PEACEKEEPING MISSIONS IN AFRICA: THE CASE OF THE AFRICAN UNION MISSION IN SOMALIA (AMISOM)

BY:

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UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL UNIVERSITY-AFRICA

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UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL UNIVERSITY – AFRICA (USIU-A)

SUMMER 2018
STUDENT DECLARATION

I, the undersigned declare that this is my original work and that it has not been submitted to any other College, Institution or University other than the United States International University for academic purposes.

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This project has been presented for examination with my approval as the appointed supervisor.

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This accomplishment would not have been possible without them. Thank you.
DEDICATION

It is with great humility that I dedicate this work to the resilient people of Somalia who have suffered years of violent conflicts. To the people trying to make Somalia a better place and the friends of the Somali people, I say “Soomaaliya Hanoolato” (long live Somalia).
ABSTRACT

Africa has continued to be associated with conflict, human rights atrocities and insecurity. Several African countries including Democratic Republic of Congo, Somalia, Mali, South Sudan, Central African Republic among others are still experiencing armed conflicts and civilians and non-combatants in these countries are in constant need of protection. Of these countries, Somalia has been the most affected and has been described by several security and political pundits as the "hot-bed of the world". Consequently, the UN through the United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1725 authorized a limited deployment of Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and AU deployment in and around the Somalia town of Baidoa to protect the Transitional Federal Government (TFG). However, despite the presence of UN-backed AMISOM, Somalia remains a country in a state of insecurity.

The purpose of the study is to examine the root causes of conflict in Somalia and to investigate the effectiveness of the methods and approaches of AMISOM in peacekeeping process in Somalia. The study seeks to achieve four objectives, namely; to investigate the root cause of conflict, its dynamics and its consequences in the region; to determine the extent of African Union’s effectiveness and ineffectiveness in peacekeeping missions in Somalia; to examine the methods and approaches that the African Union has used in trying to resolve the Somalia conflict; and, to investigate the role that different regional bodies such as IGAD have in the conflict resolution and the extent to which they affect and hamper the African Union in handling crisis.
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<tr>
<td>AFISMA</td>
<td>African-led International Support Mission in Mali</td>
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<td>AMIB</td>
<td>African Mission in Burundi</td>
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<td>AMIS</td>
<td>African Union Mission in Sudan</td>
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<td>AMISOM</td>
<td>African Union Mission in Somalia</td>
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<td>ASF</td>
<td>African Standby Force</td>
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<td>AU Act</td>
<td>Constitutive Act of the AU</td>
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<td>CEWS</td>
<td>Continental Early Warning System</td>
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<td>CONOPs</td>
<td>Concept of Operations</td>
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<td>CT</td>
<td>Critical Theory</td>
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<td>FGS</td>
<td>Federal Government of Somalia</td>
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<td>FMS</td>
<td>Federal Member States</td>
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<td>GHOA</td>
<td>Greater Horn of Africa</td>
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<td>GLR</td>
<td>Great Lakes Region</td>
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<td>IGAD</td>
<td>Inter-Governmental Authority on Development</td>
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<td>IGASOM</td>
<td>IGAD Peace Support Mission in Somalia</td>
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<td>HoM</td>
<td>Head of Mission</td>
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<td>JSCM</td>
<td>Joint Support and Coordination Mechanism</td>
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<td>MINUSMA</td>
<td>UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali</td>
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<td>MONUSCO</td>
<td>UN Organization Stabilization Mission in DRC</td>
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<td>NSS</td>
<td>National Security Service</td>
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<td>PGT</td>
<td>Public Goods Theory</td>
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<td>PoW</td>
<td>Panel of the Wise</td>
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<td>PSO</td>
<td>Peace Support Operations</td>
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<td>RCT</td>
<td>Rational Choice Theory</td>
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<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<td>SF</td>
<td>Special Fund</td>
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<td>SNRC</td>
<td>Somalia National Reconciliation Conference</td>
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<td>SRSP</td>
<td>Somalia Revolutionary Socialist Party</td>
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<td>SRC</td>
<td>Supreme Revolutionary Council</td>
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<td>TFG</td>
<td>Transitional Federal Government</td>
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<td>TFP</td>
<td>Transitional Federal Parliament</td>
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<tr>
<td>UCDP</td>
<td>Uppsala Conflict Data Program</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>UNAMID</td>
<td>African Union/United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur</td>
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<td>UNAMSIL</td>
<td>UN Mission in Sierra Leone</td>
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<td>UNMISS</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in The Republic of South Sudan</td>
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<td>WSLF</td>
<td>Western Somali Liberation Front</td>
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DEFINITION OF TERMS

Conflict

Conflict as used within this study includes violence as well as a situation of absence of violence but in which two actors or more perceive themselves as being opposed to each other over a given issue that affects them either directly or indirectly, and upon which they resort to resolve through violence (Gody, 2012).

Horn of Africa (HoA)

Horn of Africa as used within this study, rejects the conventional delimitation of the HoA as consisting of four countries of Ethiopia, Djibouti, Sudan and Somalia and adopts the definition of Mwagiru (2015) which adds to this four countries, Uganda, Kenya and Eritrea.

Peace Keeping

Peacekeeping as used within this study and as defined by Agada (2008) refers to the mechanism or framework for conflict resolution which encompasses a plethora of activities including troops deployment, use of observers, disarmament programs, relief and humanitarian assistance, elections and refugee resettlement.

Peace Support Operations

Peace support operations or PSOs encompasses the operations and activities of military and non-military organizations deployed to conduct traditional peace keeping, restore normality and actions, and perform military actions necessary for the establishment of peaceful conditions (Karock, 2014).
CHAPTER ONE

1.0 INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background of the Study

The African continent has witnessed disproportionately high levels of conflict since independence, especially during and in the aftermath of the Cold War (Caparini, 2016). The conflicts being experienced by African countries are considered historical in origin and contemporary, especially in terms of perpetuation. Historically, pundits contend that the Berlin Conference (1884-5) which paved the way for the colonization and partition of Africa into existing African states was quite illogical and resulted in arbitrary national borders with dire consequences for social and political stability for most African countries (Dowden, 2008).

These national borders did not take into account cultural and religious diversities of the native populations, thereby providing a recipe for conflict in the post-independent state (Kinfe, 2006; Tull, 2016; Menkhaus, 2007; Freear & de Coning, 2013). It is also argued by several analysts that the post-Cold War period has provided a scenario in which weak African states have had to grapple with a plethora of developmental issues including intense political, ethnic and religious fragmentation, illiteracy, poverty, lack of enough resources and weak institutions among others, that have precipitated, perpetuated and exacerbated the conflicts (Menkhaus, 2007). Some analysts consider Africa's conflict problem to be the outcome of immature integration of the continent into the global capitalist order (Abrahamsen, 2013).

