AN EXAMINATION OF THE ROLE OF REGIONAL BODIES IN CONFLICT MANAGEMENT: THE CASE OF EAST AFRICAN COMMUNITY IN BURUNDI CONFLICT (2009 TO 2017)

BY

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BY

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DECLARATION

I, the undersigned, declare that this is my original work and has not been submitted to any other college, or university other than the United States International University- Africa for academic credit.

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DEDICATION

This thesis is dedicated to my sponsor Mr. Michael Kemokai Boima for the great support throughout my studies and in the course of writing this thesis. You believed in me and supported my academic pursuits. Thank you, to my lovely husband Mr. Jean Paul Bizoza, my parents Mr. Joseph Sindayikengera and Mrs. Alipa Nsabimana, my siblings: Beatrice, Elie, Aline, Jacqueline, Gaston, Seth, Emmanuel, Esther and brother in law Simon Hassan. I would like also dedicate this thesis to Mr. Younouss Sungui, to my uncle: Daniel Bugosorwa and aunts: Orpa Ngendakuriyo, Elivanie Kayoya and Josephine Ndayizigiye for the support and prayers.
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ABSTRACT

The main objective of this thesis was to examine the role of regional bodies in conflict management using the case of EAC in Burundi for the period of 2009-2017. This study was guided by the following study questions: What is the capacity of EAC in conflict management in the region? What are the conflict management mechanisms adopted by the EAC in Burundi conflict? What are the constraints facing EAC in Burundi conflict, and how can this be resolved? This study utilized a qualitative approach. Data was collected from secondary sources and analyzing using content analysis for emerging themes for each research question. The findings have been presented using figures and narrative presentation. The findings of this study show that EAC lacks financial capacity for conflict mitigation; suffers from poor organization coordination in conflict mitigation, and lack sufficient and conflict monitoring and early warning systems. This study concludes that the high level negotiations and mediation by EAC have failed in Burundi. EAC should develop a conflict mitigation framework for the region, and establish consistent mechanisms for funding peace initiatives and interventions.
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<tr>
<td>AMIB</td>
<td>Africa Mission in Burundi</td>
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<tr>
<td>AMISOM</td>
<td>AU Mission in Somalia</td>
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<tr>
<td>ASF</td>
<td>Africa Security Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>AU</td>
<td>Africa Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>EAC</td>
<td>East Africa Community</td>
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<tr>
<td>COMESA</td>
<td>Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>CPA</td>
<td>Comprehensive Peace Agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECCAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of Central African States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EASF</td>
<td>Eastern Africa Standby Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECOMOG</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>IGAD</td>
<td>Intergovernmental Authority on Development</td>
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<td>SADC</td>
<td>South Africa Development Community</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>UNAMID</td>
<td>United Nations-Africa Mission in Darfur</td>
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CHAPTER ONE

1.0 INTRODUCTION

Every year a number of violent conflicts occur around the world. Africa has been characterized by widespread displacements, loss of millions of lives, and vast-array of human rights abuses. Conflicts often arise from incompatibility of ideas, beliefs, behavior, roles, needs, desires, values (Yang, Ryan, & Zhang, 2013). About 70% of United Nations peacekeeping operations are in Sub-Saharan Africa in countries like South Sudan, Democratic Republic of Congo, Liberia, and Cote d’Ivoire. The UN peacekeeping missions play a significant role in conflict prevention, mitigation and resolution ((Angerbrandt, 2017). Equally, regional bodies such as the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), Economic Community for West African States (ECOWAS), East Africa Community (EAC) and South Africa Development Community (SADC) play a major role in conflict prevention, mitigation and management in Sub-Saharan Africa (Brookings, 2016).

Since 1990, a lot of peacekeeping and conflict management missions shifted from the UN to regional bodies (Wulf, 2009). As a result, regional bodies such as the Africa Union (AU) and EAC have spent significant efforts in peacekeeping missions in countries like Somalia, Central Africa Republic, and South Sudan. The Establishment of the EAC Treaty in 2002 provided the regional body the mandate (under article five) to develop policies and programs aimed at enhancing peace and conflict management. Additionally, the EAC’s mandate extents to the exploration of sundry cooperation benefits particularly in political arena, economic partnerships, social-cultural exchanges, and defense training for collaborative peace and security (Arriola, 2013).
This thesis is organized in the following manner: Chapter one formulates the background of the study on the role of regional bodies in conflict management; presents the statement of the problem for which the study is established; and provides the study objectives, justification and scope of the study. Chapter two provides literature review of scholarly work on role of regional bodies in conflict management, and theoretical framework. Chapter three discusses the methodology adopted for the study; chapter four presents the study findings, while the remaining chapter five has discussions, conclusion and recommendations.

1.1 Background of the Study

Conflict has been part of human nature for centuries. The end of the Cold War between United States of America lead allies and Soviet Union in 1991, opened a new frontier for inter and intrastate conflicts, particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa, Asia, Eastern Europe and South America (Young et al., 2013). Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) has borne the devastating brunt of conflict. For instance, in the 1990s, about a third of SSA countries were embroiled in civil conflicts. Various scholars have attempted to explain causes of SSA conflict: Adedeji (1991) has noted that poor democracy and democratic processes exacerbates SSA conflicts; Angerbrandt (2017) notes that poor governance has been the major cause of SSA conflicts; while Daley and Popplewell (2016) have argued that conflict in SSA are mostly caused by African leaders overstaying in power, and gross disparities in distribution of national resources.

According to Adedeji (1999), the major causes of conflict in Africa over decades have included culture and practice of violence, poor democracy and absence of democratic structures, unstructured political systems, growing populations and lack of security, in addition to failure in the administration of justice. Currently, serious conflicts affect many
countries in the continent such as Nigeria, South Sudan, Democratic Republic of Congo, Burundi, Kenya, as well as some areas in Southern Africa and Central Africa among others (Angerbrandt, 2017). The effects of these conflicts are huge on the socio-economic development without mentioning the chain of impacts that it creates. These conflicts have destroyed lives, wealth, and infrastructure in these countries hence damaging existing social bonds and institutions (Byiers&Desmidt, 2016). As such, persistent conflicts and reluctant humanitarian tragedies in the world, in addition to the United Nations insufficient capacities to address these cases have turned the spotlight on regional bodies (Arriola, 2013).

Due to the associated negative impacts, there have been various calls for conflict prevention. In its numerous briefings and statements, the UN has called for more global action on conflict prevention as a priority for saving lives, reducing suffering and giving hope to millions of people across the world (Angerbrandt, 2017). During his term as the Secretary-General, Kofi Annan clearly articulated the need for peaceful coexistence in Africa. This was a reflection of UN’s mandate on intervention in areas of conflicts especially where political (peacemakers) are the main actors instead of the regional bodies. More so, some scholars also argued that African regional bodies are best suited for resolving African conflicts, since the search for peace must be owned by Africans. Some of the regional bodies include Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD). All these bodies have a role in dispute resolution and economic integration of the African continent (Byiers&Desmidt, 2016).
For more than four decades, regional bodies have played a significant role in conflict prevention, management, and even peacekeeping missions in Africa. Enforce preventive mechanisms or even to act as such in political disputes (Biswaro, 2013). Africa regional bodies have been called upon from time to time to provide security and in other cases to offer conflict management, conflict prevention, mediation, peace keeping, and even peace building initiatives (Elfverss, 2015). Regional bodies were formed initially to enhance and support sustainable economic growth and trade among or between countries.

Previous studies have indicated that regional bodies not only have a role to play in economic integration and development, but also have emerged as feasible framework in maintaining regional security and peace (Elfverss, 2015, Arriola 2013). A case in point is the role of IGAD in peace mediation as well as conflict management and regional developments. For instance, IGAD was actively involved in Sudan peace process which was concluded with the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in 2005 (Byiers & Desmidt, 2016). In the run-up to South Sudan’s independence, IGAD was also involved in talks that eventually helped facilitate the South Sudanese referendum and laid the ground for declaring South Sudan one of the newest states in Africa (Ngunia, 2014). These regional bodies are part of the UN’s 1992 Agenda for Peace which had set out the vision for maintaining security and peace especially in the post-cold war period.

The East African Community (EAC) is one of the well-known examples of the regional organizations that have attempted to manage conflict, including conflict in South Sudan, Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo, and Somalia (Bwisaro, 2013). EAC was first established in 1967 between Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania, however, due to lack of ideological and economic harmony, the organization collapsed (Sethi, Marais & Harjai, 2012). Still, EAC was reactivated in 1999 after Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania signed a
mediation agreement, and established the East Africa Community. The EAC Treaty which came into force on 7\textsuperscript{th} July 2000 covered the EAC as a functional organization (EAC, 2012). Rwanda and Burundi joined the EAC on 6 July 2009, while South Sudan became the sixth member in December 2012, with formal membership being granted in 2016 (Angerbrandt, 2017). EAC has a population of 150 million citizens, with an estimated 1.82 million squared kilometers, and a combined Gross Domestic Products (GDP) of USD 146 (Community, 2016).

Unlike other regional bodies, the EAC has a limited track record in peace and security activities in the region compared to ECOWAS in West Africa (Adedeji, 1999). Although it has exhibited smooth operation since it was started, there is still little evidence as to whether it has been successful in its peace and security efforts. The Southern border of Rwanda, Democratic Republic of the Congo, South Sudan, Northern Uganda, and Burundi are still embroiled in conflict which required conflict management and peacemaking urgently, however, EAC still struggled to manage these conflicts (Angerbrandt, 2017).

Burundi has been embroiled in perpetual conflict since independence. Initially, the nature of Burundi conflict was purely ethnic rivalry between the Hutus and Tutsis, but later, this transformed into political differences that fueled conflicts (Frere, 2016). Burundi conflict started in 1965 with attempted coup to overthrow an ethnic Tutsi King who took over from Belgians after independence. Following the attempted coup, approximately 5000 people were killed (Angerbrandt, 2017). In 1972, Burundi was also engulfed in ethnic warfare after the execution of exiled Burundian King Ntare V by the Tutsi government of President Michel Micombero. Nearly 200,000 people died in this conflict (Frere, 2016).
In 1976, Jean-Baptiste Bagaza overthrew president Micombero. Burundi experienced civil war between 1993 and 2005 sparked by the assassination of President Melchior Ndadaye by Tutsi rebels led by Cyprien Ntaryamira. The assassination of Ndadaye led to massive demonstration and civil conflict resulting in the death of tenths of thousands of Burundians and many Hutus fled the country. Equally, between 1998 and 2003 Burundi joined Uganda and Rwanda in supporting eastern rebels who were fighting the Congo government. Burundi was also enjoined in civil with Hutu rebels in Kivu between 2004 and 2009 (Freres’, 2016). The latest conflict in Burundi was triggered by an attempted coup on President Pierre Nkurunziza on May 13, 2015, that has resulted in civil unrest and disobedience, and political instability. The 2015 conflict has perpetuated and spread beyond Bujumbura to other cities, and stretching into 2018. Tension, violent conflicts, and police brutality against demonstrators has worsened the already volatile situation (Angerbrandt, 2017). It is appropriate to assess the role played by regional bodies especially EAC in conflict management in the context of Burundi because little has been written about active involvement of EAC corporate body in the resolution of the ongoing conflict in Burundi.

1.2 Statement of the Problem

Burundi gained independence on 1, July 1962 from Belgium and has experienced civil conflicts over time that has resulted in the deaths of thousands of people. This is despite the fact that Burundi has been part of community of states, and regional bodies whose mandate is to spearhead economic integration, security and peace in the region, and by extension in Burundi. Currently, state repression of insurgents and protestors against President Pierre Nkurunziza’s quest for a third term has resulted in deaths and violence against those opposed to his bid. The political situation in Bujumbura is still fluid as it led to the construction of new constitution on 17th May 2018.
Research on the role of regional bodies in conflict management from the context of Burundi is limited. This is despite the fact that the country has been the epicenter of conflicts since its independence in 1962. There have been a number of studies on conflict management by different scholars. For instance, Daley and Popplewell (2016) focused on the appeal of third-termism, electoral authoritarianism and militarism in political governance in Burundi excluding the role of regional bodies and how the re-run of office for president Nkurunziza fuel the conflict in April 2015. Frère (2016) also studied issues of conflicts in Burundi in general without explanation of the role of regional bodies. Thus, there is a relative lack of observed evidence and studies on the role of regional bodies’ conflict management. This study seeks to fill this gap through an examination of the role of EAC in management of Burundi conflict, from 2009 to 2017 the period that Burundi has been under EAC umbrella.

