing states dislike such measures, and Western states show little will in wanting to lead such efforts. They are all busy doing something but not necessarily preventing a conflict (Schnabel & Carment, 2004).
According to Lund (2004), the greatest impediment to effective conflict prevention is mobilizing the international community to regularly undertake timely preventive efforts and sustain them for the required periods of time.

2.2.2 Relationship between Marginalization and Conflict

Much of Africa’s history has been blotted with several instances of conflict ranging from internal strife to external border conflicts amongst neighbouring countries. This has prompted the narrative that Africa is the bedrock of conflict, chaos and instability. More worryingly than the fact that such conflicts appear to defy all manner of solutions/proposals applicable to them is the fact that they are the cause of much of Africa’s slow development or impediments to development (Aremu, 2010). Aremu (2010), goes on to explore several avenues relating to causes of conflict, their impact on national unity & cohesion as well as on several spheres of development.

Conflict can by and large be viewed as struggle over assertions and rights over limited power, natural resources and territory in which the conflicting parties aim to destabilise and injure the other so as to establish superiority (Aremu, 2010). Some of the reasons explored include influence by colonial powers through establishment of arbitrary borders that define Africa’s present day territorial zones, the ethnic diversity unique to Africa and the inherent problem of ethnicity, poverty and maladroit leadership.

Marginalisation on the other hand often gets used interchangeably with social exclusion, although (Editors, 2014) posit that marginalisation means weakening of the bonds that connect an individual from society or an environment that they find themselves in while social exclusion is seen as an escalation from the same. To this effect, social exclusion then entails a layered multi-dimensional and complex process as a culmination or the suffering from denial or limitation of enjoyment of rights, goods & services or basic
societal fundamentals. This affects the ability of the affected individual/group of individuals to enjoy or participate in interactions that normal people would otherwise have enjoyed. Ultimately, their quality of life and the overall cohesion of society get affected detrimentally.

Editors (2014), posit that states play a pivotal role in enforcing strong social bonds as a way to combat marginalisation and social exclusion. They are charged with and ought to uphold their responsibilities in treating everybody as equals in terms of providing basic human rights as the foundation of a socially cohesive state. Editors (2014), continue to state that social exclusion and marginalisation do not exist in a vacuum but rather that, they are instances that are perpetuated as a result or a combination of a multiplicity of factors, each unique to each individual state. If left unchecked, the marginalisation and social exclusion grow as the state and its citizens diverge. Many states take the wrong approach of attempting to coerce the group that had been excluded and existing outside to exist within a setting that does not appreciate their inclusion.

A 2019 ACCORD article posits that inequality stands as one of the leading causes of conflict in Africa as a primary source. Inequality along the three planes, that is, social, economic and political among individuals or groups of individuals only serves to trigger what could possibly be termed as violent retaliations. The same is explained through Rwanda as a case study, whereby political exclusion is largely attributed to the eruption of violence in 1994. This is owing to the fact that political exclusion created monopolisation of all benefits that accrue to belonging to the side wielding power that eventually became unbearable.

("Impact of Marginalization Syracuse University", n.d.) Attempts to explore the relationship between marginalisation and human psychology in an attempt at rationalising
the reactions that marginalised people often exhibit. At the heart of it is an attack on self-
worth of individuals or a group with certain characteristics such as religion or race
unifying them, as it makes the group/individual in question feel secondary to their
counterparts enjoying preferential treatment. Some of the feelings explored include anger,
fear, hopelessness, frustration and feeling invisible. These have the effect of inducing a
strain on the persons affected which leads to among other things, reluctance to interact
with the rest. The article posits that coping mechanisms, if ill-addressed or casually
addressed, go on to entrench these feelings especially within the marginalised population
as they continue to feel, that above and beyond any measures put in pace to try and
alleviate their situation, that those measures are merely lip service and for academic
purposes.

This cause and effect relationship between marginalisation and conflict as a reaction gets
further explored along the limb of inequalities, apparent and inherent that one population
in a country may enjoy over another or others whereby the continues exclusion of one
side in essence means that their quality of life gets affected fundamentally. The situation
gets exacerbated through the passage of time, all factors remaining constant, as the
excluded community continues to be exposed to unnecessary hardship that they to bear in
comparison to other demographics in society for factors such as ethnicity that they cannot
alter to suit a narrative that will suit them better.

2.2.3 The Role of External Players in Solving Conflicts

Many empirical studies examine the role of external players in solving conflicts. External
players intervention in both interstate and intrastate conflicts has created much attention
(Ayoob, 1995; Buzan, 1986; Litwak and Wells Jr., 1988; MacFarlane, 1990; Tillema,
During the cold war, interventions were largely considered a role of the great powers especially in their respective spheres of influence and also a platform where superpower competition could be implemented without directly endangering a nuclear confrontation. Most interventions occurred in third world countries such as Angola, Mozambique, Ethiopia, Somalia, Vietnam, Cambodia, Nicaragua, El Salvador, and the Arab-Israeli and India-Pakistan which had the most destructive, protracted and destabilizing conflicts. The superpowers used their resources to support the disputants. Their main goal of intervention in these conflicts was to gain credibility and prestige rather than strategic interest (Ayoob, 1995; MacFarlane, 2002, 1990).

Herbert Tillema's assess of 591 foreign military interventions in 269 interstate armed conflicts from 1945-85 pursues to ascertain if a power politics or a nuclear paralysis (the presence of mutually ensured destruction) method best explains the intervention patterns of the major powers. His findings show that the power politics view is consistent with the early post-WW II years while the nuclear paralysis explanation better explains the 1970s onward (1989, 186-187).

Yoon focuses on American intercessions in Third World internal wars during the Cold War (1997). She endeavors to account for the several motives behind these interventions and the only variable that explores the relationship between the domestic dispute and the interventionist action is whether one of the conflict parties professes a communist leaning.

The prevailing research on conflict settlement patterns designates that domestic conflicts seem to be much less responsive to negotiated settlements. Only 20% of civil wars were solved by negotiations compared to 55% of interstate wars according to a study that analyzed these violent disputes over a fifty-year period (1940-1990) (David, 1997).
Licklider's (1995) study of 91 civil wars from 1945-93 suggests that of the 57 conflicts that were over, only 14 or one-fourth ended due to a negotiated settlement whereas the remaining (43) cases concluded with a military victory. Additionally, a rebirth of hostilities arose in around half of the settlement cases in comparison to only 15% of the civil wars in which one side was victorious. These findings are mirrored in Stephen John Stedman's (1991) research on 65 civil wars from 1900-1989. In this study, only 11 cases of cessation arose through negotiations. But research by Barbara Walter (1997), among others, shows that outside actors are crucial in helping to guarantee that a negotiated settlement is effectively executed.

Two of the quantitative studies that study conflict settlement patterns and include the potential effect of the end of the Cold War are Marshall and Gurr (2003) and Ayres (2000). The Peace and Conflict 2003 Report notes that as of the end of 2002, there were only twelve ongoing civil conflicts worldwide, in marked contrast to the 1990s decade when fifty-four states were affected by major societal warfare (Gurr & Marshall, 2003). It contends that one of the main accomplishments in the first decade after the Cold War has been “the control of societal conflicts endorsed by the UN and regional organizations and reinforced by positive engagement by the US and other powers”. When armed conflicts over self-determination issues are analyzed, the report shows that since 1990 more than 70% of these disputes underway during the past 50 years have been terminated (Quinn & Gurr, 2003).

William Zartman’s (1992) comparative analysis of eleven prolonged communal conflicts shows that a neighboring state’s provision of support or asylum makes a conflict more likely to intensify and become problematic as the internal war transmutes from a bilateral conflict between a host state and an ethnic group to a trilateral conflict where the new actor (the neighboring state) is usually not interested in advocating a settlement. Study on
interstate crises where ethnicity is an essential issue between the two actors also suggests that external state interventions will boost the level of violence. This finding applies whether the interveners are great powers, other Northern states, or Third World states (Brecher & Wilkenfeld, 1997a and 1997b; Carment, 1993).

In investigating outside support for revolutions active in the 1990s, Byman, Chalk, Hoffman, Rosenau, and Brannan (2001) claim that timing is crucial when trying to establish the effect of external state support. Assistance is anticipated to be most successful in the early stages "when it can attest central to creating the insurgent group's feasibility and therefore boosting its durability", particularly as the group faces the usually superior military forces of the host state. They contend that support from both states and non-state actors "can make a movement far more efficient, prolong the war, improve the scale and lethality of its struggle, and may even transmute a civil conflict into an international war".

Regan also notes that the timing of intervention can substantially affect the length of an internal war. In the early stages, the government of a host state is usually more powerful relative to the opposition group and as an outcome, if an intervention supports the host regime, the chances of a rebel victory are further diminished and it could lead the group to settle or have to face the militarily superior government forces (Regan, 2002). On the other hand, external state support for a rebelling group can help its organizational capabilities, help further enlistment, and increase the chances that it can achieve a victory. Interventions in support of both parties, Regan asserts, will possibly maintain “the status quo balance of relative abilities, even though at higher absolute levels”.
States that intercede in ethno-political conflicts sometimes employ more than one strategy, supporting one side, often with military aid, while also seeking to mediate (Touval, 1992). Some examples include South Africa’s engagement in Mozambique, Namibia, and Angola during the 1980s and Syrian intervention in Lebanon in the 1970s and 1980s. Zartman (1992) contends that state interveners can help foster a solution if two requirements are present: when providing asylum for the rebels becomes too expensive and when the intervenor can ensure the agreement of the insurgents to assist guarantee a balanced settlement. Another possibility by which outside countries can foster a conclusion is through helping to ensure the military victory of one of the parties. India’s military intervention in 1970 in support of the East Pakistani secessionists, for example, was a major factor that led to the rise of the state of Bangladesh. Internal wars that end due to a military victory are also reported to be much less likely to re-emerge.