The post-Cold War epoch has proved to be particularly deadly and according to a recent data from Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP), the continent was the most violent
in the world between 1989 and 2014 (Melander, 2015). Williams (2016) observes that between 1989 and 1999 Africa accounted for 76% of global fatalities from armed conflicts and 93% of world fatalities arising from deliberate use of organized violence against non-combatants and civilians.

As such, Africa has continued to be associated with conflict, human rights atrocities and insecurity. In the 1990s, Robert Kaplan's (1994) nightmare vision of "the coming anarchy" epitomized Africa's perceived affinity for atavistic and senseless violence, ethnic animosity and hatred as well as environmental dystopia. Jeffrey Gettleman also conjured a similar view asserting that Africa's wars "never end" but spread "like a viral pandemic" (Gettleman, 2010, p.73). Similar views have been portrayed by academics and analysts as conflict has been the main issue of policy focus, with economic and developmental issues taking the second place (Abrahamsen, 2013).

Several African countries including the Democratic Republic of Congo, Somalia, Mali, South Sudan, Central African Republic are still experiencing armed conflicts (Tull, 2016). Civilians and non-combatants in these countries are in constant need of protection (Melander, 2015). Perhaps, as a result of the consequences such armed conflicts precipitate to human life, property, political fragmentation, overall stability as well as individual state's failure to protect, multilateral peace operations have been constantly endorsed with the perception that they have the potential to provide protection of civilians and bring about sustainable peace in specific African countries.

Currently, an unprecedented number of peacekeeping operations are deployed in several parts of Africa under the guardianship of the United Nations (UN) and in several instances, in collaboration with regional and sub regional organizations like the African
Union (AU), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) among others (Bessada, 2010).

Caparini (2016) considers the African continent as the principal operational theatre for global peace support operations (PSOs). In mid-2016, it was estimated that nine out of the sixteen UN peacekeeping initiatives were being undertaken in Africa. The continent accounted for 99,424 civilian and uniformed personnel out of 119,523 deployed in peacekeeping operations. As such, Africa accounted for 83% of all UN peacekeepers deployed around the world (Caparini, 2016).

Such PSO missions in Africa include but are not limited to; UN mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS), UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), UN Organization Stabilization Mission in DRC (MONUSCO), UN Mission in Siera Leone (UNAMSIL) (Tull, 2016; Caparini, 2016; Guehenno, 2016; Bessada, 2010). Presently, PSOs are an integral component of the continent's security landscape. These peacekeepers are involved in vital missions such as providing stability in countries plagued by violence, facilitating humanitarian assistance, protecting civilians, pacifying illegal or illegitimate armed groups, supporting the rule of law and public security as well as running elections (Bessada, 2010). If effectively managed, such peace operations often facilitate transition into peace from a history of war and violence (Caprini, 2016).

Conversely, peace operations in the African continent are defining expectations concerning the role, capacities and legitimacy of the of multilateral organizations to manage armed conflicts and facilitate sustainable peace in specific African regions and
in particular countries (Caparini, 2016). Latest PSO's have focused on two particular regions of Africa, that is; the Great Lakes Region (GLR) of Africa comprising the troubled countries of the DRC, Burundi and the Central African Republic (CAR) and, the greater Horn of Africa (HoA) comprising especially of Sudan, Eritrea, South Sudan and Somalia (Caparini, 2016; Demeke, 2016).

The HoA is the most volatile and conflict-ridden region of African and one of the most dangerous places of the world (Kinfe, 2006). It has been described by several security and political pundits as the "hot-bed of the world" (Demeke, 2016, p.249). As such, the region is considered to be the epitome of religious violence, piracy, insurgency, cattle rustling, terrorism, and state-sanctioned violence (Menkhaus, 2007).

Several issues that are considered to be the cause(s) of conflict and which (while not unique to the region as they are also found at the root of the causes of conflicts in Africa and elsewhere in the world) are more pronounced in the HoA. According to Markakis (2003) and Demeke (2016) the underpinning causes of conflict in the HoA include political fragmentation, absences of democratic political institutions, poverty and illiteracy, natural disasters (famine and drought) and general political turmoil.

Somalia has been the archetype of civil war, political instability and state fragility in the HoA and the rest of Africa and to a great degree the world (Menkhaus, 2007). Since 1991, when the despotic regime of General Siad Barre collapsed, the country has been characterized by political chaos, extreme violence, religious extremism or terrorism, banditry, insurgency and piracy that have precipitated an intermittent civil war with devastating costs in terms of human life and property (Kinfe, 2006; Menkhaus, 2011; Freear & de Coning, 2013). Thousands have died and hundreds of thousands have been
displaced by the intermittent conflict in Somalia necessitating the intervention of the UN and the AU through the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) (Demeke, 2014).

1.2 Problem Statement

In 2006, through Resolution 1725, the UN Security Council (UNSC) approved the intervention of African Union (AU) forces in Somalia. UNSCR 1725 authorized a limited deployment of troops from the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and AU deployment in and around the Somalia town of Baidoa to protect the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) which was headquartered there owing to sporadic insecurity in Mogadishu (Somalia’s Capital). In the following year, in 2007, UNSR adopted resolution 1744, which further legitimized AMISOM's deployment of troops (Murithi, 2009). AMISOM has played a vital role in peace operation in Somalia especially in helping reduce the level of conflict in the country (Freear & de Coning, 2013).

However, despite the presence of UN-backed AMISOM, Somalia remains a country in a state of insecurity (Murithi, 2009; Gowan, 2008). The inability of AMISOM to provide sustainable peace in Somalia raises concern over the effectiveness of the mission. Caparini (2016) has argued that transformations over the past two decades have shaped the manner in which PSOs are deployed as tools of conflict management. Hence, understanding these changes as well as the intricate dynamics that shape them and constrain peace operations is essential.

Somalia provides an instance in which the dynamics that shape PSOs in Africa and the effectiveness of PSO in the continent can be examined. Despite much publicity about
the AMISOM in the media, very limited academic attention has gone into the examination of the success or failure of the mission. In fact, a lot of attention to Somalia as argued by Murithi (2009) has been accorded the assessment of the conflict in the country and not AMISOM's mandate and role in peacekeeping.