1.3 Objective of the Study

1.3.1 General Objective

The general objective of this study was to examine the role of regional bodies in conflict management

1.3.2 Specific Objective

The following objectives guided this study:

I. To interrogate the capability of East Africa Community in managing the conflict in the region

II. To assess whether various conflict management resolution mechanisms employed by EAC in Burundi are effective
III. To assess the constraints facing EAC in conflict management in Burundi, and how they can be resolved.

1.4 Research Questions

This study was guided by the following research questions:

I. What is the capability of EAC in managing conflict in the region?

II. Have the various conflict management resolution mechanisms employed by EAC in Burundi been effective?

III. What are the constraints facing EAC in mitigating conflict in Burundi and how can they be resolved?

1.5 Significance of the Study

The findings of this study contribute to knowledge building that can be utilized by scholars, policy makers, governments, diplomats, the EAC Population and NGOs as well as the general public to evaluate EAC’s active efforts in conflict management in Burundi and the entire region. Policy makers are required to assess levels of political temperature in order to make informed and sound judgment. The study provides information that could be used by policy makers to come up with mechanism for resolving conflict in the region. The study provides new insights to the existing body of knowledge relating to the role of regional bodies in conflict management. It also provides useful information for law enforcement and policy makers to come up with strategic mechanism for resolving conflict in the region.

1.6 Scope of the Study

The study is focusing on examining the role of regional bodies in conflict management in the region. It specifically focuses on EAC in Burundi over the last eight years, covering 2009 to 2017. Burundi is most preferred for this study because it is one of the EAC
member states that has been pledged with internal conflicts for many years, and therefore, provides opportunity to effectively examine with EAC’ active effort as a regional body on conflict management in Burundi.

1.7 Chapter Summary

This Chapter has presented the background of the study on the role of regional bodies on conflict management. The statement of the problem for which the study is being conducted is presented, followed by objectives of the study, significance of the study, and the scope for which the study covers is also presented. The next chapter has highlighted scholarly literature review on role of regional bodies on conflict based on the study objectives.
CHAPTER TWO

2.0 LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 Introduction

This chapter presents a review of literature on the critical role of regional bodies in conflict management with a focus of active role on EAC in Burundi. The empirical review of regional bodies from different parts of the globe is presented based on the study research questions. Finally, the theoretical framework adopted by this study is also presented.

2.2 The Capability of Regional Bodies in Conflict Management

A study conducted by Francis focused on the capacity of regional peace and security systems in Africa. The study concluded that in Africa, regional organizations such as the ECOWAS, SADC, Great Lakes Region and EAC do lack both functional and operational capacity in terms of expertise to deal with complex conflict situations. As such, simple conflicts easily escalate to full blown civil conflict. Further, the study concluded that Africa’s regional bodies do not have sufficient conflict management, mitigation and peace keeping capacity.

A study conducted by Enuka and Nwagbo (2016) on role of regional international organization in conflict management concluded that regional organizations have significant power and influence in managing regional conflicts, however, the study noted that Great Lakes Region Organization and ECOWAS had significant challenges in their scope of operation and internal capabilities to effectively manage regional conflicts such as those in Burundi, Rwanda, and DRC. Enuka and Nwagbo study further noted that the capacity of regional bodies as proximate managers of conflict should be understood in
relative comparison to other international organizations. This means that international organizations including the United Nations have more muscles in terms of skills, technical capacity, goodwill, and experience in regional conflict. Regional bodies on the other hand lack effective conflict management capacity, but have recorded significant conflict management successes due to their proximity and understanding of regional politics and political dilemmas inherit within conflict (Biswaro, 2013).

A study by Klaus Mitchell (2015) that examined land grievances and the mobilization of electoral violence in Cote d’Ivoire and Kenya concluded that regional bodies lacked the capacity to intervene and manage the conflict compared to international bodies such as the United Nations and the African union. Thus, it should be noted that having a composition of regional bodies that are bound by common understanding on economic integration, and further argue that the peace and security of the region, does not in itself constitute capacity (Frere, 2016). For regional bodies to have adequate capacity, they must have both technical competencies, knowledge, functional skills, and conflict management and resolution skills, in addition to the goodwill and trust necessary to bring warring factions to the table.

On the capacity of regional bodies in conflict management, Adebaio (2002) study concluded that in as much as conflict unites different states facing conflict challenges, the cumulative impact on conflict management is significantly impaired by lack of technical capacity competencies. For instance, ECOWAS region has strongly been involved in conflict in West African states including Cameroon, Gabon, Ivory Coast, and Togo among others, but, the effectiveness of this endeavors have most often than not, been impeded by lack of training and capacity for negotiators and mediators leading to poor resolutions or prolonged wars.
Nathan (2010) posits that capacity challenges of most regional bodies spring from economic weaknesses. When majority of states within a regional body have poor economic strength, this translates into poor funding for the regional body conflict management initiatives, which at the end of the day, affects the training, deployment, negotiation and mediation that can take place to manage or avert crisis. This argument is in line with Enuka and Nwagbo (2016) who have argued that strong economies do have strong budgetary allocations to peace and conflict management initiatives compared to weaker states in the developing world. To mitigate such shortcoming, powerful states within the regional bodies should be able to shoulder a bigger economic burden in terms of funding conflict management initiatives as is the case with Nigeria within ECOWAS (Adebaio, 2016).

2.3 Conflict Management Resolution Mechanisms

Conflict management is defined as the process of limiting negative aspects of conflict are minimized while increasing enhancing positive aspects that leads to possible conflict resolution (Frere`, 2016). Conflict management also refers to the elimination of conflict or minimizing the impact of the conflict to the affected communities (Arriola, 2013). Scholars such as Biswaro (2013) have argued that regional bodies are more effective in conflict management as compared to the United Nations (UN) and other international organizations. Regional bodies enjoy political familiarity, interdependence, and commitment to peace and security within their regions as compared to international organization as the UN.

There are several conflict management resolution mechanisms that can be deployed by regional bodies. According to Nathan (2010), conflict management can take the form of mediation, negotiations, and even use of military. To this end, the arguments advance for
mediation approach by regional bodies is the fact that they tend to have more knowledge on local issues on conflict, and thus, can mediate from informed perspective. Similarly, mediation through regional bodies are essential since strong incentives to mitigate, control, or manage conflict are available to them as direct beneficiaries of peace initiatives (Aggad-Clerx, &Desmidt, 2017).

International organizations have to seek permission of engagement from all members, and approval for engagement to take place too long negating the purpose for quick engagements and gains (William, 2013). In a study on conflict management by Dersso (2013), he argues that mediation was one of the most preferred strategies for conflict management. The argument advanced in this case is that mediation allows conflict parties to retain control over the entire process, while at the same time, becoming more flexible over the entire process. Whether mediation is carried out by regional bodies or international organizations, the role of mediation is significant in that it enables or prepares the way for cessation of hostilities, violence, reduction in fatalities, in addition to achieving political settlements that are essential for conflict management (William, 2013).

**Negotiation**

Peter Wallensteen argues that under regional conflict negotiation, several variables must be understood before the negotiation process begins. This includes ideological differences that drive conflicting parties’ hard line (Wallensteen, 2011). Gray on the other hand notes that conflict negotiation by regional bodies must be threefold: Decision analysis, structural analysis, and process analysis. Regional body negotiators have to understand the structural role of power between two parties that are conflicting. Equally, Gray notes that decision analysis is also important in conflict negotiations as they assume that conflicting parties are utility maximizes, and there, win-win is required since bargaining payoff by each party has to be quantifiable. In this regard, if a negotiator does not
understand, the win-win positions for each party, then it becomes difficult to manage the conflict (Gray, 1989). Changeability in the perceived utility can therefore make negotiations by regional actors extended and very difficult (ibid).

On process analysis, there is need to understand the context of regional negotiations, and how this affects conflict actors’ choices, and decision making (Frere’, 2016). The process analysis accounts for different stages where different distances or situational pressures personality influence, cognitive influence, and other interaction factors can influence negotiation behavior, and outcome. For instance, in Kenya, following the 2007-2008 post-election violence, the personality of Kofi Annan, former UN Secretary General, prevailed upon the government and opposition negotiators to agree on a power sharing coalition government (Klaus & Mitchell, 2015). This similar approach to conflict management was adopted by Zimbabwe between Mugabe and Tsvangirai following disputed elections, following the intervention of African Union, led by Thabo Mbeki as chief mediator (ibid)

**Peacekeeping Force**

In most regional and international conflict management situations, peacekeeping is one of the viable responses to violent intra-state conflicts (Enuka & Nwagbo, 2016). In most instances, peacekeeping missions are deployed either by regional bodies or by the United Nations. The Peacekeeping missions in their generic sense, involves inter-positioning of extreme military forces between the warring communities or groups, either to prevent violence of to stop it altogether (Ngunia, 2014). In the recent years, the following are some of the countries that international monitoring of local elections in Namibia, Mozambique, Angola, and Congo; managing of humanitarian relief supplies during conflict in Somalia, Rwanda, Sudan and Liberia; and providing peace and security
protection to inter communal negotiations like was the case in Cyprus Ledra Palece Hotel (Berdal, 2003; Serafino, 2005).

Peacekeeping missions have not always been successful. In some instances, presence of peacekeeping missions has made conflict worse. This can be attributed to the composition of the peacekeeping missions, perceived partiality, or lack of respect or consideration to the conflicting groups (Wallensteen, 2011). Somalia is a good case example to illustrate this point. In the period of 1992-1993, United Nation Office of Somalia Mission (UNOSOM) escalated conflict, resulting in the killing of American Marine, subsequent pull-out of the peacekeeping force, while reducing the chances successful conflict resolution. In this regard, to argue that peacekeeping is always effective is misleading. William argues that to enhance the effectiveness of peacekeeping missions, regional bodies that understand local politics, environment, should be encouraged to get engaged in solving regional conflicts (William, 2013).

The Economic Community of West African States (ECOMOG) was established by Anglophone ECOWAS members in 1990 to intervene in Liberia civil war that lasted between 1986-1996. ECOMOG first serious conflict management case in Chad in 1981, by forcefully holding factions apart; in Sierra Leone, 1997 to stop Revolutionary United Front (RUF) rebellion and civil conflict; Guinea Bissau, 1999, to end Guinea Bissau civil war (Adebajo, 2002; UNSC, 1999). As noted by Williams (2013), deployment of peacekeeping missions are most often effective in the short term as a mechanism to halt violence and hostilities, however, peacekeeping missions lack long lasting, healing, and reconciliation capabilities (Brookings, 2015).

The International Panel for Eminent persons (IPEP) was established in 1990s by the Organization of Africa Union (OAU) in response to Rwandan 1994 genocide, and civil
conflict in DRC. According to Frere’ (2016), the IPEP report on preventable genocide influence Africa Union (AU) to adopt norms of non-indifference, and a right to intervene in affairs of members states as provided for in AU charter, Article 4(h) of Constitutive Act. Unsurprisingly, in as much as Article 4(h) of AU constitutive Act prescribes mechanisms and channels of interventions, this article has never been invoked (Vandeginstte, 2014).

**Mediation**

Desmidt (2017) have note that mediation has been adopted in various conflicts including Biafra conflict in Nigeria, Angola civil conflict, and recently in Kenya 2007-2008 post-election conflict. For mediation to be effective there is need to ensure that the mediator is not only knowledgeable about the conflict issues, but also has a wider acceptability by the conflicting parties. This means that a mediator has to be impartial and objective to gain the good will of the conflicting parties. Similarly, offering strong incentives for conflicting parties mitigate enhances mediators’ ability to control, or manage conflict (Aggd-Clerx, &Desmidt, 2017).

