BORDER, IDENTITY AND (IN) SECURITY: THE KENYA-SOMALIA BORDER 1963-2016

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DECLARATION

I, the undersigned, declare that this is my original work and has not been published or submitted to any academic institution in any form other than the United States International University-Africa.

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The dissertation has been submitted for examination with my approval as the designated University Supervisor.

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DEDICATION

To Jim, Briana and Bradley, for all the hours you had to do without me.
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ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

ADESO-African Development Solutions

AFDL- Alliance des Forces Democratiques pour la Liberation du Congo-Zaire

ATPU- Anti Terror Police Unit

AQIM-Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb

AU-African Union

AVIS-Association of Volunteer International Service

BEAP-British East African Protectorate

BIEA-British Institute of East African Studies

CAPU-Coast African Political Union

CAR-Central African Republic

CID- Criminal Investigation Department

CPP-Coast People’s Party

DDG-Danish Demining Group

DRC- Democratic republic of Congo

EACTI-East Africa Counter-Terrorism Initiative

EDU-Ethiopian Democratic Union

EIJM-Eritrea Islamic Jihad Movement

ELF- Eritrea Liberation Front

FAR- Forces Armées Rwandaises

FNLA- National Front for the Liberation of Azawad

FRELIMO- Frente de Libertação de Mocambique

GSU-General Service Unit

ICU-Islamic Court Union

ID- Identification Document
IEMF- Interim Emergency Multinational Force
KADU- Kenya African Democratic Union
KNA- Kenya National Archives
KANU- Kenya African National Union
KASU- Kenya African Study Union
KCA- Kikuyu Central Association
KTN- Kenya Television Network
LRA- Lord’s Resistance Army
MDFC- Movement of Democratic Forces for Casamance
MDAA- Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement
MNLA- Movement National for Liberation of Azawad (original is in French).
MOD- Marehan, Ogaden and D’ulbahante
MUJWA- Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa
NER- North Eastern Region
NFD- Northern Frontier District
NFDLF- Northern Frontier District Liberation Front
NFDP- Northern Frontier Democratic Party
NFP- Northern Frontier Province
NKG- New Kenya Group
NPPP- Northern Peoples Province Party
NPUA- Northern Province United Association
NRC- National Refugee Commission
NRM- National Resistance Movement
OAU- Organization of African Union
OCPD- Officer Commanding Police Division
OLF-Oromo Liberation Front.
RAF-Royal Air Force
RAS- Refugee Affairs Secretariat
RENAMO- Resistência Nacional de Moçambique
RPF- Rwandese Patriotic Front
SNF- Somali National Front
SNM-Somali National Movement
SPLA-Sudanese Peoples Liberation Army
SPM- Somali Patriotic Movement
SYC-Somali Youth Club
SYL-Somali Youth League
TB- Tuberculosis
TPLF-Tigray People’s Liberation Front
UNHCR-United Nations High Commission for Refugees
UNGA- United Nations General Assembly
UOSA-United Ogaden Somali Association
USA-United States of America
USC-United Somali Congress
US-United States
WSLF-Western Somalia Liberation Front
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

State borders ideally frame the perception of security through the logic of insiders/outsiders and natives/non-natives. Insecurity is perceived as threats posed by outsiders, the ‘enemies’ of the state. The view silences insecurities within the borders of a state. This exclusivist view of the border eliminates grey areas, and where such exist they are assumed danger zones. The realist and neo-realist perspectives understand security from historical protection or infringement of states' borders.\(^1\) Thinking of insecurities as outside state borders continue to permeate security practices. An example is the notion of ‘homeland security' in an attempt to counter the threat of international terrorism by Western governments. Border politics enhance border protective initiatives. The re-introduction of walls shift the view of borders as simple national artifacts and tourist attractions to security mechanisms. For example, the Hadrian wall constructed in 122 AD separated the Romans from Barbarians between Scotland and England.\(^2\) It remained in place as a tourist attraction and artifact. In modern days, border walls are dominant political issues. The intent to build walls between the United States (US), and Mexico,\(^3\) Morocco and Western Sahara, and on-going Kenya-Somalia border fence\(^4\) are supposed mechanisms for enhancing security.

The dominance of borders in politics elicit debates on their technical sufficiency in International Relations (IR). Neither modern political theory nor IR theory possesses an impressive record of theorizing outcomes of border difficulties.\(^5\) State borders are taken for

\(^2\) Daily Nation. "Wall on Somalia Border, not a Solution." Saturday Nation 18, 2015, p. 10
\(^4\) Daily Nation. "Wall on Somalia Border, not a Solution." P. 10
granted in international relations. They are visualized as points of departure as opposed to subjects of inquiry.6 Furthermore, state borders are managed as ‘fixtures and fittings’ of the international system.7 The study of borders call for an in-depth understanding concerning the states, (in)security and identity.

In the study, segmental differences in border areas such as ethnic and religious divisions represent distinct characteristics of population composition. Throughout this study, an all-inclusive definition of insecurity, ranging from overt political disputes with great hints to the outbreak of violence with casualties, is adopted. Such situations include wars of national liberation, conflict over national integration, international conflicts, conflicts resulting from political instability, and distinctly ethnic political conflicts which may lead to violence eruption.

Identity is defined as where a person or a group of people belong, and the expression given as ‘self-image' and ‘common-image' as the source of integration within self or as a group and the subsequent differences with ‘others.’8 The problem of identity emanates as a result of its formation with others. An individual can possess several identities; however, this commonly manifests itself regarding social roles.9 These stresses performance expectations on an individual and a group within a society.

Identity is a social-cultural phenomenon that has evolved with history-making both self and group identity. However, the latter comes into play when experienced within a close group

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while excluding others perceived as outsiders. Group identity involves characteristic such as ethnic and or status. Self and others socially construct identity. An individual views self and others as an outcome of agreed intersubjective behavior.

Collective identity removes anxieties and provides a sense of security. Factors such as fate, habits, norms, cultural codes and ideological leanings play a role in building collective security. Besides, collective opinions, stereotypes, and collective sentiments inform feelings of collective security. Alternatively, the presence of multidimensional identity takes into account influences such as gender, territory/homeland, status, ethnicity, as well as ideology and convictions.

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This research on, *Borders, Insecurity, and Identity: The Kenya-Somalia Border 1963-2016*, seeks to understand the perceptions on the border, identity, and (in)security by both Kenya, the Republic of Somalia, and the border community. Chapter one reviews the literature and delves into the methodology and ethical issues. Chapter two conceptualizes the border, identity, and security. Chapter three analyzes the challenges of African borders. Chapter four probes Kenya and the Republic of Somalia perceptions on the border. Chapter five explores the Somali people perceptions of the border, identity, and security. The last chapter concludes the study through linkages of previous chapters.

The research takes a poststructuralist approach using discourse analysis, constructivism and cognitive psychological theories. Qualitative methodology triangulates primary and secondary sources. Primary data includes focus group discussions, key respondents interviews, and
individual interviews, and additionally, observations, field experiences, documentaries, and archival materials. Secondary data is from journals, internet material, and books. Data analysis takes thematic categorization based on ordered objectives and discourse analysis. The study argues that all borders and identities are arbitrary, Kenya maintains inelasticity of the same while ethnic Somalis show both as multiple elastic layers.

The research adds knowledge to borders and identity studies through a unique theoretical approach, area of primary data collection, with an understanding that borders are necessarily unstable and stability occurs through social cohesion and a constant search for unity which shape state norms.
1.1 Background of the Study

The Kenya Somalia border covers 860km stretching from border point 1 in Mandera County to border point 29, Kiunga Island in Lamu County. Kenya-Somalia conflicts over the border date back to pre-independence Kenya. The former Northern Frontier Districts (NFD), later North Eastern Province (NEP) formed a historically disputed region. Under the British colonial administration, Italy was awarded the northern half of Jubaland as a gift for support accorded to the allies of World War 1.\(^1\) It was an outcome of an agreement between the British and Italians in a treaty that partitioned Sudan and East Africa from Ethiopia. Somalia was placed under the British and Italians respectively.\(^2\) Britain kept control of the NFD.

Jubaland located in the current day Southern Somalia was once part of NFD in the 20\(^{th}\) century. Following Italy’s participation in World War I against Germany, the British signed the Anglo-Italian treaty in 1915.\(^3\) The agreement between the two countries was to compensate Italy upon participation in the war against Germany. In 1925, the British ceded Jubaland to Italy.\(^4\) In 1941 Italy lost control of Italian Somaliland after the defeat by the allied powers. The British Administration managed Italian Somalia from 1941 up to 1950. During this period the British under the Bevin plan suggested a merger of all Somali-inhabited lands. Russia and America vetoed the decision. But during the period the suggestion under the Bevin plan of 1946 encouraged political institutions thus the Somali Youth Club (SYC) and later Somali Youth League (SYL) which enhanced the merger idea. By the time of Kenya’s independence, the NFD was caught up in the Pan Somali ideal. A referendum was carried out to decide the matter.

\(^4\) Ibid
The British position not to secede NFD was despite the outcome of the referendum in the region where most population desired to join the newly formed Republic of Somalia. Kenyan administration retained the NFD.

As part of the efforts to secure NFD, a political party by the name Northern Province People's Progressive Party (NPPPP) led the population to agitate for the union with the Republic of Somalia. In response, the Kenyan government authorized security counter-measures to thwart NFD's secession effort. The struggle became known as the Shifta (bandit) War. The conflict ended in a cease-fire, with NFD intact in Kenya but the distrust of the ethnic Somalis in the region by the governments of Kenya was born. The former identify and maintain close cultural ties with those in Somalia.

1.2 Statement of the Problem
The Kenya-Somalia border shares population challenges of identity associated with the institutionalization of colonial borders. The challenge of identity was birthed and, with it, what appears as different perceptions of the border. The challenges of the border, identity, and security started in the colonial period that split Somalis into five states. These were Ethiopia and the colonial states of Kenya, British Somaliland, Italian Somaliland and French Somaliland that became Djibouti. British and Italian Somaliland united upon independence in 1960, and became the Republic of Somalia. Kenya gained independence in 1963. There then followed what became known as Shifta War on the Kenyan side of the border with Somalia.

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The Kenya-Somalia border was subject to different interpretations, depending on whether one was in Kenya or Somalia but the reason for this difference in interpretations is not clear. How much of that lack of clarity is responsible for the perceived identity confusion at the border between the two states? Do the people at the border separate the two states? Moreover, to what extent do they do that? Kenya's perception of the border and the perception of those who live on both sides of the border affect this sense of identity, the extent to which they identify with either Kenya or Somalia as a state is itself a challenge that needs exploring.

1.3 Research Questions
1. How are global debates on borders, identity, and security presented?
2. What are the challenges of the African borders, identity, and security?
3. How does Kenya perceive the Kenya-Somalia border, identity, and security?
4. How do the ethnic Somalis perceive the border, identity, and security concerning the Kenyan state?

1.4 Objective of the Study
The general objective of the study is to explore borders, insecurity, and identity at the Kenya-Somalia border with reference to borderland communities/Somalis. Additionally, to find how identities and the border space interplay in the security dynamics. Specific objectives are:

1. To explore global debates on the concepts of borders, insecurity, and identity.
2. To examine the challenges of borders, insecurity, and identity in Africa.
3. To understand Kenya's perception of the Kenya-Somalia border, identity, and security.
4. To investigate the Somali community perception of the Kenya-Somalia border, concerning practices of identity, and (in)security in relations to the state.
1.5 Literature Review

Introduction

Korwa G, Adar in Kenyan Foreign Policy Behavior towards Somalia, 1963-1983 examines the motivation behind Kenya's outlook towards Somalia through the principles of territorial integrity and self-determination. The book takes a historical approach to delve into the discourses of the Northern Frontier District and how that shapes the state building in Kenya. The book observes that the Kenyan state held on to NFD despite the Somalis desire to self-determine and unite with Somalia. Besides, is Somalia's perspective indicating that part of the administration positioned their desire for NFD in the post-colonial era in a bid to resolve the unification issue.

Amartya Sen, Identity, and Violence: The Illusion of Destiny, addresses the question of identity and its relationship to violence in Yugoslavia, Sudan, Al Qaeda, Abu Ghraib prison, and his childhood experience of Hindu-Muslim riots. Identity is a sense of belonging based on some sense of shared history and association. Singular identity takes one category. For example, a 'Hutu' is an ethnic group in a country, and a 'Kigalian' is a regional identity in the same country while a 'Rwandese' is a state identity. An African is an indication of racial belonging or human being. An elevation of a single identity leads to violence as opposed to having plural identities. He argues for acknowledgment of plural and diverse identities. The central thesis portrays the illusion of unique identities such as ethnic, cultural and social. The promotion of a single identity promotes stereotypes.

Steph Lawler, Identities: Sociological Perspectives, proffers identities as forged in networks of relationship with others hence not given or static. An existence of relationships with others argues for making and un-making of individuals by each other. The principal focus is on broad
social and political issues. It depicts the need for proper understanding of identities as produced between persons and social relations. She hints at a paradoxical relationship between similarities and differences. That is; though the identity of self is unique, it shares common identities with others. Also, identities emerge through narratives engaged in every day. It is through assembling memories, experiences, episodes, understandings, and interpretations.

Katherine Tonkiss, *Migration and Identity in a Post-National World*, questions whether it is possible to create an identity that is independent of shared identity. Using democratic practices, she projects dilemmas based on national identity. Looking at the post-national world with increased mobility, she probes the possibility of upholding a democratic rule based rights than on national identity. Accordingly, equality enhances limitless mobility. The research involves interviews with; local community members, representatives from migrant charity organizations and communities in two small towns in an English countryside. The results indicate villagers and town’s people were likely to hold onto nationalistic identities than post-nationalistic ones.

Macharia Munene, "Conflicts and Postcolonial Identities in East/the Horn of Africa,” posits that Western powers spearheaded postcolonial identity crisis. The chiefs were recruited to work under Europeans. The chiefs grouped Africans as natives to serve colonial interests while non-natives acquired an elevated status. The division between the natives and non-natives is the root of postcolonial states identity crisis. He explains why the groups met State formation with resistance especially those who wanted to be under one sovereign entity due to ethnic identity. The result spearheaded for either elastic or inelastic state. The latter wanted colonial boundaries as they were since change could land-lock them or lead to landmass loss. The former agitated for irredentist moves as in the case of Somalia since colonial states could not be done away with, it led to down-playing the identity differences that existed in pre-colonial times.
Alfred G. Nhema and Paul T. Zeleza, Editors, *The Roots of African Conflicts: The Causes & Costs*, looks at the causes of conflicts in African states and argue that explanations are mainly essentialist geared towards racist notions and pessimistic views on the political and economic development. A critical look at one explanation indicates that African conflicts amount to the encoding of developmental genes. Various causes of conflicts are delved in, including; colonial legacies, differences in religion, vision, population displacement that result in a ‘citizen stranger’ and the treatment of a newcomer as not belonging. Therefore, state formation with diverse nationalities is excessively predatory and destructive.

Mahmood Mamdani, *Citizen, and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism*, observes customary laws and native authorities as characteristic features left behind by colonial legacies. Mamdani focuses on political institutions of colonial rule that continued in the post-colonial states. In addressing these dynamics, Mamdani argues that the rule of law, as introduced and structured by colonial rule, is a dire political consequence of colonialism. Purposely, the rule of law under colonialism differentiated people into separate and distinct groups such as; native, settler, ethnic group, race, and so on. These categories bear discrete consequences for political identity and, hence the application of rights and obligations. Arguably, politicized identities, were and still are a foundation of colonial political institutions and are reflected in contemporary institutions. The thesis focuses on the differentiation of citizens and supports the argument of marginalization by states of peripheral populations.

Mahmood Mamdani, *When Victims Become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism, and the Genocide in Rwanda*, delves at the rivalry between the Hutus and Tutsi's which led to the 1994 genocide
in Rwanda. The two groups have similar cultural background with a common spoken language of ‘Kinyarwanda. Genocide was in a historical, political and geographical context. The Tutsis dominated the country until 1959 whereas the Hutus ended up committing genocide to uproot them. To the Hutus, Tutsis were immigrant conquerors who ended up as rulers of the country to the detriment of the Hutus. After World War I, the colonial administration, initially the Germans and later Belgians enforced Tutsis rule to facilitate ease in local administration. The process resulted in racialization of Hutus and Tutsis as identity categories. Theorizing racial superiority placed Tutsis at an advantageous position hence access to social amenities.

Daniel Branch, “Violence, Decolonization, and the Cold War in Kenya's North Eastern Province 1963-1978,” observes that violence at the Kenya-Somalia border dates back to the pre-independence period where signs of Somali irredentism indicated a yearning to secede the Northern Frontier Districts (NFD) to Somalia. Though a referendum was carried out to decide the fate of NFD, the colonial government decided against secession. The Somali ethnic group in NFD ended up in a war with the Kenyan government known as Shifta war. The author shows that the Kenyan government indicated incomprehension in Somali political sympathies with Shifta movement. Besides, the government could not get close enough to Somalis to detect their attitudes towards the secessionist ideology. Therefore, loyal people were forcefully removed from towns by the police force in 1964. Afterward, their nomadic lifestyle appeared to pose a threat to the Kenyan government. As a result, Kenya introduced ‘villagization' to contain and restrain the nomadic lifestyle and cross-border movements.

of them. The estimated death toll was 3000 while others speculate it to be 1000, or 500. State violence in North Eastern was due to the people refusing to disarm.

Hannah Whittaker, “Legacies of Empire: State Violence and Collective Punishment in Kenya’s North Eastern Province, 1963-to Present,” argues that state violence on people in Kenya is a continuity of colonial legacies by the post-colonial ruling elite to use ‘collective punishment' to control the population. Arguably, violence was utilized by the colonialists to manage those it deemed to be challenging its rule. The government justified the use of force because of the historical perceptions of lack of patriotism by the North Eastern residents. A similar tactic was used by the colonial regime in the 1950s to control the Mau Mau rebellion. Furthermore, on the eve of Kenya's independence, a British governor observed that the Somali tribesmen had a volatile character easily excitable to violence.

Abdirizak Arale Nunow in “Conflict over Environmental Resources among Pastoral Communities in the Horn of Africa,” looks the environment as a constituent of conflict in the arid and semi-arid areas. Such a geographic region is an asset for pastoral nomadism which requires movement and changes of the grazing areas to avoid over-exploitation of the environment. A bid to ‘sedentarize’ pastoralist is shown as insecurity to the pastoral livelihoods. Besides, he argues that pastoral nomadism involves an overlapping of borders and does not fit into an inelastic/frozen border situation. Therefore, negotiation or property rights and co-existence are vital in the pastoral lifestyle.

John Ringquist, “Bandits or Patriots: The Kenyan Shifta war 1963-1968,” observes that since 1902, the British recognized the Somalis as different from the rest of the Kenyans. The Somalis were homogenous, Muslim, with a warrior culture and history in martial prowess. The
separateness of the Somalis led to the establishment of the NFD to act as a buffer zone between Ethiopia and the Italian Somaliland as well as protect the British economic endeavors in central province/white highlands. The NFD though a success initially, did not stop the nomadic nature of the Somalis and more so allegiance to clan elders despite the arbitrary boundaries created. The Somalis resisted to be governed by the dark-skinned Bantus and later asked the British to categorize them as ‘Asians’ for tax reasons. Ethnic superiority increased their dignity as they regarded non-Somalis as slaves. To end conflicts relocation plans of entire clans like that of the Gurre out of Wajir did not work. Also, Kenyan visa holders were required to have a special pass to visit NFD. NFD separation was to limit the Somali influence in the highlands.

Jacob McKnight and David Anderson., "Understanding Al-Shabaab: Clan, Islam, and Insurgency in Kenya," highlight divisions at the border observing that Al-Shabaab having been driven away from central Somalia by Ethiopia and later AMISOM relocated tactics to dividing the people at the borderlands. They target Christians and non-Muslims as a strategy, recruit young Muslims and radicalize them. The key becomes survival of the movement as opposed to winning a full-fledged war to govern Somalia. Recruitment occurs among Kenya’s disaffected Muslims. The authors’ points out that, in clan and Islam, theological differences are not a hindrance. The Al-Shabaab is flexible and adaptable to dynamics external to it. The use of the Jihad narrative and emphasis of the oppression of Muslims is meant to weaken the Somalis linkage to Kenya. The authors show the North Eastern population as victims and target of recruitment by terrorists.

Hannah Macharia., “The Role of the Youth in Peace and Conflicts in Kenya,” avers that the concept of the youth is multi-pronged. There are age-related youth, political youths, and role youths making the idea of youth a relationship between the status of ‘being’ and the duties
assigned. The youth in conflict emerge as victims, perpetrators, and peace promoters. Besides, they are society shapers. To decipher the place of the youth in (in)security requires a view of how their participation restructures the society.

Jan Bachman, “Governmentality and Counterterrorism: Appropriating International Security Projects in Kenya,” observes that governmentality and counterterrorism have securitized Muslims through subjectivities and political programs put in place to govern them. In essence, this has created divisions in Kenya with Muslims. The objection is on the government's counterterrorism measures target these population. The argument follows that the government concentrates on the ‘coherentness' of its program and fails to see the outcome of its practices. The articles main interest is on the Danish ‘Peace, Security and Development Programme,' which shows how local mobilization against controversial security practices in Kenya has influenced the Danish counterterrorism agenda.

Howell Jude and Lind Jeremy, Counter-Terrorism, Aid and Civil Society: Before and After the War on Terror, posit that following the 9/11 terrorist attack in the US, weak and failed states and more especially ungoverned spaces became securitized. Development became part and parcel of security. Based on the weak and failed state notion, Somalia is a harbor for terrorism that causes problems to the neighboring and far-off states. In essence, border communities are security loopholes necessitating constant watch and or use of force by states. Through procuring development aid, this follows the assumption that, poverty breeds terrorism.

Camilla Orjuela, “Corruption and Identity Politics in Divided Societies,” examines corruption and how it can be used to exacerbate both current and past grievances. Corruption brings forth issues of exclusion and divides a society creating potential gaps for future violence. Corruption
diminishes service delivery or provides poor service delivery, increases inequality and powerlessness. In the long run, it brings forth disillusionment in politics, democracy, and societal relations. Identity politics is used to show how ethnic, national and religious identities become instruments of politics that creates conflicts. The result creates mistrust and grievances that form a base for mobilizing identities that feeds corruption. Besides, when it comes to corruption and anti-corruption, politics of identity come to play. Identity politics create gaps in security matters regarding the state.

Mohamed A. Eno and Abdi M. Kusow. “Racial and Caste Prejudice in Somalia.” The authors explain the division in Somalia along identities. The differences in the Somali society is divided into two categories which include the idea of ‘Somaliness’ and the outsider. Bantu Somalis are outsiders because of the African genetic roots. Second is the outcasts which consist of the Yibir, Tumaal, and Gabooye. The Somali myth of origins explains the outcasts as those who originated from an unholy ancestor. Based on these divisions, both the Bantu and the outcast group are inferior within the Somali society. It follows that intermarriage and social interactions with these groups are improper.

Mohamed A. Eno. *The Bantu-Jareer Somalis: Unearthing Apartheid in the Horn of Africa*, looks at the Somali people racial prejudice against the Bantu Somalis whom they refer to as Jareer meaning hard hair, denoting pejorative African origin. The distinction in the Bantu identity is despite commonality with the Somali people in language and religion. The author explains that not all Bantu Somalis in Somalia are an outcome of slavery because some were already residing along the Juba and Shebelle Rivers before colonialism. The book tells that the universal Somali culture carries ambiguities entrenched in the ‘Somaliness.’
Dereje Feyissa and Markus Virgil Hoehne, "Borders and Borderlands as Resources in the Horn of Africa," in Dereje Feyissa and Markus Virgil Hoehne, editors, *State Borders and Borderlands as Resources: An Analytical Framework*, focuses on the optimist view of border resourcefulness. They challenge the irrelevance of borders as fronted by globalization theory and also the colonial border theory which posits them as sources of conflict and view borders as resources that can advance community lives. The emphasis is on human agency and how it affects the border and not vice versa. The author uses various case studies in the Horn to show that borders and borderlands whether imposed by the state or are arbitrary, offer opportunities for the inhabitants.

Ken Menkhaus in “the rise of a mediated state in northern Kenya: the Wajir story and its implications for state building,” explains how a group of Local Somalis brought insecurity under control at the border region especially following the collapse of Somalia government in 1991 and the refugees’ inflow at the border zone. Mediated state shows local non-state actors worked with the government of Kenya to solve insecurity at the border. The partnership between the government and the community forms a basis for the study as the mediated state in conflict management.

David B. Kiplel, “Borders and National Security in the Horn of Africa: A Historical View” argues that colonial legacies have made border management impossible. The legacies are the cause of arbitral demarcation of states which ended up dividing a community into two designated states. The divisions rendered state capacity impractical in managing movement of illegal factions across the borders. Also, the porosity of borders makes it difficult to use state power in mitigating issues such as terrorism, cattle rustling, bandits, and smugglers.
Gilbert Khadiagala, “Boundaries in Eastern Africa” observes that boundaries in Eastern Africa are an outcome of a settlement between pre-colonial and post-colonial powers in order to create stability. The insecurities accompanying borders elsewhere in Africa are limited in East Africa where territorial settlements have naturalized these borders. However, despite the acceptance of state borders as rigid, there is flexible usage and permeability.

Wafula Okumu, “Resources and Border Disputes in Eastern Africa,” shows that the current status of borders in the region reflects the colonial powers interests concerning where they were drawn. The desire for natural resources such as the river Nile led to drawing borders that are not adequately defined. In other cases, they have poor management and governance which is made worse by the increasing population. The discovery of resources in borderlands has a potential for conflicts between states. He suggests a regional outfit to resolve border issues and ensure transboundary resource share to avert conflicts.

Vincent Bakpetu Thomson, *Conflicts in the Horn of Africa: The Kenya-Somalia border problem 1941-2014*, focuses on the Somalia flag star with its five points which represents the ‘greater Somalia.’ The Ethiopia Ogaden, French Somaliland the present day Djibouti, British Somaliland representing current Somaliland, Italian Somaliland engulfed in Somalia and Northern Frontier District, the present day North Eastern part of Kenya. The central thesis focuses on the unsteady relationship of Kenya and Somalia based on the desire to make North Eastern Kenya region of Somalia. The analysis indicates that the Kenya-Somalia border problems are intertwined with the Ethiopia-Somalia problems and cannot be delved in without interrogating the latter. Somalis irredentist desires caused the roots of Kenya-Somalia problem.
Beatrix Haselsberger, "Decoding Borders: Appreciating Border Impacts on Space and People," explores how borders have been used to refer to the physical delineation of two sovereign territories. The tendency is to look at them as geopolitical entities. She observes borders as a multifaceted phenomenon that goes beyond the physicality because they cover cultural social and economic aspects. They either confirm differences or disrupt those units thought to belong together. In so doing they define, classify, communicate and control geopolitical, sociocultural, economic and biophysical aspects, processes and power relations. The depiction is of the entirety of borders. The article shows that borders are not ‘perfect fits.’

Alexander Hoseason, “The Role of Borders as Sites and Progenitors of Conflict: A Critical Analysis,” views borders as instigators of conflicts. They provide the fundamental divide that separates entities hence designates the opposing forces. Observably, borders are necessary for signifying the division of identity that conflict requires, however, their existence does not eliminate cooperation. Collaboration requires an intersubjective understanding and practice of opposing views. Conflict results when a violation of intersubjective understanding occurs, not necessarily contravention of borders. Accordingly, globalization works towards relocating borders not undermining them. The thesis uses securitization theory where a referent object is a threat which requires the necessary action to revise it.

Brendon John Cannon, in “Terrorists, Geopolitics and Kenya’s Proposed Border Wall with Somalia” uses comparative politics and international security theories to state that a border is as good as those it guards. The article avers that the border wall will not be useful to keep away terrorists due to corruption. Also, the border wall is counter-productive as it will separate clans that have co-existed over the decades. Besides the border is said to be an expensive venture.
The article takes the apparent reasons given for building the border but does not go beyond the obvious meaning of the border wall.

Sophia Balakian, "Money is Your Government: Refugees, Mobility and Unstable Document in Kenya’s Operation Usalama Watch," looks at money as a source of negotiating passage for ethnic Somali refugees. Money grants the refugees global citizenship creating a form of governmentality. Money ensures services regardless of the illegality involved. It pegs rights to capital instead of states. In substituting identity documents with money, the refugees can negotiate security apparatuses put in place by the Kenyan government. The study mainly focuses on the 2014 Usalama watch where ethnic Somalis without identity documents were rounded up by the government in Nairobi.

The literature reveals that the Kenya-Somalia border is a by-product of colonial legacies that predisposes it to conflicts. The ethnic Somalis at the border seem like a puzzle, not well understood and in some cases victims of government. In others, they are perpetrators of conflict and disjointed from the Kenyan state.

Cases of insecurities towards ethnic Somalis from the government and vice versa would infer. The literature leads to the idea of the border as an arbitrary separation of the two countries, Kenya and Somalia. It infers security and naturalness if ethnic Somalis were in one state.

Insecurities seem to have escalated from the 90s following the fall of Somalia government. The refugees intensify the situation through use of various means to either acquire identity papers in Kenya or perpetrate insecurities. The literature appears to point at the government for failing to secure the state or for committing inhuman acts against the border residents.
Overall, there is little information on how the border is understood. More so, none of the literature uses the psychological theories on borders. More so studies involving the ethnic Somalis view on the border, identity, and insecurity are outdated. There seem to be an assumption that all ethnic Somalis do not recognize the state border or want to be together as a unit. Time and events has bypassed the literature. Therefore, additional study capturing updated events on the border helped to explore how the border is understood, why and how it affects state practice, security, and identity.

1.6 Justification of the Study

Academic, Social and Political Justifications

The Kenya-Somalia border carries changing notions of the concept of border, identity, and insecurities. These include the problem of refugees, illegal immigrants, smuggling of goods and terrorist attacks. The rich historical literature provides an excellent foundation when looking at the pre-colonial and post-colonial border challenges. However, the understanding of the border in the contemporary remains a challenge that needs further exploring. The differences in the understanding of the border are especially so given the re-introduction of border walls in opposition to open spaces spearheaded by globalization.

The definition of identity has varying views. There are three main dimensions.\(^8\) The first is the identity as a citizen with legal status and papers to verify it. The Citizenship identity anchors

civil, political and social rights. The legal person is free to act according to the law and has the right to claim the law's protection. The second considers the identity of citizens as political agents, actively participating in a society's political institutions. The third refers to citizenship as membership in a political community that furnishes a distinct source of identity.

The third identity dimension is the least straightforward of the three. Authors include individual, collective, and social integration identities. It shows citizens' subjective sense of belonging/ the “psychological” dimension of citizenship\(^9\) unavoidably affects the strength of the political community's collective identity. Citizens with a strong sense of belonging to the same political community strengthen social cohesion. However, other factors can impede or encourage social integration, therefore, an important goal/problem\(^10\) that citizenship aims to achieve or resolve as opposed to one of its elements. The critical test for any conception of identity and citizenship is whether or not it contributes to social integration. This is a source of conflict in cross-border regions in the Horn of Africa. The Kenya-Somalia border insecurities are linked to the questioning of citizenship identity of migrants from Somalia among other causes. Somali people from Somalia are at times associated with the illegal acquisition of Kenyan identity cards through corruption. This subjects all Somalis to vigorous security scrutiny situations in a bid to sift illegal migrants. The scenario is not limited to Kenya/Somalia but additionally Kenya/Ethiopia and Somalia/Ethiopia borders.

The study provides more information on how to mitigate insecurities at the Kenya-Somalia border. Exploring the perception of borders and its effects on security and identity provides a

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further understanding of the associated security/insecurities from both the community and the state.

The study looks at how the border is perceived and how it affects the Somali community as border people and by extension the two states. The research shows the importance of social cohesion in enhancing border understanding and usage in manners which secure both the community and the state. The key is to enhance the narrative of identity to state security which is a positive focus.

1.7 Scope of Study

The study covers the period of 1963 to 2016. Kenya gained independence in 1963 and became accepted globally with the defined border mapping as a state under the United Nations. The Northern Frontier Districts became part and parcel of Kenya bringing to an end the discussion of whether or not it was going to be part of Somalia. The year 2016 is picked to capture literature and events on the subject matter for a comprehensive, holistic updated study.

1.8 Theoretical Framework

Introduction

Border studies use various theoretical frameworks. These include complex interdependence, Konrad Nicol Model of North America, realism, securitization, Michel Foucault Discourse analysis, constructivism and cognitive psychological approach. The study used the last three because they are most suitable owing to their sensitivity/close linkage to the context of the research concerning norms and identity and power as intersubjective.
1.8.1 Complex Interdependence Theory
Complex interdependence theory was first proposed by Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye in 1989. However, its underlying assumptions were developed in 1977 in their first edition work titled, *Power and Independence: World Politics in Transition*. The theory avers that countries at peace but with high levels of social and economic interactions are more willing to cooperate and reduce any military action to resolve peace. Countries deemed to experience this model have high level/degree of interaction between their societies. The Mexico-US and Canada-US border are a great example. Though there are indications that the US and Anglo-Canadian borders are similar, in a real sense they have substantial differences. The Americans and Canadians on both sides of the border are determined to form their own identities insisting on their differences. The Franco-Canadian side that is the Quebec region asserts it has its own identity too which keeps the boundary distinctive.

In the US-Mexican border, Mexicans are on both sides with binational and bicultural attributes because most of the nationals on the American side are of Mexican origin. In this case, border residents see themselves as part of the border with two coexisting identities. Cultural attributes such as music, language food are shared hence the emergence of ‘Spanglish' which is a combination of Spanish and English. The differences and similarities and high complex interdependence make the model tenable in the two cases.

1.8.2 The Konrad Nicol Model for North America
Emmanuel Brunet-Jailly in “Theorizing Borders” proposed the model first, but Victor Konrad and Heather Nicol advanced it later in *Beyond Walls: Re-Inventing the Canada-United States Borderlands*. It shows the fluidity and dynamic nature of the border. It displays transition of movements from one distinctive marker to the other. The model has five stages which follow
a specific path. These are, socially constructed and reconstructed identities, multiple levels of cross-border culture, and multiple levels of governmental policies, market forces and trade flows, finally cross-border political clout after which the process repeats itself. These components are arranged cyclically to point on the continuity. Violence is left out in the model in the argument that, drug cartels are active across the border with specific cities only. Also, there are laws of demand and supply at work thus interdependence between the two countries where drugs are concerned.

1.8.3 Realism

Aboubakr Tandia in “Borders and Borderlands Identities: A Comparative Perspective of Cross-border Governance in the Neighborhoods of Senegal, the Gambia and Guinea Bissau” uses a combination of realism and constructivism first proposed by Hans J. Morgenthau in Politics Among Nations, and Alexander Wendt's "Anarchy is What States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics," In the study the author shows that borderlands eventually produce their form of governmentality creating a new political space that brings forth diplomacy between states and non-state actors. Also, the study indicates that national borders are challenged continuously by cross-cutting social-cultural dynamics especially in Africa. The use of duo model is justified by the materiality of borderlands in matters such as trade and symbolism in political and cultural life. Identity logic falls in the universal sphere of political and cultural dynamics. Border and identity combine and reshapes the territory and or its appearance. The creation of a culture in the cross-border section is a resultant of local identity constructions and practices as opposed to formal intergovernmental cooperation.

Tandias’ used realism and constructivism theories to understand the complexity of borderlands. It shows that, though the boundary might seem diluted, the state has every claim to exercise its
power. The fact that the border is ‘silenced' does not mean it is non-existent. The justification of the state shows a constant operation of its laws irrespective of the character of the borderlands. The success in the governance of both states entails keeping their respective laws in operation without undermining the others’.

1.8.4 Securitization Theory
Alexander Hoseason "The Role of Borders as Sites and Progenitors of Conflict: A Critical Analysis" uses this theory in observing that, borders provide the fundamental divide which separates entities through designating opposing forces. Securitization theory was first proposed by Ole Wæver, Barry Buzan and Jaap de Wilde in Security: A New Framework for Analysis. It expands the security issue from military to cover other aspects such as social, economic, political and environmental. Political elites use ‘speech act' to qualify a security issue into a threat. Speech act is utterance by key political personnel that an issue is of urgent nature and requires extraordinary measures to secure a state. In border context, the assumption is that there are no difficulties in identifying the ‘divided' as separate. The population must then have a physical identity that is observable to eliminate security breaches by outsiders.

1.8.5 Michel Foucault’s Discourse Analysis
Michel Foucault proposed discourse analysis theory in his works Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1977–1978. Political science scholars have used it in studies such as, David Campbell, "Writing Security: The United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity." Richard Ashley “Living on Border Lines: Man, Poststructuralism and Wall,” and Thomas Nail in “The Crossroads of Power: Michel Foucault and the US/Mexico Border Wall." The latter argues that to make sense of the multiple and contradictory political strategies in operation at the US/Mexico border wall, an understanding of the coexistence and
The intertwinement of three distinct types of power at work is present. The sovereign exclusion of illegal life, the disciplinary detention of surveilled life, and the bio-political circulation of migratory life.

The model focuses on power relations in a society conveyed through language and practices as interpreted in the way language is spoken, thought of, discussed or represented. The model is flexible and therefore has no ‘correct' way of conducting it. The strength is in focus on language and additionally on power relations. It indicates how the social world expressed through language is shaped by power relations. Additionally, language helps to understand an individuals' view of the world categorized into personal, institutions, ideology and politics.

The model aims to question held truths which are considered socially constructed. It analyzes the way people understand their roles in the society.

**Assumptions of Foucault's Discourse Theory**

1. The existence of the world is inconceivable outside language and traditions of interpretations.

2. Discourse extends beyond the domain of the empirical. Ontological realities exist beyond expressed discourses. What language fails to express directly is equally important compared to direct articulations. The exclusion of some conversations from clear expression does not render them less real.

3. Theory and practice are intertwined.

Foucault's work is embedded in history where continuities and discontinuities of knowledge are informed by a pattern of thinking, in particular, a historical period. In his view, power and knowledge are linked inextricably. Knowledge production is dominated by those who wield
power at a particular time in history. Power used by state apparatus ensures discipline reigns over society as a whole.

1.8.6 Constructivism Theory

Alexander Wendt in *Social Theory of International Politics* proposed constructivism where material objective power as emphasized by realists is not enough to define the international system. In “Anarchy is what States make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics,” he placed a theoretical groundwork upon which he challenged neorealist and neo-liberals assumptions as devotion to crude method of materialism. Additionally, the core concepts of ‘power politics’ in the realists’ foundation are attributed to social constructions thus not given by nature. The constructions are not static/inert but capable of changing as a result of human practice given the dynamic nature of social reality.

In, *Social Theory of International Politics*, Wendt challenged the assumption that anarchy forces state to behave in specific ways creating self-help to defend their self-interests. Secondly, he viewed ‘state-level' explanation as a reductionist approach indicating that causal powers attributed to ‘structure' are as a result of the way in which the ‘structure is constructed' by social practice and not given by nature. In other words, structures do not lead to causal powers independent of processes that form them. Therefore, regardless of how realists and neo-realisists view anarchy, states behave towards each other based on formulated ‘inter-subjective' meaning.

Furthermore, constructivists propose the international system as not purely materialistic, identities play a significant role, and are drawn from cultures and norms of the actors. It tries
to place an understanding of how individual agencies construct borders, identities, and security which is the flip side of how structures construct agencies identities and norms. Constructivism seizes the middle ground between the positivists, subjective and intersubjective worlds showing how the interaction gives meaning to the constructed outcomes.  

**Assumptions of constructivism theory**

1. The norms delegate interests of the actors. This premise influence states to rely on the key individuals that carry out the decisions on behalf of states.
2. State sovereignty is not inert but subject to the existing normative prescriptions. These influence individuals’ decision making.
3. The actions executed by individuals are to a large extent driven by power defined regarding ideas, identity and constructed norms existing within the system.
4. Norms exist within the system as an accepted convergence. They guard against possibilities of divergence which may arise in the structure. The convergence of normative prescriptions gives power and relevance to individuals to carry out actions.

Constructivist theory enhances this study’s understanding of the identity proffered by the historical creation of states in the Horn of Africa that Somalia tried to bring all Somalis under one state which triggered conflicts such as the Ogaden war In Ethiopia and Shifta war in Kenya.  

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In addition, constructivism aids to examine national identities and how they affect the border. Historically, borders are depicted as not fixed/permanent. They change with the rise and fall of states. A state border is arbitrary despite the vitality in its existence. The question is therefore not why a border is drawn at one point and not the other, but how the social body constructs it. It is thus reasonable to indicate that, the people on either side of a border contribute to the role and location of the border by influencing the delineation process.  

States utilize borders as power structures necessary in their security. Borders must, therefore, provide meaning to the nation or else communicate insecurity. A state and its structure become responsive to the will of the people inhabiting it. The people indicate their will through the imagination of national identity. The defining of a people as a nation naturally captures those who belong and those who do not. The border becomes a physical tool that separates the "us" from "them" in any given land mass.

1.8.7 Cognitive Psychological Approach

The model attributes the works of Ulric Neisser's *Cognitive Psychology*, which shows that the working of the human mind is similar to computers. The proponent is of the view that a focus on human behavior without an understanding of the internal progressions that lead to it is a shortcoming. Therefore, human behavior is an outcome of a chain of provocations and responses through the thought process. Dereje Feyissa used the model in "The Cultural Construction of State Borders: The View from Gambella," where he looked at the Nuer and Anywaa perceptions of the Ethiopian-Sudan border. He concluded that whereas the Nuer hold

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flexible views, the Anywaa look at the border as fixed. Feyissa's study has similarities to the Kenya-Somalia border and informs the choice of the model.

The research utilizes Mitchel Foucault Discourse Analysis, Ulric Gustave Neisser Cognitive Psychology and Alexander Wendt Constructivism theories. The three theories are suitable due to the ability to situate identity and border and the impact on (in)security given the sensitive nature of the subject matter.

1.9 Methodology

Study design

The study utilized post-structuralism philosophy which holds that knowledge about people, their behaviors and output is different from that of non-human referent objects. A claimed discovery out there is not independent of the subjects in place.

The research uses both primary and secondary data. Primary data is from Mandera and Garissa Counties in NER. The choice of the two counties was because they hold various Somali clans which is representative of the stretch of the border concerning identity. Besides, Garissa is the most significant commercial border town in the whole of the Kenya-border. Diverse opinions from Garissa's cosmopolitan population enriched the data. Garissa has also undergone various insecurities such as illegal immigrants and terrorist attacks attributed to political linkages and association with the state of Somalia. Furthermore, Dadaab region in Garissa County is host to the largest refugee population from Somalia.
A qualitative method was chosen due to its sensitivity to the context and capacity to root everything in a time-based context whether historical, social or both. Triangulation ensured collated data from informal interviews, in-depth interviews, focus group discussions, observations, documentaries and personal experiences in the field in relation to the study phenomenon to overcome the bias that may result from using either/or of the approaches. Furthermore, triangulation facilitated in understanding and interpreting meanings attributed to occurrences and terminologies used by the people. Also, triangulation, encouraged interaction and aided in sifting through perceptions held in regards to identity, (in)security and the Kenya-Somalia border.

The qualitative methods were appropriate in the study of borders, insecurities, and identity because of its capacity to address the "what" and "how" questions. The goal was to understand how both Kenya, Somalia and the border communities understand the border. Furthermore, how the identities play out, shape, and get shaped by issues of (in)security.

**Target Population**

The study population included the communities in both Garissa and Mandera County. These were the youth, women, local elders, Chiefs, local government official, national government officials, pastoralists in the field, people in business, employees of international organizations such as African Development Solutions (ADESO), Fin Church Aid, AVIS, Danish Demining

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Group (DDG), civil society officials and religious leaders. The study also included the officers in charge of police departments in Garissa, Balambala, Dadaab, and Mandera.

**Samples and the Sampling Procedure**
Simple random and purposive sampling procedures were adopted. The method targeted all-inclusive categories of interviews and focus group discussions. Therefore religious leaders, county government officials, elders women youth were purposely selected to ensure the study met its objectives. In each category snowballing was employed where an elder or a religious leader would recommend another for interviews.

**1.9.1 Methods of Data Collection**
Data collected came from interviews and focus group discussions. Interview schedules were either pre-organized or snowballed. The research assistant(s) organized the focus group discussions beforehand. There were a total of two youth focus groups one in Garissa town and another in Hagadera market. Two pastoralist focus groups one in Garissa comprising ten people and another in Hagadera with six people. These were conducted at the animal markets respectively since they provided convenience to the participants after they had concluded their business of the day which was to sell animals. One piggyback/opportunistic men focus group occurred in Mandera at the Red Sea resort. A national government official identified a gathering of eight men from the county, and he requested them to provide their views. It was an opportune moment to gather data since it was after work and at the convenience of the group. The elder focus group in Mandera comprised of eight men but ended up with fourteen men due to uncontrolled circumstances since others heard of the meeting and wanted to participate. The elders' focus group ended up as an advantage because some were from Wajir County and provided diversity regarding clan representation. In focus groups, the study incorporated
diverse individuals regarding careers. The groups comprised of, retired teachers, chiefs, local elders, and parents. In case of pastoralists' focus group discussions, there were actual pastoralists, businesspeople who buy the animals, and elders. Women focus group was challenging and managed to get seven in a group. The women were mainly tea hawkers, animal feed sellers, and housewives.

Observations were a tool for data gathering from both local community and security officers. The choice to observe security officers was because questioning the police, CID or ATPU on security matters appeared as a futile attempt at reaching the depth of security issues. Instead, a choice to observe them in their natural work setting appeared more productive. The study compared the observations with information from the community and other materials such as documentaries, newspapers, journal articles and daily news to authenticate the findings. Furthermore, descriptive field experiences and narratives enriched knowledge which helped to address broader lessons and draw conclusions.

In looking at Garissa and Madera counties, the study was able to frame the context of the border, and identity studies were located in the historical phenomenon and current occurrences of insecurities at the border. The two Counties were, therefore, able to place a pragmatic inquiry investigating the contemporary phenomenon of insecurities within NER's real life and context. The decision to study the border and its' context was because the line between phenomenon and context are not visible but the use of multiple sources of evidence can bring it forth.\textsuperscript{16} The complex and dangerous nature of Kenya-Somalia border studies infers that circumstances on the ground change regularly. The use of this study methodology allowed for the identification,
observation, tracking, and analysis of these changes as well as opportunity to work with the various situations that present themselves. Furthermore, the complex, prolonged and transformative nature of Kenya-Somalia border insecurities allowed the use of multiple sources of information and evidence to boost the study.\textsuperscript{17}

A combination of observation interviews, focus group discussions, field experience, documentaries, journals books and unpublished material resulted in triangulation where combined methods were used to study the same phenomenon.\textsuperscript{18} This approach is also made by Patton to validate data.\textsuperscript{19} Campbell and Fiskel were the first to use triangulation method,\textsuperscript{20} and developed the idea of multiple operations. They argued that multiple method validates the process to ensure variance is as a result of the traits and not of the method. Therefore, the study tapped different phases of fieldwork, accounts, and participants before deriving the results.

Multiple methods enabled data collection of different kinds from different sources for the same study. It enhanced the research through comparison of solutions from different viewpoints to the same problem which qualified the validation of the chosen outcome as opposed to another. Furthermore, it provided an opportunity to monitor research findings. Triangulation reduced misplaced certainty through tackling the dangers to validity hence provided shared validation.

Also, triangulation allowed double checking of outcomes from multiple perspectives which enriched the understanding through enabling new and deeper dimensions that emerged.\textsuperscript{21}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{17} See appendix 8.2, figure 2: Triangulation/Methods used to validate data." Generated by the author.
\item \textsuperscript{19} Michael Quinn Patton. \textit{Qualitative Research, and Evaluation Methods}. (London: Sage publication, 1990), p. 187
\end{itemize}
Multiple methods however required inventiveness to collect and interpret data. Data collections happened through a thorough literature review of the study phenomenon and provision of a free, comfortable environment to the interviewees to avoid unnatural responses.

In primary data collection, the principal instruments of data collection used were: first, key interview guides administered to government officials that is the County officials in the regions and Non-Governmental organizations, and religious leaders. Second, focus group discussions, third, participant observation, the actual field experience in addition to archival data and documentaries on the Kenya-Somalia border. These methods are explained as follows:

1.9.1.1 Historiography/ Data from Archives

The study employed gathering historical records and data from archival newspapers, mainly from Macmillan library, Nairobi. The newspapers were from various print groups which include: Daily Nation, East African Standard, The Standard, and Kenya Times. The newspaper collections dated from pre-independence of African States. Newspapers facilitated the obtaining of information for both Kenya and Somalia within the time frame.

The second source was the Kenya National Archives and Documentation Services, Nairobi (KNA). The archives aided the parliamentary debate records, which helped to place the on goings between Kenya and Somalia concerning the fate of the Northern Frontier District (NFD) and the perceptions of the border held by the two countries. Besides, it helped to place the perceptions held by the Somali community then.

Besides, published and unpublished sources were used to amalgamate and synthesize the information gathered. These included journals, books, internet, articles, official government reports, and statistics. Other materials came from the United States International University
(USIU) and British Institute of East African Studies (BIEA) libraries. The documents were crucial for establishing the historical aspect of the Kenya-Somalia border. This included construction of a pattern of behavior and perceptions of the social structure of the Somali community and their settlement patterns. Also, colonial legacies and politics were provided primarily on the issue of identity and governance/management of the communities at the border. Macmillan library and Kenya National Archives were found to be most useful in providing these data.

1.9.1.2 Documentary Films

Documentaries films used were mainly from Kenya Television Network (KTN), Citizen Television, DigitalMinbar, Aljazeera, Nation Television Network (NTV), and Cable News Network (CNN) international News. The documentaries provided lived experiences of the NER people over time. Therefore, the study was able to achieve a wider audience from credible sources. In these documentaries, the study was able to capture interviews of Key sources such as the Governor, County commissioner, Border police, and residents of Mandera County where the documentaries looked at security at the Kenya-Somalia border. In another case, CNN journalist document a journey from Somalia to Garissa indicating real lived experiences of crossing the border. Last but not least is film documentation by Citizen TV capturing interviews with participants in the Shifta war. These were all analyzed and used to support and fill gaps in the research study.

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The use of film documentaries helped to re-awaken experiences in the field and compare the different styles of interaction, and data collected in the field. The lived experiences were reflected in the still moments making past events appear in an instant. This method was particularly helpful in reflecting across all data while filling the gaps. In addition, the study could not include some of the data captured due to the confidentiality agreement with the interviewees, but the findings were brought forth here since the films are in the public domain and can be revisited to authenticate the output.

1.9.1.3 Interviews

Categories of Interviewees

Data from interviewees required formal notifications; therefore, the first activity was to visit various government officers to meet Kenya government requirements upon reaching the field. The notifications included reporting to the ministry of education and the County Commissioner's office on the first day in each county before embarking on interviews and group discussions.

Interviewees included Key informants which comprised of county government officials starting with county commissioner's office and or deputy county commissioners in both counties. Officers in charge of the police departments in Garissa, Balambala, and Dadaab were also interviewed to place their perception on (in)security. The OCPD in Mandera was new in the area and was reserved, either way, it was possible to make observations during the informal talks. County officials in Mandera and Garissa were part of the data collected. Other interviewees included; local chiefs, teachers, a council of elders, religious leaders/Sheikhs,

business owners, and Non-Governmental organizations’ officials. Researchers from the region or previous researchers who have worked in the same research area formed part of the interviewees.

1.9.1.4 Informal Conversational Interview

The research began with informal, conversational interview approach. Informal, conversational interviews involved taking a tour both physical and verbal of the two counties of Mandera and Garissa while asking questions about places, historical occurrences and features deemed interesting all the while probing the views offered. In Garissa, Tana River Bridge, Modika/Chuma Mrefu checkpoint, livestock market, Dadaab and Hagadera markets were points of interest that generated conversations in areas of security, border, and identity. In Mandera visits at the Kenya-Ethiopia border/River Dawa and Kenya-Somalia border brought forth interactions that elicited varying views on the subject matter. Mandera's historical pieces in the form of two buses and a truck which were used by the former President Barre's entourage to flee Somalia provided data on the subject matter. The experiences of the people in these particular points seem to embrace the research interest while indicating daily occurrences and experiences of the residents. Conversational interviews took place in the form of chats where informants appeared unaware they were in an interview process through a constant reminder was made in addition to prior information and consent from the participants. Most of the questions asked emerged from the immediate context.

Informal, conversational interviews were useful for exploring identity and views on the border insecurity. The interviews were ‘ongoing’ which created participant observation during fieldwork. Informal set-ups formed a basis for gathering information on the context to any
emerging gaps. This method provided a conducive and relaxed atmosphere thus ease of flow in conversations touching sensitive matters of security and identity.

1.9.1.5 In-Depth Interviews

In-Depth Interviews took place mainly with key informants. These included: four sheikhs, two pastors, and Non-Governmental organization representatives, civil society heads in both Mandera and Garissa, Officers in charge of the police department in Garissa, Balambala, and Dadaab. County Commissioner/Deputy county commissioners, Head of Refugee affairs secretariat in Dadaab, County government officials in both Garissa and Mandera. Immigration heads in both Garissa and Mandera County.

The rationale for the in-depth interview was to place meaning and perceptions of the border, identity, and security. Information from in-depth interviews helped to compare with the information collected from the conversational interviews for credibility purpose. These interviews were mainly carried out in offices and eateries as deemed fit by the interviewees. The interviews occurred upon securing appointments and agreeing on location with the interviewees. The timing fell either during lunch hour or after office hours. A keen notice was taken to avoid running into prayer times to respect the Islamic faith.