Interventions can otherwise help moderate or even encourage a resolution of civil wars. Most often, the emphasis is on the political efforts of outside actors and their provision of good offices, informal and formal mediation, observation, fact-finding missions, and the deployment of peacekeepers. Much of the research on conflict resolution underscores the responsibility of international and regional organizations and secondarily non-state actors including religious and independent mediation organizations and a variety of grassroots organizations such as women’s or tribal groups (Carment, 1994a; Diehl, Druckman and Wall, 1998; Diehl, Reifschneider and Hensel, 1996; Dixon, 1996; Kleiboer, 1996; Touval, 1992; Zartman, 1992). These actors are thought to be more efficient mediators than external states as they are often recognized as more legitimate and/or unbiased.
Other scholars argue that there are circumstances under which external parties choose to intercede in an internal conflict. Pearson et al as seen in Regan (1998) acknowledged geography, geopolitical motives and the level of conflict are the most crucial considerations directly linked with military interventions of third parties in intrastate conflict. According to Pearson, states are most likely to mediate when the level of the conflict is high or have cross-boundary or ethnic resemblance with the targeted state, or else when the intervener has ‘transactional' interest, i.e. economic, military, educational and political linkage with the target country (Regan, 1998).

In a similar issue, Hans Morgenthau notes that intercessions take place when national interests are at stake (Regan, 1998). In other words, internal conflicts destructively affect international security in general and neighboring states, and this prompts external interventions. A good example of this realist view is that the United Nations intercede in several internal conflicts after identifying them as threats against international peace and security as well as humanitarian crises.

Correspondingly, individual states intercede in conflicts in other regions or in an intrastate conflict often with worries of national interest even if they are geographically far away from them (Geib, 2009). For instance, the piracy problem in Somalia's coast affected negatively most states in the world as the Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden are important passageways of most transnational vessels transporting goods. It threatened the global operation of goods and the transport system for it directly and indirectly affected the global economy. For this reason, many Western states sent naval forces to the coast of Somalia to fight piracy (Harper, 2012).
Moreover, scholars like Gleditsch et al (2008) have contended that civil wars and internal conflicts have strong ties with interstate conflicts elsewhere in the world. States interfere in internal conflicts of other states to counteract other external states as a proxy. And when more external actors of diverse behavior and interest are involved in an internal conflict of others, the ‘spillover’ rises and conflict escalates to an international level. States often cooperate with friendly local actors in order to increase their own interest. They are also involved in the conflict resolution procedure and endeavor to produce a resolution of their favor while the counterpart states also act in the same manner. The scopes and subjects of the conflict might as well change due to increased actors. Regional states cannot stand with nearby conflicts where transnational criminal units and conflicting elements operate. Therefore, states get engaged in conflicts in other states because of their national and regional security (Geib, 2009).

2.2.4 Research Gap

Over the past few years, events in Mali took many scholars and policymakers by surprise (Gilmour: 2012; Bresslin and Gray: 2013; Stewart: 2014) because Mali appeared to have consolidated democratic rule. As Stewart (2014) notes, “Mali had often been described as a model of democracy and stability on the continent”. Mali has been depicted as a post-colonial, democratic success story in Africa because of its relative stability and democratic institutions (Gilmour, 2012).

With the exception of a flurry of academic literature on the most recent upheavals in Mali, the author found only a small body of literature on conflict and repression in the country. However, the influx of Islamic extremists in Mali in the past decade and the subsequent overthrow of the Malian president in 2012 brought the country’s historical struggles back into sharp focus. Though France has borne most of the security burden in Mali, a number of countries, including the United States, have committed troops to
peacekeeping efforts in Mali (Bresslin & Gray, 2013). As of the writing of this study, a peace agreement has been signed, but persistent security concerns in the region make it an important focus of both academic investigation and security policy.

2.3 Theoretical Framework

2.3.1 Protracted Social Conflict (PSC)

Edward E. Azar, one of the forefathers of the conflict resolution field was the first to describe violent events in the developing world as Protracted Social Conflicts, which he defines as follows:

"In brief, protracted social conflicts occur when communities are deprived of the satisfaction of their basic needs on the basis of the communal identity. However, the deprivation is the result of a complex causal chain involving the role of the state and the pattern of international linkages. Furthermore, initial conditions (colonial legacy, domestic historical setting, and the multi-communal nature of the society) play important roles in shaping the genesis of protracted social conflict."

Azar suggests that the most significant of all factors that lead to the formation of PSC are societies that can be characterized as having a ‘multi-communal’ composition. Multi-communal societies, whether formed as a result of divide-and-rule policies of former colonial powers or whether through historical rivalries often resulted in the dominance of one group over the other which Azar states as being ‘characterized by disarticulation between the state and society. With the state usually dominated by a single communal group or a coalition of a few community groups that are unresponsive to the needs of other groups in the society. Azar suggests that efforts to reconcile this by enforcing integration or co-operation’ retards the nation-building process, strains the social fabric and eventually breeds fragmentation and protracted social conflict.
The most obvious ontological need is individual and communal physical survival and well-being. Individual or communal survival is contingent upon the satisfaction of basic needs. In the world of physical scarcity, these basic needs are seldom evenly or justly met. Whilst one group of individuals may enjoy the satisfaction of those needs in abundance, others do not. Grievances resulting from need deprivation are usually expressed collectively. Failure to redress these grievances by the authority cultivates a niche for a protracted social conflict.

Azar continues to note that developmental needs do not need to be thought of as primarily physical and neither do such unmet material needs lead directly to conflict. What is key, however, is the degree to which minority groups can access the market or political institutions or the recognition of communal existence. This then leads to us having a much broader understanding of human needs that if unmet, may become causal variables that will be attempted to be readdressed by violence.

Azar's third variable turns its attention to the role of the state and its role in ensuring that all communal groups under its jurisdiction are able to meet their basic human needs. Azar notes that in those countries that are experiencing protracted social conflict, political power tends to be dominated by one identity group that uses its resources to maintain power over the other. In turn, to ensure that the group in power remains so, PSC-affected countries will often see attempts by the dominant group to resist the participation of minority groups. Azar concludes with his note that, 'such crises exacerbate already existing competitive or conflictive situations, diminish the state's ability to meet basic needs, and lead to further developmental crises. Thus, regime type and the level of legitimacy are important linkage variables between needs and protracted social conflict.'
Azar’s fourth variable points to the role of how it not simply governance at the state level that leads to communal groups being unable to access basic human needs, security or recognition but the extent to which internal policy is dictated by international linkages. Azar categorizes two distinct forms in which these international linkages can take; economic dependency and client relationships. States which are economically dependent on the broader international economic system, in turn, see their autonomy weakened as economic development policies are partly dictated by outside influences.

Azar goes further to note, 'Moreover, dependency often exacerbates denial of the access needs of communal groups, distorting the domestic political and economic systems through the realignment of subtle coalitions of international capital, domestic capital and the state. Client relationships, referring to arrangements whereby a state's security is guaranteed in return for loyalty can be equally significant with governments potentially distracted from their key responsibilities, ‘Client loyalty and obedience involved some sacrifice of autonomy and independence, which induces the client state to pursue both domestic and foreign policies disjointed from, or contradictory to, the needs of its own public.

Azar notes that in the majority of cases, the response by states to communal grievances, particularly those which have weak governance structures is usually one of coercive repression or instrumental co-option to avoid outward signs of weakness or defeat. In many cases, a militant or harsh response constitutes the core of state strategy in coping with communal dissent. Such a hard-line strategy invites equally militant responses from repressed groups. Co-option could serve to mitigate communal grievances, but it is usually perceived as being a tactical maneuver to fragment the opposition and divert its attention. Failure of the co-option strategy further justifies coercive repressive options, leading to an upward spiral of violent clashes.
The last of Azar's process variables relate to the effects of long-term conflicts on perceptions of the other and how this, in turn, can impact on the behavior of belligerent groups. The perceptions and motivations behind the behavior of the state and communal actors are conditioned by experiences, fears a belief system of each communal group. In a situation of limited or proscribed interactions, the worst motivations tend to be attributed to the other side. There is little possibility of falsification, and the consequence is reciprocal negative images that perpetuate communal antagonism and solidify protracted social conflict.

Azar distinguishes Protracted Social Conflicts as those which result in negative-sum outputs in which there is often no clear end-point and no clear winner, let alone a solution that comes anywhere near in meeting unmet needs. The process of protracted social conflict deforms and retards the effective operation of political institutions. It reinforces and strengthens pessimism throughout the society, demoralizes leaders and immobilizes the search for peaceful solutions. We have observed that societies undergoing protracted social conflict find it difficult to initiate the search for answers to their problems and grievances. As the protracted social conflict becomes part of the culture of the ravaged nation, it builds a sense of paralysis which afflicts the collective consciousness of the population. An environment of hopelessness permeates all strata of society, and a siege mentality develops which inhibits constructive negotiation for any resolution of society.

In a nutshell, Azar points to four possible consequences of PSC: Deterioration of physical security, Institutional Deformity, Psychological Ossification, Increased Dependency & Cliency.
2.4 Chapter Summary

Chapter 2 reviews Literature with a global perspective, by focusing on the failure of Governments in preventing conflicts, the relationship between marginalization and conflict and finally the role of external players in solving conflicts.

In the same chapter, the author covered the Gap in the Literature and concluded by analysing the Protracted Social Conflict by Edward Azar as the main Theoretical framework.
CHAPTER THREE: METHODOLOGY

3.1 Introduction
This chapter presents the methodology that was used to attain the study’s objectives and to answer the research questions. It offers a depiction of the research design, sources of data and the techniques for data collection and analysis. The chapter also inspects the ethical considerations for the study.