The use of mediation allows regional body’s ability to move faster, and respond quicker compared to other UN and other international bodies. This is due to the fact that international organizations have to seek permission of engagement from all members, and approval for engagement to take place too long negating the purpose for quick engagements and gains (William, 2013). In a study on conflict management by Dersso (2013), he argues that mediation was one of the most preferred strategy for conflict management. The argument advanced in this case is that mediation allows conflict parties to retain control over the entire process, while at the same time, becoming more flexible over the entire process. Whether mediation is carried out by regional bodies or
international organizations, the role of mediation is significant in that it enables or prepares the way for cessation of hostilities, violence, reduction in fatalities, in addition to achieving political settlements that are essential for conflict management (William, 2013).

2.4  Constraint Facing Regional Bodies in Conflict Management

Regional bodies world over, face numerous constraints in trying to establish conflict management mechanisms or in trying to institute conflict resolution with the aim of stopping hostilities and violent conflict. Yilmaz (2005) argues that in violent internal conflicts, parties develop distrust towards each other, where protagonists rely on negative stereotypes towards each other as the basing for entrenching conflict positions. As such, advancing effective and affective communications devoid of stereotypes is important for conflict management and mitigation. Therefore, building confidence among the warring parties is one of the major pre-requisite for constructive conflict management by regional bodies (Brookings, 2015). It should be noted that confidence building is not an easy fete for mediators, or peace negotiators. This is due to historical disagreements and other misconceptions that percolate into group identities. Various empirical studies show that well-organized people to people meetings do provide opportunities for conflicting groups to examine root cause, and explore mitigation mechanisms together, which leads to reduction in conflict management resolution constraints (Montville, 1990; Azar, 1990; Yilmaz, 2005).

Yang, Ryan and Zhang (2013) contend that regional bodies experience various constrains in their quest to manage regional conflict. Some of these constraints include: the question of sovereignty; lack of political good-will; Lack of institutional capacity; and poor funding.
Challenge of Sovereignty

The challenge of sovereignty has been a major challenge in conflict management since time of Westphalia Peace Treaty in 1648. The Westphalia Peace Treaty that established and acknowledged the respect for sovereignty of states was meant to prevent rampant military invasions that were happening in Europe in the 17th century (Williams, 2013). Most regional bodies, regimes, and countries adopted this position not just as a position of protecting their sovereignty, but also, ensuring national or regional interest is protected. A closer look at the African Union through the Constitutive Act, and Peace and Security Council (2002) reveals the reasons as to why African Union (AU) does not intervene in most regional conflicts. Primarily, this is due to the concept of sovereignty. The African Union PSC has stipulated only the following as threshold for intervention: War crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity; unconstitutional changes; when sovereignty of a member is threatened by acts of aggression and mercenaries. However, article 4 (e) on the principle of non-interference, expressly states that there has to be respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity for members.

Williams (2013) notes that several conflicts in Africa, including Rwandan 1994 genocide, Mozambique civil strife of the 90s, Angola conflict, and current civil conflict in DRC have similar responses from the AU and other regional bodies such as the ECOWAS, EAC, Great Lakes Organization and SADC. These organizations failed to intervene in regional conflicts sighting non-interference clause of the AU Constitutive Act. Sovereignty cannot be used a blanket excuse for non-intervention. Regional bodies have a moral obligation to help regional countries manage and mitigate conflict. However, this is not always the case. For instance, during the Rwandan Genocide, regional bodies failed to act, despite the fact that thousands of people were being massacred on a daily basis.
(Frere’, 2016). By the time AU, EAC, and the UN were sending troops, it was too late, entire villages had been decimated. For conflict management to be effective, regional frameworks on sovereignty and conflict management has to be addressed effectively. Members must commit the regional body’s operational policies and framework (Williams, 2013).

One of the other challenges associated with conflict and respect for regional members’ sovereignty is the determination of what constitutes crimes against humanity or genocide. In essence, late reaction to regional states conflict hinders effective engagement (Nwonwu, 2010; Aggad-Clerx, & Desmidt, 2017). There therefore need for enhanced early warning systems that should be formulated to enhance timely interventions and conflict management by regional and international bodies.

**Lack of Political Will**

Since the end of the Cold War, numerous outbreaks (Somalia, Burundi, Rwanda, DRC) have paralyzed and devastated countries due to politically differences (Rugambwa & Nsengiyumva, 2012). The Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict in 1990 that was organized by David Hamburg had three important recommendations on political will in conflict situations. First, conflicts are inevitable; second, the need to control violent conflict is urgent; and thirdly, preventing violent conflict is possible with the convergence of political good will from the local state, regional bodies, and international agencies (Angerbrandt, 2017). However, decades later, these recommendations still remain conceptual for lack of political will among the actors. In South Sudan for instance, despite the presence of the UN peace keeping
mission, ethnic and rebel hostilities are still prevalent, with government and rebel leaders signing and dishonoring peace pact and other de-escalation measures (Yang et al., 2013). Barasa (2011) argues that there is need for structural reforms to regional bodies particularly to the AU and the UN in their mandate to compel governments to political mechanisms for escalating conflicts. The greatest challenge to preventing violent mass killings and conflict management is political good will for states and regional and international bodies to act. However, Yang et al., (2013) challenges this notion by arguing that even most effective reforms to AU and UN will still prove ineffective without the cooperation and political will from governments affected with internal conflicts and war.

There is need to marry effective political mobilization and leadership, particularly establishing of practical actions necessary to get the warring factions to talk to each other. In his study, Yilmaz (2005) recommended the following factors as essential in developing political will to act. First, there is need to engage the media effectively so as to communicate positions and highlight differences and mediation or negotiations processes; secondly, there is need for revamping of the responsibility to protect both by the UN Charter, and regional bodies such as the AU, ASEAN, and EU; thirdly, there is need to enhance institutional capacity of regional bodies to respond to early warning of impending violence and conflict; and finally, the need for improved cooperation between government and non-governmental organizations in monitoring conflict, and establishing conflict mitigation and resolution mechanisms.

**Regional Bodies Capacity**

Adequate resources, including, funding, human capital and skills in conflict management is one of the fundamental aspects of conflict management and resolution. Having a
resource base to draw from when conflict arises is as effective and conflict management itself (Adebaio, 2016). This has not always been the case for both regional bodies like the AU, and international body’s like the UN. Availability of resources determines an organizations response in terms of speed, size, and duration of peace operations. Frere` (2016) noted that there exists a huge deficit in financial funding of regional bodies to engage in conflict management initiatives. Financial resources are most essential in carrying out peace keeping operations, which organizations like the AU, EAC, ECOWAS, and SADC do not have. Equally, member states of regional bodies who have committed to financial contributions have not kept their obligations, making it difficult for regional bodies to act effectively and decisively (Vines, 2013). As such, bodies like AU, ECOWAS, EAC end up depending on the UN, EU, and G8 members for funding. Other states like the US, China, Canada provide funding. The challenge with this model is that Western countries have different interest and motivation for engaging or disengaging. If their states interests are not addressed, then probability of funding becomes minimal

As has been argued by Vines (2013), African states have only funded AUs peace fund to a tune of 2%, while the bulk of the AUs peace and conflict management funding comes from international donors. The challenge posed with this model is that international funding come with constraints that prohibit AU and other regional bodies making long-term decisions, unless these decisions are endorsed by the donor. So far, most African regional bodies including SADC, EAC, AU, and ECOWAS have limited providing short term peace operations (Byiers&Desmidt, 2016). In most instances, when regional bodies like AU or EAC have established a mission, there is usually an undertaking or premise that the UN will take over the mission after 90 days. This has been the case in most Africa conflict ridden states like South Sudan, Burundi, Mali, and DRC. As for the case for Somalia, in as much as the AU has remained in the country longer than expected,
AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) has been and is still being funded by the UN (Shinn, 2012). Thus, lack of proper funding has diminished regional bodies’ capacity for long term strategic planning which is essential in peace building and conflict management situations.

The capacity for AU in South Sudan (AMIS) helps articulate the constraints and challenges with regional bodies to manage conflict. The AMIS is understaffed, undermanned, and ill-equipped to handle complex conflict situations in South Sudan. Murithi and Hanson notes that only 3200 AMIS troops operated in South Sudan between 2004-2005; and 7000 troops from 2005-2007 in a region with a land mass of 493, 180 Sq. Kms, with conflict in numerous regions (Murithi, 2009; Hanson, 2009). Diop, Peyton, and McConville (2012) argue that most regional bodies lack requisite capacity to transport troops to buffer zones and other strategic areas making it difficult to manage emerging conflicts. To this Butler notes that:

“...Any attempts at managing, containing and limiting use of violence by regional bodies can have positive, transformative outcomes...at the same time, ill conceived, inappropriate, poorly timed, or half-hearted efforts at conflict management can worsen conflict, and generate even worse destruction, and death for even more people” (Butler, 2009: 16)

Regional capacity is not only limited to military intervention or funding, but also availability of skilled negotiators, mediators. Western regional bodies seem to have an advantage over developing world. This is due to advanced development in human capital in warfare, military academies, and better remuneration for military personnel and conflict negotiators (Byiers&Desmidt, 2016).

2.5 Theoretical Framework

This study has adopted the systems theory. The study is situated within the framework of the systems theory formulated by Ludwig von Bertalanffy in 20th Century (Biswaro,
2013). A system can simply be defined as that which functions as a whole by virtue of the interdependence of its different components. It can also be seen as a relationship between various units (Angerbrandt, 2017). Based on this, the system theory can be conceptualized as series of statements on interactions among dependent and independent variables, so that a change in one or more variables is followed by a change in other variables or group of variables (Biswaro, 2013).

The system theory was formulated to explain the interaction and functionality phenomena between living organisms, machines, as well as organizations and their interactive operations. Organizations do function as an interactive system and not stand alone units. This theory assumes that within the international systems, different countries are held together by a complex network of relationships/interactions that make them interdependent in facilitating their core functions including various economic activities, transfer of technology, communications and diplomatic relations. According to the system’s perspective, each and every system tries as much as possible to maintain its equilibrium, and that any disturbance offsets the balance (Angerbrandt, 2017). In order to avoid potential disturbances, countries are obliged to cooperate with one another.

The conflict resolution mechanism employed by the regional bodies is informed by the states’ willingness to reduce or minimize any disturbance to the system. Hence, conflict management mechanisms adopted by EAC in Burundi falls within this framework. Just like a system, EAC denotes a complex set of interrelated institutions and departments as well as mechanisms that function at the regional and national level in relation to conflict management.
CHAPTER THREE

3.0 METHODOLOGY

3.1 Introduction

This chapter presents the methodology adopted for the study. First, the study research design is presented, followed by sources of data, and how this data was analyzed and presented. The ethical issues that were considered during the study are also presented.

3.2. Research Design

The study uses a qualitative case study design to analyze the EAC’s role in conflict management in Burundi. Strength of case studies in social science research lies in the fact that they allow researchers to comprehensively examine a given area and be able to use it as representation of the real situation of the entire area.

Case study can be defined as scenarios, based on real-life situations, that illustrate recurring or notable events and issues that have been brought to researchers’ attention. It can also be conceptualized as an in-depth study of a specific situation or phenomenon as opposed to a sweeping statistical based survey (MacLure& Stewart, 2015). It is basically a method that can be used to narrow down a very broad field of study into small and manageable research areas (Orodho, 2012).

A qualitative method was used since it allowed the researcher to collect information on feelings, opinions, views and perspectives on the role of EAC in Burundi conflict management. These qualitative views were sort from scholarly articles on Burundi conflict published in major journals; newspaper opinion column writings on Burundi conflict. Therefore, a combination of case study that is qualitative enabled the researcher
to focus in detail on events, dates, and to record what EAC security missions did in Burundi, vis a vis the provision of the EAC charter on peace and security in the region.