In-depth interviews entailed prompting information with the aim of achieving a holistic understanding of the interviewee's point of view or situation. In some cases, they were good at exploring and investigating exciting areas which conversational interviews could not fulfill. The questions employed were open-ended, with occasional probing wherever necessary to obtain useful data.
The primary target was informants deemed knowledgeable and informed on the dynamics of the Kenya-Somalia border. These were the immigration officials in the two counties, county government officials, NGO directors/assistant, local community elders and past researchers on similar topics. The targeted informants helped to look at historical and contemporary views on the border, identity, and security. They further assisted in placing what the respondents saw as more critical concerning the subject matter, how the hierarchy was positioned and with what results.

Direct quotations of accounts and experiences were used for the final report to support viable observations. Efforts were made to attain a representative data, gender parity, and ethnic diversity was challenging due to the culture and the fact that northeastern is mainly populated with ethnic Somalis. However, age diversity was representative in the study, and religious affiliation even though there were more Muslims because of an Islamic majority region.

**Focus Group Discussions**

The study conducted a total of six focus group discussions. The groups were as follows; In Garissa, there were four in total. Focus groups comprised of, elders, (men pastoralists), women and two youth groups. Three focus group discussions were in Garissa town and the other in Hagadera shopping center. In Mandera, there were only two, Elders and Men. The youth and the women elicited concerns following heightened security measures in the region and the ongoing curfew which was in place. In Mandera the research focused on key informants, focus groups, and observations to avoid causing insecurities to the respondents and self.

Focus groups played a role in establishing the varying views expressed in interviews. It was also a place where categories emerged through the discussions raised by the respondents. In
security matters, issues such as corruption of both the local government and national security agents and fraudulent registration into refugee database emerged. The research paid keen attention to body language. The group members expressions such as; patting of each other's shoulders, touching each other’s beards and shaking hands affirmed what was said. Alternatively outright retreat into local (Somali) language where disagreement occurred was monitored.

Where discomfort emerged through what was expressed by a member, the research assistant played a role of reassurance mainly because in such cases local language was used. In cases of significant disagreement, the researcher asked the respondents whether to terminate the discussion. However, reassurances from a chief stated that "is the nature of Somalis when we are in a passionate discussion it can appear as if we are fighting but we are not, that is how we talk, don't worry"24 this was followed by others allaying fears, reaffirming their consent.

A keen observation was made during these discussions to capture body language following which the researcher requested a further discussion with identified individuals to interpret the message correctly. Notably, in all the focus group discussions, the youth and the female ones seemed to take time before opening up, however, with time the youth picked up and continued without hesitations. The female focus group took longer to start in Garissa because ‘a key' leader seems to have taken charge demanding the need to first ask her husband for consent before allowing the discussion. Luckily her husband was in the vicinity, and he seems not to have a problem with her participation. Therefore, keen attention ensured the self-appointed

'group leader' did not dominate to avoid creation of group effect. A 'group' effect could have distorted the outcome.25

The focus group discussions comprised of seven to ten members. However, in Dadaab youth group, there were thirteen participants while the elders' group in Mandera had fourteen members. The Mandera focus group increased in number as two more people joined in. Those who joined stated it was a desire to know ‘what others were discussing.26 Curiosity played a role given the heightened security measures in the County. All in all, it proved beneficial as provided more representatives of the County through the long years of experience by the chiefs and Elders/ retired teachers.

Focus group discussions embraced the initial question of ‘how the people think of borders, identity, and insecurity in the County. The answers led to the emergence of other codes which embraced the critical themes of "border, identity and (in)security." Further questions emerged as the discussion with occasional prompting and or probing questions from the researcher. The participants were allowed to carry on the discussions without interference even though the researcher occasionally joined in to ensure a continued relationship, ease of arguments and also clarification of ideas to avoid misinterpretations.

In the focus group discussions, the Mandera Elders group accepted the use of recording devices and photographs. The others politely turned down the idea giving various security reasons. In Garissa, there was a fear of government security agents in addition to explanations such as 'it is forbidden to take pictures in the Islamic religion.' However, apart from these reasons, own

observations indicated another angle where the gender aspect played a role with men feeling reluctant to take pictures.

Research notes-taking took place while the discussions went on. The researcher took notes except for the limited cases where required interpretation, the research assistant filled in. This captured information in its raw form to avoid losing valid contributions to the study. Where Somalis made short terms or phrases in local Somali language, an interpretation was sought from credible Somali authorities to translate the language either to its original spoken Somali form or its translated English version.

1.9.1.7 Participant Observations

Participant observations were carried out while undertaking or waiting to undertake other forms of data collection. These involved three types of observation. Descriptive, focused and selective.27 In the first instance, the goal was to understand the way things are done, and focused observation came concerning reactions to specific keywords and responses accompanied. The third is careful observation which mainly sought to understand the reactions, actions/inactions in security checks at border/checkpoints. For example, while at the Kenya-Ethiopia border, the strict nature of the border police in ensuring reasons for people wanting to cross over to Suftu town in Ethiopia was noticeable and this strictness lacked in Kenya-Somalia border where some ladies and children walked through the border point without any questions. Furthermore, students come to Mandera town to school and the residents and security agents have normalized it.

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Participant observation played a big role to reveal how vetting of individuals traveling from Somalia, Liboi, and Dadaab regions towards Garissa and Nairobi takes place. Nature and manner of security checks and the importance placed in these checks by residents of NER was noted. In summary, observing reality, hearing it and reading about it helped to amalgamate and synthesize information into holistic results. In cases where people were afraid to talk, observation played a critical role in data collection.

Participant observation was significant because it made it possible to live within the community while embedding self in the cultural practices which meant undergoing biases and favors similar to the community. Being part of the community was particularly eye-opening because of the way things drastically changed as a result of identifying with the border community. The privileges and biases went hand in hand with identity. At times, it meant alienation by those one identifies with. The joys of the ‘other’ after recognizing the identity through spoken accent and names became apparent. The physical mode of dress changed the identity in the outsider's eyes, and this went hand in hand with Security/insecurity to self. This approach to research helped in living the realities of identities and (in)securities in Kenya and Somalia. Participant observation thus helped to step into alienating situations and collect lived data. The downside of this mode of approach is the difficulty involved in replicating it in future.28

Overall, participant observation helped in understanding data that may not make meaning to a passive observer.29 It facilitated the grasp of read and collected data through corroborating it

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29 Ibid
with experience in the field. Furthermore, it acted as points of reference whenever new material was acquired either through the field or archival data. It played a role in more profound cognition and interpretation of film documentaries in the study area.

1.9.2 Data Analysis

Data analysis involved both pre-determined categories and inbuilt ones. In the first case, the research begun with the critical categories of the border, identity, and (in)security. These emerged from the objective of the study, and key variables to the study. These were used to guide the interviews from which other categories emerged from the discussions and conversations. The analysis thus took the following form.

![Figure 1: Data Analysis process](image)

**Identification and Location of data**

The study initially identified and located data that was deemed to address the research questions. The study left out unnecessary data to reduce the amount and irrelevance of information generated. The left out data was key to the provision of the needed corollary of qualitative research.
Second, the relevant information was put into categories to inform flow of information. Research questions followed a sequence meant to collect data to address specific objectives stipulated by the study. Therefore, the initial categories were pre-assigned in the research, and these included; border, Identity, and Insecurity. In addition to these, other sub-themes which emerged from the interviews, focus group discussions, archives were then organized under these key themes. Continuous identification of categories and grouping of the emerging information under the themes and sub-themes generated the holistic findings.

Third, the study searched for patterns in the data then linked the evidence that derived related information together. Patterns emerged from word/phrase frequencies. Repeated words/phrases became categories/themes. Also, recurrent information was linked to related categories, and lastly, a study was made of the information that appeared to conflict with the emerging pattern, processes and or accounts of events.

Finally, data were integrated where patterns were brought together to formulate the outcome. Notably, data that failed to fall in the identified model was also studied in a bid to understand the reason for its occurrence. In some instance, it informed the identified patterns through the intentional change of discourse by the respondents, and hence these were incorporated, but data that was outside the model as a result of poor understanding of the discussions and questions were left out.

The study built typologies under the categories of the border, Identity, and (in)security to achieve the pattern flow. Under border, the study looked at types of borders described/understood by the respondents from the field data. On the same note was the type of insecurities and identities that emerged.
1.9.3 Ethical Issues
Before embarking on the field research code of ethics was adopted. It included informed consent, participants' choice of anonymity or not, confidentiality where the sensitive material was disclosed, solicited access via pre-arranged appointments, privacy to the participants, and do no harm principle. The research involved a determination on whether to carry on an interview or terminate it through observation of participant(s) body language which conveyed comfort or distress. For example, a youth focus group in Dadaab was ended following an indicated fear and distress by the participants when it came to matters security and Al-Shabaab presence in the refugee camp. This particular focus group discussed issues of identity, the border comfortably but when security emerged, there was a silence and even real departure by some members which led to the termination of the discussion.

Research of the border in NER brings forth an emotive issue of the Shifta War which placed some Somalis on a distrust level with the Kenyan Governments. The trust issue kept coming up with respondents expressing fear of being investigated by undercover security agents. To allay the respondents' fears, the research assistant established a rapport with participants before the interviews and discussions. Provision of the research permit from the government proved the research was for academic purposes. Where necessary, a student identification card from the university was provided. Whereas this was not a problem in the field, on rare occasions, necessary steps were taken to ensure proper ethical practice.

The research permit and the identification papers helped where the respondents doubted the motive of the research. Also, the letters from the ministry of education and the County Commissioner's office confirmed the reason for the research in the chosen regions. The

documents made it easier for security agents to check back to the important offices in case of doubt and also to provide security where necessary through pre-arranged agreements. In both Counties, the research was well received. The community expressed gratitude for interest in their region especially Mandera where the respondents stated that it was scarce to see a person ‘risking’ their safety given the occurrences of insecurity in the region, to gain the views of the residents. The reactions from the residents implied a welcome, and it helped in ensuring the safety of the researcher through the reassurance especially from the elders/local chiefs on the same. Moreover, where respondents opted for anonymity, the study followed and implemented their wish.

Furthermore, prior visits were scheduled to obtain appointments from key respondents interviewees thus informed consent. Established appointments implied a contractual relationship between the researcher and the respondents. The created bond enabled future ethical sensitivities by the study.31

Informed consent played a significant role in establishing a relationship with the respondents. In all cases, the research gave the respondents a chance to raise their concerns following a step by step explanation of the researcher’s plan. In focus group discussions, an agreement enabled anyone to leave during the discussions if he or she so wished. The youth, in particular, felt comfortable after they realized they could leave at will. Notably, apart from the Dadaab youth focus group discussion, this did not occur.

The use of observation involved covert discovery of information. Ethical conduct was justified since the study did not harm those observed in any way. Besides, the method was used to describe events such that the reader would be able to decipher the meaning. The identity of those observed was kept confidential to avoid endangering them or their livelihood.

1.10 Contributions to the Study Area
The study focused on the physical border, language as well as constructed definitions/meanings of the border. It gave the Kenya-Somalia border a new angle of analysis through linkages to the perceptions of the border people. The research adds the ‘border landers’ and states’ view to the study of Kenya-Somalia border. Furthermore, the research synthesized historical occurrences with contemporary views to produce rich and updated findings.

The use of Michel Foucault discourse analysis in Kenya-Somalia border provides this area of study with a new angle of information. The interchangeability of power relations and how that occurs in daily lives, how it creates and eases tensions within the society, adds to literature making it interesting to read and understand terms taken for granted in everyday usage in the region. Language usage is a tool of power, it constructs norms and knowledge. Daily words and terminologies build meanings though taken for granted by users and those around them.

The study adds to academic literature and informs the leadership from the state to local leaders on the misfit not as existing due to arbitrary demarcation but as an embedded feature created within self and others which is reversible through reconstruction of the narratives. It outlines the established norms in NER which are defeatist in security issues.
The study of Kenya-Somalia border is enriched through the use of primary data from the field. Primary data usage in this study is not common given the perceptions of and actual insecurity and the nature of the Kenya-Somalia border and the region as a whole. The research moves away from studies that posit border insecurities as generative to looking at them in an ameliorative manner through clarifying how intersubjective understanding of the border by the actors makes the borders what they are.

1.11 Organization of Dissertation Chapters

The dissertation has a total of six chapters. Each chapter entails an introduction and a conclusion.

Chapter 1. Introduction. It provides a general overview of the research and the reasons for understanding the research. It gives the research; a historical background, statement of the problem, research questions, and objective of the study, research questions, literature review, justification of the research and, theoretical framework. Also, it provides a thorough methodology, data analysis, ethical issues, and expected contribution. The chapter establishes the basis for exploring and discussing the subsequent chapters.

Chapter 2. The Global Debates on the concepts of borders, insecurity, and identity. This chapter aims to locate these concepts from a global context. It gives a broader understanding of the concepts from different views providing all possible understandings and their conceptions. In part, it is due to the global usage of these concepts in the study of borders.

Chapter 3. The challenges of borders, insecurity, and identity in Africa. This chapter captures the unique characteristics of the subject matter from African angles. It provides the challenges in different regions of Africa and countries bearing in mind their unique identities and natures
of insecurities. It shows how over time African states have constructed interpreted what appears as borders, identity and (in)securities. The chapter traces all the possible roots of the challenges.

**Chapter 4.** Kenya's perspective on the Kenya-Somalia border, insecurity, and identity. The chapter goes back to pre-colonial times as it progresses with discussions on the views of the border from the Independence of Kenya. The section utilizes archival materials and documentaries as well as publications.

**Chapter 5.** The ethnic Somalis perspective on border, insecurity, and identity. This chapter analyzed field data as well as the available documentaries, and publications. It captures the perception of the border, identity and (in)security from the perspective of the borderland communities. It augments the view of the Kenya-Somalia border through filling gaps in the study as derived from people's views and interpretation to understand the similarities and or differences with the state's conception of the border, Identity and (in)security.

**Chapter 6.** Conclusion. The Chapter integrates all the issues and challenges arising from the previous chapters and interprets their meaning. It shows Kenya’s, Somalia’s and Somali border community views of the border identity and security based on the gathered data.
CHAPTER 2: THE GLOBAL DEBATES ON THE CONCEPTS OF BORDERS, INSECURITY, AND IDENTITY.

2.0 Introduction

Imagine the picture of these two colors: first, black and white with a clear departure of one color to another and second, black and white with various shades of grey in between. At a glance, the concept of borders appears as a clear-cut black and white picture. The border as a line that divides one legal jurisdiction from another. But closer scrutiny indicates silenced blurry grey areas in between, rendered ambiguous either by the way a border is understood, used, interpreted or demarcated. Grey-area borders are everyday phenomenon realities. Therefore, borders are multi-faceted. As a consequence, varying meanings emerge. Multi-definitions of borders are informed by the diversity of people's historical applications of the same to the state. Multiple application of the borders facilitates the ease with which each transition to its synonyms.
A border and its ‘synonyms' occur in varying forms. They are either collapsed to mean a strict line that separates or a blurred separation. Border synonyms include frontiers, borderline, boundaries, and borderlands. In debating borders, application of frontiers, borderlands, and boundaries at times appear to mean the same thing. In reality, these concepts are different with usage in delimitation as a shared aspect. A border is the outer limit of a territory. It may, therefore, comprise a frontier, a borderland, and boundaries within it. A boundary can be used to mean a border as it indicates a line between separate entities.

Global debates on borders revolve around the question of whether borders should entail geography or be social-cultural in a bid to naturalize or seek acceptable permanency in opposition to arbitrariness. Geographic borders legally map out a territory. A state's mapped out region acquires integrity to carry out affairs without external interference. It anchors territorial integrity norm. Such a border is rendered inviolable and inelastic. On the contrary, social-cultural borders are in the norms of a people. The practices, myths of origin, and symbols that unify a group curve out a border. Social-cultural boundaries are ambiguous with no clear-cut line of separation. The question becomes whether to base borders on geographic or social-cultural characteristics.

Geographic borders on maps confer a notion of arbitrariness. The counter idea is cultural which risks the assumption of naturalness/permanency. Either way, borders bestow territorial identities to those enclosed. It brings yet another question on whether identities are territorial or social-cultural?
Social-cultural norms construct an identity. A people are linked together by myths of origin shown by the way they worship, entertain, and raise their young ones. Such people may share a general geographic territory which ties it to social-cultural. A shared identity gives security to a group. Insecurity is locked out in the form of ‘other(s).’ Each identity constructs a border either as social-cultural, geographic or spatial. However, a people cannot permanently be defined by one identity. It informs the constant shifts in identity. Therefore, all borders and identities are arbitrary and complicated.

2.1 What is so Complex about the Understanding of Borders?

The complexity of borders appears in the understanding, definitions, and application. Whereas a border means a line that separates two legal jurisdictions like states, it is also used synonymously as a boundary, frontier, and borderlands. The interchangeability of these terms makes nonsense in grasping what a border is. While frontiers and borderlands denote width in a territory, the border and the boundary paint a picture of a strict line that divides. Furthermore, the border and boundary appear to mean one thing at face value. However, a boundary applies in any two different objects or subjects while a border in a strict sense is applicable where there is legal jurisdiction. Demarcation of states is one example where the Westphalian principle of 1648 introduced a notion of a border. The border, therefore, defines a states’ sovereign space. Another example of border usage is in private ownership of property. Here the concern was facilitated by modernization and development ideals. This thinly separates the term border from boundary to a certain degree and differentiates it from frontiers and borderlands.

A boundary is linear.\textsuperscript{34} Regarding juridical territorial space of a state, a boundary is the outer legal limit that separates states.\textsuperscript{35} It separates one unit at a time from another and lacks grey areas. A boundary works in the same way in social-cultural matters. For example, a boundary appears as religious, ethnic, political, lingual, and or legal belonging. A religious boundary separates members of one sect from another. The same follows with other categories. What appears to come forth is the boundary's ability to cut across natural geographic phenomena. Natural boundaries appear as geographic features such as rivers, oceans, mountains, and valleys. Geographic features, therefore, delimits one territory from the other. They introduce compass points such as North and South, East and West of an element. A boundary is likely to appear before a frontier.

A frontier means that found in front.\textsuperscript{36} The question becomes in front of what? The word \textit{front} in French refers to ‘forehead.’ Therefore, it is the front region of state territory. The ‘forehead' of a state denotes the region in contact with a neighboring state. In other cases, it is the ‘no-man's land linking two political entities. The idea of ‘no-mans' was a result of the rough nature of the terrain which made it difficult for settlement but perfect for combat. It was also applied where the territory of one state was known but adjoined to non-state land.

Traditionally, frontiers were used to ward off enemies of a state. Usually, a frontier is militarized with heightened security measures. The region was characterized by limited development and population as people would move out into heartlands in search of more

opportunities and access to social amenities and legal rights as a citizenry. Perhaps the movement was encouraged by the limited contact with the state.

Historically frontiers were identified by the names. These took the form of Marche or "Mark." Examples include Denmark and Mark Brandenburg, current day Brandenburg located in East-Germany which borders Western Poland region. Furthermore, the term frontier was part of the region's name such as the former Northern Frontier District in British East African Protectorate which bordered Somalia. A frontier faced the fate of either assimilation into the state region or let-go into the neighboring jurisdiction. Assimilation led to a change of name. The above examples converted to Brandenburg and North Eastern Province. Frontiers are often used synonymously with borderlands, but they differ.

A borderland is a region near the state border. It is known, the people and culture may or may not differ with the heartland. Frontiers are the unknown zone with limited to none exercise of state jurisdiction. Borderlands are familiar areas with equally similar terrain and population occupancy as the hinterland. Unlike frontiers, militarization is absent in borderlands. They are less feared compared to frontiers. Notably, all border terms infer the idea of delimitation, be it absolute or gradual. Grouping border terms to mean the border complicates the latter in two ways.

The first complication of borders relates to the definition and synonymous usage with frontiers, boundaries, and borderlands. It risks poor application and usage. For example, where borders are used synonymously as frontiers, people are likely to feel excluded, oppressed or ‘forgotten' by the state. Resentment arises which breeds insecurity. But what happens to a frontier when
it converts to a border? Is there an immediate change? The change from a frontier to a border is gradual which distorts the difference.

Secondly, borders carry the historical burden of blurriness. Border zones were regions least utilized by central governments. They were least known carrying the mystic and to a degree, fear. State mechanisms appeared least at the borders. Thin state presence applied to border synonyms thus frontiers and borderlands. Even where a border or boundary was visualized, it carried the gradual fade into the unknown ‘other’ jurisdiction or lack thereof. The blurriness reproduced the unclear nature of the border, not concerning demarcation as to where the line should be, but regarding usage, culture, and psychological.

2.1.1 What Borders? How do they emerge?

Given the above, borders are multifaceted occurrences. They occur in geopolitical, social-cultural, economic and ideological forms. Debates on borders are concerned with natural, social, economic and political aspects. Are borders places or spaces? ‘Place’ borders are located in the territory, rooted and fixed, but they continue in space, traverse fixity and nature which makes them spatial. It explains the centrality of borders in international and national disputes. These disputes are experienced in migration, trade, security and natural resources phenomena. The constant construction and re-construction of borders make several to appear in each as confines of territories and categories. Border making is part and parcel of human life. It creates identities.

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The relationship between borders and identity is an entangled mess. Think of a braid where each bunch of hair overlaps the other. Identities and borders are the same. Where the border is the focus underneath it is identity and vice versa. The relatedness of the border and identity manifests in discussions where each informs the construction of the other. Borders and identities are closely related. As identity groups' one category of people, it demarcates the territory, cultural practice, physiognomy, and ideology. Identity forms geographic and spatial borders. These borders create either physical or mental barriers.

Social-cultural identities concentrate on sub-state which may either be in sync with state identity or not. These categories inform the construction of borders based on a people's practices and norms. They traverse territories and create a map in the minds. Therefore, borders and identities are forms of constructions used in need of separating and or grouping people and categories.

A border is intentionally permeable. It allows specific flows while blocking others. Think of a border as ‘the door’\(^1\) metaphorically, it draws a picture of the ability to open and close at will. An open door denotes freedom while the opposite implies an intentional separation of people and places.\(^2\)

The open ‘door'/border encourages movements between the opened spaces and bridges them. ‘Bridging’ places and people do not erase differences. It only acknowledges and accepts the differences to co-exist. Separation of spaces and people occurs in human mind too. It is

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\(^2\) ibid
informed by what is seen, felt or lived. Consequently, to bridge or separate relies on the physical, social and psychological security manifested as borders.

Border debates focus on factors that inform separation or joined spaces and places. Natural features acquire the meaning of a border placed by humanity. A river is just a river unless humans designate it as a border. With acquired meaning, mental separation subsequently occurs constructing borders in units assumed separate. The unity or separation of places and spaces shadows the usefulness of an entity. In the end, geography serves to enforce constructed separation or union. The separation applies to various notions of border complexes.

2.1.2 Permanency or Arbitrariness of Borders

Borders are perpetually constructed and exist in active and inert forms. They are imaginings and re-imaginings of separateness or togetherness. The desire for freedom and security informs them. These desires are either in the physical, social, psychological or a combination of varieties of the same. In the end, borders and identities create mobility, access, a sense of belonging or lack thereof.

Paradoxically, borders meant to block, allow access, as an outcome of perceived security/insecurity of individuals, socio-political groups, and the international system. Borders and identities emerge in multiple ways which removes their permanency. The absence of

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border permanency renders them and identities arbitrary stops in the process of perpetual making.

### 2.1.3 Emergence and multiplication of Borders

Borders are variations of barriers through space.\(^{45}\) They create categories like continents, states, regional groups, nationalities and social groupings. They are a source of conflict or security to the enclosed masses. The multiple purposes of borders credit their capacity to evade threats or become sources of threats. They either enhance diplomatic relations or become barriers due to perceived insecurity. Security follows the elasticity and or inelasticity of borders.

Borders and the accompanying struggles of security are multifaceted. They carry interlinked messages, imaginings and memories, providing choices on what to remember to dis-remember. The selection of specific historical occurrences may silence others. Therefore, a border is made and remade through narration and rewriting of history based on the ‘choice' of memory. Border conceptualization intertwines images and forms. Ultimately, ideas, forms, images frame borders.\(^{46}\) Furthermore, the formations rely on the constructed history which gives colonialism a role.

In Africa, decolonization and independence formed the context of colonial borders. Different jurisdictions of colonial settlements mapped out borders. Colonial institutions defined state

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territories and established borders. These borders are present to date in international law.\(^ {47}\) State borders took the definition of inelastic lines that separate states.\(^ {48}\)

The borders constructed became faulted as arbitrary by succeeding African leaders. The risk is in the implication of the existence of permanent borders elsewhere. The permanency appeared as the creation of borders along ethnic settlements.\(^ {49}\) The ethnic settlement approves the existence of native/non-native\(^ {50}\) territories. But the question follows, were colonial boundaries constrained in the geographic mapping only? What about the social-psychological divisions? Psychological borders were constructed based on the physiognomy of the people. The training of people’s minds saw differences based on the physical manifestations of human features. The constructed differences created hierarchies placing importance on European features.\(^ {51}\) ‘African' physiognomy became disparaged. Not all Africans carried the perceived ‘African physiognomy.' The tendency was then to classify them further and bodily features became categories. The skin color remained silenced. Therefore, those with long pointed noses seemed ‘superior' to those with shorter rounded noses. Body features introduced body borders which became enshrined in the psyche of individuals and groups. Interestingly, body borders appear nowhere as constructed arbitrary borders which risks the assumption of permanency and appropriate.

\(^{47}\) Dereje Feyissa and Markus V. Hoehne, “Resourcing State Borders and Borderlands in the Horn of Africa” Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology, Working Papers, No. 107, 2008, p. 2


The psychological borders conquered the minds of the people, separated and ordered societies within and beyond the constructed state borders. Colonial borders manifested themselves as inelastic. They were challenged within due to the practice of social and psychological body borders. The social and psychological imaginings translated into categories. They caused contradictions and conflicts within territorial states and borderlands.

In the case of borderland communities, the primacy of state borders faced challenges. These communities utilized and applied state borders differently from the view of the state. There emerged the argument of the existences of stateless nations. Such nations appeared bounded by religion, culture, ethnicity, race and or language. Communities within and near state borders, either fitted in the opposing state or none. There materialized the problem of these communities' state allegiance. With it, appeared multiple overlying boundaries where each sought supremacy over the other. The most common boundaries were that of territory versus culture. The territory designated the communities' geographic space, but it seemed to fail where social-cultural identity was applied. The problem was global, from Europe, Americas, Asia, and Africa. For example, nationalistic states such as France and the United Kingdom huddle with the issue. The symbolism of the border as a unifying factor came under pressure.

It appears logical to associate border creation simultaneously with othering. Those who do not belong within a state become ‘other.’ The ‘other' according to the state is a threat which necessitates the closure of the ‘door.' However, border communities challenge the idea of state

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control of a border. The community appears to open the door perpetually in opposition to the state. A competition of country versus the social-cultural norms is set in motion which can either be worthy regarding trade and corporation or set a constant insecurity/security trend.

Apart from border communities, some migrants pose a danger to the state border notion. The migrants are the ‘others’ within the state. The migrant goes hand in hand with the notion of insecurity. The migrant forms the image of inferior ‘other' and enhances the "us." The border appears as a security phenomenon that protects the insiders from the outsiders.55

2.1.4 Imagining Borders

Borders were historically understood as earthbound. Natural geographic features bounded by different territories, separated regions, and their contents. Bodies like oceans, rivers, mountains, and valleys signified borders. The result was the emergence of continents namely; Europe, North America, South America, Africa, Australia, and Antarctica. These continents form large continuous landmasses separated by large water bodies.66 Subsequently, continents formed the basis of border units. Sub-divisions within these units emerged as continental east, west, north, and south. Further sub-divisions within led to the emergence of states. These sub-divisions informed yet more borders.

On the surface, Continents appear as mere landmasses, but each carries meaning.57 The mention of Europe, Africa, Australia, Asia and North America paints what appears as

55 Ibid
automatic imagery. The formation of these images took time through deliberate historical performances. Continental images came about in the name of ‘civilization' and development. As it were, continents were imagined by the Greek sailors’ perspective at the Aegean Sea. From the Sea, Europe was the land to the West, Asia to the east and to the South, Libya later known as Africa. Early Greeks imagined continents as more of physical units and less of political and cultural context. Therefore, the natural geographic separation of continents silenced social-cultural and psychological borders.

Where natural features are obscure territorial continents are separated by social-cultural characteristics within. Lack of natural features explains the division between Asia and Europe. Whereas the natural geography joins the two, they are separate continents. Components within a geographic territory, in this case, racial differences determines borders too. Within racial differences are rankings with constructed hierarchies of culture and customs.

Border making through cultural considerations defies the notion of fixed, inevitable lines. Cultures are held dear by groups of people. To protect a culture, it appears natural to form a border. Therefore borders emerge as cultural contents. The debate shifts from geographic to social-culturally reproduced experiences. Cultural borders generate different meanings, forms, content, and interpretations depending on the context. They are something/object or an idea.

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58 Lewis and Wigen. The Myth of Continents, P. 2
59 Ibid
60 Ibid, pp. 3-4
63 Ibid, p. 142
The ideas constitute imagined or real threat as ‘other.’ Objects separateness appears to follow natural instincts of setting aside the ‘normal’ from ‘abnormal.’ Othering becomes a common pursuit of social life.\(^{64}\)

Bordered spaces are constructed as differences to successfully ‘other.’ Since differences are not absolute, to silence and ignore some while elevating other(s) is necessary. Therefore, borders achieve order through silenced differences or elevated sameness. The insider and the outsider become embedded in people's minds who then materialize the differences/sameness through many imaginations. The outcomes of such creations are visible. Countries’ concentration on the insider and the neglect of the outsider results to significant consequences in social life. Unlike the outsider, the insider enjoys rights, access to social amenities, acceptance, and protection.

The process of bordering uses social-political constructions which over time become accepted as objective truths. Manifestations are adopted and lived to form norms. Socio-political constructions overlap in layers in the form of geographical, political, economic, social-cultural and psychological categories which perpetually demarcate, separate and unite units.

### 2.2 Categories of Borders

Border categories are either in the visible or invisible factors. Visible barriers produce thick borders while their counterparts indicate thin borders. A thick border relies on physical looks of objects in question. For example, geographic tangible land features like Oceans or human-

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made features like the former Berlin wall create impenetrable divisions. In humans, physical features involve the outward appearance of a person. Humans’ physical features emerge through genetic determinism which asserts that the occurrences in the natural, social and psychological are an outcome of previous events in natural laws. It follows that the strong thrive while the weak perish. This informed notions of race and social Darwinism rooted in the idea of the survival of the most influential race due to the capacity to organize the weaker ones. Racism appears as a natural outcome.

Thick borders may divide that which belong together. They occur where a constructed border divides a nation, similar cultures, and or ethnicity. Such manifestations arise where a border ignores relations on the physical territory. The border is made physically challenging to cross. The outcome is an emergence of political disputes creating security/insecurity threats. The examples here include the US-Mexico, the ‘Iron curtain' in the South and North Koreas. These type of borders separate state territories, and the powers exercised thereof.

Thin borders appear in ideas, where culture demarcates. The interaction between two entities is made easy. Borders in this category are permeable, more porous allowing movements back and forth. Thin borders are less likely to generate conflicts and more likely to be used for commerce and cross-border exchanges. Examples include state borders within European Union. The border between Kenya and Tanzania, South Africa and Lesotho, Botswana, and

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65 Haselsberger. "Decoding Borders: Appreciating Border Impacts on Space and People," p. 510
66 Ibid, pp. 505-526
67 Ibid, p. 510
Swaziland, Ethiopia and South-Sudan. These borders are open to particular types of flows, and they encourage interaction while recognizing the existence of state borders.

Thin borders seemingly adhere to ‘proper division'; they are in line with cultures, nationals, and ethnicities. It is easier to cross thin borders than thick ones. They are less controlled than thick ones due to an absence of identity confusions. The challenge presented in culturally generated borders is that some races and ethnicities are scattered all over geographic settings making it impossible to constitute a representative unit of the state. Examples include the Tuareg in the Sahel region who are present in Algeria, Libya, Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger. A border of a supposed Tuareg state is not feasible. Physical icons on territory construct a border.

2.2.1 Physical Borders

Geography.

Geographic features represent a physical presence perhaps divinely installed, ineradicable thus able to alleviate conflicts. Land features become borders where they separate political entities. They acquire a significant role in creating human societies. They define a border as a strict line on the sand. The polities then shape humanity through a unique way of life. Borders enact sites of differences which imply a norm in a general behavior of a people. Geographic borders are static. Land features such as oceans, rivers, and mountains become the basis of a

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70 Rankin, K. J., & Schofield, R. The troubled historiography of classical boundary terminology: Institute for British-Irish Studies, Geary Institute for the Social Sciences, University College Dublin & Institute of Governance, Centre for International Borders Research, Queen's University Belfast. 2004, p. 7

71 Chris Rumford. “Seeing Like a Border.” Political Geography. Volume 30, 2011, p. 68
border creation. The challenge is the likelihood of separating units which appear to belong together such as ethnicities, and races.

**Oceans, Rivers, Mountains and forests**

The view of borders as material manifestations attributes their creation to a natural occurrence of a barrier between two regions. During the First and Second World Wars, borders were created using such notions. Accumulation of resources and power informed the choice of inelasticity as demarcating factors. These made natural features a natural selection in bordering. Borders in the form of Oceans, Seas, and Rivers either aided growth or abated enemy intrusion.

Oceans separate formation of political entities and aid governance. States rarely span beyond them. In unique cases such as the United States, it is made possible by the possession of abundant resources. Developing countries cannot manage a geographic entity spanning beyond an Ocean.


Furthermore, Lakes constitute a basis of separation of state political entities, examples of these are Lake Victoria, separates Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda, Lake Tanganyika separates the Democratic Republic of Congo from Zambia on the West and Tanzania from Burundi on the eastern shore. Lake Nubia separates Egypt from Sudan, and Lake Malawi separates Malawi from Tanzania and Mozambique.

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Also forests such as the Amazon separate Brazil from Peru and Bolivia, Ecuador, Venezuela and Colombia and Guyana, Suriname and French Guyana. The common factor in border formation is the existence of a naturally occurring feature used to separate political entities.

Finally, borders manifest as physical barriers in a geographic area. The creation of watchtowers, customs officials, and patrol police posts fences and walls institute borders. This line of defense is in the building of gates. The question that emerges is whether this matters and how? Because people always find a way around such barriers. Entryways include the legal acquisition of documents to allow passage or illegal crossings to gain access to the restricted region. Borders, therefore, are accompanied by illicit flows.

### 2.2.2 Post-Modernism Conceptualization of Borders: Social-Cultural and Political Borders

In this category, borders are lines in space and not physical. Internal characteristics of territory are looked into to form borders. The contents construct a border. They are not symbolized by fixed features or lines, natural features can split and separate a social-cultural unit. Border classification surface as the human customs and traditions. The culture of a people constituting nationalities, language, and religion as a way of life is bounded.

Furthermore, borders are in the minds of the people. They are subjective without a true underlying nature, and reality. These borders are elastic because what is constructed by man

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can be reconstructed depending on the desired end. Social behavior demarcates since similar practices by one group informs their belonging together. Therefore the creation of borders takes the forms of nationalism, an identity that groups some while locking out the ‘other.'

Construction of border implies they are human-made.

2.2.2.1 State Borders

One of the markers of a state is the presence of a border which defines fixed territory. The geographic territory informs the state jurisdiction\(^76\) and are formed by natural geographic features or decisions by key individuals’ through drawing lines to map out a territory.\(^77\) In the latter, the borders materialize through pen and paper. As such, they rarely conform to the internal make-up/characteristics of the enclosed population.\(^78\)

Borders drawn through pen and paper have straight lines on the map or latitude and longitudes giving them the term geometric borders. The bounded then define and construct a culture which is added to the existing ones. The enclosed populace then use a language or two within to form a collective identity to succeed in the creation of a common culture. The success of a collective identity depends on the willingness of the people and efforts by governments to unite the people. Various states emerged this way as by-products of colonialism in Africa, Asia and the Middle East.\(^79\) Straight-line borders are also found between Russia-USA, Canada and USA, Sweden and Finland, France and Switzerland.

2.2.2.2 Nationalism in Border formations


\(^{79}\) Ibid, pp.5 and 7.
Nationalism is a contested concept due to its association with a multiplicity of meanings. It can imply political movements by a group or sub-state actors, expansionist policies by states, irredentism, and secessionist movements by a group with a shared identity regarding historical origins, myths, symbols, language, and religion.

Nationalism in international relations is an essential part of the global system. Initial states appeared to follow nationalism in border creations. They reflected the internal make-up of enclosed populations. The considerations were on the groups’ historical myths, their language, religious practices and day to day practices which determined a group's unique common identity. A common national identity created a status for a group which led to the desire for sovereignty. Claims to statehood based on nationalism did not always lead to perfect fits where a nation became a state. The absence of ‘perfect fits' led to multination states. These were amalgamations of different nationalities/ethnicities in one country. Nation boundaries are within state borders. Boundaries were not only located at the edge of the nation-state territories but also within and everywhere beyond these territories. As a result, state borders were laden with meanings derived from the people themselves.

Nationalism contradicts the state ideal. Nationalism challenges the existence of a state's fixed geographic territory borders. The contradiction emerges where nationalism seeks recognition as an independent body yet it is enclosed in a defined territory of a country. Such cases demand to grant self-determination to the nation within. Where this occurs, a border is drawn based on

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80 Michael Huysseune. “Nationalism and Identity Politics in International Relations.” *International Relations*. Volume 1, 2016, p. 2
the distinctive and unique identity constructed by the seceding group. A case in point is the breaking away of South Sudan from Sudan in 2011. The former claimed cultural differences being a black traditionalist and or Christian majority\textsuperscript{82} which was in opposition to Sudan, an Arab Muslim majority state. In this case, nationalism informed self-determination and was used to create new state borders.

Nationalism is used to seek economic development where a group feels marginalized. This questions identity and its implication in the international system. Over the years, nationalism surfaced in three phases. First was in the nineteenth century which led to the rise of Eastern European states after the First World War and the Versailles treaty of 1919.\textsuperscript{83} Second, was during decolonization period which birthed new states.\textsuperscript{84} The third was within post-colonial state borders where groups within sought independence\textsuperscript{85} such as the South Sudan case.

Nationalism in the third phase challenges the notion of statehood where a group within a state claims recognition rights. Such a group may have overt or covert support from a neighboring state. Nationalism claims occurred in Russia's ethnic groups outside the Federation, also the Somalis outside Somalia. In recognizing or seeking to understand a groups' unique characteristics, a creation of borders defines the differences based on the uniqueness of the groups irrespective of the geographic territory.

\textbf{2.2.2.3 Bordered by Levels of Development}


\textsuperscript{84} Ibid

\textsuperscript{85} Ibid
Levels of development create a border concept. Border thinking in developmental notion is similar to a social classification of a people. In regards to states, the basis is the developmental milestone. This is how Countries are either in the first World, second or third world categories. Development as a tool for bordering is a Western culture where classes of developed, developing and under-developed separate global regions. As such, after achieving independence, African and other non-Western countries began to connect modernization to security. Areas which were perceived left behind by central governments took issues with low to non-developmental milestones. Perceived neglect by central governments led to self-determination claims in search for sovereign status. Marginalization debates brought development bordering process from continental level to intra-state. The outcome was the production and reproduction of border thinking based on desires for better growth in the form of modernization.86

Modernization entails a western view of development. Borders emerge in the form of development. It was this view that generated the idea of the West versus the East.87 The Western knowledge got credited for its objectivity as opposed to the East ‘irrational’ attachment to values. This thinking places non-western ways of knowing in opposition to the Western thought.88 Since the latter implies developed, then non-western are the underdeveloped. Partitioning the world in this manner went beyond knowledge to cultures, languages, religion as the bordering process occurs within each.

86 Walter D. Mignolo, Local Histories/Global Designs: Coloniality, Subaltern Knowledges, and Border Thinking, p. xv-xviii
Borders as cultural differences emanated from differing languages, religion and general way of life. The outlook involved ‘transculturalization’,\(^{89}\) where looking beyond one culture was necessary. For example, the colonial involvement came with foreign languages, cultures, religion and at the same time the idea of physical appearance. It places those who appeared similar to the colonizers higher on the hierarchy.\(^{90}\) ‘Transculturalization' occurred since the colonized added colonial cultures to their own, concerning religion and languages. The colonized populations ended up with religions such as Christianity and languages varying from English, Spanish, French, and Portuguese in addition to indigenous cultures. Furthermore, ‘transculturalization' entailed a mixture of the biological and the cultures.\(^{91}\) The result was the formation of cultural boundaries within pre-existing ones. All these factors were used in the daily lives to border, order and ‘other’.\(^{92}\)

The borders marked by development and underdevelopment create traps with a constant search to reach the height of development and knowledge. In the end, Western ideals stay ahead and become reference points in bordering. Borders become cultural and manifest regarding economic and territorial development. Access in different territories requires accompanying paper borders.

2.2.2.4 Paper Borders

Paper borders accompany a person’s place of birth, represented by passports issued to an individual. Paper borders create a borderless world for some, a seamless continuity while they

\(^{89}\) Ibid
\(^{90}\) Said, Culture and Imperialism, pp. 15-19.
\(^{91}\) Ibid, p. 14
generate barriers, a disjointedness for others.\textsuperscript{93} Papers hold associated notions to individuals. Therefore, issuance of a visa carries several ideas. At its core is the idea of identity whether linked to territorial origins or cultural roots.\textsuperscript{94} Where a person’s territory of origin is acceptable, the border notion is rendered elastic.\textsuperscript{95} Where threats are perceived, it is made inelastic depicted by strict visa restrictions or complete denial. Paper borders lead to a collision of a person's origin ‘roots' and paths ‘routes' projecting a bordered body.

Besides, paper borders define a state nationally and designate outsiders. Where a minority exists in a country with its equivalent in adjoining state, such a people find themselves in the alien category despite being nationals of a state. A border, in this case, links identity to space. Space is bordered based on what a state defines its people as. It goes beyond being unnatural to inhuman.\textsuperscript{96} Border bonds power and its exercise to the country then it is transferred to the individuals and the papers they hold as identification. The freedom of movement is not even,\textsuperscript{97} some move with ease while others are forced into illegal and or dangerous movements.

2.3 Why Bother to Border?

Individuals, groups, and societies need borders to acquire a belief of being unique.\textsuperscript{98} Borders are markers of conversational processes. They serve political, social-cultural, economic and psychological purposes. They create divisions that enclose a territory and a people while excluding at the same time. Though the purposes change over time, borders remain physically

\textsuperscript{93} Nail. Theories of the Border, pp. 3-4.
\textsuperscript{94} Magyar-Haas, “Ambivalent Concepts of the Border: Political Borders, Bodily Boundaries.” p. 2
\textsuperscript{95} Ibid, pp.1-2
\textsuperscript{96} Ibid
\textsuperscript{98} Magyar-Haas, “Ambivalent Concepts of the Border: Political Borders, Bodily Boundaries.” P. 1
unchanged. The changes occur in the borders’ usefulness, benefits, and difficulties. In this manner, borders become living spaces as opposed to public areas. They enhance the quality of life viewed beyond state territory.

Also, borders are layered. State borders carry within intra-state ones. The latter’s identities become secondary to the former. Local interests and identities are required to create space for national ones. The process makes state interests a crucial part of local interest. Accepting national interest superiority has its power in safeguarding the local interests. A border is used to guard social and territorial boundaries against outsiders for the protection of the national and with it the local benefits. The idea helps the people to identify with the state as opposed to sub-state identities.

2.4 Identity

Identity emerges via various parameters which makes it fluid. Its advent is within two debates. The first, based on unchangeable characteristics, views identity as fixed. The prominence is the physical, observable attributes such as race, ethnicities and geographic territories. The second category refutes fixity of identity and argues that the physical characteristics and features acquire meaning through social constructions.

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100 Ibid.
102 Ibid 269
Whether based on the first or second category, identity is understood to mean similarity in a group or classification of a people, a political formation, ideology, physiognomy, and or a combination of these aspects.\textsuperscript{104} The process of forming identities involve constructing and reconstructing meanings to various objects and subjects to a point where both the constructed and the constructor acquire an intersubjective agreement through actions or acknowledgment of the meaning external and internal environment notwithstanding.

Identity as a term raises philosophical questions. It is in the persistence of bringing forth ‘self’ that begs recognition. Self-conception in an ‘identity’ entwines with the ‘good’.\textsuperscript{105} The desired identity, therefore, distances the person or group from the ‘bad.’ It positions one in a moral space, privilege, and preference defined as ‘good’.\textsuperscript{106} The notions of good correspond to varying ideas of self. The questions emerging are, what are the nature of self and the accompanying subjectivities? The answers to these questions are in the ability to locate self and the opposite.\textsuperscript{107} For example, when social groups claim marginalization, the affluent must exist within the same societies. Reason, imagination, sensibility, and reputation all play a role in asserting an identity. Therefore, self-identity is loaded with interpretations.

Interpretations of identity as good results in a desire to find similarities with it and vice versa. The ‘self’ becomes aware through projection in the eyes of an ‘other.’ The portrayal is an awareness that is inseparably intertwined and unable to have any concepts of ‘self’ unless experienced in an instant of identification with the other.\textsuperscript{108} To qualify identity of self as

\textsuperscript{106} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{107} Ibid
superior or inferior, beautiful or ugly, another view perceived to be potentially or different must be present. Therefore, the process of identification occurs through the perceived or held image by others.\textsuperscript{109} It can either be negative or positive depending on who the ‘other’ is and their stand in the society. It creates a constant strain as individuals strive\textsuperscript{110} to extricate themselves from such views or prove their capabilities/worth and or assert their individuality against the objectifying images held by others.\textsuperscript{111}

The desired identity informs something it wishes to highlight or distance itself from to form an identity against the oppositional other. An existing identity is demonized and profiled as ‘other.’ For example, in political situations, identities are constructed and asserted through the struggles against the adversarial other.\textsuperscript{112} A state is perceived as an entity of people compared to different state entities\textsuperscript{113} with different people. As a state assumes an identity, so do the people within.

Some identities are associated with the visible manifestations such as the color of skin, types of hair, shapes, and sizes of noses. Such identities in their capacities are not identities \textit{per se}; they acquire constructed socio-political meanings over time to serve particular purposes. These may include linking one's physical characteristics to the territory of origin. The constructs serve to empower and disempower the created identities for purposes of managing the territorial creations and the accompanying power boundaries. In objectifying identity such as stating there are no people without languages, names or cultures, a separation from the other occurs. The

\textsuperscript{113} Ibid, p. 20

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knowledge of self as it exists stems from a construction despite the attribution to a discovery. Therefore, how someone claims to be known can be unknown and known by another in a different form.\(^{114}\)

The idea of a binary in identities is a contested area. A view of ‘us/them,’ or the ‘other’, assumes the existence of mutually exclusive identities. Some notable differences highlight the identities. To separate identities, both initially inhabit a common ground which leads to a desire to separate. A shared character creates a natural competition between the two and leads to a desire for further differentiation through the ‘other.’ Identity becomes a continuum between sameness and difference. The difference is infinite making meaning to emerge at arbitrary stops.\(^{115}\)

Identities become fluid because the reason for the arbitrary stops changes continuously based on context.

### 2.4.1 Construction of Identities

Colonial domination in Africa, Middle East, Japan, China, India, Caribbean and parts of Latin America, share a common factor of having the non-Western identity.\(^{116}\) To these groups, their identity appears as the main reason for unjust treatment and control by the Western world.\(^{117}\)

The fluid nature of identities allows the elevation or suppression of different characters based on the context. A person of a particular ethnicity may oppose another from a different ethnic group. Similarly, both may share religion and oppose members of their ethnic groups. A people grouped with other identities demand an answer as to how, what, who, and the context within which each arises. Decolonization period re-defined cultures, economies, skills, and talents that

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\(^{115}\) Ibid, pp. 3-9

\(^{116}\) Ibid

\(^{117}\) Ibid
were initially undermined by colonization. It reconstructed identities through the amalgamation of the Non-Western with the Western. These identities acknowledged differences and sameness and led to groups banding together against the advancement of the Western world.\textsuperscript{118}

The transfer of sovereignty from colonial governments to indigenous leaders created new environments and cultures which confused identities. Where groups united against colonialism, the exit of the colonialists meant exposure of differences within. Post-colonial identities emerged while pre-colonial identities became revamped. Space contestation developed in these states where issues previously suppressed arose.\textsuperscript{119} Contested spaces birthed confusing identities. Despite protests, the creation of states added new forms of identification to those held previously by individuals/groups. The outcome was peoples’ grievances within the state with desires for unique identity recognition.

Paradoxically, the contested and the searched identity were part and parcel of the individual/groups’.\textsuperscript{120} To highlight an identity implied suppression of others within.\textsuperscript{121} In postcolonial times, changing environment influenced a fluidity of identities based on adopted policies. Some aspects of the past were used to point out differences. For example, with the characterization of racial disparities, the point of departure in races was derived from the colonial ideals. Yet all post-colonial cultures share a similarity in their portrayal via colonial lenses.\textsuperscript{122}

\textsuperscript{118} Said. Culture and Imperialism. P. 218
\textsuperscript{120} Ibid
\textsuperscript{121} Stuart Hall. “Cultural Identity and Diaspora.” P. 393
Besides, identity gained prominence in addressing issues of migration. It is central to ethnic makings as well as state power globally. Identity locates regime regulations and a coalition of states. It is used to set up frontiers and borders which determines acceptability. Furthermore, identity categorizes the wanted and unwanted as is the case in ‘war on terror’ where incompatible cultures are security threats. The identity of migrants, perceived as dependent, and insecure, add expenses to receiving states. They also carry the idea of injecting multiculturalism to designated state. Migrant cultures add to debates on identity where a fusion of different cultures might lead to the social breakdown.

A narrative of identity enhances a held position. People often look for information that reinforces what they wish to believe in. The case of the Luo’s of Kenya and the marginalization debate shows that, whereas this ethnic group was once elites, it portrays itself as victims of Kikuyu state capture. Given this interpretation of historical occurrences, the two ethnicities may identify themselves from physical body features while projecting notions of geographic bounders and resource share.

2.4.2 Ideology in Identity Formations

Ideology is interactive with conceptions of political identities. Capitalism and Communism grand ideologies of the twentieth century were bereft of ethnic, cultural, and national identities. States were forced to follow the East/West divide of the Cold War. For example, the USSR

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124 Ibid, p. 7
126 Ibid
sheltered all Russian ethnic groups. Upon its collapse, members of USSR found themselves under several states. Some were rendered minorities in the newly formed republics. Therefore, ideology constructed varying degrees of mixed identities. It symbolized power for political and social-cultural differences. African countries shifted their support from one bloc to another during the cold war. Such support tilted political, economic and social-cultural power. This revealed fluidity of ideological identities

The period of decolonization was within the Cold War time frame. The East versus the West identity transferred the divide to the decolonizing state entities. Ideology shaped perceptions, in social and political worldviews. The assumption of either a communist or capitalist ideology differentiated states based on the social-cultural affiliation. The differences came to an end with the end of the cold war which disintegrated communism.

The break-up of USSR subsequently formed eastern European states. East and West Germany reunited following the fall of the Berlin Wall. Germany was restored as one country as the East discarded communism. The fluidity of ideology continued to re-make identities which were accompanied by actual or imagined security/insecurity.

2.5 The Concept of Security

The concept of security is contested in social sciences. Various aspects of human support system utilize multi-angle approaches in security. These include state security which captures

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the military capabilities and human security which embraces the survival aspects such as the capacity to live without fear of poor environment, or lack of adequate food, shelter, and clothing. After the cold war, the human aspect of security took prominence. Human security brought the debate between objective reality and norms in embracing security. Should the emphasis be on state security or the individuals and the general humanities? The arguments in support of state security claim that it trickles down to an individual's security. The other counters with a case that individual security assumes a backseat when advancing state security. The view of the state versus human security questions whether the emphasis on either aspect addresses the same concept. It is possible that in advancing state security, human security is taken care of since state security implies human security. Perhaps those advocating state security are of the view that, laws are made for man and not the other way round. These mean that in securing a state, man is secure too. Where insecurity occurs, state security loses its potency. It implies consideration of security and insecurity can be objective or subjective.

Though there is no singular agreed concept of security, a definition of security infers lack of threats to acquired values\(^{131}\) which means both the state and human security. The definitions revolve around a traditional concept of state security. Security becomes a contested term\(^{132}\) due to the presence of ambiguity. Ideally, it comes down to how knowledge of security is attained, the focal points, and method(s) used. Ultimately, different approaches to security produce different ways of knowing, the known and techniques used. Therefore, security definition depends on the values sought after.\(^{133}\)

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\(^{133}\) Ibid
In finding the valued security, one can see the core of the debates since they indicate insecurity as a threat to the survival of the treasured values. The values can be individual, societal economic, political or military. It leads to a definition of security as an absence of threats to prized values. In general, security happens through state and societal angles.

State security uses power to achieve, avert or prevent threats. State power takes the form of its military, size, armies, weapons, money, and economic capabilities. The emphasis is on material physical aspects with the capacity to thwart threats. The threats are external, outside the state's borders and mostly from other countries.

Societal security uses social relations as shaped by its values and norms. Security involves interactions and discussions which shape perceptions and avert fears. It differs from state security as an absence of threats and fears informs it. Society is safe once both the state and humans security occur. Security is, therefore, the absence of threats emanating from individuals, groups, and arbitrary powers of the state where a people and their values reside.