3.2 Research Design
Bryman and Bell (2007) defined research design as an overall plan that proposals a framework for the choice of data collection methods and data analysis procedures. The study employed a case study research design. This study used a qualitative research design with a case study approach. A case study is an approach in research that emphasizes on gaining an in-depth understanding of a unit or event at a specific time. Willig (2008) noted that case studies are not considered by the approaches used to collect and analyze data, but rather its focus on a unit of analysis; a case. This study therefore, focused on governance and conflict. The unit of analysis is the Mali region.

3.3 Sources of Data
The secondary data method was used in this study.

3.3.1 Secondary Data
The secondary data that was required for this study is longitudinal data on governance and conflict in Mali. A longitudinal study is a research design that encompasses repeated observations of the same variables over long periods of time, often many decades. The study made use of archival data from 2000 to 2019. The researcher made use of online journals, books, blogs, newspapers, United Nations reports to answer the research questions. The data obtained was used to answer the research questions of the study.
3.4 Data Analysis

The data analysis that was used is content analysis where qualitative data is categorized for classification, summarization, and tabulation. The approaches used will be both descriptive and interpretative.

3.5 Ethical Considerations

The use of secondary data is a highly ethical practice. It exploits the value of any investment in data collection, it decreases the burden on respondents, it guarantees replicability of study findings and thus, greater transparency of research actions and integrity of research work. But the value of secondary data is only fully comprehended if these benefits overshadow the dangers. Hence, the researcher aimed at guaranteeing that the data used in this study will not cause damage or suffering to the readers and also the researcher endeavors to evade biasness during the analysis of the study where the researcher can be prompted to offer their views during the analysis of data. Data was collected from various secondary sources.

3.6 Chapter Summary

Chapter three has described the research methodology that was employed in the study. The chapter has outlined the research design, sample, and population under study, research methods, data analysis method and ethical considerations considered for the study. The next chapter, Chapter Four provides the research findings as per every objective of the study and presents a platform for the conclusion and recommendations in Chapter Five.
CHAPTER FOUR: FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS

4.1 Introduction

The revolutions of the Arab Spring in 2011 not only changed the political situation in the Northern African countries but also affected the Sahel region. Especially Mali experienced revolts including terroristic activities mostly in the northern part of the country. Nomad tribes, as well as Islamist groups, expressed their grievances through violence. Particularly the Tuareg developed their own hierarchical structures and refuse any help of the national governments in their area. After the fall of the Qaddafi regime in Libya, a vast number of Tuareg returned to their home country and founded the Movement for the National Liberation of Azawad (MNLA), aiming at an independent Tuareg state in Northern Mali (Lavallée & Völkel, 2015).

These tensed circumstances, known as the third Tuareg rebellion, where MNLA liberation fighters on the one side fought against soldiers from the Malian government on the other side, eventually led to a military coup in March 2012 (Mali country report). Because of fragile institutional structures and weak social and economic opportunities, a lot of Malians protested violently, resulting in numerous displaced people and hundreds of deaths (Lavallée & Völkel, 2014).

Shortly after the putsch, most parts of the country were in the hands of non-governmental actors, namely the MNLA fighters and their supporters from Ansar ed-Din, Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO). In response to the Islamist take-over, the Malian government agreed on a military intervention led by French and Chadian forces, supported by the African-led International Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA) soon after. Despite the peace agreement between the Malian government and the Tuareg rebels in June 2013, opening the way for the presidential elections in July/August, which resulted in the victory of President
Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta ( ), the gap between the Tuareg in the North and the government in the South still remains and even increased (Mali country report, 2013).

In April 2013, the French and Chadian soldiers handed the military presence over to the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) ( ). Since then, the attempts to establish peace and security are frequently threatened by Tuareg as well as Islamist terror attacks, trying to violently enforce their rights. AQIM, for instance, even poses a direct threat to Europe by taking EU citizens as hostages in order to blackmail financial assets, which they can use in their favor. Shockingly, these Islamist movements often strengthen their territory with the help of government officials. As a result, tourism, as well as formal and legal employment, radically declined while criminal and terroristic structures took over (Lavallée & Völkel, 2015).

Mali’s efforts to improve the governance system as well as democratic structures are mainly constrained by its security concerns. Apart from the independence movements of minority groups in the North, Mali’s government is threatened by Islamist terror activities, spreading-over from its neighboring countries in the Maghreb. Intra-Malian tensions and community distrust have been exacerbated and aggravated by foreign interference, both subtle and overt. These external forces have contributed by and large in the ensuing chaos following their interference, often met with little resistance from a weakened central Mali government thus each actor guns for their individual interests behind the scenes. The greater northern Mali remains a prized jewel in the eyes of some bordering nations such as Algeria and Libya, who have sought to spread their base in the Tuareg dominant region with a view to pushing their agendas for Sahelian influence as part of the greater geopolitical supremacy.
Indeed, such was the case with Gaddafi as he sought to advance his cause with the Arab Legion, by recruiting and using Libyan Tuareg men as soldiers (Gettleman, 2011). Algeria, on the other hand, sought to use Mali as an outpost where it could more or less, channel its own pockets of insurgents (Islamic terror groups) thus preserve its domestic integrity. (Badale & Isvoranu, 2013)

Foreign meddling and ethnic profiling and marginalisation were not the only tell-tale signs of a state whose authority over northern Mali was unpopular, partisan and partial. Some foreign charitable organisations, chiefly among them Arab-speaking non-governmental organisations and Islamic preaching movements, took advantage of this discord to infiltrate the region and fly under the radar, all the while advancing individual interests under the umbrella of social and security provision (Thurston & Lebovich, 2013). Many of them to imposing their own understandings and/or variations of Islamic syncretism to an already volatile and delicate region that was highly susceptible. This has only served to increase a layer of tension and misunderstanding over the rift between northern and southern regions as the south particularly holds the Tuareg population directly responsible for the rapid spread of radical Islamic doctrines within the country (Thurston & Lebovich, 2013).

This chapter includes the analysis of secondary data obtained from different sources. The research questions are discussed in this section.

4.2 What are the failures of the Malian Government in preventing and solving the conflict?

The Tuareg are believed to have lived in Mali from as early as the 5th century BCE according to Herodotus (Hershkowitz, 2005). After founding the city of Timbuctu in the 11th century, the Tuareg embarked on a conquest expedition throughout the Saharan region, eventually converting to Islam in the 14th century in a bid to reap handsomely
from the thriving trans-Saharan trade (Bowers, 2013). As a result of their involvement in the same, the Tuareg had managed to establish themselves as a dominant force in the region well from then until their eventual decline in the 17th century following invasions from Morocco. The Tuareg and the northern region by extension have not managed to restore themselves to their former glory since then.

However, they did manage to enjoy extended periods of autonomy throughout that period, with the same only coming to an end with the advent of French pursuits into Africa and eventual colonisation. Ever since, the Tuareg have clamoured for self-independence. The first of such resistances was in 1916 when they pressed the French into granting them self-independence and awarding them the region ‘Azawad’. This resistance was easily thwarted, with the Tuareg being removed from more viable grazing land and general fragmentation of their numbers, together with zoning in terms of drawing the country’s boundaries as demarcations and strict laws on entry and exit ("MRG turns 50 - Minority Rights Group", n.d.)

**First Tuareg Rebellion**

In the 1960s, the independence movement sweeping within Africa, the Tuareg claimed for self-independence and recognition of the Afellaga region as their own. This had been in part thanks to how they viewed Modibo Keita’s policies and their impact on their lifestyle, given that to them, land reforms proposed by the Keita government would strip them of their privileged access rights to agricultural lands (Henk & Keita, 2000).

Additionally, Keita established state ownership over the subsoil, giving the directives that whereas customary claims over land would not be affected save for instances of public utility, the same was not extended to sub-soil. The rationale behind this was that the Keita government wanted to have complete autonomy over the subsoil resources and create a
centralised State resource collection pool. This created a technical stalemate as the Tuaregs’ activities were heavily restricted by the State thus their livelihoods being adversely affected (Bowers, 2013).

Eventually, these suppressions boiled over and led to the first Tuareg rebellion, mainly in the form of small ‘hit & run’ retaliatory attacks at the government. However, this rebellion was short-lived as it was heavily disjointed, lacked unified leadership as well as well thought out, consolidated and compelling motives. Additionally, the Tuareg rebels, suffering from lack of resources that would have ensured aspects like communication were taken care, failed to mobilise and plan out their forces accordingly. Furthermore, the Malian government of the day had been able to flex its military muscle with the help of newly acquired Soviet weapons. By 1964, the Malian government had successfully managed to quash any pockets of resistance through their brutal counter-insurgency operations. As a result of the Tuareg’s insubordination, they were placed under an extremely suppressive military administration (Bowers, 2013).

**Second Tuareg Rebellion**

The second wave of the Tuareg uprising came up in 1990. By this time, Mali was in a transitional state, with military rule slowly paving way for a democratic government (Bleck, 2011). However, in as much as greater Mali had started to feel the relief of not being under military rule, much of the northern region was still oppressed and still faced unfavourable government development and economic policies.

The violence erupted following an attack on non-Malian Tuaregs and the southernmost edge of the Tuareg region, sparking skirmishes between Tuareg rebels and Malian state officers. However, this violence was short-lived as plans were swiftly put in place to broker armistice and have a lasting peace solution. The end result of this was the
Tamanrasset Accords, which had been negotiated into in neighbouring Algeria between the two major Tuareg militia factions, that is, The Azaouad Popular Movement and the Arabic Islamic Front of Azawad, and Colonel Amadou Toure who had since then ascended into power vide a coup (Bowers, 2013).

However, the Tuareg still had major grievances with the Accord, most notably which it had failed to grant them political autonomy as much of the north was still under the rule of southern officials who had been planted there by central government. The Accord has been intended to initiate political compromise between the two warring sides in a bid to stem the violence that had broken out. Negotiations on the same continued well into 1992 following the election of Alpha Konaré into power. President Konare intended to make good of the Malian Government’s promises as had been articulated in the National Pact of 1992, only that this time he faced a different set of challenges.

