EXAMINING THE USE OF FORCE BY POLICE AS A DRIVING FACTOR TO YOUTH RADICALISATION AND RECRUITMENT IN KENYA

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Declaration

I hereby declare that all the information in this research project report is my original work and has not been presented in any other institution other than the United States International University-Africa for academic credit.

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<td>AMISOM</td>
<td>African Union Mission in Somalia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ATPU</td>
<td>Anti-Terrorism Police Unit</td>
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<td>COK</td>
<td>Constitution of Kenya</td>
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<tr>
<td>CID</td>
<td>Criminal Investigations Department</td>
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<td>DCI</td>
<td>Directorate of Criminal Investigations</td>
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<td>DPP</td>
<td>Director of Public Prosecutions</td>
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<td>CIPEV</td>
<td>Commission of Inquiry into the Post-Election Violence</td>
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<td>EJE</td>
<td>Extra-Judicial Executions</td>
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<td>IAU</td>
<td>Internal Affair Unit</td>
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<td>IBEA</td>
<td>Imperial British East Africa</td>
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<td>IPOA</td>
<td>Independent Policing Oversight Authority</td>
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<td>KDF</td>
<td>Kenya Defence Forces</td>
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<td>KNCHR</td>
<td>Kenya National Commission on Human Rights</td>
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<td>NPS</td>
<td>National Police Service</td>
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<td>NPSC</td>
<td>National Police Service Commission</td>
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<td>SAFO</td>
<td>Swedish Security Service</td>
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<td>TFG</td>
<td>Transitional Federal Government</td>
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<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
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Abstract

The purpose of this study was to examine the use of force by police as a driving factor towards youth radicalization in Eastleigh area, Nairobi County, Kenya. This is due to previous accusations that the Kenya police has used excessive force to prevent and respond to terrorism. While such force may help to immediately suppress the situation, it often contributes to further frustration, anger and resistance in the longer-term. This includes an unintended effect of further youth radicalisation and subsequent recruitment. The stringent security measures put by security agencies is often not well-thought: a case in point is the “Operation Usalama Watch” which led to polarization between the youth and the police. By focusing on police use of force as a counter-terrorism measure, this study research responds to a changing discourse in terrorism studies.

The research method employed was qualitative. The primary data collection methods applied was structured and semi-structured interviews which included questionnaires, observation, Key Informant Interviews (KII) and Focus Group Discussions (FGDs). The population target was youths, families that have been affected, human rights defenders and state and non-state actors. The primary data was complimented by the secondary data and the findings analysed through content, pattern and comparative analysis.

The study analysed the relationship between police officers and youths in Eastleigh to establish their (youth) participation in policing, as provided for in Article 244(e) of the Kenyan Constitution which obliges the National Police Service to foster and promote relationships with the broader society in order to prevent and respond to crime and more specifically, to youth radicalization and recruitment. The research concludes with recommendations to be considered to prevent and respond to youth to youth radicalization and recruitment in Eastleigh.
Chapter One: General Introduction

1.0 Introduction

This study examined the use of force\(^1\) by police as a driving factor to youth radicalisation and recruitment in Kenya. The research sought to determine the driving factors to the process of youth radicalisation and recruitment and interrogated the mechanisms used by police officers in confronting the youth. It also assessed the effectiveness and efficiency of these mechanisms towards addressing security threat.

Over the years, the Kenya Police has had a reputation of not only being one of the most corrupt state institutions, but has been accused numerously for human rights violations including acts of torture and inhuman, degrading treatment, extra judicial executions (EJE) and disappearances therefore necessitating the need for comprehensive reforms. Additionally, the Kenya Police has been haemorrhaged by lack of professional and operational independence from political regimes, and low levels of confidence and trust among the populace (KNCHR, 2008).

Indeed, one of the main criticisms of the Kenya police has been that they have, just like their pre-colonial predecessors, retained a posture of regime policing instead of embracing the philosophy, ethos and practices of democratic policing (KNCHR, 2008). The latter is primarily significant while discussing police reforms because the bedrock of any democratic

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\(^1\) The Sixth Schedule to the NPS Act 2011 stipulates conditions under which force may be applied by police officers. Non-violent means shall first be employed if it, an officer can use force but only in proportion to the objective to be achieved, the seriousness of the offence, and the resistance of the person against whom it is used, and only to the extent necessary while adhering to the provisions of the law and the Service Standing Orders. "Firearms may only be used when less extreme means are inadequate and for saving or protecting the life of the officer or other person; and in self-defence or in defense of other person against imminent threat of life or serious injury".
society is a police service dedicated to serving the public by ensuring that the rule of law and order is maintained and police are proactive in leading intelligence-led beats and not respond by use of force.

The study further analysed the relationship between police officers and youths in Eastleigh as a way to encourage citizen participation in policing, an over-riding constituent embedded within the Constitution under Article 244(e).

1.1 Background of the study

Terrorism is one of the biggest global challenges that both the Global North and Global South are grappling with (Duffy, 2015). Governments allocate and re-allocate huge resources to prevent terrorism, although there has been every so often, lack of a conceptual foundation for understanding terrorists and their acts of violence. This gap creates a serious challenge at many levels: one of it being the policy-level where decisions about how a state should respond to terrorism are made. Other levels include the individual-level decisions about how a given person who advocates for extremist ideas truly poses a serious threat to a nation’s personnel, assets, and interests (Shimko, 2015).

Terrorism remains a huge security threat in Kenya, just like in many other countries and has resulted to not only loss of lives, physical injuries, psychological trauma but also rising instability and insecurity. Many people live in fear of what will happen next. The levels of insecurity has resulted to distraction of the country’s economy specifically the tourism sector, which is among Kenya’s top earner, that accounts to 10 % of the GDP compared to a mere 2.39% in 2007 (Tubei, 2017). Although security measures have been increased in major areas in the country including hotels, public buildings, universities and shopping malls, to name but a few, more needs to be done to effectively and efficiently prevent and respond to terrorism.
Earlier, the Kenyan government had claimed that it was an innocent victim of the Somali terrorist war against the West. However, Al-Shabaab, a jihadist fundamentalist group, have in numerous occasions stated that following Kenyan military involvement in Somalia in October 2011, it would target all those who voted for the government that sent in the troops (Hellstein, 2016). Moreover, most recently, some attacks in Kenya have been planned and executed by young Kenyan nationals. This is a clear indication that terrorist attacks in Kenya are related to its foreign and domestic policies (Hellstein, 2016).

There have been several driving factors to youth radicalisation and recruitment in Kenya. The two major refugee camps in Kenya: Dadaab and Kakuma, have in the recent past been breeding grounds for terrorists (Hellstein, 2016). Currently, there is a shift and recruitment is now much more widespread, due to the increasing criminal and terrorist activities in the region. There has been growing concern by international human rights organisations, civil society organisations, among others, that youths have become easy targets by extremist organisations and are very vulnerable to the offers being presented to them. This is irrespective of their religious affiliation, political class or ethnic background, boys and young men living in the slums are often approached by Al-Shabaab recruiters (Hellstein, 2016).

Young Kenyans with little or no hope of education and employment opportunities are predominantly the easy preys. Likewise, in the country’s border regions, recruitment is reportedly active. Nonetheless, recruits have also included girls, children from wealthy families and university students, like in the case of the Garissa terror incident of 2015 where one of the attackers was a trained lawyer from the University of Nairobi and the son of a Chief. According to media reports, the student joined the extremist group not for the money, but out of a sense of loyalty to his Al Shabaab ‘brothers,’ and in reaction to a burning sense of injustice toward the marginalization faced by Kenyan Muslims (Piercey, 2016).
It is worth noting that radicalisation is a complex phenomenon and studies show that the reasons for joining extremist organisations vary between social groups. A specified number of youths living in poor urban neighbourhoods are enticed with money and material reward, while others believe in the jihadist ideology. There are those who have completely lost trust in the dysfunctional politics while others just seek to explore and get a set of rules and norms to follow. Additionally, there are those that join because they cannot resist peer or family pressure. The messaging and promises by these organised groups are alluring, resulting to more and more young men and women to give in. Youths in the West and elsewhere have also fallen prey as they are recruited into these terror groups. However, recruitment easily happens where poverty, inequality, ethnic and religious tension, political marginalisation and insecurity is the order of the day (Hellstein, 2016).

It has been difficult to find the balance between national security and combating terrorism in Kenya and human rights organisations are worried about the measures that have been put in place by the government to improve state security (Hellstein, 2016). The cause for alarm is the manner in which the security agencies have conducted themselves in preventing and responding to these attacks. Human rights violations have been meted against the suspects and also innocent civilian population which is against the international human rights standards. These violations have included excessive use of force by police from arbitrary arrests, enforced disappearances, torture, ill treatment, cruel and degrading treatment and extra-judicial killings of young men. Those affected are majorly from the Northern, Coastal and sections of Nairobi where the ethnic Somali and Muslim population is highest (KNCHR, 2015).

Over the past, the security initiatives/measures in Muslim and Somali dominated areas such as Eastleigh in Nairobi, and the Coastal areas, have led to more biasness against ethnic Somalis and Muslims, whether they are Kenyan citizens, refugees or migrants
What is worrying is that the more alienated these groups feel in Kenya, the greater the possibility that some of their members will sympathise with extremist organisations. The hard power approach or the coercive method being used by security agencies against the civilian population is worrying and if not well addressed, will drive youths towards extremism. Terrorism and insecurity cannot be stemmed through extra-judicial killings, ethnic profiling or collective punishment; on the contrary, these measures lead to radicalisation (Warah, 2014). There is therefore a widened gap between the communities (the youth to be specific) and the police.

1.2 Statement of the problem

Kenya is struggling with the intricate challenge of dealing with terrorists’ attacks and continues to bear the greatest brunt of attacks. This is arguably heightened by the 2011 Kenyan Defence Force (KDF) intrusion into Somalia under the auspices of ‘Operation Linda Nchi’. Kenya was hopeful to stabilize the country and secure the Kenyan borders once its Defence Force was in Somalia but this hasn’t been the case as since then, the country has experienced numerous attacks in the Coastal, Northern and Nairobi regions where hundreds of civilians have lost their lives, many injured and property worth millions destroyed. Notable attacks between 2013 and 2016 include; the September 2013 Westgate mall attack where 67 people were killed, June 2014 attack in Lamu, Mpeketoni which led to 68 deaths, November bus attack in Mandera killing 28 people, December 2014 attack in Mandera in which 36 quarry workers were killed and the April 2015 attack on Garissa University College in which 148 students died. In 2016, there was an attack on the Kenyan Defence Forces (KDF) military base at El Adde, in Somalia, causing more than 60 deaths. In January 2019, 21 people died when terrorists attacked the DusitD2 Hotel in Chiromo lane, Westlands area of Nairobi.
These attacks have made the security situation in the country more volatile allowing the government to adopt stringent measures to protect its citizenry and contain the threats posed by these attacks. As a result of this, human rights violations for both civilians and terror suspects have been recorded in the name of ‘weeding out’ terrorists and destroying their hideouts KNCHR (2015). ‘Operation Usalama Watch’ is one of the measures put in place to smoke out undocumented refugees, illegal aliens and terror suspects in Eastleigh, Nairobi. Absurdly, the operation was intended to keep Kenya safer, however, during that period of time, Al-Shabaab hit back by initiating separate terror attacks some of which targeted Eastleigh (Warah, 2014).

A few studies have attempted to link the hard approach used by security agencies as a possible factor towards radicalizing and eventually recruiting more youths into extremists groups. This study will seek to examine the use of force by police as a driving factor to youth radicalization and recruitment in Kenya and will contribute towards knowledge on countering violence extremism.

1.3 Objectives of the study

The general objective of this study is to find out if the use of force by police is a driving factor to youth radicalization and recruitment in Eastleigh area, Nairobi County in Kenya. The specific research objectives that guided this research are the following:

a) To determine the driving factors of youth radicalisation and recruitment in Eastleigh Area, Kenya;

b) To interrogate the mechanisms used by police officers in confronting youth radicalization and recruitment in Kenya;

c) To understand the relationship between police officers and youths in Kenya.
1.4 Research Questions

The specific research objectives above was guided by the following research questions;

a) What are the driving factors of youth radicalisation and recruitment in Eastleigh, Nairobi County?

b) What are the mechanisms used by police officers in confronting youth radicalisation and recruitment in Kenya?

c) What is the relationship between police and the youths in Kenya?

1.5 Significance of the study

Although there has been a wide body of literature globally and in the Kenyan context on various drivers of youth radicalization and recruitment, very few studies have explored police operations as a possible factor. There has been no study to determine if the of use of force by the police to deal with crime and terrorism is an aspect that is pushing youths to violent extremism. The findings of the study will help both academics and policy makers, and will contribute to a better understanding of the existing knowledge on the drivers of youth radicalisation and recruitment, and provide recommendations to counter-radicalization. Currently, the Kenya police is grappling with finding solutions to this increasing problem and therefore this research will contribute towards informed interventions in the ongoing police reforms.

1.6 Scope of the Study

In examining the use of force by police as a driving factor to youth radicalization and recruitment in Kenya, this research has focussed on the period between 2012 and 2018 with a focus on Eastleigh in Nairobi County. Eastleigh is an area that has been dominated and almost exclusively inhabited by Somali immigrants. The youths in the area have evidently been radicalized and recruited and the area has extensively experienced police use of force.
especially the ‘Operation Usalama Watch’ launched in 2014. Furthermore, young men have been profiled and killed with their bodies paraded on social media by their killers- police as a warning ‘sign’ to others (Odenyo, 2019).

1.7 Theoretical Framework

This study relied on two theories to situate the problem. This is securitization theory and social movements’ theory to anchor the study. The two theories are complimentary.

1.7.1 Securitization Theory

It is important to note that at the end of the Cold War, there have been fundamental transformation of security and an emergence of entirely new security challenges, risks and threats which has redefined the concept of security. Security has become more multifaceted and complex. The securitization theory states that national security policy is not naturally given, but carefully designated by politicians and decision-makers. This theory which has been formulated by Barry Buzan and Ole Waever from the Copenhagen School, adopts two approaches: one that “something is a security problem when the elites declare it to be so”, and the other is when something becomes securitized because it has been declared a security problem and this problem is accepted by the audience (Ole, 1995). Terrorism is a threat to the national security of a State and countries have developed polices to counter it. This theory is applied to understand Kenya’s state framing the security threats originating from youth radicalization and how security agency have been able to respond.

1.7.2 Social Movement Theory

This study depended also on the social movement theory as a way to comprehend the social networks that are involved in pushing individuals to join social movements like extremist groups. This theory has been applied to the study of terrorists’ movements and in particular social networks that are relied upon for recruitment into these groups. According
to Beck (2008), the dominant social movement paradigm of mobilizing resources, political opportunities, and framing suggests that basic ways of conceptualizing terrorism as a social movement. Additionally, cultural perspectives on movements call attention to underlying issues of identity in terrorist groups. He argues that social movement goes beyond structural description by considering commitment and recruitment and attributes radicalization to movement cycles and the constraints imposed by state repression which has direct bearing on militancy. This theory has been applied in this study to understand the driving factors to the process of radicalization and recruitment in Kenya with a focus on examining the attributes recruiters look for in their targets.