3.3 Secondary Data Sources
The study uses qualitative method of data collection. In particular, it relies on secondary data through a review of available data and secondary sources. These secondary sources included examining reports from the Institute of Security Studies on Burundi, African Arguments Blog Reports; Africa Mission in Burundi Reports 2009-2015 (AMIB), The Central Africa Report on the role of EAC in Burundi crisis; The African perspective Report on Burundi and the East Africa Newspaper. All these secondary sources have reported on different aspects on the role of EAC in Burundi conflict.

3.4 Data Analysis and Presentation
This study utilized a deductive approach to content analysis to examine thematic issues raised in the secondary sources that do answer the objectives of this study. Downe-Wamboldt (1992) defines content analysis as the subjective interpretation of content inherent in text narratives through a systematic process of classification, coding and identification of emerging themes and patterns. Qualitative content analysis is best used when methods of study include ethnography, phenomenology, and historical research. Case study on role of EAC on Burundi conflict falls in the both category of phenomenology and historical analysis. Since content analysis focuses on communication, contextual meanings on text data, verbal or print or in electronic form that might appear in narrative form (Kondracki& Wellman, 2002). This study seeks to examine historical reports on EAC role on Burundi conflict that are both in print and electronic sources in narrative format. Content analysis helped the researcher to go beyond the meaning of words and text, by examining use of language to classify texts into
categories that are either explicit or implicit communication, and as such, this enabled the researcher to extract knowledge and understanding on the phenomenon of EAC role in Burundi conflict.

Data collected from institute of security studies, African Arguments Blog Reports; Africa Mission in Burundi Reports 2009-2015 (AMIB), The Central Africa Report on the role of EAC in Burundi crisis; The African perspective Report on Burundi and the East Africa Newspapers were analyzed for the role of EAC in conflict management. Information gathered in this reports on the same was grouped together, interpreted for emerging themes, knowledge and understanding, before they are presented as findings in narrative form.

For the second objective of this study, findings from the reports and online secondary sources mentioned above will be analyzed for information on mechanisms EAC has used for conflict management and resolution. The mechanisms were analyzed as to whether they were effective or not, by documenting narrative findings on the same. To determine effectiveness of the channel, the study was examined the net results or impact of each of the conflict resolution mechanism adopted by the EAC in Burundi conflict.

Finally, on the third objective on the constraints facing EAC in conflict management in Burundi, the mentioned secondary sources were analyzed for texts and themes on challenges, constraints, struggles, failures, capacities, resources that have been available to EAC, and whether this has been adequate, effective, and sufficient. In cases where they have not been efficient and sufficient, texts were examined for possible reasons, and inhibitions of EAC to carry its mandate in Burundi conflict.

3.5 Ethical issues
This thesis aims to promote, knowledge, truth, and avoidance of error. Assurance of ethical standards since research involves different disciplines: values such as accountability, mutual respect and fairness

3.6 Chapter Summary

This chapter has presented the methodology adopted for this study. A qualitative case study has been presented as the research design adopted for the study. This chapter has also stipulated the data sources that were examined for secondary data to answer the research questions. Content analysis method was adopted to analyze texts, and narratives presented in print, verbal formats and electronic formats online. The next chapter presents the study findings for each of the study objectives.
CHAPTER FOUR

4.0  RESULTS AND FINDINGS

4.1.  Introduction

This chapter presents data providing answers to the raised study questions. This chapter is organized in the following manner: Findings on the capacity of EAC to manage regional conflicts; conflict management resolution mechanism adopted by EAC in Burundi; the constraints facing EAC in conflict management in Burundi, and finally, the research theoretical framework upon which the study was established in presented.

4.2.  Capacity of EAC to Manage Conflict in the Region

A regional body’s ability to manage conflict is usually determined by their capability on various fronts. First and foremost: diplomatic capability to get the conflict factions to talk and to cease hostilities. Secondly: the ability for the regional parties to assemble military and peace building capabilities, and finally, the ability to inform and influence peace building and peacemaking initiatives (Adebaio, 2016).

4.2.2  The Eastern Africa Standby Force (EASF)

The Eastern Africa Standby Force (EASF) is a regional standby force for security and peacekeeping by the East African states. The EASF is one of the five sub-regional brigade of the Africa Security Force (ASF) established in 2004, The Inter-Governmental Development Authority (IGAD) was temporarily charged with the mandate of establishing the regional standby force (Bouhuys, 2011). In September of 2004, the EASF was formally established consisting of thirteen countries from the Eastern Africa region, under the auspices of the Africa Union (AU). These counties included Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, Tanzania, Djibouti, Seychelles, Sudan, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Comoros, Somalia, Madagascar, and Mauritius (Sousa, 2013). Since IGAD had no command and
control structures and mechanism required for political and technical coordination over the Eastern Africa states, the Eastern Africa Standby Brigade Coordination Mechanism (EASBRICOM) was established, and it took over the EASF in 2007 (Kimathi, 2010; Robinson, 2014). The EASBRICOM was renamed to EASFCOM in 2010 to include not only the military force, but also police and civilian components. By 2015, the EASF membership had reduced to ten, after Madagascar, Mauritius, and Tanzania decided to join the Southern Africa Security Force within the SADC region. The EASF has three functional policy structures: The Assembly of Heads of State and Government; the committee of Chiefs of Defense Staff; and the Council of Ministers of Defense and Security.

According to Mumma-Martinon (2010) EASF is still in the process of reading its planned operationalization, and thus, lacks necessary functional capacity to enforce peace in EAC conflict regions. As such, EASF has played a minimum role in securing the peace and security in the region. In as much as EASF has undertaken conflict prevention activities, this was limited to observer missions and fact-finding missions, which were mostly in Somalia, and not Burundi. However, Jacobsen and Nordby (2013) have noted that the capacity of EAC to enforce peace within the region should not be dismissed for lack of tangible engagement. Mild engagements are equally essential in peace and security in any region. As such, since EASF has been part of United Nations Office for Somalia (UNPOS), which facilitated negotiations between key political actors, this should be considered as part of EAC’s capacity to enforce or implement peace initiatives. According to Robinson (2014), the question of EAC capacity is subjective since comparisons are made to other well financed and established entities. To this he notes:

“...EASF has helped AMISOM operations through providing command and staff...making EASF the first and most advanced among the five sub-regional
As indicated by Bouhuys, EAC capacity though nascent, it has been effective in some cases, while faltering in others. Though to a lesser degree, EASF has contributed troops to peace keeping missions including women military police officers in South Sudan, and peace missions to Somalia and DRC (UNDP, 2011). The EAC through EASF has provided pre-deployment training facilities and staff for UN-Africa Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) in collaboration with other mission trainers (ibid). Additionally, EASF has provided mission control assistance to UNAMID and AU Mission in Sudan (Tlalka, 2013). One of the challenges that have faced EAC in effective implementation of EASF security mandate is the withdrawal of some of the member states who were not actively participating in EASF. This included Mauritius, Tanzania, and Madagascar, who migrated to the Southern Africa Brigade (Cilliers, 2008). The action by these members resulted in loss of troops, and funding, reported by Tlalka as follows:

“...EASF loses financial, military and other contributions to the organization by the breaking away of members...directly affects the (capacity) and development of EASF” (Tlalka, 2013: 5)

Based on this finding, the capacity of EAC in dealing with regional conflicts is shrouded in conflicting engagements. On one hand, the organization through EASF has demonstrated capacity, strength, commitment and ability to engage in regional conflict (as the case in South Sudan, Somalia); while in other cases, EAC EASF has demonstrated lack of capacity, skills, and ability to engaged in regional conflicts as the case in Burundi

**The Eastern Africa Standby Force Capacity for Burundi Conflict**

The EASF has not engaged in the Burundi conflict despite the conflict having lasted since 2015. The EASF has failed to halt the crisis in Burundi (Kimathi, 2010). According to Attempts by the EAC to negotiate with the government and opposition rebels has been
rebuffed by Nkurunziza’s government, as such, this has halted deployment of human rights and military observers, in addition to the UN Security Council sanctioned policy (Elowson&Lins de Albuquerque, 2017). Equally, the EAC was mandate by the AU to mediate the crisis, a role the organization has not fully embraced nor succeeded. To this, Elowson and Lins de Albuquerque noted as follows:

“…the situation in Burundi has been the first test of the organization’s (EAC) ability to ensure its peace and mandate, a test that many observers claim it has failed” (Elowson&Lins de Albuquerque, 2017: 2).

Kimathi (2010) notes that internal division between the EAC states on how to carry out the mandate of EAC and EASF has prevented the organization from being effective. For instance, during the formative years, some member state pledged to contribute troops to EASF, while other members sort to consult further before committing. As such, Rwanda offered two light infantries, with one being a mechanized battalion; Djibouti offered one light battalion consisting of 3 sub units and two infantry companies in addition to one de-mining team. On the other hand, Kenya, Sudan, and Uganda offered one infantry battalion, Sudan. Somalia committed to contribute one infantry company with 10 technicians (Alusala, 2004).

One of the obstacles to the effective operation of EASF in Burundi conflict has been the weak legal framework. Elowson and Lins de Albuquerque (2017) has argued that EASF policy framework had been structured on a non-binding Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), and thus, had less legal basis to compel members to contribute to EASF, or to enforce peace and security.
Lack of Financial Capacity

In peace and security missions, organization functions effectively when it is well-funded to carry out its mandate. However, this has not been the case with EAC and the EASF. The EASF has relied heavily on funding from AU, which relies on funding from UK, USA, France and European Union (EU), meaning, when AU if not sufficiently funded, the regional security bodies suffer (Mumma-Martinon, 2010). The EASF internal financial support is equally insufficient and weak as few member states pay their dues (Jacobsen et al., 2013). To this end, Kasaijja in addressing the issue of financial capacity of EAC EASF noted that:

“...members give lip service regarding their contribution, while at the same time, unwilling to make tangible sacrifices in sending forces (to conflict prone regions…” (Kasaijja, 2014: 5)

This situation indicates that EAC member states lack capacities to effectively finance EASF on annual basis, and as a result, over-reliance on external funding affects the stability and sustainability of the EASF mandate on peace and security in the region (Kasaijja, 2014). This means that EASF is highly vulnerable to external fluctuations in funding, negatively impacting the effectiveness of the force.

Despite the fact that EASF has well-trained personnel, financial contribution and deployment of forces is largely a political affair, depending on political will of those in power (Robinson, 2014). As such committing forces to peace missions for a longer time period becomes a difficult task for EASF, as funds to compensate states for troop contribution is not readily available. This discourages states with minimal financial capacity from participating in multi-national efforts towards enhancing peace and security in the region (Allehone, 2008).
Lack of Logistical Capacity

The EASF has weak logistical capacity to deal with perpetual conflict in the region, including equipment supply such as artillery assets, helicopters, and air defense and communication capabilities to deal with emergency security threats in the region (Allehone, 2008). According to Robinson (2014) lack of logistical capacity compels EASF to remain under the mercy of western countries. Bouhuys (2011) notes that one of the biggest challenges of EASF is that in cases of peace missions, EASF deploys troops that at times lack better weapons such as artillery. Poor weaponry negatively impacts peace missions as was the case with AMIS which had 18-man patrol unit, and 20-man rescue team kidnapped in West Darfur in 2008 (Feldman, 2008). In this incidence, the EASF did not have the logistical or air defense support system to support the kidnapped team.

In 2011, EASF conducted a 1,500 troops, civilian, and police training in Djibouti to broaden peace building capacity, preparedness, and interoperability of its forces (UNDP, 2011). This Initial Operational Capacity (IOC) has enhanced EASF’s capability to response to conflict challenges in the region, howbeit in a limited way. The operational capacity missions were also held in Sudan in 2011, Uganda in 2013, and by 2015, EASF had achieved its Full Operational Capacity (FOC). However, as conflict continues to fester in the region, particularly in Burundi, the effectiveness and operational capacity of EASF has also come into question (Adebaio, 2016).