It should be noted that the 1970s had witnessed mass migrations of many Malian’s into neighbouring countries such as Libya. Part of the factions that migrated to Libya were welcomed with open arms where it is said that he welcomed them as brothers and made them feel at home. Aside from granting them amnesty, Gaddafi had then trained in military tactics and had them combat ready. Unbeknownst to them, they had been recruited as pawns to further Gaddafi’s personal ambitions of establishing the Islamic Legion in 1972 (Gettleman, 2011).

The goal of the Legion had been to advance his own territorial conquest ambitions in the African interior as well as advance his own take of Arab supremacy upon the land. Thus in the Arab Legion he had a band of dedicated foot soldiers who believed they were fighting for a worthy cause. The Legion however, was short-lived and fizzled out in 1985 due to a lack of funds that would sustain it and thus forced to disband.
With nowhere left to go, the Malian Tuaregs were forced to return back to their motherland. However, this in of itself posed a huge problem as the men returning were battle hardened, combat ready and radicalised men. The Peace Pact of 1992 failed, largely because some Tuareg rebel groups such as the Arabic Islamic Front of Azawad, comprised mainly of the returning soldiers from Libya, did not attend these talks. The violence did continue, at the cost of estimated 6,000-8,000 lives before the Peace Pact was finally signed.

**Third Tuareg Rebellion**

The third Tuareg rebellion of 2006 was instigated following the kidnapping and execution of members of the Malian military. Insurgency began in May 2006 when military barracks in the Kidal region were attacked by a group of Tuareg army deserters. The rogue group then proceeded to ransack the barracks, seizing weapons and demanding greater autonomy & assistance in developing the northern region (Bowers, 2013).

President Amadou Toure reacted to this by partnering with a rebel coalition, Democratic Alliance for Change, in a bid to reach out to the Tuareg rebels and try to broker for peace by offering greater inclusivity and levels of autonomy. However, the Tuareg rebel groups by and large snubbed these advances and continued with the skirmishes. The Malian government’s had was forced and it had to respond with counter-insurgency measures that lay the backdrop for the current violence as it stands.

Since the presidential and parliamentary elections in 2013, President Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta re-introduced the rule of law and strengthened the National Assembly and the Constitutional Court on paper. In reality, both legislative bodies are heavily restricted through the influence of the executive. The president, for instance, chairs the High
Judicial Council, thus shaping legislative decisions. Moreover, the judiciary suffers from corruption and a lack of educated personnel and resources (Hoecke, 2011).

Apart from the governmental courts, some regions in the North rely on traditional, mostly religious, moral leaders deciding on what is right. As outlined in the Introduction, parallel institutions based on faith rather than on law are not in line with the Western understanding of the rule of law. However, some communities in Mali might see these moral leaders as legitimate (Fukuyama, 2014).

Before the military coup in 2012, Mali enjoyed rather stable democratic structures. Unfortunately, this progress dramatically changed in the aftermath of the putsch (Matera, 2014). Nowadays, Mali's democracy is slowly recovering, yet still working rather inefficient. One striking example of governmental inefficiency is the fact that three prime ministers have been appointed by the president since 2013. Currently, Modibo Keïta holds the office as prime minister.136 Radical groups and Islamist organizations in the country refuse the existent democratic structures and promote their ideas of legitimate institutions (Hillion, 2018).

Apart from that, Mali faces huge problems concerning the political integration of minority groups due to historically based frictions between ethnicities. Despite the fact that there is no leading ethnicity in the government (Van Vooren, 2014), the nomad tribes from the north, as well as Arabic minority groups, do not feel represented by the government. The Movement for the National Liberation of Azawad (MNLA), a Tuareg liberalization army, even tried to gain independence for the Azawad region, illustrating the non-acceptance of the Malian nation-state (Hadfield, 2017). Even though there is a vast amount of political parties registered in Mali, most of them are based on elitist
groups. Moreover, the functioning of the parliament is restricted by the unwritten law of finding a consensus, which most Malians regard as ultimately democratic (Ott, 2018).

According to the constitution, Mali is a secular state and does not allow its political parties to express religious stands. However, especially the Islamist movements stress the importance of traditional leaders as legitimate institutions. In the past, these leaders did influence political decisions despite the regulations laid down in the constitution. Apart from that, the Malian High Islamic Council is involved in politics as well, questioning Mali’s level of secularization (Beyer, 2018).

Moreover, the existing public administration structures in Mali were mainly implemented with the support of international donor organizations, pushing Mali into the direction of a democratic and decentralized system. However, the established institutions are not functioning effectively in all parts of the country, mainly because the national capacities do not reach rural areas. Furthermore, as the decision-making process only takes place in the South, the nomad people from the North do not feel included and represented by the government (Hillion & Wessel 2016). This cultural and geographical gap ultimately led to dual administration systems. While the institutions in the area of the capital Bamako are organized by public employees, the North is administered by both governmental institutions and local Tuareg leader structures, which hinders coherent cooperation (Kaunert, 2009). Furthermore, with 30 ministries under the hand of the government, the division of competences is oftentimes unclear. Moreover, financial support from international donor organizations operating in Mali leads to corrupt incentives for public employees.
Inadequate administration structures also influence the election processes. In the northern regions, a vast amount of the population lacks access to voting offices. This underdevelopment consequently leads to biased voting outcomes and underrepresentation of northern minority groups. According to international observers, the last presidential and parliamentary elections in 2013 were ‘generally free and fair (Merkert, 2012).

Resulting from the security crisis, the Malian government currently faces the challenge to combine multiple actors involved in the country including local as well as international donor organizations. Hence, Mali’s governance system is under constant surveillance as the government is dependent on international civilian and military aid (Piazza, 2018).

4.3 What is the relationship between marginalization and conflict in Mali?

Whereas northern Mali is presently viewed by Malian authorities as a problem area rather than area of unutilized potential, that has not been a true reflection of the kind of impact that the northern Mali region has had on the country as it is now (Chauzal & Van Damme, 2015). At the height of the trans-Saharan trade and royal pilgrimages to Mecca, the northern regions were considered as key contributors to the political power an economic prosperity of Mali. Owing to its geographic location, northern Mali was both an area of exploitation of very vibrant commercial trade and a meeting point among the Saharan, Arab and African worlds. Indeed, Timbuktu, as an example, aside from its more well-known history as the mecca of education in the world in that age, was an influential commercial metropolis where gold was negotiated, exchanged and sold to countries in the Maghreb, Mediterranean Gulf and European countries (Ravnkilde, 2013).

When the curtains fell on the great Malian empires of old, coupled with concerted French efforts at colonization many years later, the northern regions of Mali began to experience alienation from the center of power. In 1963, following the Malian government’s decision
to abandon the Common Organization of the Sahara Regions (OCSR) project barely five years after its inception, in a bid to avoid its own domestic nation-building objectives, fed a strong resistance to the clutches of the growing southern influence. Contextually, the OCSR membership had been deemed to be working as a counter-weight to the territorial and political domination of the predominantly southern led Malian government as it meant that the more traditional nomadic areas left to the preserve of the Tuareg had some umbrella body that would, if not for anything, create a platform where their issues would have been understood and stood better chance of being resolved (Ravnkilde, 2013).

Mali’s choice in exiting from the OCSR thus in effect buttressed the belief mostly among the Tuareg population of northern Mali that they had indeed been abandoned. Thus began what many believe is an observable trend in deliberate decisions to marginalize the north from the south. This had been further exacerbated by the southerners’ perception of the northern tribes. Owing to the long and often mythicized practice of “rezzou” or carrying out raids against the more sedentary southerners, the Tuareg are historically associated with insecurity and volatility; this coupled with what many southerners believe was a pivotal role the northerners played in the trans-Saharan trade, especially with regards to slave trade (Chauzal & Van Damme, 2015). However, part of the northerners too such as the Songhay or the Fulani fell victim of these attacks, but not much credence is given to this as it would serve to detract from the narrative that the northerners were hostile and unwelcoming to the southerners, hence the seeds of mistrust sown.

Since Mali’s independence in 1960, the northern Tuareg and Arab populace has never quite succeeded in fitting in or being integrated within the new Malian state model, having been regularly secluded and marginalized from positions of power and exclusion from enjoying the proverbial “national cake” (Muiderman, 2016). As a result, northern populations did not benefit directly from developmental programs, policies and directives.
unlike their counterparts from the south, who, to a certain extent, actually had. Additionally, the State’s rent was out of reach of the northern population owing to very limited representation in the country’s Parliament, in of itself purposeful as it was the result of a “divide & conquer” tactic aimed at weakening the north, perpetuated by the central Malian government and which was believed to have hit its peak during the rule of President Amadou Touré and which is still in effect in present day times. (Ravnkilde, 2013).

These “divide & conquer” tactics include practices such as electoral zoning to in effect ensure that northern regions had and still has imbalanced political representation so as to favor select groups of northerners who had been viewed as more receptive of French colonial initiatives at the expense of groups more hostile and rebellious. This did a great disservice to the Arab population of Mali who were ranked at the lowest Malian class of citizenship/belonging. The infighting served a greater purpose overall as it sought to keep the northern region engaged in internal wrangles that the central government could easily dissociate itself with, all the while advancing its own agenda over the area. As at 2013, for example, Zahabi Ould Sidi Mohamed was the first (and only) Arab representative to be elected for a position at the National Assembly (Ravnkilde, 2013). Post 2012 crisis, only 12 Tuareg representatives were elected, out of a possible 147 deputies, into the National Assembly.

Mali’s post-colonial era had been exclusively pioneered and dominated by a select class of Southern political and military elites, extremely familiar with each other owing to a host of several common factors such as schooling, work environments and clandestine democratic and/or anti-colonialism associations. Later on this was extended to similar political influences and international networks such as Internationale Socialiste and Pan African movements.
This “southern caucus” had been the leading contributor towards shaping and defining post-colonial Mali. The solidarity group ran Mali for its own corporate interests, spinning a southern nationalism narrative selectively when it suited their cause politically but without clearly addressing issues that affected the southern Mali population. The upshot of this was the creation of a central political society advocating for its own interests while using the southern nationalistic ground as a crutch and step-up towards consolidating control over Mali. In doing so, Mali became its own worst enemy in that it managed to turn regions against themselves so that the select class could continue to benefit in the midst of that bedlam.