1.8 Organization of the Thesis

This study is organized into five chapters with an introduction and conclusion of the theme discussed. Chapter one provides the introduction, background of the study, statement of the problem, objectives, justifications, scope, and, theoretical framework. Chapter two is the literature review that evaluates the available body of literature on the related discourses of radicalization and recruitment as well as contextualizing the history of policing in Kenya to assess its effect in addressing terrorism in Kenya. Chapter three explains the methodology. This chapter discusses the overall research design of the study. It outlines the type of data and the sampling strategies used. The methods of data collection including data interpretation and analysis is explained. This chapter also provides the ethical guidelines applied in this study. Chapter four analyses the findings from the data collected including the driving factors to youth radicalization and recruitment, the counterterrorism strategies to prevent and respond to radicalization and the relationship between the police and the youths in Eastleigh in addressing radicalization. Finally, Chapter five offers the general conclusions by summarizing the key findings of the study, and provides key recommendations to address the issue of youth radicalization and recruitment in Kenya.
Chapter Two: Literature Review

2.1 Introduction

This chapter evaluated the available body of literature on the related discourses of terrorism and radicalization from a global perspective to the Kenyan context. It further assessed the available literature on the historical context of policing in Kenya and how it has handled youth radicalization and recruitment. This, was in a view to evaluate police effectiveness and efficiency in dealing with the dynamics of terrorism.

2.1.1 The Radicalization Debate

Radicalisation is not a new phenomenon globally. Until the beginning of 2000, there had been virtually no mentioning of radicalisation in texts on terrorism and political violence Neumann (2013). Despite the concept of radicalisation now being well used by researchers as well as the public, there is still no common and agreeable definition of radicalisation.

Different Governments define radicalization in different ways. The Swedish Security Service (SAFO) for example, defines radicalisation in two ways: ‘a process that leads to ideological or religious activism to introduce radical change to society’ and a ‘process that leads to an individual or group using, promoting or advocating violence for political aims” (Schmid, 2013).

The Danish Security and Intelligence Service (PET): defines radicalisation as ‘a dynamic process whereby an individual increasingly comes to accept the use of violence or other illegal means, in order to achieve political, religious or ideological goals” (Center for Terror Analysis, 2017, p. 10)

Neumann (2013) argues, that the ambiguity arises in part from the lack of agreement about the end-state of radicalisation. Some define radicalisation purely as a cognitive
phenomenon, where individuals adopt what is considered radically different ideas about society and governance. Other researchers argue that radicalisation should be defined by the actions stemming from these ideas, referred to as ‘behavioural radicalisation’ (Neumann, 2013).

Moreover, Borum (2011) complements Neumann’s argument that it is important to reminisce that radical beliefs are not a substitution or precursor for terrorism. Most radicals do not engage in terrorism, and some terrorist may not hold ideological beliefs deep enough to call them ‘radicals’ in that sense. A universal definition of radicalisation is further challenged by the fact that the word ‘radical’ lacks meaning on its own, as what is considered radical varies immeasurably depending on what is considered conventional. Being a radical is therefore highly dependent on context, (Neumann, 2013).

2.1.2 The Process of Radicalization

In spite of the fact that there is no clear definition of radicalisation, a clear analysis of the earlier mentioned definitions resonates that radicalisation is considered a process. The same is echoed in two notable models developed to demonstrate this process. A perfect example is The Staircase to Terrorism by Moghaddam (2005) which states that; ‘a terrorist act is the final step on a narrowing staircase. Although the vast majority of people, even when feeling deprived and unfairly treated, remain on the ground floor, some individuals climb up and are eventually recruited into terrorist organizations. These individuals believe they have no effective voice in society, are encouraged by leaders to displace aggression onto out-groups, and become socialized to see terrorist organizations as legitimate and out-group members as evil’ (Moghaddam, 2005)

The other model is the Pyramid model by Moskalenko (2008) which conceptualizes political radicalization as a dimension of increasing extremity of beliefs, feelings, and
behaviours in support of intergroup conflict and violence across individuals, groups, and mass publics, twelve mechanisms of radicalization are distinguished. For ten of these mechanisms, radicalization occurs in context of group identification and reaction to perceived threat to the in-group. It is worth noting there is no single universally accepted model considered to explain the radicalisation process.

Notably, the process of radicalisation is most often initiated and maintained by external factors, often peers or family pressure. An area of interest and concern is also the increase in development of modern technology, and its role in the process of radicalisation and recruitment of youths. Neumann (2012) argues that the use of the internet to radicalise is the most dangerous innovation post 9/11 and should be a constant reminder for effective measures to prevent online radicalization as internet keeps changing, so do the methods and users.

The radicalisation process towards violent extremism is multifaceted and diverse and how it operates is reliant on the internal and external factors that can change based on the socio-psychological traits of the individual, the context and the dynamic of the violent extremist group itself (UNDP, 2016).

2.1.3 Understanding drivers of violent extremism

The U.S. Republican Congressman Peter King in June of 2012, convened a fifth hearing on the radicalization of Muslim Americans. The agenda of the meeting was to discuss radicalization of Muslim Americans in general. However, prominence was given on Al-Shabaab’s recruitment of more than 40 young Americans (Mohamed, 2011).

The root causes of violent extremism are complex, multifaceted and intertwined, and relate to the structural environment in which radicalization and possibly violent extremism
can start to take grip. Violent extremism is the product of historical, political, economic and social circumstances, including the impact of regional and global power politics. Growing horizontal inequalities are one of the consistently cited drivers of violent extremism (UNDP, 2016).

UNDP (2016) reported that not only is unemployment or poverty the only push factors (“underlying/root causes”) to violence and extremism but also perceptions of injustice, human-rights violations, social-political exclusion, widespread corruption or sustained mistreatment of certain groups. Once all these disparities converge in/for a particular group, radical movements and violence are more probable to flare up.

State failure to provide basic rights, services and security does not only contribute to growing inequality, but also creates a void that allows non-state actors to take control over State sovereignty and territory. There is a risk that failed political transitions, with weak institutions, law enforcement excessive human rights violations and checks and balances provide a fertile breeding ground for violent extremism (UNDP, 2016).

Pull factors, conversely, are the positive characteristics and benefits of an extremist organization that “pull” vulnerable individuals to join which includes the group’s ideology (for example emphasis on changing one’s condition through violence rather than “apathetic” and “passive” democratic means), strong bonds of brotherhood and sense of belonging, reputation building, prospect of fame or glory, and other socialization benefits (Schwartz, 2009).

There are also personal factors which individual psychological susceptibilities independent of push and pull factors (mental health conditions, depression, trauma), personality traits (such as narcissism and impulsivity) and individually specific demographic
characteristics (age, gender, country of birth) that constitute subjective states that make the individual more vulnerable to extremism (Vergani & Barton, 2018).

After assessing the structural drivers, people then get pulled into radical and violent movements through well-coordinated manipulation and accompaniment (socialization) processes. This is frequently enabled by personal, or emotional factors, like isolation, looking for an identity and self-respect, reprisal for prior ill-treatment, failure of the authority’s transparency and accountability for figures and youth, as well as seeking online audience. For example, one of the ringleaders of the Garissa University attack in 2014 that killed 147 students was a trained lawyer. Media reports later revealed that the attacker joined the extremist group not for the money, but out of a sense of loyalty to his Al-Shabaab ‘brothers,’ and in reaction to a burning sense of injustice toward the marginalization faced by Kenyan Muslims (Piercey, Chemonics, 2016). It is often a sense of belonging to a group supporting a higher ideal, however misguided, that causes young people to risk everything to participate in radical violence. That belonging is what money can’t buy, and it’s a critical element of recruitment for extremist groups. It then requires well-analysed and well-thought fundamentals of the social fabric of States that are at risk from its citizenry joining violent extremism (UNDP, 2016).

**2.1.4 Recruitment process in Kenya**

In a field research carried out in Nairobi, Kenya of former Al-Shabaab members between the ages of 19 and 27 living in Eastleigh, participants unanimously stated that it was a combination of both pull and push factors that led them to join Al-Shabaab, as the group presented a “package” deal in its recruitment propaganda (Muhsin, 2012). Furthermore, majority of them joined the group as a form of employment to help themselves and their families which paid from $50-$150 monthly, to only carry around a gun and patrol the streets. Muhsin further states that although personal poverty is not a reason for joining
violent extremism, the cases of these youth show that the effects of poverty, such as idleness and low self-esteem, cannot be ignored. Some explained that the bombing of Somali towns by the mostly Ugandan and Burundian UN peacekeeping force, The African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), built intense hatred toward this group while others mentioned they sought revenge against Transitional Federal Government (TFG) soldiers. Their urge for revenge was due to harassment, particularly of female relatives at checkpoints. Another push factor from the discussion was lack of education where they were not able to pursue different avenues and as a result, easier to join Al-Shabaab rather than suffer in poverty with no chance to “pursue something greater.” (Muhsin, 2012).

On pull factors they mentioned Al-Shabaab to use reputation to attract youths which delivers them from irrelevance to prominence and strengthens a particular identity: in this case, “defender of country and religion.” More importantly, though, it echoes (Schwartz, 2009) argument that terrorism represents a confluence of cultural, social, and personal identity. Obtaining paradise was yet another reason for joining Al-Shabaab which stems from the belief that Al-Shabaab was conducting valid jihad in defense of God’s religion (Muhsin, 2012).

Explanations for how they found out about the extremists group, some of them were encouraged by their peers and family members to fight and maintain their culture, language, religion and way of life. It is a fight to safeguard their identity and its important features from foreign “invaders” such as Ethiopia and AMISOM. Furthermore, religious leaders would deliver fiery sermons about jihad and urge the populace to join Al-Shabaab. There were others that were enticed by money, especially those who were more impoverished than others in the society. Others were attracted to the power and influence and were offered guns for joining (Muhsin, 2012).
Madrassa and mosque schools have also been reported as chief generators of extremist ideology and incubator for terrorism due to the contents of their curriculum. They produce violent radicals and aggressive militants for example, Afghan Taliban (Hogan & Braddock, 2012).

Women and young girls have also been radicalized and recruited into violent extremism. Mwakimako (2018) depicts women’s life struggles, about being young Muslim girls, poor mothers and abandoned spouses noting that it is to circumstances like these that pushed the women closer and closer to al-Shabaab radicalization and violent extremism. For most of these women the push was mostly out of their effort and desire to uplift their life conditions, their vulnerability ultimately rendering them susceptible to Al-Shabaab recruiters, human traffickers, extremist operatives’ and ideologies. Young Muslims women in higher learning institutions in Kenya have become easy targets for recruitment by violent extremist organisations such as Al-Shabaab and the Islamic States of Iraq and Syria. This is because learning institutions have been identified by these extremist groups as sites of recruitment due to their transitionary, permissive, biographical, secular and socialization space. The presence of radicalised young educated Muslim women is a proof that there is a shifting profile of extremists from focusing on the illiterate to the literate and from male to female recruits (Ali, 2018).

Hellstein (2016) points out that youth of all social groups are vulnerable to be radicalized and recruited into extremists groups. As long as Kenyan domestic politics remain divisive, corruption prevails and inequality and lack of political voice continue, the youth of all ethnic groups will be vulnerable and susceptible to believing the promises made by recruiters. The youth have learned not to believe the promises made by politicians during the elections. It is therefore prudent for relevant actors to find ways to cooperate in order to prevent these threats, if not, Kenya will continue experiencing these attacks.
2.1.5 The Historical context of policing in Kenya

The history of policing in Kenya traces back to the period between 1887 and 1902 with its foundation on the Imperial British East Africa (I.B.E.A.) Company, where a businessman Sir William McKinnon, with his business interest deemed essential to provide some form of protection (security) for his stores along the coastline of Kenya (Sommer, 2007).

In 1896, the British Foreign Office ordered the first police station to be opened in Mombasa, thus the origin of the concept of the police. The activities of the station were centred on protection of the IBEA Company. The police force grew during the construction of the Kenya - Uganda Railway from the Coastline to Nairobi and Kisumu with an aim of protecting the railways property (Sommer, 2007).

During this period of time, the laws in use were from India: the Indian Criminal Procedure Code, the Indian Evidence Act and the Police Ordinance. It is worth noting that up to 1907, the Kenya Police was structured along military lines and the training was military in nature. In 1906, the Kenya Police was legally constituted by a Police Ordnance. In the meantime, the Village Headman Ordinance had been enacted in 1902 as a means for the colonial administration to penetrate native areas and bring the African into the money economy, enforce tax collection, control livestock movement, regulate agriculture, supply and mobility of labour and other social-economic programmes. The village headman relied on local “toughies” and bullies to effect the often-unpopular policies of the colonial government. These bullies took on the role of Native Police and being untrained, used very crude methods on civilians to enforce compliance. Thus, from the outset, civilians have had a negative perception of a policeman – as an agent of coercion and not safeguard (Police, 2017).
In 1911, through a recommendation made to improve police performance, a training depot was established in Nairobi which later saw the establishment of the Inspector General to unite various units of the police service and to administer the operations of the Police Force. During the 1st World War, in 1914 the Kenya Police officers were deployed in military service to fight alongside Kenyan soldiers and subsequently in 1918, there was a reorganisation of the police. This included the increase in personnel, better administrative and residential housing. By 1940, the literacy levels of the Kenya Police Force improved due to schools that were established (Police, 2017).

Other units that were established included the Criminal Intelligence Unit to collect, tabulate and record the history and data of criminals and suspicious characters. Special sections like fingerprint bureau and the Criminal Investigations Department (CID) currently the Directorate of Criminal Investigations (DCI) were created which composed of former police officers from Britain and South Africa. This was the foundation of today’s Kenya Police Service (Police, 2017).

The Railway Police Unit was also established to deal specifically with prevention and detection of offences in the railways from the coast to Kisumu. The scope of police activities increased and it was called upon to deal with traffic problems such as accidents, parking and cattle rustling in the countryside (Sommer, 2007).

Police recruits were deployed in Northern Frontier Districts to counter the threat from Italian Somali Land and Ethiopia in preparation for the Second World War. In addition, to fighting alongside regular soldiers, the Kenya Police acted as guides, interpreters and carried out reconnaissance missions in the enemies’ territories. 1946 saw the Police placed under the office of the Attorney General and their powers increased to deal with the new development (Sommer, 2007).
Other developments that took place from 1948, included the establishment of the Kenya Police Reserve Unit as an auxiliary of the Force that used armoured vehicles and deployed in trouble spots. The dog section Unit was also established in 1948 to improve the effectiveness of crime control and the General Service Unit established and deployed in ‘hotspot’ areas in emergency situations. 1949 saw the formation of the Police Air wing to carry out duties as communication and evacuation of sick persons to hospitals and was made part of the permanent Police service in 1953 (Service, 2019).

Nevertheless, the reorganization and extension of skills within the Police did not touch on the function of the force- it was still a tool of the colonial administration. This saw a total disconnect between the police and the natives. It became offensive during the emergency period, from 1952 to 1960 (Sommer, 2007). There was a huge panic by the white settlers when there was an uprising of rebellious group - Mau Mau in the late 1940-1950. The main areas were the Rift Valley and Central areas of Kenya. (Sommer, 2007).