Divisions within EAC on EASF and Conflict Management Initiatives

As was reported by Jacobsen and Nordby (2013), the divisions in the EAC structure affected the formulation of EASF and commitments on the same. As can be noted, Tanzania, Burundi, Ethiopia and Eritrea did not commit troops, while Eritrea remained
inactive as a protest to perpetual conflict it had with Ethiopia over the years. Additionally, the formula for funding of the EASF secretariat and troops was not agreed upon, leaving EASF at the mercy of AU and UN mission funding, which meant, EASF could not work independently, but under the direction of AU and the UN (ibid). To this, notes that:

“...EAC members want to use the security framework as a means of keeping control of any action to be in the region and of preventing states outside the region from interfering, but in reality, not eager for the EAC mandate on peace and security to evolve” (Elowson&Lins de Albuquerque, 2017: 4)

As such, the reluctance of members to adopt and embrace peace security framework as advanced by EASF means that EAC has not been effective in advocating for, and implementing the provision of EASF mandate. This means that evaluating the capacity of EAC in conflict situation is difficult, since the organization is yet to establish and implement concrete policies for regional

According to International Crisis Group, Burundi has been has offered security enforcement challenge to the EAC, leading to the AU to intervene through the African Union peace and Security Council (PSC). The AU PSC engagement forced EAC led by President Museveni to kick start stalled mediation with Nkurunziza. However, Museveni’s efforts failed as Nkurunziza refused to engage with the opposition in political dialogue, scuttling the opportunity for consultative peace agreement between Nkurunziza’s government and the opposition (International Crisis Group, 2017).

To cover up for EAC security capacity inadequacy, on December 17, 2015, the AU PSC issued a communiqué’ that authorized a five thousand (5000) strong Africa Prevention and Protection Mission (MAPROBU) to help prevent the deterioration of peace and security in Burundi, and to help create an inter-peace dialogue between the warring factions. The EAC through EASF sought to be part of the MAPROBU, which was accepted by the AU PSC. Nkurunziza’s government was given 72 hours to accept the
intervention, or else, the AU PSC would seek AU Assembly of Heads of States and Governments to invoke Article 4(h) which does allow interventions in member states in case of war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide (International Crisis Group, 2017).

During this period of time as PSC was taking drastic measures to force Nkurunziza’s government into dialogue with opposition, the EAC were powerless, uncoordinated, and without proper approach on how to deal with the Burundian conflict (Adebaio, 2016). As was the case, Nkurunziza rebuffed the PSC requested, and by extension, the EASF. This meant that MAPROBU could not be deployed in Burundi, and as such, EASF could not deploy the troops too. Six days prior to the PSC communiqué, violence in Burundi had escalated with at least 87 people being killed, with hundreds of thousands being displaced. The communiqués considered the situation in Burundi as dire and noted as follows:

“...violations of human rights and other abuses, including targeted assassinations, arbitrary killings, arbitrary arrests, detentions, torture...and closure of civil society organizations and media...” (PSC Communique, 2015: Note 5)

Equally, the AU PSC noted that for Burundian stakeholders to overcome the challenges facing their country there was need for President Yoweri Museveni, the EAC mediator to hasten the inter-Burundian dialogue, and formulate a proposal for return to peace. It is worth noting that the EAC had not done any substantive work before the AU PSC decided to create the MAPROBU to respond to the crisis. Therefore, despite the fact that EAC had EASF and a mediator, little had been done to that extent that could elevate the EACs capacity and capability to deal with regional conflicts.

Following EAC’s complacence in dealing with Burundi, MAPROBU was mandated to do the following: (i) prevent the deterioration of security and in addition to monitoring
developments on the ground; (ii). Contribute to the protection of civilian populations under threat; (iii) Coordinate the creation of inter-Burundian dialogue and preserve the gains of Arusha Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in Burundi; (IV). Help facilitate international community and Burundian parties in disarming militia groups, and other illegal groups that were threatening the peace and security of Burundi (AU PSC Communiqué, 2015)

As such, the articulation of the PSC Communiqué’ is in a sense an indictment of EACs inability to initiate effective peace and security mechanisms when dealing with Burundi (Elowson&Lins de Albuquerque, 2017). Similarly, as noted by International Crisis Group, EAC had demonstrated limited capability and track record in dealing with peace and security. As such, there is little evidence that peace and security component has taken off at a large scale, with Burundi being a necessary weighing scale for EAC (International Crisis Group, 2017).

Notably, the EAC Assembly of Heads of States and Governments have deliberately avoided engaging in regional political issues or affairs, as such, resorting dealing with conflictual issues amongst themselves. This has in turn, made the EAC technocrats in charge of peace and security initiatives redundant. One of the other major issues that have been noted that has slowed the peace and security initiatives in Burundi is the divisions that exist among member states. For instance, Rwanda, Kenya, and Uganda are economically integrated; however, Burundi and Tanzania are not economically integrated with the other members, creating a rift in collecting decision making as a regional organization on security matters (Jacobsen &Nordby, 2013)

Lately, there has been a growing rift between Uganda and Rwanda, partly attributed to the leadership styles that are not able to see eye to eye on regional security and initiatives
(Adebaio, 2016). Significantly, the regime types within the EAC are equally a source of strife. For instance, Kenya and Tanzania are considered to be far more democratic compared to Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Somalia, and Sudan. Therefore, agreeing on what constitutes internal affairs, and what constitute aggression against humanity is a dicey issue that most do not find consensus, or even attempts to (Jacobsen & Nordby, 2013).

According Elowson and Lins de Albuquerque the challenge with EASF is the logistical, financial, and political. Logistical in the sense that, the hierarchy and pecking order within the EAC is a challenge. Burundi, Rwanda, South Sudan are young economies that are still struggling economically to finance EASF (Jacobsen & Nordby, 2013). Similarly, the political disparity within the EAC countries makes it difficult for harmonious agreements on functional operationalization of EASF and as such, EAC has continued to experience insignificant capacity.

4.3 Conflict Management Mechanisms Employed by EAC in Burundi

Conflict management in Burundi has been both challenging and frustrating. According to Central African Report (2016) EAC under the auspices of the AU has engaged Burundi conflict in various ways. Some of these conflict management mechanisms include mediation, negotiations, monitoring, and peace keeping

4.3.1 Mediation

Mediation is defined as process of helping two or more conflicting parties sort their issue without resorting to war, or court (ICG, 2017). Mediation is usually led by a neutral third party that encourages and facilitates conflict parties to talk to each other, and have conflict issues addressed amicably. In mediation, parties are encouraged to examine conflict issues, whether big or small, and agree on a set of solutions to mitigate the
conflict. Equally, specific set of outcomes to address each party’s concerns are developed (Jacobsen et al., 2013). According to Elowson and Lins de Albuquerque (2017), the mediation efforts in Burundi commenced in April 2015 when the National Council for the Defence of Democracy-Forces for the Defense of Democracy (CNDD-FDD) announced President Nkurunziza would be seeking a third term in office. This announcement triggered a wave of protests across the country, leading to death of approximately 500 individuals with more than 280,000 being displaced from their homes. As a result, The EAC, through the auspices of the AU structured mediation efforts to fend off the crisis (ICG, 2017). However, according to Central Africa Report (2016), the mediation efforts were frustrated by the fact that EAC did not gain any traction in getting Nkurunziza’s government and the opposition, mostly in exile, to agree to mediation talks. Within days of conflict 2015 conflict in Burundi, the AU had delegated mediation talks to EAC. This was done on the principle of comparative advantage or subsidiarity that guides peace and security interventions between the AU and the RECs (ICG, 2017). Following the delegated mandate by AU to the EAC, the EAC appointed Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni to lead the mediation process. However, the opposition and Burundi conflict observers viewed Museveni’s appointment with skepticism since Museveni does not espouse any hallmarks of democracy (Brookings, 2015). Museveni’s choice was ironical in that he had sought a third term, for which he was appointed to ask his counterpart, Nkurunziza, not to seek. To this Bouka noted as follows:

“...Museveni’s own disregard for term limits makes him unsuitable as a mediator” (The EastAfrican, 2016: 2)

One of the other challenges facing the mediation process was the fact that Museveni was deep into his reelection campaign, and thus, relegated the mediation process to his
defense minister Crispus Kiyonga, who lacked the reputational credentials and gravitas to compel the various actors into the mediation table (ibid).

A senior researcher with the Institute for Security Studies, Dr. Yolande Bouka noted that for mediation work to be effective, a strong leadership was need. To this he noted that:

“...the future of Burundi mediation would be better served by AU, alongside EAC leadership committed to peace” (Bouka, 2016: para 14)

As such, the AU and EAC failed to halt the crisis in Burundi through mediation under Museveni. Nkurunziza exploited divisions within and between the AU, the UN and EAC, which enabled his government to rebuff lackluster EAC attempts to bring on board negotiations. Consequently, failure of Museveni to lead effective mediation equally stalled the deployment of AU authorized human rights and military observers, as well as UN Security Council-sanctioned police (Barasa, 2011). When the AU attempted to revive the mediation talks, Burundi Foreign Affairs Minister Alain Nyamitwe in an interview The East African newspaper noted as follows:

“...we are not aware of the dialogue...because we never even received the invitation. The government position remains the same...we are concerned on how representatives of the opposition, civil society and women representatives were invited Entebbe (without us)” (The EastAfrican, 2016: 7)

In as much as Nkurunziza’s government was rejecting mediation attempts by EAC and the AU, President Museveni was very adamant that the mediation process was on course to solve the conflict and political impasse. Museveni noted that:

“...the ruling party in Burundi and the opposition has agreed to negotiate expeditiously, intensively, in order to reach an agreement” (The EastAfrican, 2016: 2)

Similarly, the efforts of this mediation process were doomed to fail since Nkurunziza’s government wanted the opposition to acknowledge that they are in power legitimately, while the opposition had rejected the proposed notion by Museveni for a government of
National unity (Bouka, 2016). Both the government and the opposition sides had indicated that their position was not going to change. The opposition spokesperson Nditié argued Museveni to demand that Nkurunziza adhere to the two term presidential limits set in the Arusha Accord that ended Burundi’s civil war in 2005. To this, Nditié noted that:

“…a government of unity cannot be based on the legislative elections that (opposition) has opposed” (The EastAfrican, 2016: 4).

In March 2016, Museveni passed the mediation role to Tanzanian former President Benjamin Mkapa, however, Mkapa suffered the same fate as Museveni with the opposition accusing him of siding with the government, and requested him to cease all efforts for inter-Burundian dialogue. In a statement, the opposition CNARED noted as follows:

“Given the lack of effectiveness of President Mkapa’s facilitation, CNARED asks that future mediation facilitator should be assisted by the AU, and UN teams…” (The EastAfrican, 2016: 2)

In as much as mediation was adopted by both the AU and the EAC for conflict management and resolution in Burundi, it has failed to produce tangible results in bringing the government, opposition, civil societies, and other interest groups to the negotiating table.

4.3.2 Peacekeeping

Peacekeeping was one of the conflict management and resolution mechanisms that were adopted by the EAC. The AU encouraged EAC to use its comparative advantage and subsidiarity to engage in peacekeeping mission in Burundi. The EAC’s familiarity with the political working of the region was best placed to take action through the EASF to provide peacekeeping force in Burundi (Central Africa Report, 2016). In December 2015, the deterioration of security situation in Burundi had worsened with an estimated 79
rebels being killed and more than 300 youth being arrested. On 17th December 2015, the PSC issued a communiqué after consultation with the EAC that authorized a 5000 strong Africa Prevention and Protection Mission (MAPROBU) to help prevent the deterioration of peace and security in Burundi (ICG, 2017). The EAC, through the EASF was part of the forces that formed MAPROBU. As such, Nkurunziza’s government was given 72 hours to accept and consent to the deployment. However, if the Burundian government did not consent, then the PSC was to call on Assembly of AU Heads of States to authorize the deployment of the MAPROBU as per Article 4(h) of the constitutive Act which allows member states to intervene in cases of war, crimes against humanity, and genocide (ICG, 2017).