Bamako attempted to implement gestures of reconciliation and openness towards the northern populations through absorbing and integrating northern elites into the state machinery. However, these thinly veiled mock up exercises were only symbolic in nature and intent, serving the greater purpose of using these influential northern elites to ‘manage’ problems up north. Such examples include elections of Nock ag Attia and Assarid ag Imbarcawane to the positions of Vice-President of the High Council of Regional Authorities and Vice-President of the National Assembly and appointment of Mohamed ag Hamani as Prime Minister under Amadou Toure (Chauzal & Van Damme, 2015).

Additionally, Malian authority also attempted unilateral assertion of their presence over rational authority, especially in the north, through the appointment of loyal southern military and civil servants. This was taken as an affront by the northern population no less than the manner in which the southern population appointees took it as a sign of punishment, considering the north as hostile and uninhabitable. As a result, many of these appointees took to heavy handed administration as a way to assert their rule and impose
central government authority, which served to fan the flames of discord between the northern and the southern people.

The French tried to rule the country's diverse population in a centralized manner, but the colonialists also had a fascination with what they deemed a quintessentially nomadic and free ethnic group. Thus, they did not force the Tuareg to change the nomadic lifestyle and allowed them freedom from the centralized rule. Instead, they sought to protect the Tuareg's way of life, allowing the clans to regulate their own internal affairs (Keenan, 2002).

However, they also realized how useful the Tuaregs might be (Klein: 1998; Keenan: 2002). In fact, the French were partly responsible for the privileged position of the Kel Adagh confederation. The French allied themselves with the Kel Adagh because they needed the support of a powerful local clan. The Kel Adagh was chosen by the French to help control trade routes and to secure the border from attack, particularly against the powerful Iwellemmedan confederation (Boilley: 2016; Pezard and Shurkin: 2013, 2015).

This placed the Kel Adagh in a privileged social and economic position with the French in Mali, and the Kel Adagh enjoyed good relations with the French up until independence (Bøas and Torheim 2013).
FIG 1.1 Organization of the Kel Adagh confederation


Kel Afella is the traditional leader (amenokal) of the Kel Adagh confederation.

In the late 1950s, the country sought independence. At the time of independence, Mali elected its first president, Modibo Keita, who ruled in a centralized mode as the French had (Sears, 2015). Keita sought to modernize and liberalize the country, seeing the Tuareg clans as inimical to this clans than the French had been during their colonization. Indeed, some scholars suggest that the French colonization of the Sahel may have been beneficial to some Tuareg confederations (Pezard and Shurkin: 2015).
That position disappeared when colonialism ended. The Tuaregs and specifically the Kel Adagh confederation went from being a privileged group in society to a marginalized one. This change in fortunes after independence has been a primary cause of upheaval in Mali.


The Tuareg lifestyle of nomadism "was looked upon as an obstacle to such modernization and development in general. Keita argued, for instance, that the sedentarization of nomads was important in order to develop the new nation and to convert nomads into 'productive' citizens by having them take up farming" (Benjaminsen, 2018). "Sedentarization" refers to the process of converting nomadic people into agrarian people making nomads into farmers. According to many scholars, the pressure to modernize from the Keita regime, particularly for nomadic northern Malians, is both a cultural and economic infringement (Lecocq, 2014). It is justifiable to argue that, this early economic repression is a root cause of Tuareg discontent, particularly since the French colonialists had allowed the Tuaregs freedom to practice a Nomadic lifestyle.

In addition to the economic opposition of the Tuareg, "the Kel Adagh were discontent for social and cultural reasons. Seeing themselves as ‘white’ nomads, they refused to submit to rule by ‘black’ farmers and refused the concept of equality implicit in the Malian ideal of citizenship" (Harmon, 2014). They opposed the new Keita regime on the grounds that they were nomadic peoples, equally residents of the countries surrounding Mali, and
resented being ruled by individuals that they considered being of an inferior race (Giuffrida: 2005; Cline: 2013; Harmon: 2014).

The Malian government was perceived as illegitimate and the Tuareg did not see themselves as Malians. The problem persists today, as Tuaregs see themselves as ethnically and racially distinct from both black Malians in the south and Arabs in the wider region. Whereas the French had treated the Tuareg in an almost reverential way for their nomadic freedom and saw them at least as instrumental to security and economic gain in the North, the new Malian government viewed the Tuaregs as a problem to be dealt with (Sears: 2015).

Based on the backdrop, it is safe to argue that, this shift in status and economic influence has been responsible, in some measure, for much of the discontent in Mali for the past several decades. Mali makes the bulk of its income from gold, which constitutes from 59% -70% of annual exports, yet according to the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative International Secretariat, the majority of people have not received the benefits from this mineral wealth (Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative, 2015).

Historically, the Malian central government (and the French government before it) has managed resources in ways that create discontent among northern minorities (Jalali: 2013). Mali is one of the most underdeveloped countries in the world (CIA Factbook: 2015). Its northern regions are particularly arid and difficult to cultivate, with desertification increasing over the past few decades (World Trade Organization, 2015).

The Tuareg clans have survived there for centuries because of their nomadic lifestyle. However, the French government, in a desire to ascertain who owned the land during the colonial period, generated long-standing discontent in the north. The problem originated because the French Forestry Service could not determine who owned large swathes of
northern Mali. To make such a determination, the French model meant that ownership was established through productive use, which generally meant farming (Benjaminsen: 2017). “Thus, pastoralism, the collection of wood and gathering of wild grains, fruits, and medicinal plants outside the European notion of property which was used” (Benjaminsen 2017).

To make matters worse, agents recruited to enforce French forestry policy were often from military and police backgrounds and they operated as such (Benjaminsen, 2017). After independence, Mali’s first two leaders, Keita and Traoré, both maintained the strict agricultural and forestry laws put in place by the French. Modibo Keita’s regime introduced an “Agrarian Reform” in 1963, in which agricultural “land was redistributed according to the principle of ‘first occupier’, which penalized absent pastoralists and migrant” (Giuffrida, 2015).

The 1963 rebellion began, in large part, because of these ethnically insensitive economic policies (Lecocq 2014; Bøás and Torheim: 2013). This economic marginalization by the central government, paired with already scarce resources, has had the dual effect of creating conflict and also of impairing its ability to be sustained (Humphreys: 2015; Whitehouse: 2015).

The Malian central government was so hostile to the Tuareg nomads that they labeled the northern pastures "le Mali inutile" (useless Mali), and this marginalization helped result in the goal. Ag Baye (2013) asserts that the new Malian government was more hostile to the Tuareg first revolt in 1963 (Lecocq: 2014; Benjaminsen: 2018). Shortly after French occupation, the problem of conflicting Tuaregs and Malian nationalisms arose. Moreover, shortly after gaining independence, the Malian government attempted to reduce the power
of the chiefs in the north, seeing their powerful positions as relics of French colonialism (Harmon, 2014).

One particularly offensive policy to the nomadic Tuaregs was the government’s effort to regulate the movement of livestock across borders. The Kel Adagh “regarded a cattle tax and customs duties imposed in February 1962, as well as the creation of the Malian franc to curtail illegal exports, especially cattle, as hurtful to their interests. Their main export was cattle, many of which they sent to the oasis towns of the Algerian Touat in exchange for commodities” (Harmon, 2014).

However, Lecocq challenges this explanation by noting that the Tuaregs did not rebel because they paid high taxes. They rebelled because they did not pay the taxes, and the Malian central government dispatched the army to northern Mali to enforce the new taxes. In Lecocq’s (2012) view, the real source of the 1963 uprising stemmed from this attempt at political and economic coercion. Subsequently, the violent reaction of the Malian government to the first Tuareg uprising laid the foundation for future revolt in the country.

The Keita government’s desire to sedentarise the nomadic Tuareg people has been the basis of each successive rebellion. During his administration, and particularly during the Traoré administration, development aid often found its way into the hands of elite supporters of these regimes rather than to the northern communities who needed it (Gutelius: 2017).

This same pattern of marginalization characterized each subsequent Tuareg rebellion (Krings, 2015). For decades, the Malian central government has promised decentralization and has delivered on such promises to varying degrees. At the time of independence, the Tuaregs asked for several concessions from the Keita administration,
such as teaching in Arabic instead of French, greater regional autonomy and an autonomous police force (Seely. 2011).

All demands were categorically denied, and little effort was made to incorporate the northern Tuaregs and Arabs into government roles (Klute, 2013). Similar demands were made and somewhat met, in the early 1990s. Yet even after that rebellion, Sears (2015) notes, "The promise of the Peoples’ Revolution, which helped precipitate multiparty democracy in 1991–1992, has been thwarted by ongoing and excessive dominance by the executive branch (especially from the President's office), as well as incomplete and poorly implemented administrative decentralization and devolution." Moreover, the state is reluctant to devolve too many powers to the northern rural population, because they are skeptical that the "illiterate rural population will be capable of organizing elections, collecting taxes, and so forth" (Benjaminsen, 2017).

Interestingly, efforts by Bamako to fight some forms of repression, particularly the repression of women, have further fanned the flames of discontent among Tuareg clans. In 2009, when the Malian government introduced legislation to reform the Code de la Famille to provide more rights to women, religious leaders organized mass protests (Cline, 2013). This marked a shift in the factors motivating civil conflict. Far from reacting to repressive government tactics, this effort to alleviate a particular form of oppression resulted in a further schism between the north and the south.