1.3 Purpose of the Study

The purpose of the study was to examine the root causes of conflict in Somalia and to investigate the effectiveness of the methods and approaches of AMISOM in peacekeeping process in Somalia.

1.4 Objectives of the Study

1.4.1 To explore the dynamics of the Somalia Conflict and its consequences in the Horn of Africa region.

1.4.2 To examine the methods and approaches the African Union used in trying to resolve the conflict and to what extent have these methods and approaches been effective or ineffective.

1.4.3 To investigate the role that regional bodies particularly IGAD have had in the conflict resolution and the extent to which they affect the African Union in handling crisis.

1.5 Research Questions

1.5.1 What is the root cause of the conflict, its dynamics and its consequences in the region and in the world?
1.5.2 What methods and approaches did the African Union use in trying to resolve the conflict and to what extent have these methods and approaches been effective or ineffective?

1.5.3 What role does regional bodies such as IGAD have in the conflict resolution and to what extent do they affect the African Union in handling crisis?

1.6 Significance of the Study

1.6.1 Epistemological Significance

The study provides information which adds to the existing understanding of peacekeeping operations, both as a concept and as a process. The study may equip academicians and future researchers with information that may lead to their (re)assessment of the demands of peacekeeping operations in different contexts in Africa. The study may also be vital in drawing scholarly attention to the link between peacekeeping missions and the effectiveness of such missions to address the dynamics of the conflict. It adds to existing literature on the role that sub-regional intergovernmental bodies play in the peace process.

1.6.2 Somalia Federal Government and Citizens

The study adds to existing knowledge of policy-makers in Somalia on issues concerning peace operations. The study may equip policy-makers in Somalia with greater knowledge of the mandate, role, successes and failures of PSOs in general and AMISOM in particular. Such information would prove vital in influencing policy improvement and in shaping the relationship between the Federal Government of Somalia and the peacekeeping missions. The study may also be important to the citizens of Somalia in that it may inform them of the mandate of AMISOM in Somalia as well
as on the specific roles that AMISOM is playing towards the establishment of sustainable peace.

1.6.3 The African Governments

This study may also be very relevant to other African governments. The study adds to the existing information and knowledge that other African governments have of the mandate, role, achievements and failures of AMISOM. The study may influence policy debates at the AU forum for better improvement of existing or contemporary AMISOM mandate and role in Somalia. It accrds policymakers in the individual African governments information regarding the effectiveness of the regional bodies in peacekeeping processes which could help inform policy at the sub-regional level in such organizations. This study may also unearth vital information that may allow the AU to adopt lessons learnt in the AMISOM in peacekeeping mission in other African countries experiencing conflict.

1.6.4 Peace Organizations

The study may also be crucial to peace organizations especially the United Nations. The study may generate unique yet important information about peace operations and thereby add to existing knowledge of policy makers and negotiators at the UN and other sub-regional organizations regarding the use of PSOs as conflict management tools. The study provides information regarding AMISOM which adds to UN and other organization's knowledge concerning the need for partnership with regional and sub-regional organizations in peace operations. As such, the study may lead to an overall improvement in the activities of peace organizations in managing PSOs and civil wars.
1.7 Scope of the Study

The study focused on AMISOM and examined how it has addressed the security situation in Somalia in terms of establishing enduring peace and tranquility in the country. It focused on investigating the root causes of the conflict in Somalia, and assessed the role that different regional bodies such as the AU and IGAD have played in the peace process in Somalia and in so doing examined the effectiveness of AMISOM in peacekeeping in Somalia. The reason for taking such an approach was to permit the assessment of whether AMISOM, as a peacekeeping operation, has been effective or ineffective in realizing its objectives. The study was conducted between the months of September and November and was purely a qualitative study based on a desktop review.

1.8 Chapter Summary

Chapter One of this study has provided the introduction of the study. The chapter comprised of the background of the study, the problem statement, the research questions and objectives, the significance of the study and the scope of the study. Chapter Two of this study provides the literature review. The chapter is subdivided into five parts, the empirical review, the summary of review and gaps to fill, theoretical framework, conceptual framework and conclusion. Chapter Three discusses the methodology of this study. It explains the research design, the sources of data, the data collection techniques, the data analysis technique, the study limitation and the conclusion.

Chapter Four provides the results and finding of the study. The chapter is subdivided into four parts according to the objectives of this study. The first part of chapter four provides findings regarding the root causes of conflict in Somalia, its dynamics and
regional consequences. Part two provides findings on the methods and approaches that the African Union has used in trying to resolve the Somalia conflict. Part three provides findings regarding the extent of African Union’s effectiveness and ineffectiveness in peacekeeping missions in Somalia. The fourth and last part of the chapter provides study findings on the role that different regional bodies such as IGAD have in the conflict resolution and the extent to which they affect and hamper the African Union in handling crises. Chapter five provides the summary of the study, the conclusion and the recommendations.
CHAPTER TWO

2.0 LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 Introduction

This chapter examines literature on the history of the conflict in Somalia, root causes of the conflict, peacekeeping and the role and mandate of AMISOM as well as the approaches that AMISOM has used in peacekeeping. Furthermore, the review also examines the role that the regional bodies such as the IGAD have played in the peace process in Somalia. In so doing, the review seeks to achieve two major objectives; First, it seeks to conceptualize the Somalia conflict and its underpinning precipitators, the mandate and role of the AMISOM, and the role that the regional bodies play in Somalia peace process. Secondly, it seeks to determine discrepancies and omissions of existing literature on these issues and in so doing accord credence to this study in terms of its epistemological significance.

2.2 Empirical Review

2.2.1 The History of the Somalia Conflict and the Underpinning Precipitators

Somalia is Africa's easternmost country located in the Horn of Africa. It borders, Kenya, Djibouti, Ethiopia, the Indian Oceana and the Gulf of Eden, to the West, South, the North-West, the East and the North respectively. The country has not known peace since the collapse of the despotic regime of General Siad Barre in 1991 (Dahre, 2011). A systematic analysis of literature on the political history of Somalia would reveal the major events and issues that have mutually reinforced in precipitating the contemporary explosive state of things in Somalia and such an analysis predates the Barre regime and focus on the epoch from 1884 during the colonial rule.
According to Dahre (2011), Britain had controlled northern Somalia since it established the British Somaliland Protectorate in 1884. From 1884 to 1896, the British colonial government concluded multiple treaties with local Somali clans living in modern Somaliland, Djibouti and Ethiopia gaining control over some of these territories (Jama, 2011). The most popular was the treaty with the Ogadeni people (presently living in Ethiopia) that ended in British colonial government promising Ogadeni people protection from Ethiopia (Dahre, 2011). However, as Dahre (2011) notes the British reneged on this promise and ceded control of the Haud and Ogadeni territory to Ethiopia in what has become known as the Anglo-Ethiopian Agreements of 1897 (Menkhaus, 2011; Jama, 2011).