Significantly, the PSC decisions were to use the troops from member states to prevent further deterioration of peace and security in the Burundi; contribute to the protection of civilians’ life, in addition to creating conducive atmosphere for mediation and dialogue. Additionally, the PSC was to receive a list of Burundian stakeholders perpetuating the conflict for purposes of imposing sanctions (Central Africa Report, 2016). It should be noted that the Burundian government flatly rejected the AU intervention. The deputy presidential spokesperson Mr. Jean-Claude Karerwa in responding to AU and EAC request for MAPROBU noted that:

“…Burundi is clear on (MAPROBU) matter; it is not ready to accept the AU force…if AU troops come without Burundian government approval, it will be considered an invasion and an occupational force…which Burundian government will deal with accordingly” (Daily Mail, 2015: para 4-5)

Further, Jean-Claude noted that Burundian government was of the view that the MAPROBU force could not be automatically be sent to Burundi without consent, and without UN Security Council approval. By January 2016, the EAC petitioned AU not to move into Burundi hastily, but to grant EAC opportunity to keep negotiating with the
government (Daily Mail, 2015). By the time the AU summit was being held in late January 2016, African states, and more specifically, EAC support for MAPRUBO in Burundi had faded. As such, the AU Heads of States reversed the decision to deploy MAPRUBO to Burundi. Instead, the AU preference focused into the deployment of a high-level delegation to Burundi (ICG, 2017).

It is evident that in the discourse on the deployment of MAPRUBO, the EAC played a minimal to insignificant role to since the decision to deploy was purely done by AU (The EastAfrican, 2016). Therefore, the effectiveness and capability of EAC in organizing peacekeeping force in Burundi has been abysmal (Brookings, 2015). First, the EAC does not have direct mandate to send peacekeeping mission to any of its member states without direct mandate and authorization of the AU. This means that even the East Africa Standby Force (EASF) lacks direct mandate for peacekeeping without approval of the AU, and the member state where intervention is required (ICG, 2017). In this regard, the peacekeeping as a conflict management and resolution mechanisms by EAC in Burundi was not effective, as it was not deployed, despite EASF contributing troops to the MAPROBU 5000 strong force that had been requested by the AU. According to Daily Mail, the AU had urged member states including the EAC through its EASF to generate mission troops and security police that were required to reach the authorized strength of MAPROBU. The EASF is one of the AU’s regional bodies with express mandate to coordinate and boost regional peace and security. Surprisingly, the EASF has never deployed, and is a current force in principle (Daily Mail, 2016). Chadian president Idris Derby criticized AU and EAC inaction saying:

“...Our organization (AU, and by extension EAC) meet often, we talk too much, we always write a lot, however, we don’t do enough, and sometimes we do nothing at all” (Daily Mail, 2016: Para 6).
President Derby’s frustration did not only expose the inaction of the AU, but also the constant talk and no action by the EAC, who were lobbying the AU to let EAC continue taking charge on Burundi conflict.

4.2.3 High Level Delegation on Burundi Dialogue

The failure of mediation talks led by Uganda President Museveni, and former Tanzanian President Benjamin Mkapa, followed by the rejection of MAPRUBO by the Burundian government, led to the appointment of a high-level delegation to visit Burundi and access the level of conflict, what could be done to mitigate the situation (ICG, 2017). Chadian President Idris Derby being the chair of the AU at this time, appointed President Jacob Zuma (South Africa); President Macky Sall (Senegal); President Mohammed Ould Aziz (Mauritania); President Ali Bongo (Gabon) and Ethiopian Prime Minister Hailemariam Dessalegn of Ethiopia (Central Africa Report, 2016). The mandate of this high-level delegation was to hold dialogue with both the government, opposition and other stakeholders with the view of jump starting conflict resolution in Burundi. Equally, they delegation was to convince Nkurunziza’s to accept the MAPRUBO force into Burundi.

The appointment of high level delegation did not have a representation from EAC member countries, but was represented by Ethiopian Prime Minister Dessalegn, who is part of the EASF (Central Africa Report, 2016). As such, EAC did not have a direct conflict management and resolution influence on Burundi through the high-power delegation. After a successful visit, the delegation recommended the following: (i). All stakeholders in the Burundi crisis were encouraged to participate in the EAC dialogue without pre-conditions; (ii). The team expresses support for Museveni as the EAC appointed mediator, and encouraged Museveni to set a timeline for resumption of dialogue; (iii). Increase the number of AU human rights observers to 100, and AU
military experts and personnel to 100; (iv). Encouraged the international community to resume aid and encouraging Burundians to engage in dialogue.

It should be noted that the high-level delegation did not have unity of purpose in the issuance of their statement. After the delegation left, President Zuma remained in Burundi, and issues a separate statement that contradicted previous communiqué by AU delegation. Instead of using all stakeholders’ in his statement, Zuma said only important stakeholders should be involved. Nkurunziza’s government pounced on this opportunity to describe the CNARED opposition as not important stakeholders, and declared that the government would not have dialogue with the group. To this, Alain Nyamitwe, noting that:

“...the government will not sit down with members of the armed opposition”
(Daily Mail, 2016: 6)

The AU PSC communiqué noted that recommendations by the high-level delegation should be adopted by the EAC, however, as had been noted by Elowson and Lins de Albuquerque, EAC lack the capacity to enforce recommendations from the PSC, or EASF. They further noted:

“...EAC members want to use the security framework as a means of keeping control of any action to be in the region and of preventing states outside the region from interfering, but in reality, not eager for the EAC mandate on peace and security to evolve” (Elowson&Lins de Albuquerque, 2017: 4)

4.4 Constraints Facing EAC in Burundi Conflict Mitigation

In any conflict, prevalence of divergent constraints make it difficult to mitigate or manage the conflicts. According to Byiers and Desmidt (2016), conflict management is a necessity in modern conflicts. Conflicts should be controlled, monitored and prevented from escalating into unmanageable warfare. However, every conflict has challenges and constraints that have to be addressed to effectively mitigate the conflict. For Burundi,
there are various constraints that have inhibited effective conflict mitigation and resolution. According to Central Africa Report (2016), these constraints include lack of effective conflict monitoring mechanism, poor financing of the conflict mitigation interventions, uncooperative government,

4.4.1 Monitoring Constraints

The Burundi conflict has experienced conflict monitoring challenges since 2015 after the attempted coup. According to the ICG (2016), the EAC could have done more to influence the management of Burundi conflict, and help mitigate escalation of violence. However, the EAC lacked an effective conflict monitoring system in Burundi. The EAC did not have a monitoring mechanism, making it difficult for analysts and policy makers within the region to access the full extent of the conflict, casualties, and human rights violations. The Central Africa Report noted that:

“...with limited information concerning the nature of conflict, dynamic of the conflict, and actors of the conflict, it remains difficult to truly access the risks (inherent) of the conflict” (Central Africa Report, 2016: 4)

The lack of effective conflict monitoring mechanism had enabled Nkurunziza’s government to continue engaging and perpetuating violence against citizens, opposition and civil societies opposed to Nkurunziza’s third term in office (ibid). According to Brookings (2015), constraints faced by EAC for effective monitoring of the conflict have been compounded by the decision by the government in stalling any direct engagements with international community, the opposition, and other stakeholders like the civil society. For example, in June of 2015, the AU PSC had adopted the communique recommendations that had proposed sending of a small number of human rights observers and military experts and advisors into Burundi to document and report on possible human rights violations, in addition to reporting on the disarmament process of armed militia.
groups within Burundi (AU, 2015). While it was the case that Nkurunziza’s government accepted these observers, The Central Africa Report (2016) notes that these observers and military advisors faced numerous hurdles in performing their duties, including being denied access to significant resources, facilities, and meetings with government officials who could shed light on conflict events and undercurrents. As such, the observer team failed to secure a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between the team and the government. As such, these observers were not able to monitor wider scopes of the country, and as such, their report was inconclusive, despite reporting on massive civilian rights violations, detentions, killings, disappearances, and torturing of opposition figures by the government forces (ibid).

Most of the report that was documented by the observers was mainly for conflict around the capital city Bujumbura. Observers could not have access regions outside the capital city due to security risks, and thus, the monitoring mechanisms and the report had significant gaps about the conflict and the human rights situation (ICG, 2017). By October 2015, the AU in conjunction with EAC mediation group, attempted to increase the number of conflict observers, particularly the human rights observer teams and the military experts, however, Nkurunziza’s government has continued to frustrate these endeavors.

In as much as the AU and EAC observer missions were not successful, the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHRP) deployed a fact-finding mission from 7th to 13th December 2015, whose mandate was also to investigate human rights violations and other abuses taking place in Burundi conflict (Daily Mail, 2016). The report from this mission was to inform the AU Summit meeting in January 2016, however, the report was not ready until May of 2016, making it difficult for the AU to
offer any concrete advice to EAC’s EASF, and the EAC mediation team on how to deal with the situation in Burundi. As such, the Central Africa Report notes that:

“...the conflict monitoring effort in Burundi has not been useful or effective” (Central Africa Report, 2016: 4)

Some of the challenges associated with the observer and monitoring missions was the fact that these missions lacked transparency and systematic public reporting. As such, the findings had minimal impact on the public diplomacy and ability to exercise leverage or punitive measures on violence perpetuators, or to inform the mediation agenda by the EAC (Nwonwu, 2010; Aggad-Clerx&Desmidt, 2017).

**Fatalities and Conflict Patterns**

During the monitoring exercise, one of the main constraints way verifiability of fatalities and conflict patterns so as to be able to inform the EAC and the AU on intervention mechanisms. Data obtained from the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data (ACLED) was more concise in illustrating violence patterns as compared to the EAC and AU observer missions. As indicated in Figure 4.1, violence against civilians by government police and armed forces was the highest between: April 26, 2015 to April 25, 2016; Followed by other forms of violence and conflict such as armed battle, street protests, remote violence with reported hundreds of fatalities as indicated in Figure 4.1. On the other hand, Figure 4.2, highlight the data differences from local level sourcing that indicated that violence against civilians was at (35%); Battles (7%); strategic development (48%). Data reported by media as indicated in Figure 4.2outlets showed
violence against civilians at (32%); Battles (20%); Strategic development (8%); riots and protests (39%).

Source: ACLED 2017

Figure 4.1: Burundi Crisis by Type: 26 April 2015-25 April 2016

Figure 4.2: Data Differences, Burundi Crisis by Event Type, 26 April 2015-25 April 2016

Source: ACLED 2016

According to the data indicated by ACLED, the findings of conflict fatalities count was 1,555 between 25th April 2015 to 26th April 2016; more than three times higher than the data that had been collected by observer missions, which had indicated a rough estimate
count of 474 people (Raleigh, Kishi, & McKnight, 2016). As such, it was difficult to structure meaningful mediation and humanitarian engagement in Burundi by the EAC, when the interventions they were seeking were not based on solid data.

Raleigh et al., (2016) further notes that for monitoring interventions to have been effective, there was need for conflict dynamic to have been recorded and documented; which was not the case by the observer missions in Burundi. Data from ACLED that riots and protests had spiked in mid-2015 but cooled off as the year progresses as indicated in Figure 4.3

![Figure 3: Burundi Crisis Demonstrations by Event Type, 26 April 2015 – 25 April 2016](image)

Source: *ACLED 2016*

Source: One of the most important aspects of monitoring that was missed by the observer teams was the violence against civilians. Battles were largely composed of military forces and police fighting against armed groups that were opposed to Nkurunziza’s term limit
extension. According to Raleigh et al., (2016) police crackdown were mainly in opposition strongholds, and most often turned violent, forcing opposition supporters to openly take arms against the government as indicated in Figure 4.5

![Figure 4.4: Violence Against Civilians by Victim's Affiliation](image)

**Figure 4.4: Violence Against Civilians by Victim's Affiliation**

Source: *ACLED 2016*

According to Raileigh et al., (2016), the reason why it was important for EAC to monitor this group is to have sufficient data on groups and stakeholders to negotiate with, and to be able to map conflict actors. As it were, EAC mediation team and AU PSC observer teams did not have data or information concerning the conflict, and as such could not report accurately on the status of the violence in Burundi. This was one of the constraints that inhibited effective mediation and conflict management in Burundi (ibid).
Similarly, one of the most difficult aspect of monitoring and reporting on conflict in Burundi was data on groups perpetrating the violence (ICG, 2016). Groups persuading this violence could not be punished, and neither could sanctions be imposed effectively, when EAC and AU did not have data on these violent groups, and their leaders. Data collected by ACLED show that both opposition and government had armed militias that were used to spread violence and terror as indicated in Figure 4.5.