4.4 What is the role of external players in resolving the Malian conflict?

Throughout most of 2012, Mali was in a state of deep crisis. Its political institutions were in disarray following a military coup. Its territorial integrity was threatened by a secessionist conflict in the north with the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) and other actors, and its people were facing displacement, acute hunger
and violence. Some of the most active responses to this state of affairs came from Mali's neighbors, in the form of diplomatic interventions by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and eventually an African Union (AU)-led push for a UN-authorised military intervention (Associated Press Africa, 2013).

The first response of regional bodies and neighboring states was to try to mediate a resolution to Mali's political crisis. ECOWAS denounced the March coup and urged the junta to ‘immediately relinquish power to the rightful Government so that the country could return to constitutional normality'. It also called for the MNLA to lay down its arms (BBC 2013a).

On 30 March 2012, it imposed economic and diplomatic sanctions on Mali, and ECOWAS member states bordering Mali closed their borders, thereby blocking Mali's access to neighboring seaports. Thereafter, ECOWAS focused on political negotiations to remove the military junta. President Blaise Compaoré of Burkina Faso was appointed the lead negotiator, and an agreement was reached in April outlining a transition to civilian government under an interim president, parliamentary speaker Dioncounda Traoré.1 The following August, after a brief reassertion of control by the junta and continued intimidation of civilian politicians, a government of national unity was formed (BBC, 2013b).

ECOWAS' approach came under increasing pressure as extremists in the north took advantage of the lack of clear political leadership in Bamako to extend their control. Although it advocated for a military mission (the ECOWAS Mission in Mali (MICEMA)), this idea did not come to fruition; the organization did not have the political clout or financial resources to go ahead without international assistance, but donors were
reluctant to back the proposal because they were skeptical that ECOWAS forces would be equal to the conditions in northern Mali (Willis, 2013).

Meanwhile, in April the AU imposed sanctions, asset freezes and travel bans against the junta and others deemed to be involved in ‘contributing to the “destabilization” of Mali’ (CNN, 2016). The following June MICEMA was transformed into the African-led International Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA), thereby making it an African, rather than a West African, initiative (Théroux Bénoni, 2017a).

However, before AFISMA could be deployed the hand of the international community was forced when some 1,200 extremist militants – primarily from Ansar Dine and MUJAO – launched an offensive towards the south and threatened an advance on the capital, prompting Traoré to call on France, the old colonial power, to intervene (Chanda, 2015).

With French support, ECOWAS called both for political negotiation and military intervention in the form first of MICEMA and then, as the AU became involved, AFISMA. However, key states outside of ECOWAS – Mauritania and Algeria – blocked these efforts, and the UN was also reluctant to provide logistical and financial support. Reservations about the intervention centered on the weakness and illegitimacy of the administration in Bamako that it would be supporting, doubts about its longer-term security strategy concerns around ECOWAS’ tense relations with the political leadership in Bamako and the fact that AFISMA did not have the necessary equipment or combat experience (Loeuillet, 2015).

Although the AU was crucial in securing broader political support for the mission – and a UN mandate – by framing it in a more global perspective (preventing jihadists from establishing a base in northern Mali as a launching pad for attacks outside the region)
(Théroux-Bénoni, 2017b), ECOWAS remained the effective lead and implementer of the plan and the ‘key regional partner institution for Western states’ (Lacher, 2018).

The French intervention was never intended to be a long-term solution to Mali’s problems, and the French sought to make the mission multilateral quickly so as to reduce their involvement. As such, AFISMA was transformed into a UN mission on the explicit understanding that it would be better equipped and financed in such an arrangement – and that African troops would continue to engage ‘robustly’ (RFI, 2017). MINUSMA has a similar composition to AFISMA, and about the same compliment, with around 6,000 personnel.

Although in accordance with the policy of both the AU Peace and Security Council and the UN, the speed of the handover from the AU to the UN – AFISMA deployed January 2013, and ‘rehatted' just six months later – was unusual.2 Several AU missions have been rehatted under the UN, but previous handovers have been fraught with delay and disagreement – and expected handovers have not materialized. For example, the AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS) had its mandate extended four times beyond the scheduled handover date of March 2006, and it was not until December 2007 that the UN finally took control of the mission, forming the new AU–UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) (Oxfam, 2018).

In terms of political and diplomatic action, the EU took part in the last five Donor Conferences for Mali. Moreover, the Union cooperates through political dialogue with the Malian government tackling issues on constitutional conditions, governance, internal mediation, security and defense policies, the inclusion of northern Mali, human rights and peace agreements and talks with the Tuareg and other armed groups. Furthermore, the EU
strengthens cooperation with international actors involved in Mali such as the UN (Moti, 2018).

Following Mali’s appeal to support its national army with relevant know-how concerning military actions, logistics, and human resources, the EU introduced a military training mission, called EUTM Mali (EUTM Mali), in 2013. The mission provides training support and advice and is not involved in any military operations (The European Union and Sahel Factsheet). In 2015, the EU added another CSDP civilian mission in order to strengthen Mali’s internal security bodies. The aim of the mission was to contribute to the democratization process of the country by improving the security situation and supporting political authorities (Larémont, 2015).

With the high amount of 225 million EUR, the Union contributes to state-building initiatives in Mali. For development, good governance and internal conflict resolution, the EU spent 727.8 million EUR from the 10th EDF for the improvement of governance systems in Northern Mali and 225 million EUR for public administration systems and anti-corruption measures. Furthermore, financial assets for judicial reforms decentralization mechanisms and strengthened government effectiveness in the North. Planned actions are government reforms to improve the rule of law and further decentralization processes (Tannock, 2013).

For the fight against terrorism, a comparatively low amount of 3 million EUR is provided from the IcSP for political dialogue and 5 million EUR from the EDF in order to solve conflicts in the region. The EU tackles the main problems of weak governance and public institutions as well as instability in Mali with adequate financial and training measures. A high amount of money is spent on governance structures as compared to counter-terrorism initiatives (Mix, 2013).
However, there is little doubt that France has been the leading European actor attempting to manage the crisis in Mali. Despite encouragement from the European Parliament to go alongside Paris, EU Member States seem to have let France go mostly alone in handling the situation in Mali in terms of an offensive security response. With other EU member-states providing support ‘from behind to Serval. Germany and the UK both excluded a priori any boots-on-the-ground option and limited their contributions respectively to refueling components, and to airlift and transport. Belgium and Denmark volunteered needed support. Southern European countries such as Italy and Spain, directly concerned by the consequences of instability in the Sahel, did not opt for any major involvement, apart from some logistics (Keenan, 2017).

In terms of division of labor between the various components of EU's external action, France and the EU institutions (the European Commission, the Council, and the European External Action Service – EEAS) found a compromise on a division of labor which suited them all. Because they have more or less been stuck with this division of labor up until now, there is some sense of coherence in this geometry of the EU’s external action. At the administrative level, the bureaucratic nature of the EU system is such that interdepartmental tensions within the EEAS or between the EEAS and the Directorate General for Development Cooperation (DEVCO) are almost unavoidable, and policies towards Mali are not an exception. This being said, some coordination has been made at various levels and in several circumstances, to feed into the work of the Council, which discusses Mali on a monthly basis: an inter-service mission was sent to Mali as early as February 2013 in the view to planning post-crisis interventions, and a another one in May on reconciliation issues, to mention but a few. The deep involvement and strong leadership of France (with an efficient network of seconded national experts or French
civil servants in EU structures), supported in the Council, has perhaps also boosted the

On the flip side, if viewed from the ambit of financial gain, Northern Mali is widely
regarded as being very promising in terms of the financial potential that can be attained
from the exploration, extraction, processing and exportation of its natural mineral
deposits. According to a study carried out by Authority for Oil Research (Autorité pour la
recherche pétrolière, AUREP), an service that set up in 2005 by the Malian government
and working under the Secretariat General, Ministry of Mines, the subsoil of Gao,
Timbuktu and Kidal could contain natural gas and oil deposits in the region of
850,000km² (Studer, 2013). To this end, four main basins have been identified namely:

i. Tamensa (halfway between Mali and Niger)

ii. ‘graben de Gao

iii. Taoudeni (in the borderland of Mauritania, Mali and Algeria)

iv. ‘rift de Nara’ (close to Mopti region)

Such is the area’s massive potential that foreign companies have been tempted into
pouring resources into the region in a bid to cash in on the natural resource.
SONATARCH, Algeria’s national oil company has made massive prospecting operations
in the Taoudeni basin to the tune of 60 Million USD (Bayle, 2014). Following the
disruption of prospective activities in 2012 owing to the crisis and ensuing chaos, Algeria
approached the central government with a view to resuming its activities in the northern
Mali region, but the same appears to have slackened off (Chauzal & Van Damme, 2015).
Northern Mali is also believed to be rich in ore sites for uranium, as evidenced by a potential 200 tonne ore site in Gao area, specifically Sammit ("Presentation of the Journées Minières et pétrolières du Mali,", 2019) However, even in the wake of such opportunities ripe for exploitation, central government remains largely inert on the issue. Whereas they may have justifiable claims with regard to the potential outbreak of violence erupting as several parties may arise, each claiming a stake, the flip side of the narrative is that the Malian government is not too keen on jumpstarting development up north and in effect alleviating the poverty burden that the region feels is unfairly placing on the rest of the nation, as well as robbing them of the opportunity to experience growth and development primarily as persons to whom the mining sites are closest.

Furthermore, the manner in which Authority for Oil Research (Autorité pour la recherche pétrolière, AUREP) presented its findings would be a clear indicator that the underlying motives were to outsource for investors, giving priority to foreigners thus creating an unnecessary complication when the issue of repatriation of funds arises (Chauzal & Van Damme, 2015). From the perspective of the north, this blatant overlooking has continued to feed into the narrative that they are largely unwanted and viewed as the problem in Mali, whereas the south feels that such kind of policies are rightly justified as they curtail the progress of the northern region who have outclassed them in aspects such as combat, thus in effect under-developing the north for extended periods of time has ensured that they cannot continue their conquests in the south (Chauzal & Van Damme, 2015). Thus neighbouring countries such as Algeria, by virtue of having vested interests in Mali, would benefit from having stability within the region.
4.5 Analysis and Conclusion

The Mali crisis has demonstrated the ability of regional organizations to respond to emergencies, as well as highlighting their limitations in the security, political and humanitarian spheres. The shifting lead relationship between ECOWAS, the AU and the UN has also highlighted tensions in how these organizations relate to one another. As the situation evolves the involvement of regional organizations, however, appears to be waning.