A state of emergency was declared in 1952 and the army took over power from the police as the chief law enforcement agency. With support from other security forces including Home Guards, the British military, volunteer military forces and a special police bureau (Special Effort Force) set up in 1953 to handle the difficult situation (Sommer, 2007). The emergency ended in 1960. The rebellion and the fear of another revolt forced the British government to leave the colony in 1963 and hand over the country to moderate African politicians. This led to the independence of Kenya that same year.

Kenya gained her independence on 12th December 1963, which called for a massive change in the Administration of the Force that led to among other developments, replacement of the expatriate officers in the senior ranks by Africans and formation of the Anti-Stock Theft Unit, Anti-Motor Vehicle Theft Unit, Tourism Police Unit, The Anti-
Corruption Police Unit, Presidential Escort Unit, and the Anti-Terrorism Police Unit. This is to respond effectively and efficiently to security threats (Sommer, 2007).

2.1.6 The Police Reforms Process

The police reforms process in Kenya has come a long way, dating back to the establishment of the modern Kenya Police in 1920 when Kenya became a colony, as a tool for the colonial government to enforce their will on Africans, concentrating on minor offences like vagrancy and payment of tax (Sommer, 2007). This process can also be traced from 1902 with the establishment of the Administration Police via enactment of the Village Headman Ordinance, designed to bring the local population into the money economy, enforce tax and movement of people and livestock. The police later gained a reputation for egregious human rights violations as the struggle for independence gained momentum, especially during the emergency period in the 50s (Police, 2017).

In subsequent post-independence years the Kenya Police, Administration Police and their related specialized units have played a critical role in law enforcement and maintaining peace and stability. However, over the years, the Kenya Police has had a reputation of not only being one of the most corrupt state institutions, but has been accused numerous for human rights violations including acts of torture and inhuman, degrading treatment, extra judicial executions (EJE) and disappearances therefore necessitating the need for comprehensive reforms (KNCHR, 2008). On the other hand the Kenya Police has been haemorrhaged by lack of professional and operational independence from political regimes, and low levels of confidence and trust among the populace (Amnesty, 2013).

Indeed, one of the main criticisms of the Kenya police has been that they have, just like their pre-colonial predecessors retained a posture of regime policing instead of embracing the philosophy, ethos and practices of democratic policing. The latter is primarily
significant while discussing police reforms because the bedrock of any democratic society is a police service dedicated to serving the public by ensuring that the rule of law and order is maintained. Police reforms are therefore seen as a means to safeguard, entrench and further human rights and democratic gains that ensure public safety and security (Amnesty, 2013).

Following the Commission of Inquiry into post-election violence of 2007/2008 (CIPEV, 2008) the Kenya National Dialogue and Reconciliation proposed four agenda items that would provide a roadmap for sustained security and peace in Kenya. Of these items, Agenda four (4) was specially focused on long term durable solution actions including Constitutional, legal and institutional reforms. Among these was a recommendation for comprehensive reform of the Kenya Police and Administration police that gave new impetus to police reforms agenda in Kenya (CIPEV, 2008). Subsequently President, Mwai Kibaki appointed the National Task Force on Police Reforms chaired by Justice Phillip Ransley in May 2009.

Extensive public consultations saw the Ransley team submit a report with 200 recommendations and established four pillars to guide the police reforms agenda, namely: a) Legislative policy and Institutional reforms; b) Police accountability reforms; c) Police professionalism reforms; and d) Administrative, operational preparedness, logistical capacity, police tooling and kitting reforms (Wabala, 2009).

The Ransley report was adopted by Cabinet in 2009, which paved way for the appointment of the Police Reforms Implementation Committee (PRIC) which was mandated to coordinate, implement, oversee and monitor implementation of reforms in the Police. This was to enhance police professionalism and accountability; its goal is to ‘transform the Kenyan Police and the Administration Police Forces into an effective, efficient, professional
and accountable security agencies that Kenyans can trust for their safety and security’ (PRIC, 2011, p. 5).

The Ransley Task Force recommendations greatly informed the drafting of the Constitution of Kenya 2010 with specific provisions that seek to reform the national security institutions in Kenya. Arising from these constitutional provisions are laws including of the National Police Service Act (NPS) 2011, the National Police Service Commission Act (NSPC) 2011 and the Independent Policing Oversight Act (IPOA) 2011 and related institutions, namely National Police Service (NPS), National Police Service Commission (NPSC) and Independent Policing Oversight (IPOA). In 2015, a strategy framework for the implementation of reforms in the National Police Service was developed by the Ministry of Interior and Coordination of National Government to spearhead the reforms (MOICNG, 2015).

In September 2018, President Uhuru Kenyatta passed major reforms in the structure, command, control and welfare of the National Police Service aimed at making the police a “service that is respected” rather than “a force that is feared” (House, 2019). The Head of State noted that the reforms, ranging from the changes in structure and command, integration of the Kenya Police Service and the Administration Police Service, change of uniform, rebranding of colleges, introduction of housing allowances for junior officers, are meant to make the police force more efficient (House, 2019).

For many years the service has invested heavily on the hardware with very limited resources located to the software including trainings, housing, psychological support, better pay and medical cover. The President in his address noted that the reforms will put smiles on police officers, especially those in the lower ranks, who have traditionally lived in congested houses with no option of living in houses of their choice. Hopefully, this will
better integrate them with the Kenyans they serve. The Head of State said that the reforms are aimed at raising the morale of the security officers by improving their conditions of service (House, 2019).

On the issue of the change in command structure, the Deputy Inspector-General of the Kenya Police will be responsible and accountable for all general duty staff or personnel, renamed “Public Security and Safety” and the Deputy Inspector-General of Administration Police will be in charge of the “Protective and Border Security” mandate (House, 2019). This is where most of the Administrative Police (AP), plus some Kenya Police (KP), have been merged to deal with livestock theft, protection of critical government installations and the Rapid Deployment Unit, for border security. The President noted that this will clarify and simplify command and control, increase both accountability and performance and will make the police more than equal to the threats that Kenya faces. Kagwe (2018) agrees the change in structure is a harmonised command structure, from the previous confusion of command to a rationalized accountable command’. Besides, more resources will be ploughed from the costs saved from reduction in duplication that existed between the two Services (Kagwe, 2018).

The President unveiled a unified police command as follows (i) One Regional Police Commander (RPC), (ii) One County Police Commander (CPC) (iii) One Sub County Police Commander (SPC), and (iv) Officer Commanding Police Station (OCS)/Ward Commander in charge of a Police Station and its Posts/ Patrol Bases (House, 2019). This will see an elimination of overlap and duplication in reporting functions and will enhance accountability within the NPS as the reporting channels are clearly defined.

From the history of policing, it is evident that the Kenya police was established as Colonial or regime police and were accountable to the ruling powers alone above and beyond
their responsibility to their community. They were protectors of governments rather than the citizenry while they maintained law and order without any reference to protecting human rights standards and fundamental freedoms. With the new developments in the police reforms agenda witnessed in the country nine years after the promulgation of the Constitution, it will only take the change of attitude, behaviour and culture of the Kenyan police to realize its transformational journey from a force to a Service even as they maintain law and order and safeguard civil liberties for all citizens.

2.1.7 *Kenya’s Policing Approach to Radicalisation*

In the international security environment, terrorism remains the severest of any threat and is still a global challenge. States have invested heavily on preventive and responsive mechanisms/measures to deal with this issue. Kenya’s approach to Al-Shabaab has been comparable to that of Nigeria where the Joint Task Force (JTF), a special military force comprising the Nigerian armed forces and the police, carried out crackdown operations through house-to-house searches, raids, military stops and check points, and demolitions of homes on extremists groups. (Sodipo, 2014).

International organisations and civil society organisations in Nigeria have accused the government of excessive use of force, physical abuse, secret detentions, extortion, burning of houses, and stealing money during raids, enforced disappearance and extrajudicial killings of suspect (Sodipo, 2014). According to civil society leaders, JTF abuses have created growing resentment in communities, making community members more reluctant to provide information that could help curtail Boko Haram. “The abuses by the JTF have created more distance between the people and the government and so they don’t want to cooperate.” (Human Rights Watch, 2012)

Kenya’s effort to tackle the threat of violent extremism has been met by huge criticism from civil society and human rights organisations with reports of stigmatization of
the Somali community and serious human rights violations during counter-terrorist operations by the police and other security forces. (Amnesty, 2014)

In a study carried out in 2015 by Afrobarometer on Kenya’s response to terrorism, Kenyans disapprove of the government’s management of terrorism and that the Somali Kenyan community feel marginalised by the state and express problematic levels of social intolerance, factors that indicate the presence of political and social conditions associated with higher levels of violent extremism. (Buchanan and Lekalake, 2015)

The ‘Operation Usalama Watch’ was launched in 2014 and according to government officials to ‘weed out’ Al-Shabaab and destroy their hideouts. The operation involved large-scale deployment of security forces, house-to-house searches, raids, and interrogations, with allegations of looting and bribery by the security officers. The operations were carried out by a combined contingent of the Kenya Defense Forces (KDF), National Intelligence Service (NIS), Kenya Wildlife Services (KWS), County Commissioners, Deputy/Assistant County Commissioners, Chiefs and various units of the National Police Service including the Anti-Terrorism Police Unit (ATPU), Kenya Police Reservists (KPRs), Rapid Deployment Unit (RDU) of the Administration Police, Border Patrol Unit (BPU) and the General Service Unit (GSU) (KNCHR, The Error of Fighting Terror with Terror: Preliminary Report of KNCHR Investigations on Human Rights Abuses in, 2015)

Amnesty (2014) reported that the operation was carried out in blatant disregard for national and international law, and disproportionately focused on the Somali community, with human rights violations continuing to take place in the name of national security. The same was echoed by the Kenya National Commission for Human Rights (KNCHR) who stated that security agencies conducted the abusive operations against individuals and groups suspected to be associated with terror attacks in various parts of the country (KNCHR, The
KNCHR (2015) documented over one hundred and twenty (120) cases of egregious human rights violations that include twenty five (25) extrajudicial killings and eighty one (81) enforced disappearances. The violations were widespread, systematic and well-coordinated and included but are not limited to arbitrary arrests, extortion, illegal detention, torture, killings and disappearances. Besides, KNCHR (2015) documented suspect accounts of being rounded up and detained for hours to many days in extremely overcrowded and inhumane and degrading conditions. Many were tortured while in detention sustaining serious physical injuries and psychological harm as a result. The torture methods include beatings, waterboarding, electric shocks, genital mutilation, exposure to extreme cold or heat, hanging on trees, mock executions, and exposure to stinging by ants in the wild, denial of sleep and food (KNCHR, The Error of Fighting Terror with Terror: Preliminary Report of KNCHR Investigations on Human Rights Abuses in, 2015).

Buchanan (2015) suggested that the Kenyan government should restrain police abuses and explore more developmental approaches to counter-terrorism to ensure that measures aimed at engaging Al-Shabaab do not generate further grievances among an already isolated and vulnerable community. The same is echoed by McKnight and Anderson (2014) who argued that such a response is likely to be used by Al-Shabaab to exploit the existing dissatisfaction amongst certain segments of the population, thereby opening new recruitment opportunities for the extremist group.

The Kenya police is serving a knowledge-based society that has devised survival tactics even with the sophisticated approach that is employed. It is therefore important that by the virtue of the legal powers endowed on them to equally equip themselves with
commensurate logical capacities including building their capacities on human intelligence, an area that Kenya police has not done very well. Gathering intelligence through community policing is the best counter-terrorism approach that allows for preventive rather than reactive ways of dealing with radicalization and recruitment of young men and women in Kenya. Kenya should therefore invent more of soft approach rather than the hard approach that is bearing minimal results.

2.1.8 Identified Gaps in the Literature Reviewed

The use of force by police as a means to counter violent extremism remains a critical area but largely an under researched area. This study will in response to this, call for further research. One is the need for reliable data/information and particularly information centred on state policies and procedures to counter terrorism. Secondly, more data would enable researchers to explore the efficacy of the counter-radicalization interventions put in place by security apparatus and expand the understanding of radicalisation and recruitment in Kenya. Third, will be the call for more research studies that would compare counter-radicalization security measures across the region. A good case study is how Ethiopia has effectively enhanced trust-building, understanding fears, and sharing a common vision while embracing the principle of subsidiarity which requires all external actors to be backup supporters of efforts by internal forces and local communities in the fight against terrorism. This approach also helps to build close-knit neighbourhood associations that provide community-based peace and security with effective oversight by the state.

By this study responding to the Kenyan context, it has helped to broaden the knowledge on counter-radicalization and in particular, the use of hard approach to deal with this menace. Therefore, the study questioned the capability of the Kenya police to deal with this rising phenomenon and how it has retained a reactive rather than a proactive approach.
There is an argument that the public does not trust its police and therefore resulting to police using reactive measures (use of force) to deal with radicalization.
Chapter Three: Research Methodology

2.0 Introduction

This study was carried out in Eastleigh area in Nairobi County. It drew on primary method of data collection. The primary data was complimented by the secondary data. The study adopted both quantitative and qualitative research design. ‘By encouraging the use of qualitative and quantitative methods and by facilitating a blend of examining and explanatory research, the findings addressed a wider range of the questions relating to ‘how’, ‘why’, ‘what’, ‘who’, ‘when’ and ‘how many’ (Denscombe, 2010).

3.1 Population and Sampling Design

The study used Kenya as the case study and specifically Eastleigh area, Nairobi County and the main entity analysed was the Kenyan youths (male and female) between 18 and 35 years of age living within Eastleigh. Other respondents included families affected by youth radicalisation and recruitment and the policing agencies like the National Police Service and the National Government Administration Office (NGAO).

The study collected data from the following main respondents:

a) Youths - both male and female from the target location;
b) Affected families;
c) Community leaders in the target location (chiefs, religious leaders, youth leaders);
d) Police officers in the target location;
e) Human rights defenders and community based organisations;
f) Civil society organisations working on Countering Violence Extremism.

In addition, the researcher included the following key informants:

a) Senior police officers in the target location;
b) Senior national government officers; County Commissioner

c) De-radicalized youths;

d) Representatives from the Kenya National Commission on Human Rights, Amnesty International and the Independent Medico-Legal Unit.

3.2 Sampling Techniques

The study used purposive and snowballing sampling techniques. The two sampling techniques were useful to identify potential interviewees which saved on time and costs. Purposive sampling operates on the principle that one can get the best information through focusing on a relatively small number of instances deliberately selected on the basis of their known attributes. This method was very important in acquiring specific respondents from the target group as the study only focussed on ‘definite respondents’ who shared their experiences on radicalisation and recruitment that helped to deepen the study. ‘With purposive sampling the sample was ‘hand-picked’ for the research on the basis of relevance: to the issue/theory that was investigated; and knowledge: privileged knowledge or experience about the topic’ (Denscombe, 2010).

Snowballing sampling is the process of seeking reference from one person to the next which creates credibility as it operates in referral approach. It is an effective technique for building up a reasonable sized sample. One advantage is that the accumulation of numbers is quite quick, using the multiplier effect of one person nominating two or more others. (Denscombe, 2010). This statement is true as the researcher was able to get specific respondents for the study.