![Unidentified Armed Group Involvement by Event Type Based on Affiliation, Burundi Crisis, 26 April 2015 – 25 April 2016](image)

**Figure 4.5: Unidentified Armed Group Involvement by Event Type Based on Affiliation**

Source: ACLED 2016

As indicated in Figure 4.5 above, it is evident that state affiliated armed groups (93%) inflicted violence against civilian population, compared to (18%) from opposition groups, and (61%) from unknown affiliations. When it comes to battles, the opposition affiliated groups mounted the highest battles (60%) at government forces compared to (4%) by government itself. As had been noted by Nwonwu (2010) poor data collection and monitoring as some of the constraints to effective conflict management and mitigation. Burundi. This data indicates how perverse the conflict situation both by government and opposition groups and their affiliation were, yet, the EAC did not have their own mechanisms to collect, analyze and devise strategies to mitigate the conflict.
Resolving Conflict Monitoring Constraints

To resolve challenges surrounding conflict monitor, there is need for the EAC to put in place early warning mechanisms that will help move from conflict management to conflict prevention (Central Africa Report, 2016). In Burundi, lack of effective conflict management system from a regional body perspective significantly contributed to the deterioration of peace and security (ibid). According to Raileigh, (2016) there is need for EAC to invest in technical capacity personnel, including human rights defenders, military experts, conflict mediators and negotiators. As a regional body, EAC should also invest in conflict data collection, synthesis, and analysis so as to inform decision making particularly the emergency summits of peace and conflict management.

Effective conflict monitoring would also include actor mapping of the perpetuators of conflict. According to ICG (2017), poor conflict actor mapping results in situations where mediators and negotiators are not well informed on knowledgeable on levels of engagement with important groups. Conflict stakeholder analysis cannot be developed without an effective actor mapping process. As such, Brookings (2015) report had noted that EAC capacity and capability is as good as the data that can enhance and inform effective decision-making process. In case where perpetrators of conflict in Burundi have to be charged and placed under trail, evidence of violence and human rights violations have to documented in Burundi. Such documentation will not only enhance accuracy of reporting on Burundi conflict, but also form authoritative evidence that economic sanctions can be imposed (Central Africa Report, 2016).

4.4.2 Lack of Strategic Harmony among EAC Members

The limited strategic coherence, and political will as demonstrated by EAC members has placed a significant constrain on Burundi conflict mitigation. According to Brookings
(2015), the lack of political will among the EAC members has hobbled the organizations ability to effectively address Burundi conflict. The Brookings report further notes that on 30\textsuperscript{th} May, 2015, the attorney generals from EAC members submitted a legal note to the EAC head of States. The note indicated that Nkurunziza’s third term pursuit was unconstitutional, and in violation of Arusha Accord of 2005. However, former Tanzanian President Kikwete prevailed on his fellow EAC members by asking them to drop the issue, arguing that the issue was domestice, and should be dealt and determined by Burundians. In as much as the EAC heads of States called for a return to constitutional order, they did not have concrete agreement on what that meant (Nantulya, 2016).

According to African Report for Strategic Studies, Ugandan President Museveni, who was appointed a mediator in Burundi in 2015, offered President Nkurunziza a 10-point exit plan that included a 2 year stay in power that would culminate in general elections, for which Nkurunziza would not be eligible to run. However, this was rebuffed by Nkurunziza (Nantulya, 2016). Before the May 13, 2015 coup, EAC heads of state were divided on how to respond to Nkurunziza’s bid for third term. Additionally, the chatter on how to oust Nkurunziza through unconstitutional means had widened EAC member differences. For instance, Rwanda being out of synch with EAC members position on Nkurunziza, boycotted the first emergency summit called by EAC secretariat. Similarly, Kenya and Rwanda boycotted the second EAC emergency summit, while Uganda joined the two in boycotting the third emergency summit (Elowson&Lins de Albuquerque, 2017). Unsurprisingly, former Tanzanian President Mkapa called a forth emergency session to “look into obstacles dragging the dialogue”, which was aborted entirely for lack of members commitment (Nantulya, 2016: 2).
One of the other factors that constrained EACs conflict management and mitigation in Burundi was Kagame’s open criticism of Nkurunziza. Kagame in a speech accused Nkurunziza of killing his own people, noting that:

“...Are these leaders or what (Nkurunziza), who kill their own people from morning to evening, throw them in the streets, then stand up to accuse Rwanda?” (Al Jazeera, 2015: par 4)

On the other hand, Nkurunziza blamed Kagame for instigating violence in Burundi. As such, the strife and tension between the leaders, which other EAC members being non-committal with indifference worsened the organization’s position on conflict management and mitigation in Burundi (Al Jazeera, 2015). Similar, there existed a rift between Tanzania and Rwanda, after President Kikwete called on Kagame to enter into dialogue with Rwanda rebels in Eastern DRC, The Democratic Forces for Liberation of Rwanda, a remnant of rebel forces that has been accused of 1994 genocide atrocities. Kagame perceived Tanzanian position as an affront to Rwandan security, and was unwilling to work with Tanzania to develop amicable strategic solutions to Burundi conflict (ibid). As such, lack of coherent strategic direction among the EAC members significantly scuttled prospects of a singular authoritative position and strategy on Burundi conflict mitigation.

**Resolving Poor Incoherent Strategies**

In his study on Burundi conflict, Nantulya noted that poor incoherent strategies lacking unity of purpose, and similar ideological persuasion on conflict management within the region has been a major constrain on conflict management and resolution in Burundi (Nantulya, 2016). First and foremost, the ideological differences on democracy and governance have caused significant rift between members that needs to be resolved before a common and coherent position on Burundi conflict can be adopted. For instance, the Vines (2013) argues that the effectiveness of RECs is as good as the intra hegemony
between the members. Meaning, EAC members has to solve the existing differences, and negative perception between and among each other. The conflict issue between Tanzania and Rwanda on Rwandan rebels in Eastern DRC should be resolved, for Tanzania and Rwanda to work together effectively (Diop et al., 2012)

4.4.3 Poor Implementation of Key Decisions

One of the challenges facing EAC in dealing with Burundi conflict was poor implementation of key decisions. For instance, in September 2014, the EAC Summit had created a joint EAC-COMESA Panel of the Wise that was to be used to diffuse tension in Burundi (Daily Mail, 2016). However, after the panel spent three months in Burundi collecting data, engaging stakeholders in dialogue, and consulting with the government, came up with 10 issues that was to form basis of mediation and dialogue; Burundi government rejected the proposal. Instead of enforcing and pushing through with the panels recommendations, EAC, shelved it, resulting to a perpetual state of inaction, and spread of tension and conflict in Burundi (ibid).

Secondly, during a pre-conference meeting for the EAC summit, the EAC Council of Foreign Ministers issued a warning stating that if the emergency session allowed Nkurunziza to stay in power, a crisis of legitimacy was going to arise, and subsequently erode the Arusha Accord, leading to increase in violence (Nantulya, 2016). Despite this warning, and the call for postponement of the elections for a period of 45 days to mitigate tension and conflict, Nkurunziza postponed the elections only for one week. The elections were boycotted by the opposition, and marred with violence, yet, no punitive measures were imposed by the EAC on Nkurunziza’s government (ibid).

Thirdly, the EAC summit that was held on September 8, 2016 had approved a fresh roadmap that was to be adopted by Burundi. This consisted of a series engagements stretching
between December 2016, May 2017, and culminate in a comprehensive peace agreement in June 2017; none of which happened. Nkurunziza’s government scuttled scheduled talks by boycotting all face to face meeting (Aggad-Clerx&Desmidt, 2017).

**Resolving Poor Decision-Making Constrains**

Burundi conflict constraints can be resolved by implementation of various strategies by the EAC members including effective and timely implementation of key decisions. Nantulya (2016) study established that EAC does not follow though most of its decisions on resolving the Burundi conflict. There are no repercussions for defiance, or lack of compliance on EAC resolution by president Nkurunziza’s government. There is equally little to no follow through on key decisions, including imposing of conditionality’s and sanctions to force warring factions on the mediation table. As such, there has been no meaningful mediation or negotiation by EAC, which has significantly frustrated the AU. To this end, the EAC should develop a raft of measures that accompany non-compliance of the organizations decisions and recommendations on Burundi conflict.

**4.5 Chapter Summary**

This chapter has presented the study findings for each research questions. Findings on the capacity of EAC to deal with regional conflicts were presented first. The major findings for this research question has indicate that largely, EAC lacks the capacity to marshal significant funding internally to support conflict management within the region, and as such, relies mostly on funding from the West including USA, EU, Britain, China, France and AU. The EASF is equally not well-coordinated due to poor funding, training, technical capacity including air power, advanced warfare engineering, and special tactics and weapons.
On the question on mitigation mechanisms adopted by the EAC on conflict management in Burundi, this study has established that EAC adopted mediation, peacekeeping, and high-level delegation to Burundi. Mediation was led by President Museveni, Mkapa, and Kikwete. However, the mediation efforts had not yielded any tangible concession or peace, since Nkurunziza’s government officials rebuffed the mediation talks, preceded with elections, while at the same time engaged in civil and human rights violations across the country. The high-level mediation that was appointed by AU previous chairperson Idris Derby including President Jacob Zuma (South Africa); President Macky Sall (Senegal); President Mohammed Ould Aziz (Mauritania); President Ali Bongo (Gabon) and Ethiopian Prime Minister Hailemariam Dessalegn of Ethiopia failed to accomplish its mission for peace and security. An EAC member was not selected as part of high-level delegation; however, Ethiopian prime minister represented EAC under EASF umbrella.

Finally, findings on the constraints facing EAC in conflict management in Burundi; the findings of this study have indicated that poor conflict monitoring and documentation, poor early warning system, lack of mapping fatalities and conflict patterns, lack of coherent strategic direction among EAC members, and poor implementation of key decision on Burundi conflict significantly impacted conflict management and mitigation.

The next chapter presents the study discussions, conclusion, and recommendations.
CHAPTER FIVE

5.0 DISCUSSIONS, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

5.1 Introduction

This chapter has presents the entire study discussions, conclusion, and recommendations based on each research question. The study discussion has been presented first for each research question. The study conclusions and recommendations are also presented for each research question.

5.2 Study Summary

The objective of this thesis was to examine the role of regional bodies in conflict management using the case of EAC in Burundi for the period of 2009-2017. This study was guided by the following study questions: What is the capacity of EAC in conflict management in the region? What are the conflict management mechanisms adopted by the EAC in Burundi conflict? What are the constraints’ facing EAC in Burundi conflict, and how can this be resolved?

This study was a case study design based on Burundi that utilized a qualitative approach. Data was collected from secondary sources analyzed using content analysis for emerging themes for each research question. The findings have been presented using figures and narrative presentation.

The first research question sought to determine the capacity of EAC in conflict management in the region. The major findings show that in as much as EAC has attempted to manage conflicts in countries like South Sudan and Somalia; generally, EAC has lacked the capacity to marshal significant funding internally to support conflict management within the region. Mostly, the EAC funding conflict management funding has been from the West including USA, EU, Britain, China, France and AU. The EASF is
equally not well-coordinated due to poor funding, training, technical capacity including air power, advanced warfare engineering, and special tactics and weapons

On the question on the conflict mitigation mechanisms adopted by the EAC to manage in Burundi, this study has established that EAC adopted mediation, peacekeeping, and high-level delegation. Mediation was led by President Museveni, Mkapa, and Kikwete. However, the mediation efforts had not yielded any tangible concession or peace, since Nkurunziza’s government officials rebuffed the mediation talks, preceded with elections, while at the same time engaged in civil and human rights violations across the country. The high-level delegation that was appointed by AU previous chairperson Idris Derby including President Jacob Zuma (South Africa); President Macky Sall (Senegal); President Mohammed Ould Aziz (Mauritania); President Ali Bongo (Gabon) and Ethiopian Prime Minister Hailemariam Dessalegn of Ethiopia failed to accomplish its mission for peace and security. An EAC member was not selected as part of high-level delegation; however, Ethiopian prime minister represented EAC under EASF umbrella.