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136 Ibid
Threats to humanity are either human-made or natural. Both insecurities result from the unfortunate use or abuse of the environment in addition to intentional damage to some people's values by others. Security ensues through curbing causal vulnerabilities such as Tsunami, hunger, and hurricanes.\(^{145}\) It also requires the protection of acquired values through individual's justice. Justice enhances human rights and freedoms of the person/groups. The individual/group thrives in the absence of threats which appear within and beyond state boundaries to achieve security.

Whereas state security emphasizes tangible values, human security understands it as relations, intangible values. Relationships between and among actors' are either positive or negative which reproduces either security or insecurity. The latter reflects the absence of or poor linkages between actors. Societal security occurs where power is exercised with others, not over them. It brings joint effort within the community. To achieve security necessitates asking the question whose security and for which values, the answers to these questions are shaped by who/what required security.

### 2.5.1 State’s, Individual’s or Groups’ Security?

Various actors such as individuals, groups, and states hold different security values.\(^ {146}\) The answer to what or whose security requires knowledge on what/who needs protection which locates the safeguarded object. The referent object develops the substance of security\(^ {147}\) which is applied in three ways in security debates. The first is state security whose primary focus is territorial integrity and sovereignty/self-government thus aversion of threats to these values.


\(^{147}\) Ibid
Emphasis on state security happened during the Cold War period where the accumulation of weaponry seemed like a solution to state threats.

The second is individual security through the emancipation of a people in practices of justice which equals security. The debate follows that, in seeking security, the ultimate goal is to ensure the safety of individuals within the state. Security is expanded from the state to humans. Security follows threat aversion like diseases, hunger,\textsuperscript{148} ethnic violence, and all practices that undermine human dignity.

Humans emphasize the construction of structures which aid access to goods and services for all in the society to avert threats.\textsuperscript{149} Security surfaces through the removal of hierarchies that discriminate identities, groups, women, and children. It broadens security definition to cover nations, groups, and individuals.\textsuperscript{150}

Security as rights to groups places value on their identities and seeks to protect shared values. Where each identity acquires freedoms and rights, humanity appears to blossom in a society. The referent objects thus vary from individuals to bureaucracies, states, regional groups, civilizations and the international system. These varieties could mean conflict amongst/between different groups. To avoid conflict attention is given to each group taking the context into account.

\textsuperscript{149} Ibid, p. 187.
The third is protection of issue areas such as the environment for human sustainability. Earth protection goes beyond looking at humanity thus the basis of human sustenance. In locating what sustains the human, protection of the ecosystem is given preference as the referent object. Environmental care defines security as averting natural phenomena threats like earthquakes floods and Tsunamis. In the end, security cuts across multiple themes of the state, societal and environmental. Each argument defines the referent object which defines threats and or means' of aversions.

2.5.2 State security

State security idea was prominent during the First, Second and Cold War period which engaged the use of force. Security concentrated on the military aspect while economic, psychological and cultural areas received little to no attention. It adopted the use of force as a priority. It embraced policies that governed the principals of war deterrence. Security was achieved through decreased or prevented threats. This notion stirred debates over time and received challenges as it appeared to focus on the state through the study of diplomacy and war.

Usually, the state held monopoly use of threat of force, insecurity emerged where that monopoly was unsure. The threat was either internal/external or both. State security appeared to evolve to mostly internal threats post-Cold War.

State security was and still is in the equality of all as no state is above another. However, if all states are equal, it then brings the problem of a chaotic world where none is the police or judge.  

The equality in States’ means none has the legitimacy or ultimate power to control the actions and behaviors of the others. The international system is a playfield for all states pursuing their interests. Those of the view that security occurs through the use of power take the chaotic nature of the international system as the focal point.

The notion of states power differentiates their capacity to ensure security. Small states with considerably low/weak power ‘bandwagon’ with strong. They join the aggressive and capable other to avoid the cost of engaging in war. For example, during the Cold War period, weak states attached themselves to the powerful ones with a critical mandate of enhancing their powers both within the country and the region.

The capacity of a state to enhance security relies on military power as an indicator of the might and safety wielded. Security definition becomes outward looking, implying, the enemy is outside the borders of the country.

Additionally, the importance placed on military power led to changing the view of security and the interpretation thereof. Building Nuclear power became pertinent to the states that saw it as a means of deterring threats. It facilitated changes in policies to weapons that deterred threats the most. This advanced nuclear weaponry build-up.

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158 Ibid.


160 Walt, "The Renaissance of Security Studies,” p.214
Furthermore, geographic size substantiated states power in the twentieth century from 1960 to about 1969. It was also part of the decolonization period in Africa in which states fought to expand their lands based on varying criteria’s such as ethnic composition while others insisted on going with colonial maps. Size appeared to enhance power with its capacity to secure the state.

Africans sought freedom through fighting to end colonialism, and they achieved independence. Though insecurity threats continued, they were characterized by internal agitations as opposed to external threats.\(^{161}\) State’s internal unrests increased at the end of the Cold War where insecurities between states reduced while those within multiplied.\(^{162}\) Insecurities within states ushered in the debate from a human insecurity angle.

### 2.5.3 Human Security

The end of the Cold war and the advent of globalization meant threats were beyond territorial space to the people.\(^{163}\) For example, terrorism, environmental threats, refugee flow, migration and disputes over resources surpassed state borders. It necessitated a revisit in the understanding of security to scrutinize threats for better solutions.

Security debate was enhanced concerning what/who should be secured and what the concept should entail regarding its application.\(^{164}\) It appeared that securing the state did not

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automatically lead to defending the human beings within. The ambiguity was in the conceptualization of the term security. To curb insecurities in totality required a conceptualization of security which included intra-state aspects.

### 2.5.4 Intra-State Wars

Intra-state wars were/are carried out by non-uniformed rebel groups, private security, and armed state militaries. They use movements/campaign to politicize and attain support from within and beyond state borders. The (in)security shifted from external to internal where those who seemed ‘debased’ agitated for their rights as a result of perceptions of real or imagined marginalization and exclusions from the state development goals. Identity politics fuel insecurity as opposed to ideological objectives.

Resource competition became a factor in the state, and it led to the creation and uprising of groups soliciting recognition by state mechanisms. The threats to the countries were and still are from disgruntled groups within the borders seeking to increase power through the use of force. Groups and key individuals became part of the actors in addition to the states.

The emergence of low resource states which replaced colonial powers had equally self-centered elites which encouraged groups’ agitation and use of force against the states. These types of conflicts lead to informal wars without a time frame which results to protracted insecurities.

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169 Ibid, pp. 80-81
A solution appears as the capacity of a state to provide basic needs equally to all political identities within.\textsuperscript{171}

In the Western states, the intra-state insecurities occurred in the sixteenth century and the twentieth century. The latter experienced internal clashes within the state. For example, in the United States, the John F. Kennedy assassination occurred on November 22, 1963.\textsuperscript{172} Later, the Black Panther agitated for freedom and rights of black people. Also, women fought for suffrage. Insecurities fashioned themselves as the systems deprivation of groups within the state.

In Africa, national movements fought for independence in the 60s. Groups which appeared weak within with a low potential to rule the independent states worked as spoilers. They prolonged possibilities of autonomy as a tactic to increase the opportunities of gaining chances to rule the would-be sovereign states.\textsuperscript{173} Domestic variables had a significant impact on (in)security of the states. Local groups engaged states in proxy wars, where other countries gave these groups support. Militia groups emerged especially where resource competition was concerned.

Domestic influences on security/insecurity reduced the importance of military power. Military power was no longer the key source of security, and neither were their threats the primary source of vulnerabilities.\textsuperscript{174} Security expanded to diplomacy, arms control and crisis

\textsuperscript{171} Ibid. p. 11
\textsuperscript{174} Walt, "The Renaissance of Security Studies," p. 213
management frequently referred to as statecraft.\textsuperscript{175} All these factors influence the chances and character of war.

Furthermore, the shift from state to individual and humankind indicated the dissatisfaction with the concentration on states' power and body as the referent object. A focus on the state led to the failure to predict and or sufficiently explain the end of the Cold War whose primary concern was the military power. Moreover, post-Cold War period characterized an increase in acts of terrorism which defied state power. Groups launched devastating attacks on powerful states as was the case on the invasion of the US on September 11, 2001. Security began to appear as the emancipation of individuals and/groups.

2.5.5 Security as Emancipation

Security as emancipation strived to enhance an individual's or a groups' freedom.\textsuperscript{176} Their security meant the person/group engaged in activities without coercion. Some of the ways this included the ability to carry out cultural expressions and performances. Any restrictions implied fear which caused insecurity. Fear of a group or individuals were within a state as opposed to the “enemy’s” presence outside the borders.\textsuperscript{177} The state was expected to provide security through freedoms to the people. States were a means through which security was channeled and not the solution to threats in themselves.\textsuperscript{178} State security-focused beyond the military hardware to the living environment.

\textsuperscript{175} Ibid, pp. 214-216
\textsuperscript{177} Booth. “Security and Emancipation.” P. 318
\textsuperscript{178} Williams. Security Studies, p. 93
In cases of states with diverse cultures, a groups’ cultural practices could infringe on another. Each groups’ perception of security as legitimate, means security is politically contested. Security to one group carried the possibility of insecurity to another. In the end, security is defined based on how best the key people can forge the agenda and the objects to be secured.

### 2.6 Conclusion

The concept of borders, security and identity come in many variations. The traditional notion of borders looks at them as strict lines that separate one state from another for purposes of exercising control over a finite territory. Other aspects are the political interpretation of borders. In the latter, borders illustrate identity, belonging and political attachments. There are also social borders which reflect groups and primary norms of particular societies.

Borders link the identities of the people. Despite the placement of a people in a geographic location of one state, they may identify with a neighboring country owing to their interpretation of their identity when projected against ‘other.’ The border moves from the idea of a geographic place to the space and bodies. ‘Body-borders’ is linked to a people's physical looks/identity, which spearheads ‘monoculturalism,’ and scatter a people's physical presence globally. In the end, state borders are externalized beyond the finite state to airports in other countries and internalized within itself through surveillance and identity papers. Body borders confuse the security of the state, groups, and individuals.

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180 Robinson, Narratives of the European Borders, p. 16.
State security emerges as an endeavor to protect the strict line and geographic region in the concept of sovereignty. It contradicts the people's desire to protect ‘body borders' where the two fail to connect. State borders become less important to those living along it in cases where the social-cultural identity of a people traverses it. In contrast, local notions of borders take prominence within the local region.

Where the state lacks a mechanism to control its physical border, movement of the people along and in and out of it does not necessarily mean freedom of movement. The permeability of the border does not eliminate differentiation in the treatment of people moving back and forth. It implies, one may move into the territory of another state but will not get the same treatment as those ‘legally identified' as belonging.

The rationality of borders is hinged on the historical and loose discourse progressions. These inform identities as humans search for space and belonging. It is distinguished as construction and maneuver of reality by humans whose ultimate goal is power play whether by accepting, rejecting, contesting or resisting. The goal is to refuse what one is not in either material form as in geographic designation or ideological which has a way of ultimately concretizing/materializing the initial constructions.

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CHAPTER 3: THE CHALLENGES OF BORDERS, INSECURITY, AND IDENTITY IN AFRICA

3.0 Introduction

Border notions exist in both visible and invisible forms throughout human society. Visible borders occur where the imagined blends with the ideal to create a cohesive society. Invisible borders show up and distinguish differences informed by the desire to separate self from others. They are attached to the idea of power, which rests with the majority's identity in a given place. Identity creates a hierarchy of importance, giving the dominant one power while the rest use minority status to demand rights. Borders are perpetual for they form and are formed by a successful identity.

The rationality of borders and identity creations is both historical and far-reaching. In naming continents, regions, states, nations, ethnicities, races, ideologies and religions, borders are created and re-created in the physical, political, psychological and social-cultural zones. Their persistence creates points of contention as each border carries with it a power to include and exclude. Borders inform power as a basis for competition over resources. They unite and dis-unite. They act as defenses and points of attack. With each border, a relation of power is constructed between two opponents and with it tensions. Borders construct and conceal reality in human actions, with power at the core to acceptance, rejection, toleration or contestation.¹

In Africa, borders remain ideologically contested as a creation of a Western definition of geography and power sharing among leaders. They indicate where one western identity stopped and another begun. Independence struggle sought both sovereignty and terrain-making. Africans would later inherit these borders and combine them with their social-cultural ones to form trans-cultured identities.

In pre-colonial Africa, different communities had contact/union points for trading and social purposes. Cross-boundary activities were naturalized on the basis that each person knew where they belonged. Visits across community boundaries were for specific reasons. Elders within the communities granted passage to ensure harmonious living. Cultures defined boundaries.

Post-colonial borders opened up spaces while closing others informing perceptions of freedom, diversity, and inclusivity all over the world. These borders enclosed oppositional duality of values in one state. They silenced people’s cultural ties and norms. They led to attempts to construct state norms, cultures, and identities. State borders curved identities within and the emblematic other of what a state did not represent. These borders disrupted the ‘others’ cultural ties and norms despite their linkages with those in the enclosed countries.

Efforts to globalize the world furthered the disruption. Globalization appeared to devalue state borders in what seemed as an endeavor to create a borderless world. It facilitated free mobility.

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movement of goods and some people. Nevertheless, state borders remained dear for integrity and security purposes. In doing so, African state borders continued to be problematic. They separated a people who believed they belonged together whether based on suppositions or the arbitrary characteristics. Some borders led to wars of self-determination, secession, proxy wars, militias, xenophobia, resource competition, ethnic cleansing with adverse forms being genocidal. The wars displaced populations who took refuge across international borders. These problems defied state borders, identities and security.

There was a debate among African states concerning the future of the inherited colonial borders. Two camps emerged at the founding of the then Organization of African Unity (OAU). The first championed retaining the borders as they were at independence while the second demanded the revision of the borders to fit the social-cultural ethnic context. One of the arguments in favor of keeping the status quo of the borders was, a change would lead to anarchy and potential conflicts in the continent. Anarchical signs were in the form of secessionist ambitions by states whose minorities were in the adjacent ones. The second camp championed for redrawing of borders to ensure communities with similar cultural, historical and ancestral ties remained in one state. For example, Edem Kodjo, OAU’s former Secretary General referred retaining borders inherited at independence as a sick heritage that needed curing.

The revision of colonial borders was rejected by the first camp which viewed it as a form of border expansionist ambitions by some states. For example, at the OAU meeting in 1963, the President of Mali, Modipo Keita, referred territorial claims as ‘black imperialism’ and argued that though colonial governments divided the people, they also provided avenues for the birth of new nations.11 Madagascar’s Philibert Tsiranana supported Mali’s view and added that no state was willing to be the victim while at the same time reversing the borders was bound to ‘bloat’ others and create demagogues.12 In 1964 the OAU favored keeping the colonial borders at the Cairo, Egypt Summit.13

Disagreements within and between state borders continued despite a broad consensus on the sanctity of borders. These were spearheaded by nationalistic struggles which sought freedom and independence through desires to break off and self-determine. The problem became complex where a nation within received support either overtly or covertly from the adjoining state(s).

Territorial and social-cultural notions of borders interplay in different sub-regions of Africa to produce insecurities. These vary from militias and rebel menace, wars, proxy wars, genocide, self-determination, secession, resource competition, and political instigations to terrorism. The magnitude of insecurities increases where racial/ethnic notions of border and identity combine with other factors.

11 Ibid, p.134
12 Ibid
3.1 Africa in Context: Territorial Integrity Vis A Vis Self-Determination.

The initiation of globalization tried to defy cultural and state borders with nationalism cast to the periphery. Despite it, nationalistic feelings remained deeply ingrained in communities. Their roots are in ancestral origins, psychological and religious affiliations. In Africa, these roots enhance cross-border attachments and in some cases, a desire to define identities through calls for self-determination. Such calls are in pursuit of international recognition viewed as an answer to repressive regimes.

The suppressed minority within states spearhead desires for self-determination which is traced in three distinct phases. According to Woodrow Wilson, the First World War served to stop suppression of minority nationalities from the dominance of Russians and Germans. It led to his 14 points during the League of Nations. The points inferred self-determination in matters of autonomy and protection of minority rights through equity. Self-determination appeared confined in Europe and not to other parts of the world. The second phase was in the 1945 UN Charter which refers to a principle in developing friendly relations among nations and ensuring equity among peoples. The principle is later indicated in the 1960 UN Declaration on Granting of independence to colonial people which stipulated self-determination for territorial regions occupied by colonial governments. It was specific to conceding independence to

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19 United Nations Charter Article 1(2) and Article 55.
colonized regions. Up to this point, self-determination never referred to a people's language, ethnicity or any other character within a community as a determining factor. The third phase occurred in the 1970s following decolonization of most African states. It referred to a combination of the first two phases, that is; rights according to a recognized group within a state and to attain independence.\(^{21}\) Henceforth, self-determination became popular with attachment to the last phase's definition where groups seeking a right to autonomy in a region defy territorial integrity of states.

Africans focused on self-determination through decolonization to achieve independence and overlooked the idea of self-determination of nations within state borders.\(^{22}\) Later, states found it problematic to control nations within as groups sought autonomy based on unique, racial, ethnic and social-cultural identities. Peace and security within states became elusive. Despite it, states held the sanctity of their borders while groups sought recognition through self-determination and in other cases secession. Self-determination meant either autonomy of their regions or a complete break from the ‘mother' state.

The principle of Territorial integrity specified that African states were to maintain the borders acquired at independence.\(^{23}\) The OAU accepted self-determination through decolonization only, and the position is in the 1964 Cairo Resolution.\(^{24}\) The view avoided changes in contested border areas to stop demands of the same by other groups in varying states. Secondly, it could lead to demands of the same by groups within a state's border. Last, the idea of ‘correcting

\(^{21}\) Olusola. “Sovereignty, Self-Determination and the Challenges of Nation Building in Contemporary Africa.” P. 292
\(^{22}\) Ibid, p. 290-291
arbitrarily' drawn borders could instigate nations demand for secessions all over the continent and breed anarchy. African states insisted on territorial integrity despite acknowledging the 'arbitrariness' of the borders.

In general, African states have mostly honored the July 1964 Cairo resolution [AHG/Res. 16 (1)] which states that borders attained at independence are inviolable. The legal implication is inelasticity of the state borders through either, effective occupation or existing boundaries through the use of force. The OAU narrow conception of self-determination meant decolonization but not groups within independent African states. The case of Eritrea and South Sudan was unprecedented. Respect of inviolability of borders translated into customary law, and was binding.

The principle of inviolability of borders was not unchallenged. It was in opposition to the principle of *Uti Possidentis* which legitimized the conversion of internal administrative boundaries into international borders hence statehood creation. *Uti Possidentis* a Latin term meaning ‘as you possess you continue to possess,’ implied that, when national liberation movements fought for independence, the whole which they acquired through war became theirs and remains so as a unit of state-sanctified by the Berlin Conference. The internal makeup of countries is subject to the acquiring power. The only way a warring group can change this is by acquiring a region through a treaty agreed upon in international law. Otherwise, seizure of any region without the support of law does not make a region legitimate to the group. The


legitimizing agent remains the UN and AU for African border issues, and both are against secession.

African states focused their concerns on the unitary outlook of the state entity which made giving autonomy to groups within a challenge since it would create multiple centers of power. The rights of minorities threaten to create diversity and differences while the state forges for unity and unitary culture within it. Therefore, self-determination within an independent state is a means to disintegrate and diversify a people hence a threat. However, how were these sovereign bodies formed to warrant such protection?

3.2 Creation of African States

The idea of state borders in Africa is a foreign concept. However, in Pre-colonial times, there were Kingdoms, cities, towns, villages, and clans with their mode of borders and influence. These mechanisms enabled Europeans explorers and ultimately, the colonizers to enter into complex agreements to manage their acquired territories. For example, in ancient Zimbabwe, the people were bound to a central authority, borders demarcated spheres of authority, laws and religious adherence. Similarly, the Buganda Kingdom had an organized system of governance which enabled colonial masters to enter into an agreement with its King.

Apart from Kingdoms, pre-colonial Africa had other political organizations in the form of empires, and chiefdoms. At independence, these organizations were replaced and silenced by

30 Olusola. “Sovereignty, Self-Determination and the Challenges of Nation Building in Contemporary Africa.” P. 292
states. The latter accepted inelastic borders which reduced cross-border interactions. Conflicts emerged due to disagreements on how and where the state borders occurred. Despite the negation of state borders and their accompanying political organizations in Africa, the first heads of state like Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, Julius Nyerere of Tanzania, Jomo Kenyatta of Kenya and Sekou Toure of Guinea continued to rule their independent African states under the colonial mode of political organization, the state.34

The states were full of border problems from the onset due to failure to relate cultural borders with state geographic borders or ‘the artificial borders.’ The latter included latitude and longitude lines which cut through a group(s) of people with similar identities such as cultural roots, religious affiliations and shared history while designating them to two or more states.35 The resulting state demarcations were partly attributed to economies of scale whereby, large states ensured dense population which was cost effective to manage as opposed to small sized states.36 Some states in Africa were large compared to the colonizers’ states.37 The size led to inclusion of different identities which required co-existence and management of differences.

The new state meant colonial state borders conflicted with national/ethnic patterns of settlement.38 Some communities with similar identities found themselves in different states. Although diverse ethnic groups existed in Africa long before the advent of the colonialism,
colonialists made the ethnic aware of their differences which were ranked hierarchically. The created inter-ethnic rivalry or hierarchies facilitated the divide and rule policy.

The division of African subjects went along ethnic/racial lines. For example, Arabs interacted with Blacks long before colonialism. They came up with the name Sudan which means black ones, but it was never a disparaging term.\(^{39}\) It meant the color black without any hidden meaning.\(^{40}\) Arabs inter-married with the Southerners. When colonialists arrived, blackness was constructed to mean inferior.\(^{41}\) Those who appeared to have somewhat similar features with Europeans were assumed better than their counterparts.

The Bantu and Nilotic identity was further from Europeans while Cushitic appeared somewhat better than the first two groups. The hierarchical creation of identities meant Bantus and Nilotes were looked down upon as inferior races or ethnicities. In rare cases, conflicts in the form of differential identities with human rights violations would later lead in redrawing of colonial boundaries or desires to do so. South-Sudan best indicates the example of national autonomy through self-determination and eventual secession.\(^{42}\)

Almost all states in Africa have components of ethnic and religious identity that traverse state borders.\(^{43}\) These groups are different from the core/majority ethnicities regarding their origins and myths. They differ from the conceptualized colonial state ideals within which they have


\(^{40}\) Ibid

\(^{41}\) Ibid, p. 75


\(^{43}\) Sabelo J. Ndlovu-Gatsheni and Brilliant Mhlanga. “Introduction: Borders, identities, the ‘northern problem’ and ethno-futures in postcolonial Africa.”, p. 15
found themselves. The peripheral groups mostly differ in ethnicity, religion and body borders/physical looks. They are located in underdeveloped border regions thus possess limited resources which bring forth the idea of marginalization. In some cases, the endowment of natural resources at the border regions compounds the border, identity and security situations of the state and the borderlands.

Arguably, apart from nations forming a state, various typologies of cohesion are a prerequisite to forming strong state borders. These may include an overlap of; religion, a socio-economic share of state resources, and functional administration. Secession movements may thus occur when there is a weak overlap between the administrative wings with the social-cultural one. African border challenges, whose powers are centralized fear secession and self-determination uprisings based on how Western Powers constructed Africa.

3.3 Meta-Narratives on Borders in Africa

The term Africa has more than seven origins, the majority of which emanated from a foreign conception. In the Roman era, the Greeks used the term ‘Africa’ to refer to Libya where the origin is from the Berber term Aourigha which means a larger unknown. If indeed it is from the Berber people then it is from within the continent. The Greek usage showed the abstract nature of the land to their south as at that time. Second, Africa is probably named after a fruit called Pharaka, in Phoenician. Third, it could be a root faraqa in the same language. Fourth, it

44 Ibid
46 Lewis and Wigen. The Myth of Continents, p. 2

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is thought to have originated from an inclination to weather hence, the Latin term *aprica* which means sunny. Alternatively, *aprike* could be the absence of cold in Latin and Greek consecutively. Fifth, it could be from Hindi word *apara* meaning root. Sixth, is the association with a chief from Yemen known as *Africus* who annexed and found a town called *Afrikyah* in North Africa in the second millennium B.C.E. Seventh, Africa is likely named after *Afer*, the grandson of Abraham. Finally, it could be the Phoenician's reference to Tunisia's productivity meaning "ears of corn" which the Arabs 'culturalized' into *Ifriqiya*.

The diverse probable origins of the name ‘Africa,’ most from outside the continent, implies two things. First is the dispossession of the continent's own and individual historical identities and second is the silent acquisition of new racialized identities, laden with negative meanings which defrauds a people of interpretation and production of their humanity. The outcome is the construction of inferiority through an ‘other’ geographic region, with equally inferior cultures/practices and norms compared to the Western cultures.

The origin of ‘Africa' as a name raises the problem of whether there is concrete, tangible meaning associated with it to designate an ‘African' identity. The latter shows a construction of a continent empty of a meaning, more about the explorer than the explored, the absence of an interpretation of cultures that can be owned by its people without opposing and conflicting

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49 Ibid, p. 69
51 Mazrui. The Re-invention of Africa, p. 69.
53 Zeleza, “The Inventions of African Identities and Languages, p.15
categorization. Despite it, people living within identify with Africa, with each passing day the ‘unreal becomes real’ through practice since there is a geographical location known as Africa irrespective of the meaning and origin of the name.

Having located Africa, discourse making led to the division of Africa into the North and Sub-Sahara. The North-South divide created a meta-frontier which led to grand narratives such as the one used to divide the world during the Cold War into East and West. Implicit within is the racialized notion and ranking of the identities.

Africa initially meant the northern region of the current continent as indicated in the origins of the term. It was used to name this region dating back to the Roman era termed by the Greek/Egyptian phrase "Libya" and later extended to the rest of the current continent. Africa designates the identity of the black race, given that the North is geographically closer to Europe and Asia with mainly Arabs. Re-naming of everything was, therefore, one of the ways that were used to colonize Africans mentally.

The racialized hierarchical rankings of the north and sub-Saharan is an identity constructed to place the ‘blacks’ at the bottom. The colonial period created an awareness of the differences and hierarchy between the Arabs and the black people. The colonialists used Arabs as middlemen in slave trading black people. Unfortunately, this misbehavior continues in Libya.

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56 Zeleza, The Inventions of African Identities and Languages, p.15
where blacks are enslaved to ‘masters' within. In this view, the differences between North and Sub-Saharan lies in the racial hierarchical construction that came about during colonialism.

Northern Africa people are physically identifiable as Arabs and Amazigh/Berbers.\(^{59}\) Besides, the North practices Islam either as Sunni or Shia. The Arabs are of brown skin, brown eyes with black curly hair. The Amazigh/Berber may have European features such as blond and red hair with green or blue eyes. The Arabs are mainly in Tunisia, Libya, Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, and Sudan. The Berbers are in Morocco, Algeria, Libya, Tunisia and Egypt mostly in the villages, and mountains, and are mainly Sunni Muslims.

The United Nations categorizes North Africa as comprising Tunisia, Libya, Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, Mauritania, and Sudan. The blacks are conspicuously absent hence the name captures ethnic and geographic characteristics hence the Southern region of the Sahara desert as Sub-Saharan Africa. A racial connotation implies countries ruled by blacks.

Apart from the North-South divide are the two European cities, Ceuta and Melilla, owned by Spain located on the Moroccan coast. They trace their Spanish roots to 15\(^{th}\)-century\(^{60}\) and were trade routes to Africa and Europe. The Fez Kingdom a Berber territory owned both cities. They later became Portuguese and Castile regions during the acquisitions of Maghreb territories in the Mediterranean.\(^{61}\) The battle of Ceuta led to the Portuguese capture of Ceuta in 1415. The

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\(^{60}\) Harris, Africans and Their History, p.19

King of Spain later took Portugal for 60 years during the Iberian Union. The union led to a Spanish influx in Ceuta to a point whereby in 1640 when the war broke between Spain and Portugal, the city decided to identify with Spain. Portugal ceded Ceuta to Spain 1668 in the treaty of Lisbon, and it became Spanish.

Whereas, the Castile Kingdom conquered Melilla which was mostly Spanish in 1497. Ceuta and Melilla became Spanish territories before the 1912 treaty signed between France and Morocco in which the latter became a protectorate of the former. The treaty lasted until 1956. Therefore, Morocco became a French protectorate from 1912 as opposed to the two cities which remained Spanish territories.

Ceuta and Melilla cities practice catholic religion and are Spanish speaking. Geographically, the cities are located in Africa and share the land border with Morocco where a 10-meter high barbed wire border fence separates the two territories. The fence was constructed to stop Africa's illegal immigrants from accessing European Union. The cities are adjacent to the Mediterranean defying a natural feature as a state border. They are the only land borders in Africa found in the European Union. They hoist the Spanish Flags and are a bone of contention between Morocco and Spain with the latter's claim of their ownership owing to the location.

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63 Ibid
65 Ibid, p. 304
68 Ferrer-Gallardo and Planet-Contreras. “Ceuta and Melilla,” pp.32-35
Ceuta and Melilla cities are the most guarded European borders due to perceived and actual insecurities.\textsuperscript{70} They have heavy surveillance cameras, border patrol police, and helicopters.\textsuperscript{71} The challenges to the cities range from illegal immigrants to smugglers trying to access Europe.\textsuperscript{72} The cities are geographically African, but contextually European and challenge the notion of a homogenous geographic African continent.

Morocco lays claims to these cities in the argument that they are in its geographic territory and therefore regions for decolonization and self-determination.\textsuperscript{73} Spain insists on ownership before its occupation of the northern strip territories of Morocco (with the exception of Tangiers which remained an international region) hence not a result of colonization. Identity in the form of geographic territory and the human cultural population is at loggerheads creating confusion in the right of ownership.

Further south of Morocco is yet another border termed the Sub-Sahara, a region located south of the Sahara desert. The region, constructed as ‘black Africa,’ indicates a body bordering process. The body-borders inclined to the Sub-Sahara meta-frontier is racialized and forms a bordering reminiscent of the colonial philosophy. The North/South divide comes down to physiological/bodily differences. The ‘blackness’ conveys silent meanings of backwardness/inferiority resonating with colonial discourse as indicated by respondents to a BBC question, “How African is North Africa?\textsuperscript{74} Culture is not a dividing factor but the amount

\textsuperscript{70} Ferrer-Gallardo and Planet-Contreras. “Ceuta and Melilla,” pp.32-35
of melanin in the inhabitants’ skin.\textsuperscript{75} One respondent observed that "When the West coined the phrase ‘sub-Saharan Africa’ to describe southern Africa, it conveniently conjured the image of Africans as sub-humans."\textsuperscript{76} Sub-Sahara was conveniently constructed to represent poverty and degradation which explains the desires of the northerners to distance themselves from an ‘African’ identity. The implication of such meta-borders is a loss of trade opportunities and cultural integration while promoting ‘imperialists’ and xenophobic tendencies.

3.4. Borders and Identity Challenges

Identity signifies the cultural practices and language of a people which denotes the life and habits of a people.\textsuperscript{77} Religion, language, and day-to-day practices create an identifiable group of people, thus a border or boundary. These forms of identities relate to what a people believe in and are passed on to the subsequent generations.\textsuperscript{78} The physical border which marks a state's identity becomes a concern owing to its juridical responsibility. The geographic border designates a states' sovereignty and authority. The border gives the state powers to use the laws of war and treaty obligation characteristically derived from the 1648 treaty of Westphalia which defined and introduced the notion of a nation-state.\textsuperscript{79}

African states contestation of borders is based on the ‘arbitrary’\textsuperscript{80} nature which ignored the internal make-up of the nations/ethnicities. It indicates the importance placed on identity


\textsuperscript{78} Munene. "Culture and Religion in Conflict Management, p. 27.


projected against state demarcations. The states’ delimitation confers the capacity to sanction exclusive and inclusive independent authority. The practice of sovereignty leads to conflicts within if deemed unfair by the citizens. African governments have a task to achieve fairness/equality of ethnicities within. Ethnicities are divisive, always suspicious of another especially in matters of resource and power distribution. The scars of colonialism often resurface in the culture, philosophy, and psychology of the colonized. The divisions affect state management of varying internal identities.

The interchange between states and ethnicities is rooted in colonial state borders. Upon independence, some groups within identified differently from the state and caused tensions between/among states. The threats became regional intra-state conflicts. Such conflicts begin in one state and later acquire an international character as they transcend state borders. One of the outcomes cross-borders refuge. Where refugees have similar identities with the host state, carry weapons and hide factions within them from a state of origin, governments are exposed to insecurities.

Cultural purity or homogeneous polity does not exist. Every exclusive identity-based polity produces an accompanying minority. There is no state with a ‘mutually exclusive identities’ or

82 Munene. “Culture and Religion in Conflict Management.” p. 27
85 Macharia Munene “State, Regional and International Responses to Militia and Rebel activities in Africa.” In Wafu Okumu and Augustine Iklege, editors, Human Insecurity and State Crisis in Africa: Militias, Rebels and Islamist Militants. (Pretoria: Institute of Security Studies, 2010), p. 421
86 Kaldor. ‘New and Old Wars,” p. 81
the possibility of creating a single identity state in Africa. Despite its supposed homogenous status experienced political disintegration following President Barres failure to capture the Ogaden region from Ethiopia. Warring factions emerged with Somaliland’s quest for independence, and others for autonomy. Arguments for Somalia’s homogenous status necessitates silencing other identities such as the Somali-Bantu, Somali-Arabs and Oromo’s within Somalia making it a state with diverse nationalities like any other in Africa. Looking below the Somali nation reveals chaos as a result of different groups declaring different central government-affiliated to one identity or another.

Post-colonial African states have multiple identities based on nationalities that cut across borders. Some citizens claim they are marginalized or oppressed in these countries which pose constant security dangers. Split nations in border regions face the task of identifying with their state policies despite the differences in cultural practices. The ‘Sudans,’ faced the identity challenge where post-colonial Arabization policies divided the Arabs and blacks. The blacks’ adherence to Christianity and African traditional religious practices led to the secession of the South from Sudan. Whereas Sudan was desperate to identify with Arabism, in the Arab world they are viewed as hybridized, less Arabic race. South Sudan, a black populace felt marginalized and isolated from the Norths’ policies and the Arab World.

91 Ibid.
3.4.1 Conflict and Poverty in Border Communities

Post-colonial African leadership mostly embraced a centralized system of government. Within these states, some regions appeared peripheral and lacked infrastructure and essential social amenities. These were large semi-arid areas where state usage was through nomadic communities. These communities crisscrossed state borders and continued to disregard these borders. For others, state borders provide opportunity and places to hide after engaging in criminal activities like cattle rustling, terrorism, ethnic conflicts and smuggling goods.

3.4.2 Border Porosity and Security Threats

The ease with which people and goods move across state borders make them appear porous. Border porosity is a phrase used to imply lack of and/ or limited state capacity to secure/monitor states' borders. The reverse of porosity implies that a state is sustainable when the right mechanisms are in place and with the capacity to control the whole of its borders. The vast nature of African states challenges border-management whereby vast sizes limit the spread of resources. Therefore, lack of sufficient power to exclude and include renders states vulnerable to powers operating within and outside its bounds. Failure to regulate who and what crosses state borders leads to failure to manage what happens within, hence insecurity.

Borders with a shared community identity elicit debates in two phases. The first phase was in the immediate post-colonial period with secessionist movements. The second phase came after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attack in the US which utilized zones of ‘safety' to infiltrate

America. Both have linkages with ideology, poverty, identity and real or imagined marginalization of minority groups.

Marginalization challenge led to calls for the democratization of African states as competition over resources intensified in the post-cold War era. As minority groups straddled two or more states, it made it difficult to compete for recognition in governance positions. Since numbers aid democracy, minority groups sought to enhance their powers through desires to join their kin in neighboring states. Secessionist ambitions threatened ruling governments leading to a constant lookout for these groups that seemed unpatriotic, at geographic peripheries.

Equally, populations with a collective identity in adjacent states contributed to border porosity as shared kin made it difficult to include and exclude at the same time. The border landers ‘kin' often crisscross the border legally or illegally. The interdependencies of the border communities threaten states’ power of control on who comes in and goes out. In some cases, the numbers of the community increase sharply without the twin reflection in the increase in legal status. These challenges occur in different forms in various regions in Africa.

3.5 Regional Dimensions

Regional dimensions involve conflict clusters where states engage in conflict with non-State armed groups, or different armed groups from proximal states. These groups traverse state borders as they either seek protection from a neighboring state or export conflict to protect and or fight for their cultural links with a community within. Armed groups involve separatists,

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criminal gangs, religious extremists, terrorists, war-Lords, private military, militias, and mercenaries. The conflicts often begin as intra-state then transcend state borders and rise to the international level. A conflict starts in one country but assumes a life of its own and engrosses neighboring states.

3.5.1 The Western Sahara Factor/ North West Africa.

Western Sahara, a Spanish colony from 1884 to 1975 was originally known as Spanish Sahara. It is located in Northwest Africa and covers a landmass of 266,000 square kilometers (km). It borders Morocco to the North stretching a length of 444 kilometers (km), Algeria to the Northeast stretching 41 km, Mauritania to the East and all the way southwards with a length of 1,564 km, finally the Atlantic Ocean to the West.

Western Sahara inhabitants, also referred to as the Sahrawi, are a hybrid of Arabic, European and African cultures. The hybridity led to confusion of identity by the Sahrawi as to whether they are Arabs or Africans. In the past Sahrawi’ registered themselves as Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) taking an Arabic identification. The independent fight movement Frente Popular de Liberacion de Saguía el Hamra Río de Oro simply referred to as Polisario Front founded later changed the Sahrawi identity to reflect an Arab, African and

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100 Sidi M. Omar. ”The Right To Self-Determination and the Indigenous People of Western Sahara” Cambridge Review of International Affairs, Volume 21, Issue 1, March 2008, p. 43.
103 Munene. “The Multiple Colonialism in Western Sahara,” p. 179
Islamist roots by 1976. Besides, the faction established a government in exile in Algeria-Tindouf. The Sahrawi identity as indicated by Polisario Front is in line with the historical depiction of their emergence from a fusion of the Sanhaja Berbers, Africans and Arabs around the 13\textsuperscript{th} century.

The Sahrawi begun a path for self-determination in the 60s. They pressured Spain to self-determine the region amidst Morocco’ claim for the same. In 1975, the International Court of Justice declared that though the Sahrawi had some relation with Morocco, they were not territorially bound to a point of abdicating their self-determination. The ICJ called for negotiation. King Hassan the II of Morocco had been organizing a secret march. Therefore following the ICJ advisory opinion, King Hassan called upon volunteers where about 350,000 Moroccans took part in the Green march into Western Sahara. They were met with resistance from the Polisario Front. The incidence led to the signing of the Madrid Accord where both Morocco and Mauritania were left in charge of Western Sahara in 1975.

Spain left Western Sahara under joint administration of Morocco and Mauritania under the agreement of the Madrid Accord in November 1975. Therefore Spain ceded Western Sahara to Morocco and Mauritania. The latter dropped its claim in 1979 following a peace treaty with Polisario Front. Mauritania exited after a failure to hold off the Algeria-supported guerrilla faction. Morocco took over the remaining portion that was under Mauritania. Spain actions went against the United Nations General Assembly Resolution 1514. The resolution supports

105 Munene. “The Multiple Colonialism in Western Sahara.” P.179
109 Ibid
110 The United Nations General Assembly Resolution 1514 (XV) 14, December 1960.
Western Sahara self-determination. Morocco remains alone in aspirations to annex Western Sahara.

In hindsight, indicators of expansionist ideology appeared since Morocco’s independence in 1956. Morocco’s ambitions involved creating a “Greater Morocco” to encompass parts of Mali, Senegal, Mauritania, Algeria and all Spanish colonies in Africa’s Northwest region. Western Sahara became one of the desired regions which created border, identity and security issues. The Polisario Front engaged in guerrilla war from its founding in 1973 until 1991 when the UN organized a cease-fire.

The contestation over Western Sahara led to a call for a referendum by the Sahrawi’s to determine their future. In 1992, the UN organized a referendum for Western Sahara to decide either independence or integration to Morocco. Initially, Morocco supported the idea and later, rejected it after scrutinizing the electoral register. Morocco pulled away its support on the referendum. Before this, Morocco had transferred Sahrawi’s populace from its region to Western Sahara to vote against independence. The referendum failed to take place, which increased tensions within the Saharawi nation.

Western Sahara disputes Morocco’s intrusion and control of 85% of its territory which left a marginal 15% under Polisario Front. Morocco’s aggression was indicated by the building of

a 2,700 Km wall referred to as the ‘Bern.’ The ‘wall’ enclosed 85% of Western Sahara's territory.\textsuperscript{116} Morocco also planted mines along the wall to deter crossings.\textsuperscript{117} This split Sahrawi's in Western Sahara and Morocco creating a new identity for those in Morocco. The Sahrawi’s from Dakkha indigenous group refer to the Sahrawi-Moroccan migrant community who moved into the disputed territory during the 1992 failed referendum as, "Al wakkala" translated as ‘the eaters.’\textsuperscript{118} The non-Sahrawi’s are termed ‘Dakhilis,’ these are central-Moroccans in Western Sahara.\textsuperscript{119} The ‘Dakhilis are perceived as job thieves otherwise termed as Ch’lihat ‘little Berbers' while those in manual jobs are perceived as inferior, termed as ‘hammal' meaning ‘porter’.\textsuperscript{120} The ranking of different Sahrawi’s derives from colonization experience which created natives and non-natives.

The differences between the Moroccans and Sahrawi's created an impasse, which led the United Nations (UN) to call for respect of the ceasefire agreement signed in 1991. In the same year, UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) was established by the Security Council under Resolution 690. MINURSO monitored peaceful co-existence between Morocco and Western Sahara. By 2007 a call for direct negotiation was made. However, by 2016 both Polisario Front's and Morocco's armed factions still occupied the buffer region. Antonio Gutierrez, the UN Secretary-General made several calls for de-escalation of tensions.\textsuperscript{121} The UN Security Council urged for maintenance of peace until "a just, lasting and

\textsuperscript{116} Anouar Boukhars. Simmering Discontent in Western Sahara. P. 8
\textsuperscript{118} Ibid
\textsuperscript{119} Ibid. P. 9
\textsuperscript{120} Ibid.
mutually acceptable political solution”¹²² is found for self-determination of Western Sahara.¹²³ Despite the US and France indirect positions in the matter, their policies support Morocco’s imperialism.¹²⁴ Apart from the UN, the then OAU supported the independence of Western Sahara. OAU’s position led Morocco to leave the organization in 1984.¹²⁵ AU retains its belief on decolonization of Africa and supports Western Sahara’s self-determination.¹²⁶

The identity crisis in North-West Africa created a complex web accompanied by threats of insecurities in the region. Apart from Western Sahara, the Sahrawi people are across the border of the disputed region, mainly in Southern Morocco, Western Algeria, and Northern Mauritania. Furthermore, there are Sahrawi’s in refugee camps in Algeria encased in inhumane conditions. The camps are sites of A-Qaeda recruitment.¹²⁷ The problems of the Sahrawi and their spread in the region translates to regional insecurity which gives groups affiliated to Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) opportunities to recruit and train terrorists amidst the discontent among the Sahrawi’s ethnic affiliations and political chaos.¹²⁸

Insecurities in the proximate regions of Western Sahara and Tindouf camps in Algeria where the Polisario Front is based range from drug trafficking, contraband goods, and terrorist...
activities. Insecurities are attributed to independence fighters' frustrations and Sahrawi feelings of marginalization and spread throughout Northwestern Africa and extended regions. As a result, Morocco's relations with AU are complex. It withdrew from OAU on account of the latter's recognition of Western Sahara. Morocco unable to make its case in the UN, International Court of Justice (ICJ), AU, and lack of legitimacy over Western Sahara from both the AU and UN, sought to rejoin the AU on January 30th, 2017 after 33 years. Morocco's membership in the AU gives hope on the problem of Western Sahara agitation for self-determination.

3.5.2 Southern Africa

The Southern Africa region carries nine countries. Most of the colonies attained independence in the 60s with a few lagging behind in the 70s, 80s and 90s. Many of the colonies under the British rule achieved independence first. These were Zambia in 1964, Malawi in 1964, Lesotho in 1966, Botswana in 1966, and Swaziland in 1968. The remaining colonies were Mozambique which gained independence in 1975 from the Portuguese, Zimbabwe in 1980 from the British. Namibia underwent multiple colonialism first under the Germans whose exit after the defeat in World War I led the League of Nations to place the then South West African colony under South Africa.

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129 Ibid
In 1948, South Africa forcefully made Namibia one of its provinces and subjected it to apartheid rule until 1990 when it attained independence. South Africa was the last to gain independence in 1994. South Africa played a critical role in destabilizing the region through training and sending guerillas across the borders to divert the neighbor’s attention from supporting opponents of the white minority rule.134

Southern African countries borders share divided communities. An Example is a border between Mozambique and Zimbabwe, Botswana, and Zimbabwe, Malawi, and Tanzania. The notable difference from other African borders is that disputes revolve around resources as opposed to ethnic identity. The Malawi-Tanzania dispute was over the 1890 Anglo-Germany treaty which placed the whole of Lake Nyasa/Malawi into Malawi135 raising the question as to why other countries shared contiguous lakes like Victoria, Edward, Tanganyika, and Albert and not Lake Nyasa.136

Tanzania upon gaining independence in December 1961 sanctified the colonial borders.137 The Issue of Lake Nyasa was not problematic until 1967 following an agitation from Malawi. In 1964, Malawi’s government experienced internal unrests which led some Ministers to take refuge in Tanzania. The relocated ministers gave Tanzania an impression that the Shoreline border happened in 1956 following a meeting of the British Federal Boundary Commission.138 The Colonial Annual Report of 1948-1953 shows a shoreline border and therefore contradicts the idea of a central lake border before 1956. The then President of Malawi Kamuzu Banda

136 Ibid
138 Ibid, p.624
reacted to Tanzania’s allegation and stated that the three regions in Tanzania on the Western side of the lake culturally belong to Malawi. The Malawi northerners, the Nyakusa are closely related to the South-western Tanzanians.

Other factors influenced the Tanzania-Malawi border issue. They disagreed on relating to the regimes in South Africa and Mozambique. Tanzania's position was always to spearhead the self-determination of all African colonies. Tanzania viewed Kamuzu Banda as an obstacle for working with the imperialists. Tanzania’s President Julius Nyerere claimed that Banda’s boldness was insanity especially following a comment by Banda that even the eastern shore was debatable because the lake sometimes either recedes or floods. To Nyerere, Banda's statements came from the South African and Portuguese regimes.

Malawi shared the lake with Mozambique, but it occurred after the British agreed with the Portuguese to exchanged part of the latter’s land with a portion of the Lake in 1951 later signed in 1974. Nyerere could not foresee a possible agreement with Banda. He put the matter to rest in 1968 with the hope of resolving the issue with Malawi’s future leaders. However, the issues in the colonies and some South African countries created a thriving environment for militias.

**Militia’s Menace**

The Southern African region border issues involved militia’s cross-border incursions. For starters, the Mozambican case became central to the neighboring states because of, first the independence war from 1964-1974 and the internal agitations from 1976-1992. In the

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139 Ibid. p. 618
140 Ibid. p. 625
independence fight, there were two ‘liberation’ groups, Frente de Libertação de Mocambique, (FRELIMO) and Resistência Nacional de Moçambique, (RENAMO). The former worked towards the unity of the country post-colonial bringing together whites, blacks, Indians and other ethnic groups. The movement was made up of workers and the leaders were from the southern parts. RENAMO opposed FRELIMO in what appeared like the rest against the southern Mozambicans. RENAMO viewed FRELIMO as a southern agenda. The competition between the two led to various hideouts across the state borders which affected Tanzania's southern border.

In 1975, FRELIMO secured independence and formed a majority of the cabinet ministers while Portuguese formed a minority. Mozambique embarked on aiding freedom of South Africa and Southern Rhodesia/Zimbabwe from imperial regimes. The freedom fighters from both countries occasionally found refuge in Mozambique.

Initially, the minority rule in Rhodesia and South Africa invested in the creation of an insurgency group in Mozambique,\(^{141}\) which became RENAMO.\(^ {142}\) The latter caused destabilizations in Mozambique through cross-border incursions until 1980 when Southern Rhodesia became Zimbabwe upon independence.

RENAMO, with the help of South Africa minority rule positioned itself as a fight for democratization\(^ {143}\) while FRELIMO equated them to banditry. Mozambique in the interest of

\(^{143}\) Justin Pearce. “From rebellion to opposition, p. 373
the country signed Nkomati Accord with South Africa to enhance non-interference in each other's country. The freedom fight increased in South Africa, and RENAMO continued its activities in Mozambique. In 1986 RENAMO became stronger than FRELIMO. This was because of the success in including some rural populations which felt marginalized by FRELIMO’s villagization policy. FRELIMO’s policy was accepted by the farming populations in the south but negated by the Nampula province. The northerners had conflicts with FRELIMO before RENAMO emerged. The latter took advantage of the rift and managed to secure a majority support from northern rural people. The friction between FRELIMO and RENAMO led to the latter's hideouts outside the state border in Tanzania. Mozambican conflict came to an end in 1993 after the first democratic elections. In 1994 the apartheid rule ended as South Africa secured independence. The developments in the two countries though they led to an end in the conflict in Mozambique, the FRELIMO-RENAMO rivalry continues to cause instabilities creating refugees in South Africa, Malawi and Zambia.

Refugees
The fight between FRELIMO and RENAMO led to an outpouring of about one million refugees to Malawi. Some of the refugees fled to other countries like Angola and Zimbabwe. RENAMO fighters who took refuge in Zimbabwe, in turn, caused instabilities in the country. Refugee issues were in countries with a similar ethnic group. These countries included Zimbabwe and Mozambique, Zimbabwe and Botswana.

144 Ibid, p. 12
146 Ibid, p. 72
3.5.3 West Africa

West Africa's population is estimated at 382 million cutting across cultural lines. The landmass constitutes 18 states with varying sizes and climatic conditions. Some countries are in the zones of the Sahara desert to the North, while others are characterized by the rainforest and fertile land to the south. Mali, Niger, and Nigeria are the largest states within and carry multiple population identities. In addition, Senegal, Mali, and Niger lie on the Sahel belt connecting the region to the Islamic North. Amidst the multiple geographic and social-cultural identities are challenges such as trafficking of contrabands due to the multiple unauthorized passages across state borders, poverty and widespread corruption. Additionally, fragility of states means a low capacity to protect themselves against multiple challenges. Border, and identity challenges in West Africa include disgruntled split ethnicities, militia groups, and rivalry over resources, clashes between nomadic and agricultural people, cattle rustling, smuggling, religious ideology conflicts, terrorism, coups, proxy wars and secessionist ambitions.

The Senegal and Guinea-Bissau border suffer from encounters of migrants fleeing from governments and locals instituted insecurities. Border areas carry the allegations of cattle rustling, robbery, and smuggling of light weapons/contrabands. The challenges are evident in the communities of the Fula territory called Fouladou on the Senegal side and that of Gabu on the Guinea-Bissau side. The two communities were close kin in the ancestral ancient kingdom of Gabu. The Fulas of Senegal are known as the Fulas of Gabu by the Guinea-Bissau. The

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migration flows from Central Senegal, and Guinea- Bissau disrupted the border region of the two states.

Also, Senegal consists of a majority of Wolof language speakers and Muslims in the north with a minority of Diola speakers and either Christians or African traditionalists in the southern part called Casamance. Casamance is separated from northern Senegal by the Gambia state and the River. It is tropical, green compared to the arid to the semi-arid north. The differences in territory, religion, and language led to secession calls from the Movement of Democratic Forces for Casamance (MDFC) since its inception in 1982. In the 80s, the separatist group got the support of the local population through claims of marginalization by the governments. The government employed tactics to encourage the local population to abandon secession calls.

In the 90s, the movement changed tactics and sought support from the neighboring countries. These were Guinea- Bissau, which borders Casamance to the South and Guinea on the South-western. Senegal reached out to its neighbors, and the group eventually lost support. It morphed into an illegal faction and financed itself through abductions, looting, and military ambushes at the Gambia border. In the late 1990s, both the Senegalese government and the Casamance Rebels planted mines at the border with the Gambia and rendered the land inhabitable. These contribute to the vulnerability and instability of the border region between Senegal, Guinea-Bissau, Guinea and the Gambia.

152 Simpson and Diallo. “Between War and Peace,”
153 Ibid.
On the Eastern border of Senegal is Mali, with a population of 13,518,000 which struggles to integrate its people into a cohesive society. The North is an arid sparsely populated nomadic region mainly with the Tuareg community. The communities rely on cross-border animal trade as a significant source of income. Government presence in the border region hardly exists which encourages illegal activities. Following Mali's independence in 1960, the Tuareg resisted being part of Mali, claiming separation from a kin in Mauritania, Burkina Faso, Algeria, Niger, and Libya. They wanted to secede and create a Tuareg state. From the onset of Mali’s independence, they looked down upon the southern blacks whom they called slaves who were not able to rule. The Southerners too perceived the Northerners as facilitators of white man’s slave trade, barbarians with a lazy streak. The Tuareg, a descendant of the Berber, consider themselves Arabs and not Africans thus ‘superior.’ These led to political crises that contributed to the instability of the region.