3.3 Data Collection Methods

The research used qualitative method with both primary and secondary methods of data collection. The primary data methods applied structured and semi-structured interviews.
This included use of questionnaires, observation, Key Informant Interviews (KII) and Focus Group Discussions (FGDs). Secondary data utilized academic books, journals articles, accessed from libraries including the United States International University – Africa, Nation Media Group Library, among others.

The research applied the following tools to collect primary data as described below:

**3.3.1 Questionnaires**

Questionnaires were developed for the main respondents (youths). A total of 171 respondents were reached through the questionnaires. These were administered randomly to community members as they went about their business or in their homesteads for the targeted rural populations. Specifically, questionnaires were administered in Mlango Kubwa, Majengo and Pumwani. The questionnaire was closed ended questions which saw information on the levels of interaction and cooperation between the police and the youths in addressing security matters, police responsiveness, existing platforms that facilitate youth participation to share valuable information on security incidences and improve service delivery by the police and the nature of interaction between them and the youth. The questionnaire was very concise, considering the fact that there was minimal time to collect data.
3.3.2 **Focus Group Discussion (FGDs)**

At least two FGDs were conducted in Eastleigh area. Each FGD had 12 participants, drawn from among the main respondents – youths. The FGDs were conducted in a secluded section to allow for confidentiality. All participants were given an opportunity to contribute to the discussion. Because of the interaction amongst participants, much of new information emerged, that was not possible with the individual interviews. The FGDs allowed for probing and took the appreciative inquiry approach. This approach was preferred in this context because it created an atmosphere of openness, which resulted in discussants opening up and sharing their experiences without fear. Each FGD was facilitated by the researcher, assisted by a volunteer rapporteur. The researcher sought permission to record the sessions for ease of data collection although this was denied due to the sensitivity of the topic under discussion.

3.3.3 **Key Informant Interview (KIIs)**

All KIIs were conducted by the researcher and were done at the convenience of the key informants who included reps from CSOs, security and counter-terrorism experts and human rights defenders. The data collected from key informants was very useful as part of the triangulation process but also enabled the researcher to fine-tune data collected from main respondents.

3.3.4 **Observation**

A detailed observation was conducted in the study sites. This was conducted by the researcher who is conversant with both overt and covert observation, in view of the nature of the study site.

3.5 **Data Analysis Methods**

Denscombe (2010) states that the purpose of analysing something is to gain a better understanding of it. This is through a detailed examination of the thing that is being studied.
with an aim to either describe its constituent elements; to explain how it works; or to interpret what it means. This study will use both quantitative and qualitative methods to analyse data as follows;

### 3.5.1 Quantitative Data Analysis

Quantitative data was coded and analysed using the Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) version 21. SPSS was used because for the close-ended questionnaire due to its ability to appropriately create graphical presentations of questionnaire data for reporting and presentation. This was important in assessing the relationship between the youth and the police.

### 3.5.2 Qualitative data analysis

**Content Analysis**

The research documented narrative responses at a sufficient level of detail to permit a systematic content analysis of the qualitative data. Narrative reviews of interviews and discussion responses provided an in-depth understanding of beneficiary and stakeholder experiences and perceptions. This was presented in verbatim and helped put a human face to the respondents’ views/experiences.

**Pattern Analysis**

From the content analysis, the researcher examined interview and discussion notes for patterns to determine whether some responses received appeared to be correlated with other factors, such as location, respondent group, age, gender, etc.

**Comparative Analysis**

Results from both the quantitative data based on interviews were sampled population and the qualitative analysis based on the document review, log frame and discussion notes
that emerged and was compared across data type or sources. This approach facilitated both within case (each stakeholder group and secondary data source) and between case comparisons. In this way key pieces of evidence from the various interviews and documents were compared and triangulated to identify the main findings that respond to the questions.

3.6 Ethical Consideration

All ethical issues related to this study were cautiously discussed, considered and taken into account. Permission was obtained from relevant policing authorities and communicated well in advance that the information required is purely for academic purposes. Informed consent was obtained from all participants, who were assured of their confidentiality and anonymity and psychological support were provided where necessary. As part of the research ethics, the research process did not harm the respondents in any way. Before embarking on the research, the researcher applied for research permit from the University’s Institutional Research Board (IRB) although this was not provided for due to the huge delays by the research department. An approval from the Kenya National Council for Science and Technology (NACOSTI) was delayed due to the University’s internal delays to provide a recommendation letter. This therefore delayed the researcher to carry out data collection. Although the researcher used other means including human rights defenders in Eastleigh and the already established rapport with government agencies like the police. This permitted the researcher to obtain all the relevant information for the study.
Chapter Four: Analysis and Findings

4.0 Introduction

This chapter examines the processes and trends of youth radicalization and recruitment in Kenya with an intent to identify the driving factors. It is derived from fieldwork conducted in Eastleigh area in Nairobi County. The fieldwork was conducted from April 2019 to June 2019 with the support of human rights defenders from communities around Eastleigh. Further, social justice centres that monitor and document human rights violations were instrumental in providing critical information for the research. The chapter sees an interconnection between radicalization and recruitment and identifies specific drivers that lead to violent extremism. It further notes that there is the lack of a singular explanation for this complicated and growing security threat. This chapter also discovers the rising number of youths ‘seeking refuge’ in Somali and other East African countries due to profiling by police as suspects of criminal activities within the area. Further, parents live in fear due to lack of knowledge on the whereabouts of their sons and daughters. It further observes that recruitment is done within Kenya with some of the de-radicalized young men and women were lured to with promises of jobs with the country only to find themselves in Somalia. In light of all this, there is an increase in civic education on the effects of youth radicalization with an emphasis of encouraging artivism.

Radicalization and the recruitment process into violent extremism still remains a complex matter both from a national and international level. Individuals or groups are motivated to these extremes despite deliberate but minimal efforts by different stakeholders to reduce or prevent young men and women to join there illegal groups. These motivations include but not limited to personal grievances, religion, frustrations, revenge and seeking a sense of belonging. Therefore, this chapter finds that the driving factors towards
radicalization and recruitment is an individualized process and therefore cannot be
generalized across the board either by religion, ethnic background, sex or gender. Notable,
is the number of youths radicalized and recruited to join movements in Libya and Syria. This
was shared by a senior security officer and one concerned guardian who has apparently
reported this matter to the local police after a confession from on phone. Recommendations
here include; need for a multi-faceted counter-terrorism strategies by key actors including
state and non-state actors, and the general public to deal with this global security challenge,
come up with preventive strategies to reduce radicalization and building trust and
cooperation between security agencies and the public.

4.1 General Information

The fieldwork sample to determine the driving factors (push and pull) towards youth
radicalization and recruitment in Kenya composed of a specific target of 50 participants
segregated by gender: 33 male and 17 female participants. Out of this number, 30
(radicalized, de-radicalized and potential) were aged between 18-35 years living within
Eastleigh and remaining 20 aged above 35 years. The 20 included parents of the radicalized
youths (4), senior security agents (4) and a mix of civil society organisations, human rights
defenders and faith based organisations (12).

The findings are based on the research questions which include what respondents
consider to be the driving factor to youth radicalization and recruitment in Kenya/what drove
them, their take on the government’s response to the same, mechanisms put in place by
communities to reduce or prevent the same and their perceptions towards the role of the
police in countering violence extremism. The gender information is presented in the pie chart
below.
4.1.1 Religious ideology

The findings from the data collected in Eastleigh revealed that out of the 50 participants, 38 believed that religious ideology was a major influence to youth radicalization and further recruitment to violent extremism. This was highlighted in both the focus group discussion and individual interviews. Majority of the respondents believed that mosques have been associated with preaching violence extremism citing examples of the late Sheikh Aboud Rogo and Makaburi who died between 2012 and 2013, were believed to teach violent Jihad. According to the respondents, the late Sheikh Rogo, was the main ideological leader responsible for Islamist radicalization, recruitment and deployment of young men to Somalia. Two of the five respondents believed to have left Somalia due to the harsh demands that included killing, indicated that they identified with Sheikh Rogo as he understood their plight and provided solutions to their problems. The two believed in his preaching and ‘would do’ anything when called upon. In the contrary, twelve respondents were quick to state that Islam was a peaceful religion and does not preach against the Holy Quran, adding
that it was evident those who believed in the two Sheikhs misinterpreted the words of the Quran.

Additionally two respondents (a religious leader and a youth) noted that there still exist recruiters that push extreme religious ideology through specific schools (Madrassas) and Mosques. The target groups according to the respondents are young and innocent school going children who do not have a clear/in-depth understanding on the religion and therefore providing an opportunity to preach their ideology leading to religious radicalization. However, this is being done in secrecy due to the high surveillance by law enforcement agencies. A religious leader during the FGD revealed that the police beats and patrols in the area and the constant and consistent raids have made it next to impossible for the recruiters to do their work effectively. However, the close monitoring has led to the terror networks/recruiters to devise other ways to reach their target(s) such as social media platforms – Facebook, Twitter, and Whatsapp and You Tube channels. A local administrator pointed out that majority of young men and women own smart phones and it was difficult to monitor their use of social media especially at the local level. Although he added that many a times he has been called upon to help track individual owners of numbers suspected to be in communication with the terror group by the Directorate of Criminal Investigations.

Human rights defenders in the FGD noted that there was a worrying trend of young men and women converting into Muslim and disappearing without trace. It was argued that one explanation why this is so is due to the fact that they become soft targets and vulnerable to religious radicalization. This is due to their vulnerability as new members in to the religion and high likely to be driven into radical views and extreme positions from ‘rogue’ religious ideologists. Parents are afraid to come out and speak about the disappearance of their children to avoid intimidation or unwarranted and unexpected repercussion from security agencies. These sentiments prove the fact that there is clear no or minimal relationship
between the police and the public which has increased the gap of sharing and collection of intelligence information by the public and security agencies, respectively. A few brave parents have reported to police stations for further investigations.

‘My son converted into Muslim during his high school studies. Before that he was a very active church choir member and he loved singing since he was a young boy. When he completed school, he was not the boy I knew. He isolated himself with the rest of his siblings and often would be on his phone while he was around the house, locked up in his room. I came to realize later that he was attending Madrassas class later that year. He started reading the Quran and would ask me questions on what I left about Islam. I would tell him he was a grown up and there was no way she was going to tell him which religion to follow. That was the day I lost my son. Two weeks after my statement, he came, packed his clothes, wore a twaub and said he had found a new love in Muslim and would be traveling abroad to join those that he can identify himself with. I had a responsibility as a parent. I went to report to the police that was in 2017. To date, I have neither heard from the police nor my 23 year old son. I am hopeful that I will one day see my son.’ A parent respondent whose son left in 2017.

Again, there exist a gap in responding to these reports and a clear monitoring and tracking system for people moving in and out of the country through the borders. A senior officer during the KII noted that the government has put measures in place along the border lines including the deployment of special units in different road blocks and at the border points. This he reported has seen tremendous improvement of security at the border points. The new move by the Inspector General of police to reduce the number of road blocks or traffic checks on highways and without justified approval from senior officers is expected to stem rampant corruption on Kenyan roads including the border points.
4.1.2 Poverty and Unemployment

The findings from the FGDs and the individual interviews revealed that poverty is the leading cause of radicalization among the young men and women in Eastleigh. According to the respondents, ‘a learned and uneducated youth has nothing to lose.’ and therefore they feel that they ought to do ‘anything’ to get out of dearth, to make a living. The findings further shown that most radical youths in Eastleigh are radicalized by the terror organization with the promise of a better life and redemption from the shanty slums and the life of turmoil. They are so vulnerable due to destitution which allows them to desert their moderate religious and political morals to adopt and practice radical views in exchange for a small pay usually embellished by recruiters. A de-radicalized youth who left Somali in December of 2018 was given three hundred thousand as an advance salary, which without any second thought, accepted to save his family from poverty.

‘I come from a single parent upbringing and my mother has had to struggle in order to make a livelihood for me and my six siblings. I have struggled in school and I almost gave up on this God given life. My support system was my mother who encouraged me to soldier on until I cleared my Secondary Education. We had gone for days without food. One day I was watching a movie in a video shop in Majengo, my two friends introduced me to a man who said he would offer me a job and would change my family.’ I did not hesitate as that is all what I wanted at that time. After one week, the man came home and told me that he was ready to connect me to the ‘prospective employer.’ I was given an envelope and given two days to prepare for the trip. To my surprise it was money. I lied to my mum that I had won a bet and she was at first hesitant but when she recalled that there was pending school fees, she took the cash and some of it she added more stock to her vegetable business. To cut the story short I found myself in Somalia after traveling by road, blindfolded. What I saw there I cannot explain further... tears flowing. I was misused and went through physical and
mental pain. I was there for six months but it seems like a decade. I am back home but a very 
miserable young man. I am trying to cope. I do not know if they will come back for me. I 
want to go back to school. With my mean grade of C- I believe I will pursue my career in 
hospitality...’

The above respondent quote illustrates how Al-Shabaab recruiters in Kenya have been capitalizing on the high levels of poverty experienced by young men and women in Eastleigh to engage in radicalization and recruitment. Singling out the place of economic marginalization, the lack of job opportunities and mainly for young males has been identified as a critical factor for recruitment. Economic vulnerability remains an important driver of terrorist recruitment in regions or communities under greater economic pressure. (Darden, 2019)

Many Kenyan youths are migrating to cities in search of educational opportunities, employment, and the modern amenities that accompany urban life and therefore the demand for employment opportunities is high while opportunities are few. Unemployment is a trigger factor that was identified by the respondents. It deludes young men and women that fighting alongside the terrorists is a form of employment with utopian rewards for both them and families back home. A local administrator during the interview noted that this a major problem as many of the young men and women are unemployed and vulnerable to radicalization. Many of these youths access the internet in search of online and offline jobs. While at it find themselves in terrorists groups sites which in many circumstances leads to being radicalized and recruited to the terror groups. The findings further revealed that the recruiters and radicalizers tap into the large available pool of unemployed youths seeking to make a living to escape destitution in return for a monthly payment to be disbursed to their families back home. Similarly, they recruit professionals looking for jobs to fill in their white-collar wing positions that require experts like engineers, journalists, computer experts
among others that complement the foot soldiers. A good example being the University of Nairobi Law student who took part in the 2015 terror Garissa attack that left 148 people, many of them students dead. There were clear examples of families who receive monthly ‘salaries’ from their sons and daughters ‘abroad’ and some of them advancing from the earnings of terrorism by living ‘high life’.

In a KII with a security expert with a wide range of experience in counter-terrorism, he blamed societal cultural expectation that it is the government’s job to provide employment opportunities. However, due to inadequate infrastructure, weak economic growth and terrorism in Kenya, the public sector cannot absorb the large workforce, which is evident in the job cuts and early retirement of civil servants. Graduates are educated but unequipped with essential life and work skills. The frustrating reality for the majority of young men and women in Eastleigh is that they are being educated for jobs in a flooded market, leading to an ever-expanding gap between their aspirations and the actual opportunities available. Programmes to expand the number of graduates therefore risk increasing the problem, fuelling further frustration(s). It is this gap of exclusion that extremist groups have identified as key recruitment potential.