A similar situation also transpired in Kenya, where just before the country's independence, the British colonial government conducted a referendum in which they sought to determine whether Somalis in the British colony of Kenya preferred to be part of an independent Kenya or an independent Somalia republic (Menkhaus, 2011). However, despite popular preference by Somalis to be part of an independent Somalia, the British included the former Northern Frontier District (NFD) as a province of independent Kenya (Harper, 2012). These developments are important because they have affected both the conduct and agenda of domestic politics in the post-independent Somalia as well as how Somalia relates with its neighbors. According to Dahre (2011) the pre-independent machinations of the British and the Italians (who controlled southern Somalia from 1883) resulted in the division of the Somali people (a single nation) into five administrative regions. This act therefore, paved the way for post-independent political agenda depicted by the adoption of the five-pointed star in the Somalia flag. In essence, this would be the basis of Somalia irredentism that became the cornerstone of its regional policy (Menkhaus, 2011).
According to Jama (2011), between 1969 and 1991, a precedence for conflictual Somalia was established despite having undergone a peaceful power transfer from President Adan Abduller Osman to Dr. Abdirashid Ali Sharmarke in June of 1967. In just two years after the power transfer, President Sharmarke was assassinated in Las Anod on 15th of October, 1969 and was succeeded by General Mohamed Siad Barre through a bloodless coup d’état (Menkhaus, 2011). Upon taking power, Barre established an authoritarian regime in which political deviance was not tolerated and could land one in jail or detention without trial (as it did the former President, two former Prime Misters and the police commander (Jama, 2011).

At the same time, Barre suspended the constitution, banned all political parties, trade unions and the Supreme Court and went ahead to replace the National Assembly with the Supreme Revolutionary Council (SRC) (Menkhaus, 2011; Jama, 2011). At the same time, Barre explored and exploited clan differences and successfully created mistrust among clans. Clannism and nepotism replaced meritocracy in public appointment and public property became Barre's own property, to be deployed at Barre's command to advance his narrowly conceived political agenda (Jama, 2011). These developments therefore crystalized in the minds of Somalis, the idea that constitutionalism could be abrogated at will to serve the agenda of whoever was in power.

Descent to Barre's despotic regime led to his own disposal in 1991 by the Ethiopia-backed United Somali Council (USC) (Stamford, 2011). Jama (2011) and Menkhaus (2011) contend that the clan tensions that Barre had successfully created persisted as a dominant rallying point and element for political mobilization in the post-Barre epoch. Ethiopia is said to have also exacerbated the clan animosities in its bid to stir up instability in Somalia and to derail Somalia's irredentist claims over its Ogaden territory (Stamford, 2011).
The anarchy and violence that emerged with the overthrow of Barre made Somalia virtually ungovernable as warlordism emerged with each warlord (often linked to a clan) seeking to ascend to power (Gettleman, 2010). It also opened the country to Islamic fundamentalism as international terrorists such as the Al-Shabaab gained a foothold in the country as base for planning clandestine regional and global terror operations (Aganda, 2008).

Thus, chaos and anarchy fueled by clan-based warlordism and supported by regional actors such as Ethiopia and Eritrea defined much of the events in Somalia throughout the 1990s. From the early mid 1990s onwards Somalia started to dominate regional and international debates on peace. The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) comprising of regional countries and as part of the African solutions to African problems (an idea conceptualized within the AU agenda for Africa) initiated attempts to negotiate peace between the warring factions in Somalia (Abukar, 2015; Knezevic & Smith, 2015). The move by regional and international actors including the IGAD and the UN was necessitated by the recognition of the growing strain the anarchy in Somalia was placing on regional stability and international security (owing to presence of international terror organizations in the country) (Abukar, 2015; Menkaus, 2011).

In the year 2000, several Somalia political groups agreed at a conference held in Arta in Djibouti to establish a Transitional National Government (TNG). Being Somali-driven, the Arta Agreement presented an aura of legitimacy for the TNG and reasonable acceptance among the Somali warring factions Abukar, 2015). However, the agreements main misgiving, and one which had dire repercussions for its legitimacy and effectiveness was its exclusion of the warlords and some other significant actors in the Somalia conflict such as the youth and women (Dahre, 2011). By 2004, the weaknesses of the TNG and with it the Arta agreement had become apparent necessitating another round of new negotiations.
to allow for progress to be made towards delivering peace in Somalia. In 2004, the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) was established (Menkaus, 2011).

The agreement was mediated by the UN-backed IGAD and resulted in the Mbagathi agreement (having been conducted at Mbagathi in Nairobi, Kenya). The Mbagathi conferences created a more accepted and relatively legitimate TFG (Dahre, 2011). Considered as the 'conference of the warlords' the conference brought the warlords to the negotiation table and was effective in bringing a ceasefire in Somalia especially as far as the warlord's overt participation in violence was concerned (Dahre, 2011). Nonetheless, the Mbagathi conference concentrated so much on the warlords and for this, Menkaus (2011) argues, it lacked the crucial participation of the civil society and the clan leaders thereby becoming intrinsically directed towards failure.

The failure of the TFG to address the interests of all the major players in Somalia resulted in the emergence of even more powerful and violent groups, the Islamic Courts Union (ICU). The ICU quickly gained control of Somalia especially in the South and were responsible for orchestrating insurgent attacks in Mogadishu. In response, as Menkhaus (2011) and LeSage (2005) posit, the TFG sought the assistance of international actors especially the African Union and Ethiopian forces.

At a conference in Djibouti in 2008, dubbed the Djibouti Peace Talks that was conducted between the top representatives of the TFG and moderate Islamists, the Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia (ARS), it was agreed that the Ethiopian troops should withdraw from Somalia. According to Dahre (2011), the term of tenure of the TFG was to end in 2011 (Abukar, 2015). In the following year in 2012, the newly composed Federal
Parliament of Somalia elected Hassan Sheikh Mahamoud as the country’s first President in 40 years (Abukar, 2015).

Apart from these historical and political drivers, there are other underpinning factors of conflict in Somalia that are environmental, social and economic in nature. Somalia is a semi-Arid flat country that is prone to seasonal severe droughts and floods. According to a 2005 report by the United Nations Environmental Program (UNEP) (cited in (Knezevic & Smith, 2015) subsistence agriculture and nomadic pastoralism are the primary sources of employment in Somalia (UNEP, 2005). This makes Somalia a purely agrarian economy and this exposes its population to dire consequences in instances of drought and famine as this affects quality of life and stability.