Instabilities associated with the Tuareg people are along the Sahel belt. They are across in the countries of Burkina Faso, and Niger in West Africa, then Mauritania, Algeria, and Libya in North Africa. The Tuareg’ desire for autonomy goes beyond Mali to other countries thereby creating border challenges within West Africa and in parts of Northern Africa.

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157 Ibid, p.68

158 Ibid

159 Ibid

160 Ibid
The Tuareg aspiration to secede led to their lack of allegiance to any country. During the Libyan crisis, they were recruited, trained and funded by Muammar Gaddafi as forces of Islamic Legion to aid his struggle. Additionally, Gaddafi used some Tuareg as mercenaries which led to insecurity and chaos in the region. For example, during Gaddafi’s rule, they found refuge in Libya. With the fall of Gaddafi, Libyans attacked the Tuareg community considered as outsiders. Tuareg fled the disorder in Libya to Niger and Mali with large amounts of weapons. The flow of weapons from Libya found ways into other countries. In Niger, the government disarmed them, but, that could not happen in Mali due to a deep split between the Tuareg Northerners and the Southern held government.

Subsequently, the Tuareg launched a secessionist movement in Mali through the formation of National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA). Geographically, ‘Azawad’ spans from Nampala near the Mauritania border, through Diabaly, Konna to Douentza which goes all the way to Burkina Faso border and stretches to all the northern parts of Mali. The secessionist demands cut Mali’s landmass into half from the shortest distance of the border from Mauritania to Burkina Faso. The whole Northern region forms the desired state of AZAWAD.

The AZAWAD/Northern half region of Mali carries all rebel movements. These include AQIM, Ansar Dine, Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJWA), National Front for the Liberation of Azawad (FNLA) and MNLA. Mali’s instability is on the increase due to

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162 Ibid
163 Ibid
164 Hussein Solomon. “Ansar Dine in Mali: Between Tuareg Nationalism and Islamism.” P. 67
165 Larémont. “After the fall of Qaddafi,” P. 3
these terrorist groups. The terrorist activities and criminal gangs traverse from North Eastern regions of Mali to Niger, Chad, and Nigeria where Boko Haram activities are predominant.\textsuperscript{165} Border challenges and terrorist threats in Nigeria are enormous. Nigeria borders Niger and Chad to the North, Benin Republic to the West, Cameroon to the East and finally by the Gulf of Guinea and the Atlantic Ocean to the South.\textsuperscript{166} The diverse borders come with equally different challenges which include small arms, drug trafficking, illegal exploitation and exportation of oil and timber, and smuggling goods.\textsuperscript{167} First, the border With Cameroon carried the issue of the former contested region of Bakassi peninsula. Second is the border with Niger, Chad, and Cameroon which experiences cross-border terrorism, smuggling, and trafficking of light weapons. The Southern border is known for resource conflicts especially in the Niger Delta area.\textsuperscript{168} Identity issues compound it. The Igbo community tried to secede through the Biafra war in the 1950s which resulted in the construction of the Biafra region in Southeast Nigeria.

First, Nigeria is one of the largest states in West Africa. It has vast borders with the northern parts in constant terrorism challenges. The north-south divide is due to significant identity differences between the Afro-Muslim North and Afro-Christian south. The practice of Islam in the north attracted Islamic extremism associated with Boko Haram in the north-east border


Part of the outcome is the rise of desires for a Nigerian Islamic state in the North. For example, there exist several attacks in attempts to forbid western education and secularism under the banner of Boko Haram in the North.

Boko Haram is a Hausa phrase which means Western Education is sinful. Organized death or kidnappings befall those who defy it. Such was the case of the 276 Chibok girls, and 22 others who underwent forced Islamization. In 2018, more than 100 Dapchi girls were abducted too. The last group of girls was Muslim except Leah. Boko Harams’ objective was to rescue, and warn, the girls against Western education. The girls were later released but Leah, the Christian girl remains in captivity as at July 2018. Boko Harams’ intent is to Islamize the northern-most states in Nigeria. Bono state in one of the regions, with sub-regions of Maiduguri and Chibok being the most afflicted. Boko Haram traverses border regions with Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. There are over 250 un-manned footpath routes from Maiduguri linked to Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. Northern Nigeria region practices Nomadic lifestyle and has identity linkages across the borders. The similarity in culture and geographic terrain encourages the proliferation of cross-border movements of small arms along Nigeria, Benin, Cameroon, and Niger.

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174 Ibid
175 Interview with Oluwole Adekola, Nairobi, July 2018.
Second is the issue of Biafra secession war in the south-eastern border of the Igbo community. Nigeria got its independence in 1960 from Britain. On July 30, 1967, Biafra state, an oil-rich region on the south-eastern side declared its independence from Nigeria which led to the civil war and defeat for Biafra in 1970. However, the strife between Northerners and the Southerners continued. It led to the emergence of secessionist groups like the Movement for the actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB), Biafra Congress Party (BCP), Biafra Zionist Movement (BZM), Biafra Rebirth (BR), and the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB). The last group continues to represent Biafra calls for independence. Nigeria struggles to make its authority felt in the Biafra region with residents nursing desires to achieve independence.

Third, Nigeria’s diverse ethnic groups crisscross border regions of other countries. The existence of more than five hundred ethnic groups, speaking many languages with a population of over 196 million facilitates cross-border migrations. The North is predominantly Islamic with the Hausa and Fulani communities. They are also in Niger, Chad, and Cameroon. The Hausa are in other countries too such as Sudan, Cote d’Ivoire, Ghana, Togo, Gabon, and Senegal and all along the trans-Sahara route on the North and East crisscrossing the Sahara Desert.

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181 Bybee. “The Indigenous People of Biafra,” p. 2


The North/South divide is present in Nigeria in religion, ethnicity, and geographic recreating the North-South divide picture in the African continent. The divide propagates the rise of ‘ethno-religious’ conflicts, especially the Boko Haram insurgency.\textsuperscript{184} The prevalence of attacks is in the north-eastern border made other attacks in the south,\textsuperscript{185} mainly Abuja and Lagos appear insignificant.

Fourth, Nigeria’s Western region experienced border conflicts with Cameroon which established roots of border tensions, trans-border crises, regular attacks and reprisals between the nationals of Nigeria and Cameroon. The Calabar Kingdom had occupied the region since the 1400s, but by 1884 Britain signed an agreement with their Kings and chiefs.\textsuperscript{186} Britain ceded the region to Germany via the 11 March 1913 treaty.\textsuperscript{187} This region later became a point of contention between the two modern countries leading to the dispute over the border area known as the Bakassi Peninsula sandwiched between Nigeria to the West and Cameroon to the East covering 600 square miles. The region has poor infrastructure and a population of over 300, 000 who mostly rely on fishing for sustenance.\textsuperscript{188}

The Bakassi region discovered oil in the late 1950s which increased claims and counterclaims of ownership between Nigeria and Cameroon. The two countries submitted the matter to the International Court of Justice, the ICJ, which ruled that Nigeria should cede the region to Cameroon. Though the problem seemed resolved, the residents in the area were aggrieved, over

\textsuperscript{188} LeFebvre. (2014) "Interests and Identities in Peace Negotiations," p. 84

129
12,000 relocated to Nigeria and became instant refugees. The remaining populace began a Bakassi secessionist movement demanding autonomy from both governments. Additionally, a movement to free the Niger Delta, an oil-rich region, mushroomed.\footnote{Ibid} Bakassi Peninsula attributes secessionist claims to a loss of cultural ties and practices that align the residents’ identity more with Nigeria than Cameroon. In this case, cultural identity and physical geographic border conflicts led to border insecurity in both Nigeria and Cameroon.\footnote{Edward Said. \textit{Culture and Imperialism}. (New York: Vintage Books, Random House, 1993), p. 7} Furthermore, the conflict indicates that a nation’s existence is dependent on the belief of the people, which informs state behavior mostly shaped by the norms and contributory aspects of shared identity and values of the people.\footnote{Emmanuel Adler, ‘Seizing the Middle Ground: Constructivism in World Politics,’ \textit{European Journal of International Relations}, Volume 3, issue 3, 1997, pp.264-265}

3.5.4 The Great Lakes Group/ Central Africa

Central Africa comprises of Chad, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Congo, Sao Tome and Principe, Democratic Republic of Congo and Angola as categorized by the United Nations (UN). The Economic Community of Central African States includes Rwanda and Burundi which have ties to the former Belgian colony of Congo.

The Great Lakes group constitutes Congo, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Angola, Central African Republic, Rwanda, Burundi, Tanzania, Zambia, and Uganda. Congo River is a common factor as it flows through one part or the other of these countries emptying into the Atlantic Ocean. The Great lakes name comes from the freshwater lakes and rivers in Eastern and Central Africa. Postcolonial identity confusion largely afflicts the region. The exception is Tanzania which applied the Ujamaa (brotherhood) ideology after the 1967 Arusha declaration consolidating a postcolonial identity while minimizing pre-colonial differences.

The historical, social-cultural, and political features of the Great Lakes region crisscross constructed borders. The European colonial border making also led to new identity constructs. The identity constructs made the Europeans appear superior and the Africans inferior. The physiognomy of Africans compared to that of Europeans meant those who had similar characteristics close to Europeans were considered superior to ‘black’ Africans. The

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199 Rothmyer. Joseph Murumbi, p. 151
division intensified with the presence of abundant natural resources in the region that required slave labor. The division among Africans remained as part of postcolonial identities. Under Tanzania's first President, Julius Nyerere, the country embraced civic education and Kiswahili as the official language. The collective identity helped to engrain trust amongst Tanzanians through forming a national identity bereft of ethnic divisions.200

Central Africa has encountered many conflicts and coups d’état, making it one of the most fragile regions.201 It has had conflict in Democratic Republic of Congo which centers on resources in the two rich provinces, the North and South Kivu that has claimed over 4million lives.202 DRC borders the Central African Republic (CAR) and Sudan to the North, Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, and Tanzania to the East, Angola to the Southwest and Republic of the Congo to the West. In 1885, the Berlin conference on the partition of Africa gave the territory to King Leopold II as personal property. It was known as Leopold's Congo until 1908 when Leopold sold it to Belgium, and it became Belgium Congo.203

In 1960 Belgian Congo attained independence following the hasty departure of the Belgians who ruled it for seventy-five years.204 At independence, Joseph Kasavubu became the president while Patrice Lumumba became the first prime minister. Lumumba agitated for the rights of the people individually to benefit from Congo’s resources. Despite Belgians government’s departure, they manned the political, military and economic structures. The Belgians and the

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201 Angela Meyer. “Preventing Conflict in Central Africa: ECCAS Caught Between Ambitions, Challenges, and Reality” Institute of Security Studies, Issue 3, 2015, p.3
203 Ibid, p. 26
204 Christine Schuster, Conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo, in Global Politics: How to Use and Apply Theories of International Relations. (Berlin: Osteuropa-Institut der Freien Universität 2006), p. 56
United States considered Lumumba as a leftist trouble maker and engineered his ouster using Joseph Desire Mobutu, and later Patrice Lumumba was assassinated.  

The big powers used Mobutu later known as Mobutu Sese Seko, to overthrow Lumumba, and to entrench neo-colonialism. In turn, Mobutu used the US support to amass wealth and suppress his people through arms supply from the US. In May 1997, he was overthrown by Laurent Désiré Kabila under the umbrella of Alliance des Forces Democratiques pour la Liberation du Congo-Zaire (AFDL) with the support of Rwanda and Uganda. Laurent Kabila was involved in cross-border businesses, especially with the Tutsi community. The Tutsi got an opportunity to claim citizenship and recognition.

Looking into Rwanda, the composition of Hutu and Tutsi ethnicities had differing identity experiences with the Belgians. The Belgians constructed Tutsi as a superior race over the Hutus, creating two ethnicities and a division of hatred that led to the 1994 genocide. In the 1994 conflict, the Hutu militia slaughtered about 800,000 people in the Rwandan Genocide.

The Hutu rebels fought under the tag of Interahamwe meaning those who stick together, and later fled to DRC. They launched cross-border attacks on the Tutsi faction Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF) from DRC. In the end, RPF formed the Rwandese government. Rwanda

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208 Ibid
met Interahamwe with equally vicious retaliation.\textsuperscript{212} Later, Rwanda invaded DRC supposedly to pursue Hutu rebels involved in the 1994 genocide. However, it could not explain thousands of deaths of old women, men and children of Hutu origin in the East and Northwest border of DRC and CAR.\textsuperscript{213} Meanwhile, Hutu rebels in DRC attacked local Tutsi populace (\textit{Banyamulenge}) extending the conflict dynamics. It affected DRC’s local politics since the coming to power of Laurent Kabila was supported by Kagames’ Rwandese government.\textsuperscript{214}

The DRC soldiers, Ugandan and Rwandese groups, and the Tutsi Banyamulenge later accused Laurent Desire Kabila of mismanagement, corruption, misuse of power, and failure to serve the people of DRC. The Tutsi \textit{Banyamulenge} citizenship in DRC was a bone of contention since independence. Mobutu's regime repealed the Tutsis’ citizenship in 1966 and demanded their return to Rwanda.\textsuperscript{215} The action created an ethnic division and affected local political dynamics in DRC. In August 1998, these opposition factions formed rebel groups opposed Kabila’s rule, leading to their control of about a third of the Eastern parts of the country.

The United Nations peacekeeping force was sent to DRC in 1999 to protect the civilians under the Interim Emergency Multinational Force (IEMF), and to quell the conflict. The IEMF became the UN-MONUC (Mission de l'Organisation des Nations Unies en République démocratique du Congo) in July 2003. Amidst the UN missions, the assassination of Laurent Kabila happened in January 2001, and his son Joseph Kabila became the new head of state.

\textsuperscript{212} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{213} Ibid, pp. 1-2.
\textsuperscript{214} Munene. “Mayi Mayi and Interahamwe Militias,” p. 241
\textsuperscript{215} Omeje. “Understanding the Diversity and Complexity of Conflict in the African Great Lakes Region.” p.42
Laurent Kabila's government's support from Zimbabwe, Angola, and Namibia faced opposition from groups backed by Burundi, Rwanda, and Uganda. The involvement of these countries in the Congo conflict was tagged African World War in which 4 million people died between 1998 and 2002.\textsuperscript{216}

Uganda, located on the eastern border of DRC attained its independence in 1962.\textsuperscript{217} In 1966 the then Prime Minister Milton Obote overthrew President Edward Muteesa and abolished the post of Prime Minister in 1967 to concentrate power in the presidency.\textsuperscript{218} Edward Muteesas’ presidency appeared to represent the Kingdom of Buganda, a monarchy.\textsuperscript{219} The supposed presence of the Buganda monarchy meant promotion of factional politics. The Obote regime, in search for equality made changes in the constitution which abolished the premier position in Uganda.\textsuperscript{220}

The removal of the Buganda monarchy from power meant the abolition of factional politics which resulted in power changes. In 1971 Obote was overthrown by General Idd Amin Dada who lasted till 1979. Amin tried to capture the Kagera region in Tanzania, and this led to Uganda-Tanzania war.\textsuperscript{221} Between 1979 and 1986 several men claimed the presidency before Yoweri Kaguta Museveni clinched it in 1986 using the National Resistance Movement (NRM), with additional support from RPF, a Tutsi exile group.\textsuperscript{222}

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\textsuperscript{216} Ibid, p.42.
\textsuperscript{218} Ibid
\textsuperscript{219} Kisekka-Ntale. “Colonialism, Postcolonial Violence, and Repression.” pp. 245-247
\textsuperscript{220} Ibid, pp. 246-247
\textsuperscript{222} Munene. “Mayi Mayi and Interahamwe Militias: Threats to Peace and Security in the Great Lakes Region, p. 241
\end{flushright}
The RPF group that helped NRM were mostly Tutsis refugees in Uganda. Following NRM success, RPF considered doing the same in Rwanda. The opportunity came when the plane carrying the Rwandese president was shot down and the resulting 1994 Rwandese genocide.

President Museveni helped RPF materially for fear that defeat of the Tutsi’s in Rwanda would have meant problems for Uganda. The Forces Armées Rwandaises (FAR) and the Interahamwe, a former Hutu government military group, fled to Eastern Congo as refugees, taking with them weapons previously used in Rwanda genocide. The chaos from Rwanda extended to the great lakes region as armed refugees moved to neighboring countries.

The rebels in northern Uganda were not happy with NRM coming to power. Sudan, faced with its problems of a then possible secession of its South, was suspicious of NRM involvement in arming a faction called Sudanese Peoples Liberation Army (SPLA). Sudan took advantage of the situation in Uganda and supported the northern rebels under Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) headed by Joseph Kony. The situation created war environment on both sides of the border. Notably, Northern Uganda and subsequent Southern Sudan are both inhabited by Nilotic communities.

The great lakes region exhibit high connection between and among nation-states. Conflict in Rwanda translated to conflicts in eastern DRC, Uganda, Sudan, South Sudan, Tanzania, Burundi and Southern regions of Africa. Common to all is the manner in which colonial governance was undertaken under constructed identities which privileged some ethnic groups, and undermined others. The worst scenario was the use of physiognomy to designate

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223 Mamdani. When Victims Become Killers, pp. 173-175
224 Ibid.
inferior/superior ethno-racial categories and with it power. Identity divisions left the region in a condition of perpetual conflict. Furthermore, the presence of split identities at the state border offers opportunities to rebels and political leaders to launch proxy wars. State borders are undermined by body borders with deeply embedded hatred due to failure for each state to construct a shared state identity successfully.

3.5.5. Central African Republic (CAR).

Central African Republic state is an outcome of geography with multiple identities.227 France, the colonial power, extracted and exported mineral resources such as gold, diamonds, timber, coffee, and cotton from CAR.228 The presence of natural resources and population with diverse identities led to insecurities with cross-border implications. CAR, communities share identities with others across the border regions in South Sudan, Sudan, Chad, Congo, and DRC.

Countries bordering CAR have over the years engaged in political and border strife. Sudan and Chad have had conflicts since their inception in the 1960s. These conflicts drew CAR into the midst as populations fled. Also, mercenaries and militias take refuge in neighboring states in the border regions of CAR where government presence is minimal or lacking.229 An example is a conflict in South Sudan where the LRA fled from Uganda and were forced to flee again to CAR. LRA presence in CAR attracted Uganda’s interest.

CAR’s southern territory which borders DRC continues to experience border crossings and political entanglements which appear out of the government’s control. The continuous refugees

229 Meyer. “Preventing Conflict in Central Africa,” p. 5
flow has merged borderlands communities creating a lack of internal/external notion of the border. The refugees flow from DRC to the neighboring country has made the border concept complicated and irrelevant, as the people have moved back and forth over the years transforming the international into local and vice versa.

Furthermore, CAR faces identity-based conflicts between the North Muslim and the South Christian populations. The Northern part, with the Arab population, is associated with the colonial slave trade, in addition to dominating and controlling trading prices due to ease of border crossings to a kin in Chad and Sudan. The South is perceived as discriminatory by the North for denying the Northerners citizenship rights, and poor development of the region by successive Southern and Northwestern governments.

The North-South divide led to a religious division in CAR which formed militia groups. First is the Seleka faction, a Sango word for alliance formed in 2012. It is a Muslim faction against the southern-held government. Second is the anti-Balaka meaning anti-Machette, a Christian faction on a revenge mission against the Muslim. Local leaders in the north created Seleka as militias for hire and ended up forming alliances with others in Chad and Sudan. In 2013 Seleka captured the town of Bangui and drove out and killed Christians while anti-Balaka killed Muslims in rural areas, and forced them to change their religion or die with others driven out

232 Ibid
of CAR. A Peace agreement led to the disintegration of the groups, but they persisted with the Anti-Balaka driving out and killing the minority Muslims in the western border regions. The presence of rebels in the border regions of CAR is a contributory factor in government instability due to identity and regional conflict connections. The coming to power of President Bozize in 2003 was attributed to support from Chad leading to allegations of Chad's soldier's extrajudicial activities in CAR. The aggrieved punish those whose identity appears connected to Chad.

Identity affiliations inform intra-state and interstate instability due to ease of movement through the borders. The DRC case shows that what begun as one state's problems, ended up as a regional problem. The DRC conflict attracted countries like Rwanda, Burundi, and Uganda in a mineral-rich region.

Burundi, which borders DRC to the East, claimed that its involvement in DRC conflict was to protect itself from the invasion of DRC-Hutu based radicals. Burundi, CAR, and DRC share the Hutu and Tutsi ethnic groups. Additionally, DRC and Burundi share the eastern border which complicate state's involvement when problems from one country's ethnic population interfere with the others’ security.

Besides, some terminologies specific to the Hutu and Tutsi groups imply a division within a state and unity with kin across the state border. The term Interahamwe means ‘those who stand together,’ it is used by a Hutu group which materialized during the genocide in Rwanda. A clear

235 Essa. “Muslims being 'erased' from the Central African Republic,”
identity was curved related to an ethnic grouping, not a country. The second is the Tutsi Banyamulenge, an identity of Tutsi who settled in DRC at a place called Mulenge. The intention is to differentiate themselves from Hutu refugees who fled to DRC occupying the eastern side. Apart from the Banyamulenge, there are Tutsi's who are DRC's nationals. When the conflict arose in DRC, the two groups extended their differences not based on their identity as nationals of DRC but as Tutsi and Hutus who fled Rwanda as opposing sides.\textsuperscript{238} The two ethnic groups reside in various states in Great Lakes region and have created a security complex. The state border is used by a split ethnic group as arbitrary lacking ethnic, body, psychological and cultural foundations whenever a need arises.

### 3.5.6 The Horn of Africa

The Horn of Africa also referred to as ‘the Horn' has varying definitions. Its narrow definition comprises the states of Eritrea, Ethiopia, Djibouti, and Somalia. The broader definition adds Kenya, Sudan, South Sudan, Democratic Republic of Congo and Uganda.

The Horn is one of the most volatile regions in the African Continent.\textsuperscript{239} It is among the regions where the East and the West fought the Cold War through proxies. It has complexities of state legitimacy and unique history.\textsuperscript{240} It is unprecedented with the emergence of countries like Eritrea from a federated region of Ethiopia following a 32-year war,\textsuperscript{241} and South Sudan. The self-determination of South Sudan in 2011 defied the 1964 Cairo resolution and AU stand on


\textsuperscript{241} Ikome. “Africa's International Borders as Potential Sources of Conflict and Future Threats to Peace and Security.” p.7
maintaining colonial boundaries. South Sudan broke the norm thus created doubts on the notion of inviolability of state borders. Furthermore is the existence of the quasi-state of Somaliland placing questions on whether it will achieve recognition one day? However, Somaliland recognition could encourage balkanization of Somalia with regions such as Puntland, Jubaland, Hiranland and other clan provinces quest for self-determination. Clan affiliations could pose a problem to Kenya, and Ethiopia because of the presence of Somali clans in their border regions with Somalia.

Insecurities in the Horn are both intra and inter-state with international dimensions. Similarly, states and non-state actors such as militia and terror groups contribute to the problems. However, states in the region appear to place importance on security between states (inter-state) while ignoring security within states (intra-state), an aspect of human security. The cold war left some countries like Somalia heavily armed, following its fragmentation, the arms found their way into civilian hands.

The insecurities, therefore, involve border conflicts and irredentism, proxy wars, weak governance in border regions, small arms smuggling, armed militias, terrorism and acts of piracy all traverse state borders through cross-border operations. Likewise, environmental

244 Bereketeab. "Introduction," p. 85
degradation and the presence of pastoralists' communities fail to recognize international borders where the border splits a community.²⁴⁷

**Self-Determination, Irredentism, and Border Conflicts**

Some groups in the Horn harbor irredentist desires due to unhappy situations of their borders. Borders are understood as permanent, inflexible and impermeable creating tensions between and among communities in the Horn. Irredentism comes from the term ‘irredenta’ which was used in Italy around the 19th Century in the desire to unify ethno-geographic populations seen as lost lands. Irredentism occurs where a country engages in exercise of authority beyond its borders to another perceived to carry a similar population. Irredentism transfers a population, territory occupied and sovereignty from one state to another and with it an adjustment of the boundary of the affected states.²⁴⁸

In the Horn, Somalia attempted to engage in irredentism upon independence. One of the objectives was to bring together ethnic Somalis split by the international borders. Somalia's bid to encompass all Somalis linked ethnicity to territoriality, as such, understood the land inhabited by Somalis as the outer limits of the grazing land.²⁴⁹

Border conflicts in the Horn emerged due to disagreements concerning the international borders. These conflicts happened between Ethiopia and Somalia, Kenya and Somalia, Sudan and South Sudan, Kenya and Uganda over Migingo Island, within the Republic of Somalia

there is the conflict between Somaliland and Puntland, and Kenya and South Sudan. All these destabilize the Horn contributing to insecurities in the region.

To begin with, Somalia occupies the North-Eastern part of the Horn with a map in the format of number seven. In 1960, British Somaliland and Italian Somali merged to form the present-day Somalia. The merger left other Somalis in British East Africa, Ethiopia and French Somali under different rule. Somalia encouraged irredentist-secessionism in the ‘lost lands' in a bid to unite all Somalis under the myth of a Greater Somalia.  

Somalia aspired to include the states of Djibouti, the then Northern Frontier District (NFD) in Kenya, and Ogaden-Ethiopia. The outcome was Shifat (bandit) proxy war in Kenya 1963-1967 also, invasion of Ethiopia thus Ogaden war in 1977-1978. Somalia lost in both wars. Various oppositional factions emerged within Somalia. A prolonged period of internal instability culminated in the fall of President Siyaad Barre's regime in 1991 and the collapse of the state governance machinery.

Somalia began a path of fragmentation following President Barre's ouster. Quasi-states sprouted beginning with South-West Somaliland on 18th May 1991, the Northeast Puntland in 1998, and middle-South Galmudug state in 2006 which bears similarities to the anarchic Southern Somalia where clan politics form the core. Despite Somalia’s creation of semblances of independent states, Somaliland and Puntland remain embroiled in border contestation issues.

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251 Mengisteab. “Poverty, Inequality, State Identity and Chronic Inter-State Conflicts in the Horn of Africa,” p. 32
252 Bereketeab. “Self-Determination and Secessionism in Somaliland and South Sudan,” p. 6
253 Ibid P. 7
255 Bereketeab. “Self-Determination and Secessionism in Somaliland and South Sudan,” P. 86
Construction of internal clan borders in Somalia harbors secessionist desires posing fears of Somalia state balkanization. An Islamic state group within Somalia emerged in a bid to recapture the myth of Greater Somalia with an aim to forge unity of all Somalis. The idea of a collective Somali identity poses a threat to the neighboring countries in the Horn of Africa and beyond. It creates a distrust of the Somali population in Kenya and Ethiopia.

Ethiopia was not colonized. The absence of colonization in Ethiopia questioned the application of maintaining the colonial borders acquired upon independence. Somalia’s perception of Ethiopia as an imperial state led to claims over Haud and Ogaden regions for independence. Somalia argued that the policy of maintaining colonial borders should not apply to Ethiopia. The self-determination of Haud and Ogaden meant revising Ethiopia's borders.

Apart from irredentism, there is the challenge of secession whose objective is to create a distinct unit identity separate from existing states. Secession occurs where a group within an existing state breaks away as opposed to irredentism where another state supports a sub-group’s breakaway.

Eritrea and South Sudan are secession cases though most countries are reluctant to use the term and opt for separatist or self-determination. Upon Italy’s defeat in the World War II, the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) placed Italian colonies under new governance. UNGA

256 Munene. “Conflict and Postcolonial Identities in East/the Horn of Africa,” p 129.
determined to grant Libya independence latest by January 1, 1952.\textsuperscript{259} Libya gained independence in 1951. UNGA placed Italian Somaliland under its trusteeship council from November 21, 1949 for ten years in preparation for independence.\textsuperscript{260} Meanwhile, Eritrea was placed under Ethiopia as a federated region following the US proposal.\textsuperscript{261}

Emperor Haile Selassie later granted the US the Kagnew military station based in Ethiopia-Eritrea. Eritrea began a path for self-determination from Ethiopia in 1961 following the formation of Eritrea Liberation Front (ELF) in the same year. Ethiopia’s Emperor dissolved Eritrea’s federation status in 1962.\textsuperscript{262} In 1972, the EPL morphed into Eritrea’s People Liberation Front (EPLF) to liberate its people from Ethiopia. After three decades of liberation war, Eritrea seceded and self-determined in 1993.\textsuperscript{263}

Eritrea and Ethiopia later engaged in border disputes over the Badme Triangle. Whereas Eritrea relies on maps drawn by Italy in 1934, Ethiopia placed claim based on the treaty between Emperor Menelik and Italians in 1908.\textsuperscript{264} To control the Badme border problem, Eritrea recruits the youth to national service and posts them to guard the border for an indefinite period.\textsuperscript{265} The youth seek refuge in neighboring countries and abroad to avoid the human rights insecurities associated with the recruitments.\textsuperscript{266}

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Eritrea’s secession from Ethiopia encouraged calls for the same in the Horn. Somaliland, having declared itself independent from Somalia in 1991, continues to seek recognition based on the border drawn between British Somaliland and Italian Somali. Puntland acts as a federal state of the Republic of Somalia but with an exclusive border-identity of the Majerteen clan. Various national conflicts with same/cultural differences from the central governments were enhanced in Somalia. Furthermore, South Sudan seceded from Sudan and became independent in January 2011, following a referendum vote.267 The success of Eritrea and South Sudan’s secession created precedence in the region that defies territorial integrity and non-intervention principle.

Sudan and South Sudan issues were influenced by matters beyond the Horn. Sudan, an Arab Muslim state, enjoys the support of Arab states in the North. South Sudan a Christian and/ African state gets the support of African states in the South. Self-determination of South Sudan occurred without a well-defined border. As a result, the borderline belt extending from Ethiopia to Central African Republic (CAR) is a contested zone.268 Regions of dispute begin near the Blue Nile that is Jodha, Megenis Mountains, Kaka, Jau, Heglic, Abyei and Kafia Kingi269 located near the CAR border. The presence of minerals in the border zone enhance the disputes. Apart from border issues, Sudan is yet to come to terms with South Sudan’s self-determination. As such, problems and claims of border dispute appear as a political tactic to destabilize the South. The chaos in the South seems to have more than leadership squabbles to proxy wars from the North.


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Proxy Wars in Interventions

The proxy war is the use of indirect actors, mainly militias to tackle a state’s enemy or as a substitute for direct armies. In the Horn, rebel movements acquired importance through an ability to cause chaos in other states, in most cases, where countries border each other. Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan, South Sudan, DRC, Rwanda, and Uganda have all engaged this tactic in the region. The result is a cycle of mutual interventions whenever one state experienced real or constructed unrest.

The ‘Sudans’ embroilment in border disagreement extended the proxy war to internal matters of South Sudan. South Sudan is engaged in political rivalries between two main ethnic groups the Nuer and the Dinka. Sudan appears to sponsor belligerents to destabilize South Sudan. The poor relationship between the two countries begun when the South rejected the North policies of Islamization and Arabization which led to demands for self-determination through secession.

To the East of ‘Sudans,’ Ethiopians’ cultural identity differences led to the emergence of rebel groups such as; the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), Eritrean insurgent groups, the Ethiopian Democratic Union (EDU), the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) a Benishangul Gumuz Liberation Movement (BGLM). These groups were supported by Sudan, Somalia and the last one by Eritrea. Ethiopia opposed the states friendly to Eritrea which also share an Islamic culture with Sudan and Somalia. It retaliated by supporting factions in the two countries. In the

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case of Somalia, Ethiopia supported Kenya in the Shifta War and in Sudan, it supported Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) in the South.

Additionally, Ethiopia and Eritrea extend their rivalry in fragmented Somalia where they support opposing factions. The increase in Al-Shabaab activities in Somalia with massive resource support from Al-Qaeda led Ethiopia to send troops to Somalia in 2006. Eritrea took the opposing side by supporting the Al-Shabaab. The Eritrea Islamic Jihad Movement (EIJM) was linked to Al-Qaeda. The involvement was exposed when Al-Shabaab key members held a meeting in Eritrea which gave refuge to Al-Qaeda’s leader Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys whom the UN Security Council declared a terrorist.

In 2008 the US threatened to sanction Eritrea with travel, trade and investment veto, and to declare it a state sponsor of terrorism. The Obama administration accused Eritrea of allowing arms transit to Al-Shabaab militia in a bid to undermine Ethiopia’s fight against the terror group. Ethiopia partnered with the US to fight the Islamic insurgents in Somalia. President Barack Obama praised Ethiopia for its role in combating Al Shabaab militants.

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275 Bereketeab. “Self-Determination and Secessionism in Somaliland and South Sudan,” p.71.


279 Ibid


Ethiopia’s poor inter-state relation ended up in proxy wars in Somalia’s terror tormented afflictions.

**War on Terror and Political Islam**

While the end of Cold War reduced geopolitical importance attached to the Horn, September 11, 2001, hereafter 9/11, attack in the US redirected the interests of the West to the Horn due to the linkage of the region to terrorism. For instance, Sudan provided shelter to Osama bin Laden a central figure in terror activities. Before it, US embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam were bombed by terror groups connected to Osama Bin Laden and Al Qaeda. It prompted the US and European Union (EU) involvement with some countries in the Horn to uproot Al-Shabaab, an Al-Qaeda affiliate based in Somalia. Djibouti hosts the East Africa Counter-Terrorism Initiative (EACTI), funded by the US. Terrorism and war on terror reinforced the challenges of Postcoloniality.

Partnership with major powers in the Horn against War on Terror came with challenges. First, countries in the Horn sought to benefit through enhancing their political position in the region to defeat their enemies. Second, favored states receive external support increasing the division in the region. Third, it enhanced comparing and contrasting of identities along religious lines thereby creating suspicions.

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285 Ibid, p.89.

The thin border between political Islam and War on Terror polarized countries in the Horn. Ethiopia and Eritrea are on opposing sides. Ethiopia with a large Muslim population has to balance issues on religion and has taken a stand against political Islam. It has engaged in fighting Al-Shabaab insurgents in Somalia to curb the desire for an Islamic state, considered a threat to Ethiopia's territorial integrity.287

The terror from Al-Shabaab threatens territorial integrity as the group demands Islamic adherence in state's peripheral regions, especially in Kenya. It does this through multiple attacks in Kenya and Uganda. Kenya which borders Somalia to the Northeast has had most casualties.288 The presence of refugee camps which host Somalia citizens continual flee because of instabilities complicate security matters. Apart from the refugee camps, there is a considerable population of Somalis in Kenya's North Eastern region which encourages cross-border flows of people including the Al-Shabaab militants. Cultural affiliations and nomadic activities allow movement along the Somali inhabited states in the Horn and eases the militants’ movement.

The brief rule of Islamic Court Union (ICU) in Somalia advanced an Islamic state ideology. ICU leaders made public statements which threatened Ethiopia’s national security and territorial integrity.289 The same threat led to insecurities of Kenya's Northeastern region through attacks on non-Muslims. The Al-Shabaab insecurities prompted Kenya's 2011 intervention in Somalia in a bid to uproot the Al-Shabaab militants.

289 Bereketeab. “Self-Determination and Secessionism in Somaliland and South Sudan,” P. 88
Given the above, Sudan which initially had strong support of political Islam has taken a low key on the matter. Compared to Kenya, Ethiopia, and Uganda, Sudan is yet to take a firm stand against political Islam. Post-colonial ‘Sudans' presented a non-melting pot of identities in the Horn of Africa. The intermixture of races, ethnicities, and religion posted a complicated situation. North Sudan was under Egypt practicing Arabism and Islamism while the South was under the British practicing Christianity, therefore, the divisive North-South policies. Besides, the suppression of the South by the British led to economic divide, with the South un-educated and underdeveloped. The divisive character benefited British and Northern Sudan in what would later play out as an inferior/superior race which looked down upon South.

The educated Arabic-Muslim North took the mandate to govern Sudan and impose Arabic and Islam culture on the black Africans in the South. The North's policies paved the way for demands of autonomy by the South that led to the referendum and the subsequent South Sudan state in 2011.

South Sudan brought with it challenges to African borders. Also, the creation of an external state border from an internal one led to points of contestation between the two ‘Sudans.’ A key aspect contributing to contestation is the existence of oil in the conflict border points. Despite state borders, the South exports its oil via pipelines in Sudan. Again, change of governance occurred while some structures remained the same resonating with colonial-postcolonial Africa's experience.

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Ilemi Triangle and the Colonial History

The Ilemi Triangle is named after Chief Anuak Ilemi Akuok from Sudan. The triangle forms a border for Kenya, Ethiopia, and South Sudan. During the colonial rule, the British were not interested in the area. The neglect of the region became part of the problem because it lacks defined demarcations.

The Ilemi Triangle is known for its pasture and water points due to various swamps and the River Tarach. The Turkana from Kenya, Merille from Dassanetch, Toposa from Sudan, Tirma and Nyangatom from Ethiopia have over the years shared the pasture and water in the area. The British colonial governments allowed the neutrality of the region to avoid pastoral conflicts over the resources. The triangle experiences conflict over pasture from the mentioned pastoral communities and also cross-border animal raids. Apart from inadequate demarcation, the pastoral nature of the communities implies elastic borders and with it conflict.

In 1902, 1907 and 1972 Ethiopia signed treaties with Sudan where it agreed the region belonged to Sudan. The region is however disputed between Kenya and South Sudan. Over the Years, Sudan allowed the Turkana community in Kenya to graze their animals in the region. The elasticity between the 1902 Maud line, the 1938 Redline and 1947 Blue line fails to meet laws on the territorial integrity of states. The shifts in the borderline are the source of conflict since there is no one agreed border.

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3.6 Conclusion

Africa border challenges stem from the differences in colonial experiences, and the notion of the artificiality of borders yet all borders are human-made hence artificial and arbitrary. The North-South divide which emanates from an ambiguous North Africa and Sub Sahara separation plays out down to state level. Intrinsic in the divide are racial underpinnings constructed as superior/inferior human qualifications. These create competing relations that plague physical demarcation and identification of states and by extension the people within.

The colonial experience left social-cultural, political and psychological effects to races and ethnicities in Africa which created hierarchies of superior-inferior identity notions. Black Africans became the inferior category. Within, ethnicities were ranked too based on physical manifestations of bodily features. Physiognomy constructed ‘superior’ ethnicities against the ‘inferior’ ones. Irredentism and secession became part of state struggles with issues on contested borders multiplying.

Irredentism and calls for secession were countered by territorial integrity norm as supported by the AU. Use of a group's uniqueness could imply a right to demands for separation, and this is a threat to state territorial integrity unless there is consent from the state of origin and recognition from other states.

Despite OAU and later AU upholding the sanctity of state borders, Eritrea managed to break away from Ethiopia through claims of a right to self-determination. Moreover, South Sudan

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became independent from Sudan through secession. The secession of both countries countered the notion of inviolability of borders achieved at independence, however, Ethiopia and Sudan consented to the secession validating the two which were subsequently recognized by the UN and AU hence gaining legitimacy.

The notion of irredentist-secession increased due to the presence of shared cross-border communities in African states. A common cross-border led to a rise of militias who through the promotion of group ideals received covert support from neighboring states. Such states use militias as proxies to launch attacks on neighboring ones. To date, borders such as Eritrea-Ethiopia, South Sudan-Sudan, DRC-Rwanda-Uganda, Kenya-Somalia, Nigeria-Chad-Niger-Cameroon, Mali-Libya-Niger, Western Sahara-Morocco-Algeria experience border and identity-related insecurities.

The size of most African states challenges the state borders. Large size includes diverse social-cultural communities concerning religion and ethnicities and their constructed physiognomic differences. Also, the large sizes incapacitate government's presence in the border zones due to limited resources. An unequal development, with least developed border regions, creates the idea of marginalization.

The issue of marginalization construct differences that divide, separate and pity one identity against another and defy state borders. The constructed differences enable factions to construct more divisions. Terrorists capitalize on identity divisions within a state to undertake their

activities. Furthermore, terrorists recruit vulnerable members to undertake terror activities either within or across state borders. Political Islam wedges proxy wars using religion.

In the end, conflicts bring down or weaken state machinery and force populations to flee across international borders. In such cases, refugees transfer conflicts to the host states, while promoting hide-out joints for militias.

African states thus struggle with the issue of holding a unitary state, providing basic needs to all the populations equitably, managing the vast border regions, and avoiding intra-state conflicts with an international character. Kin relation across state borders encourages cross-border activities whether positive or negative. The reason for these challenges is a failure by all post-colonial states to construct national identity and culture that supersedes sub-state identities. An absence of nationalistic ideologies and innovative ways in which citizens legitimize polities.\textsuperscript{298}

\textsuperscript{298} Khadiagalla. “Boundaries in Eastern Africa,” p. 266
CHAPTER 4: KENYA’S PERCEPTION OF THE KENYA-SOMALIA BORDER, IDENTITY AND (IN)SECURITY.

4.0 Introduction

Kenya covers a land area of 581,313.2 square Kilometers. It carries a population of 37,724,850 as per the 2009 government census and a UN estimate of over 50 million as of April 2018. Kenya borders Ethiopia to the North, South Sudan to the North-West, Uganda to the West, Tanzania to the South-West, the Indian Ocean to the South-East and Somalia from the East and all the way to the North-East.

Kenya’s ethno-lingual composition is ranked at number twelve in the world making it among the most diverse countries. Papua New Guinea is ranked as the most diverse followed in descending order by Tanzania, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Uganda, Liberia, Cameroon, Togo, South Africa, Congo, Madagascar, and Gabon. Kenya has more than forty ethnic groups which include Kikuyu, Luhya, Kalenjin, Luo, Kamba, Kisii, Mijikenda and Meru. The 2009 census indicated a population of more than a million people in each of the above mentioned ethnic groups. Besides, there were the Kenya-Somalis whose figures were marred by anomalies. Somali population stood at 800,000 in the 1999 census making the 2009

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2 ibid
population of 2, 385,572 problematic. While the number of Somali households and women remained the same, the number of men tripled. An increase in the number of men without the same in women is a biological impossibility. Over the years, Somali male mobility depends upon their female immobility. Females retain the roots while male seeks and multiply wealth in various locations. The amplified number of men raised security concerns over border infiltrations by Somalia's citizens.

The historical identity crisis at the Kenya-Somalia border links the Somalis to security concerns in Kenya which raises some questions on the notion of borders. Somalis linkage to border insecurities is due to differences in the perception of the border by both Kenya and Somalia. Kenya seems to hold the border as a strict, rigid ‘line,’ while Somalia perceives it as where Somalis live. The latter's view disregards other countries' borders with the Somali population in the belief of ‘Greater Somalia.'

Kenya's immediate pre-independence and postcolonial experiences explain its perception on the border, identity, and security. Kenya and Somalia contested over the NFD region. The British administration decided not to secede NFD despite a publicized referendum which favored secession with 87%. The failed referendum led to Shifta war, Somalia supported the NFD Somalis in the secession struggle as Kenya stressed the sanctity of borders acquired at independence. During the Ogaden War between Somalia and Ethiopia in 1977-1978, Kenya supported Ethiopia against the secession of the Ogaden region to Somalia. The outcome of the Ogaden war led to a massive inflow of refugees to Somalia.

8 Ibid
The refugees' increased internal problems in Somalia. In 1991 President Barre of Somalia was ousted, marking the beginning of increased refugees flow to Kenya and with it, border security concerns. The issue of insecurity re-emerged in Kenya in the form of terror attacks as refugee camps seemed to conceal the perpetrators. Local Somali populations withheld information which could aid in the counterterror attacks. Therefore, the multi-ethnic dynamics in Kenya portrays its inelastic perception of the border contrary to Somalia's elastic notion of state borders based on the Somali identity in the Horn.

4.1 Somalia and the Notion of Greater Somalia
The belief in "Greater Somalia" emanated from pre-independence rule and ambitions in the Horn of Africa in the 20th century. Around 1899-1920, Mohammad Abdulla Hassan, popularly known as the ‘Mad Mullah’ wanted to unite Somalis and remove non-Somalis considered as Kafirs (not of Islamic faith) from Somalia.11 He became an iconic figure for the Somalis. Sir Charles Elliot, the British Consul-General and commissioner from 1901 to 190412, proposed the placement of the lands occupied by Somalis in NFD under one government in the then British East African Protectorate (BEAP) that became Kenya.13 According to Elliot, Somalis were a different people from the rest of Kenya, in addition, NFD had a limited population. The presence of a differing adjoining administration, the Italian Somaliland made the proposal unviable.

Ernest Bevin, the British foreign secretary\textsuperscript{14} proposed ‘Greater Somalia’ again in 1946 in what became known as the ‘Bevin plan.’\textsuperscript{15} According to Bevin, a merger of the Somalis in the inhabited regions of British Somaliland, Ethiopia’s Ogaden, and Italian Somaliland would contain nomadic raids within one community.\textsuperscript{16} He thought Somalis unity would promote their way of life.\textsuperscript{17} It could prevent clashes between agricultural and nomadic communities. Bevin’s proposal came after the British and Italian Somali lands merger under the British Military Administration from 1941 to 1946 following Italy’s defeat by the Allied powers.\textsuperscript{18} The notion of Greater Somalia was a British plan.\textsuperscript{19} The Somalis seemed happy during that union.\textsuperscript{20}

Greater Somalia ideal advanced upon the 1949 UNGA decision to place Italian Somali under the United Nations Trusteeship Council for ten years.\textsuperscript{21} However, French Somaliland, NFD, and Ethiopia’s Ogaden were not part of the land under the UN Trusteeship. Therefore, the regions claimed by Somalia were never under one administration block, but this did not deter subsequent politics on greater Somalia.

\textbf{4.1.1 Mohammed Abdullah Hassan’s Role in Greater Somalia.}

Ethnic Somalis homogeneity is a product of colonialism which in turn was spearheaded by Abdullah Hassans’/ ‘Mullahs’ effort towards a ‘Somali’ unity. In 1898, a Sheikh wrote to the British expressing fear of the Abyssinians threat. In the letter, the Sheikh pledged allegiance to

\textsuperscript{16} Ibid
\textsuperscript{18} Lewis. \textit{A Pastoral Democracy}, p. 270
\textsuperscript{19} Hansard (Somalis) Government, House of Commons Debate, Volume 463 cc18223, Para 3, April 4, 1949
\textsuperscript{20} Ibid
\textsuperscript{21} Ibid
the British whom he observed were on one side of the Ogaden-Somalis while Abyssinia was on the other. The letter likened Somalis under the threat of Abyssinians as sheep under the knife and pledged for British protection.

In the beginning, Somalia’s current Southern parts were separate from the North and carried two main clans of, the Darod (Marehan, Ogaden, and Harti) and Hawiye (Ajuran and Degodia) in 1900. The South in fear of an Ethiopian expansion encouraged the British to hoist their flags in the region. Farah Ibrahim and Ahmed Murghan, the head of Sub-Ogaden clans of Mohammed Zubeir and Auliyahan respectively, requested the British to raise their flag in the South around 1898. After evading an Ethiopian occupation, these clans devised ways to expel foreign rule. They observed the Mullah from the North and his religious bid to bring Somalis together. The Southerners had little interest in the religious teaching but were impressed by the Mullahs’ defiance towards the Euro-Christian colonialists.

The Mullah embarked in a unity call for the North and central parts of Somalia. The unity encouraged migrations of the Marehan clan southwards. Clan feuds accompanied the migrations over territorial occupations essential for grazing animals. The Auliyahan, a sub-clan of the Ogaden, conflicted with the Marehan southern migrations. Meanwhile, the expansion of Auliyahan-Ogaden upwards agitated the Hawiye clans in central Somalia. Therefore the unity of a Somali religious identity was at the cost of clan suppression.

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23 Ibid
The first political party, the Somali Youth Club (SYC) founded in Mogadishu on May 13, 1943, attempted clan unity as influenced by the Greater Somalia idea from Mohammad Abdullah Hassan\textsuperscript{25} to pursue the goal of unifying Somalis.\textsuperscript{26} The SYC drew representatives from thirteen clans throughout Somalia.\textsuperscript{27} It was renamed the Somali Youth League (SYL), in 1947\textsuperscript{28} to advance the Greater Somalia objective. SYL established branches in Ethiopia’s Ogaden region and Kenya’s NFD to pursue unification goal.\textsuperscript{29} In 1948 the British colonial government outlawed all political parties in NFD.\textsuperscript{30} The government’s lift on the ban of political parties in 1960 coincided with the time of Somalia's independence, which encouraged Somalia and SYL in their agitations for NFD secession. Before the SYL, political parties in Somalia adhered to clan identities accompanied by feuds then blood compensations.\textsuperscript{31} The SYL created a unifying front for Pan Somali ideal. The perceived unity contributed towards the debate on territorial integrity versus self-determination in the Kenya-Somalia border problem.

4.2 The Border

Kenya and Somalia carry different concepts of the border. The difference emanates from the debate on territorial integrity Vis a Vis self-determination.\textsuperscript{32} Given territorial integrity, Kenya supports maintaining colonial borders inherited at independence. On the contrary, Somalia inclines to self-determination guided by the wishes of the people enclosed in a state border. Somalia's view is anchored in its 1960 constitution which calls for the unification of all Somali

\textsuperscript{25} Lewis, A Modern History of the Somali, P. 121.
\textsuperscript{26} Lewis, A Pastoral Democracy, p.304.
\textsuperscript{27} Ibid
\textsuperscript{29} Lewis, A Modern History of the Somali, p. 22
\textsuperscript{31} Ibid, pp. 122-129.
territories.\textsuperscript{33} Moreover, Somalia's 2012 constitution states that the boundaries of Somalia shall remain as specified in the 1960 constitution.\textsuperscript{34} The 1960 constitution supports irredentism, claiming regions occupied by ethnic Somalis in neighboring states through the Pan-Somali belief.

In the Pan-Somali philosophy, Somalia sought to revise colonial borders through expansion to the ‘Somalis inhabited' regions of Ogaden in Ethiopia, Djibouti, and NFD in Kenya. The five-pointed star on the Republic of Somali flag symbolizes the desire for unity. Somalia's approach to state borders is against OAU's view and the spirit of African unanimity.\textsuperscript{35} Despite Somalia’s insistence that the unification it sought was not a border dispute,\textsuperscript{36} the sought unification affected its borders with other states. From the international border perspective, Somali unification is a border dispute\textsuperscript{37} because of the physical shift of the geographic border from one region to another.

The notion of Somalia's borders put perpetual fear to Djibouti, Ethiopia and Kenya central governments due to the presence of Somali population. Furthermore, ethnic Somalis occupy border regions and share culture and identity with Somalia. The fear of the peripheries is emblematic given Somalia's flag whose five-pointed star indicates the general directions occupied by ethnic Somalis to date. Their population in these regions pointed out the star symbol stating that as long as the star remains, their hope to re-join Somalia lives on.\textsuperscript{38}

\textsuperscript{33} The Republic of Somali Constitution of, 1960, Article 6(4). Available at http://www.ilo.org/
\textsuperscript{35} Lewis. A Modern History of the Somali, p. 199
\textsuperscript{36} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{37} Drysdale. The Somali Dispute, pp.7-8, 22-24.
\textsuperscript{38} Interview with Civil Society Chairman in Garissa. October 24, 2016. Nomads Palace Garissa. Also, Elder Focus Group in Mandera November 10, 2016, Office of the Marginalized Community, Mandera Town.
constructed symbolism forms part of the Kenya-Somalia border problem whose ideology accounts for Somalia’s perception of the border before and after Kenya’s independence.

4.2.1 Contextualizing the Shifta War and the then Northern Frontier District/ North Eastern Province, 1962-1969

The Northern Frontier District/ North Eastern Province
The British administration ceded the Northern half of Jubaland to Italy and constructed the Northern Frontier District (NFD) in 1925.\(^{39}\) The British colonial government carved NFD out of Jubaland province, presently in southern Somalia region.\(^{40}\) Jubaland became part of Italian Somali as gratitude for supporting the allies in the Great War. Britain retained the southern half and formed the Northern Frontier Province (NFP) which bordered Ethiopia and Somalia. NFD was twice the size of England\(^{41}\) at 264,178.787 square Kilometers\(^{42}\) and almost half the size of Kenya's 581,313.2 square Kilometers. The NFD, an arid to semi-arid land had poor infrastructure compared to the core regions. A majority Somali Muslim community occupied NFD thus differences with Kenya and similarity with Somalia. It complicated Kenya's path to independence and post-colonial experience.

African leaders’ major preoccupation was to attain independence. The Pan African movement pushed for the independence of all African colonies despite prevailing border and identity problems.\(^{43}\) Somalia attained independence in 1960 and began to call for the Somali people

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\(^{41}\) Hansard. The Earl of Lytton, col 602, Paragraph 3

\(^{42}\) Castagno. “The Somali-Kenyan Controversy,” p. 165


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occupied regions unification ignoring existing borders. Somalia claimed the NFD. Kenya countered the claim and insisted that NFD is its territory regardless of who occupied it.

**Pre-Independence Politics and the NFD Issue in Kenya (1962-1963).**

Divisive politics characterized the pre-independence political parties in Kenya. Identity politics were not new, the genesis dated back to the British East Africa (BEA) protectorate. The British settlement Act of 1887 enjoined the British government to run matters of the protectorate. The British settlement Act of 1887 enjoined the British government to run matters of the protectorate.

The government formed the first Legislative Council (Legco) in 1906 headed by a governor who managed the affairs of the protectorate in the territory. The Governor was Legco’s Speaker till 1948.

The settlers, spearheaded by Lord Delamere and the Protectorate under Sir Charles Elliot formed Legco in 1906 with an objective of creating a ‘white man's colony and eventually country. Legco sat for the first time in 1907 and from a 9 membership, three un-officials were white settlers who demanded that future nominations of un-officials be done by themselves. Ultimately, the Legislative Council Ordinance of 1919 endorsed elections for representatives from eleven constituencies. However, only Europeans were eligible for elections therefore, in 1920, the first ‘elected’ members of the Legco were Europeans, in the same year, the protectorate was declared a British colony.