The Mali crisis brought to the fore challenges not only in the relationship between the AU and the UN but also within the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). In theory, the AU establishes rules of cooperation with regional economic communities which should guide complementary action, within which the AU’s role has primacy, irrespective of which body actually takes the lead.

In practice, the relationship between the AU and ECOWAS has been marked by rivalry, tension and a lack of coordination (International crisis group, 2013). It is not clear what role either ECOWAS or the AU will have in Mali now that the handover to MINUSMA has taken place. Given that the involvement of ECOWAS and the AU will now decline and evolve, it remains to be seen what direction this will take and what lessons these organizations will draw from the experience. However, it is clear from the above discussion that, ECOWAS was the first multilateral institution to propose a military intervention in Mali and to begin to compose a force, though these plans were superseded by AU involvement and then supplanted to some extent by the French and Chadian intervention. Now that the AU/ECOWAS force AFISMA has transitioned to a UN mission it is important that ECOWAS remains to become involved in the humanitarian and security functions.
However, it is also important to note that, ECOWAS has deliberately branded itself as focused on human security, human rights, poverty, and humanitarian concerns, and it has recently released a lengthy policy position piece on humanitarian assistance, which includes plans for a greater role in facilitating aid provision. Yet there remains a gap between the development of policies and institutions for humanitarian action within ECOWAS and their implementation. However, in the Mali crisis, there was no significant tangible attention to the needs of people affected by the conflict: it did not play a role in aid coordination and access, act as a donor or service provider or address IHL or human rights abuses against non-combatants.

There is no comprehensive approach in Mali, without the recognition that France has been the most relevant level of EU action to re-establish physical security. What the crisis tells us about the EU’s comprehensive approach in external action is that it has to include the Member States in its scope.

The French and European pro-activeness may have had a counter-effect on the self-esteem of ECOWAS and West Africa in general on being able to provide solutions themselves, especially because the sub-regional organization was depicted as the most advanced experience in the African Peace and Security Architecture until the Malian crisis. Additionally, some gaps have temporarily reappeared between many Western African states and other regions of the continent, within the AU and between the AU and some RECs. Yet, at a political level, the discourse is much more positive: the "multilateral and inclusive" way Africans (mainly via ECOWAS) and Europeans (mainly via France and EU institutions) have tackled threats in Mali indicates a reset of Africa-Europe relations on peace and security.
The crisis in Mali confirmed the need for strong regional cooperation frameworks in Africa, seriously and genuinely backed up by their Member States, able to find common solutions to transnational and cross border challenges. At the same time, it also deepened a crack existing in the APSA, by separating Western and Northern African dynamics from Eastern and Southern ones. Secondly, it has re-affirmed an old policy template according to which France is playing an essential military and political role in this part of Africa. Finally, it confirmed the acute need for de-radicalization and the need for dialogue and research on the role of transnational radical Islam in Mali, Western and Northern African societies, in relation with pro-development public policies, beyond security interventions.

In addition, the case of Mali indicates that what seems to matter in the future is the existence of strong leadership on both European and African sides, lively diplomatic and secure communication channels, and well-prepared capabilities to react to unforeseen multidimensional, cross-border and cross-regional challenges. The fact that France's intervention was conceived as a temporary endeavor in coordination with Western African states indicates that Africa-Europe relations on peace and security in the Sahel have changed gear: it is not either/or (either European or African intervention, either a French, European or an African problem); it has become a joint challenge to be tackled together with available capabilities and resources reflecting the financial, military and technical asymmetry between both sides, in a "multilateral and inclusive" fashion.

It is also important to acknowledge the role of internal players as their actions deeply compromise the stability of the northern region. The Malian conflict has been instigated and perpetuated by several parties. Each of these parties has had varying motivations, interests and levels of involvement in the grand scheme of things. Owing to the
multiplicity of actors involved, central Mali has at times found itself stretched thin in terms of allocating resources so as to battle these uprisings (Badale & Isvoranu, 2013).

The National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) remains one such group, territorially occupying the north-eastern area of Mali, around the Adrar de Ifoghas Mountains. This is because of the security group members feel owing to the familiarity over the area’s terrain and the heavy Ansar Dine presence further west and south around Timbuktu (Thurston & Lebovich, 2013). The group is an amalgamation of two separate factions, Mouvement Touareg du Nord Mali (MTNM) and Mouvement National de l’Azawad (MNA) that were able to merge as one and in so doing consolidated territory, soldiers, equipment and ideologies as motivational factors, seeing them rise to be among the leading militia/insurgent groups in Mali (Badale & Isvoranu, 2013).

The Ansar Dine, which roughly translates to ‘defenders of the faith’, is widely regarded as the strongest militant force in Mali and it emerged in 2012. The group enjoys support from several hitherto unknown and unnamed sources, but which nevertheless ensure that the group is well taken care of in terms of money, arms and other needs. The group also actively takes part in jihadi teachings and is organised into cells that carry out recruitment mainly of young boys in the regions that they occupy. Interestingly, it was formed as a break-away coalition by its leader, Iyad Ag Ghaly, who had failed to garner leadership in another rebel formation, the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA).

The Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) is also another faction currently engaged with Malian governmental forces. The group evolved from an Algerian group, the Salafist Group for Call and Combat (GSPC) and drew inspiration for its name following a merger with the infamous Al-Qaeda group in 2007. The group’s ultimate goal is to topple the Algerian government and impose its take on Islamic rule on the Algerian people. The
group took advantage of Mali’s weakened state security machinery to firmly establish itself in the northern Mali region, where the local northern population has welcomed it. The group also has strong ties with the Ansar Dine faction given that the leaders of both factions have had previous interactions in the past (Badale & Isvoranu, 2013).

On the flip side, the Malian government forces have been at the forefront in combating these insurgent groups. The Government forces are between 6,000-7,000 strong, comprising of several regiments such as the land forces, air force and a paramilitary Gendarmerie. As valiantly as the government forces have fought in trying to suppress these bouts of insurgency, they also face their fair share of hitches, being underpaid, stretched too thin and found wanting in terms of loyalty to the state given that Mali has experienced its fair share of military coups in its history since independence.

The southern Malians have also not been left behind too as some of them have banded together to form armed militia groups. Presently, there are over 15 major militia groups although the two at the forefront are the Northern Mali Liberation Front (FLNM) and the Patriotic Resistance Front (PRF). The main agenda and motivations behind the militias have been to contain and repel the radicalised northern Mali Islamic population from the south. This has seen them grow in rank owing to a large number of Malians of African descent being frustrated with the continued occupation of Arab and Tuareg populations whose sole aim is to sow seeds of anarchy and destruction within Mali. These groups often work independently, not partnering with the Malian government forces in as much as both entities fight for a common cause. The Malian militia groups mostly rely on guerrilla tactics owing to their limited resources and military training (Badale & Isvoranu, 2013).
In conclusion, though the government and armed groups signed a peace agreement in May 2015, none of the parties to the agreement would speak directly to one another and international actors wrote the agreement. For the average Malian, though security is important, placing so much emphasis on it at the expense of other social services misses the point. Malians, particularly in the north of the country, desire incorporation and inclusion without a loss of identity. The new agreement fails to recognize this.

According to the International Crisis Group (2015):

"It prioritizes the restoration of order and stability rather than aiming to meet a desire for genuine change that runs deep among northern populations. The agreement makes scant mention of issues like access to basic social services, jobs or justice concerns at the heart of popular demands. Prioritizing security overshadows the need to restore the state's social function across the Malian territory".

Without addressing government corruption, clientelism, and the redundant and outmoded models of decentralization, Mali is unlikely to see much improvement in relations between the public in the rural north and the government in Bamako.

In addition, France's swift intervention in Mali in 2012 was key to halting the advancing rebels. In 2014, France also established counter-terrorism operations in Burkina Faso, Chad, Mauritania, and Niger, with no indication of when it may leave those countries (Reeve & Pelter 2014). It is safe to conclude that, France's involvement in the region has less to do with security and more to do with resources. On the other hand, Western involvement provides yet another security hurdle for Mali. If individuals in the country see the government as a puppet of France or the West, future rebellion seems much more likely.

Mali’s History of conflict paired with its government’s typical unresponsiveness to northern demands promotes uncertainty and instability in a country that is already a tinderbox.
The following chapter provides recommendations for these predicaments.

4.6 Limitations

The study encountered several limitations, but this did not affect the quality of the research. One of the limitations was the collection of primary data. The researcher did not get enough time to collect data from the field. The use of primary data was also expensive to the researcher as it required the researcher to travel to Mali. Hence, the study was limited to secondary sources of data.

In addition, assessing the role that regional actors have played in addressing humanitarian issues is limited by the largely desk-based nature of this paper.
CHAPTER FIVE: SUMMARY, CONCLUSION, AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 Introduction

This chapter provides a summary, conclusion, and recommendations based on the findings in chapter four.

5.2 Summary

Following the topic of governance and conflict, this research specifically focused on the conflict in Mali and its governance process. Thereby, this thesis aimed at answering the following research questions: What are the failures of the Malian Government in preventing and solving the conflict? What is the relationship between marginalization and conflict in Mali? What is the role of external players in resolving the Malian conflict?