Somalia can be considered as a country of multiple contradictions. The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, OCHA (2002) notes that Somalia is immense in terms of its geographic expanse which unlike any post-colonial state in sub-Saharan Africa has a single ethnicity (Somali) and a common language, a common religion (Islam) and a dominant traditional livelihood (nomadic herding). It is estimated that 65% of the population directly depends on pastoralism (Hosken, 2011; Agada, 2008). On the contrary, the country has one of Africa's most divided society based on political affiliation and more specifically on clan-identities, elements which are mutually reinforcing and which have worked to precipitate and exacerbate instability and conflict in the country (Knezevic & Smith, 2015).

Somalia's major issue is the state of lawlessness that is both intermittent and poignant in its ability to result in a bloody anarchy that is close to 3 decades old. Add to these rampant piracies in the Indian Ocean, warlordism, domestic and international terrorism, corruption,
pestilence, severe drought and famine, mass displacement of populations and infiltration by foreign terrorists (Hosken, 2011; Milena, 2012; Agada, 2008). In 2011, Somalia underwent a severe drought that affected some 9 million people (one-third of Somalia's population) and resulted in about 200,000 fatalities of Somali’s mostly children and women (Milena, 2012).

At the backdrop of the multiplicity of developmental and political issues that Somalia has witnessed it is not surprising that the country is considered among the most fragile in the world. In the Fragile State Index (FSI) the best that Somalia has done is position seven out of ten states considered either most fragile or failed. Between 2008 and 2013 as Knezevic and Smith (2015) report, Somalia was ranked the most fragile. The country has topped the world's most collapsed or fragile states for over two decades.

2.2.2 The African Union and Africa's Peace and Security

The understanding of the African Unions peace and security architecture must be conducted within the framework of the transformation of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) into the African Union (AU) (Karock, 2014). According to Bah, et al., (2014) the transformation of the former into the latter is linked to the political, security and peace dynamics as well as the socio-economic needs that Africans continue to face in the aftermath of the Cold War. At the core of these transformations is the institutional and normative shift of AU’s conception of regional and global security (Aning, 2008).

At the basis of these new considerations, is the conventional continent-wide aspirations to unite Africans. A spirit of cooperation and solidarity among African leaders to formulate and implement socio-cultural, economic and political strategies that would drive continents much desired emancipation (Karock, 2014). These underscored the
aspirations of Africa's first-generation leaders including Kwame Nkuruma (Ghana), Leopold Sengor (Senegal), Mwalimu Nyerere (Tanzania) and Gamal Abdel Nasser (Egypt) drive for the establishment of the OAU in 1963 (Bah, et al., 2014).

In creating the OAU, the underpinning ideology that the founders had was that there were certain issues that were above the levels of individual African states to address, issues which needed a multilateral approach by African states rather than a unilateral one by individual states. These issues were well articulated in OAU's aims, guiding principles and purpose (Desmidt & Hauck, 2016).

Nonetheless, the post-colonial period and particularly the end of the Cold War presented a plethora of internal or domestic issues that demanded special international attention due to their propensity to spill into neighboring states or to influence stability and regional security in Africa (Aning, 2008). Key among these were the intensification of civil wars in much of African countries, the scourge of famine and drought (environmental catastrophes) as well as a plethora of issues pertaining to good governance including gross violation of human rights in member states, wide scale corruption and other factors that threatened human security in the continent (Aning, 2008; Desmidt & Hauck, 2016).

According to Bah, et al., (2014), OAU’s ability to intervene in these matters was however hindered by its own internal constraints (Desmidt & Hauck, 2016). For instance, Article III of the Charter of the OAU prohibited it from interfering in matters considered to fall within the domestic jurisdiction of member states. In other words, the principles of non-interventions demanded a strict observance and adherence to the notion of state sovereignty. The Rwandan Genocide, the civil wars in Sierra Leone and Liberia, the civil war in Sudan and the developing anarchy in Somalia among other
African states placed a lot of pressure on the OAU which was perceptibly inherently incapable of intervening (Aning, 2008).

The majority of the African leaders were convinced that there was need for a rethink of OAU’s rules of engagement and particularly a need for a total overhaul or revision of the OAU Charter especially as it pertains to the principles of non-interference and sovereignty. These concerns led to the adoption by the OAU member states of the OAU Charter on Human and People's Rights (CHPR). The CHPR was signed in 1981 and became binding in 1986 (Karock, 2014). This was followed with the establishment of the African Economic Community (AEC) in 1991. A landmark development was made in 1993 when the OAU established a Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution at a summit in Cairo, Egypt.

However, this framework, due to the obvious lack of enforcement authority, was ineffective in solving the growing conflicts such as those in Rwanda, Angola, Mozambique, Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Somalia. In fact, these developments demonstrated the rigidity of the OAU and its incapacity to function as an effective framework for conflict resolution in the continent (Bah, et al., 2014).

Thus, by mid-1990s it was apparent that there was an urgent need for a more robust continental framework, one that was comprehensive and flexible enough to assist in addressing the myriad security challenges in Africa (Carsten, 2007). Apart from the above challenges, there are a few positive achievements by the OAU such as, terminating colonialism and racial subjugation in South Africa which was at the epitome of OAU’s agenda including the collapse of the racial apartheid regime in 1994. At the same time, the OAU has been accorded credit for the eradication of colonialism in hitherto colonized African states (Aning, 2008).
Nonetheless, there was need to revive the spirit of Pan-Africanism and this was realized at the OAU summit that took place in 1999 at Sirte Libya when the idea of the African Union (AU) was first considered. On 11 July 2000, (the following year), a Constitutive Act of the AU (AU Act) was signed at OAU summit in Lome, Togo. This paved the way for the formal creation of the AU in July 2002 at the OAU summit in Durban, South Africa. The transformation of the OAU to the AU had certain normative and institutional significance. The most important of which was a shift from near-sacrosanct and strict observance of the principle of non-interference to one that accorded the AU, the right to intervene in a domestic jurisdiction of a member state. This has been termed as the principle of non-indifference.

Equally significant was the shift to accord precedence to issues pertaining to democratic principles of governance and human rights (Carsten, 2007). Thus, underscoring AU's establishment was the recognition that the continents socio-economic development was contingent on continent-wide, security, peace and stability. Under Article 4(h) of the AU Constitutive Act, the AU is accorded the right to intervene in member states. This is a landmark break with the OAU (Aning, 2008). According to Article 4 (h) the AU can interne in a member state pursuant to the AU Assemblies decision and in respect to grave circumstances including; genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity.