An exclusive white membership in Legco and change of status to a colony attracted the Indians call for equality with the whites. The former wanted land from the colony too. Indians’

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demands led to the introduction of the Devonshire white paper in 1923 by the British government to avoid a clash between the settlers, Indians and the locals. The white paper specified that in the event of a disagreement between the settlers and the natives, the interests of the latter surpassed the settlers.’ The colony status threatened the Africans who feared a further loss of land and racial discrimination. A demand for land by Indians too meant an exacerbated situation. In 1924 an amendment in the Legco electoral eligibility laws allowed the Indians and Arabs to participate in elections while Africans were left out.

In 1925, Legco made room for African representatives, and ironically they were represented by European missionaries until 1944 when Eliud Mathu became the first African representative. In 1948 four Africans were in the Legco though inequality with whites led to further agitations. In 1951 the colonial government proposed the Royal order changes in which members of the Legco increased to 26. The Europeans got 14 elective posts from the initial 11, Asians and Arabs got one more thus, 6 and 2 respectively, Africans nominees increased from 4 to 6. The order took effect in 1952. In the same year, the Mau Mau uprising begun where Africans agitated for independence and land dabbed correspondingly as *Uhuru na Mashamba*. African’s fight for land had begun early 1900s leading Harry Thuku to form Young Kikuyu Association (YKA) which morphed into the East African Association (EAA). Thuku fought against forced labor and unfair taxation of Africans, the colonial government arrested him in 1922 which provoked the ‘Harry Thuku Riots.’ The agitations led to the formation of Kikuyu Central Association (KCA) in the same year to end the ‘*ahoi*’ (beggars) status where the settlers

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had reduced the Kikuyu land owning families into beggars.\textsuperscript{48} The riots led to arrests and deaths which forced KCA to go underground. KCA operations gained new leadership in Jesse Kariuki, Joseph Kang’etha and Jomo Kenyatta. In 1928 Kenyatta became the General Secretary of KCAs’ and later founded the newsletter \textit{Muiguithania} (the Unifier).\textsuperscript{49} The colonial government banned all African political bodies in 1940 but secret operations gave rise to the Mau Mau uprising which spread out in 1952. The agitations in the period 1940-1952 led to several developments, among them was the formation of the Kenya African Study Union (KASU) in 1944 to help Eliud Mathu in legislative matters. KASU had nationwide membership compared to KCA. In 1946, KASU became Kenya African Union (KAU).\textsuperscript{50} Jomo Kenyatta became KAU’s president in 1947. The onset of Mau Mau and mounting agitations for independence and land led the British parliamentary delegates to the colonial secretary 1954 recommendations for a racially inclusive tactic.\textsuperscript{51}

Following the royal recommendations, the colonial Secretary of State Oliver Lyttelton proposed a racially inclusive constitution known as the ‘Lyttelton Constitution’ in 1954. The constitution led to the formation of a 12 member council of ministers. 6 of the members were Governor's appointees while, the remaining shared, 3 Europeans, 2 Asians and 1 African. Africans were dissatisfied with this arrangement and rejected the council seat.

In 1958 the Allan Lennox Boyd, the successor of Lyttelton led to the Lennox Boyd Constitution. Legco members increased to 16\textsuperscript{52} whereby, 8 of the member were elected, while

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{48} Ibid, p.86
\item \textsuperscript{49} Pio Gama Pinto. \textit{Glimpses of Kenya’s Nationalist Struggles}. (Nairobi: African Asian Heritage Trust, 1963), p. 9
\item \textsuperscript{50} Ibid, p. 14
\item \textsuperscript{52} Ibid, P.113
\end{itemize}
the other 8 were appointed which retained the Europeans majority. The constitution removed the Executive council and replaced it with the Council of Ministers represented by two Africans and Asians respectively and four Europeans. Land issues were not addressed and neither were political prisoners set free. Agitations for independence increased as Africans demanded for a constitution for independence. Africans and Asians boycotted the Legco in 1958 prompting the British government to accept a meeting for a constitution conference.

In 1960 Ian Macleod, the colonial Secretary of State presided over the first constitutional conference held in London. Present at the conference were different racial groups.\textsuperscript{53} The Macleod Constitution increased the number of the Legco to 65 where racial minorities received 20 slots.\textsuperscript{54} The nationals continued with a path for political party formations. Meanwhile the colonial minority rule saw a means to divide the nationals.

Upon formation of the Kenya National African Union (KANU) in March 27, 1960, those who felt sidelined by the ‘main identities’ in KANU decided to form an alternative party to represent minority identity group which comprised of an amalgamation of regional parties that is, the Kalenjin Political Alliance, Coast African Political Union, Maasai United Front and Kenya African People’s Union. In June 25, 1960 four of the regional parties in addition to Somali National Association led by Osman Araru met in Ngong and formed Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU).\textsuperscript{55} The Macleod Constitution scheduled the first elections in January 1961. Observably, members of the Legco appeared to change from a racial representations to political parties. KANU won the 1961 elections while KADU and New

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{54} Ibid
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Kenya Group (NKG), a European party formed a coalition. Europeans dominance continued in the coalition. KANU refused to form a government awaiting the release of Jomo Kenyatta from prison therefore KADU formed the government. The European dominance in KADU represented the minority rule fear of an African government and spearheaded for regionalism/Majimbo in KADU.

In 1962, the second Lancaster House Conference was held amidst disagreements between KANU and KADU on the mode of government for the independence constitution. The Lancaster House conference reached a new constitution with a bi-cameral form of government. The Lancaster House conference adopted regionalism/Majimbo which divided the Kenyan colony into seven regions each with a legislature and an executive wing. There were a total of 131 House of Representatives and 41 Senators. The Internal self-government or ‘majimbosim’ became established in 1963 and negotiation for an independence constitution began.

The perceived divisions in the Second Lancaster House conference constitution disrupted efforts to form a new constitution for independence. Political parties disagreed on the form of governance. KANU geared for a central unitary government while KADU desired regionalism/Majimboism, which reflected the second Lancaster House Conference where the established seven regions managed their own civil affairs under the federal government.

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KANU rejected regionalism in the argument that it would fragment the country into ethnic territories.60 Amidst the independence constitution debate, there were ongoing developments in NFD and Coastal region. The Regional Boundaries Commission (RBC) had an ongoing exercise of demarcating the regions. Identity confusion and political developments marred the coastal region and NFD boundaries formation. Around the same time, the constituency commission finished its report and recommended it to be read together with the findings of the RBC report.61 The colonial government formed RBC to solve ethnic rivalries in constituency boundaries.62 The RBC placed NFD and the Coast in one region to give Kenya a viable decision in case NFD seceded.63 It provided a possibility of NFD’s secession and Coastal region’s autonomy.

The Coastal region had two political parties before Kenya's independence. The Coast African Political Union (CAPU) and the Coast People's Party (CPP). Both parties desired autonomy. The Coastal region was allocated to the Sultan of Zanzibar in 1886 through the Anglo-Germany treaty. Based on prior ownership, the two coastal parties submitted a communication to the then colonial secretary Duncan Sandy demanding that, the Sultan of Zanzibar should consult them before integrating the region to Kenya. The Coastal region stressed self-rule64 to the Sultan of Zanzibar, the British administration and Kenyan government. CPP general secretary Mr. Ali Abdulla argued that the 1886 agreement gave the British rights to administer and rent the area; also, the British were to give a six months' notice before making any changes in

64 Daily Nation, "We Want Self Rule." February 14th, 1963. P. 2
region's management.\textsuperscript{65} CAPU’s general Secretary Mr. Sammy Omari supported CPP through arguments that, "We consider it vital that the Sultan should consult us before any integration is agreed upon."\textsuperscript{66} It was February 1963, a six months' notice meant, Kenya's independence was not likely before August of 1963. The coastal leadership supported the \textit{Majimbo} ideal while NFD demanded secession.

KANU and KADU differences were on whether to adopt a unitary government or Majimbo system. Whereas KANU wanted a unitary government, KADU desired the second Lancaster House structure in which every region managed its affairs.\textsuperscript{67} The white minority rule constructed Majimboism in KADU and capitalized on the propaganda of fear and instituted it in the second Lancaster House conference as regionalism. Numerically small ethnic groups which included European, Asian and Arab communities supported KADU.\textsuperscript{68} The white minority rule feared loss of property and investments under a centralized African government.\textsuperscript{69} Within the constructed fears were two distinct groups, the NFD secessionist movement and the Arabs in the coastal strip who advanced for autonomy.\textsuperscript{70} Despite KANU and KADU’s differences, they were in agreement against NFD secession\textsuperscript{71}

The NFD secession question built up amidst internal identity politics. Secession demands increased while deliberations for a constitution and Kenya’s independence were ongoing. The question of identity was at the core of both desires for regionalism by the Coastal people and

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{65} Ibid
\item \textsuperscript{66} Ibid
\item \textsuperscript{67} Daily Nation. "NFD: The Case against Seccession." November 22\textsuperscript{nd}, 1962.
\item \textsuperscript{68} Okoth-Ogendo “The Politics of Constitutional Change in Kenya since Independence,” p. 13.
\item \textsuperscript{69} Ibid
\item \textsuperscript{70} Ibid
\item \textsuperscript{71} Lewis. A Modern History of the Somali, p. 187.
\end{itemize}
separatism by NFD.\textsuperscript{72} The latter constructed their agitation as ethnic Somalis oneness with Somalia as opposed to other Kenyan ethnic groups.

Kenya's imminent independence made NFD leaders uneasy as they desired to secede before it occurred. The NFD formed a committee and were among the groups that headed to the Lancaster House Conference.\textsuperscript{73} The committee wanted the colonial government to recognize the region as a separate entity. It was clear NFD was against the handover of the region to black leadership.\textsuperscript{74} As a result, the colonial government formed the NFD commission. As Kenya's leadership worked out the modalities of the new constitution, NFD waited for the region's commission outcome. The commission aimed to determine whether the people in the region desired to remain in Kenya or secede and join Somalia.\textsuperscript{75} The creation of the commission indicated an acknowledgment of an identity problem.

The NFD commission headed by Major General Bogart, a Canadian, and E.C.M Onyuike a Nigerian, had two fundamental challenges. The first was the anti-secessionist group under a political party named Northern Province United Association (NPUA) which ordered its followers to boycott the commission's work.\textsuperscript{76} NPUA stated that though NFD comprised of eight districts (Moyale, Marsabit, Rendile, Isiolo Maralal, Mandera, Wajir, Garissa), the commission was investigating six districts. According to NPUA, the NFD commissions’ mandate was flawed and could not get the real views of the whole populace. NPUA was left out during the Lancaster House constitutional conference which decided to form the

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{Weitzberg2016} Weitzberg, We Do Not Have Borders, p. 116
\bibitem{Nene2015} Nene. Bandits at the Border. P. 86
\end{thebibliography}
commission. NPUA argued that NFD commission was a discussion between Britain and Somalia which overlooked ‘Kenya's' interest. The head of Northern Peoples Province Party (NPPP) a pro-secessionist party negated NPUA’s view stating that its leader Osman Araru is an Ethiopian representing the government of Ethiopia for fear that, the secession of NFD would imply secession of the Ogaden region in Ethiopia.

The NFD Commission engaged the people through public forums to establish pro-Kenya Vis a Vis Pro-Somalia opinion. The commission was aware of divisions within the Somalis where some regarded others as half-Somali but, pursued the need to establish real cultural identity. The results were not particular on cultural identity. The outcome showed a division of the people as either Muslim or non-Muslim. The commission used religious affiliations to show those in favor of or against secession. The members of Rendile and Gelubba communities, with the latter located at Loyangilani area, bordering Ethiopia are non-Muslim but preferred secession which baffled the commission. Cushitic identity grounded the people's decision to secede or not to secede. In other reports, the Negro/Non-Negro line was the dividing factor. A further explanation indicated that Somalis and Galla differ from the rest of Kenya as the Chinese and English. Racism around this period was unacceptable, and people navigated the issue by highlighting religion, culture, and pastoralism as distinctive markers of difference with the rest of Kenya.

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77 Ibid
80 Weitzberg, We Do Not Have Borders, p. 118
The non-Muslim group that opted for secession
81 Hansard. Northern Frontier District. "HL Deb 03 April 1963 Vol 248 cc606
The commission noted that non-Somali communities’ feared secession to Somalia. Some Rendile and Galla later wrote letters to the commission stating that secession would render them minorities, threaten their status, and animal ownership in Somalia.82 The Boran-Sakuye and the Watta indicated the likelihood of enslavement in Somalia83 revealing a further sub-division from pan-Cushitic to clannism. In the latter, clans are hierarchical in status, and those falling outside the Somali clans are ranked low in Somalia.84

The second challenge was the launch of Boundaries Commission which occurred before NFD commission begun its work. The boundary commission’s mandate was set out as ‘creation of boundaries based on the peoples’ language and way of life while respecting people’s wishes.’85

NFD and Somalia viewed the Boundaries Commission as an undermining of the NFD Commission. Part of NFD leaders refused to participate and to welcome the regional boundaries commission in the area. Despite the hesitation by NFD leaders, the regional boundaries commission began its work but after NFD commission had commenced its duties.

The Regional Boundaries Commission released the proposed regional map in December 1962 which received mixed views from the people.86 The President of KADU, Ronald Ngala expressed satisfaction stating that the Commission's report meant the party would attain almost everything it wanted.87 However, KANU's secretary General Tom Mboya indicated that the commission was in place from Lancaster House Agreement and therefore according to KANU, the final decision on regional boundaries was to come from an agreement between KANU and

82 Weitzberg, We Do Not Have Borders, p. 119
83 Ibid
KADU. Also, the regional boundaries report included comments from the people of Maralal who observed that NFD entailed the Rendile, Turkana, Borana, and Samburu which rejected the Somalis exclusive claim.

Maralal people stated that the Somalis had patterns of movement due to trading and were, therefore, not indigenous to the region. The comment was indicated in the reports oral presentation. Furthermore, the regional boundaries report included an observation by the NFD report which stated that the people of that region wished to join Somalia.

Allegiance to Kenya Vis a Vis Somalia appeared to consolidate a native status. Somali secession told the story of a people who felt as non-natives in Kenya. Meanwhile, the group that opposed secessionism in NFD, specifically the Rendile, Boran-Sakuye, and Watta defended their native status in NFD. The group argued that secessionists were aliens. The native logic appeared to validate colonial construction of Somali expansionism. It shows why Jomo Kenyatta later implored those who felt they were not one with Kenya to feel free and go to their native countries albeit without the territory. Nativism appeared to go together with territoriality.

The regional boundaries report revealed ethnic divisions within the country, particularly in NFD which needed immediate attention. Internal political competition between KANU and KADU enhanced the divisions. During a KADU meeting held at the West-bank of Tana

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88 Ibid, ”Mboya: We couldn't alter it.” P. 1  
89 Kenya. Regional Boundaries Commission, Cmd, 1899, pp. 43-105  
90 Ibid.  
91 Weitzberg. We Do Not Have Borders, p.223  
92 Ibid, p.119  
River,94 the Somalis and the Riverine communities' disagreement resulted in injuries of 24 people including the police. The government dispatched the General Service Unit (GSU) to the region. It was the beginning of insecurity and use of state security mechanisms to curb the border problem in the region.

The Regional Boundary Commission promoted inclusion of similar ethnic groups under one landmass and border within the country to avoid ethnic strife. 'Nativist' territories spearheaded NFDs claim of a unique identity and desire to unite with Somalia intimating a shift of the international border. Somalia supported the region's secession.

The Afro-Asian Conference held in Tanganyika in February 1963 passed a motion in favor of NFD secession which gained international attention.95 In the conference Aden Muro, the representative of Somalia argued that failure to address the artificial boundaries set by colonial government’s amount to creating dangerous problems.96 At the same conference, Somalia referred to Ethiopia as imperial.97 The delegates rejected Somalia’s remark observing its lack of consistency with African views of retaining inherited international borders.

Besides, at the Afro-Asian Conference, the then KANU vice President Mr. Oginga Odinga said Majimbo was a creation of imperialists.98 He observed that America and Britain imperial forces were using some locals as stooges to impose neo-colonialism in the constitution. According to Mr. Odinga, the regional constitution was “the latest product of these wicked design”99 whose

95 Lewis. A Modern History of the Somali, p. 198
97 Ibid
99 Ibid
intention was to enhance tribalism and disrupt nationalistic forces in the country. Furthermore, he argued that wherever border problems ensued, imperialists offered military aid to one side or the other to bait them into their military Cold War blocs.\footnote{Ibid}

The issue of NFD secession was brought up again in the Addis Ababa summit in May 1963. Following the motion in support of NFD secession in the Afro Asian Conference in Tanganyika, Ethiopia embarked on fighting Pan-Somali ideals in Addis Ababa.\footnote{Summit Conference of Independent African States. “Proceedings of the Summit Conference of Independent African States.” Volume 1, Section 2, Addis Ababa, May 1963, \textit{Summit/CIAS/GEN/INV/43}. pp.3-8} Somalia attended the Addis Ababa summit reluctantly given the border problem with Ethiopia. Though Somalia taled the idea of ethnic Somalis’ unity, African governments were against it and insisted on colonial borders irrespective of identities in a state.\footnote{Lewis. \textit{A Modern History of the Somali}, pp. 199-201}

### 4.3 Identity: Kenya’s Perception of the Non-Africans 1962-1963

The issue of identity constantly changed among various populations in pre-independence Kenya, where identity was racial and hierarchical.\footnote{Maxon, Majimbo in Kenya’s Past, pp, 1-5} The colonial administration classified people as either tribes or races under the categories of native and non-native.\footnote{Mahmood Mamdani. \textit{Define and Rule: Native as a Political Identity}. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press), 2012.} Tribe included various native\footnote{Mahmood Mamdani. \textit{Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism}. (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1996), pp.3-8} ethnic groups. Non-natives were races such as Europeans, Asians, and Arabs and received excellent treatment and access to good hospitals and social amenities. Tribes were local to the land and, were forced to live within bounded territories.\footnote{Ali A. Mazrui. \textit{The African Condition: A political Diagnosis}. (London: Cambridge University Press, 1980), p. 7} Natives were considered
below the stature of non-natives.\textsuperscript{107} The natives and non-natives classification was not clear-
cut since other identities presented ambiguities in between. For starters, a section of what
appeared as Somali ethnic group was ambiguous. Initially, all Somalis were under the category
of natives. But some urban Somalis of the Isaaq clan demanded non-native status in the early
1900s. The Harti Somalis joined them. Both groups operated businesses in urban centers.\textsuperscript{108}
Their area of operation gave them access to the British administrators both in Nairobi and
Britain. They were able to present their issues to the colonial government.

Some Somalis through the agitation of the Isaaq clan rejected an African identity.\textsuperscript{109} The Isaaq
clan claimed a Yemen origin, therefore, an Arab identity. The British Administration through
the Somali Exemption ordinance of 1919\textsuperscript{110} accommodated a section of ‘alien’ Somalis as non-
natives.\textsuperscript{111} The ordinance promoted the idea that Somalis were different from others in the
colony.

The non-native status prompted a demand to pay higher non-native taxes to which the Isaaq
paid 30 rupees from 1920 to 1936. Later the British administration introduced a new non-native
scale where Europeans paid a tax of 40 rupees, Asians 30 and other non-natives 20. The Isaaq
were in the last category and were dissatisfied. In 1937 they requested the then colonial
secretary Ormsby-Gore to appoint a board to look into their grievances. In 1938 the Isaaq sent
a petition to King George IV.\textsuperscript{112} Meanwhile, they continued to pay the 30 shillings tax instead

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292, 1974, p. 326
\textsuperscript{111} Ibid, p. 328
\end{flushright}
of 20 in the argument that their status remained unchanged. In 1939, a few members began to pay the new taxes. In the same year, they learned that King George IV had rejected their petition. In 1940 the Isaaq resumed tax payment of ‘other’ non-native category. In the same year, the colonial government changed the mode of non-native taxation as dependent on one's income to avoid pegging it to rights.

The colonial government found it problematic to identify native Somalis from non-natives. The government revised the Isaaq and Harti Somalis status to natives. The provision on non-native status allowed the overlapping of international and local identity to Isaaq and Harti Somalis. Other non-native peoples within Kenya included the Indians, Arabs and white settlers.

The non-native identity was crucial to power in pre-independence Kenya. But the divide in native-non-native was a racially motivated structure. As the country approached independence, the non-natives who maltreated Africans found themselves in an ambiguous position. Among these were Somalis who had insisted on a non-native identity though later they embraced an African identity. The African identity appeared linked to the geographic region, not race. Meanwhile, the color of one's skin remained silenced. The ambiguity promoted a challenging debate on whether being African was vested in racial identity or regional identity. Some Somalis were quick to point out that Somalis were Africans inferring the continental commonality. Others went ahead to discredit previous kin who had claimed Asiatic status indicating them as misguided.

114 Weitzberg. We Do Not Have Borders, p. 64
115 Ibid, Pp. 59-64.
116 Salim. “Native or Non-Native?” p.83
Rationality of Asiatic status was quickly fading away. The Isaaq joined the rest of Somalis as a unit in the early 60s. The Somali new-formed unity constructed NFD's regional uniqueness from the rest of Kenya as independence neared.

On the eve of Kenya's independence, fragmentation of multiple identities called for unity. On October 26, 1962, Kenyatta particularly urged the Indian and African communities to unite. The KANU leadership noted that colonization and slavery subjugated black Africans in which the Indians and white settlers undermined them. Kenyatta told the non-black races to adopt "brotherhood with us." He warned, "those people who do not want to unite with us, to them I say slowly and without prejudice, although we want you, you think too much of yourself, and it is better for you to go." The warning was in the context of internal political divisions. Amidst these were calls for NFD secession attributed to Somalis unique identity.

The Asians (Indians) were a business community and did not support NFD secession from Kenya. Secession was bound to increase taxes and eventually cause loses. In Ethiopia, the border community made cross-border purchases from the Kenyan side to avoid the hefty prices of essential goods. Kenya's low prices gave the Asian businesses an advantage. It led to their identity construction as part and parcel of Kenya. Though they initially supported KADU political party and the idea of regionalism, they later joined KANU in 1963 and were lauded by Kenyatta in the depiction of genuine solidarity with the people of Kenya.

117 Ibid
118 Daily Nation, "Kenyatta's Appeal to Unite." Friday, October 26, 1962.
120 Ibid.
In February of the same year, Mahmoud Aden Muro headed the Somali delegation from the Somalia Parliament at the Afro-Asian Peoples’ solidarity conference held in Moshi, Tanganyika. He informed of a resolution passed in Somalia’s parliament for NFD secession to retain the ‘spirit of brotherhood’ with the neighboring states. Somalia’s brotherhood with Kenya was conditional by giving up NFD. Furthermore, Muro stated that “you cannot hold people by force.” He warned against ill-treatment of NFD Somalis and stated that Somalia would retaliate Kenya’s threat of war. The Somalis in NFD identified with Somalia which supported and urged them to secede, defying the state borders identity.

Somalia’s view of identity stretched beyond the colonial state borders. According to Somalia, ethnicity of the people informed the border. Kenya opposed this view as was feared to lead to a balkanization of the country. Kenya and Somalia’s opposing views of the border led to the Shifta war of 1963-1967.


The term ‘Shifta’ originated from an Amharic word sheftenat. It is from the verb shafatta which means to rebel. Shifta referred to a banditry lifestyle of those who roamed about and committed lawless acts in Ethiopia about mid-nineteenth century. This was particularly used in reference to Kassa Haylu, a legendary man in Ethiopia.

123 Daily Nation. “Afro-Asian Resolution on NFD.” Wednesday, February 13th, 1963
126 Ibid
128 Ibid
129 Bakpetu. Conflict in the Horn of Africa, p. 107
Kassa Haylu was born to a nobleman in Qwara district near the Ethiopian-Sudan border around 1818. He became the Emperor Tewodros II. He gained adoration from the poor because of fighting for their welfare by taking wealth from the rich and redistributing it to the poor. Prior to Tewodros’s rule, different regions of Ethiopia were under the rule of Princes. He brought Prince’s rule to an end through forceful wealth redistribution in a bid to unify Ethiopia, which took place briefly in 1855. This earned him the title ‘the great unifier’ from the common people but the feudal Lords called him ‘Shifta.’

The British used the term Shifta to refer to Tewodros banditry and insurgency around the nineteenth and twentieth century in Ethiopia. Following an invasion from the Moslem Turks and Egyptians, the Emperor sought help from Britain to deter the invasion from the North. The British refused to help Tewodros, and he then captured some of Britain missionaries and envoys prompting the British forces to fight against him to secure the captives in April 1868. The Emperor accused the British of scheming against him.

Kenya invoked the term Shifta in the course of NFD secessionism. The parliament referred the Somali aggression in NFD as ‘Shifta.’ In 1963 Kenyatta used Shifta to refer to hooliganism. Kenya’s experience of other cross-border outlaws from Ethiopia and

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132 Bakpetu. Conflict in the Horn of Africa, p. 107
134 Ibid citing Mr. Konchella in Kenya House f Representative Debates, Volume 2, Second Session, 12, March 1964 column 1012-1013
Uganda, were termed ‘raiders’. In this regard, NFD's desire to secede, and join Somalia was viewed as an act of outlaws from Somalia. The ‘criminals' appeared to defy Kenya's authority in NFD. Shifta war in Kenya appeared as a proxy war from Somalia. It reflected a cunning resemblance with Tewdros II continuous aggression, and failure to respect Ethiopia’s feudal central authority. This equates both activities to acts of banditry. In both cases the common goal was to unify a people believed to belong together under one government, and one state.

Shifta’s goal of uniting particular nations went against the reigning authorities. It called for a conquest of the central authorities in order to bring the respective areas under desired authority. In Ethiopia, Sheftani’s ultimate goal was to acquire power. More so, Shiftas end desire was to increase their status. Equally, Somalia’s desire for NFD was to increase its territorial space. The increase in the state’s size informed power. In Somalia’s case, NFD was a means to an end, power.

Kenya and Somalia differed in their outlook of the term Shifta. Kenyan authorities criminalized Shifta and undermined its goal in order to subdue those associated with it. Somalia equated Shifta to nationalists/heroism. Shiftas fought for the rights of the ‘marginalized’ to end an ‘unworthy’ authority. The two countries differences in the view of the shared border informed the interpretations of Shifta. In Kenya the term was used where government authority was defied causing a threat to the state's territorial borders, in Somalia, it was viewed as a means to self-determine the ‘marginalized’.

138 Ibid, p. 152  
139 Ibid, 136  
140 Ibid, 135
The Shifta ideology interpreted or represented a social and political relationship between the Kenyan-Somalis and the Kenyan government. This created social meanings and consequences to both. Collapsing the meaning of ‘Shiftas’ to criminals removed the legality of Somalis secession pursuits of NFD. Shifta operations became the government’s responsibility to sanitize the region off criminality. The NFD region, and subsequently North Eastern Province (NEP) carried the consequences of this criminality silencing other possible explanations why the Shifta war occurred. It shaped Somalis relationship with the Kenyan state as well as the Republic of Somalia. Criminalizing Shifta war subdued the possibility of Kenya going to war with Somalia. It became an internal matter of the state which prevented external interferences. To date, the Shifta war is assigned a meaning deemed preferable and more explainable by actors. The actors constructed the war based on a preferred understanding, which over time appeared as the objective truth. At the core of these interpretations was the muzzled location of power which involved border politics.

On Kenya's side, an ethnic identity based state was problematic given the political agitations within. Conversely, Somalia's idea of a people who yearned to be together captured the imagination of most. Somalia succeeded in the construction of the Pan-Somali viewpoint. Somalia's ideology was symbolized by the five-pointed star. Prior unification of the British and Italian Somaliland of July 1960 supported Somalis unification. However, the colonial government decided against NFD secession to Somalia.

4.3.2 Silences on the Decision not to Secede the Northern Frontier Disctrics from Kenya by the Colonial Government.

A referendum carried out in NFD appeared to indicate that majority of the people questioned preferred to secede. Despite the outcome of the referendum, NFD secession did not happen.
There were silences within the secession debate. The various silenced logic influenced the colonial government decision. First, during the Cold War, Somalia initially supported the Soviet Union between 1960 and 1969\textsuperscript{141} which practiced communism ideology as opposed to the British capitalist ideals. Second, the British who had settled in the white highlands needed protection in form of a frontier. Third, Britain shared a religious identity with Kenya, the spread of Islam was a threat. Fourth, NFD was not homogenously Somali. Fifth, NFD secession would affect the fate of Ethiopia’s Ogaden region inhabited by Somalis too. Sixth the 1960 union of British and Italian Somalis had problems in form of power sharing. Seventh, KANU’s and Kenyatta’s popularity in the country could not be ignored, given that power hand-over was going to the same. Eighth, African countries were against it due to a multi-ethnic composition and split ethnicities at the state borders. African countries would not recognize secession of NFD to Somalia. Finally, the UN is against irredentist-secession especially where a country uses force in abuse of others’ territorial integrity.

To begin with, Somalia and the British government fell out over the NFD decision in March 1963. Somalia’s severed links with Britain through a motion passed in the parliament.\textsuperscript{142} The motion indicated differing results, one showed 70 people voted in favor while 14 against,\textsuperscript{143} in another outcome, 74 voted in favor while 14 were against severing links with Britain.\textsuperscript{144} In the same month, the British House of Commons debates indicated that, Somalia’s disagreement with Britain led to Somalia's loss of 100 Million pounds subsidy per year.\textsuperscript{145} Similarly, Britain

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\textsuperscript{142} Hoyos. “Horn of Africa,” p.13
\textsuperscript{143} Daily Nation. “Break with Britain: Somali Assembly Votes 70 ‘Yes’ to 14.” Friday, March 15, 1963, p. 1 and P.
\textsuperscript{144} Daily Nation. “Somalis Warn UK Again.” Saturday, March 16, 1963, p. 1
\end{flushright}
lost the main broadcasting communication base in the Somali terrain,\textsuperscript{146} the mutual loss remained with the hope of resolving the NFD question.

Secondly, the British settlers’ presence in Kenya’s fertile white highlands were key to the economy’s growth. NFD secession would have exposed the agrarian white settlers in the fertile highlands to the nomads.\textsuperscript{147} In 1962 during the House of Lords debate, the Marquess of Salisbury moved a motion on Kenya stating that the white settlers and Asiatic community were in dire danger. The two groups were key to the country’s economy and were projected to remain so after the change of power to African leadership. In addition, the increase in business rate was shown in which ivory and hides that passed through the port of Mombasa were 11 tons and 10 tons respectively in 1898.\textsuperscript{148} Farm produce passing through the same port amounted to 25 million; whereby 20 million originated from the white settlers by 1960.\textsuperscript{149} Apart from economic productivity, white settlers left their claim on all assets in Britain in order to qualify for the British Government schemes which facilitated security of freehold.\textsuperscript{150} The threat to the settlers appeared in the initial stages of power change. Therefore, NFD carried security concerns to the white settlers. The colonial government designated a frontier to protect the inner fertile white zones from the expansion of nomads. In addition, NFD was a buffer zone which prevented cultural altercations between Christianity and Islam.

Third, the decision on NFD involved weighing the advantages and disadvantages on identity and security between Kenya, Somalia, and the region at large. The UK House of Lords

\textsuperscript{146} Ibid
\textsuperscript{148} Marquess of Salisbury, Hansard (Kenya), HL debate, December 3\textsuperscript{rd}, 1962 volume 245 cc65 paragraph 2.
\textsuperscript{149} Ibid
\textsuperscript{150} Ibid cc 66, para 1
observed that granting Kenya independence with NFD could lead to war with Somalia. Furthermore, British Administration noted that Kenya was militarily weak without British troops. In order to avoid war between the two countries, NFD’s status was paired with an option of a foreseeable British support. In the initial NFD violence flare-up, the Royal Air Force (RAF) was dispatched to Garissa area in operation “sharp panga.” RAF was withdrawn when the violence ended with assurance of its future support to Kenya.

Fourth, Britain disallowed NFD secession because it was not homogeneously Somalis. The Borana, Samburu, Rendile, and Riverine people around Tana River were non-Somali. As it were, apart from the minority Waso Borana Muslims, the Borana community did not support the secession. Generally, the Borana are affiliated to the Oromo’s in Southern Ethiopia which they consider as homeland and not Somalia. Southern Ethiopia borders Kenya to the North. They practice a traditional Gada system, not Islam.

Therefore, the people of NFD had mixed opinions, secessionists, and anti-secessionists. The anti-secessionist comprised; the Northern Province United Association (NPUA). The group was headed by the executive officer Osman Araru and comprised of urban Borana people from Marsabit and Moyale. He stated that the NFD commission comprised of two foreign men, Major General Bogart a retired Canadian from the army, and E. C. M Onyuike, an Eastern Nigerian and director of public prosecution. The commission was not welcomed in NFD.

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152 Ibid
154 Ibid
155 Ibid
The party felt that the British and Somalia governments wanted to secede NFD to Somalia against its people wishes. The Party ordered the people to ignore the commission’s work, and instructed the people to await further action after the commission’s report especially, if it was pro-secession. Mr. Araru later ordered the expulsion of what he referred as “certain Somali Chiefs who were dominating the people”.\textsuperscript{157} In response to Araru’s anti-secessionist party, Hersi Haji of the Northern Province People's Progressive Party (NPPPP) stated that NPUA was sponsored by the Ethiopian government which feared secession of NFD would imply the same for the Ogaden-Ethiopia.\textsuperscript{158} Coincidentally, in February 1963, Mr. Araru had offered that, if one square inch of NFD was to secede to Somalia, Ethiopia would go to war with Somalia.\textsuperscript{159} Somali people disliked urban Borana whom they termed ‘\textit{Kufar}’/pagan\textsuperscript{160} and thus tried to isolate them. June 28, 1963, the differences in Pan-Somali view between the Somali and Borana people led the Somali fighters to kill two key Borana spokesmen, the District Commissioner of Isiolo Daudi Dabaso Wabera and Chief Hajji Galma Diida.\textsuperscript{161}

Another anti-secessionist voice came from United Ogaden Somali Association (UOSA), a party led by Ali Abdi. The party was opposed to secession and advocated for an East African federation and Pan Africanism.\textsuperscript{162}

In the end, the Gabbra found in Marsabit, the Borana in Moyale, and Riverine people (Korokoro, wa Boni, Orma, Malakote, and Malalu) around the Tana River banks were in

\textsuperscript{160} Arero. “Coming to Kenya,” p. 295
support of integration in Kenya.\textsuperscript{163} Moyale settlement of Sakuye, Marsabit settlement, the district of Isiolo, Garissa Township, and South-West of Tana River had mixed opinions concerning secession.\textsuperscript{164}

Finally, the NFD Commission noted that the people were highly influenced by their religious practices and identity. Identity informed the Somali desire to secede and join Somalia. Kenyatta challenged the commission stating that some people were not allowed to project their views.\textsuperscript{165} In addition, he stated that people could not be seceded by indicating a different race since the Maasai were both in Tanganyika and Kenya and so were other ethnic groups at the Kenya-Uganda border.\textsuperscript{166} Being a minority in the country was common in other African countries too.\textsuperscript{167} Tom Mboya added that, of the seven NFD districts, only three had a majority of Somalis while the remaining had a bare minimum. The government of Somalia and Kenyan representatives experienced a period of anxiety; they pressured the then colonial secretary Duncan Sandy to give the way forward on NFD.

Sandy recommended the formation of North Eastern as the seventh region in March 1963.\textsuperscript{168} This forewarned of the likelihood that the final decision on NFD would favor Kenya. Somalia set-off a series of negative reactions ultimately affecting its relations with Britain and Kenya. The colonial secretary stated in Nairobi that the creation of the seventh region was a sign of goodwill by both the British and Kenyan's even though it was not ideal. In addition, he indicated that both countries were aware of the Somali people’s desire to convey their identities

\textsuperscript{164} Bakpetu. \textit{Conflict in the Horn of Africa}, p. 88
\textsuperscript{165} Daily Nation, “Something Fishy Going on' says Kenyatta.” Thursday, November 22, 1962, p.2
\textsuperscript{166} Ibid
\textsuperscript{167} Drysdale. \textit{The Somali Dispute}, p. 146.
\textsuperscript{168} Hansard. “Northern Frontier District of Kenya,” HL Deb 03 April 1963 Volume 248, Col. 614
especially, in a country with a people of another race. Once again the confusion of racializing Somalis by the British was indicated despite the fact that like other Kenyans, Somalis are Africans.

The British Administration’s decision to retain NFD in Kenya and create the North Eastern Region (NER) led Somalia to recall its foreign mission from Nairobi, London, and Aden, the latter is modern-day southern Yemen, the port of Aden and its surroundings. Somalia simultaneously expelled the British Embassy in Mogadishu referring the NFD policy as insolent to its integrity. Furthermore, Somalia stated that it would not be intimidated by aid ambitions. The British government misguided Somalia into believing in the NFD secession.

4.4 External Actors and the Northern Frontier Districts Question

4.4.1 Ethiopia – Somalia

Both Ethiopia and Somalia were interested in the fate of NFD. They got involved either in support or opposition of NFD secession. At the onset of NFD commission, there were doubts as to who was behind the voices of secessionism and anti-secessionism. The two governments allegedly funded political parties in NFD to favor their political inclinations.

The subsequent insecurity at the Kenya-Somalia border’s led to Kenya’s deployment of the military in the region. Somalia referred Kenya’s location of the military at the border as ‘sharp panga’ (sharp Machette). Somalia issued a threat to Kenya for creating un-ease at ‘its’ border.

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169 Times, March 9th, 1963
171 Bakpetu. Conflict in the Horn, p. 91
172 Ibid. 92
Ethiopia seized the opportunity to support Kenya. In response to Somalia’s Vice Consul warning over the ‘sharp panga’, the Ethiopian Council in Nairobi stated the willingness to support Kenya should Somalia cause chaos after independence over Northern Frontier Province (NFP).\textsuperscript{174} Ethiopia observed that the protest of ‘sharp panga’ by Somalia was a tactic to pressure the British Government over NFD decision. Somalia stated that Kenya would lack peace after independence if NFD remained within it. Therefore, Ethiopia stood for the belief on inherited colonial borders and respect thereof\textsuperscript{175} which reinforced the reluctance to secede the Ogaden region. In the end, the British Administration disallowed the secession of NFD.

4.4.2. Somalia’s Internal Politics: Power Sharing between Former British Somaliland and Italian Somali

Somalia was not at peace during the NFD secession issue. At the merger of the two ‘Somali lands,’ a need arose for equitable distribution of power to the two regions. Each expected to gain either the Presidency or the Premier post. This was not the case as Aden Abdulle/Aden Adde a Hawiye based in central Somalia filled the President’s position while Abdirashid Ali Sharmarke a Majerteen-Darod from North-Western filled the Prime Minister post. Both were from former Italian Somaliland. The President’s wife came from the Majerteen clan which made the leadership appear as a close family affair.

British Somaliland was discontent with the leadership in the Republic of Somalia. British Somaliland, with the Isaaq majority clan got the speaker of parliament post and were unhappy with it. Besides, they preferred a federal government while former Italian Somalia wanted a

\textsuperscript{174} Daily Nation. “Ethiopians Intervene in N.F.D. Dispute.” Thursday February 28, 1963, p.1
centralized government, the latter was adapted. In June 1961, the former British Somaliland boycotted the constitution referendum. Meanwhile the British trained Lieutenants were against the leadership of Italian trained officials placed in power over them by Mogadishu leadership, this led to an attempted coup by the Northerners. The division indicated marginalization of Somaliland by the Republic of Somalia.

Despite the division, NFD secession meant the Southerners/former Italian Somaliland would increase territory, and the Northerners hoped irredentism would re-capture their grazing lands ceded to Ethiopia by the British in 1897. The separate clan desires problematized the Somalis projected unity. Seccession of NFD meant an increase in the Ogaden-population in Somalia. If Somalis were in fear of a minority status in Kenya, it appeared the same for the Isaaq Northerners in Somalia especially with a successful secession of Ogaden ‘foreign’ lands hence quest for a federal government. Irredentism and the cracks within Somalia showed an elastic identity.


Kenya held onto NFD. The British ruled the East African Protectorate, later known as Kenya, as a single entity, despite NFDs separate governance due to the vast and arid nature of the region. Its size implied high resource expenditures with little returns. Furthermore, NFD’s

177 Ibid, p. 158
179 Ibid, p. 232
181 Lewis. Modern Political Movements in Somaliland.
182 Whitaker, “Pursuing Pastoralists,” p. 5
pastoral way of life contributed towards its separation from agrarian regions, which prevented nomadic raids and conflicts.\textsuperscript{183}

Kenya relied on the principle of territorial integrity enshrined in OAU to resolve the NFD conflict with Somalia.\textsuperscript{184} President Jomo Kenyatta indicated that Kenya did not desire an inch of any other state’s territory and neither was it willing to let go of an inch of its land.\textsuperscript{185} On the contrary, Somalia supported irredentist-secession and invoked the principle of self-determination within internal colonial state borders.\textsuperscript{186} Somalia used the “Somalian” identity to advocate for a homogenous state. For Kenya, an identity of the populace was not a factor in determining the state border.

Somalia derived its outlook partly from the British colonialist who contributed to NFD secession ambitions through constructions of the racial and cultural differentials of the NFD region. For example, the Earl of Listowel observed that an adherence to the Greater Somalia ideology proposed by Ernest Bevin, the then foreign secretary would have solved the Somali problem in the Horn of Africa.\textsuperscript{187} The Somalis’ differentiation, racial identity, and confusion provided a substantial reason for secession desires to join Somalia as opposed to other African ‘tribes’ separated by international boundaries.\textsuperscript{188}

\textsuperscript{185} KHR Debates, Volume 1, Part 2, July 25, 1963 columns 1368-1385
\textsuperscript{187} The Earl of Listowel, “The Northern Frontier District of Kenya” House of Lords Debates, April 3\textsuperscript{rd}, 1963 Volume 248, col 620-621
\textsuperscript{188} Hansard. The Earl of Listowel, “Northern Frontier District of Kenya: The Minister of states of Colonial Affairs.” Volume 248, Col 621, Paragraph 2-3
NFD’s identity was filled with controversies. The region initially included the districts of Garissa, Wajir, Mandera, Isiolo, Marsabit and Moyale.\textsuperscript{189} Painstakingly, Lord Lytton explained in the British parliament that NFD consisted of an African people non-Negros, while the rest of Kenya had Negro people.\textsuperscript{190} He differentiated the Hamitic Somalis from the ‘Negro’ Nilotic and Bantu people. The separation of the ethnic Somali identity was also depicted in Kenya’s 1962 census in Appendix 1 which referred to racial categories of the people where the options included: Somali, Asia, Arab, White-European and African.\textsuperscript{191}

The instilled racial factor hierarchically placed African identities. Either native or settler structures governed racial identities, therefore, common or civil law system respectively.\textsuperscript{192} In other words, common laws governed the natives and civil laws the settlers.\textsuperscript{193} The latter superseded tribal issues which were decided by local modalities. Civil laws invocation was racism. Therefore, African independence fight sought recognition of an African race equal with others. The racial connotation/body border gave Somalia a leeway for the pursuit of the Greater Somalia under the mandate of ‘one race’ depicting an elastic view of the border.

The British colonial powers confusion over Somalis race brought two problems; first was that, a settler classification meant Britain needed to decide NFD’s fate, on the contrary, the uncertainty of Somalis classification meant it was an internal matter to be determined later by Kenya. The Earl of Lytton found it difficult to define Somalis. He stated that by saying they are not Negros did not infer they are Caucasian or Arabs. He admitted that they were blacks

\textsuperscript{189} Ibid, Lord Marquess of Lansdowne. “Northern Frontier District of Kenya: The Minister of states of Colonial Affairs.” col 630
\textsuperscript{190} Hansard. The Earl of Listowel, Volume 248. Col 621, Paragraph 2-3
\textsuperscript{192} Mamdani. “Beyond Settler and Native as Political Identities,” pp. 654-655.
\textsuperscript{193} Mamdani. Citizen and Subject. pp. 111-138
and Africans whose origin was unknown. He tried to define the Somalis through an observation that people of his age grew up knowing all black people were descendants of Ham the son of Noah, but it was no longer the case, as the construction of the term Hamites excluded all Negros. The confusion of Somali identity from the onset complicated the perception of the Kenya-Somalia border.

The pre-colonial and post-colonial activities at the NFD largely defined the Kenya-Somalia border. These included Shifta activities which played out in terms of identity definition and later on security/insecurity matters. For example, Jomo Kenyatta advised the then governor Malcolm Macdonald to announce a state of emergency in NER on December 25th, 1963 following the onset of Shifta activities. In addition, movements were restricted within a five-mile zone on the Kenyan side of the border from Somalia except for El Wak and Mandera border area. Kenya invoked a rigid notion of the border which defied Somalia’s idea of a transient border into NFD.

There was another incidence, where an attack occurred on a police post at Msabubu coastal area, in which an estimated group of fifty Somalis raided, killed three people and wounded four police officers. The Region's Civil Secretary, T. P. Randle attributed the acts to terrorism. The incidence led Ma’alim Mohamed Stamboul, the chairman of NPPPP to withdraw his support for the Shiftas. He opted to pursue the party’s agenda through constitutional means.

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194 Hansard. The Earl of Lytton, col. 603, paragraph 2
195 Ibid
197 Keesing's Record of World Events “April 1964 - Border Incidents, State of Emergency in Kenya North-Eastern Region, - Regional Elections ” P. 20034
198 Ibid
NPPPP’s change of mind on the Shifta agenda showed the latter traversed the initial desires of North Eastern people. It legitimized Kenya’s view of Shiftas’ as an illegal faction.

For Kenya, secession and the dangers associated with Shifta emanated from Somalia. Jomo Kenyatta observed that, an estimated group of 2000 people was involved in Shifta activities. Most of them were based in Somalia but about 700 operated in NFD where 150 were in possession of arms.\(^{199}\) He argued that Somalia was involved due to the Pan-Somali ambition.

Prior to independence, the administration of the Kenya-Somalia border region sent messages on the perception of the border. Under the British rule, the NFD was administered separately giving the people in the region a sense of a separate identity.\(^{200}\) The 1902 District Ordinance and 1934 special District Ordinance placed an administrative border between NFD and the rest of the country.\(^{201}\) Later the colonial administration revoked the ordinance\(^{202}\) which created a notion of a unitary geographic region under one government. In 1962 NFD commission was created and it gave hope to separatist calls. In addition, the Regional Boundary Commission included NFD in Kenya’s regions which implied unity of the region with the rest of the country. These activities created a back and forth perception of the border. The lack of consistency sent confusing messages to NFD, Somalia and the Kenyan representatives about the border.

Following the deployment of the military by Kenya at the border, the Vice Consul of Somalia Abdul Khadir Mussa, observed that the big military referred as “sharp Panga” near its border,

\(^{199}\) KHR Debates Volume 2, Session 2, December 31\(^{st}\), 1963 Col. 8, (Kenya National Archives). See also The East African Standard, January 1\(^{st}\), 1964.

\(^{200}\) KNA. PC/Coast1/1/229, “Control of Somalis and Kindred Tribes,” Official Dispatch No. 996/13. March 23 1922. A communication from Senior Coast Commissioner to the Honorable Native Commissioner.

\(^{201}\) Lewis, A Modern History of the Somali, p.184.

\(^{202}\) Bakpetu, Conflict in the Horn of Africa, p.78
had a sinister motive to Somalia. Somalia through the utterance recognized a rigid border between the two countries. Meanwhile Somalia had warned against mistreating ‘its people’ meaning Somalis of NFD which indicated a notion of a border beyond the border. The border seemed to shift between a transient and rigid one. In these two occurrences, Somalia perceived its border as a line demarcated during colonialism, and as the region occupied by all ethnic Somalis. Kenya maintained a consistent view of the border as a rigid line in the sand. For Kenya, ‘body borders’ was out of the question given the actions to secure NFD through military deployment.

In addition, territorial integrity meant different things to both Kenya and Somalia. In the case of Kenya, keeping the colonial boundaries meant territorial integrity while Somalia viewed it as imperialism. This was indicated at the third Afro-Asian Peoples Solidarity conference in Moshi, Tanganyika in 1963, where Somalia suggested the removal of imperialists and implementation of territories in the spirit of African ‘brotherhood.’ Kenya and Somalia were in agreement when it came to removing the colonial powers. However, Kenya’s actions were geared towards securing independence of the whole region including NFD. Conversely, Somalia perceived NFD as a region under imperialism where securing it from the British did not mean aggravating the African Spirit of ‘brotherhood’. Therefore Kenya’s territorial integrity was equated to self-determination by Somalia.

The notion of identity was equally confusing from Somalia’s point of view. Somalia referred to Kenya as ‘brothers’ on several occasions; it also called for the secession of NFD as pursuit

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204 Daily Nation. “Somalis Repeat NFD Demand.” Thursday February 14th, 1963, p. 5
of unity with its ‘brothers’ separated by artificial boundaries. This indicated a layered notion of identities with each invoked depending on the situation at hand.

Furthermore, Somalia’s statement that a people who desire togetherness cannot be forced to live apart implied oneness of the Somali nation. The idea was problematic in several ways. First, during the demarcation of provinces in Kenya, NEP became the seventh region comprising of the Somalis. Somalia reacted stating that the whole of NFD belonged to it. The second problem was depicted during Djibouti’s repatriation of Somalis in 1967. Somalia refused to allow the deportees back. The French Communiqué, observed that “these people are being kept in the transit camp only because of the refusal by the Somali (Republic) authorities to allow them to re-enter their country, their own country.” In response to Djibouti, Somalia’s Ministry of Information Spokesperson stated that the stranded people were French Somaliland citizens and hence their problem. In addition, Somalia offered that the French had destroyed the deportee’s valid identity cards and claimed the people entered Djibouti illegally. The deportees were held against their will and were denied entrance into Somalia. The Djibouti case was the reverse of the NFD situation. The rejection left the deportees stranded at the Red Sea border camp. The desire for Somalis unity appeared pegged with uniting the lands they dwelled in with Somalia. Somalis outside Somalia Republic were a means to an end, power.

Kenya realized that Somalia capitalized on the differences of Somalis with non-Somalis as a basis for claiming unity/disunity. Kenya begun to minimize these differences with Somalis in

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NFD through changes that would affect NFD’s culture. In 1967 Kenya constructed fourteen Manyatta (semi-permanent housing) villages for NEP dwellers.\(^{209}\) It reduced nomadic movements in NFD. The move sought to create businessmen and agronomists out of Somalis. Kenya’s action showed an awareness of the conflictual nature of Kenya-Somalia border interpretations based on lifestyle differences. NFD’s desire to join Somalia was to enhance free movement of the nomadic community. Construction of villages caused some Somalis who were against being stationed ‘to go back’ to Somalia.\(^{210}\)

In some occasions, Somalia acknowledged the colonial borders through the reference of ‘the good neighbor policy.’\(^{211}\) In October 1969 during the Addis Ababa meeting, M. Diallo Telji, the then Secretary General of OAU stated that Somalia reassures Kenya on pursuant of the ‘good neighbor’ policy irrespective of the regime changes.\(^{212}\) The assassination of President Sharmarke followed with the overthrow of Premier Egal in a military take-over caused a regime change. Prior to these occurrences, Somalia’s Prime Minister Egal and President Kenyatta had signed an understanding in Arusha, October 28, 1967, in line with OAU charter on matters pertaining the border.\(^{213}\) They agreed to maintain peace and security on both sides of the border and renounced use of propaganda in the interests of both countries. The following year in July 1968 President Egal visited Nairobi which showed improved relations between Kenya and Somalia. It appeared some forces in Somalia were discontent with the new found friendship and agreements with Kenya because soon after, Somalia experienced unrest.

\(^{210}\) Ibid
\(^{212}\) Daily Nation. “Somalia Reassures Kenya.” Thursday, October 23, 1969, p. 16
\(^{213}\) Bakpetu, Conflict in the Horn of Africa, pp. 140-144.
Given the above, though colonial borders were acknowledged, Somalia lacked consistency. After the Arusha agreement, major problems occurred in Somalia in 1969. First, President Sharmarke was assassinated on October 15, 1969, then Premier Egal was removed from power through a military coup which took over in October 21, 1969. General Siad Barre the then Commander in chief of the Army was its spokesperson, he became the President of Somalia in the same year. These changes informed a change of policy on good neighborliness concerning Somalia’s state borders. Therefore, after Shifta war in Kenya, Somalia engaged Ethiopia in Ogaden war over the border region.

4.6 The Ogaden War in Ethiopia, 1969-1978.
Ethiopia and Somalia experienced border difficulties as a result of internal problems in each country in the late 60’s and 70’s. Somalia suffered a military take-over by General Siad Barre who became its president in 1969. Meanwhile in Ethiopia, the Derg, a military council overthrow Emperor Haile Selassie on September 12, 1974. The leadership gap created further internal unrest and calls for secession by factions within the Ogaden region. There was also drought in Ethiopia which together with political unrest made Ethiopia vulnerable. The chaos in Ethiopia led Somalia to assume an easy victory over the Haud and Ogaden regions. But several changes occurred in 1977. In February Colonel Mengistu Haile Mariam, the head of the Derg took over power in Ethiopia. In June Djibouti became independent. In July Somalia invaded Ethiopia which led to the Ogaden war. In December 1977, the Soviet Union backed Ethiopia against Somalia invasion hence the defeat of Somalia in March 1978.