Additionally, the situational factors of corruption, unemployment and lack of quality education lead to a lack of self-worth, motivation, and financial security. These push factors are forcing many educated young people into unemployment with career options limited to the semi-formal economy or to leaving the country in search of higher level work or greener pastures. In these circumstances a small minority (like the young men and women in Eastleigh) fall prey to extremist ideologies. It is therefore not that surprising that there is at least a correlation between the increase in youth unemployment and radicalisation in Eastleigh.
A section of the youths interviewed identified football as a way of luring young men and women with a promise to be connected to teams in the Middle East. Many youths got into this trap where they would be picked and taken to a field in Majengo where no one would suspect them of any illegal activities. Respondents noted that this tactic passed off easily as a sporting activity and thus did not attract security suspicion or scrutiny. This approach was used to recruit many young school going children, as young as twelve years old. A teacher in a school in Eastleigh observed that many young men would not return to school after the long December holidays. Follow ups by teachers to the parents of the affected children showed that some of them had been recruited in football teams in Isiolo, Garissa, Mombasa and in Somalia. Most of these young men ended up in Somalia where they joined Al-Shabaab against their will.

‘I was lured into this group when I was in class seven pupil in one of the City Council Schools here in Eastleigh. It started with an introduction from my friend who was already a member. I loved football, I was a striker, and I had a dream to play in the English Premier League. One training led to the other and in a month’s time, I found myself in Mombasa ‘competing’ with other teams and later in Somalia. It was against my will. I regret because whatever happened to me in Somalia changed my life completely. I had not held a gun not even seen one. I stayed there for three years. I sneaked out of the ‘camp’ walked miles and miles to civilization and here I am. When we left to Somalia we were a group of 10 young men and two young women. I escaped alone. My friends are still there but there is no football that goes on there...’ A de-radicalized youth. The same sentiment was echoed by a security officer who said that this has gone down as intelligence-led beats and patrols have ‘neutralized’ some of these groups.’

From the findings, it is evident that the most important solution to this vicious cycle is meaningful jobs that provide purpose, motivation, financial reward, and bridge the gap of
social exclusion by providing an alternative future for the young men and women. They would also utilize the high tax revenues to enable improve infrastructure and develop higher performing public services. Given that governments are not likely to create more jobs and there is a lack of foreign investment to generate employment, job creation through entrepreneurship can therefore be an important means of filling the gap. If viewed as an untapped resource, developing youth capacity through innovative business ideas would benefit not only the economy and society but also provide occupation and motivation to an increasingly dissatisfied and super active generation. This would include them in society and provide alternatives to radicalisation.

4.1.3 Social Networks (Online and Offline)

Data from the focus group discussions and individual interviews in Eastleigh observed that another major area of recruitment is through social networks. ‘Social networks are crucial in drawing vulnerable youths’ towards radicalization. It was observed that social networks are more than just the online versions that have become so common in media reports of radicalization and recruitment. While the use of social media is a new and increasingly utilized phenomenon, it is merely one tool used by terror groups and recruiters. It was revealed from the findings that recruiters will ‘use the communication tools that are available to them including the internet’ to influence the youths. With so many young people leading digital lives due to its affordability and accessibility, it should surprise no one that recruiters will naturally use digital media as a tool. This affirms the theory of social movement which explains why social mobilization occurs, the forms under which it manifests, as well as potential social, cultural, and political consequences. It begins with a friend request, sharing propaganda, attracting recruits and finally coordinating their followers; all of which can contribute to radicalisation and recruitment of youths.
An interview with a senior police officer from the Directorate of Criminal Investigations - Cyber Crime, there is an increase in the role played by online platforms in the radicalization process in Kenya: ‘There are several factors that are contributing to youth radicalization and recruitment and this includes social media (Facebook, Twitter, Telegram, Signal, Whatsapp – as cited from the interviews) where radicalizing materials like videos, publications, audio-visual and speeches are posted that could motivate an individual to join the radical groups. Social media therefore has been used by terrorist networks for a range of purpose including but not limited to propaganda to youth radicalization and recruitment and this calls for regulation of social media use to reduce this security threat.

Further, the use of social media is but one tool, and it does not exclusively explain the transition to violence. According to the Security expert, the transition from radicalization to violence leads to the non-digital aspect of recruitment as ‘violent action is unlikely to originate from purely virtual ties if they are not sustained by previous face-to-face interaction’. The face-to-face aspect of social networks is something that is unique to each context.

The KII with the security expert observed that in Eastleigh, a broad description of social networks is that they are kinship-based, extending through marriages into clans and ethnic (Somali) consisting of both personal and political considerations. While in other regions, like the Coastal region, the social networks penetrated by recruiters may be based more on ‘political, religious, and economic” or isolated villages where everyone knows each other. Other contexts ripe for recruitment, generally speaking, may include social networks organized around considerations of identity, such as nationalism, ethnicity, or language.

The findings from the interviews further observed that recently a focus has been on deportees from foreign countries as a source of radicalization and violence. The young men
aged between 13 and 23 years, are members of a gang called ‘Super power’ deported from US, UK, and other Western countries for crimes committed there. This group has provided a point of contact with different social networks, with no evidence concerning the role of the deportees in recruitment. If anything a deportee becomes just another tool for the recruiter to use based on the context of the social networks in Kenya. An interview with a senior officer revealed that the Super Power is said to have been initially backed by businessmen in Eastleigh, for protection and intimidation of rival merchants to eliminate competition. The group was rumoured to have financial links with terrorists and communication between them and the facilitators cut off, leaving them to their own. Broke and desperate, members organized themselves into the gang and have been accused of numerous criminal activities ranging from murder, mugging, pickpocketing, and violent robbery – often stabbing their victims.

According to a psychologist who has worked closely with de-radicalized youths in Eastlands, Nairobi County, there is need to have proper rehabilitation measures for youths who return home. Many of the de-radicalized youths fear for their lives as some of their friends have been executed by police giving a clear warning to those returning.

‘I do not leave the house ever since I came from Somali. One of my friends who I learnt later had been recruited by Al Shabaab and returned home, his body was found with bullet wounds. Police had visited his home constantly for a year or so and when he returned, his neighbours informed the police. That was the day he was last seen.’ De-radicalized youth interviewed in Eastleigh.

4.1.4 State Hard approach in Response to Counter-terrorism

Findings from the FGDs and individual interviews especially from human rights defenders in the area revealed suppressive state approach to respond to terrorism which had
influenced the radicalization and recruitment process. Majority of the respondents believed the hard approach used by the state to counter terrorism violated the rights of the young men and women including the right to life, to fair hearing and freedom from torture, cruel inhumane and degrading treatment and punishment. Further, this had increased the gap between the youth and the police and this had aroused grievances that were now being utilized by radicalizing networks. Clear examples cited by the respondents was the securitization of the Somalis identity during the Operation Usalama Watch of 2014 launched in Eastleigh. The operation followed a series of terror attacks including the September 2013 Westgate attacks. This affected a majority of the Somalis in the area. This security swoop that was intended to pre-empt terror threats resulted in a range of human rights violations including arbitrary arrests, enforced disappearance, torture, unlawful confinements and extra-judicial executions.

A security expert who is also a former police officer, observed that the Kenya’s counter-terrorism responses by security agencies is predominantly anchored on hard-power approaches including use of force. In the process of policing terrorism, a section of respondents argued that security agencies and mostly the police had resulted into gross human rights violations. The security agencies actions. Community based organisations and social justice centres in this area have documented many cases of enforced disappearance and illegal police killings. These hard approaches by the State have created ‘suspect’ communities which continue to evoke feelings of blanket condemnation and as a result widened the gap between the police and the communities. The Muslim community considered this victimization an attack to the Islam religion. This denunciation provided the drive to join radical groups with the aim of ‘retaliation’, protect their religion under attack and ‘correct’ injustices against them and their families.
Majority of the respondents observed that the operations in Eastleigh, were conducted in a cruel, inhumane and degrading manner and some of the young men picked by the police during the swoop have never returned home. Efforts by the families to find them including visits to the police stations, morgues, hospitals and prisons have been futile. A number of young men who experienced police actions and inactions sought refuge in other countries for fear of their lives, never to return. Those who remained have open hatred towards the police which has seen some officers killed in their line of duty.

Human rights defenders in the area interviewed, considered these counter-terrorism measures as a form of collective punishment for the Somali Muslims. The selective arrests had created feelings of political ostracism providing ground for religious radicalization. Further, claimed that these human rights violations created alienation between the government and communities. The claims of extra-legal interventions were termed by respondents as counter-productive to the state and thus the need to formulate effective soft approaches like dialogue that would bring together affected communities and policymakers to create a multi-layered plan that takes on all of the forces that lead to radicalization and recruitment. Some of the respondents that included religious leaders affirmed that some of the actions by the security agents perceived as directed against the Muslim identity were opening up opportunities for radicalization, recruitment and revenge.

These results suggest that the Kenyan government should curb police abuses and explore more developmental approaches to counter-terrorism to ensure that measures aimed at engaging terror groups do not generate further grievances among an already isolated and vulnerable community. This is a view echoed by respondents asserting that most of the Kenyan government counter terrorism measures are not effective and often counter-productive.
4.2 Mechanisms confronting youth radicalization and recruitment in Kenya

The Kenyan government just like other States globally, have put in place efforts to prevent and combat terrorism including legislation and policy mechanisms. While States have a right and duty to protect her citizens and other individuals under their jurisdiction from acts of terrorism and to bring to justice persons who commit terrorism, the human rights of the suspects must also be addressed. The Counter-terrorism strategies or rather efforts must adhere to the protection of human rights.

The fieldwork sample to determine the mechanisms put in place to confront youth radicalization and recruitment in Kenya composed of a specific target of 50 participants segregated by gender: 33 male and 17 female participants. Out of this number, 30 (radicalized, de-radicalized and potential) were aged between 18-35 years living within Eastleigh and remaining 20 aged above 35 years. The 20 included parents/families of the radicalized youths (4), senior security agents (4) and a mix of civil society organisations, human rights defenders and faith based organisations (12).

The findings are based on the research questions which include what respondents consider as the current government responses to radicalization to address the problem of youth radicalization and recruitment, the best approach that the government can employ to counter radicalization and recruitment in Kenya and what counter radicalization policies they would recommend for government and the public. Aspects of human rights violations were identified during the collection of data which prompted the researcher to interrogate this issue further by speaking to specific rights reported. The chapter will discuss the findings obtained from the study and give accounts from some of the respondents.

In summary, this chapter explores the mechanisms that have been adopted and implemented in Eastleigh, an area that has been perceived as a radicalization and recruitment
‘hotspot’ to confront youth radicalization and recruitment. The chapter further analyses counter-terrorism mechanisms including Institutional, Legal and Policy, and looks at human rights and counter terrorism, the coordination among different security agencies and community based approaches in countering terrorism. The chapter also looks at the gaps and challenges in implementation of countering youth radicalisation and recruitment mechanisms.

4.2.1 Human rights and counter terrorism

It is important to note that the preamble of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) recognizes that the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world. UDHR recognizes that all human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood. Kenya has ratified various international and regional instruments and resolved to take measures to uphold the rule of law without violation of human rights as it combats terrorism. As the government fulfils its obligations to protect the life and security of its citizens, it has a duty to prosecute those who are responsible for terrorist acts as well as to protect individuals within its jurisdiction. However, there have been reported cases of violations of specific rights provided for by the different international, regional and national instruments. The following are testaments from both duty bearers and right holders from the findings. The sections are divided into the specific rights.

4.2.2.1 Right to life

According to an interview with one respondent from the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) in Kenya, measures should be taken to

preserve the life as everyone is entitled to right to life as provided in the UDHR under article 3. Further, the African Charter article 4 states that human beings are inviolable. Every human being shall be entitled to respect for his life and the integrity of his person and no one may be arbitrarily deprived of this right. The respondent noted that international and regional human rights law recognize the right and duty of States to protect those individuals subject to their jurisdiction. The KNCHR shared the same sentiment noting that Kenya has taken the appropriate steps to protect and promote this right under Article 26 of the Constitution. However, in practice, some of the measures that States have adopted to protect individuals from radicalization and recruitment in Kenya have themselves posed grave challenges to the right to life.

The findings from the FGD and KII carried out with civil society organisation and specific informants respectively revealed that there are “deliberate” or “targeted killings” to eliminate specific individuals as an alternative to arresting them and bringing them to justice. The group noted that targeted killings should not be used to punish young men and women but instead allow the criminal justice system take its course. One woman who lost his two sons in Eastleigh in 2015 noted that police had been trailing them for close to a year and even visited her to warn her about his sons’ ‘movement’.

‘That morning in 2015, I was called by my sister-in-law requesting me to go to her place, a few blocks away from my house. I met a crowd of people staring at two bodies, only to find that one of them was my son’s. The witnesses who saw what happened said that his other son had been picked up by police not known to them. It did not take me an hour when I was called again to be informed that my other son’s body had been found with bullet wounds about 5kms from where we were. To be honest I had no idea that my sons were being used to recruit young men and women to join the militant group in Somalia. I blame myself a lot for their deaths as I was not there to monitor what they were doing. But again I also
blame the government for not arresting and rehabilitating them. I have become an ambassador here sensitizing young men and women to shun crime including being used by people who have their own interest to use violent means to address issues. I miss my sons... 

The findings from the KII with family members affected by radicalization revealed that many of them do not know where their sons and daughters are four years after they were picked by law enforcement agencies.

‘We have visited all the prisons, police stations and morgues but to no avail. I believe one day that my son will come back. He was picked here in Eastleigh while we were having dinner by men who said they were police officers from ATPU. The police have since denied being involved in their disappearance.’

One of the respondent’s perspective of the police also changed;

‘I can’t be friends with these police. I can’t, I cannot sit with them. There’s too much anger inside of me right now. Every time, when I’m driving by, and I see the police stop anybody, I stop, take out my phone, and I take a video so that if something happens to them, I have a record. One of my biggest fears is that they will come for me and my family and kill us. I am afraid...’ A parent respondent who was in the middle of the Operation Usalama watch in Eastleigh.

A psychiatrist who has been providing psychological support to a group of family members in Eastleigh area stated that the amount of trauma experienced by these families is so huge that the hatred they have for law enforcement agencies is immeasurable. These families experience a level of suffering that is naturally ignored and misunderstood. They still hold negativity within themselves and it is not that the affected family suffer, but the

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3 Selected respondent for the interview
community at large. She noted that once a mother is broken, she can no longer hold a family together then the family becomes broken. And when the family is broken, the community becomes broken. In her statement there is need for the government to come up with preventive and responsive measures to counter violence extremism that are acceptable by the community and those that will not leave a community ‘wounded’.

A senior police officer revealed that there is no policy within the system to deprive anyone’s life and that there are clearly defined laws that help the police to maintain peace and order and in specific counter violence extremism. The law provides for proportionality, legality, accountability and necessity while responding to radicalization in Kenya.

4.2.1.2 Prohibition against torture

The prohibition of torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment is absolute under the international and other regional and national laws. UDHR under article 5 provides that no one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. This prohibition is non-derogable even in states of emergency threatening the life of the nation under international and regional human rights treaties. In a KII with a respondent from one of the CSOs, the use of torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment to provoke one to give information is absolutely prohibited. Further, the use of evidence obtained by torture is illegal and violation of the principle of non-admissibility of evidence extracted by torture, contained among others, in article 15 of the Convention against Torture.

The Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture protects detainees against torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment. Further the Prevention of Torture Act 2017 prohibits torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment. However, in practice these laws have been violated when countering violence extremism. According to
the KNCHR, there are several case studies in Kenya that attest to violation of this right in Kenya and in particular in Eastleigh. The findings from the FGDs and the KII from the data collected revealed that the cases of torture in Eastleigh have been high since the government launched the ‘Operation Usalama Watch’ in April of 2014. Numerous cases of torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, extortion and sexual harassment at the hands of security agents during the operations were reported. The torture methods include beatings, water boarding, electric shocks, genital mutilation, exposure to extreme cold or heat, denial of sleep and food. The arrests did not lead to any case(s) appearing in Court charged with terrorism-related offences. Those that were tortured during the swoop remain with physical and mental wounds and live in fear of any repeat of the suffering they went through. One of them is a 30 year old young man and his wife as accounted below;

‘I was seated outside my house at around 11am listening to my radio with my two sons. I saw three officers in uniform who came straight to me. They took me and bundled me into a Land Cruiser parked outside my gate. They then went into my house and took my wife who was feeding our last born daughter, and bundled her too. My two sons screamed for help but neighbours only peeped through their windows. We were taken to a police station around Thika road in an unsanitary conditions in an overcrowded cell without food or access to lawyers. We were about twelve of us. We were detained for five days and tortured close to 5 hours to confess that we were part of a team radicalizing and recruiting members to Somalia’s Al-Shabaab terror group. My wife and I suffered physical and mental pain. We found the house ransacked and we lost many of our belonging during the swoop. We were warned not tell anyone of what happened to us. I have a scar on my back that is a reminder of what I went through. The trauma that has been left on my two sons is still evident as they fear Land Cruisers and any time they see one, they run into hiding...’
One religious leader did not agree that torture should be prohibited as it is a form of collecting information in an easy way and for the sake of the government to get rid of the criminal elements within the society. Torture inflicts pain that allows people to promptly provide intelligence information. From this statement there lacks knowledge on the provisions of the laws that prohibits torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment. This therefore calls for sensitization by CSOs on these laws encouraging preventive measures like community policing as a way of building trust and confidentiality among the police and the general public and in the long run encourage sharing of intelligence information.

From the findings above, torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment remains a tool of government to collect information. As remarked by the psychiatrist there is need for the government to come up with measures that are accepted by the community and are in line with the international, regional and national legal provisions. Further, there is need for police and the public to co-exist and live in cohesion in order to identify criminal elements of radicalization and recruitment of young men and women. This can be done through establishing reporting mechanisms that are anonymous and those that accessible and friendly to anyone willing to share intelligence information. This will reduce cases of people going through torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment to provide information.

### 4.2.1.3 Right to liberty and security of person

In an interview with OHCHR, Article 3 of the UDHR provides for the right to liberty and security of person. In addition, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966 also recognizes a right to security of person. Article 9 states that ‘everyone has the right to liberty and security of person,’ and prohibits ‘arbitrary arrest or detention,’ and that ‘no one shall be deprived of his liberty except on grounds provided for by law. Article 6 of the
African Charter⁴ states that, ‘no one may be deprived of his freedom except for reasons and conditions laid down by law.’ In a nutshell, the law prohibits arbitrary arrests or detention and Kenya has an obligation to prevent unlawfully or arbitrarily detention while responding to violence extremism.

Kenya committed to protect this right under Article 29 of the Constitution of Kenya which states that every person has the right to freedom and security of the person, which includes the right not to be: (a) deprived of freedom arbitrarily or without just cause; (b) detained without trial, except during a state of emergency, in which case the detention is subject to Article 58; (c) subjected to any form of violence from either public or private sources; (d) subjected to torture in any manner, whether physical or psychological; (e) subjected to corporal punishment; or (f) treated or punished in a cruel, inhuman or degrading manner.

However, in practice in countering violence extremism, CSOs have documented cases of violation of this right. Several persons have been arbitrary arrested and detained for being suspected of planning or engaging in terrorist activities. From the data collected from the FGDs and the KIIIs, the 2014 ‘Operation Usalama Watch’ was the beginning of the violation of this right. In 2017, a male respondents interviewed in Eastleigh, was arrested and detained in a police station along Jogoo Road for ten days without being informed why he was arrested. Further, he was not allowed to contact any of his family members contrary to Article 49 of the Constitution which provides that one should be informed of why they were being arrested and contact family member(s) of their arrests. He was detained together with other five young men, one of whom was found dead a week after their release with

⁴ http://hrlibrary.umn.edu/instree/z1afchar.htm
bullet wounds, suspected to be police officers. He does not know the whereabouts of the other three since then.

Out of the 50 respondents, eighteen of them know at least two people who have been unlawfully arrested and detained with no case going through the criminal justice system. Some of them have been tortured before being released and other have disappeared to date.

4.2.1.4 Non-discrimination

Somali nationals living in Kenya have been targeted before and blamed for the terror activities that have been witnessed in the Country. A number of measures which undermine their human rights have been deployed by the government including moving thousands of refugees and asylum seekers from Somalia living in Eastleigh to refugee camps that are overcrowded and insecure. The theory of securitization is affirmed here as Kenyans have been made to believe that Somali nationals are a security threat, which has been accepted by the audience as it has been declared by the politicians and policy makers. This has led to discrimination and lack of trust between them and other ethnic groups.

The respondents, majority of them from the Somali ethnic observed that the government has been discriminatory in countering violent extremism in Eastleigh and across the country. Muslims of the Somali origin have been major targets contrary to Article 2 of the UDHR which sets out the basic principle of equality and non-discrimination as regards to the enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms. Further, the article forbids ‘distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status’.

One representative from CSO noted that the operation initially focused on the Somali community, including refugees and asylum-seekers. Whilst there have been arrests of Kenyan nationals, refugees of other nationalities, undocumented foreigner nationals and
NGO workers, the operation has inexplicably focused on the Somalis. This has birthed mistrust and stereotyping that all Muslim of Somali origin are terrorists. It is therefore the responsibility of the government to respect to all human rights without discrimination as it fights against terrorism.

**4.2.2 Institutional, Legal and Policy in countering terrorism**

Terrorism and counterterrorism remains a global issue that requires global efforts. The international community has come up with numerous efforts to prevent and combat terrorism. Africa and Kenya to be specific is not an exception. Kenya has committed to the fight against terrorism by coming up with institutional, legal and policy measures. This is to support the fight against terrorism with a view of protecting her citizens and other individuals within its jurisdiction from acts of terrorism and to further bring to justice persons found guilty. In this section, the researcher will interrogate the institutional, legislative and policy legislations put in place by the Kenyan government and briefly look at the international and regional laws. A lot of information provided under this section is analysed from the data collected from experts including those involved in countering violence extremism, security agencies, CSO organisations and a section of community members who understand the subject matter.

**4.2.2.1 National**

Having had its fair share of terrorists' attacks from Somalia terror group Al Shabaab, Kenya has come up with counterterrorism measures which include institutional, legislation and policy. This is to ensure that it protects her citizens against terrorism. This section will look at each of the measures as follows;

**4.2.2.2 Institutional measures**
4.2.2.2.1 The Anti-Terrorism Police Unit (ATPU)

According to the security expert, the Anti-terrorism Police Unit (ATPU) is a unit within the NPS mandated to mitigate terrorism related cases in the country. The Unit was formed in the year 2003 to investigate all terrorism matters. This was after Kenya experienced two major terror attacks – the US Embassy in August of 1998 and the Kikambala in 2002 where over 220 Kenyans lost their lives and over 100 others injured. This was the time that the Kenyan government knew that terrorism was not a European problem but a global one concern. The roles of the Unit includes to ban terrorist activities within the country, investigate all terrorism-related cases, create profiles for suspected terrorists and keep an updated databank, share intelligence with other stakeholders, review and monitor security of vital installations and soft targets, among other roles.

At that time, there were no laws or policies in place to provide operational direction to the Unit. The Unit received support from foreign countries including the US and the UK. The support was majorly on the hardware and the software including equipment and capacity building respectively. The same sentiment was echoed by a security agent who said there was no law in place and the police used what had been provided for in the Force Standing Orders which has since been replaced by the Service Standing Orders which are in line with the Constitution. Mistakes were made as Kenya did not have the capacity especially in gathering intelligence, analysis and response. This is one area that Kenya is still grappling with, to date.

4.2.2.1.2 National Counter Terrorism Centre (NCTC)

The security agent observed that the Cabinet in 2004 saw the need to have a National Counter Terrorism Centre (NCTC), a multi-agency instrument primarily of security agencies to strengthen coordination in countering terrorism after an escalation of terror attacks. The NCTC was not anchored in law but in 2014 after the promulgation of the Constitution in
2010, it was established in law by the Security Law Amendment Act 2014. The National Security Council plays a special role in the management and constitution of the NCTC.

The mandate of the NCTC among other functions is to coordinate national counter-terrorism efforts, conduct public awareness on prevention of terrorism, develop strategies to counter radicalisation and foster de-radicalisation and engage public for counter radicalisation, and coordinate the implementation of the Strategy to Counter Violent Extremism. According to the Counterterrorism expert the NCTC has not effectively carried out its mandate effectively due to the capacity gaps; knowledge and skills. Further, there are no clear strategies to foster de-radicalization for those young men and women willing to return home like rehabilitation centres. A CSO representative observed that young men/women returning home, majority of them are ‘picked’ by security agencies never to return. This by itself demoralizes those willing to return for fear of any repercussions. The establishment of the NCTC has not been the panacea that people had hoped for.

Further to this, the NCTC is to engage the public for counter radicalization, an area they have been criticised. The counterterrorism expert notes that there are no or limited platforms where the public and the security agencies can engage instead the relationship between the two has been met with suspicion and mistrust to say the least. The two experts (security and counter-terrorism) recommend that there is need for the security agencies to come up with soft rather than hard approaches to fight terrorism. This includes preventive measures like human intelligence and utilizing this information by implementation rather than use of reactive means like ‘shoot to kill’. Further, invest in collection of intelligence from the members of the public through community policing structures. This should be done through building trust and confidentiality with the community.

4.2.2.3 Legislative measures
4.2.2.3.1 Constitution of Kenya, 2010

Kenyans passed a new Constitution in 2010 with a hope of the State to protect her citizens. Article 238 (1) defines national security as the protection against internal and external threats to Kenya’s territorial integrity and sovereignty, its people, their rights, freedoms, property, peace, stability and prosperity and other national interest. This mandate is carried out by the national security organs. Terrorism is a threat to national security and Kenya has a duty to counter it as the Constitution places this duty on the national security organs. This duty must be undertaken while taking into considerations the law on human rights both for its citizenry and suspects of terrorism.

Both the KIIIs with a cross section of CSO and human rights defenders agree that chapter four of the Constitution of Kenya provides for the Bill of Rights which is an integral part of Kenya’s democratic state and is the framework for social, economic and cultural policies. The Chapter in addition, provides that the purpose of recognizing and protecting human rights and fundamental freedoms is to preserve the dignity of individuals and communities and to promote social justice and the realization of the potential of all Kenyans. These Articles of the Constitution reiterates the need for respect, promotion and protection of human rights including those who are suspects of terrorism. The CSO respondent observed that the Bill of rights applies to all law and binds all State organs and all persons; suspects of terrorism must also be accorded dignity and treated with respect as far as their rights are concerned. However, in practice, this has not been the case as highlighted in the previous sections on human rights and counter terrorism.

In addition to the bill of rights, chapter fourteen of the Constitution provides for the National security including the Kenya Defence Force (KDF), the National Intelligence Service (NIS) and the NPS. Article 238 provides the principles of national security which shall be promoted and guaranteed in accordance with the following principles (ii) National
security shall be pursued in compliance with the law and with the utmost respect for the rule of law, democracy, human rights and fundamental principles. Terrorism is a security issue that must be addressed within the provisions of the supreme law.

All the respondents observed that the provisions in the Constitution undeniably provides the State with clear legislation to protect its citizenry and draws attention to the need for promotion, respect and protection of human rights when enforcing national security. All legislation and policy to counter terrorism therefore must abide by the Constitution as far as respect and protection of human rights are concerned.

4.2.2.3.2 Prevention of Terrorism Act (POTA), 2012

The KII with the security and counterterrorism experts observed that the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2012 provides measures for the detection and prevention of terrorist activities and it came as a result of the sporadic attacks by the Al-Shabaab terror group. The Act defines terrorism as: ‘an activity carried out with the intent of ‘intimidating or causing fear amongst members of the public or a section of the public,’ ‘intimidating or compelling the Government or international organisation to do, or refrain from any act,’ or ‘destabilizing the religious, political, constitutional, economic or social institutions of a country, or an international organization.’

The Act also has a subsidiary legislation; the Prevention of Terrorism (Implementation of the United Nations Security Council Resolution on Suppression of Terrorism) Regulations, 2013. The security expert noted that the regulations were developed by the Cabinet Secretary of the Ministry of Interior and Coordination of National Government as provided for in the POTA law under Section 50 of the Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2012. The measures that Article 41 of the Charter of the United Nations

provides for are measures not involving the use of armed force to give effect to its decisions, contrary to what is in practice.

Some of the FGD respondents noted that in relation to terrorism, terrorism requires the suspension of normal rules. Some argued that terrorism suspects do not deserve the same guarantees and safeguards that a citizen going through the normal judicial process deserves. One respondent observed that terrorists are brutal and they do not deserve to be treated like any other criminal. A CSO respondent emphasised the importance of the rule of law when dealing with terrorism, arguing that respecting the rule of law may indeed be a more effective way of dealing with the terrorist menace. Using extra-judicial means could drive these young men and women into violent extremism.

The CSO respondent observed that POTA has addressed civil liberty concerns as it has balanced national security and civil liberties where certain safeguards have been put in place to minimize terrorism and at the same time protect the Kenyan citizens. The security expert pointed out that the Act still has shortcomings but it is a better legislation compared to other laws that dealt with terrorism before the passing of the Constitution of Kenya, 2010. One aspect that was shared across by the KII was that the Act had provided for any person suspected of terrorism should be taken to court before a court of law within 24 hours. This ensures that the suspects are presented to court within the required time and this also ensures their fundamental rights and freedoms are not violated as witnessed over the past years.

To conclude this section, the government has put in place measures to ensure it effectively combats radicalization and recruitment in Kenya from institutional, legislation and policy. This is only evident on paper. In practice, there is need to respect the rule of law as it is essential to preserve the Kenyan democracy. Democracy, rule of law and individual freedoms are closely interlinked. Without individual freedom and the rule of law, real
democracy cannot exist. Further to fight terrorism, security agencies need to respect and fulfil the rule of law including fair trial for all suspected individuals. Although Kenya has used POTA to aggressively investigate and prosecute terrorism, it has fallen short in implementing initiatives to improve access to justice among terrorism suspects.

Moreover, counter-terrorism laws that threaten fundamental freedoms and rights are likely to result in state terrorism in the form of police violence, torture, sexual assault, and arbitrarily arrest and detention based on nationality, ethnicity or religion. Lastly, counter-terrorism methods that violate the rule of law have proven to be counter-productive and are likely to result in more violence.