Finally, findings on the question on what were the constraints facing EAC in conflict management in Burundi; the findings show that poor conflict monitoring and documentation, poor early warning system, lack of mapping fatalities and conflict patterns, lack of coherent strategic direction among EAC members, and poor implementation of key decision on Burundi conflict significantly impacted conflict management and mitigation.

5.3 Discussions.

5.3.1 Capacity of EAC to Manage Conflict in the Region

One of the objectives of this study was to examine the capacity of EAC to manage conflict within the region. The findings have indicated that in as much as the EAC had
previously engaged and effectively managed conflict in Sudan, the same cannot be said of Burundi and Somalia for the period of 2009-2017. Largely, the EAC lacks the capacity to marshal significant funding internally to support conflict management within the region, and as such, relies mostly on funding from the West including USA, EU, Britain, China, France and AU. The EASF is equally not well-coordinated due to poor funding, training, technical capacity including air power, advanced warfare engineering, and special tactics and weapons. This finding is in line with a study conducted by Klaus Mitchell (2015) that examined land grievances and the mobilization of electoral violence in Cote d’Ivoire and Kenya concluded that regional bodies lacked the capacity to intervene and manage the conflict compared international bodies such as the United Nations and the African union. Thus, it should be noted that having a composition of regional bodies that are bound by common understanding on economic integration, and further argue that the peace and security of the region, does not in itself constitute capacity.

The findings of this study also indicated that for regional bodies to have adequate capacity, they must have technical competencies, knowledge, functional skills, and conflict management and resolution skills, in addition to the goodwill and trust necessary to bring warring factions to the table. However, this had not been the case for EAC in managing regional conflicts due to poor technical capacity including fully loaded and functional air power for monitoring peace and security, and that had the capability of responding to emergency conflict in short period of time.

Equally, capacity challenge for EAC was poor funding for EASF, leading to sluggish operationalization, even in times of conflict and This confirms Nathan (2010) argument that capacity challenges of most regional bodies spring from economic weaknesses. Disparities in economies lead to situations where members are either not contributing, or
poorly paying their dues, as has been the case with EAC. When majority of states within a regional body have poor economic strength, this translates into poor funding for the regional body conflict management initiatives, which at the end of the day, affects the training, deployment, negotiation and mediation that can take place to manage or avert crisis.

This study also found that EAC had weak logistical capacity for deploying EASF to deal with perpetual conflict in the region, including equipment supply such as artillery assets, helicopters, and air defense and communication capabilities to deal with emergency security threats in the region. This finding is in line with similar assertions by Allehone, (2008) who noted that EAC challenges in deploying conflict management support was based in its poor and weak logistical capability. Robinson (2014) had also argued that lack of logistical capacity had compelled EASF to remain under the mercy of western countries.

Similar arguments had also been advanced by Bouhuys (2011) who had noted that notes that one of the biggest challenges of EASF is that in cases of peace missions, EASF deploys troops that at times lack better weapons such as artillery. Poor weaponry negatively impacts peace missions as was the case with AMIS which had 18-man patrol unit, and 20-man rescue team kidnapped in West Darfur in 2008, where EASF did not have the logistical or air defense support system to support the kidnapped team.

The findings confirm implication on the Systems theory that within the international systems, different countries are held together by a complex network of relationships/interactions that make them inter-dependent in facilitating their core functions including various economic activities. According to the system’s perspective, each and every system tries as much as possible to maintain its equilibrium, and that any
disturbance offsets the balance. The slight misalignment of any EAC member in failing to pay their dues to EASF, or enhance their training capacity, military capabilities, and technical and logistical capabilities affects EACs conflict management capabilities, since the unit works as a system.

5.3.2 Conflict Management Mechanisms Employed by EAC in Burundi Conflict

The findings of this study, on conflict management mechanisms adopted by EAC in Burundi conflict management have established that EAC adopted mediation, peacekeeping, and high-level delegation. However, the mediation efforts had not yielded any tangible concession or peace, since Nkurunziza’s government officials rebuffed the mediation talks, preceded with elections, while at the same time engaged in civil and human rights violations across the country.

This study found that regional EAC just like other regional bodies and the UN, relied on mediation, preventive diplomacy, good offices, and use of intervention force. Preventive diplomacy was done in the form of EAC Summit resolutions and recommendations to Burundi government. This is in line with Abbink (2002) who argued that mediation is one the mechanisms adopted by regional bodies since mediation has the capability of bringing conflict partners to the discussion table to talk over their grievances and how to settle these grievances. Desmidt (2017) had noted that mediation had been adopted in various conflicts including Biafra conflict in Nigeria, Angola civil conflict, and recently in Kenya 2007-2008 post-election conflict, and had been successful. However, for EAC, the mediation in Burundi conflict had not succeeded. In as much as Enuka and Nwagbo (2016) had argued that the use of mediation allows regional body’s ability to move faster, and respond quicker compared to other UN and other international bodies, this was not
the case with EAC, as AU was not satisfied with the slow pace of EAC’s engagement, with no tangible results in Burundi, and as such, AU had to intervene.

This study found that peacekeeping force was one of the conflict management mitigation mechanism adopted by EAC, through EASF being part of MAPROBU by the AU. However, the 5000-strong force was not deployed, and therefore, not effective. In most regional and international conflict management situations, peacekeeping is one of the viable responses to violent intra-state conflicts (Enuka&Nwagbo, 2016). Peacekeeping missions have not always been successful. In some instances, presence of peacekeeping missions has made conflict worse. This can be attributed to the composition of the peacekeeping missions, perceived partiality, or lack of respect or consideration to the conflicting groups. In Burundi, the MAPROBU missions did not succeed because Nkurunziza’s government rejected the force from stepping foot in Burundi, threatening that the force will be considered as an invasion.

This study found that EAC had adopted the use of high-level delegation as a conflict mitigation strategy. High level delegation as similar to the International Panel for Eminent persons (IPEP) that was established by OAU in response to Rwandan 1994 genocide, and civil conflict in DRC. However, this study established that the high-level delegation did not succeed for lack of unity of purpose in their recommendations, and in failing to convince Nkurunziza to work with EAC to formulate a conflict solution for Burundi.

5.3.5 Constraints facing EAC in Burundi Conflict Mitigation

The findings on the question constraints facing EAC in conflict management in Burundi, the findings show that poor conflict monitoring and documentation, poor early warning system, lack of mapping fatalities and conflict patterns, lack of coherent strategic
direction among EAC members, and poor implementation of key decision on Burundi conflict significantly impacted conflict management and mitigation. This finding is in line with Yang, Ryan and Zhang (2013) who argued that regional bodies do experience various constrains in their quest to manage regional conflict. Some of these constraints noted by Yang, Ryan and Zhang included the question of sovereignty; lack of political good-will; Lack of institutional capacity; and poor funding.

This study found that EAC had failed to intervene in Burundi in a timely and effective manner due to poor conflict monitoring mechanisms, poor and incoherency strategy mitigation in conflict management. This is in line with similar constraints documented by Williams (2013) who noted that for several conflicts in Africa, including Rwandan 1994 genocide, Mozambique civil strife of the 90s, Angola conflict, and civil conflict in DRC; the AU, ECOWAS, EAC, Great Lakes Organization and SADC, the responses were similar. These organizations failed to intervene in regional conflicts sighting non-interference clause of the AU Constitutive Act. In most instances as was the case in Rwandan Genocide, by the time the threshold for engagement is being reached, it is usually too little too late to manage the conflict (Frere`, 2016).

One of the other constraints established by this study is the limited strategic coherence, and political will as demonstrated by EAC members, and that placed a significant constrain on Burundi conflict mitigation. Lack of political will among the EAC members has hobbled the organizations ability to effectively address Burundi conflict. This finding lines up with the argument and findings by Barasa (2011) who argued for structural regional bodies reforms, to enhance their ability to compel governments to agree to political mechanisms for de-escalating conflicts. The greatest challenge to preventing violent mass killings and conflict management is political good will for states and
regional, and international bodies to act. However, reforms without the cooperation and political will by governments affected with internal conflicts and war, frustrates the mitigation processes.

5.4 Conclusion

5.4.1 Capacity of EAC to Manage Conflict in the Region

This study sought to examine the capacity of EAC to manage conflict in the region. The findings have indicated that in as much as the EAC had previously engaged and effectively managed regional conflict, the same cannot be said of Burundi and Somalia for the period of 2009-2017. This study concludes that largely, the EAC lacks the capacity to marshal significant funding; EASF is equally not well-coordinated due to poor funding, training, technical capacity including air power, advanced warfare engineering, and special tactics and that EAC lacks adequate technical capacity including fully loaded and functional air power for monitoring peace and security, and capability to responding to emergency conflict in short period of time.

5.4.2 Conflict Management Mechanisms Employed by EAC in Burundi Conflict

This study sought to examine the conflict management mechanisms employed by EAC in Burundi. This study established that EAC adopted mediation, peacekeeping, and high-level delegation. This study concludes that mediation efforts, peacekeeping efforts by MAPROBU, and high-level delegation did not yield any tangible concession or peace, since Nkurunziza’s government officials rebuffed at all of these measures.

5.4.3 Constraints Facing EAC in Burundi Conflict Mitigation
This study sought to examine the constraints facing the EAC in conflict mitigation in Burundi. The study established that poor conflict monitoring and documentation, poor early warning system, lack of mapping fatalities and conflict patterns, lack of coherent strategic direction among EAC members, and poor implementation of key decision on Burundi conflict were some of the constraints facing EAC in Burundi. This study concludes that lack of coherent strategy among EAC members, and poor implementation of key decision in addition to effective follow up negatively impacted conflict mitigation in Burundi.

5.5 Recommendation

5.5.1 Recommendation for Improvement

5.5.1.1 Capacity of EAC to Manage Conflict in the Region.

This study established that EAC lacks the capacity to marshal significant funding; Poor coordination of EASF due to poor funding, training, technical capacity including air power, advanced warfare engineering, and special tactics, and that lacks adequate technical capacity including fully loaded and functional air power for monitoring peace and security, and capability to responding to emergency conflict in short period of time.

This study recommends as follows:

I. **Funding:** - There is need for EAC to enhance internal budgetary allocations based on the strength of each members GDP strength, so as to minimize overreliance on external inconsistent donor funding

II. **Technical Capacity:** - There is need for EAC to collaborate with other advanced regional bodies, AU and UN to enhance internal capacity for emergency response in conflict situations
5.5.1.2 Conflict Management Mechanism Employed by EAC in Burundi Conflict

This study established that EAC adopted mediation, peacekeeping, and high-level delegation as conflict management mechanisms. This study recommends as follows:

I. **Mediation:** - There is need for EAC to develop a team of experts on conflict mediation so as to enhance effectiveness and success of mediation processes

II. **Peacekeeping:** - Peacekeeping in times of gross human violations, including crimes against civilians, should be mandatory to enhance regional bodies’ capability to effectively protect lives, and manage conflicts.

5.5.1.3 Constraints facing EAC in Burundi Conflict Mitigation

This study found that poor conflict monitoring and documentation, poor early warning system, lack of mapping fatalities and conflict patterns, lack of coherent strategic and poor implementation of key decision on Burundi conflict were some of the constraints facing EAC in Burundi. This study recommends as follows:

I. **Conflict Monitoring:** - There is need for EAC to benchmark with other successful RECs to establish effective early warning and conflict management systems, so as to enhance conflict monitoring, management, and mitigation

II. **Effective implementation of Key Decisions:** - There is need for EAC to develop a decision implementation framework. This will help eliminate high cases of poor decision implementation that are detrimental to conflict management in the region

5.5.2 Recommendations for Future Studies

The main purpose of this study was to examine the role of regional bodies in conflict management using the case of EAC in Burundi for the period of 2009-2017. There is need for future studies to examine the role of IGAD, and the Great Lakes Region Organization conference in management of regional conflict.
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