217 Hoyos. “Horn of Africa,” p. 14
218 Simala and Arrous. “Whose Self-Determination?” P. 178
219 Hoyos. “Horn of Africa,” p. 15
With Somalia’s Ogaden defeat, Barre’s popularity decreased as arms accumulation increased due to the proxy war between the West and the East Cold War adversaries. It appeared that a win of the Ogaden would restore Barre’s authority. Somalia supported the Western Somalia Liberation Front (WSLF) faction based in Ogaden through supply of arms. Ethiopia weakened WSLF by July 1977 upon which Somalia's army engaged in a direct war. The army lasted for eight months as Mengistu Haile Mariam restored order in Ethiopia.

Somalia's major military growth occurred between 1970 and 1975 making it the most significant force in both tank power and Airforce in the continent of Africa. In 1977 Somalia's military workforce force had grown to about 37,000. It received military hardware and training from the Soviet. The accumulation of both military hardware and skills contributed in Somalia's confidence to provoke Ethiopia and Kenya indirectly over the border issue but culminated in the defeat in the Ogaden war and the destruction of the accumulated military hardware. Somalia lost the war.

### 4.6.1 External Actors and the Ogaden War

The Ogaden War attracted several external actors allied to either Somalia or Ethiopia based on socio-political, geopolitics and/ideology identities. The actors included: the United States, the Soviet Union, Cuba, Libya, Kenya, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Sudan, and Yemen. These actors were allied along the Cold War ideology.

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220 Simala and Arrous, “Whose Self-Determination?” p. 179
222 Ibid
224 Ibid, p. 117
225 Marte. Political Circles in International Relations, p. 228,
Egypt supplied arms to Somalia, an inconsistent move based on its support of the OAU Charter on the sanctity of colonial borders. First, Egypt stated its adherence to territorial boundaries and acknowledgment of the OAU Charter on non-interference. Nevertheless, it transported weapons to Somalia disguised as humanitarian aid. On suspicion of Egypt's double standards, Kenya Airforce intervened and forced an Egyptian aircraft to land where it discovered nineteen tons of explosives and other artilleries. Kenya held the Egyptian plane for violating its airspace. In retaliation, Egypt held two of Kenya’s Boeing 707’s passenger planes. The two countries resolved the impasse through the mutual release of the planes. Later, Egypt restrained three other planes destined to Somalia; however, the Egyptian Embassy in Rome stated that ships to Somalia would replace the planes.

Before Kenya-Egypt diplomatic impasse, mysterious Boeing 707 jets with yellow or blue tails were spotted around October 1977 making trips to Somalia. They downloaded green boxes which resembled small ammunition boxes. The WSLF secretary general, Abdullahi Hassan Mohammud affirmed that Somalia was receiving ammunition from “every Arab state except Libya and South Yemen.” Kenya viewed Somalia’s armament by Arab nations as a threat to the North Eastern border.

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227 Ibid, p.1
230 Ibid
232 Ibid. 16
Iran supported Somalia in the Ogaden war from the onset and warned Ethiopia against invading Somalia’s territory. Iran's warning came after radio in Somalia reported attacks in Tug Wajale town, North-Western of Somalia, where the radio reported 13 deaths and 35 injuries. Iran, an avid competitor with the Soviet Union, seized the opportunity to side with Somalia after the immediate exit of the Soviets and future support of Ethiopia. As the cold war powers switched their support between Ethiopia and Somalia, so did Iran. Also, the government of Iran had strong ties with the US.

Kenya warned Iran to keep-off African matters in response to its threat against Ethiopia. Iran recalled the envoy to Kenya following the criticism. Ironically, the then minister for foreign affairs Dr. Munyua Waiyaki observed that there were no foreseeable problems where the Arabs and Iranians were in support of a member of the Arab league while the Russians and Cubans supported Ethiopia. Somalia’s Arab identity was invoked, at the same time, Iran was warned to keep–off African matters which invoked an African identity. Though the Soviets and Cubans involvement shared a communist identity ideology, it had nothing to do with Ethiopia. Overall, racial and political ideology identity confusion persisted where Somalia was concerned.

When the Soviet Union stopped their support to Somalia, it paved the way for the US support. However, the US denied arms supply to Somalia. It claimed the supply was agricultural and health aid to Somalia. The aid was in the form of 10 million dollars ‘food for peace’, 1.5 million dollars for smallpox eradication and a cash contribution to the Red Cross of $225,
000. The US blamed Russia for the chaos in the Horn due to its role in arms supply to Somalia and later to Ethiopia. Before this, the US had signed a mutual defense assistance agreement with Ethiopia in June 1952 from which military and training were accorded to Ethiopia until 1977 when an internal military force overthrew the government with a scientific socialist ideal. US support of Somalia during the Ogaden war appeared out of place given its relations with Kenya’s pro-western outlook.

Somalia's military human resources continued to increase long after the Soviets exit. In 1977 the military workforce force stood at 37,000, by 1980 it was 96,000, and by the end of 1985, it stood at 123,000. The increase implied supply from the subsequent supporters. Somalia sold US food aid and purchased weapons. Later, the US supply of arms to Somalia became one of the strongholds used against it in “Operation Restore Hope” conflict of 1993.

4.6.2 Cold War Powers

The Soviet Union and the US strived for strategic advantage through promises and actual military support to the Horn countries. They played a significant role in the Ogaden war and the delicate peace process in the Horn. Ethiopia had a Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement (MDAA) with the US from 1952 to 1977. The US developed Ethiopia’s military power and had full use of the Kagnew transmitter communication facility for the diplomatic and military

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238 Ibid
242 Bakpetu. Conflict in the Horn of Africa, p. 266.
mission. The arrangement ended in 1977 when Ethiopia severed relations, at the peak of the Somali-Ogaden aggression which the US supported Somalia. Ethiopia received support from the Soviet Union worth two billion dollars within three years. Somalia’s goal was to capture Ogaden region in Ethiopia and NFD in Kenya.

Geopolitics informed competition between cold war powers in Ogaden war. Whereas the US and the Soviet competed in the Horn, Ethiopia, and Somalia had an interest in securing or annexing Ogaden region respectively. Ethiopia proved successful, having secured weapons from the US from 1953 to 1977. Additionally, the Soviet Union provided massive military and training support. Furthermore, the Soviets enlisted the Cuban military in 1977 to fight on Ethiopia's side thus defeated Somalia.

The 1980s marked a period of peace and calm in the Horn. In 1980 the US signed an agreement with Somalia where it gained access to Kismayu and Berbera naval bases and Mogadishu air base. In June 1981 the then president of Somalia Siad Barre visited Kenya during which he stated that Somalia had no claims over Kenya’s or any other country’s territory and he proposed to have brotherly relations with Kenya. In 1984, the proposition to hold peace talks in Nairobi spearheaded by the US was turned down by Ethiopia in question of the US involvement. In the same year, Kenya's president Moi paid a visit to Somalia from June 22 to 25th. He had to balance Kenya-Ethiopia relations at the same time improve Kenya-Somalia. In his speech, he mentioned the talks with 'a brother and colleague' Haile Mariam, and also how he looked forward to enhancing relations with the President of Somalia on the

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245 Daily Nation, June 30, 1981
246 Bakpetu. Conflict in The Horn of Africa, pp. 252-260
improvement of peace in the Horn. In 1984 Somalia signed an Accord with Kenya in which it renounced claims of the NER. In 1986 Somalia resumed talks with Ethiopia in 1986. In 1986 President Moi of Kenya indicated improved relations with Somali with a few exceptions of theft and robberies at the border. The Kenyan government did not invoke Shifta term in border skirmishes. Therefore, the 1980s was a period of relative calm in border problems at the Horn despite the issue of refugees from the Ogaden war and drought in the region.

4.7 Security


The Ogaden war in Ethiopia led to refugees outflow into the neighboring states of Djibouti, Kenya and the Republic of Somalia. Initially, 85,000 refugees from Ethiopia took up residence in the northern parts of Somalia. Ethiopia continued to campaign against the Ogaden insurgency which caused an estimated 800,000 refugees in Somalia by the end of 1980. To cope with the refugees, Somalia formed a National Refugee Commission (NRC). It located camps in the North, Central and Southern regions of the country. The camps were financed by the government of Somalia, voluntary organizations and United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR). UNHCR estimated the refugees' cost at 100 million dollars per year where western countries made major donations. The high number of refugees burdened Somalia’s economy. In total, there was an estimate of between 650,000 and 700,000 refugees. The refugee strain split Somalia along clan lines. Major settlements were in the North,

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250 Bakpetu. Conflict in The Horn of Africa, P. 264
252 Ibid
253 Lewis. A Modern History of the Somali, p.247
255 Lewis. A Modern History of the Somali, p.247
predominantly inhabited by the Isaaq clan and the Shebelle Rivers where the Rahanweyn dwell, a sab clan commonly looked down upon by the Darod, Isaaq, and Hawiye clans. The government displaced some of the Rahanweyn clan members from the Shebelle river areas.

Partisan competition between the North and the South in Somalia led to differences in the refugees’ reception in the North. The Oromo refugees were received better compared to the Darod who shared the clan identity with President Barre. In 1988, the Barre regime terrorized the Isaaq after the SNM attacked his forces. In retaliation, the Barre regime tried to eliminate all the Isaaq through aerial bombardments which became known as the Hargeisa Holocaust/massacre. The rivalry between the Isaaq and the Darod led to the alienation of the Northerners by the Barre regime in the 1980s and culminated to his ouster in 1991.

4.7.2 The Fall of President Siad Barre’s Regime in 1991

Some citizens of Somalia questioned Barre’s leadership style in the 1980s. Different regions criticized his government due to strictness and control with allegations of clannism and corruption. After the 1969 coup, the Barre’s regime prohibited clannism in a bid to unite all Somalis. Paradoxically, he recruited members of his government from a trusted close circuit, of the Marehan, Ogaden, and D’ulbahante (all sub-clans of the Darod). Barres government became labeled MOD, an abbreviation of the three clans. The Marehan clan was his paternal,

257 A Conversational Interview with Hassan Hassan, “Security and Kenya-Somalia Border, where it all took a different direction.” Rift valley Institute. January 4, 2018
259 Lewis. A Modern History of the Somali, p.247
261 Weekly Review. “From Rags to Riches and Back Again.” January 21, 1993, p. 43
the Ogaden his mother’s and the D’ulbahante his sons-in-law’s clan. The latter was the head of the security docket.\textsuperscript{264} Besides, the government had close relatives like his half-brother Abdurrahman Barre, the deputy Prime Minister, and his sons-in-law were Ministers of education and defense.\textsuperscript{265} The concentration of the Marehan clan in government posts triggered defections from the army. The Hawiyes and the Ogaden clan members defected and joined rebel factions against Barres’ government in 1989.\textsuperscript{266}

The rebellious behavior against Barres government begun in May 1986 after an accident speculated as an attempted assassination. By 1988, several groups were against his regime. These were the Somali National Movement (SNM) predominantly the Isaaq clan concentrated in North-western, United Somali Congress (USC) from the Hawiye clan mainly in Mogadishu area, Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM) and Somali National Front (SNF) key to Darod clan in the Southern parts. The groups represented the North, Central, and South-Central Somali clans respectively. The northerners abandoned Pan-Somali ideology and begun to claim for independence due to the regime maltreatment of the Isaaq clan.\textsuperscript{267} Puntland consisting of the Majerteen, a sub-clan of the Darod followed suit but settled for a federal administration. Puntland remains a part of the Republic of Somalia with the hope of forming Greater Somalia. President Sharmarke who was assassinated in Las Anod/Laas Caanood in the North on 15 October 1969\textsuperscript{268} was from the Majerteen clan. The Hawiye dominant in Mogadishu, defeated Barre’s forces and government in 1991.\textsuperscript{269} The Hawiye sub-clans of Habargidir and Abgal

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\textsuperscript{264} Simala and Arrous. “Whose Self-Determination?” p. 175.
\textsuperscript{265} Weekly Review. “From Rags to Riches and Back Again.” P. 43.
\textsuperscript{266} Ibid
\textsuperscript{267} Ingiriis. "We swallowed the state as, the state swallowed us, p. 237, 243
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represented by General Farah Aideed and Ali Mahdi Mohammed respectively went ahead to contest for power in the civil war.\textsuperscript{270}

Though leaders in both Ethiopia and Somalia were ousted, Ethiopia managed to reconfigure itself and establish a new leader. In Somalia, Barre’s ousting and eventual collapse of the state had various implications within and in the Horn region. Clan rivalry worked against the creation of a new government in Somalia. Some fragments of Somalia recollected themselves and created new governments under different clan leadership. These included Somaliland in North-western, Puntland in North-eastern section, central Somalia, South-west State in the South and Jubaland at the southernmost region of Somalia. Somaliland, a former British protectorate revived colonial borders and declared its independence from the Republic of Somalia in 1991.

In an attempt to reconcile differences in Somalia, different groups within scheduled an international meeting in Djibouti June-July 1991. Somaliland refused to attend the Djibouti meeting during which members from the six factions reached a new agreement.\textsuperscript{271} Mr. Ali Mahdi, the leader of USC which controlled central Somalia, the capital city Mogadishu became the leader of the interim government.\textsuperscript{272} The vice-Presidents were to come from the SDF and SPF which held power in the South, located near the border with Kenya. The SNM leaders were absent in the talks and insisted on the independence of Somaliland.\textsuperscript{273} The absence of SNM representatives created a vacuum in the reached solution and the consequence was a

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{270} \textit{Ibid}
\item \textsuperscript{272} \textit{Ibid}, p. 99
\end{itemize}
failure to form a united government in the Republic of Somalia. Amidst it, the OAU reiterated the recognition of colonial borders.\textsuperscript{274}

Competition and deep divisions characterize Southern Somalia. At the core of the divisions is the Hawiye clans’ contest for leadership especially vying for control of businesses in Mogadishu.\textsuperscript{275} The degeneration to warlord factions in the south and the capital of Mogadishu is mainly for the control of the center and business opportunities.\textsuperscript{276} The competing trend in the leadership divides Somalia between Pan-Somali, Clans and political Islam all with the threat to NEP in Kenya and Ogaden in Ethiopia border zones.

The disintegration of Somalia characterized essential consequences to Kenya, Ethiopia, and Djibouti. The first concern was the refugees’ overflow and with it, security concerns in form or cross-border of small arms.\textsuperscript{277} The threat is compounded by lack of a central government in Somalia. The border control and monitoring mandates are squarely on Kenya with increased security concerns through illegal incursions from Somalia leading to threats and attacks at Kenya’s border regions and at times the interiors of the country.

\subsection*{4.7.3 The Threat of Refugees in Kenya from 1991-2016}

Refugees’ incursions from Somalia posed security threats to Kenya. First, there was the fear of an emergence of a possible ambitious leader who could use them to capture the NEP region given the secession history.\textsuperscript{278} Second, the clan rivalry in Somalia had spill-over effects in NEP

\textsuperscript{274} Ibid
\textsuperscript{276} Ibid
\textsuperscript{277} Mburu Nene. Bandits on the Border: The Last Frontier in the Search for Somali Unity, pp. 234-238.
which cause insecurity in the region. Third, the advent of the Al-Shabaab terrorists devastates NEP as the factions hide within the refugees.

Kenya-Somalia border experienced more cross-border challenges from the early 1990s. The initial stages of restoring Somalia’s government attracted the UN which established its mission dubbed “Operation Restore Hope” in Somalia. To access Somalia, the US overflew Kenya’s NER at times without proper chain of consultations.\(^{279}\) The move worried Kenya given the US position in Ogaden war. In addition, the land borders experienced continuous flow of Somali refugees into Kenya indicated by UNHCR reports at 700 daily in early 1992.\(^{280}\) The following year the numbers escalated to 500,000.\(^{281}\) Moreover, May 1993 experienced yet another 90,000 refugees from the Ethiopian-Kenyan border.\(^{282}\) Furthermore, increased fighting in Somalia halted the humanitarian assistant flow from Nairobi to Somalia in early 1993. The effects were more refugee flow from Somalia to Kenya at about 3, 800 per day.\(^{283}\)

The large numbers of refugees from both Ethiopia and Somalia into Kenya was due to the proximity and the presence of a Somali identity at the border zone. Also, drought displaced agricultural clans from the Jubaland area and Ogaden region close to Kenya. Apart from drought, Somalia's defeat in Ogaden war and the subsequent counterinsurgency made Ethiopia not attractive to Somalia's refugees. Furthermore, Ethiopian-Somalis had fled the Ogaden to Kenya and Somalia during the war.\(^{284}\) By the end of December 2013, the number of Somali

\(^{279}\) Keesing’s record of World Events, 1992, p. 39035, col. 1
\(^{280}\) Ibid
\(^{281}\) Ibid Col 1 and Col 2.
\(^{282}\) Ibid
\(^{283}\) Keesing’s, the record of World Events, 1992, p. 39035, col. 2
refugees in Kenya stood at 477,424\(^{285}\) by July 2015 it was 420,711.\(^{286}\) The decrease was an outcome of the November 2013 tripartite agreement between the governments of Somalia and Kenya, and the UNHCR on voluntary repatriations of Somali refugees.\(^{287}\) Furthermore, the Al-Shabaab attack on Westgate Mall in Nairobi in September 2013 and Garissa University attack in April 2015 led to numerous calls by the Kenyan government to repatriate Somali refugees.\(^{288}\)

The insecurity and unstable nature of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) in Somalia and subsequent attempts at governance made refugees unwilling to go back.\(^{289}\) Furthermore, a good number of refugees present from 1992 to 2015 were born in Kenyan camps. They are not familiar with Somalia. Despite it, there are no foreseeable possibilities of integrating refugees from Somalia given the history of secession and now terrorism. The refugees blur the border and Kenyan-Somali identity in Kenya. In 2016 while at the World Humanitarian Summit, the Deputy President of Kenya Willian Ruto announced a decision to close the Dadaab camps due to emanating insecurities posed to the country.\(^{290}\)

The illegal border crossings and insecurity threats from Somalia led to Kenya’s onset of a border fence construction, an insistence on a rigid border, but distinguishing Kenyan-Somalis from Somalia-Somalis remained a problem. Furthermore, corruption by Kenya government


\(^{289}\) Ibid, p. 12

officials in NER allows people from Somalia to buy Kenya’s identity papers as accusations are traded back and forth among Garissa, Wajir and Mandera leaders.\textsuperscript{291} Besides, Somalia and Somalis are against the idea of border fence due to the presence of kin members across the state borders.\textsuperscript{292} Furthermore, business traders offer that the wall will deteriorate trade between the two countries.\textsuperscript{293}

4.7.4 The Al-Shabaab Insecurity and the Kenya-Somalia Border.

The continual conflicts in Somalia led to the emergence of Islamic Court Union (ICU) aimed at uniting Somalis. The Ethiopian incursion in Somalia dismantled the ICU in 2006.\textsuperscript{294} The remnants of ICU formed the Al-Shabaab in 2007.\textsuperscript{295} The Al-Shabaab is based in the North-western and Southern parts of Somalia near the Kenyan border but traverses the Horn causing insecurities.

The term Al-Shabaab carries double connotations in the Horn of Africa. It emanated from Somalia having metamorphosed from ICU’s Al-Itihaad Al-Islamiyah, Arabic words meaning \textit{the nation of Islam}. In Arabic, Al-Shabaab means \textit{the youth}.\textsuperscript{296} It was constructed to represent the remnants of ICU military wing after ICU lost popularity. Al-Shabaab’s goal is to make Somalia Islamic and expel infidels. The objective threatens countries neighboring Somalia albeit, with a religious identity and terrorism.

\textsuperscript{291} \textit{Weekly Review}. “More than Passing Interest for Kenya.” P. 42
\textsuperscript{292} Elders Focus Group Discussion: Office of the Marginalized Communities. Mandera. November 20, 2016.
\textsuperscript{293} Elders Focus Group Discussion: Garissa Animal Market. Wednesday, October 26, 2016.
The US linked the Al-Shabaab to Al-Qaeda terrorist group after its September 11, 2001 attack. The attack raised the security radar for Kenya and the world with the US characterization of Somalia as a hotbed for terrorism.\textsuperscript{297} Kenya’s proximity to Somalia, a shared border, and Somali community became a doorstep for terrorism. Kenya has so far suffered major bombings such as the 1998 US embassy in Nairobi, the 2002 Paradise hotel in Mombasa, the 2013 West Gate and the 2015 Garissa University.\textsuperscript{298} Kenya attributed all the attacks to the Al-Shabaab group. Additionally, varying degrees of grenade attacks occurred within Nairobi and the border regions in Kenya between 1998 and 2016.

Kenya faces a dilemma whose roots are historical and chronological given Somalia’s insecurity and the refugees’ armament. Dadaab refugee camps located in Garissa County are hide-outs for illegal arms trafficking.\textsuperscript{299}

The challenge is that identity played a role in Garissa University terrorist attacks where the terror group classified the targets based on religion. It brought out the religious differences between Christians and Muslims in North Eastern Kenya. Tensions emanated afterward which led the Garissa Member of Parliament and majority leader of government Mr. Aden Barre Duale to promise that, Somalis were going to produce a list of financiers and terrorist sympathizers from NER. A few days later he renounced the claim in the argument that NER leaders did not owe anyone a list of terrorists.\textsuperscript{300} Some members of parliament followed up Mr.

\textsuperscript{299} Ibid
Duale’s promise and gave him an ultimatum to either produce the list of terrorists and financiers\textsuperscript{301} alternatively, step down from his official post. Notably, 40 members of parliament from NER supported Mr. Duale that they did not promise to provide such a list.\textsuperscript{302} Furthermore, NER leaders argued that demands for a terrorist list were laden with intentions to divide the country. The division between North Eastern and the rest of the country re-emerged as a result of Al-Shabaab tactics. The latter continue to construct Somalis as a separate unit in Kenya.


In 1978 Kenya swore in a new President, Daniel Toroitich Arap Moi, following the death of Jomo Kenyatta. Moi’s leadership upheld the borders of Kenya as per the colonial status. As the Vice President, Moi declared Kenya’s satisfaction with its geographic mapping\textsuperscript{303} and stressed Kenyatta’s statement that Kenya would not relinquish any section of its land. Moi observed that if any country was to claim other lands beyond the borders as they were, then Kenya was entitled\textsuperscript{304} to claim Jubaland in Somalia and Mount Kilimanjaro in Tanzania.\textsuperscript{305} Despite the transfer of Jubaland to Italy and eventually Somalia in 1925, Moi upheld that Kenya respected the territorial integrity and would not pursue these lands.

The NEP residents took a new approach towards Kenya-Somalia border and begun to identify more with Kenya in 1991. Somalia’s defeat in Ogaden war in 1977 coincided with several

\textsuperscript{301} Standard Digital. “Give us the list of Al Shabaab sympathizers or quit, Kenyan MPs tell Aden Duale” April 17, 2015. Accessed October 4, 2016, available at \url{http://www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/2000158684/give-us-list-of-al-shabaab-sympathisers-or-quit-kenyan-mps-tell-aden-duale}


\textsuperscript{305} Ibid.
Members of Parliament from NER region reiteration of their support, and oneness with Kenya. One such a member was Mr. Elisha Godana the then assistant Minister of information and broadcasting who was quoted saying “we in northeastern have no intention of joining Somalia.” NER’s government support marked a turn-around from the 1960s rhetoric.

The NEP change on the border issue was an outcome of two things. First, a certain section of the region did not believe in Somalia's expansionist strategy but remained silent for fear of being seen as traitors. The Greater Somalia ideal appeared to be a project of influential clan voices feared by the rest. Second, the defeat of Somalia by Ethiopia in the Ogaden War created fears of likely repercussions towards the ‘settler’ Somalis. The real motivations for the Shifta war occurrence in Kenya appeared multi-pronged.

The fear of Somalia's aggression lingered in Kenya during Barre's regime necessitating specific measures against it. The first was the reinforcement of 1964 Kenya-Ethiopian agreement on border protection in 1979. Somalia had a reservation on adhering to inviolability of borders during the July 23, 1964. The objection prompted the initial Kenya-Ethiopia agreement of 1964. Therefore, Kenya continued to hold on to a rigid notion of the border.

Somalia renounced territorial claims during Barre’s regime. Barre acknowledged the sovereignty of Djibouti in 1982. President Moi visited President Barre in 1984. In 1986 he observed the improved relations between Kenya and Somalia concerning the border. Subsequently, Moi referred to border issues with Somalia as ‘thefts and robberies’ and

306 Daily Nation. “M.Ps Condemn Somalia Aggression.” P. 4
307 Ayoob. The Horn of Africa, p.11
reiterated there was a common strategy by the two governments to apprehend and punish the culprits.\(^\text{308}\) It showed a recognition of the border as per the colonial demarcation by both countries with equally, a mutual notion of insecurity.

Kenya changed from referring to border problems as Shifta to thefts and robberies. Previously, Kenya used Shifta where it experienced territorial threats from Somalia. In some instances, Kenya used the term Shifta where cattle rustling and illegal border aspects were concerned. Kenya disassociated Shifta from secessionism. It indicated Kenya did not believe secession of NFD emanated from the people within its borders. The idea seemed to be Somalia's effort to create Somalis homogeneity.

The Failure to capture NFD and the Ogaden region exposed disunity within Somalia. Clan politics resurfaced and led to the fall of the government in 1991. Divisions developed between the Northern and Southern Somalia along clan identities. The Darod clan in the south going all the way to Ogaden in Ethiopia showed interest in political clout in both Kenya and Ethiopia. Barre's heavy material and ideology failure in Ethiopia, begun clan's agitation for political space.\(^\text{309}\) In 1991 Somaliland broke away from the Republic of Somalia and declared its sovereignty. Somalia lost its grip on the "Greater Somalia" ideology which implied Kenya's view of the border. The Republic of Somalia eventually fragmented into clan enclaves. The disintegration of Somalia shattered the idea of Somalis homogeneity in search of a single state. It questions whether it was in existence in the first place or was a tactical plan to annex and expand Somalia's territory.

\(^{308}\) Bakpetu. Conflict in The Horn of Africa, P. 264

The Al-Shabaab started to construct the unity of Somalia under religious identity. The agenda was to rule Somalia under Islamic law, subjugating clan identity to a religious one and state borders to a religious identity common in ethnic Somalis. The Al-Shabaab outlook takes Somalia and its neighbors back to the immediate pre-independence era where Somalia perceived the border as the identity and culture of a people.

The Al-Shabaab attacks in Kenya had implications for territorial borders, dividing Muslims and Christians. A distorted outlook of religion overtly adds a layer to the notion of identity and border.\textsuperscript{310} It rebirthed a divide between NER with the rest of Kenya. Ideally, Al-Shabaab tactics stem from Mohamed Abdullah Hassan whose goals were to rid Somalia of infidels, claim its territories and enhance an Islamic state.\textsuperscript{311}

The notion of Somalis homogeneity creates an open gate for illegal Somalis and goods in Kenya. In this aspect, the intrusion of Al-Shabaab and hide-out in the Somalis population creates the border porosity in Kenya. Fear characterizes refugee camps, as they are afraid to talk about terrorism. A Citizen Television documentary asked an individual in the refugee camps whether there are Al-Shabaab in their midst, he responded that "the fact that am not willing to respond to your question, does it give you the answer?"\textsuperscript{312} To Al-Shabaab factions, the border is not a line on the sand but body borders whereby the presence of Somalis gives a notion of belonging until they encounter non-Somalis.

\textsuperscript{311} Lewis, A Modern History of the Somali, pp. 80-85.
Finally, Somalia’s self-determination has layered meanings. First was Somalia’s liberation from colonialism. Second, Somalis unification for purposes of enhancing a culture through liberation from adjoining non-Somali states of Ethiopia, Djibouti, and Kenya. Lastly is the disintegration of clan regions to enhance each clan’s agenda. Clan self-determination contradicts the initial building blocks of a united Somali nation.

4.9 Conclusion.

Kenya and Somalia's perceptions of the border and identity appears to emanate from the definition of nationhood. Somalia bases nationhood on a feeling of ethnic commonality where territory is immaterial. Kenya grounds nationhood on territoriality which casts ethnic affiliations to the periphery to advance the whole. For this reason, Kenya retains a fixed notion of the border as a strict inviolable line. The inelastic notion of the border aligns with the territorial integrity of colonial borders. Contrarily, Somalia's idea of the border is transient/elastic. Somalia interpretation of state borders is inconsistent where at times it meant strict lines but mostly was based on a constructed homogenous ethnic identity of Somalis. The homogeneity brought forth body borders where physiognomy, racism/ethnicism' carry security consequences associated with the insider/outsider notion. The perception of NER's threat to Kenya remains as indicated by the symbolism of Somalia's five-pointed star, a propagation of greater Somalia ideology. The five-pointed star serves as a constant reminder to Somalia's neighbors of the history and future desires to achieve the goal of uniting all Somalis.

314 Ibid
Secondly, Kenya's outlook of the border augurs with the European notion where a border is inviolable irrespective of reasons credited to any desire to cross it. Somalia perceived the neighboring countries as brothers taking an African notion of the border. The idea of brotherhood invokes notions of sharing and accommodating one another. Somalia's explanations of disagreements with Kenya over NFD as brotherly shows conflict as everyday occurrences. It informed the back and forth understanding of conflict and peace. Similarly, it paved the way for an elastic notion of the border where Kenya could cede part of the territory as a ‘brotherly' indication since the region remained accessible to both.

Furthermore, Somalia abides by spatial patterns of ethnic groups in which prohibition of people desires to separate were unacceptable given the primacy in the sense of belonging together. The ingenuity of constructing the Somali Nation required masking non-Somalis within NFD. Somalia used, a Pan-clan/Cushitic ideal successfully through convincing ethnic groups with strong clan notions that they belonged together. The Pan-Somali convinced NFD they were minorities with possible marginalization in the future. Besides, religious affinity drew the people together. It created a ‘Somali' nation outlook in border construction. It was contrary to Kenya's multi-racial/ethnic/religious outlook of a State.

Kenya disregarded the internal make-up of identities. The cosmopolitan nature of its citizenship shaped this disregard. The use of identities to qualify borders appeared to infer a total balkanization of the country. After all, Kenya borders Uganda, Tanzania, and Ethiopia all with split ethnic groups at the border zones. The border with Uganda splits the Luo’s and Luhya. Similarly, its border with Tanzania to the south-west splits the Maasai community. Additionally, the border with Ethiopia to the North splits the Oromo and the Gabbra ethnic
groups. There is also the presence of minority communities within such as; Indians, Caucasians, and Arabs.

Kenya invoked national unity instead of concentrating on rights of a minority. A pure ethnic Kenyan state was not feasible. The multi-ethnic state border did not imply Somalia's naturalness in border construction because it also was not based on pure nationalism. Both states based their imagination of a state on the colonial experiences and circumstances of the time. Somalia with the help of British administration appeared successful in constructing the fallacy of Somalia's homogeneity. In reality, there are non-Somalis in Somalia albeit minority groups such as Arabs and Bantus. Furthermore, Somalia nation adheres to clan identities as opposed to the umbrella of being a Somali. Somalia's disintegration into clan enclaves and the efforts to re-build a federal state show an absence of homogeneity. Somalia's notion of the border, identity and insecurity became transient from the Pan Somali to clan rigidities.

In the end, the view of the border and identity shapes security. The turbulent history of Shifita war and what appeared as Somalis desire to secede NFD created distrust between the governments of Kenya and the Somalis in NER. The al-Shabaab attacks and hide-outs in NER exacerbate the distrust. It creates the unfavorable condition for a united Kenyan state with the NER. As the government continues to bridge the gap with NER, the Al-Shabaab propagates the opposite.

A view of the Kenya-Somalia border as porous\textsuperscript{315} with insufficient policing mechanism is attributed to rough terrain and vastness complicating effective policing.\textsuperscript{316} Furthermore,


Somalia’s fragmentation and the collapse of the central government since 1991 left Somalia’s side of the border open and prone to unmonitored movements. Amidst all, is the presence of Somali clans’ competition on both sides of the border which disrupts a united front in border management. Clan competitions beg the question on how Somalis perceive identity, security and the Kenya-Somalia border.

CHAPTER 5: FROM JOHN KAARAR TO SOMALI SIJUI-ETHNIC SOMALIS PERCEPTION OF THE KENYA-SOMALIA BORDER, IDENTITY AND INSECURITY

5.0 Introduction

The Somali perception of the Kenya-Somalia border, identity and insecurity appears similar to that of the Kenyan government. Kenya-Somalis identify as Kenyans and also acknowledge the existence of the Kenya-Somalia border despite the insistence on the presence of kin across. However, 99% of all interviewees in Garissa County swore they had never been to Somalia. On the surface, there seems to be no problem with the Kenyan identity. Yet in practice, there is a gap between Somalis and non-Somalis residing in NER. There are labels for non-Somalis and vice-versa from the communities. The labels appear connected with fears of or need to keep the ‘other' at bay. These fears occasionally culminate in attacks on non-locals by Al-Shabaab terror group in NER. The terror groups capitalize on the existing gap to ‘cleanse' off ‘non-locals’ from NER.

The lack of a stable government in Somalia projects the border threats as emanating from Somalia, though some insecurities are committed by locals. In Garissa County, these threats were projected as an outcome of the presence of the refugee camps. The residents held a consistent view that the camps should be closed. But the study findings from both Garissa and Mandera Counties indicate insecurity as a by-product of either side or both sides of the Kenya-Somalia border. Members of the local community in Mandera indicated that some attacks are passed off as emanating from Somalia yet the local gangs are responsible for them.
Additionally, substantial references to the Kenya-Ethiopian border by the local community in Mandera led to the inclusion of experiences of that border in a comparative perspective. This is due to Ethiopia’s proximity and influence on the people in Mandera County. The Kenya-Ethiopian border is in contact with Kenya-Somalia border enclosing Mandera County in a triangular shape. The distance from Ethiopian border to Somalian border takes less than 15 minutes’ drive at 60 Kilometre per hour. The three countries share the Somali community at the borders but differ in terms of Somali clan identities and security. As Kenya bears extensive border attacks, Ethiopia enjoys relative peace.

The state and clan identities are easily detectable amongst the Somalis.1 This is through the Somali dialect accent.2 Among the Somalis, the accent places a person’s state of origin as either Kenya or Somalia. Somalis cannot falsify their identity within the community.3 Ironically, the Kenyan government officials have significant problems detecting the differences between Kenyan and Somalian Somalis.4

Somalis perception of insecurity is paradoxical. Whereas the state finds it challenging to detect non-citizens passing off as citizens thus attributed to insecurity, the community views corrupt officials as security loopholes. Furthermore, corrupt local Somali officials cause border insecurities. Higher border insecurity in Kenya Vis a Vis Ethiopia was attributed to corruption and lack of patriotism by both security agents and local chiefs. The chapter is mostly a result of primary data collected from Garissa and Mandera counties. It shows that Somalis hold an

elastic notion of the border with a clan-based vertical identity substantiated by a similar physical appearance and pastoralist culture.

5.1 Background of Garissa and Mandera Counties

5.1.1 Mandera County

Mandera County is located at the North-Eastern corner of Kenya. It has a population of 1,025,000 based on the disputed 2009 country census.\(^5\) It is bordered by Ethiopia and Somalia thus the reference, ‘the triangle.’ The elders observed that “we live in a place called pembe tatu, (three corners) Somalia, Kenya, and Ethiopia.”\(^6\) It is a pastoralist County with minimal seasonal farming along River Dawa which runs on the Northern border with Ethiopia towards the North-Eastern border with Somalia.

Insecurity at the border in Mandera County is a combination of internal competition for resources amongst the Somali clans and presence of Al-Shabaab terror group both from within and Somalia.\(^7\) Clan competition is brought about by drought episodes which affect the nomadic lifestyle due to limited grazing zones for different clans.\(^8\)

Mandera has four major clans. These are, the Degodia in Mandera North, Garre in El Wak, Banissa and parts of Mandera East, Murulle in Mandera East, Lafey, and parts of Mandera North, and the fourth represents an amalgamation of minor ones referred to as corner tribes. The corner tribes are Shikaal, Sharmoge, Hawadle, and Warabeya. The corner clans are spread

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\(^5\) Menkhaus, “Conflict Assessment/2014 Northern Kenya and Somaliland, p. 93
\(^7\) Interview with a senior County Official. “The Sources of Insecurity in Mandera.” Mandera Town. Tuesday 8, November 2016.
from border point 1 to Khalalio division, and Hareri Horsle\textsuperscript{9} in parts of Mandera East/town. The Marehan clan forms part of corner tribes. They are key businessmen in Mandera East.

The clan dynamics and competition for power occasionally leads to conflicts between the Garre and others within Mandera and/or neighboring counties. The majority Garre carry political power and they are often in conflict with the Murulles within the county and the Marehan in El Wak constituency. The Marehan originate from Bula Hawa, the immediate side of the Kenya-Somalia border near Mandera town.\textsuperscript{10} Garres at times conflict with the Degodia in Mandera and those in the neighboring Wajir County. They also have conflicts with the Ajuran in Wajir County.

5.1.2 Garissa County

Garissa County covers 44,175 square kilometers with a population of 623,060 people according to 2009 government census.\textsuperscript{11} It is home to the Dadaab refugee camps and is the headquarters of the North Eastern Region (NER). The County borders Tana River County to the West, Isiolo to North-West, Wajir to the North, Somalia to the East and Lamu to the South. It has six administrative constituencies: Garissa town, Balambala, Lagdera, Dadaab, Fafi, and Ijara.

Garissa County is home to the Ogaden Somali clan in Kenya. The clan sub-divides into the sub-clans of, Abdalla, Abdwaq, Auliyaahan, and Magabul in addition, to the minority sub-clan of Mohammed Zubeir. The Abdalla reside in Ijara, Hulugho, and parts of Fafi. Abdwaq resides

\textsuperscript{9} Ibid
\textsuperscript{10} Interview with a Senior County official. “Kenya-Somalia Border, Identity and Security.” County Commissioner Offices: Mandera. Wednesday, November 9, 2016.
in Balambala and Fafi. Auliyahan is in Dadaab and Lagdera. Mohamed Zubeir is in Wajir County and southern parts of Somalia. Finally, Magabul is in Dadaab and southern parts of the County.

Initially, the Abdalla and Abdwaq were populous in the County, but some of the Auliyahan who straddle the Kenya-Somalia border emigrated from Somalia to Garissa County.\textsuperscript{12} They acquired identity cards (IDs) which increased their numbers in Kenya.\textsuperscript{13} This intensified competition for resources and culminated in clashes between them and Abdwaq in 1998-2000.\textsuperscript{14}

Also, Garissa County has the highest number of non-Somalis in NER. Garissa town is cosmopolitan with a presence of different clans and non-Somalis.\textsuperscript{15} This has attracted the Al-Shabaab and business moguls and is a threat due to fear of losing culture and business opportunities to ‘non-locals’.\textsuperscript{16} In addition, there are fears of losing electoral posts due to ‘non-locals’ influence.\textsuperscript{17} These fears are compounded by refugees’ influx.\textsuperscript{18}

5.2 Typology of Insecurities identified by Somalis; these were associated with the Governments’ actions in North Eastern Region 1963-2016

The residents pointed out several insecurities incurred by the community as an outcome of governments’ actions to restore peace in the region. These measures were identified as having

\textsuperscript{13} Ibid
\textsuperscript{14} Ibid
\textsuperscript{15} Interview with an NGO official. “Identity in Garissa County.” Finish Church AID: Garissa. Friday 22, October 2016.
\textsuperscript{16} Menkhaus, “Conflict Assessment/2014 Northern Kenya and Somaliland,” p. 115
caused Somalis deaths. The Shifta war or killings of non-Somalis in NER ‘aided’ by some local Somalis attracted the insecurities. The following historical occurrences were mentioned.19 The 1964-67 Shifta war, between 2000 and 7000 people were killed.20 In 1980 Garissa Gubay (burn) or Bulla Karatasi operation occurred after 6 government officials were killed by the ‘Shiftas,’ in response the government raided and burnt structures in Bulla-Karatasi-Garissa in order to capture the leader Abdi Mathobe, 3000 people ended up dead.21 In 1981 the Malka Mari ‘Massacre’ occurred as a result of banditry in Mandera where 200 people were killed. In 1984 the Wagalla Massacre took place at the Wajir airstrip which led to 3000 deaths as a result of the government operation to disarm the Degodia clan.22 In 1998 a security drift in Garissa-Balambala led to the torture of 38 people.23 These problems sowed the seed of distrust between Somalis and the Kenyan governments to date.

Following the killing of six government officials in Garissa in 1980, the then Minister of State in charge of Internal Security, Mr. G. G. Kariuki stated that "The Kenya Government has maintained that Kenya Somalis belong to this country, but of course, we know there have been some individuals who seem to think they would get better treatment from Mogadishu or Ethiopia,"24 In addition, the then Provincial Commissioner for NER Mr. Benson Kaaria stated that “Kenya would be ready to shed blood to defend its borders against foreign aggressors.”25

Prior to this, Mr. Kaaria observed that the Somalis in Garissa region most of whom are

19 See Appendix 8.1 Table 2. “Typology of Insecurities Identified by Residents in NER.” Source, generated by the author from field interviews and various publications.
22 Ibid, p., See also; Abdi. Blood on the Runway, p. 86
25 Ibid
Kenyans, aided Shiftas to strike and escape. It appeared like Shiftas were protected by the local Somali women. Subsequently, the killings of non-Somalis in NER in acts of terrorism from Somalia seems linked with sympathizers from the local Somali community again attracting the governments’ security apparatuses.

Somalis in NER repeatedly quoted the above atrocities by the government against them. Asked whether change of governments over the years has led to any changes in security measures; locals responded there were no significant changes. "We are treated like second-class citizens, they should have allowed us to go." Meaning the 1963 NFD referendum on secession should have taken its course. In matters of governance, an elder observed that "Ratiga dambe ratiga hore saanqaadkiisa ayuu leeyahay" (the camel behind always follows the footsteps of the one in front). It implies changes of government’s since independence has brought little change in the treatment and development of the NER.

5.3 Historical Occurrences of Insecurity in Kenya Attributed to Al-Shabaab and Cross-border Incursions

Historical terrorist insecurities where non-Somalis/non-Muslims were targeted by either Al-Qaeda or the affiliate Al-Shabaab group contribute to the tensions between the Kenyan government and Kenya-Somalia border infiltrators. According to the government of Kenya officials, these insecurities emanated from the Somalia border. The terrorist atrocities were

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27 Ibid.
repeatedly cited by government officials in NER. Somalia was shown as the origin of the threat with the help of some local Somalis.

Terror bombings and shooting in Kenya occurred from around 1975 in which the Al-Shabaab or Al-Qaeda targeted non-Muslims/non-Somalis. They include the following occurrences where several lives were lost. In the 1975 Nairobi bus bombings, 27 people died. The 1980 Norfolk Hotel Bombing, 20 lives were lost. The ‘Norfolk’ was a revenge mission for allowing Israelis to refuel in Nairobi in 1976 during ‘operation Entebbe’ in the Israelis rescue from the Idd Amin government. The 1998 US Embassy bombing killed 213 people. The 2002 Paradise Hotel-Mombasa bombing claimed 16 lives. The 2013 West-Gate bombing in Nairobi 67 people died. The 2014 Mpeketoni attack in Mombasa claimed 65 lives. The 2014 Gikomba Market attack in Nairobi 10 people died. The 2014 Mandera-Quarry attack 36 people lost lives. The 2015 Garissa University attack in Garissa town 147 students died. The 2015 El

31 See Table on the Appendix 8.1, table 3.

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Wak-Mandera bus shooting 28 people were shot dead.\textsuperscript{40} The 2016 Mandera Lodge attack 12 people died.\textsuperscript{41}

Terror related insecurities began around 1975 in Kenya and had international networks. The perpetrators' were either locals with an international network or vice versa. The targets are no longer expatriates working and living in Kenya but also local non-Somali/non-Muslim Kenyans.

The two views of insecurity activities from both the Somali in NER and the Kenya government officials bear a strong linkage to Somalis perception of identity and the Kenya-Somalia border. Amidst it, is an embedded indication of mistrust between the locals and the Kenyan government dating back to the pre-independence period about the border

5.4 \textit{Xadka, Xuduud or Sera?} Somalis Perception of the Kenya-Somalia Border

Somalis occupy North Eastern Region (NER) which borders Somalia. \textit{Xadka} a Somali word for border or boundary or \textit{xuduud} also a Somali word meaning boundary or borderline were used interchangeably in reference to state or internal administrative borders. Kenya institutionalized border management systems in NER deemed appropriate for security. NFD was managed separately by the colonial government. This created an administrative border

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with the rest of Kenya. The Northerners or former NFD coined the term ‘down Kenya/downy/down country’ to refer to the rest of Kenya.\textsuperscript{42} The colonial government spatial border separated NER from the rest of Kenya. However, county government officials maintained the border with Somalia is rigid. They observed that "a border is that which is indicated on the map."\textsuperscript{43} This contrasted with the Somalis view, who despite recognizing the border on the map carry additional notions of borders. When questioned on the understanding of the border, the elders shot back “what border?\textsuperscript{44} Kenya-Somalia border was shown as existent in a paper but not in practice.\textsuperscript{45} The elders stated that nomadic culture is widespread in the Horn of Africa and renders state borders non-existent to pastoralists.

Furthermore, Somalis were of the view that the government has total disregard of the nomadic lifestyle.\textsuperscript{46} Separate interviews indicated that “pastoralists do not know about borders.”\textsuperscript{47} “…The idea of borders is understood among the few of us who have gone to school, pastoralists do not know borders; it is a foreign concept in the villages.”\textsuperscript{48} Furthermore, a border as a line in the map was observed to hold no meaning in Mandera \textit{penbe tatu}/triangle. This is due to the movement of pastoralists at the border zones.\textsuperscript{49} An elder stood near the Kenya-
Somalia border and asked whether we could see any differences in the land or the people; according to him, “the border is in the minds, it does not exist in reality.”

The Somali term for the border/boundary/borderline is Xadka or Xuduud. These can be international and/or local borders. The conception of the border materializes as a constant shift from rigid to permeable and vice versa. In other cases borders appear layered. Borders between counties designate clan dwellings therefore considered rigid. Clan borders invoke the native/non-native assemblages. Borders between clans defy those between countries with a similar clan.

Clan borders allow corresponding conceptions of sovereignty, space, and authority. The men focus group in Mandera were of the view that the study should have concentrated on county borders where a ‘big problem exists' due to some county officials shifting the border to a point of narrowing other clan's jurisdiction to a mere belt.” Political borders were compartmentalized into clan's jurisdiction whose implications meant that they cannot be taken over by another. Clan borders are more important than state borders. They are critical to the nomadic lifestyle. Elders of a clan authorize and coordinate permissions to various clan's pastoralists seeking pasture and water. Amidst clan borders, the state border is almost invisible as it lacks elder representation. The state rarely impedes on pastoralists in the open spaces and crossing zones.

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50 Interview with Chief Mohammed. “What is your understanding of the Kenya-Somalia Border?” Mandera, November 11, 2016
County borders of Garissa, Wajir, and Mandera, are rigidified in relation to local governance. A person from a non-local clan cannot run for a political office. This contrasts the flexible view of the Kenya-Somalia border deemed permeable. The varying understanding of borders by the Somalis are drawn from the cultural representations of a pastoral lifestyle. Border perceptions are adjusted when it comes to state border in order to enjoy opportunities provided by geographic/natural and man-made features.

Apart from Xuduud, the term Sera is also used to refer to the border. Sera was mainly used by the herders in the pastoralist focus group discussion and Sheikhs. The two appeared to have more concentrated cultural roots found in Somalia as opposed to the diluted culture of the Kenya Somalis. Other discussants and respondents referred to the border as Xuduud. Pastoralist focus groups explained that Sera is a permanent mark made on animals to distinguish clan ownership. Sera is placed on cows, goats, and camels. Each clan has a distinctive mark. The mark separates authorities and creates a strict border that cannot be crossed or made permeable in terms of animal ownership.

The clan imparts a rigid view of the border. Where a clan straddles state borders, the latter is silenced. This is the case in the Southern parts of the Kenya-Somalia border in Garissa County. The border is straddled by the Ogaden clan. Despite the permeable view of the Kenya-Somalia border, sub-clan borders are rigidified in Garissa County. In the Northern parts of the Kenya-Somalia border in Mandera, the rigidity is both on the states and clan borders. The Marehan clan present on the Somalia side is considered as a corner tribe in Mandera. Though the

56 Ibid
57 Ibid
Marehan have emigrated to the Kenyan side and established some homes, the locals consider them Somalia's citizens.\textsuperscript{58}

In practice, the physical and cultural similarity of the Somalis results to a lack of recognition of the border between the states of Somalia and Kenya. Pastoralists crisscross state borders at will. This practice was established before the foundation of states in the region and continues to date.\textsuperscript{59} Somali herders developed seasonal movement patterns in the Horn of Africa. Therefore, elites recognize international borders and the legal requirements of the governments involved but they constitute a minority in NER population.

\textbf{5.4.1 Border(s) and Symbolisms}

Border points are heavily guarded by security officers in NER. They are symbolic both as physical demarcations on the map and paper representations. The presence of state security increases at checkpoints as one nears Tana River. These checkpoints serve as borders in themselves. The heightened security is normal to the community while unsettling to visitors. The visibility of state security forces disciplines the people, creates awareness and representation in the society.\textsuperscript{60} Therefore, security presence and discipline outcomes are tools of power used to maximize state control.\textsuperscript{61} The NFD was a frontier zone characterized by militarization. It was changed to NER and converted to the outer limit of the state borderline. However, the conversion was bereft of demilitarization as NER remains heavily guarded due to fears of insecurity. The perceived internal and external security threats militarize the region.

\textsuperscript{59} Abdi. Blood on the Runway, p.37
\textsuperscript{60} Foucault. Discipline and Punish, p. 168
\textsuperscript{61} Foucault. Security Territory, p 67
NER residents observed that the presence of regular security checks, "is the only way to secure 'our' State." This 'norm' is full of tensions and conflict about how security is carried out and the impact thereof.

The entrance to NER by road is mainly via Tana River Bridge which borders Garissa County. It is the first checkpoint and serves as a border itself. The policemen wear operation uniform (jungle green and brown patches) a departure from the common practice of traffic police with light blue shirts and dark blue pants/‘men' in blue. A distinction between Kenyans and foreigners is first established by these police officers.

At the Tana River Bridge the police focused more on foreigners in the group, they wanted to know why they were visiting Garissa, how long they were going to be there and where they were staying. They also wanted to know if they had any intentions of traveling beyond Garissa town.

The security officers allow Kenyans easy entry at the Tana Bridge. But, foreign passport holders, especially from Western countries, are cautioned not to go beyond Garissa without a security escort. This is after a thorough scrutiny as to the purpose of visit and the length of stay.

Exit from the NER via Tana River Bridge is equally strictly vetted by government security personnel and Somalis undergo rigorous checks. But those with the Kenyan identification (ID) papers travel out of NER easily unlike other nationalities. Observably, non-Somalis go through light check-ups. In addition to the Kenyan ID holders, people with personal vehicles exit NER

63 Interview with a member of an International NGO. “Describe your experience upon reaching the Tana River Bridge.” Garissa: Ziwani Primary school (during a medical camp). Thursday 21 October 2016. A follow-up telephone conversation with another member of the same NGO in Nairobi, January 4, 2017
at the Tana Bridge with ease. “If you have a private car no one will bother you, all you have to do is to show the driver’s license whether you are a Somali or non-Somali. Class difference separates travelers to and from the region creating a form of a border.

Tuberculosis (TB) inoculation scars is a distinctive modality used to separate Kenyans from Somalia citizens at the Tana River Bridge. “Garissa is a major safety block for you coming into the rest of Kenya.” These thorough check-ups were observably low at Mandera border post as they intensified at NER entry/exit points into the heartland. Security actions appear to designate NER as a frontier.

5.4.2 Body Borders

Body borders involve physical manifestations of bodily features. Non-Somalis are regarded as foreigners in NER and vice versa. The Somalis use physical features such as curly soft texture of hair and a narrow pointed nose as an identity. The human body is an identity in NER. As a result, locals enjoy privileges such as jobs, physical and psychological security and cultural superiority over non-locals.

Body border goes with cultural borders and their geographic depictions. Non-Somalis observed that “Somalis are very intolerant of other people’s cultures.” Recreational places such as nightclubs and bars are present in Garissa but absent in Mandera town. Garissa is further from

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66 Abdi. Blood on the Runway, p. 34
the Kenya-Somalia border compared to Mandera. In the latter, bars and clubs were shut down following the locals' protest. "Mandera residents insisted on the closure of bars stating that they were pagan practices against their religious beliefs." The influence of Islam culture seems to intensify as one draws near the Kenya-Somalia border. The locals' values discipline the cultural orientations of the ‘non-locals.’ "When we want to take alcoholic drinks we cross River Dawa and go to Suftu (Suftu is a town in Ethiopian near Mandera at the Kenya-Ethiopian border) or others go to the army barracks." Body borders overlap with the cultural border to create the ‘unequal gaze' for non-Somalis which places power in favor of the Somalis in NER, irrespective of state affiliations.

The physiognomy differences between Somalis and Non-Somalis are physical markers used to reward those who belong. It is discipline to the mind to internalize ‘otherness’ and punish in social settings to ‘outsiders’. Whereas Somalis enjoy freedom in NER, non-Somalis enjoy it once they leave the region. The mental punishment is visible at checkpoints such as; The Tana River Bridge, Modikar /Chuma mrefu checkpoint in Garissa and Mandera Airstrip as one head towards Nairobi. The reverse experience occurs at the same checkpoints while heading to NER.