In so doing, the Constitutive Act of the AU, narrows down the scope of application of non-intervention and state sovereignty (Desmidt & Hauck, 2016). Something, which OAU was inherently incapable of achieving. This is supported further by the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council, the so-called PSC Protocol (Karock, 2014).
According to Bah, et al., (2014) and Carsten (2007) certain principles underpin the PSC Protocol which have a direct significance to peace and conflict; (i) prompt action to preempt crisis situations from developing into outright conflict (provided for under Article 4(b); adherence to the rule of law, observance of human rights and freedoms, respect for international humanitarian law (IHL) and for the sanctity of human life (provided for under Article 4 (c); and, right of AU to intervene in members states with respect to grave circumstances highlighted in Article 4 (h), which also provided for Under Article 4 (j) (Bah, et al., 2014; Desmidt & Hauck, 2016) 

Institutionally, according to Bah, et al., (2014), the AU also presented a paradigm shift precipitating the emergence of proactive and ambitious Africa Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). The move from the conventional, narrow and state-centric conceptualizations of security to wider and more comprehensive human-centered has serious and direct implications for Africa Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). Bah, et al., (2014) explains that APSA is the operations structure for Africa to implement with great success the decisions pertaining to conflict-prevention, peace-making, PSOs and peacebuilding as well as post-conflict reconstruction.

The APSA is linked to the Regional Economic Communities (RECs), the so-called Regional Mechanisms for Peace and Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution (Desmidt & Hauck, 2016). At the core of the APSA is the Peace and Security Council (PSC). The PSC is defined in the Act as having the power for decision making regarding management, prevention and resolution of conflicts (Aning, 2008).

According to Bah, et al., (2014), one of the PSC functions is a collective early warning and security arrangement to enhance timely and effective response to crises and conflict in Africa. PSC Protocol under Article 2 defines the components of the APSA as
including: the AU Commission, PSC, a Continental Early Warning Systems (CEWS), a Panel of the Wise, a Special Fund (SF) and an African Standby Force (ASF) (Karock, 2014; Desmidt & Hauck, 2016). The APSA is shown on Figure 2.1.

Of particular interest in the APSA and indeed for this study is the African Standby Force (ASF) and the RECs. According to Karock (2014), ASF is the continent's peacekeeping force which comprises of police, military and civilian contingents. It is receiving its orders from the AU and is deployed in crisis situations in Africa. It can be authorized to participate in PSO by the PSC or in interventions by the AU assembly (Bah, et al., 2014).

So far, the ASF is yet to receive soldiers from any member states and is hugely considered to be under construction (Karock, 2014). With respect to the RECs, Bah, et al., (2014), Desmidt and Hauck (2016) contend that the PSC Protocol provides for the AU and the RECs to try and engage in shared undertakings including the cooperation and coordination of programs and policies, information exchanges and the promotion of inter-regional projects.

Article 16 of the Protocol calls for the cooperation by the RECs with the AU in the areas of peace and security. Such a framework was realized in 2008 when the Regional Standby Brigade of Eastern and Northern Africa was set up in Addis Ababa. It further provides for the establishment of Liaison Offices to the RECs/RMs by the AU and vice versa by the RECs/RMs (Bah, et al., 2014).

Six RECs, namely; COMESA, EAC, ECCAS, ECOWAS, IGAD and SADC have already established Liaison Offices to the AU, as well the two RMs, NARC and EASFCOM (Desmidt & Hauck, 2016; Bah, et al., 2014). The Offices have helped
facilitate coordination and collaboration between the AU and the RECs/RMs (Bah, et al., 2014; Karock, 2014; Desmidt & Hauck, 2016).

**Figure 2.1: Africa Peace and Security Architectures**  
Source: Badmus, 2015

2.2.3 The United Nations and Peace Operations

Peace operations incorporates the coordination of police, military as well as the civilian personnel performing a range of activities including humanitarian assistance, human rights policing as well as election monitoring (Caprini, 2016). Also at the core of peace operations is the coordination of economic and social reconstruction and rehabilitation (Sheehan, 2011). Caprini (2011) has argued that modern peace operations are essentially a political undertaking or engagement whose main underpinning question
concerns how to augment political processes between parties that have hitherto been engaged in war or armed conflict.

In its most conventional understanding, peacekeeping was a preserve of the United Nations (Bellamy & Williams, 2010). Badmus (2015) contends that traditionally, UN peacekeeping emerged during the Cold War era (1947 – 1991) as a means of resolving international conflicts between sovereign states. The practice of the UN, according to Berdal and Economides (2007), was to deploy a lightly armed or unarmed military personnel contributed by member states, between the armed forces of the waring states or parties.

Furthermore, peacekeeping was only initiated by the UN when the major states, the UN Security Council (UNSC) especially the five permanent members (US, France, Russia, China and England) gave the directive for the to proceed as such (Murphy, 2007). These was the context in which the UN peacekeepers were deployed to the demilitarized zone between North and South Kores in Asia.

However, at the end of the Cold War few instances of interstates conflicts were witnessed, especially a surge in intra-state conflicts was witnessed in the countries that had just obtained their independence in Eastern Europe (Murphy, 2007). The increase in the number of conflicts especially in Eastern Europe and Africa, necessitated a change in UN focus on intervention in international issues to domestic ones (Berdal & Economides, 2010). This was the contexts in which UN intervened in Kosovo during the Kosovo Crisis and in Lebanon (Murphy, 2007; Berdal & Economides, 2010).

UN interventions in these contexts also involved the deployment of lightly armed contingents of soldiers contributed by member states to act as barriers or to establish
buffer zones between the warring factions. The UN peacekeeping forces were also to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance to innocent civilians that were caught up in the conflicts.

In Africa, the developments in several countries including Sierra Leone, Burundi, Liberia, Sudan, Rwanda and Somalia attracted international community's attention and demanded the intervention of the UN (Aning, 2008; Bah, et al., 2014). However, the strict adherence to the principles of non-intervention, non-interference and state sovereignty created a significant challenge to the UN in its ability to fully execute its mandate for bringing peace to some of these countries (Berdal & Economides, 2010). Furthermore, the transformation of the AU into AU and its adoption of the principle of non-indifference created avenues through which the UN could coordinate with Africa on matters relating to conflict management, prevention and resolution (Badmus, 2015).