The introductory chapter gave an overview of the background of the problem and outlined the academic state of the art by conceptualizing the most important terms and presenting existing research on the relationship between governance and conflict. Following the background of this study, the government of Mali was the initial root cause of the violent conflict in the region, following their disproportionate violence against the Tuaregs in the colonial era. The initial ethnic protests in northern Mali were “crushed” by the Malian central government, which sought to implement rapidly its industrialist, socialist vision of Mali (Sears, 2015). Perhaps if that initial revolt had been dealt with politically rather than violently, we would not see the country in its current situation. Instead, the descendants of many fighters killed in the first Tuareg uprising are still fighting for greater autonomy in northern Mali. With the emergence of radical Islam in the region, Mali faces new challenges that threaten its stability and stability in the region.
In chapter two, the influx of Islamic extremists in Mali in the past decade and the subsequent overthrow of the Malian president in 2012 brought the country’s historical struggles back into sharp focus. Though France has borne most of the security burden in Mali, a number of countries, including the United States, have committed troops to peacekeeping efforts in Mali. With my research, I tried to contribute to the existing literature by assessing the link between, the conflict in Mali, its governance and external actors.

Chapter four verified the assumptions outlined in the theory section. According to protracted social conflict by Edward Azar, the four possible consequences of protracted social conflict are Deterioration of physical security, Institutional Deformity, Psychological Ossification, Increased Dependency & Cliency. Coming back to the research questions, my findings point out that, the tension between AU and ECOWAS in resolving the conflict in Mali limits their ability in resolving this predicament and this has also led to the decline in the involvement of resolving the conflict, which is vital in this conflict. While ECOWAS has deliberately branded itself as focused on human security, human rights, poverty, and humanitarian concerns, and it has recently released a lengthy policy position piece on humanitarian assistance, which includes plans for a greater role in facilitating aid provision, there remains a gap between the development of policies and institutions for humanitarian action within ECOWAS and their implementation.

The French and European pro-activeness may have had a counter-effect on the self-esteem of ECOWAS and West Africa in general on being able to provide solutions themselves, especially because the sub-regional organization was depicted as the most advanced experience in the African Peace and Security Architecture until the Malian crisis. In addition, there is a lot of dependency on western actors to control and mitigate the conflict both financially and militarily. The EU has contributed a lot financially to
support the end of the conflict, but the funds given do not help due to mismanagement of the funds and also corruption in the region. These findings support the arguments given by Edward Azar in the protracted social conflict theory.

5.3 Conclusion

Mali teaches valuable lessons about the results of unresolved political and economic grievances and about the potential for democratic countries to become entangled by the opportunism of terror groups. This case study also teaches the value of restraint when political leaders are faced with public protest.

Nevertheless, if the Malian central government is to gain the trust of the northern Tuaregs, it must first tackle issues of governance, corruption, and impunity that have derailed decentralization and development over the past few decades. Unfortunately, at present, the outlook is bleak.

The issues affecting Mali have regional dimensions that call for meaningful participation from countries outside of the ECOWAS zone. While ECOWAS does appear to offer the most functional framework for a regional response, its limitations and the relationships between its member states should be factored into any analysis of how to support a response to the crisis at this level. Context analysis must continually seek to look beyond national borders and the ‘usual suspects' to fully appreciate where most leverage will be found.

Additionally, the new government must address claims of impunity in order to further stabilize the country. Moreover, though both sides have finally agreed to a peace accord, neither the government nor the rebels are happy with the agreement and fresh skirmishes have broken out. This uneasy settlement does not bode well for the future security of Mali.
Like so many post-colonial countries in Africa, Mali is struggling with how to incorporate different ethnic groups within one nation-state. For Mali, northern tribes should continue to receive devolved powers. But if the country is to stave off Islamic extremists, it cannot let devolution of powers dissolve into the abandonment of the region, as was the case in 2012. Malian officials in Bamako must recognize the differences in custom and lifestyle of those in the north while allowing them greater representation in a functional government.

With the lapse of about 70 years following the Bretton Woods Conference that led to the formation of both the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, the international community continues to be alive to the fact that development in of itself is not stagnant, that improving the quality of development is equally as important as the level of development achieved. Thus, with this in mind, the scope of analyzing development has slowly been rethought and reworked to now include underlying determinants related to governance ("World Development Report 2017: Governance and the Law", 2017).

Among policy makers, there is the realization that new frameworks have to be created together with utility of new analytical tools in order to sift through the growing body of evidence as to the factors that ought to be considered as opposed to those that shouldn’t. The driving factor behind this is that policy does not exist in a vacuum. Rather, it is a creature born in as a result of interactions of several actors with unequal bargaining power in complex social and political settings each keen on furthering their own interests, sometimes to the detriment of each other.

Previously, World Development Reports had succeeded in shedding light on ways of solving some of the most challenging problems in key areas of development such as stability of the job market, mitigating risks and shocks a country was likely to face as well
as addressing complex societal imbalances such as gender inequality. However, there is a shift being witnessed whereby other parameters such as better utilization of institutional, behavioral and technological instruments have begun to be developed with a view to improving state efficacy as far as development is involved ("World Development Report 2017: Governance and the Law", 2017).

As a result of this paradigm shift in terms of reasoning, the realization that policy formulation at any level in of itself demands a new focal point in order to be effective became apparent. This was due to the fact that, in taking into consideration inherent inequalities such as unequal bargaining power, it would be wishful thinking to appeal to a sense of hope that parties would willingly conform to “best practice” policies even though there was a chance that the same would actually be unfavorable to them. Such policies would require a re-adjustment and refocusing institutional forms in a manner that would cater to both collective action problems as well as specific commitment by the relevant actors involved.

The World Development Reports proposed a new three pronged approach towards rethinking governance for development. The first limb would be with regard to expanding the context of institutions to include both their form and function equally, rather than favoring one at the expense of the other. The second limb would be with regard to being alive to and factoring in power asymmetric within the ambit of capacity development for the different actors involved. This would be with regard to choice of capacity building, investment in actors with the goal of improving and ultimately utilizing this capacity. The third limb would involve reshaping the consideration of law, not just for its authoritative use (rule of law) but its presence, amenability and pliability (role of law) ("World Development Report 2017: Governance and the Law", 2017).
With regard to Mali, the same approach becomes relevant when all factors are considered. The northern and southern populations are pretty much polar opposites in many aspects. Whereas the northern region had previously enjoyed vast authority over the general Mali area, the passage of time had brought with it a change of guard. Presently, an analysis of central government’s actions, policies formulated and implementation thereof indicate visible partiality, with the north being on the receiving end. Given then, that this does not augur well with them, as they feel left out, isolated, unimportant and expendable, the north has chosen to react by retaliating and pushing back through violence as a way to capture the attention of the central Mali government.

Granted, that the road to development is not one of linear progressions, adaptability is the biggest strength of this model. The system has to be able to take cognizance of changes in society and the flow of bargaining power and empower its laws and institutions to be able to flex, bend and warp to extents necessary to accommodate the same. This ultimately ensures that on a balance of probabilities, policy and in effect governance is constantly improving. ("World Development Report 2017: Governance and the Law", 2017).

Indeed the narrative can be repurposed as so, so as to ensure development. (Ali, 2001) posits that governance, conflict management and state restructuring are interconnected. To this, he further expounds by denouncing the more commonly believed narrative that Africa’s ethno-diversity condemns it to perpetual civil strife. He instead offers a solution, beginning by stating that socially fractionalised states such as African countries need careful management of the actual lurking impediments to development such as poverty, political exclusion, undevelopment and under-employment in order to realise healthy and sustainable progress. He suggests that Africa ought to seek inclusive, participatory and positive politics/policies if it is to at all turn the negative notion around itself.
Well-functioning states share certain fundamentals as ideals, in as much as the manner of implementation/execution may vary. (Ali, 2001) gives the example of ‘consensual democracy’ in Japan as contrasted with unitary liberal democracy in parts of Europe. These ideals include the capacity to maintain nationwide peace, law & order, security of individual liberty and equality before the law, security of property rights and proper dispute resolution mechanisms and last but not least, working checks and balances countering arbitrary exercises of power.

(Ali, 2001) in his analysis of African states, arrives at the conclusion that the period after colonisation when most states were getting independence were their most pivotal, to which some such as Congo, had not been properly prepared for. He continues to state that it is uncertainty left to brood unchecked that led to much of the problems as many of the colonial regimes had been exclusionary and suppressive thus he maintains that, in some countries, the same had been left to proceed unchecked for extended periods of time, culminating in instances of factional clamours for power.

Resolving conflicts and building peace are more complex variables than preventing war. To this end, a government desirous of ending civil strife would know better than to renge on peace pacts. Such was the case in Mali with president Amadou Toure in 2016 choosing to broker for peace rather than going on the offensive, only launching counter-insurgency operations as a last ditch effort at preserving the integrity of the state. Peace building directives are multi-dimensional and include demobilisation of combatant factions, rehabilitation and eventual reabsorption into the general public as well as economic rehabilitation including repair and improvement of infrastructure. Thus the move from war to peace involves long term systemic and intentional commitment to economic, political and social transformations (Ali, 2001).
5.4 Recommendation

For further research, I would recommend an impact analysis of government and conflict in other conflict-affected regions in the third world such as Sudan and Somalia. Another interesting research would be to analyze the influence of the measures taken by the external actors in these regions. In addition, more remains to be learned about the role that regional organizations have had, perhaps behind the scenes and on the ground. Nonetheless, the regional response to the Mali crisis underscores the need to move beyond African regional organizations' political and military functions and more fully examine their humanitarian role, which so far is aspirational rather than operational.

I would also recommend that the Demobilization of combatant factions, rehabilitation and eventual reabsorption into the general public as well as economic rehabilitation including repair and improvement of infrastructure be accelerated and conducted by Minusma; the Setting up a committee that would champion and promote the cultural and linguistic diversity of Mali in the hopes of bringing National Unity be initiated and finally, the establishment of a defense and security system based on the principles of unity, inclusivity and representativity to bring all parties together, fighting against a common enemy; Terrorism in the region.
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