Furthermore, body borders limit the interaction of Somalis and Non-Somalis in NER. The Somalis and non-Somalis shut each other out in social dealings. In Garissa town, Taxi drivers are cautious and do not transport Somali women who are not in the company of their men. A taxi driver stated that "we do not speak to Somali women even when they approach us to ask for taxi services, we are afraid because if we are seen talking to them by their men, they can

71 Ibid
73 Foucault. Discipline and Punish, pp. 32-67, p.104
easily kill us."  

Though kill maybe an extreme representation, it left no doubt that there are serious consequences for such interactions. Non-Somalis are not acceptable in social relations like marriages. They are looked down upon due to the African ancestry as opposed to an Arab genealogy. These strict limitations have not hindered clandestine relationships. “We pretend during the day but at night things are different. Both women and men have relations under the cover of the night, this is how things are here.” The adamant refusal to integrate with non-Somalis is positioned to authenticate ‘Somaliness’ due to oppositional forces which regard other Kenyan non-Cushitic ethnicities as inferior.

Finally, body border defines duties for Somalis and non-Somalis. Somalis look down upon manual duties such as loading trucks, lifting heavy stuff, waiters/waitresses in prominent eateries and quarry work. Manual work is perceived inferior only fit for "slaves" or those with a ‘physical body' to carry out such work. Following an observation of non-Somalis doing these jobs an inquiry from a trader led to the response that "A Somali cannot do manual work like that, a Somali is designed to do brain work or long distance walking work such as pastoralism which requires constant thinking and decisions." The body, in addition to being a border, it is privileged/disadvantaged based on the physiognomy. Despite the existence of a division of labor and opportunities for non-Somalis, the presence of the latter is despised and results to deaths. After Quarry workers were killed in Mandera an elder stated that "why are they killing these poor people, a Somali cannot do the quarry work, they are working to feed their families

77 Conversational Interview with a Trader. “Why are there no Somalis unloading and loading trucks of goods?” Garissa: Garissa Town. Monday, October 24, 2016
as we are benefitting from the same to feed ours.”

Body border manifests between the Somalis and non-Somalis in NER questions the perception of the Kenya-Somalia border.

5.4.3 Kenya-Somalia Border Wall or Border Fence?

Since independence, there appears a confusion on the location of the Kenya-Somalia border based on happenings in the border zone. The Kenyan government decided to construct a wall to keep out insecurities. The Kenya-Somalia border wall/fence construction which started in 2016 is supposed to run from Border point 1 in Mandera to Lamu. The residents were of the view that the ‘wall’ is good for the government to define crossing points but bad for the community. The residence views the fence as a limitation to interactions of the Somalis in the two countries.

The border fence symbolizes Kenya’s authority though it does not indicate rigidity on the ground. Somalia’s citizens, in the neighboring Bula Hawa town, are from the Marehan clan and are only found in Somalia. Some Marehans have constructed homes in no-mans-land and encroached on Kenyan side next to Mandera town. Initially, the Marehan clan resisted the construction of the wall. Kenya challenged the resistance as more attacks on the security personnel and residence continued. In 2016, the Al-Shabaab killed 80 security agents near the Marehan border region. Eventually, the Marehan clan accepted the idea of a border fence. In

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79 See Appendix 8.2, Figures 3. “Picture of the Construction of Kenya-Somalia Border Wall at Border Point 1 (BP 1).”
82 See Appendix 8.2, Figures 4 and 5. “Picture indicating the Proximity of Bula Hawa Town to Mandera Town.”
discussion with national government officials in Mandera, one noted that the government of Kenya is yet to make a decision on the affected residential areas directly opposite Mandera border control point. A dilemma lingers concerning Somalians residing on the Kenyan and no-man's land. "The ‘wall’ is bound to pass through the extended Bula Hawa residential homes. A national government official stated that those on the Kenyan side may live in Kenya as refugees or will have to pack and move back to Somalia. This dilemma led Kenya to skip the affected section as the construction continued up to El Wak towards Lamu. The Mandera governor Ali Roba and the Gedo governor Mohamed M. Mohamed held a press conference and stated that President Uhuru Kenyatta of Kenya and Mohamed Abdullahi Farmajo of Somalia were to meet for a discussion to find the friendly ways to resolve the dilemma. Notably, Kenya encourages inter-community relations in the border region as indicated by the presence of Somali citizens on the Kenyan soil. It contradicts the strict view shown over the years.

The border ‘wall’ appears to aim at instituting a clear Kenyan identity in the minds of the walled-in and walled-out residents. The symbolism of the wall is a military and political tactic to control bodies and individual forces within the state. The ‘wall’ may not prevent entrance of insecurities such as the Al-Shabaab and illegals, but, it serves as a constant reminder of ‘who is in charge’ placing the illegal factions in endless fear and search for safety. The states’ presence is felt by all who hear, see, live near, and or cross over the fence. Ultimately, a border ‘wall’ shapes the social body to identify with the state and remove the Somali identity confusions which date back to the colonial period.

5.5 Identity or the ‘Bicycle Dispute’

During the colonial period in Kenya, the government thought of the inhabitants as local tribes or settlers like other colonialized territories. Local tribes were tagged natives of certain territories. The identity of natives went hand in hand with customary laws as opposed to non-native settler status which was guided by civic laws.\(^{87}\) The colonial government ingrained divisions in ethnic versus racial identity. The former were tribes thought of as low status designated to enslavement by racial identities. Ironically, races paid more taxes compared to tribes. Higher taxes were in line with the tenet of equality whereby those who earned more are required to pay higher taxes based on the state protections enjoyed.\(^{88}\) But it was taken to mean privileged because, with higher taxes, racial identity and masters of the slaves gained access to better medical care and areas of residence within Nairobi city.

It is from these services and privileges that the Isaaq Somalis sought non-native status. In 1920, the Isaaq and the Harti (Majerteen, D’ulbahante and Warsangali) Somalis secured the non-native status following the 1919 Somali Exemption ordinance.\(^{89}\) The Isaaq are in modern day Somaliland, Nairobi city, Naivasha, some sections of Isiolo, as western Kenya. The Harti which means the strong man consists of a business community from the D’ulbahante, Warsangali and Majerteen clans which fall under the Darod clan. What the Somali ordinance did was to introduce an ambiguous status of the Somalis. It, therefore, befell the colonial government to identify the non-native Somalis from the natives. The government found it tenuous given that physically it was impossible to tell ethnic Somalis apart. It was from this

distinction of the Somalis that the brawl over the bicycle tickets emerged. The Nairobi Council issued Asians whom the non-native Somali identified with, a diamond shape bicycle ticket. And the Africans a round ticket. Somalis began to protest against the round ticket and insisted on the diamond shaped one. After all the Somali Exemption Ordinance was never translated into legal rights and least of all where trivial matters such as bicycle tickets were concerned. Therefore, now and then the Somalis encountered identity ambiguity. Even though the colonial government later revoked the Somali Exemption Ordinance of 1920, the Somalis carried forth the identity ambiguity to the post-colonial government in Kenya.

Like the colonial government, Kenya faces the ambiguity of the Somali identity. To separate citizens from non-citizens the government in place determines the difference then issues national identification papers. Identity papers are critical in conferring legal rights, therefore, birth certificate, driver's license, the national ID card and the passport are used in identification. It is a prerogative of government officials' to differentiate the local Somalis from their foreign counterpart. To execute the duty officials rely on local Somali elders\textsuperscript{90} in vetting Somalis for identity papers.\textsuperscript{91} Kenya’s non-Somalis have difficulties in identification task but Somalis posit it is easy to tell apart Kenyan Somalis from Somalia citizens. Apparently, a person’s State identity is established by the accent in the Somali language.\textsuperscript{92} This view was constant in all Somali interviewees throughout the study.

\textsuperscript{90} Interview with the Officer Commanding Police Division (OCPD). “Identity and Kenya-Somalia Border.” Dadaab: Dadaab Town. Thursday, 27 October 2016.
\textsuperscript{91} Interview with the Chief Immigration Officer. “The Challenges of the Somali Identity in the Somali Community”. Garissa Immigration office: Garissa Town. Wednesday 23\textsuperscript{rd}, October 2016. Also, Interview with Chief Immigration Officer. “The Kenyan and Somali Identity of the Somali Community”. Mandera Immigration and Border Control Office: Mandera town. Thursday 10\textsuperscript{th}, November 2016
Furthermore, Somalis can determine County of origin amongst themselves. Regional identities are determined by clans whose distributions in the geographic region are known. Also, clans have unique names in some cases. Clan identities cannot be changed horizontally but it can change vertically as it either adds up to the main clan or subdivides into smaller sub-units of the main.

Kenyan-Somalis identify themselves as Kenyans in addition to other identities. These identities either agree or contradict state identities, in some circumstances complicating citizenship governance. Whereas Kenyan-Somalis acknowledge their state identity and have papers to authenticate the same, there is no hesitation in picking up other identities when circumstances call. The identities provide ‘opportunities’ especially since the collapse of the Somalia government. Such opportunities include, access to infrastructure in Kenya by Somalia’s citizens and refugee status in Kenya and abroad by Kenyans who pass off as Somalia’s citizens.

At the border, Somalia’s citizens cross to access social amenities in Kenya. Some children study in Kenyan schools and access free medical care in Mandera. An elder reiterated that,

*Mamilioni na halaiki ya watu wamekuja*” (millions and crowds of people have come), in other parts of Kenya you may know your neighbors since you grew together from childhood. Here, you don’t know your neighbor. You wake up in the morning and see new faces. In North Eastern people have come and filled the place. We Somalis hide because they are our in-laws and so on. In Somalia, Kenyan-Somalies identity is not questioned because there is a law that, any Somali regardless of where they were born is a citizen. This makes Kenyan Somalis reluctant to point out non-citizens, and we do not see them as foreigners. Because if you do something bad and go there no one will ask you but if you go to Ethiopia you will be questioned.

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In view of the above, Mandera residents acknowledge allegiance to a ‘kin’ across the border. The kinship allows the presence of Somalis from Somalia and normalizes foreigners’ access to Kenyan citizenship rights and privileges.

Other additional identities by Somalis involves Kenyan citizens’ registration as refugees in Dadaab camps. The Somalis, the government and Non-governmental Organization officials all agreed there were Kenyan citizens registered as refugees. The refugee status counters a Kenyan identity. A person registered as a refugee cannot apply for a Kenyan national ID card. These identities are mutually exclusive.

Somalia citizenship is attained in various ways, first, where a person has a Somalian father by law during their application regardless of where the applicant was born. In this case, a Somali ethnicity is not a prerequisite. Second, an ethnic Somali can acquire citizenship through renunciation of any other citizenship. Third, Somalians acquire citizenship through origin, tradition or language of the Somali nation. However, NER residents observed that, in practice, as long as one physically looks like a Somali, they can access any opportunities similar to those who are born in Somalia. For example, a former Minister of Defense in Somalia was born in NFD and previously served for many years in the Kenyan Military.

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96 Garissa Youth Focus Group Discussion, “The Duality of the Kenyan and Refugee Identity”. KALRO offices, Saturday, October 23, 2016.
Garissa and Mandera Counties observed that, before the fall of President Siad Barre’s regime, to access Somalia… "No one asked for the papers from us, in Somalia, your identity is your physical look (as he gestured cupping his face in both hands)." The physical features as an identity brought forth the notion of body borders where an identity is determined by how an individual appears.

The Kenyan security officers confirm citizenship identity at the Kenya-Somalia border using varying tactics. These include; language, mode of dress, and language accents. The modalities are forms of inclusion and exclusion at the checkpoints as a way of border management in NER. The ultimate goal is to determine and accord rights to Somalis based on the state identity.

The use of Swahili language is collapsed to mean a Kenyan identity in NER. In addition, a Kenyan Swahili accent is an asset to any individual as security scrutiny increases from Dadaab area to Garissa and equally, from Mandera to Nairobi. In a bus journey from Garissa to Dadaab and back, passengers clustered based on the benefit of a chosen identity. From Garissa to Dadaab all Somalis clustered together chatting in Somali dialect and excluded non-Somalis. On the return journey, Somalis clustered together at the onset and left out non-Somalists and an observed case of Somali-Bantus present in the bus. As the bus neared Garissa, Kenyan-Somalis switched the language to Swahili and begun to chat with Non-Somali Kenyans. Somalia citizens were sidelined and were silent and equally anxious. A Somali identity appears elastic.

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and quickly maneuvered to the benefit of the person which is apparent to security agents as they increase identity checks towards Garissa town.

Increased security checks include the use of fingerprint magnifiers at NER exit points to authenticate the thumbprint on the Kenyan ID. The locals observed that Modikar also known as Chuma Mrefu (Long metal) is the strongest identity-security checkpoint. It is located at the Wajir, Dadaab and Garissa junction and locals regard it as the most difficult to pass through. "If you ask anybody, they will tell you once you go through security check at Modikar, then you can relax, that is where everything comes to a standstill especially coming from Dadaab, Liboi or Somalia itself.…at Modikar there are no jokes, people sweat there." Observably, at the Modikar checkpoint, all passengers in the bus are required to alight and re-enter one by one as each provides identification papers to the security agents. In addition, the security agents' cross-check the fingerprint on National ID card with the actual thumb of the holder using a magnifying glass. Minors and refugee students provide original birth certificates and school identity cards respectively. During the study research, there were at least three officers from the Criminal Investigation Department (CID), and about ten armed policemen in combat uniforms guarding and executing the process.

The security process at the checkpoints tries to eliminate Somalian citizens from passing off as Kenyans. On rare occasions, there were some Sudanese citizens. Cultural aspects questions how and who should manage these checkpoints. How should the elimination-inclusion process

be carried out? Regardless of ethnic affiliation, non-Somalis in Islamic garb received strict vetting even though the agents tried to make it appear normal. On the contrary, non-Somalis and non-Muslims had comparatively light scrutiny. Therefore, the physiognomy of the individuals/body borders appeared to predict and project state borders.

5.5.1 The Politics of Hair and the Kenya-Somalia Identity

The texture of a person's hair is rarely a determinant of one's identity, especially state identities. But, in NER hair texture is a big issue, it is an identity which subsequently confers certain rights. The Somalis use hair to categorize people into two groups, the Jareer (hard) and the Jileec (soft).\(^{110}\) It designates ‘natives’ versus ‘immigrants’ in NER. Somalis to refer to non-Somalis as ‘nywele ngumu’ a Swahili term for ‘hard hair.’ Conversely, non-Somalis in Kenya to refer to Somalis as ‘waria’ a Somali word for ‘you’ but used in reference to the soft curly Somali hair type.

Somalis in Garissa and Mandera County use Nywele ngumu or its equivalent gurale to refer to Bantus and Nilotic communities whom they consider foreigners in the region. In Mandera, the use of gurale\(^{111}\) instead of nywele ngumu is common, but both terms mean ‘hard hair.’ Hair designates inclusion of Somalis as one regardless of a person’s citizenship while excluding all with nywele ngumu. Similarly the non-Somalis use of the term ‘waria,’ countrywide to refer to Somalis clusters all notwithstanding state identities. Both groups abhor the hair texture reference perceived as pejorative. Ironically, during the youth focus group discussion, a member stated that; "I feel like dying when nywele ngumu refer to me as waria."\(^{112}\) Oblivious

\(^{110}\) Eno. The Bantu – Jareer Somalis, p.15
to the speaker, he used an equally derogatory term (*nywele ngumu*) to refer to the different identity.

Non-Somalis were of the idea that Somalis use the phrase *nywele ngumu* to separate them from the local community because “it means we love hard work.” The interpretation shows a lack of awareness by some non-Somalis as Somalis clarified that it refers to the texture of hair. Equally, Somalis find non-Somalis use of the word *waria* derogatory. An elder explained that *waria* could never be used to refer to an older person, yet non-Somalis use it on anybody. Notably, both Somalis and non-Somalis use these words often in casual conversations. Both groups act as if the words are acceptable but harbor resentments.

Racializing and or ethnicizing a border space affects the Kenya-Somalia border in NER. It converts the geographic space to empower Somalis while disempowering non-Somalis. This takes away social, psychological and political power from ‘non-natives’ while benefiting the perceived natives. Body border gives all Somalis a sense of belonging which disregards citizenship status. Therefore, political borders fail to overlap with cultural ones perpetuating the misfortune of the nation-state where social disintegration from colonialism is inherited and passed on. This has affected Kenya-Somalia border since independence.

Prior to Kenya’s independence, the then Prime Minister Jomo Kenyatta seemed to think Somalis will intermarry and integrate with the rest. While on a tour of NER, Kenyatta reached

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out to a child on a Somali mother’s back, touched the child’s hair and said though it was soft, it was bound to change to nywele ngumu in future.\textsuperscript{117} The intermarriages have not happened. Kenyatta overlooked the Somalis’ pride and protection of ethnic purity. Furthermore, he overlooked the religious difference, cultural attachments and a determination to ‘guard’ the Somali woman from non-Somalis. Socially, the Somalis look down upon intermarriages with other ethnic groups. “A Somali cannot marry nywele ngumu, where a Somali woman marries a non-Somali man, she is thrown out of the society and children born by such are illegal.”\textsuperscript{118}

The stigma attached to marrying outside the group guards the Somali identity. At a youth focus group, the youth stated that their interaction with ‘nywele ngumu’ was limited to school time. “We do not want to be seen with ‘them’ because we will be teased and labeled Adoon\textsuperscript{119} meaning slave. Adoon is used in reference to Bantus to emphasize the difference in the ethnic origin in Somalia.\textsuperscript{120} The perception of a non-Somali identity as slaves emerged from an observation by Somalis of the tolerant nature of ‘these’ people towards colonial maltreatment.

According to a key respondent,

\begin{quote}

The separation from non-Somalis has nothing to do with the texture of ones’ hair, God gives the type of hair so that is not the problem. The issue came about during the colonial period when Somalis saw these people working hard for and with the white man. The colonialists treated them badly and they remained there and continued to work for the white man. This made the Somali to wonder, what was wrong with these people thus the label slave.\textsuperscript{121}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{118} Interview with a Local Elder. “Somali Identity and the view on Intermarriage with Non-Somalis.” Garissa: Garissa town. Friday 22 October 2016.
\textsuperscript{120} Mohamed A. Eno. The Bantu – Jareer Somalis: Unearthing Apartheid in the Horn of Africa,p.65
\textsuperscript{121} Interview with a Senior Program Officer. “Identity and the Kenya-Somalia Border.” Garissa: ADESO Office. Friday 22, October 2016.
The explanation to justify the use of the pejorative term ‘slave’ about non-Somalis has undergone political sanitization over the years because the Somali-Bantu were forced to work in the firms by the Somalis before the colonial invasion in Somalia.\textsuperscript{122} Initially, the Somali used some of them as slaves. With the incursion of the Italians, the latter used Somalis to recruit laborers from the Somali Bantu community forcibly.\textsuperscript{123} The community underwent multiple colonialism first from the African natives and second from Italians who appeared to foster enslavement.

The non-Somalis appear tolerant to unacceptable situations compared to the defiant and warrior-like nature of the Somalis. An elder stated that "Somalis are friendly yet wild; it is their nature."\textsuperscript{124} It implies, getting along with Somalis is not a problem as long as everything is going according to plan. However, once a person crosses their comfort zone, the past relationship does not matter as the person becomes an immediate enemy. This lesson was kept in mind throughout the field study while observing the delicate relationships.

In another narrative, an expatriate\textsuperscript{125} observed that they had traveled to Somalia and while there, they asked locals to guard their plane and agreed on a fee. However, in the evening the ‘guards’ approached them and requested the security fee for the group leader. They told the guards the fee was paid to cover all. Shortly, the guards produced a rocket-propelled bomb and pointed at the plane and asked the expatriates whether they were going to pay the remaining fee or not.

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{122} Eno. The Bantu – Jareer Somalis, pp. 117-119
\item \textsuperscript{123} Ibid
\item \textsuperscript{124} Telephone conversational interview with an Elder. “Understanding the reception in Mandera Vis a Vis attacks on non-Somalis" A conversation with a Resident of Garissa County. November 16, 2016.
\item \textsuperscript{125} Conversational Interview with an American Pilot Expatriate. "On Understanding the Somali Identity.” Nairobi, Sunday, November 6, 2016.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
They ended up paying the fee. In the morning, these guards prepared a sumptuous goat meat meal and ate with them jovially as if nothing had happened.\textsuperscript{126}

The Somalis separateness from other ethnic groups in Kenya is social-culturally normalized. For example, while trying to secure an interview with the Officer Commanding Police Division (OCPD) in Dadaab, our driver got into an altercation with the police guarding the gate. The guards had an issue with the two visits which we made within a short period. The police guard considered it was inconveniencing to open the gate. Our driver instructed the policeman to open the gate, telling him it was his job to do so. The policeman refused to open the gate upon which we alighted, approached the gate and requested him to allow us in on foot.

Later, we narrated the altercation between the driver and the police to our host, a local employee in one of the NGOs at the UN complex in Dadaab. The employee addressed the research assistant and stated: "it is because you are with the wrong woman." We elaborated the altercation was between two Somalis, the driver and the police guard not with the research assistant. In another observation, while at the UN complex dining area in Dadaab; we noted the Somalis sat separately from the non-Somalis. The same gentleman who told the research assistant he was walking with the wrong woman, instructed us to seat at a separate table from which he and other Somalis occupied. Somalis and non-Somalis have normalized body borders in Dadaab. Therefore, the Somalis view on non-Somalis as inferior in NER is deeply embedded in a Somali identity especially in informal set-ups. Hence, identity is layered, and it peels to closest placed at the core. The interviewees' showed the nature of identity in response to how

\textsuperscript{126} Ibid
they identify themselves in day to day situation starting from the core identity to the periphery. They consider the clan a core identity as it provides tangible security.

5.6 (In)Security

The presence of multiple cadres of security officers tells the security situation in NER. In view of this, locals expressed notions of security as applicable in numerous aspects at the Kenya-Somalia border. These were first, (in)security to the people as a nomadic community, second, its conception by the business community, third, the refugee factor, fourth, the linkage to Al-Shabaab and the impact to the region as a whole, fifth, corruption of local and national government officials, sixth, lack of trust and social cohesion in the Kenyan social fabric, and lastly, (in)security from clan rivalry and competition over resources. The breakdown in information flow and the mentioned obstacles create security loopholes.

5.6.1. Pastoral Nomadism and Insecurity

Ethnic Somalis, a nomadic community value animal ownership. The larger the size of a herd, the more pride it generates to the owner. They own animals such as camels, cows, and goats. Security is conceived as first and foremost lack of threat to the nomadic lifestyle. Drought and animal diseases formed the number one insecurity to the people. The community linked the threat of animal diseases to cross-border movements in search for pastures. A key informant observed that…,

During the colonial period, there used to be inspection points where animals were checked for diseases before crossing to Kenya. There was infrastructure to control animal movement and risk of diseases, nowadays and especially with the closing of the border, animals come in

127 See Appendix 8.2: Figure 6, “Layers of the Somali Identity from the clan to the State in NER.”
128 Interview with the Chairman of the Civil Society Garissa. “Security and Identity in NER.” Garissa Town, October 24, 2016.
130 Nunow. “Conflict over Environmental Resources,” p. 102.
anyhow raising the threat and spread of diseases endemic in Somalia to our animals' health. Somalia cannot monitor these diseases.\textsuperscript{132}

Animals were few at the animal market. “We used to have up to 4000 animals on Wednesdays at this livestock market, and now it is down to about 200.”\textsuperscript{133} The herders attributed the reduced numbers to drought and the growth of the animal market in Kismayu-Somalia.\textsuperscript{134}

Apart from diseases and drought, the herders were of the view that infrastructure at Kismayu market is favorable in the animals business compared to Kenya. There is ease of movement at Kismayu due to the absence of fear associated with police checks for identification. "To Kismayu it is easy, Kenya insists on identification which limits movements."\textsuperscript{135} The government requirement for pastoralist to carry identification papers has reduced the number of animals and buyers in the Kenyan markets. The Hagadera animals' market was similar with less than 100 animals, a steep decline from what herders said used to be in thousands.\textsuperscript{136}

Second, rogue cartels cause insecurity at the Kenya-Somalia border. The terrorist gang referred to as the Al-Shabaab look to make money from the pastoralists. “Al-Shabaab sometimes catch our pastoralists and demand they pay \textit{zakat} (alms).”\textsuperscript{137} Zakat is the third pillar of Islam. Under normal circumstances, Muslims pay Zakat to purify and cleanse themselves. The revenue generated helps the poor in the society. It benefits both the giver and the recipient. But, when the Al-Shabaab force pastoralists to pay \textit{Zakat}, it contradicts the tenets of Islam as it enhances

\begin{flushright}
134 Ibid
135 Ibid
\end{flushright}
hatred instead of care and love. Zakat payment is compulsory in Islam, but it is anchored in willingness to pay.\textsuperscript{138} Sheikhs observed that a person forced to pay Zakat might pay more than once a year which criminalizes the idea thus a security issue. Pastoralists pay Zakat using the animals owned.\textsuperscript{139} The livestock represents the type of wealth held by pastoralists. Camels, cows, and goats form a category liable to Zakat payments.\textsuperscript{140} The Al-Shabaab collect Zakat to make wealth,\textsuperscript{141} which causes insecurity to pastoralists.

**Nomadism Vis a Vis Identity Papers**

Pastoral Somalis view insecurity at the border as double-edged. Kenyan side of the border poses the fear of arrests due to lack of identity documents, and the Somalian side carries the fear of falling victim to Al-Shabaab. Nomadic lifestyle links both conceptions of insecurity to constant movements from one region to another.

As nomads, the settler requirement for securing Kenyan identity documents is elusive. Pastoralism disallows possession of a permanent residence in a village. To acquire a Kenyan ID, the local elders must identify the person as a resident of a specific village. Though some nomads are known to the chiefs and elders, they lack permanent residency status at particular villages. Besides, pastoralists view possession of identity documents as a foreign concept,\textsuperscript{142}

\textsuperscript{138} Waris. “Taxation without Principles,” P. 280
\textsuperscript{140} See Appendix 8.2, Figure 7. “Zakat Derived from Animals ownership.”
\textsuperscript{142} Interview with an Elder. “Security and Somalis.” Garissa: Garissa Livestock Market. Wednesday, October 26, 2016
“ID makes no sense to them.”\textsuperscript{143} Despite the low value placed in having an ID, some pastoralists have secured identification papers in Kenya, but most operate without any.

\textbf{5.6.2 Refugees and Insecurity}

The state views refugees as a security threat, and the community regards the camps as a threat to the region. The camps provide hideouts for Al-Shabaab factions who recruit the local youth either willingly or by force. The youth consider the camps as an ‘opportunity,’ they register as refugees and cannot acquire Kenyan citizenship. The camps also threaten the perception of the community in the country. An elder intimated that "Somalis are always suspect in Kenya which limits our movements within the state."\textsuperscript{144}

The habit of locals’ registration as refugees is a security threat to the community. The interviewees discussed it freely stating that ‘it is an obvious fact.’ An official at Refugees Affairs Secretariat and security personnel placed the numbers of Kenyan-Somalis posing as refugees between 40,000\textsuperscript{145} and 100,000 respectively.\textsuperscript{146} The youth observed that "registering as a refugee is an opportunity for adventure abroad."\textsuperscript{147} Whereas the youth took the matter lightly, the parents agonized over it. The children who pose as refugees automatically lose the Kenyan citizenship. There were several indications in which parents discovered their children were ineligible for Kenyan citizenship in the process of applying for an ID card. One parent

\textsuperscript{144} Interview with the Chairman of Garissa Civil Society. “Security and Identity at the Kenya-Somalia Border.” Garissa. Monday 24 October 2016.
\textsuperscript{146} Interview with a County official. “Identity: Refugees and Security.” Garissa Town. Tuesday, 25\textsuperscript{th}, October 2016.
narrated: “My son registered as a refugee without my knowledge, later as I was trying to secure the national ID card for him, I was shocked to learn that he is a refugee and does not qualify, and this has brought a headache in my life! Who will believe me?”

The poor families also register as refugees. The impoverished see the refugee status as an opportunity to access social amenities which include, healthcare, schools, and food rations. The choice of a refugee status leads such families to abdicate citizenship rights. Lack of citizenship implies abrogating voting, movement, social, and access to employment rights. The refugee status causes insecurity to the family.

The presence of refugee camps in NER hosting Somalia's citizens who resemble Kenyan Somalis is a security threat to the latter. The interviewees were unanimously for the closure of the refugee camps. Others were of the view that the location of the camps outside NER from the onset would have solved the problem. "They should have located the camps elsewhere because it would be easy to tell apart the refugees from the locals."

The third security threat is in the refugee camps capacity in enhancing a distorted Kenyan-Somali identity in NER and Kenya as a whole. The movement of a Somali in Kenya is limited physically and psychologically. The two contributing factors are, fear of security agents and the checks on Somalis wherever they travel within the country. “You are assumed to be a non-

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citizen, then you work your way into proving your citizenship.”\textsuperscript{152} For example, an interviewee in Dadaab stated, "Security agents use extra-judicial force, a person can be killed at any time and labeled Al-Shabaab, and there is nothing one can do to protect themselves."\textsuperscript{153} Also, security officers use torture and residents have no recourse, all in the name of security.\textsuperscript{154} Dadaab had the highest 'security' measures compared to Garissa town and Mandera. Uniformed armed law enforcement officers were present everywhere. The people were tense and equally divided between Somalis and non-Somalis.

\textbf{5.6.3 The Afduub (Al-Shabaab) Factor as a Security Threat}

The term Al-Shabaab appears to have different meanings to different people. The Somali usage of Al-Shabaab differs from non-Somalis’ and security agents.\textsuperscript{155} The Somalis conceive the word Al-Shabaab first and foremost in its literal meaning “the youth” which strips the stigma attached about the terror group. For example, Somalis discussed the Al-Shabaab problems with ease while non-Somalis used low tones and whispers.

During a youth group discussion at Hagadera shopping Centre with non-Somali youths, the mention of Al-Shabaab caused stigma to the group. All youths but one took off when the issue of insecurity and Al-Shabaab came up. The remaining youth lowered his voice and wiped the smile off his face. The study ended the discussion immediately to avoid further distress. However, the Somali youth focus group in Garissa and those interviewed in Hagadera and Mandera were at ease with the Al-Shabaab discussions. Observably, the non-Somali


\textsuperscript{153} Interview with an NGO employee. “Security and the Kenyan-Somalia Border.” Dadaab UN Complex. October 27, 2017


\textsuperscript{155} See Appendix 8.2, figure 8, “The Somalis and Non-Somalis Conceptions of the term Al-Shabaab.”
government officials also shortened Al-Shabaab to “AS” especially near the Kenya-Somalia border in Mandera. The discussions were in low tones compared to Somalis who elevated their voice while uttering the tail end of Al-Shabaab. The Somalia people refer the Al-Shabaab as Afduub (with long mouth).

The Afduub hinder cross-border movement of the local community. It limits kin interaction on either side of the border. The group forcefully recruits young men on the Somalia side of the border. "I cannot go to Somalia. I am afraid of falling into the hands of the Al-Shabaab. They take you, and they do not even ask permission from your clan or your family they just take you by force." The terror group is a threat to the community which relies on goods from Somalia.

The second threat is recruitment through cash enticements in Kenya. The youth viewed the Al-Shabaab terror group as tempting given the limited employment opportunities. Annual graduation from high school leaves the youths wondering aimlessly. The proximity to Somalia heightens the youth vulnerability. The parents observed that when they send their children to school, it is with the hope that the children will not fall victim to the Al-Shabaab recruitment. Parents hope the extravagant lifestyle of those who have more will not lure the children into the Al-Shabaab terror group. Parents live in constant fear hoping and wishing that their

children be neither tempted nor forced into the terror group. The threat is to both the Kenyan and Somalian Somalis youths.

Constant kin interaction is a threat to the local community. In Mandera County, the residents posited that "here in Mandera, you cannot trust your own blood brother or sister, you don’t know who has joined the Al-Shabaab terror group." In support of this, an observation was made when requesting someone’s phone number where uneasiness was elicited followed by explanations such as, “I cannot share my number and you know why.” Fear and lack of trust were elicited when it came to sharing phone numbers regardless of the relationship. Observably, in Garissa County, the respondents shared their phone numbers with ease.

Thirdly Al-Shabaab terrorist activities have silenced the voice of Islam in state affairs in Kenya. The terror group appears conflated with Islamic religion. It obscures political expression by Muslims where Islam is projected as ‘other.’ The threat emerges where Islam and Muslims are equated to terrorism. In elaborating this, one Sheikh narrated

During the Garissa University attack, there were four Christian students who were running having jumped over the college fence. They seemed confused and did not know where to go. I saw them and stopped them, I wanted to help them, but they looked at me in horror, I could see they were afraid of me because I am a Muslim. But, I told them I worked with SUPKEM office and that is when they accepted me to hide them. Later, I took them to the police station where they were helped to go to their families.

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The community indicated that following a terrorist attack they stay indoors (especially when outside NER) because of the ‘policing gaze’ and maltreatment by non-Muslims. Terrorist attacks leave long-term consequences to Muslims/Somalis. It makes it difficult to integrate and mingle with the rest. Terrorism is a threat to Somalis religious practices and beliefs.\(^{167}\)

Lastly, local government officials experience threats from gangs across the border. In Mandera, local elders are at times faced with death threats. This occurs during the vetting process for national ID card issuance.\(^{168}\) The elders' focus group discussion observed that two chiefs were killed in Mandera because they refused to authenticate papers for ID cards.\(^{169}\) The governor of Mandera, Ali Roba in an Interview with Kenya Television Network (KTN) claimed that there were four attempts on his life which led to the loss of life of four members of his entourage.\(^{170}\) In addition, he stated that the pastoralist community received information about Al-Shabaab operating in groups of 15 to 30 along the Kenya-Somalia border.\(^{171}\) During the field study, a phone call from a local chief in Bula Hawa to a government official said that a group of 19 Al-Shabaab was spotted approaching Mandera.\(^{172}\) It was not clear, whether the chief meant a ‘group of youths or a group of terrorists.’ However, the official took it to mean the latter.

5.6.4 Corruption and Security/Insecurity at the Kenya-Somalia Border

Corruption contributes to insecurity at the Kenya-Somalia border. Somalis viewed corruption as a key aspect which links illegal entrance and terrorism in the region. Despite identity security
checks, cross-border movements occur due to the corrupt state officials. Security measures are mere symbolism. The agents solicit bribes and the local community avails it. The Border entry point in Mandera is nicknamed a ‘call box.’ The elders' focus group stated that “the police do not care if someone is carrying grenades, people can enter with anything… at the "call box," people drop as little as fifty shillings and cross over to Kenya." “Can you imagine selling your country for fifty shillings?”

Corruption is a security threat in two ways; first, it breaks down the social fabric between the Somalis and the security agents in the border region. Second, it creates a culture of cash for services, including, illegal passage into Kenya by Somalia citizens. These pave the way to terrorists. In 2015, the Mandera residents took to the streets demanding the resignation of Alex Ole Nkoyo, the then County Commissioner. In April 2015, they accused him of fueling insecurity through corruption. The people observed that the Kenya security agents accept bribes to the detriment of the state security. In the KTN ‘Terror crossing documentary,’ a police officer was on camera saying, "...We go on patrol not just to protect the border…but to get what we will eat tomorrow. If I get someone coming …’ and they have goods to take to Mandera, and they offer ‘water,’ the officer will take it." The police officer attributed corruption to poor pay in a harsh environment where hunger and dehydration ‘forces’ the border police to take bribes.

178 Ibid
Furthermore, the local Somali government officials, the chiefs and elders in NER are corruptible. The local officials receive money in exchange for vetting people. They pass Somalia's citizens off as Kenyans to secure national ID cards. One chief asserted that corruption in Kenya has reached the depth of his elderly mother in her 80's. The chief's mother questioned why he was living in a poor standard house. She compared it to his colleague who lives in a 'mansion.' The chief said that people offer up to Ksh. 20,000 for one Kenyan ID card. Therefore his mother wondered why he was not following the footsteps of the 'rich' chief.

The acquisition of the Kenyan ID is paramount to the ease of movement. Once the government officials issue an ID, no one can question it. In one case, at the Mandera Airstrip, a person who appeared to be a non-citizen had a Kenyan ID. The man was in his late 20s. The security agents questioned where he was going. The man could not respond. Instead, he uttered the word 'Swahili' and shook his head sideways, meaning he did not understand Swahili. The security agents looked at the man in dismay. His ID was aged and almost tattered. In the end, the security allowed him to travel to Nairobi. Upon inquiring why they did so, the agents stated that the man was in possession of a legal Kenyan ID document, though they acknowledged an anomaly, they could not stop him. Notably, the other passengers looked at the man questionably, and distanced themselves. The man had in possession a black plastic bag. The other passengers were smartly dressed with travel suitcases. All the while, the man stared

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181 Ibid
182 Ibid
sideways and on the ground uneasily during the questioning. The security agents said such
cases were common.

In another instance, two ladies accompanying a young boy of about seven years lacked proper
documentation for the boy. They were escorted to the airstrip by their ‘father’ a local chief. The
security agents requested the ladies to provide the boy’s original birth certificate. The ladies
had a duplicate. The ladies said they ‘forgot’ the original birth certificate in Nairobi. The
security agents asked the chief why he allowed his ‘daughters’ to attempt travel without proper
papers. The chief responded in Swahili, "funga macho tu, angalia upande ile" (Just close your
eyes and look the other way). Ironically, the government relies on local chiefs to vet people in
the villages in NER. The security agent told the chief that, as a government official, he should
be better placed to understand the workings of the law regarding security and ID papers at the
border. Despite the discrepancy, the passengers were allowed to travel to Nairobi from
Mandera.

Later, after the passengers had gone through all the vetting, a ‘probox’ car with dark tinted
windows approached the passengers who were all waiting under a tree for the plane. A person
inside the car beckoned one of the chief’s ‘daughters.’ She approached the car and was asked
to take a short ride in the car. They re-assured her kin that she will be brought back. The car
sped off the stretch at the army airstrip base. After a short while, the car returned the chief’s
‘daughter’ who emerged from the vehicle laughing and giggling. The rest of the passengers
looked on. The incident happened after the chief had departed having ensured ‘safe’ passage
of his ‘daughters’ and ‘nephew.’ The security agents appeared to lack credibility.
Apart from Mandera, security checks between Dadaab and Garissa revealed serious gaps. Despite heavy security types of machineries such as CID, ATPU, policemen, guns, and vehicles, the passengers observed that one could travel from one end to the other without papers as long as they have cash.\textsuperscript{183} In one case a lady from Somalia narrated that, she witnessed a young man in Nairobi-Eastleigh bragging that he traveled from Somalia to Nairobi without papers.\textsuperscript{184} The listeners asked him how he traveled. He responded by patting his pockets indicating they were full of cash. He dished out as much as could allow him passage. In support of this view, an Al-Shabaab member in a KTN documentary observes that "In Kenya, there's a lot of corruption. There is a way we deal with the police officers."\textsuperscript{185} “The government of Kenya is very corrupt, so we deal with them the way they are…”\textsuperscript{186}

In the elders’ focus group discussion, they observed that the security agents, especially the police facilitate insecurity. An elder narrated a story that, one morning he came across three ladies sitting by the roadside where the bus from Mandera to Nairobi passes. He could not recognize the ladies as residents of Mandera. He hid behind some shrubs and observed. When the bus arrived, the ladies were escorted into the bus by the armed police officers. The officers explained something to the bus driver and conductor. The ladies were allowed on the bus. The chief later pointed out, "what is the point of making everyone produce papers if, in the end, those who are illegally traveling can still make the journey?”\textsuperscript{187} Therefore, corruption hoards distrust between the locals and the security agents at the Kenya-Somalia border.

\textsuperscript{186} Ibid.
The Kenya social fabric breakdown provides opportunities for insecurities. The security agents do not utilize the locals' knowledge because of a divide between the two. Somalis were of the view that, NER should employ Somalis because they understand the culture, the geography, and the community. A county official in Garissa observed that to solve insecurity at the border region, “send a Somali to catch a Somali.” The issue of non-ethnic Somalis in northeastern security predates independence. Other officials repeated the statement in both counties and said the Somalis were better placed to secure the border. Accordingly, the Kenyan troop’s failure in understanding the Somalis implies, everyone is treated as a security threat.

In both Mandera and Garissa Counties, the residents observed that the non-Somali security agents have nothing to lose in NER. Their ‘lack of stakes' appears to inhibit the interest in securing the border. A chief in the elders' focus group observed that…”Security officers here are like Hollywood actors. When people are under attack, the officers do not come out to help, because they are afraid. Afterward, we see the security agents littered everywhere with guns. We look at them and laugh.” The elders thought the solution rested in the placement of the locals in the region in government positions such as County Commissioner, security dockets like National Intelligence Service (NIS), and increase the numbers in the police force.

192 Ibid
Kenya’s policy is to recruit a person outside the local community for security positions such as County Commissioner and Deputy County Commissioner, and OCPD. The policy pre-empts issues of favoritism based on ethnic affiliations when dealing with security matters.\textsuperscript{194} On the contrary, clan relations and religion complicate the NER. Based on these differences, the community views non-Somalis in security positions as costly to the region. For example, Alex Ole Nkoyo, the former County Commissioner of Mandera stated that "I don't live among them to know what they have planned, I don't understand the local language unless the locals are willing to tell us what is being planned."\textsuperscript{195}

The locals felt they are better placed to understand the geography of the vast NER and the inherent cultural challenges. The phrase ‘Send a Somali to catch a Somali’ emerged from separate interviews both in Garissa and Mandera County. The security agents and the locals’ relations is complicated as differing views surface after a terror attack. For example, following the October 25\textsuperscript{th}, 2016 Mandera attack, the government issued a statement indicating it was terrorism, meanwhile, the NER coordinator Mohammed Ali Saleh said it was an act of local criminal ‘gangs.’\textsuperscript{196}

The issues of security at the Ethiopian border with Mandera-Kenya are handled differently by both countries’ security agents. Mandera residents’, say they do not dare cross to Ethiopia. A man who tried to cross River Dawa to Suftu-Ethiopia narrated how the local community collaboration with the Ethiopian security has secured their border. According to the

\textsuperscript{194} Interview with the Deputy County Commissioner. “Security and Identity.” Mandera, the office of the deputy County Commissioner. Wednesday, November 9, 2016.

\textsuperscript{195} KTN Documentary “Terror Crossing” Part 2. In an Interview with Mandera’s former County Commissioner, Alex Ole Nkoyo. Mandera Town.

interviewee, the Ethiopian police/security agents do not take their jobs lightly, they are serious and committed to security matters.\textsuperscript{197} The security agents asked him where he was going and whom he knew in Suftu. He replied that he was going shopping. The security disallowed his passage, and he had to turn back.

5.6.5 “My Small Daughter Occasionally tells me, You Are Not My Father!”

Lack of trust and social cohesion between the national government officials and the local Somali community in NER has existed since the onset of the Shif\textipa{\texta{t\texta{a}}} War.

\begin{quote}
My Small Daughter occasionally tells me, you are not my father! But I do not cast her out, I still bring her close to understand why she is behaving that way, and we restore the relationship. To date, our community still pays the price of that war; as a result, we do not have unity with the rest.\textsuperscript{198}
\end{quote}

The Social fabric is either a strength or a weakness when used against outsiders. In NER, government officials and the local Somali community trade accusations and counter-accusations. The Somalis versus non-Somalis division emerge in security matters. Government immigration officials in both counties maintained that Somalis sometimes pass off non-citizens as relatives and Kenyans.\textsuperscript{199} The locals acknowledged this challenge and stated that it is difficult to tell on a relative, the kin relationship makes it difficult to reveal non-citizen status.\textsuperscript{200} Asked how they guard against a suspected terrorist, the response was, "we live in fear, and if a relative visits from Somalia, our prayer is that the person is good, there is nothing one can do."\textsuperscript{201}

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\textsuperscript{198} Interview with the Director of Education. “Security loopholes at the Border.” Mandera. November 8, 2016.
\end{flushright}
The security gaps result in suspicions of the locals by the security agents. For example, an individual observed that it is normal to be accosted by security agents and for him, “when I am going home, and I get beaten by security agents for a wrong that I do not understand, I no longer take it as anything, I assume it was an accident as if a Hyena attacked me on the way home.” For the security agents and the community to exist in the same space they dehumanize each other. The individual equated the officers’ use of unnecessary force with animalistic behavior. The choice of a Hyena to describe the officers’ action is pejorative. Somali poems use the ‘the Hyena’ commonly to disparage an action, in this case, it showed the perception of the ‘others’ identity.

Secondly, Somalis fear to report matters concerning the Al-Shabaab terror group to security agents. They pointed out “we have lived to witness reported people ‘walking freely’ in the streets, it endangers our lives.” Also, a reported person gains the information and leaks it back to the community. Therefore, the silence is due to fear of repercussions. Lack of trust among Somalis was more in Mandera, where a lady said that one could not trust anybody, even own brother or sister because you do not know who has joined the terror group.

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206 Ibid
Thirdly, there is the issue of the security agents’ victimization of a person who reports a suspected Al-Shabaab. Security agents were alleged to torture the person reporting to explain how the person came across the given information.\textsuperscript{207}

Fourthly, is the fear of victimization by the community. “Once a person suspects that your brother or sister or close relative is apprehended, they keep away from you. They delete your phone number from their phone book to avoid being tracked by ATPU.”\textsuperscript{208} In another interview, a respondent indicated that, during the October 25\textsuperscript{th}, 2016 Mandera attack, it emerged that one of the perpetrators was a colleague’s son. The colleague cut-off all the co-workers whom in-turn avoided calling her for fear of being tracked by ATPU. Therefore, the community delinks from any person suspected or linked to terrorism. Furthermore, family members do not follow up any members’ disappearances. When a person disappears, relatives do not report to the police for fear of victimization and inclusion into terror-related matters.\textsuperscript{209}

The fear of inclusion stigmatizes terrorism and suspected terrorists shutting down information channels. Where a relative is aggrieved or wrongly accused, they become bitter instead of following the law. It becomes a radicalization process.\textsuperscript{210}

The research study experienced the fear expressed by Somalis while undertaking the research. At one point we took pictures at a place not allowed. Shortly, we were called and led into an


office. A person in plain clothes asked why we took pictures. We explained they were self-pictures (selfies) and we did not know it was not allowed. The security agent took the phone went through all the 289 pictures. The officer threatened us with incarceration and said, "I can take your picture and plaster it in all the local and international media, stating that I have caught an Al-Shabaab, and the world will wake up to a new reality and everybody will believe me."

Being a non-Muslim dressed in Hijab could have easily corroborated his story. Later, we were allowed to go after over an hour of a distressing experience. It confirmed the discussion held with the elders who said the security personnel could hold anybody and label the person an Al-Shabaab and there is nothing that person can do. Worst still, such a person is alienated from the family and community for fear of association with terrorism.

Observably, the security agent added that “this is Mandera, there are no jokes around here! A terrorist is courageous, intelligent and very friendly.” Despite it, the officer was unfriendly, and rough and used threats of force, a departure from the description of terrorist tactics. The approach towards terror suspects follows an operation exterior to state norms of dealing with criminality or lawbreakers. It has the cunning resemblance with terrorist activities. Terror and counter-terror measures are frequently undertaken beyond the powers vested in a state's territory making nonsense of state borders, legality and autonomy. The measures enhance a cyclical security/insecurity culture. Counter-terror approaches make it impossible to apprehend terrorists. In the process, innocent people are disenfranchised and radicalized. An elder observed that "if you suspect someone why not investigate instead of torturing the person?" Where security agents ignore procedures, security becomes insecurity.

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While sharing the incidence with a lady working with an international non-governmental security organization, she observed that “Imagine you who is ‘a real’ Kenyan is treated like that, what of us who are Somali-Kenyans?”212 The lady indicated the degree of security threat to Kenya as qualified213 by the levels of ‘Kenyaness,’ where a Somali seems more of a threat than other ‘real’ Kenyans.

5.6.6. Security and the Community

Security branches such as ATPU, CID, and NIS rely on the privacy of the agents to collect intelligence. Privacy enhances the capacity to access information without the civilians' knowledge. The security agents anonymity is absent in NER. The agents in ATPU, NIS and CID are known to the community. For example, the locals identified the agent who threatened to lock us up in Mandera as ATPU. During the Garissa-Dadaab public transport road trip, the locals kept whispering the branch of the security agency at every security stop despite the civilian attire. Whenever security agents pulled out an individual from the bus, the passengers would murmur the name of the agency. The passengers appeared to know the security branch before the bus came to a stop. The local community specifically identified an individual as NIS agents in Garissa town. When questioned how they knew the agencies and agents, the locals responded that the security agents do not make it a secret.214 Equally, NER members of parliament questioned how security agents were able to gather information when they make it

212 Conversational Interview with a local Somali Lady. “Conversation on Security and Identity at the Border Region.” Mandera Town. Thursday, 10 November 2016
known they are security agents from the ATPU,\textsuperscript{215} CID or NIS. The security agents appear to lack professionalism at the border.

5.6.7 Clan Rivalry and Competition over Resources

Clan rivalry and competition over county resources among Somalis contribute to the border insecurity. A similar clan unites across the state border in order to win against its rival within the state border.\textsuperscript{216} In worst case scenarios, the rivalry within leads to recruiting gangs from outside the state to teach the other a lesson. In Mandera, the Al-Shabaab find loopholes among clan rivalries and penetrate to kill ‘non-locals/non-Somalis’ to disempower the County government.

Therefore, socio-political competition among clans within a state can lead to ‘inviting’ members of the same clan who live across the state border to boost numbers to capture socio-political clout.\textsuperscript{217} For example, the Al-Shabaab threats to non-locals appear to have a linkage to local politics. In a documentary, an elder states, "…our problem is trying to remove the non-locals from Mandera, why? What mistake have they done? Because a Garre is in office?"\textsuperscript{218} The terror group capitalizes on the clan division to disempower county officials. “We live here, and we have brought the problem of killing non-locals”\textsuperscript{219} This is a significant security threat at the border.

\textsuperscript{218} Ibid
\textsuperscript{219} Elders’ Focus group. “Security and Non-locals” Mandera, Thursday 10, November 2017.
Security loopholes contribute to the porous nature of the Kenya-Somalia border as opposed to the absence of police forces to man the entire stretch of the border. They range from the 1991 collapse of the Somalia government, misconceptions of the Somali identity, the Al-Shabaab terror group, lack of social cohesion, corruption and the Somali clan rivalries and competition over resources.\textsuperscript{220} Border porosity is not equivalent to an open un-manned border. The presence of corrupt workforce contributes to the linkages in the border, identity and insecurity of the Kenya-Somalia border\textsuperscript{221} creating a notion of an open door.

5.7 Conclusion

The Somalis hold an elastic notion of the border which includes Kenyan, Somalian, and a Somali clan-based vertical identity substantiated by a similar physical appearance, pastoral and religious culture. Therefore, border, identity, and security are massively inter-linked contributing to insecurities within Kenya. The Somali identity transcends state borders designating it to body borders whereby non-Somalis are separated from Somalis using the \textit{Jareer} and \textit{Jileec} category based on the hair texture. The category nullifies the Kenya-Somalia state border. It contributes to the insecurity of non-Somalis and the ‘heavy’ vetting of the Somalis in NER border regions. Furthermore, identity takes a shifting notion where being a ‘Somali’ provides an array of opportunities taken as the ‘right’ of the community. Those who pass-off as refugees compromise the Kenyan citizenship status and vice versa. Therefore, the Somalis take up identities depending on the circumstances posing insecurity to the community at large and the state.

\textsuperscript{220} See Appendix 8.2, figure 9, “The summary of Field Findings on Somalis Perception of the Kenya-Somalia Border Insecurity.”

\textsuperscript{221} See Appendix 8.2, figure 10, “The Summary of the Linkages in the Border, Identity and (In)Security of the Kenya-Somalia Border.”
Somalis view security as first and foremost the capacity to maintain the pastoral and cultural way of life. Insecurity poses as drought and refugees both with a capacity to deteriorate the environment. Refugees are also a threat to the Kenyan-Somalis as they blur the Somali identity. Furthermore, the presence of the camps provides an enticement to the poor and the youth who register as refugees. The 'adapted' refugee status nullifies a Kenyan identity and abrogates citizenship rights. Besides, insecurity comes in the form of Al-Shabaab's monetary and lifestyle enticement to the Somali youth, apart from the fear of forceful recruitment on the Somalia side of the border. The corrupt security agents both in the national and local government contribute to the border insecurity. Corrupt officers facilitate the issuance of the Kenyan Identity papers to non-Kenyans and passage of non-Kenyans through border checkpoints. Ultimately, lack of patriotism and weak social cohesion leads to Kenya-Somalia border insecurity. Therefore, the border is expressed in silent yet obvious forms as body borders and with it, identity confusions, and insecurities.
CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION

Borders and identities are in constant formations; therefore, all are arbitrary, and pastoral-nomadic communities show them as elastic layers. State borders are constructed based on ‘social-cultural’ norms and state norms. Social-cultural norms are held by individual groups through ethnic affiliations and are primary. State norms are constructions of expected general behavior common to similar bodies of the state. One such behavior is the inviolability of borders because a state holds the absolute power to exercise sovereignty. State territories, assume inelastic borders. Inelasticity confers inviolability of states as a norm hereafter referred to secondary norms.

Borders and identities constitute and are constituted by both primary and secondary norms. They are constructed perpetually through primary and/or secondary norms indicated by arbitrary stops. Border and identities compatibility depends on each, and ‘others,’ perceptions. Arbitrary ‘stops’ inform the security/insecurity of the enclosed community. Equally, the perceptions/‘misperceptions’ feed on the fears of the ‘other.’ Fears come from historical narratives or incidences, besides daily practices within and outside the community.