Currently, the UN is the single most important actor directly engaging in peace operations in Africa through troop deployment. However, the AU has also become a significant actor ever since it was created with the ability to intervene in domestic jurisdiction of member states (Karock, 2014; Desmidt & Hauck, 2016). The UN peace operations have thus undergone remarkable transformation over the past two decades. It has moved from having less than 10,000 uniformed peacekeeping soldiers deployed mostly in Europe and Asia (a few in Africa) to having over 100,000 police, civilians and military personnel deployed globally (most of which are in Africa and the Middle East) by 2015 (Badmus, 2015).

The transformation of the OAU to AU with relevant consequences on intervention as well as the drastic growth of the mandate of the UN peacekeeping missions, and the
frequency and gravity of conflict in Africa, has precipitated areas of strategic encounters between the UN and the AU (Sheehan, 2011). According to Badmus, (2015) currently the link between the UN and the AU-backed regional and sub-regional organizations including the RECs has become an indispensable development with respect to peace and security management in the continent (Sheehan, 2011; Badmus, 2015; Boulden, 2013).

Boulden (2013) has identified two unique and connected trends in UNSC’s politics. The first one, is the drive from within and without the UNSC towards greater cooperation with continental bodies and the RECs in the area of peace and security. This need for cooperation is not however abstract and surprising, according to Berdal and Economides (2010) the Charter of the UN calls for cooperation with regional bodies as a means of achieving the ultimate goal of international peace. The second observation that Boulden (2013) has made is that there are more debates at the UNSC on conflicts in Africa which lean towards cooperation with AU in peace and security which does not include troop contributions from the western countries.

According to Badmus (2015) these developments are completely unsurprising if we take into account the fact that it is Africa that the UN experiences devastating encounters in security management especially with respect to peacekeeping in Somalia, Rwanda, DRC, Central African Republic, Sierra Leon, Darfur, and Liberia. As such, the UNSC is willing to give African countries a chance to participate in the founding of African solutions to African problems and enhance interaction and cooperation with the AU in ways that would not only be important for the two organizations but would elevate the chance for the effectiveness of the PSOs.
The UN Charter provides for cooperation between the UN and regional arrangement (Article 52[1]). Article 17(1) of the PSC Protocol recognizes Chapter VIII of the UN Charter as the basis for AU relations with the UN and the Protocol also calls for cooperation between the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) and the UN Security Council (Murphy, 2007; Badmus, 2015). On the basis of the provision of the UN Charter and the recognition of the importance of the UN-AU partnership, there has been an increase in the political debates between the two organizations on peace and security matters (Sheehan, 2011; Badmus, 2015; Boulden, 2013).

As part of the UN’s effective steps to enhance its relationship with the AU, the UN established the UN Office to the AU (UNOAU) in July 2010, headed by an Assistant Secretary General (Sheehan, 2011; Badmus, 2015; Boulden, 2013). The establishment of this office is a positive development in an effort to integrate the mandates of different UN offices to the AU, viz, the UN liaison office, the UN’s AU peace and support team, the UN planning team for AMISOM, and the administrative functions of the Joint Support and Coordination Mechanism (JSCM) for UNAMID (Aning, 2008; Gelot, Gelot & de Coning 2012). The enhancement of UN-AU strategic partnership is important for the success of peace operations in Africa and for the credibility of UN peacekeeping. The recognition of this important reality has resulted in the inauguration of the AU-UN Joint Task Force on Peace and Security on 25 September 2010 (Badmus, 2015; Badmus, 2015; Boulden, 2013).

2.2.4 AMISOM: Mandate, Role and Approaches to Peacekeeping in Somalia

The 9 September, 1999 Sirte Declaration paved the way for the transformation of the OAU into the AU in 2002 (Nduwimana, 2013; Amadi, 2014). This transformation meant that the AU as opposed to its predecessor had more robust and comprehensive
objectives including peacemaking, peacekeeping and peace enforcement all which are
designed to deliver effective conflict management, prevention and resolution. This
security mechanism is within the African Union Constitutive Act and specific Protocol
pertaining on the Peace and Security Council (PSC) (Nduwimana, 2013). It is within
this security mechanism that AMISOM was conceptualized and initiated.

The Constitutive Act of the AU, was adopted a summit in Lome, Togo in July 2000 and
was ratified the following year by fifty-member states at a summit in Lusaka, Zambia
in July 2001. Thus, the idea of African peace mechanisms predated the AU and
provided the agenda for AU’s role, not only in continental integration but in the
continents conflict resolution (Amadi, 2014). Thus, the AU emerged with a promise of
placing the continents destiny the hands of the people (Melber, 2001). Drawing from
the pre-AU years, it can be generalized that two issues inspired the formation of the
AU, namely; First, the high degree of frustration with the sluggish pace of the
continent’s socio-economic integration and the multiplicity of the security and socio-
economic challenges. Second, the realization that there was need for
a novel approach in building partnership among continent’s governments and to look
into collective ways of solving the continents developmental challenges (Amadi, 2014).

Thus, after its inauguration in 2002 in Durban, South Africa, the AU was mandated to
play and ambitious role of facilitating the addressing the socio-economic challenges
through multilateral means and also for creating and operationalizing Africa’s peace
and security structure (Lucey & Mesfin, 2016). Critical to the Constitutive Act of the
AU is the fact that it affirms the right of intervention in domestic matters of a member
state. In line with this, the Peace and Security Council (PSC) was created as a legal
institution of the organization through the 2002 Protocol concerning the PSC. (Amadi,
The PSC entered into force in 2003 and has since been mandated with ensuring peace in the continent. The PSC is complemented with the Panel of the Wise (PoW), the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS), the African Standby Force (ASF) and the Military Staff Committee (MSC) (Kuwali, 2009).

In the aftermath of the creation of the AU Act and the PSC Protocol, AU’s commitment to intervention has been witnessed in its proactive stance on the continent's peace and security problematique. This was first witnessed in 2003, when the AU deployed troops in a peace operation in the republic of Burundi, which became known as the African Mission in Burundi (AMIB) (Caparini, 2016). However, regardless the fact that the APSA institution framework was still in its infancy and was not properly established, the AMIB was successful in stabilizing the security situation in the country. Nonetheless, questions were asked regarding the efficacy of these new approach and whether gains in Burundi could be replicated in other conflict-ridden countries.