4.2.3 Coordination among the Different Security Agencies

The KIIIs and the FGD revealed that a number of security lapses that have been experienced while responding to terrorism attacks can be attributed to the lack of effective coordination between the different national security organs. Through the KIIIs and the FGDs, the study established that there is rivalry between the NPS’ units - the Kenya Police Service (KPS) and the Administration Police Service (APS) and this has resulted into serious lapses of coordination within the NPS.

For instance, in so far as coordinated and joint policing between the APS and the KPS is concerned, the researcher was informed by a senior security agent that the two units carry out their operations almost independently of each other due to the command structure. This has resulted to the NPS not able to work in a coherent and coordinated manner, which in turn has created serious gaps that pose a challenge to the country’s security. Lack of operational congruence between the two police service formations has affected information sharing and the carrying out of joint policing operations.
Notably, the lack of coordination between the various agencies that make up the national security organs is not only limited to the NPS but also extends to the Kenya Defence Forces and the National Intelligence Service. With no coordinated and joint approach to security by the requisite security organs, Kenyans have been treated to an unacceptable spectacle of blame shifting and finger-pointing among the institutions charged with keeping them safe. The security expert provided an instance, in the wake of the horrific terror attack carried out for an inordinately long period of time against the hapless and helpless civilians at the Westgate Mall by four armed Al-Shabaab terrorists, the NIS absolved itself of any blame stating that it had shared information on the impending terror attacks targeting upmarket malls with the police and other security outfits but no preventive action was taken. These challenges mirror similar concerns that were raised by the Intelligence predecessor – the National Security Intelligence Service (NSIS – currently the NIS) during its evidence to CIPEV in 2008. NIS contended then that information on the possibility of post-election violence was shared with the police and relevant agencies but the same was not acted upon.

The security expert (police officer) observed that the counterterrorism functions were divided among the three branches of the NPS - the Kenya Police's paramilitary General Service Unit (GSU), the DCI (including the ATPU, the Bomb Disposal Unit, and the Cyber Forensics Investigative Unit), and the APS. The National Intelligence Service and elements of the KDF. Interagency also shared responsibility. He added that the coordination was uneven, but this with improved information sharing in some cases and failure to appropriately pass threat information in others. According to the counterterrorism expert, generally, resource constrictions, inadequate training, corruption, and indistinct command and control has always hindered effectiveness in responding to terror attacks. This calls for clear chain of command and control for effective service delivery. This includes detecting and deterring terrorist plots and responded effectively to terrorism-related incidents. If done
effectively, this is expected to minimize cases of arbitrary and unlawful killings, particularly of known or suspected criminals, including terrorists.

The senior officer observed that despite the hitches in coordination of security agencies, there are efforts that the government has put in place to improve coordination within the security agencies and include more stakeholders to combat youth radicalization and recruitment. In 2017, the government worked towards implementing the 2016 National Strategy to Counter Violent Extremism for purposes of prevention efforts against terrorism and violent extremism. This is principally through county-level action plans. This has seen the NCTC work with county governments, security actors, and civil society to launch these action plans in Kwale, Mombasa, Lamu, and Kilifi Counties, areas that have been perceived to be breeding grounds for terrorists. Further, the NCTC led the Global Community Engagement and Resilience Fund (GCERF), which is currently awarding grants for community initiatives to counter violent extremism. Kenya is a GCERF beneficiary country.

One respondent in the FGD accounted the positive efforts by the security agencies in the Dusit Hotel attack;

‘We appreciated the quick response and efforts of the first responders: journalists, police, the Kenya Red Cross and other good Samaritans that supported the efforts to save the lives of our brothers and sisters during the Dusit Hotel attack. We noted the exemplary job of the National Police Service joint command, led by the former IG Boinett and other senior officers, both local and international, in the search and rescue operations. During the whole incident, the officers behaved in a most professional manner, bravely forging forward to engage the terrorists, but also being mindful of the victims and calmly reassuring them to safety. The clear coordination of efforts confirmed that the NPS had learned from the past, and is looking ahead to build coherence and effectiveness in policing. This, is indeed the kind of police service that we in the human rights sector, as well as the CoK and
National Police Service Act envisaged. In addition to the on-the-ground operations, there were regular and concise updates to the public through the press conferences. These were received well by the public, who were reassured that the situation was being handled professionally, with the ultimate aim to minimize panic, eliminate the distortion of facts, and to remain accountable.” A human rights defender.

That said and done, there is still a lot that needs to be done to ensure that Kenya never has to experience such events again. There is need to improve the intelligence gathering and prevention efforts. It was observed that in the case of the Dusit terror group, police narrowed in on a house in one of the local estates in the outskirts of Nairobi in which the terrorists had set up camp. The local security initiatives such as the Nyumba Kumi initiative need to be reviewed and revamped in order to discharge their mandates properly, and act as a first line of intelligence gathering. This will ensure that Kenyans are their brothers’ keepers, and can quickly track those who behave suspiciously within our neighbourhoods, and pass on this intelligence promptly to the police. These efforts, seemingly small, will go a long way in improving the Kenyan security right from the villages. CSOs on their part, should endeavour to continue, among others, to support the capacity building of the local security initiatives (Nyumba Kumi, and other community policing structures) as well as the NPS to ensure that they develop and strengthen a model and ethos of vigilance in our communities.

4.3 Public-police partnerships

4.3.1 Relationship between police officers and youths in Kenya

Using the field findings, this section, analyses the relationship between the police and the youth in Eastleigh in the fight against crime and specifically terrorism. The researcher will analyse the perception of police and policing services in the area and what the communities feel about the police. At the end of this section structures to promote police-public partnerships will be discussed based on the data collected from the field. This is with
a view of assessing the impact of Article 244 of the Constitution of Kenya, on objects and functions of the National Police Service, which provides that the NPS shall foster and promote relationships with the broader society. Further, article 238 is explicit that national security shall be pursued in compliance with the law and with the utmost respect for the rule of law, democracy, human rights and fundamental freedoms. These articles read together with the principles of sovereignty of the people and public participation call for an all-inclusive stakeholder strategy for legislative, policy and institutional reforms in Kenya, police reforms agenda not being an exception.

In each of the identified areas, both KII and face to face interviews were undertaken. KII’s focused on the providers of policing services at the county, division and station levels. Chiefs, religious leaders and leaders of local organisations were also interviewed as part of the key informants. Face to face interviews were undertaken with consumers of policing services in the targeted areas. A total of 171 face to face interviews with the general community representatives were undertaken in Eastleigh. These were administered randomly to community members as they went about their business or in their homesteads for the targeted urban populations. Specifically, questionnaires were administered at Mlango Kubwa, Pumwani and Majengo areas. One FGD was undertaken in Mlango Kubwa 15 key stakeholders representing religion, youth leaders, women reps and CBO and NGO leaders.

4.3.2 The relationship between the police and the youth in Eastleigh area

Public interaction and their experiences in hands of police should ideally result in confidence through fair treatment, shared values and priorities with the locals. The research assessed the public interaction and experiences in hands of police while making general enquiries, during arrests and detention, interrogation, writing statements and while seeking P3 documentation. The analysis indicates room for improvement in the interaction of the police and community as the highest very satisfied rating was 7% on assistance/ general
enquiry. A less satisfaction rate of 60.8% was reported of respondent’s experiences in hands of police during arrest and detention, on seeking general enquiry (52%), and during interrogation (54.4%). Generally, from the data collected on the relationship between the police and the public it is evident there is no trust between the two and calls for building trust, confidentiality and partnership, which is critical to enhance a people-centred policing that is pro-active rather reactive.

### 4.3.3 The perception of police and policing services in Eastleigh area

The respondents were asked to rate their level of satisfaction with police service delivery in the target areas. This was mainly in reference to the seven (7) out of the ten key police functions listed in the police service charter. Data below has been gender disaggregated;

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Rate of satisfaction with service delivery by police on key functions</th>
<th>Provision of general assistance</th>
<th>Maintaining law &amp; order</th>
<th>Protection of property</th>
<th>Protection of life &amp; property</th>
<th>Investigating crime</th>
<th>Collecting criminal intelligence</th>
<th>Preventing &amp; detecting crime</th>
<th>Apprehension of offenders</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Very good job</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fairly good job</td>
<td>21.1</td>
<td>20.5</td>
<td>19.9</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>14</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fairly poor job</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Very poor job</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Don’t Know</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>14.6</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>23.4</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Very good job</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fairly good job</td>
<td>35.1</td>
<td>31.6</td>
<td>25.7</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>24</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fairly poor job</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Very poor job</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>16.4</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Don’t Know</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>16.4</td>
<td>28.1</td>
<td>22.2</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Provision of general assistance was the highest rated service by male and female respondents with a 35.1% and 21.1% fairly good score, followed by maintaining law and order at 20.5% by female and 31.6% by male respondents respectively. Service delivery by the police can be termed as above average, in consideration of the 7 police functions. A very
good job rating was on protection of life and property reported by respondents at 24%, and 21.6% on maintaining law and order.

A high percentage of respondents, however, did not give an assessment on three (3) police functions: investigating crime (31%), collection of criminal intelligence (52%) and preventing and detecting crime (45.6%) where a ‘don’t know’ rating was given as highest. This poor rating can be associated with the limited interaction of the community and the police as they undertake these functions or could mean that the public does not understand the work of the police entirely, in crime management.

The respondent’s’ views on what needs to change or improve at the police station to ensure provision of adequate services to survivors of crime are analysed below. Important to note, 61 respondents out of 171 abstained from answering this question while the highest number of the respondents believe that there is need for structural and operational changes for a better facilitated police service. This means that the public are aware that the Service is laid up to effectively carry out their work. Further, there is need to look more into supporting the police welfare including housing, psychological support, medical cover and better remuneration. On community policing, a lot needs to be done to ensure that the structures are established and operationalized to allow for open, transparent and accountable security discussions and actions.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Respondents views on what needs to change at the police station for adequate services to survivors</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Need for structural and operational changes for a better facilitated police service</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>27.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Need for police thoroughness in undertaking their functions</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>14.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Need for transparent operations especially firm action on corrupt officers</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>11.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Need for an effective community policing</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>5.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Need for attitude change</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>5.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of respondents who did not respond</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>35.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>171</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Respondents views on what needs to change for adequate services to the citizens
To analyse this section, increasing the number of officers posted to a station was termed key among the structural and operational changes at the station, as this would address response rate upon reporting, ensure thorough investigation, proper statement taking and taking cases to court as necessary. Structural and operational changes would result in a better facilitated police service to respond to youth radicalization and recruitment in Eastleigh area. Respondents mentions of factors related to structural and operational changes had 27.49% of views given. Other factors considered important include: more police patrols in the area, especially at night, hence the need for patrol vehicles, beyond the current one vehicle provision per station; provision of communication gadgets for easy accessibility by the locals; improved conditions of police cells in terms of food, shower and toilets accessibility for those under arrest; and proper information management that assures informers confidential data and identity is not leaked out to criminals for any community policing concept to be effective in the area.

Further, a better facilitated work force would result in thoroughness by police undertaking their key functions, or so it’s expected. However, 14.62% of respondents points out the need for police to undertake their functions seriously and in a professional manner. Respondents felt this would be achieved through speedy and thorough investigations and transparent evidence collection to avoid rampant cases of wrongful arrests and keeping confidential the identity of their informers. To facilitate the police work, some respondents shared the need to: need for modern data storage system through computerizing the police system to store and access information easily; and the need to have professionals in fields of psychology to assist in some of the special cases that are reported, both the victims and the perpetrators – or at the least have police trained to offer some psychological support.
11.11% of the respondents indicated the need for transparent operations, especially, on the need to take firm actions on corrupt officers and fair treatment of all victims regardless of how wealthy or poor they are their economic status.

4.3.4 Structures to promote police-public partnerships

The respondents were asked to share on the existing local initiatives for managing security in their community to manage security in their neighbourhood. Nyumba Kumi (53.26%) and the village elders (11.41%) received most mentions by the respondents as initiatives on security. As a security initiative, only 3.8% of responses linked the chiefs and assistant chiefs as a local security initiative. Other local initiatives on security mentioned by security sector stakeholders in addition to above include vigilante groups, peace committee’s structures, community policing committees, resident associations; CBD Associations and FBOs and churches.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Respondents views on Existing local initiatives on security</th>
<th>No. of mentions of the initiative</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nyumba Kumi</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>53.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chiefs and Assistant chiefs / Baraza</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Village / Community Elders / council of elders</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>11.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Church</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neighbourhood Watch</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youth groups</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Welfare groups</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College administration / Student Council</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community Policing led by chief</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t Know</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>25.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>184</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

However, none of the respondents to the face to face interviews cited awareness of the existence of peace committees, while only a small percentage noted existence of community policing initiative (0.54%), neighbourhood watches / resident associations (0.54%) and 3.8% mentioned chief and assistant chief as part of the existing structures.
The Nyumba Kumi as the most profoundly mentioned local initiative on security had equally received a 51.2% rating of effectiveness (effective & very effective) by respondents who had identified it as a dispute resolution mechanism in Eastleigh. While serious concerns were raised on the operations of Nyumba Kumi in some areas, in areas like Pumwani good practices were shared in from other areas with very good operations management. Some of the instances shared by respondents: In Pumwani, for instance, the Nyumba Kumi initiative was viewed to be working. There are meetings held every month by the assistant chiefs and chief where the police are invited. In Majengo, Nyumba Kumi was perceived to have worked. The team is headed by 8 people at the division level but the election of members were said to have started at the cluster / village level - from 58 clusters, 5 members were elected to sub- location headed by 1 chairperson and 5 committees elected to the location level. Having been elected by members of the community, they are known and from this they draw their legitimacy.

In other localities, respondents indicated lack of knowledge of how the Nyumba Kumi representatives were picked as most community members are not unaware of who they are. Their lack of legitimacy and recognition by the locals stems from their nomination by the chiefs and the sub chiefs, and hence viewed with suspicion by the locals. Their effectiveness was also cast in doubt as criminals continue operating through sale of illegal drugs and changa’a (Majengo especially) at the door step of the Nyumba Kumi representative’s house or neighbourhood and no action is taken. Respondents noted that close relations of the representatives of Nyumba Kumi with criminals through weekly pay outs as their license to operate, which allows the criminals room to continue with their illegal businesses.

Respondents who included the security agents and consumers of policing services shared their opinions on what has worked, concerns and what Nairobi county government
needs to address as it sets up the structures below the county policing structures at the County level. This was in reference to local community initiatives, which include, Nyumba Kumi, Community policing, Peace committees and neighbourhood watches.

An analysis of what has worked on the local community initiative, the respondent’s’ responses reflects either as a contribution of these initiatives or what has worked in them to include: increased reporting of crimes to the security agencies, which has further been facilitated by the presence of technology; open engagement on security issues through improved relationship between security actors, and the community and a police offering more a friendlier service; involvement of youth in security management in their localities. Only 2.17% of respondents mentioned youth groups to be a local initiative in management of security meaning residents in these areas do not trust the youths in policing matters. In some areas, like Mlango Kubwa, a best practice was shared noted where good working modalities between the police and the community was shared, and where the youth play a central role. Further to this, Community policing worked through intelligence gathering, sharing and networking of various actors; the integration of Bodaboda in security matters was viewed as a good strategy. Most of the security agents interviewed indicated to hold frequent meetings to nurture good relations with the boda boda operators who they consider central to goings on at the community. Nyumba Kumi was said to hold regular monthly meetings and also organize fundraising events in some areas to support security enhancements in area of focus.