Arbitrary stops imply the constructed borders are subjective. Where people use natural features as borders, the role of humanity makes them subject to chance. Similarly, where people use ethnic, racial/body features as borders, the arbitrariness is invoked too. Fears or perceptions of insecurity and or security ideas guide in the choice of borders.

States view insecurity as externally generated while ethnic communities interpret them as either external to the state or from the state itself or other ethnicities within. The changeability of
what is security creates a constant overlapping of internal and external borders which curve or are curved by constructed identities for security. Border overlaps are common in African states and result in challenges within and between states.

Border challenges are multi-pronged. The debates on self-determination and territorial integrity between communities and the states inform border challenges. Where communities’ seek to convert and legitimize an internal border into external, they give priority to primary norms over secondary ones, and the same occurs where a state tries to convert other states internal border into its external one. States which seek to externalize others internal border use either direct or proxy wars or both. The states threatened by expansionist ideals/irredentist secession challenge post-colonial self-determination in an argument that colonial borders are inviolable. A similar case occurs where a community within a state seeks to secede unless the original state gives consent. Therefore, conflict emerges between primary and secondary norms. State Vis a Vis communities’ conflict gave rise to Pan Africanism and eventually the OAU/AU.

The OAU agreed that self-determination equated self-rule from colonial governments. The acquisition of self-rule led to delimited territories within which states exercised sovereignty. Sovereign states enjoy territorial integrity. Delimited states eliminated justification of interferences from groups within or other states.

OAU stand on the sanctity of borders meant self-determination could not occur within an independent state. However, some communities felt they were maltreated and needed to form new states through secession. Secession meant a breakaway from the states in existence to form a new unique state. Such communities felt they did not belong because of a unique social-cultural identity or claims of maltreatment in the original states. Looking at social-cultural
identity, some colonial state-borders appeared as a block, but underwent multiple colonialism. Pseudo-colonizers appeared after the departure or withdrawal of the white colonists creating marginalization. An example of these states is Eritrea, Western Sahara, and Southern Sudan. Eritrea was colonized by Italy prior to becoming a federated state of Ethiopia. Equally, Western Sahara was colonized by Spain which left it in limbo in 1975. Spain's failure to grant Western Sahara independence created a self-governing loophole. Morocco realized the gap and claims the region. South Sudan was colonized by the British together with the Northern counterpart, the Sudan. South Sudan later found itself under the North/Sudan relationship which continued with colonial tendencies. Eritrea and South Sudan were able to overcome multiple colonialism and acquire independence in 1977 and 2011 respectively through referendums where the former states consented. Western Sahara continues to seek self-determination from Morocco.

Apart from the multiple colonized territories, other states encountered the issue of secession but failed to gain recognition and consent from the original state and others. These regions include Biafra in Eastern Nigeria, Casamance in Southern Senegal, AZAWAD in Northern Mali, the Bakassi peninsula in South-Western Cameroon, Katanga region in Southern DRC where the communities tried to foster a case of uniqueness and self-determination but failed. Other communities aided by irredentist states engaged in the secession attempts.

Irredentist secession efforts occurred where a state tried to help a community in another state in a bid for ‘self-determination’. A successful breakaway meant the communities together with the territories occupied would join and transfer sovereignty to an adjacent state. Some of the

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1 Munene. The United Nations as Source of Legitimacy, p. 4.
attempts included Biafra region in Nigeria, NFD in Kenya and Katanga region in DRC. In Biafra, it led to Biafra war, but Nigeria retained the region. The NFD issue led to Shifta war where despite covert and overt support from Somalia, secession failed. Kenya retained the region. Katanga region remains embroiled in skirmishes because, apart from desires to separate, the region is rich in minerals that complicate the separatist ideal. Proxy wars from neighboring states compounded irredentist secession ambitions.

Proxy wars are a challenge to states because militias from the adjoining states attack communities within a state. Militias in inter-state attacks emanate from a population split by the international border. In the Horn, Somali militias were used in Ethiopia-Ogaden, Kenya-NFD, and Somalia itself between different clans.

In addition to the armed militia conflicts, terror attacks are rampant in Africa where factions operate in weak states to attack either western-oriented states or regions or targets within. The Boko Haram attacks in Northeastern Nigeria continue to terrorize the Bono state. The Al-Shabaab attacks in the Horn of Africa are from the disintegrated state of Somalia. The AL Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and Daesh terrorize North African states.

Some states in Africa have experienced almost all of the challenges mentioned above. The Kenya-Somalia border posed these challenges from inception at independence. Both countries grapple with historical narratives/occurrence, identity and security challenges.

The Kenya-Somalia border encompasses competing notions between primary and secondary norms based on the discourse of compatibility/incompatibility colonially instituted before the onset of independence. These competitions continued after independence in the form of the
colonial maltreatment of the people in both states and manipulations of historical myths of origins with racist notions. The colonial government positioned ethnicities against each other through social-political hierarchies.

Historical occurrences such as colonialism, Shifa war and the collapse of Somalia shapes the perceptions of Kenya, Somalia, and Somalis notions of the border, identity, and security. Somalia's and Somalis’ perceptions show incompatibility of primary and secondary norms on the state border. Differing notions of identity indicate these incompatibilities and, they create fears to both Kenya and the Somali ethnic identity within.

The secession attempts by Somalis instilled Kenya's insecurities. More insecurities emerged with the subsequent influx of refugees from Somalia and, attacks from the Al-Shabaab whom the state fears have hide-outs within the Somalis. Likewise, corrupt national and County state officers compromise the Kenya-Somali identity and border security at large.

The Kenya-Somalia border presents two key phases where primary and secondary norms interaction affects the state border. First is the pre/postcolonial experiences of 1991. The second phase is the post-1991 to 2016. Both phases show that borders and identities are necessarily arbitrary to allow shifts according to social-political contexts; therefore Kenya’s inelastic view of the border with multiple identities and Somalia’s elasticity with the silenced heterogeneous clan identities are subjective.
6.1 Precolonial/Post-Colonial Experiences of Kenya and Somalia 1991

Somalia perceives its international borders as elastic. Somalia’s basis is on the primary norms where historical myths of origins and the practice of Islamic religion construct Somalis as a homogeneous nation. Besides, the visible physical looks of the Cushitic Somalis fosters the homogenous claim of singleness. One author observes that upon a British official’s inquiry from a Somali government official on how far Somalia wished to encompass geographically, the latter’s response was ‘where Somalis were.’ Equally the study revealed from the interviewees that all that Somalia required of visiting Somalis was “In Somalia, before the collapse of the state, your physical look was your identification.” Somalia bases body features/body borders in the construction of the state borders.

Also, writers foster the Somalis perceived homogeneity. Over time, repeated notions of the Somalis homogeneity in written materials and documentaries have constructed it into a norm. It fosters the ideology of greater Somalia in visualizing ‘a Somalis political nation' anchored in the notion of body borders.

Greater Somalia belief is spatial and, it has never existed geographically. The presence of Somalis was assumed to delimit the geographic area. It translated to ‘Somalis habitation curves Somalia’s border.’ The belief included Djibouti, Ethiopia Ogaden region and Kenya’s NFD. Mohammad Abdullah Hassan referred by the British Administration as the “Mad Mullah, famed the desire for a Greater Somalia.”

Abdullah Hassan was born and raised in the Northern parts of Somalia, Somaliland. He traversed Somalia and fought British occupation in the Southern parts. He was a byproduct of the British and Italian occupation in the Horn and, so was the Somali identity. The Mullah used religion to unite Somalis. The South had two main clans around 1900, the Darod (Marehan, Ogaden, and Harti) and the Hawiye (Degodia and Ajuran). The two clans did not hold notions of brotherhood. He united the North and the South spatially somewhat through religion. He used Quranic recitals and poems to enforce unity throughout the Somali region. The Mullah’s defiance of the western rulers attracted the remaining Somalis who had failed to visualize his religious aspirations.

Initially, Southern Somalia leadership encouraged British occupation to prevent Ethiopian expansion. Farah Ibrahim and Ahmed Murghan, the leaders of sub-Ogaden clans of Mohammed Zubeir and Auliyahan, respectively encouraged the British to raise their flag in the South around 1898. Later, when the British controlled the Ethiopian occupation, the clans began to rebel against the British which marked the beginning of a rebellion against foreign rule. Abdullah Hassan’s ideology bridged the spatial-psychological unity of the South with the Northern Somalis. The latter united religiously with the Central Somalis. As a result, the Marehan clan migrated southwards. They were armed and threatened other Somali clans like the Auliyahan, a sub-clan of the Ogaden clan. The Auliyahan armed themselves too.

As it were, given the proliferation of religious unity, the Somalis viewed the land as belonging to God. All nomads of the Somali community could graze animals anywhere from modern-day Djibouti, Ethiopia-Ogaden, Kenya-NFD, and Somalia. Pastoralists traversed these lands in

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6 Ibid, p. 419
8 Ibid
search of pasture. Common to all was a shared religion. Therefore, an Islamic identity played a vital role in the unity. Upon foreign rule incursions, the Somalis resorted to regard land as belonging to *Kabil* clans\(^\text{10}\) where clan elders managed relations. The elders would permit each other’s group to graze whenever requested. The elastic notion of borders and identity emerged as the land moved from being God’s to Clans’.

The shift from God's land to clans' brought about competition and migrations. These were problematic to the colonial powers. Some clans such as the Marehan were in Support of Sheikh Abdullah Hassan. However, in 1950, the UN placed Italian Somaliland under the UN Trusteeship Council to prepare it for independence. Both Italian and British Somaliland attained independence in June and July 1960 respectively. The two merged in the same year and became the Republic of Somalia. The merger enhanced the idea of Pan Somali under the ‘Greater Somalia' ideal which in reality appeared as Pan-Cushitic due to the presence of non-Somalis in the desired regions. Somalia began a path of resistance towards Kenya-NFD and Ethiopia-Ogaden considered under ‘alien' leadership. Somalia presented the resistance as Somalis against foreigners which promoted unity among the Somali clans. The outcome was the Shıfta and Ogaden Wars respectively.

### 6.1.1 Shıfta War 1963-1967

Populist secessionism notions rendered loud silences to the understanding of the Shıfta war. The Kenyan government understood Shıfta war as acts of banditry, but the Somalis viewed it as a path to nation making, uniting with kin in Somalia. The difference left gaps and silences as to what it represented. African governments’ prioritized the imminent independence of African colonies which overshadowed the Shıfta war. African countries and colonies focused

\(^{10}\) Ibid
on self-determination/independence. They conceptualized the path of self-determination narrowly to mean units/blocks under colonial authority seeking independence. The conception excluded parts of such units which desired self-determination either as stand-alone or as mergers with others.

Somalia explained the Shifta war as the desire by Somalis in NFD to secede and join Somalia. NFD had a total population of 388,000 residents. Ethnic Somalis numbered 240,000 according to the 1962 census. It implies 148,000 people were non-Somalis yet 87% wanted to secede and join Somalia. The figure over and above the Somali population was influenced by prior inevitable indications of the British administration to cede the region to Somalia. The Bevin plan of 1947 played a critical role in this conception because it occurred during the administration of the British and Italian Somalia under the British Military Administration following Italians defeat in 1941. The proposal by Bevin inclined those within NFD to support a possible future government and its people. The colonial government outlook of NFD as a dominant Somali region silenced the diversity within NFD. The supposed unit influenced the referendum through a successful construction of a nation within NFD. Initially, the Northern Frontier Democratic Party (NFDP) desired NFD to remain separate from Somalia until it developed and carried the capacity to negotiate its place as a federal state of Somalia. NFDP eventually joined NPPP, but a section of the Galla non-Muslim group wanted to remain in Kenya.

12 Drysdale. The Somali Dispute, p. 103.
NFD residents internalized secession at three levels. The first constructed Somalis as a political family/body borders, second were clans’ self-interest, and third as a religious unit. Clans showed self-interest before the Kenya NFD issue. The lower Juba British protectorate chiefly consisted of the Ogaden. Central parts/current day Wajir held Degodia and Ajuran clans while the Northern Parts had the Garre and Murulle who occupy the region from River Dawa to El Wak. On Somalias’ side of the border, the Marehan clan occupy modern-day Somalia border from Bula Hawa to El Wak. The Auliyahan-Ogaden located opposite Wajir, on Somalia side of the border met the Marehan migration southwards with resistance. The tension and rivalry between the Marehan and the Auliyahan-Ogaden clans preceded the NFD secession dispute.

The disputes among Somali clans initiated suggestions for a merger of Somali regions. Historically, Sir Charles Elliot suggested the merger in 1904\(^{14}\) and then Sir Ernest Bevin in 1947.\(^{15}\) Both further influenced the merger of British Somaliland and Italian Somaliland in 1960.\(^{16}\) The Somalis pastoral culture and raids led to the suggestions to limit the group in one geographic administration. The proposed holistic merger influenced the actual merger of the British and Italian Somaliland and led to feelings of nationalism among Somalis from the 1960s onwards.

Therefore clan rivalries such as between the Marehan and the Auliyahan were silenced by a newfound ‘brotherhood’ in the Shifta War. The amalgamation used body borders, the clan’s self-interest and religious unity as captured under the greater Somalia ideology.

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\(^{16}\) Hansard (Somalis) Government, House of Commons Debate, April 4, 1949 Volume 463 cc18223, Para 3.
The survival of body borders in greater Somalia ideology depended on the presence of the non-Somali identity. In the Kenya-Somalia border issue, the colonial administration enhanced it in two ways. The first was through the creation of a separate administration of the Somali inhabited region and the second was through racial segregation and hierarchical rankings of ethnic groups. Racism during colonial period made the Isaaq-Somalis and later the Harti to demand Asiatic status. The Isaaq went further as to deny the Somali identity.

First, racism created sub-racial identities and designated subservient levels of non-white races. The colonial government used body features to rank groups. In the Horn, Somali identity seemed confusing. Initially, early Europeans identified Somalis as an Arab-African mixed race. An African identity meant a native with low status. Nativist status provoked the Isaaq search for the Asiatic category in Kenya. Though they briefly attained it under the 1919 Somali Exemption Ordinance, another category was introduced in 1938 under “other” lower non-native tax which included Arabs and Swahilis. The Isaaq resisted the native category and continued to pay higher non-native taxes but eventually succumbed because of refunds and resistance by a section of some Somalis to pay the high taxes. Interestingly, both the Isaaq and the Harti are located in Somalia Somaliland (North-Western), and Puntland (North-Eastern) respectively. They were traders in Nairobi during the colonial period which separated them from pastoral NFD Somalis.

18 Munene. “Conflicts and Postcolonial identities in East/the Horn of Africa.”, pp. 132-134.
20 Weitzberg. We Do Not Have Borders, p. 58.
In place of the above, the division among Somalis existed before Somalia's independence. Despite it, the myth of Greater Somalia constructed Somalis as a political nation. "As Somalis, we have also been guilty of tribal prejudice, during the colonial era we saw ourselves as distinct from other Kenyan tribes and sought to be categorized as Asians, as Indians and Arabs other than African." In this narrative, the speaker assumes all Somalis sought Asiatic status but it was the Isaaq and the Harti only. The colonial administration allocation of the Isaaq/some Somalis a special category through the Somali ordinance of 1919 was because some British administrators believed the Isaaq were different from other Africans. The colonial government later eliminated Somalis non-native status since qualifying ‘some Somalis’ became problematic.

The Somali identity confusion continued to elicit debates in the British Administration. For example, in the 1962 census, the British East African Protectorate showed Somalis as a stand-alone race. The confusion prevails as some Somalis believe they are Arabs, while others view themselves as Africans. The notion of superiority creates a wedge between ‘them’ and ‘others.’ “Somalis are not Africans, they are Arabs, and it is by accident of nature their color became darker like Africans.” The Somali identity as fronted by the Isaaq gained momentum as a non-African race during colonial rule. It positioned the Isaaq and the Harti in a hierarchical racial order over other Kenyan ethnicities. However, ultimately the Somali identity attained a middle ground, an ambiguity between native-and non-native status. The native-non-native status enables latitude to a Somali identity in attachment claims within and across state borders. The created ambiguity made nonsense of state borders.

23 Weitzberg. We Do Not Have Borders. p. 48
6.2 The Collapse of Somalia in 1991 and the Perception of the Kenya-Somalia Border

The cracks within Somalis political nation began to show before independence despite the merger between the British and Italian Somaliland at their independence in 1960. The emergent Somali political nation suppressed pre-independence clan identities to forge unity. Three decades later, the assumed unity blindfolded Somalia's President Siad Barre who undermined the might of Ethiopia during its struggle with internal agitations from Eritrea-Tigray community. Initially, Barre supported the WSLF in Ogaden covertly through a supply of arms but later deployed Somalia army to the region. Somalia’s accumulated USSR weapons could not match Ethiopia’s backing from USSR. Upon falling out with Somalia, the USSR channeled its support to Ethiopia which included the Cuban army. Ethiopia and the allies defeated Somalia in the Ogaden war.

The failure by Siad Barre to gain the Ogaden region and the subsequent losses incurred increased the division along clans in Somalia, particularly with the Isaaq clan. At the merger of Somaliland and Italian Somaliland in 1960, British Somalia expected to share government positions equally with Italian Somali. The Republic of Somalia filled the presidency with Aden Ade and the Prime minister with Abdirashid Ali Sharmarke from the Hawiye and Majerteen-Darod clans respectively. The two represented Central and North-western Somalia. The President's wife was from the Majerteen clan. The Isaaq got the speaker of parliament position and were unhappy with it.

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In 1967, Abdirashid Sharmarke defeated Aden Ade and became the President. He appointed Mohamed Haji Egal, an Isaaq from the north as his Prime minister. Egals’ appointment calmed the dissenting Isaaq North. Sharmarke also re-established diplomatic relations with both Kenya and Ethiopia opting for a peaceful quest for the Somali unity. The period of peace did not last as a military coup led by General Siad Barre overthrew Sharmarke in 1969 and detained his Prime Minister Egal.

Siad Barre a Marehan-Darod took the presidency in 1969 and resumed an aggressive greater Somalia ideal. His invasion of Ethiopia sought to ‘liberate’ the Ogaden region in 1977. The defeat in 1978 widened the Republics division with the North. The Ogaden war led to an influx of Ogaden-Somali refugees in Somalia. They were stationed in the North partly to water down the Isaaq dominance and Shebelle Rivers where they displaced some Rahanweyn clan members. The Isaaq felt left out of the ‘State’ by the Barre regime in unfair clan discrimination. Increase in the clan divisions eventually ousted Siad Barre in 1991. In the same year, the North, predominantly Isaaq declared independence from Somalia and sought to reinstate the colonial borders.

The disintegration of Somalia affected the perception of borders and identity between Kenya and Somalia in several ways. First, the idea of Somalis political nation became secondary as clans prioritized their interests over the state. Somaliland’s reinstatement of colonial borders and the subsequent declaration of Puntland as a federal state exposed the disintegration. Unlike Puntland’s composition of primarily the Majerteen clan, Somaliland, a predominantly Isaaq clan region has other clans like the Gudurbirse, D’ulbahante and minimal Majerteen. The last three are the Harti sub-clans.
Second, the declaration of Puntland as a federal state of the Republic of Somalia in 1998 brought forth border problems with Somaliland. Puntland and Somaliland contests over the Sool and Sanaag region. The pursuits of clan borders shatter the myth of a Somali political homogeneity and nation.

The Somali notion of a political nation and clan territories clashes with the idea of state identity and borders. It unveils Somalia’s issues of elastic state borders and identity. Despite it, Somalia’s elastic border seems to stand the test of time from pre-independence to post 1991 collapse of the government and state with either an increment to the Somali nation or shrinkage to clan regions/state(s).

Somalia’s elastic border implies a competition between social-cultural and state norms. The incompatibility of these norms shows constant motion in border and identity formations. The borders either expand to encompass all Somalis /body borders or shrink to clan and sub-clans infinitely. Somalia's elastic perception of border and identity shows the struggle along national, state and clan identity. Somalia based the initial desire for Pan Somali on what appeared as a successful construction of Somali homogeneity. Greater Somalia regions were never under one central authority at any given point in time. Somalia attributed its collapse to Ethiopia’s win of the Ogaden War and the subsequent use of clans to cause the divisions. Therefore, the competition between the state and social-cultural norms inform the differences, disunity, and insecurity amongst Somali clans.

6.3 Somali Clans and the Kenya-Somalia Border, identity, and Security

Several Somali clans straddle the Kenya-Somalia border. The main ones are the Darod, Ajuran, Degodia, Hawiye, and Rahanweyn. The southern section has the Darod-Ogaden sub-clans of Auliyahan, Abdwaq, Abdalla, Mohammed Zubeir and Magabul in Garissa County. The central section of the border carries the Ajuran, Degodia, Mohamed Zubeir, and Magabul-Ogaden in Wajir County. The northern part has the Degodia, Garre, and Murulle clans in Mandera County. On Somalia side, the Marehan-Darod occupies the border from Bula Hawa to El Wak. As a result, the Kenya-Somalia border is straddled by two different main clans in the North. The difference affects the perception of the border in two ways; first, the clans in Kenya ‘rigidifies’ the border. Mandera clans consider the Marehan clan foreign in Kenya. Second, the border is insecure because of clan clashes, the Al-Shabaab opportunisms, and blatant acquisition of Kenyan identity cards through bribery or threats of force. The Al-Shabaab killed two local chiefs upon failure of the latter to facilitate Kenyan Identity papers.26

The Somali ‘caste system' furthers the rigidity of the Kenya-Somalia border where certain clans look down upon others as inferior.27 An example is the Rahanweyn clan considered either as half-Somalis or not Somalis. A senior member of the Ministry of Education in Mandera County observed that "tribes think others are superior to others."28 Looking down upon the Garre clan through references like half-Somali or not Somalis drives them to embrace the Kenyan state border compared to the southern Ogaden sub-clans. For example, whereas Somalis from both

sides of the border were against the building of the border wall by Kenya, the Governor of Mandera Ali Roba urged Kenya to hurry up and complete the first 30 kilometers of the border fence from border point 1 to Mandera town to keep away unwanted elements from the County.  

Furthermore, the collapse of Somalia meant the Rahanweyn clan in Kenya are secure under the state while warlordism in Somalia embroils clans’ perceived superiority. The embrace of the Kenyan identity by the Garre and Murulle in northern Kenya shows a sense of state pride, security, and status.

The Garre, Murulle, and Degodia clans refuse to include the Marehan clan in any government security meetings in the argument that the latter are foreigners. The clans in Mandera limit the Marehan rights in Kenya despite holding critical businesses in Mandera town. The northern border region clings to the state border, and the clan identity to separate the insiders from the outsiders in identity matters.

The hierarchy in the Somali clans system leads those perceived inferior to cooperate with the state norms. The Garre clan is partially ‘agro pastoral' in Mandera. Agricultural practice is a less privileged identity among Somalis. The domicile of the Marehan, an upper clan on Somalia side of the border has several implications for the state identity. Before 1991, a functional Somalia government implied weak Mandera-Kenyan clans. However, post-1991, a

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dysfunctional and absent Somalia state gives Mandera clans considerable gain of power concerning movements across and beyond the two states.

President Barre's family entourage used two buses, and a truck to flee from Somalia in 1991 and the remnants of the vehicles are present in Mandera near the Kenya-Somalia border at the immigration office compound. These remnants are emblematic in the logic of state belongingness and the inelastic borders. The vehicles display the refugee Kenya accorded Siad Barre and Kenya's power at the border. By extension, the remnants of the vehicles discipline the mind and separate the locals from foreigners at the border. The two buses and a truck are symbolisms of territorial nationalism and memorization of the interruption/stoppage in the Pan-Somalism.

Besides, the Garre practice are agro-pastoral which is between Somalia's Pastoralism and Kenya's mostly agricultural subsistence. Partial agricultural practice places the Garre clan in the middle. The northern border residents' identity with Kenya is easy to imagine due to partial agricultural practice along the River Dawa. During the study, the reception in Mandera County differed from Garissa County. In Mandera, the elders were surprised that a person from the Kikuyu ethnic group was interested in their region. The elders clapped happily and applauded the visit. The reception in Garissa was marred with suspicions and at times contempt based on the ethnic identity. In the South, a Somali identity appeared more important to the residents.

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32 See Appendix 8.2 figure 11: The two buses and a truck that were used by president Barre’s family to flee from Somalia in 1991.
Mandera residents portrayed the Somali-Somalia identity as both acceptable and hostile. The Somali identity is acceptable as the Somali nation at the same time Mandera residents are frustrated with illegal crossings, purchase of Kenyan identity by non-indigenous clans via bribery and attacks on non-Somalis in the county to discredit their Governor Ali Roba, a Garre. Despite acknowledging kin relations with Somalia, Mandera residents appeared interested in stopping illegal infiltrations into the County.

Somalia’s citizens’ illegal crossings from Somalia increase insecurity in Mandera. The residents observed that crossing to Somalia side occurs every second. The people from Somalia can cross freely every day into Kenya either for business or social visits. However, border security officers scrutinize those carrying significant luggage, but they pay a bribe Ksh50 to cross the border. The residents referred to crossing points as “call box” where ‘you drop coins (bribe) to make a ‘call.’ As a result, criminals make in-roads to the country.

Terror attacks are widespread in Mandera because of criminality from a collaboration of clans within and those outside the state border. The residents said clan competitions within and outside aid terrorism. An example is a high competition in the post of governorship between the Garre and the Murulle in the 2017 Kenya elections. A documentary probed residents about the source of insecurity, an elder answered… "The fact that the Marehan occupy the border from Bula Hawa to El-Wak… does it give you an answer?"

In addition, an opposing clan carries out attacks on non-Somalis to discredit the County government.\textsuperscript{34} Killing a fellow Somali has consequences given that one has to pay blood money (\textit{diya}) to the aggrieved clan. Non-Somalis rely on the state for security and become easy targets/pawns. The Somali ethnic group adheres to clan lineages for security purposes. Therefore, the Somalis consider the clan the closest identity for security. Any injury caused to a Somali by another receives immediate compensation. However, the non-Somalis rely on the state security mechanisms. In terror activities, the state cases either take a long time to solve or never get resolved. Therefore, some Somalis in Mandera use non-Somalis as pawns in clan competitions. In killing non-Somalis, the perpetrators hope to expose the weaknesses of the county government in security and governance matters to oust the county government. Therefore, some clan members resort to ‘gangsterism’ or ‘terrorism’ through use of a convoluted Islamic identity to discredit the County government.

Somalia and all Somalis practice moderate Sunni Islam.\textsuperscript{35} On the contrary, Al-Shabaab practices the Wahhabi Islam. Clan competition indicates joint works with radical Islamists to achieve an end. On several occasions, the NER coordinator Mohamoud Swaleh indicated the killings of non-Somalis in Mandera as acts of local gangs. The elders observed it as a combination of external factions and internal groups. The security in the northern parts of the border is an interplay between the clan, body borders/state, and the Islam identities.\textsuperscript{36}

Issues of border, identity, and security stigmatize the residents on the southern side of the Kenya-Somalia border. In Garissa, every interviewee acknowledged a Kenyan identity as the

\textsuperscript{34} Elder Focus Group. “Identity and Insecurity at the Kenya-Somalia Border.” Mandera. 8 November 2016.
\textsuperscript{36} See Appendix 8.2, Figure 12: The pockets of Security at the Kenya-Somalia-Border.
only identity. Unlike Mandera region, all people interviewed in focus groups, key respondents, government officials except the pastoralists at the livestock market said they had never been to Somalia. The observation is interesting because the same groups/individuals insisted that despite the Kenyan identity, they have kin relations with Somalia-Somalis and need the flexibility to visit and be visited by the kin.

The acknowledgment of relationship with Somalia formed the differences between the southern and the northern parts of the Kenya-Somalia border. The geographic distance from Somalia influenced how much the residents were willing to acknowledge their cross-border movements. Mandera is closer to the Kenya-Somalia border compared to Garissa and Dadaab towns. In interviews with Somalia-Somalis businessmen in Dadaab, they said all their goods were from Nairobi and Mombasa contrary to three distinct categories of interviewees. One, a senior non-Somali government official in the North Eastern office of the president, two, businessmen in Garissa town and lastly the Non-Governmental officials in ADESO office who observed that goods are smuggled at night by lorries from Somalia. “Who will go at 4 am to the wilderness to catch smugglers? We fear for our lives so, we act as if we do not know they are doing it.”37 Businessmen said due to the closure of the border, the smugglers charge high fees for the goods which leaves them little profit.38 Meanwhile, in Mandera, the elders observed that everything they consume apart from salt is from Somalia.39

Apart from the distance from the Kenya-Somalia border, the clan identity influences the acknowledgment or denial of a relationship with Somalia and Somalia-Somalis in Garissa County. The Darod-Ogaden sub-clans reside on both sides of the border. It implies a close relationship across the border compared to the Mandera region where different clans straddle the border.

A close clan attachment in the south encourages immigration of the Auliyahan clan into Garissa which creates tension with other Ogaden sub-clans like the Abdwaq. These cross-border clan emigrations influence elections of state representatives in the government. A similarity in a sub-clan identity influences the state identity. The former promotes movements into Kenya and the illegal purchase of the Kenyan official documents through corrupt state officials. Corruption and falsified identities by the locals led to the closure of the Garissa Passport issuance office in October 2014.40

Corrupt state officials facilitate shifts in state identity at the Kenya-Somalia border. The Somali identity blurs between the state, clan's and nation. Somalis interchange these identities easily based on the circumstances. For example, a bus journey from Garissa to Dadaab and vice versa indicated a pattern in passenger clusters of identities. It entailed a shift from Somali to Kenyan and vice versa. From Garissa towards Dadaab, Somalis clustered together leaving out non-Somalis. In the reverse journey, Somalis clustered together and excluded non-Somalis including an observed case of a few Somali-Bantus. But as the bus approached Garissa town, Kenyan-Somalis clustered with other Kenyan non-Somalis. They switched the language from

Somali to Swahili. Kenyans held intense conversations and sidelined a group of Somalia citizens who were observably silent and anxious.

A unique identity in NER draws attention. In the Dadaab-Garissa route, a Somali-Bantu with an American passport got pulled out of the bus at every checkpoint by the security officers. Initially, no one seemed perturbed. As the bus reached Modikar check-point/Chuma mrefu, about twenty minutes' drive to Garissa town, Somalis around the young man surrounded him and chatted heartedly over the issue in Somali dialect. The young man involved in these security interests held an American passport. The passport had six months to expiry period. He was traveling to Nairobi to renew it "the passport is not the issue, they want to pin the young man down with the hope of getting American dollars." Some passengers explained laughing out aloud. The young man previously ignored, gained attention from other Somalis. Some stared at him, while others kept whispering something to each other. They were saying he was a Somali-Bantu, while others used the adoon/slave word to describe his identity. The shift in an identity of passengers on the bus was a reflection of Kenya and Somalia's perception of the border and identity.

Kenya and Somalia took their stand on the perception of the Kenya-Somalia border before independence. Kenya has maintained the stand on the inviolability of the state borders acquired at independence. The OAU/AU validates inviolability of borders acquired at independence. Somalia displays the belief in an elastic border. The greater Somalia ideal and the five-pointed star symbol on Somalia’s flag attests to it. Additionally, Somalia showed elasticity of borders through the emergence of independent self-declared states within following the fall of the

government in 1991. These variations reflect Somalia's identity as a political nation/body
borders, clan enclaves and subscription to Islam.

Somalis in Kenya and Somalia notions of state borders and identity shifts between cultural
affiliation and the state norms. A state with the Somali population is bound to be affected by
this culture. The case of Somaliland shows an attempt of a merger between the state norms and
cultural through the presence of both House of elders (Giurtti)\(^{42}\) and House of
Representatives.\(^{43}\) However, the UN and AU do not recognize Somaliland as a state because it
consented to merge with Italian Somali in 1960 to form the Republic of Somalia.

In both Kenya and Somalia, Somali cultural norms defy state borders. It results in multiple
allegiances to different states which bring forth multiple identities. Introduction of devolution
by the 2010 constitution of Kenya led to negotiated democracy in NER particularly Mandera
County where decisions were made in the appointments of senior County officials, the
Governor, and Senator. The elders attempted to merge the social-cultural and state norms for
peaceful coexistence. The delicate balance between state norms and social-cultural exposes
potentials for conflict, for example, when the Governor of Mandera refused the elders directive
to step down, the elders facilitated a new political outfit the 'Economic Freedom Party' which
appeared as a clan party.\(^{44}\) Despite it, the county residents re-elected the Governor under a
national Jubilee party. Before his re-election various ‘terrorist’/‘Al-Shabaab’ attacks took


\(^{43}\) Ibid. Part One, Articles 39-56.

\(^{44}\) Nation Television (NTV). “Mandera Politics: Political Leaders Ditch Jubilee, Unveil New Party.” NTV: Nairobi, 19 March 2017. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=N0sm1mtlidM
place. The terrorists killed non-Somalis, some of the governors’ guards, and the governor himself survived four attempts on his life.

The ‘Al-Shabaab’ insecurity in Mandera is an outcome of a competition between state and social-cultural norms. The proximity to the state border makes it easy for assailants to disappear to Somalia. An elder observed that “we are one with Somalia-Somalis, you know when we do something bad here in Kenya and run there to hide, no one will report you, so when they also come and buy identity papers or do something bad, it becomes difficult to tell on them.”45 The merger between the state and the social-cultural is complicated as each occasionally suffers in place of the other.

Where the government/state is not able to secure the people, Somalis resort to the clan. Given the distance between the central government and the vast nature of NER, clans as a mode of security are necessary. The role of clans in securing the Somalis substitutes weak or poor state security machinery. Corruption opens the roots and routes of insecurity at the border as state security remains symbolic and mocked. For example elders in Mandera equated state responses to insecurities as "action from a Hollywood clip with no meaningful outcome towards protecting the poor non-Somalis in the region."46 Despite this, the residents fear the secret arm of security. It utilizes unconventional means through un-explained disappearances of terror suspects. “Here people disappear every day, and we know the government security agents have something to do with it, but we cannot question.”47 The fear of the unknown keeps this society from engaging in state endangerment albeit to some extent.

Border insecurity prompted Kenya to initiate the building of a border fence. Kenya intends to use the fence to stop the Al-Shabaab and illegal migrants. Somalis at the border are of the view that the border fence will not stop insecurity. The border residents said corruption and the Al-Shabaab capacity to blow the fence would retain the insecurity. Though true from the physical aspect, the fence is symbolic of state presence in the periphery. It will impact socio-psychological aspects of the community at the border. The border fence will be a constant reminder of the state identity. The issue of the Somalis identity gravitation back and forth is likely to change over time as the fence embeds into the minds of those living near or crossing it either the Kenyan or Somalian identity.

Comparing the fence to Somalia's flag with the five-pointed star, on several occasions, interviewees observed that the presence of the star is an indication of hope of uniting Somalis one day. Similarly, the presence of the fence will be a reminder of the border and state identity both in the physical and psychological sense.

Daily activities of both security agents and locals in NER point out that the Kenya-Somalia border is at Tana River. The NER is a frontier for Kenya to sift insecurities and identities. The militarization of NER and a separate culture of impromptu searches on individuals is different from the rest of Kenya. The NER fear of Modikari/Chuma mrefu and Tana River Bridge checkpoints as ultimate security checkpoints make Tana River appear as the Border.

The NER closure to Non-Somalis qualifies the Somalis differences with other Africans where terminologies like nywele Ngumu/gurale meaning, hard hair in Swahili and Somali respectively separate Kenyans. In addition, Somalis elevate body features like a narrow nose and use
derogatory terms such as slave\(^{48}\) to refer to non-Cushitic Africans. Over the years, these terminologies have developed psychological impact on Bantus and Nilotes in NER. Observably, males from these ethnic groups use chemicals to soften/curl the hair. In both Garissa and Mandera counties, some male teachers and security agents had chemically altered the hair texture. Though straightening/softening hair is a characteristic common in African females ‘beautification,’ in this region, the psychological stigma of \(nywele ngumu\) references has normalized the act in males. Body border has converted the body into a site for bordering in relation to the Kenya-Somalia border.

Equally, non-Somalis security agents’ fear and do not trust a Somali identity. They use body borders to separate and scrutinize Somalis. Body borders as a security feature separates NER from the rest of Kenya. Daily norms of the Somalis and non-Somalis alike makes Tana River Bridge appear as the border. A young Somali man narrated that…

\(Hîndî îrî ndî Mandera, njîtagwo Abdi, Ndakinya rûî rwa Tana ngeîîta Njoroge. Ninjikarîte na ngaruta wîra Thika miaka míngî, kwa úguo ndaraca-inî ya rûî rwa Tana ngiuma Mandera ngarûraga nganjia kwaria Gîkûyû na hatîrî mûndû ûûngiaga. Nonjeere handû hohothe bûrûri ûyû ndîta Njoroge na ndîta Abdinasir hînda hînda NER (Rûgongo rwa bûrûri).\(^{49}\)

(Meaning, when I am in Mandera I am called Abdi (not his real name), when I get to Tana River, I change to Njoroge. I have lived in Thika for many years, so when I get to Tana River Bridge from Mandera I switch to Kikuyu, and no one bothers me. I can travel anywhere in the country as Njoroge and as Abdi in NER). As a researcher, it was necessary to change the mode of dress past Tana River Bridge. Equally, to get back without raising security concerns, the reverse occurred thus a change from Islamic cultural expression to non-Islamic. A policeman


\(^{49}\) Telephone Interview with a Young Mandera Resident. 10 September 2017. Translated from oral to written Kikuyu by Henry Waitindi on 23 October 2017.
at Modikare checkpoint whispered to his female colleague that the researchers’ exit at Tana River Bridge would be impossible and it facilitated a change in dress expression. Cultural norms are well known to NER residents and visitors who either tone down or adopt a ‘local' language/dress for an easy exit at Tana River Bridge.

Lack of trust between Somalis and security agents in NER is a concern. During the interviews, a strategy to get the best out of interviewees involved occasional ‘separation from the assistant, following the reluctance by non-Somalis to contribute freely. Besides, the security/border officers tended to clutch their guns closer to their bodies whenever approached until they heard the researcher’s accent upon which they discarded the gesture. The protective body language against an Islamic dress code by the police happened in Garissa police station, Modikare checkpoint, Dadaab town checkpoint, and Mandera border control.

Lack of/poor trust between Somalis and security agencies breeds insecurity to both. It leads to substituting the state security mandate with that of clans. Poor information sharing between the community and the state security officers create security gaps. The cycle promotes clan identities over state identity which results in clustering Kenya-Somalis with Somalia-Somalis. Therefore, the border is rendered elastic through the promotion of body borders as opposed to state borders.

In the end, all borders are necessarily arbitrary and unstable which necessitates the search for stability. The instabilities result in desires to shift borders or stabilize them. The duality of borders/divisive character renders them arbitrary regardless of whether they are cultural, geographic or ideologically determined. Borders always produce the other side and the ‘other'
no matter where each is placed. In Pastoral communities borders are layered which depicts elastic characteristics

6.4 Limitations of the Study

1. Security challenges made it difficult to cross to Somalia and interview people on the Somalia side of the border. Interviews with Somalis from Somalia at the border regions and Nairobi overcame this limitation. Also, the study collected Somalia-Somalis views from journal articles, documentaries, and internet sources. Furthermore, some focus group discussion like the youth in Garissa, Men in Mandera, and group interviews with the Sheikhs, individual interviews in Dadaad-Hagadera had Somalia-Somalis present which helped to consolidate the data.

2. Security issues in NER demand having identity papers all the time and an awareness of all recent insecurity incidences in the region to avoid insecure areas. Whereas it is a normal activity to step out of the residence to buy a paper or go for a walk without any identity papers, this was avoided, and identification documents were carried all the time. Though psychologically challenging, it was necessary to avoid falling into problems with the government security agents. The research adhered to strict security advice especially where security officers advised against going to certain regions without security agents. For prudence purposes, it was necessary to solicit the local community's view on issues of security which facilitated data gathering in addition to ensuring researchers security.

3. Cultural differences at the Kenya-Somalia border was challenging. Somalis culture in addition to Islamic adherence is noticeably different from the rest of Kenya. The way of dressing was different. For females, full body cover in a long dress with long sleeves is mandatory. The ears and neck have to be covered too which differed from some Somalis dress
code in Nairobi. The researchers adhered to the border Islamic dress code. It enhanced an amicable relationship with the research assistant in Garissa who stated that "if you were dressed the way your people do, this exercise was going to be very difficult for me, I do not think I would have walked with you in the streets." The cultural challenge was overcome through an adjustment to the context. Social interactions between different genders were visibly different. Social-cultural norms were learned through soliciting information from Somalis in Nairobi, journals, the internet, research assistants and observations on the ground. It facilitated easy entry in the community and acceptability afterward.

4. The researchers’ choice of cultural expression in NER required weighing whom to please between the government security agents and community. In dressing like the locals, it raised issues with government security agents who became suspicious. For example, the OCPD in Garissa questioned: "how do we know you are not an Al-Shabaabs’ wife coming to solicit information for them." Various branches of government security in Dadaab and Mandera expressed the fear. To overcome security agents’ suspicions, the researcher presented identity documents, both from the government and college which include the research permit from the government. In most cases, spoken Swahili accent set aside any suspicions. On the community side, there were worries that the researcher was a secret agent of the government sent to collect information from them. Though it happened in a few cases, research permit documents together with the research assistants' validation dismissed the fears. Mostly, the community was pleased to see attempts towards cultural respect. The choice of going against the security agents as opposed to the Somali community in cultural expression is data in itself because it shows it was easier to convince the government security agents as opposed to trying to convince Somalis to accept another cultural orientation in a strict Muslim region.

5. The researchers’ ethnic identity was a challenge in two ways. First, it created expectations where some felt the researcher had access to the President and could get one thing
or another for them. The study overcame the challenge through explaining there was no personal relationship with the President or the Presidency.

6. A research on identity was challenging where some Somalis referred to non-Somalis in derogatory terms. The Somali people either insisted or assumed the researcher was from the Borana community despite verbal and paper identification. It, therefore, led to opening up on the view on non-Somalis to deeper levels which were difficult to listen to. A reminder that it was a means of collecting valuable data helped to remain calm. Likewise, looking at the defeatist nature of non-Somalis and how they carry themselves in NER was difficult. Furthermore, the aloofness of non-Somali staff towards Somalis in Dadaab, both in government and NGO offices was emotionally tasking to observe and live through.

7. Photographs and videos were minimal due to security concerns of the interviewees and government officials. This was overcome through in-depth narratives which painted the picture of the occurrences and explanations.

8. The view of the Somali women was difficult to get despite efforts by the study to gain access to the females in the community. The study engaged the few numbers of females accessed in in-depth interviews and supplemented the voices with written and documentary materials.

6.5 Areas for Further Research

Kenya-Somalia border, identity, and security appears to be influenced by the 2010 Constitution of Kenya which introduced devolved county governments. Further explanation and understanding on the impact of devolution on the Kenya-Somalia border are needed. This research will likely require mixed methods both quantitative and qualitative. Devolution seems
to harden county borders. Its influence on state border intricacies is worth an explanation, exploration, and understanding.

The issue of terrorism at the border requires further study. Terrorism appears as a tool for self-preservation in various competitive environments such as business and politics.
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The Interviews and conversations took place between 2016 and 2018 in Garissa and Mandera County including follow up physical meetings in Nairobi and telephone conversations. Some names are withheld due to the sensitive nature of the subject matter or upon personal discretion owing to the subject matter. Though others desired to publicly indicate their names the research chose to use one name only for purposes of transparency of the results but at the same time to protect informants. The decision follows personal experience in the field which calls for prudence to avoid harming respondents. In most cases, the study uses the professional titles to credit it instead of individual’s names.

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Abdi. Red Sea, Mandera, November 11, 2016
Abdille M. Garissa Town. October 27, 2016
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8.0 APPENDICES

8.1 Tables

Table 1. Summary of challenges of African borders, identity and Security

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characteristics of the Geographic Periphery</th>
<th>Challenges at the Periphery</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>State A</td>
<td>Neighboring states</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Differ in Means of subsistence (mostly pastoral-nomadic communities).</td>
<td>Disagreement on where the actual international border should be.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious difference.</td>
<td>Presence of conflicts over natural resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Culturally unique.</td>
<td>Calls for Self-determination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Under-developed compared to the core.</td>
<td>Calls for secessionist desires</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vast and Arid/semi-arid</td>
<td>Do not acknowledge the international borders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Similar ethnicity with neighboring state thus kin affiliations.</td>
<td>Presence of armed militias.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presence of conflicts over natural resources</td>
<td>Presence of terror groups/cells.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Calls for Self-determination</td>
<td>Used by adversary states to engage in proxy wars with the core.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Calls for secessionist desires</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do not acknowledge the international borders</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presence of armed militias.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presence of terror groups/cells.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Used by adversary states to engage in proxy wars with the core.</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Generated by the author

Table 2: Typology of Insecurities Identified by Residents in North Eastern Region.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date/Year</th>
<th>Typology</th>
<th>Attributed cause</th>
<th>County/Location</th>
<th>Somalis Estimated Death Toll</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1964-1967</td>
<td>Shifta War</td>
<td>Seccession/irredentism50</td>
<td>NFD</td>
<td>2000-700051</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 10, 1980</td>
<td>Garissa Gubay (Burn) or Bulla Kartasi Massacre</td>
<td>Killing of 6 government officials by ‘Shifta’,52 Led to government action to capture a Shifta called Abdi Mathobe.</td>
<td>Bulla Kartasi-Garissa</td>
<td>300053</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>Malka Mari Massacre</td>
<td>Banditry in Mandera</td>
<td>Mandera/Malka Mari area</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 10, 1984</td>
<td>Wagalla Massacre</td>
<td>Government disarmament of Degodia clan</td>
<td>Wajir airstrip-Wajir county</td>
<td>300054</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Generated from interviews, exact dates and figures were compiled from various sources by the author.

52 Daily Nation Newspaper. "Total War on Shifta." Tuesday 11 November 1980, p. 1
Table 3: Historical insecurities in Kenya Attributed to Al-Shabaab and cross-border incursions.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Typology</th>
<th>Number of Deaths</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>2/03 1975</td>
<td>Nairobi</td>
<td>Bus Bombings</td>
<td>27(^{56})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>31/12/1980</td>
<td>Norfolk Hotel</td>
<td>Revenge mission for allowing Israelis to refuel in Kenya during ‘operation Entebbe’ which rescued Israelis from Uganda</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>7/08/1998</td>
<td>US Embassy/Nairobi</td>
<td>Bombing by Al-Qaeda-affiliated to Al-Shabaab</td>
<td>213</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>28/11/2002</td>
<td>Paradise Hotel</td>
<td>Bombing</td>
<td>16 (^{58})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>21/09/2013</td>
<td>Westgate-Nairobi</td>
<td>Four Al-Shabaab</td>
<td>67(^{59})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>15 &amp; 17/06/2014</td>
<td>Mpeketoni Attack-Mombasa</td>
<td>Al-Shabaab</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>16/05/2014</td>
<td>Gikomba Market</td>
<td>Al-Shabaab</td>
<td>10(^{60})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>2/4/2015</td>
<td>Garissa University</td>
<td>Al-Shabaab, target nonlocals</td>
<td>147(^{61})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>22/11/2015</td>
<td>El Wak- Mandera Bus shooting</td>
<td>Al-Shabaab, Target non-Muslims</td>
<td>28(^{62})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td>2/12/2014</td>
<td>Mandera Quarry</td>
<td>Al-Shabaab, target non-Somalis</td>
<td>36(^{63})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.</td>
<td>25/10/2016</td>
<td>Mandera Lodge</td>
<td>Al-Shabaab-Target non-Somalis</td>
<td>12(^{64})</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Compiled by the author from various sources.

---

8.2 Figures

Figure 2: Triangulation/Methods used to validate data

![Diagram showing methods used to validate data](source: Generated by author)

Figure 3: Pictures of the Kenya-Somalia Border Fence Construction

![Pictures of the Kenya-Somalia Border Fence Construction](source: Generated by author)
Figure 4: Bula Hawa Residence in Somalia opposite Mandera Town

A picture of the Mandera Border control post, outside the department of immigration. The red circled building is where the actual border is, the residential buildings inwards belong to Bula Hawa, a town in Somalia (picture taken by the author).

Bula Hawa Residential Homes on Kenyan Soil opposite Mandera Town

Figure 5: Bula Hawa Residential Homes built on the Kenyan side of the Border

These are Bula Hawa residential Homes on Kenyan soil. The government of Kenya halted the Kenya-Somalia border fence construction until a solution and agreement with Somalia is reached on what to do with the near Mandera town.

Figure 6: Layers of Identity of the Somali People from the clan to State in North Eastern Region

Source: Developed from the field data by the author
Figure 7: Pastoralist pay Zakat based on the type of animals owned.

Source: Derived from field data by the author.

Figure 8: The Somalis and Non-Somalis Conception of the term Al-Shabaab

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnic Somalis conception of Al-Shabaab</th>
<th>Non-Somalis Conception of Al-Shabaab</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>1</strong> Al-Shabaab</td>
<td><strong>1</strong> Al-Shabaab</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2</strong> The Youth</td>
<td><strong>2</strong> Terror Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>3</strong> Terror Group</td>
<td><strong>3</strong> The Youth</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Developed by the Author from observations in field interviews and focus group discussions.

Summary of Field findings on Somalis Perception of the Kenya-Somalia Border Insecurity.

Figure 9: The Summary of the Field Findings on the Somalis Perception of the Kenya-Somalia Border Insecurities

Source: Drawn by the author.
Figure 10: A Summary of the Linkages between Insecurity, identity and the Kenya Somalia border

Source: Drawn by the author from field interviews and focus group discussions

Figure 11: Two Buses and a Truck that were used by President Barre’s family members to escape from Somalia in 1991.

Source: Pictures taken by the Author, at Mandera Border Control near the Immigration Office.
Source: Drawn by the author from field interviews and focus group discussions

Figure 13: River Dawa, at the Kenya-Ethiopia Border.

The picture of the author and a Kenyan-Somali raft captain taken at River Dawa, the Kenya-Ethiopia border. Towards the author’s back were alert Kenyan border police on guard to ensure we did not go beyond the middle of the river into Ethiopia nor take pictures pointing towards Ethiopia. The Ethiopian border police were camouflaged in a make-shift wooden-stick shelter. The stiff reaction of the Kenyan border police showed Ethiopia’s Power and care concerning their border.
8.3 Interview Questions

On the Kenya-Somalia Border
1. How would you describe a usual day of living near the Kenya-Somalia border?
2. Do you know anyone with the experience of crossing to the Somalia side?
3. Have you ever crossed/visited Somalia?
4. Why have you not crossed the border?
5. How was your experience in Somalia different from the Kenyan side of the border?
6. Describe your experience of crossing the border
7. At what point in the NER/Somalia do you feel a change in the way things are done?
   Describe the difference.
8. Does the border make a difference? Please …Explain…how…explain.

On Identity.
1. As a person living in a border county, how do you identify yourself?
2. Does being a Kenya or Somali citizen make a difference? Why/why not?
3. Do you feel pressured to identify with any of the states? If not/yes why?
4. How is being a Kenyan-Somali or Somali-Somali different?
5. How does that affect you?
6. If you were to draw circles on how you identify yourself starting from the most least important, how would that look like?
7. Describe your understanding of the Kenya-Somalia border.

On (In)Security
1. Describe what makes you feel secure/insecure
2. Does living near Somalia border make you feel insecure? How?
3. How would a typical day be like where issues of insecurity are felt
4. In your opinion, is it easy for people from Somalia to cross the border? How? And why?
5. How can a difference be made?
6. As an individual/organization, what are some of the challenges of living in a border county?
**Focus Group Questions**

1. How do you think of borders, insecurity, and identity as people living near the Kenya Somalia border? (This examines the way the border affects particular groups).
2. What are the challenges of living near the Kenya-Somalia border in terms of Identity and (in)security?

**Further questions that emerged during the discussion include;**

Explain your experience in crossing the border. (This led to experiences in Crossing County borders).

How would you describe a porous border?

Does identity matter?

What is your understanding of identity? What does it mean to be a Kenyan /Somalian national?

Does it make a difference?

Help us understand why Somalis and non-Somalis rarely/do not interact? (This was a follow-up question especially in Mandera and Dadaab where tensions between the two groups seemed very high).

What is security or insecurity to you?

How can it be enhanced or reduced?

The questions emerging were numerous but led to a creation of an identifiable pattern that helped to make codes and final interpretation of the data at the end of each field day and eventually at the end of the field research.
8.4 Research Permit

NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY AND INNOVATION

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when replying please quote:
Ref. No.

NACOSTI/P/16/66360/13566

Date: 27th October, 2016

Agnes Wanjiru Behr
United States International University
P.O. Box 14634-00800
NAIROBI.

RE: RESEARCH AUTHORIZATION

Following your application for authority to carry out research on “Borders, insecurity and identity: The Kenya-Somalia Borders 1963-2015,” I am pleased to inform you that you have been authorized to undertake research in Mandera and Garissa County for the period ending 24th October, 2017.

You are advised to report to the County Commissioners and the County Directors of Education, Mandera and Garissa County before embarking on the research project.

On completion of the research, you are expected to submit two hard copies and one soft copy in pdf of the research report/thesis to our office.

GODFREY P. KALERWA MSc., MBA, MKIM
FOR: DIRECTOR-GENERAL/CEO

Copy to:
The County Commissioner
Mandera County.

The County Director of Education
Mandera County.

The County Commissioner
Garissa County.