The respondents noted that there have been challenges to effective operation of the local initiatives on security in the targeted area. Some of the notable challenges or concerns on the operationalization of the local initiatives were shared to include: police leaking the identify of their informers to criminals once they report an incidence, and this was viewed to jeopardize the security of community members; and commercialization of the community
structures where protection fee was reported to be demanded by some initiatives from the locals. For instance in Majengo area, a protection fee of Kshs 100 was said to be charged to chang’a’a and drug peddlers. This was evidently viewed as lack of transparency and accountability among the players in security policing.

Inconsistent recruitment of the members of the local initiatives resulting in lack of legitimacy of such leadership and recognition by the locals was also termed as a challenge and the lack of civic education to the public on how community policing is supposed to work. Additionally, lack of clear linkage points in some areas of the police and the community initiatives and lack of financial facilitation of the leaders of the local initiatives results in low morale and poor commitment to their expected role. Some members of community policing were viewed to have abused their role by giving false information to fix their adversaries.

The research findings based on interactions with consumers of policing services in during focus group discussions revealed that the locals felt that the Nyumba Kumi initiative has failed. This is because the leadership supposedly viewed to comprise of old men and illiterates chosen by the chief and who are prone to manipulation. Some of the respondents noted, that though they have had heard of the initiative, they did not know who their representatives were as they lacked rapport with the community. Nyumba Kumi in this area was also viewed to have no link with the community and no relationship with the police, especially young people.

Providing information was recorded as the main role community or civilian within the community security initiatives play at 45.86%. This involves reporting of any crime incidences, sharing intelligence information with the security initiative leaders, including reporting suspicious persons. Other roles were noted to include: participate in meetings by
security representatives and or the chiefs to discuss security (2.21%) matters. During these meetings, the members of the community in some areas contribute resources required to aid the work of the community security initiatives; keeping law and order was also identified as role of civilian (14.36%) in community security initiatives; and counselling of the youth in the community to be law abiding citizens and shun radicalization.

The respondents shared some of the spaces and platforms that currently exist for interaction and collaboration between different units of the NPS and ordinary citizens for addressing crime in the areas of operation. These were viewed to bridge the gap in various structures. These were mentioned to include: integration of the Boda boda associations which run different routes was a strategy reported in most of the stations. Police use the boda boda operators as police informers and to collect intelligence as they are familiar with the locality and are more likely to come across suspicious characters in the community. Frequent meetings are held between police and the boda boda operators. For instance, boda boda operators reported the group to have good relation with the local security officer and are open to contact him in case they notice something out of the norm.

Police meetings with various community groupings like traders, motorcycle and matatu associations or Sacco’s through their leaderships and deliberate on how to ensure a secure and serene environment as they undertake their businesses. Police are invited to Public barazas convened by public administration to deliberate on how security issues are dealt with, share trends and how to deal with any insecurity. Awareness of police work and nature of cases community should report to police were noted to be shared in such meetings. Further, police convened forums with representatives on various community security initiatives / community policing meetings to deliberate on crime and security issues. The meetings with police were viewed important as they help address the fear members of public
have of the police or relating with them and provide platforms to ask questions and gather intelligence information.

4.4 Conclusion

From the findings, it is evident that recruitment for radicalization can take many forms. There is no simple path that can be countered, if certain avenues become blocked the recruiter will find other ways to reach those that are vulnerable to radicalization. Despite different attempts and successes in counter radicalization, Kenya’s general strategy has been marked by serious institutional weaknesses that limit the effectiveness of the set strategies. Kenya is still grappling with the challenge of recruitment for radicalization of young men and women within the country and the porous borders, among other concerns. Moreover, the security agencies including the Kenya police and the larger public security sector have every so often failed to conduct good policing with the community. This has led to officers’ use of reactive measures rather that preventive measures to deal with recruitment for radicalization due to the low gathering of quality intelligence. Further, there still lacks programmes to cater for the de-radicalized programmes to motivate those willing to leave the terror groups. Without addressing these factors, Kenya’s counter-radicalization strategies cannot work effectively.

The research findings appreciates the existing structures and considered critical by the security agencies, the county government and the provincial administration among other stakeholders to combat crime and terrorism to be specific. These platforms if well established and operationalized can help security agents to detect crime though information sharing in preventing and response to security challenges. There is however need to address the too many unstructured uncoordinated structures, currently in operation for a one size fit all structure that would effectively serve the citizens and the police needs on security management.
Building community cohesion in the face of a sustained effort by al-Shabaab to foment ethnic and religious divisions in Kenya is vital for marginalizing extremist actors and avoiding sectarian strife. Key to this will be building trust and confidentiality in the effectiveness, professionalism, and transparency of Kenya’s security sector among Kenyan societies. Counter radical efforts for it to be successful, must be intelligence-led and thus calls for the winning of the hearts and minds of the population.
Chapter Five: General Conclusion

5.0 Conclusion

In conclusion, from the findings it is evident that use of force by police is driving young men and women to violent extremism. This research has further shown the importance of the rule of law when dealing with terrorism. The rule of law serves the interests of the government but it is important to preserve the Kenya’s democracy which is well ascribed in our progressive Constitution. Furthermore, respect for the rule of law is important in the fight against terrorism as it may delay violence and allow Kenya to gain support in the fight against terrorism since it shows there is respect for human rights. This goes a long way to end the menace through a multi-sectoral approach to fight terrorism.

It is therefore the responsibility of the Kenyan government to refrain from use of force which is violation of many rights when dealing with terrorism. As it is, the Kenyan government has developed and implemented counter-terrorism measures that have been criticized as to violate specific human rights and fundamental freedoms. Some of the actions of its security agencies have been criticized by human rights’ NGOs and the media worldwide. Some of the laws that Kenya has passed, in relation to terrorism, have again fuelled use of unlawful means to combat terrorism. It is therefore important that the government addresses the issues of legislation that conform to the supreme law and encourage early intelligence gathering in order to prevent and respond to radicalization and recruitment in an effective manner.

5.1 Recommendations

5.1.1 Anti-terrorism Legislations in line with the Constitution

The findings from the study has revealed that there have been a number of documented cases of human rights violations including profiling of young and women,
arbitrary arrests, torture, cruel inhumane and degrading treatment, unlawful killings by
security agencies while carrying out security operations. By this, it was observed that the
approach used by the state does not conform to the national, regional and international
legislations. The government should therefore ensure that no laws in relation to terrorism are
in conflict and these laws and should be in line with the supreme law; the Constitution.
Provisions that contradict the Constitution should be amended with a view of encouraging
soft approaches to combating youth radicalization and recruitment.

The national assembly should endeavour to enact laws that are explicit in the
protection of human rights and that criminalize the contravention of human rights. This is in
contrast to the Prevention of Terrorism Act, which did not explicitly for example prevent the
government from adducing evidence obtained by torture. The government should negotiate
for the lawful return of terrorism suspects who have been rendered to other jurisdictions.
More international instruments that recognise and protect more human rights must be ratified
like ratifying the International Convention for the Protection of all persons from enforced
disappearance and make the act of an “enforced disappearance” an offense under the Kenyan
criminal law. The Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment and Punishment, which requires states’ parties to set up,
designate or maintain at the domestic level one or several visiting bodies for the prevention
of torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading forms of treatment or punishment. Finally,
it is critical that these laws be enforced. No change would result purely from well-written
laws if these laws were not properly enforced. Enforcement requires respect for these laws
by the government and specifically security agencies and individuals and, further, enhance
internal and external accountability mechanisms for checks and balances.

5.1.2 Respect for the rule of law
Apart from the government having laws in line with the Constitution, the findings revealed that Kenya has laws that prohibit excessive use of force to fight crime, terrorism being one of them. However in practice, there have been reported cases of police excesses and this has seen young men and women moving to ‘safer grounds’ for fear of repercussion. These safer grounds many a times push them to violent extremism. One of the recommendations is that the government should ensure that the police and the ATPU do not carry out extrajudicial killings; torture and other ill-treatment; excessive use of force; enforced disappearances; or other forms of arbitrary detention, renditions, and transfers to torture and other serious human rights violations. The ATPU’s conduct should be scrutinised by Independent Policing Oversight Authority (IPOA) and the National Police Service Commission (NPSC) to ensure that they act in compliance with the law and further ensure that any discretionary exercise of power is punished.

Additionally, security agencies including those with the direct mandate to combat terrorism like the ATPU must act in accordance with the law provided for the in the Bill of Rights under the Constitution. Expressly, they should not engage in unlawful killing and torture which are prohibited in the Constitution and other regional and international legislations. When these fights and fundamental freedoms are violated, independent investigations must be conducted into the allegations and the perpetrators brought to book. For effective investigations, the security agencies must be compelled to give relevant information to the civilian oversight body IPOA as required by law.

5.1.3 Equal application of the Law to all

One of the driving factors to radicalization and recruitment is the profiling of young Muslim men and women. State counter terrorism measures rise above stereotype-based ethnic and religious profiling and therefore calls for monitoring indiscriminately all faith-based teachings and outreaches for intelligence gathering to better understand the problem.
Further, POTA and any other legal provisions for handling terrorist suspects should not apply differently for citizens and aliens. Aliens should be allowed similar rights to citizens in the same position. All terrorist suspects should be afforded the right to fair trial irrespective of their religion, race, ethnicity and or nationality. There is need to amend some of the sections under POTA including section 32 as it allows the police to hold terrorist suspects over long periods contrary to Article 49 of the Constitution which provides for all arrested persons to be presented to call within 24 hours. Meaning, the courts should not allow for the prolonged detention of terrorist suspects. Such detention costs the government a lot of money in the upkeep of prisoners, and further allows the suspects to be detained for long periods despite no evidence showing that they are guilty of the offences they are accused of.

5.1.4 Strengthening internal and external accountability policing mechanisms

The findings from the research observed that there still exist police use of force due to weak accountability mechanisms. Many of the suspects who have been arrested are yet to be traced, some of them have been killed which has resulted to young men and women seek refuge in other countries for fear of their lives. One of the recommendations is that first the security agencies must use reasonable power in the fight against terrorism. This as prescribed by law should be proportionate, within the law, one must be accountable and the force used must be necessary. To effectively address this issue, the government should strengthen accountability mechanisms like the IAU, the NPSC and the IPOA to enable them ensure that the security agencies including police officers work within the confines of the law and held to account once they violate it. This will be act as a deterrence to law enforcement agencies whose modus operandi is use of excessive force to deal with crime.

Further, there is need for consulted efforts by the criminal justice actors including the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) and the judiciary to bring to book officers
responsible for any human rights violations including extrajudicial killings, torture and other ill-treatment, excessive use of force, and disappearances of persons as well as other forms of arbitrary detention, unlawful renditions, and transfers to locations where suspects will be tortured, or other serious human rights violations. This is with a view of holding officers individually accountable for their actions or inactions. Additionally, there is need for the courts to give fair trial and ensure that justice is administered expeditiously, efficiently, lawfully, reasonably and procedurally fair. The prosecution and the terrorist suspect should have equal opportunities to state their case and allowed to be represented by a lawyer.

5.1.5 Soft power in dealing with radicalization and recruitment

From the findings of the research, it is not enough to counter violent extremism - we need to prevent it, and this calls for forms of ‘soft power’, to prevent a threat driven by distorted interpretations of culture, hatred, and ignorance. No one is born a violent extremist – they are made and driven. Notably, violent extremism should not be tackled solely through measures conceived by law enforcement, intelligence services, and the military. An effective response would mean bringing members of the affected community together with policymakers and creating a multi-layered plan that takes on all of the forces that lead to radicalization.

Disarming the process of radicalization must begin with human rights and the rule of law, with dialogue across all boundary lines, by empowering all young women and men, and by starting as early as possible, on the benches of schools. Government institutions should work with the communities to understand the underlying factors of radicalization and recruitment of young men and women in Eastleigh. This can be done through dialogues. The outcome of the dialogue forums is to enable design and implementation of short and long term counter de-radicalisation strategies to reduce the appeal of radicalism in particular to the youth and to persuade those already in radical organisations to leave.
By involving these youths in the dialogue forums and noting that the most socially and economically vulnerable and are the main targets of terror organizations, the government will ensure that they are involved in designing robust programmes for destitute children and fast-track them for implementation.

5.1.6 Inclusivity in drafting policies and legislations to counter terrorism

Young people provide extremely valuable information on the key drivers and root causes of violent extremism in their local communities. They should become key partners for policymakers and law enforcement. Young people should be consulted on public policy through focus groups and should be asked how their gender, age, religion, race, socioeconomic status, and geographic background affect their experiences of security and insecurity. Through political participation, communities and young people become familiar with advocacy and build skills to think independently, to reflect critically on extreme narratives, and to challenge them.

5.1.7 Intelligence gathering, analysis and action

One of the major areas that the government has not done very well is to gather intelligence information and utilizing it at the same time. Relevant government agencies such as the ATPU and other counter-terrorism agencies should put in place effective intelligence gathering system to collect and analyse information for quick action to mitigate threats of possible attack(s). This can be done by strengthening the existing intelligence gathering systems to address challenges brought about by emerging forms of crimes associated with terrorism and radicalization. Further, enhance implementation of specific county strategies developed with the government support to address countering violent extremism and youth radicalization with specific deliverables and timelines. By so doing, young man and women especially those that are innocent will ne be linked to radicalization
and recruitment to terror. This will also enhance intelligence-led intervention for effective service delivery.

### 5.1.8 Community Policing

From the findings of the research, it is evident that establishment and operationalization of community policing structures can help to prevent crime. And this should be done within the confines of the law, both the Constitution and other related laws. This further calls for building strategic partnerships through the multi-sectoral approach to ensure inclusivity of stakeholders as a prevention and response initiative. Supporting effective community structures such as opinion leaders, religious leaders and community leaders in building community resilience and prompt response to address radicalization. Additionally, undertaking community education and awareness through existing community policing structures incorporating government agencies and other key stakeholders to enhance police-public partnerships. Finally, the government needs to initiate community exchange programs and bench marking activities between and among counties to be used as a learning process for local communities.

### 5.1.9 Rehabilitation for de-radicalized youths

The research findings revealed that there is a need to set-up youth friendly rehabilitation centres in each region to be used for rehabilitation of the affected youth within local communities. This is to encourage those willing to return home to the rehabilitated. Further, encourage use of the reformed criminals as change agents in enhancing de-radicalization of the youth as a long term and sustainable approach. And finally incorporating youth de-radicalization and sensitization programmes in schools and learning institutions targeting the youth to impact knowledge and life skills.
Additionally, psychosocial support should also be provided to those affected both primary and secondary victims. This can be done through engaging voluntary counsellors and training support services to the affected youth in a continuous manner. Initiate partnership with learning and counselling institutions to provide technical and professional support services should be identified for the target groups and promote sports, recreational activities and social events especially among the youth to provide alternative forms of engagements.
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