The developments in Sudan, the Comoros and Somalia saw to AU’s deployment of troops, the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) in 2004, the African Union Military Observer Mission in the Comoros (MIOC) in 2004 and the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) in 2007 (Caparini, 2016; Amadi, 2014). The AU has also engaged in other hybrid mission such as its collaboration with the UN in Darfur, which dubbed the African Union/United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) in 2007 (Norris & Bruton, 2011). In the recent years, the AU has permitted the deployment of peace missions in Mali, the African-led International Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA) in 2012, the African Union-led International Support Mission to the Central African Republic (MISCA) in 2013 (Freear & de Coning, 2013).
It estimated that since initiating operations in 2003, the AU has deployed over 40,000 peacekeeping troops to several conflict situations in the continent (Williams 2011). The UN has taken over some of the AU peace forays in a process perceived as the re-integration of African peacekeeping troops into the UN’s multidimensional operations. This development has result in questions being asked about the nature and effectiveness of such engagements and whether, Africa’s reengaging of external actors would have a more welcome result than was witnessed in the past.

The intricacy of the conflict in Somalia, and the failures by the US, the UN and other Western governments in the country has led to the consideration that the AU has a potential for success in the country. The UN has authorized at least three peace missions in the country since 1990s. However, these missions were largely unsuccessful as they were confronted by challenges and the last UN mission on Somalia (UNOSOM II) terminated in a fiasco in October 1993 when insurgents dragged the bodies of US marines in Mogadishu (Samatar 2007).

The incident witnessed the withdrawal of the US troops and troops from other Western governments from Somalia in the following year (Norris & Bruton 2011). Consequently, between 1995 and January 2007, state of anarchy and conflict reigned in the country with no international attempt at deploying troops to the country. It is at the backdrop of this turmoil and international indifference that the AU and the PSC deployed AMISOM, and this was in response to a request by the IGAD (Lucey & Mesfin, 2016).

IGADs, request for AMISOM deployment to Somalia was aimed at offering support of the newly created Somali TFG (Lucey & Mesfi, 2016). In fact, according to Freear and
de Conning (2013) this request was made after the IGAD had failed in its earlier plan of deploying 10,500 troops to Somalia under the IGAD Peace Support Mission in Somalia (IGASOM).

This failure is linked to two factors; the body’s lack of peacekeeping capacity and IGAD’s member states’ differing position on the Somalia conflict due to their own national interests (Nduwimana, 2013). At the 69th conference of AU PSC held in 2007, the AU authorized the deployment of AMISOM as a mission to oversee Somalia’s transition. The understanding was that the mission would be integrated into the wider UN peace mission to provide enduring stabilization and Somalia’s post conflict stabilization when the situation permitted (Freear & de Conning 2013).

AMISOM can be conceived as a regional defense pact with the TFG (Nduwimana, 2013). The mandate of the mission was to offer support for Somali Transitional Federal TFIs in their endeavor to stabilize Somalia and engage in further dialogue in the reconciliation process. The mission was also mandated to facilitate the process of providing humanitarian assistance to Somali’s either caught in the conflict or suffering from famine and also to establish condition for long-term reconstruction, stabilization and development (Murithi, 2009).

It is estimated that as of January 2018, there were 22,126 AMISOM troops stationed in Somalia. These troops contributing countries for the AMISOM are Burundi, Djibouti, Uganda, Ethiopia and Kenya. In terms of actual areas of deployment, the troops from Uganda are deployed in Sector 1, comprising of the areas of Lower Shabelle and Banadir, the Kenyan troops are in Sector 2 which comprises of Middle and Lower Juba, and Sector 3, which includes Bakool, Bay and Gedo. The Ethiopian forces are in Sub-
Sector 3 while Djiboutian forces command Sector 4 covering Galgaduud and Hiiraan and the Burundian forces are in Sector 5 comprising the Middle Shabelle region (AMISOM, 2018).

2.2.5 The IGAD and Somalia Peace Process

The origins of the IGAD can be traced to 1996 when the body succeeded the Inter-Governmental Authority on Drought and Desertification (IGADD) that had been established ten years earlier in 1986 (Demeke & Gebru, 2014). The original body was founded by six states of the wider HoA, namely Kenya, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Uganda and Sudan. Eritrea later joined IGADD in 1993 as the seventh partner but again withdrew five years later in 1998. In 2011, South Sudan was admitted into the IGAD following its secession as a sovereign state from Sudan (Demeke & Gebru, 2014). Thus, IGADD was created as a forum for mobilizing and coordinating the resources of its partner states to halt the spread of famine, desertification and drought (Lucey & Mesfin, 2016; Demeke & Gebru, 2014).

As such IGAD was established as a mechanism for responding and addressing regional environmental challenges rather than political and security issues in the greater HoA. However, owing to the persistence of conflict within this region, the need to expand the mandate of the body to bring into the fold, peace and security matters became apparent (Lucey & Mesfin, 2016). In the mid-1990s, the IGADD was revitalized into a full regional economic political and security entity after member states realized that regional integration and economic development was intricately linked to regional security and peace (Nduwimana, 2013). Thus, beginning in 1995 initial moves were made to transform and expands IGADD’s mandate to include the areas of conflict.
management, resolution and management (Kinfe, 2007). In 1996, IGAD created and since then it has played and continues to play a critical role in Somalia’s peace process. The IGAD, which has its headquarters at Djibouti has played a critical role in the geopolitics of the HoA especially in Sudan and particularly Somalia (Dersso, 2014).

In 2000, the IGAD initiated a National Reconciliation Conference, which was held in Arta (Djibouti) to establish a transitional charter with a power-sharing transitional government (Lucey & Mesfin, 2016). Since it was obvious that the TNG was incapacitated to govern effectively and its authority was challenged, efforts were made by IGAD to continue a peaceful negotiation of the Somali conflict. At its 2001 Summit in Khartoum, IGAD mandated that Kenya assume political leadership in negotiating peace. The Nairobi Peace Process formed the foundation of the 2002–2004 Kenya-based Somalia’s National Reconciliation Conference (SNRC), which led to the establishment of the Somali TFIs. It included the TFG and Transitional Federal Parliament (TFP) with a five-year mandate to rule and prepare the country for general elections by 2009 (Dersso, 2014).

In January 2005, IGAD’s Heads of State and Government, after reviewing the security situation in Somalia, agreed to deploy IGASOM with the mandate to “provide support to the TFG in order to ensure its relocation to Somalia, guarantee the sustenance of the IGAD peace process and assist with the re-establishment of peace and security.” Although, the AU endorsed IGASOM in February 2005, IGAD soon faced difficulties to implement its peace mission plan due to a number of factors (Demeke & Gebru, 2014).
First, IGAD is not empowered by its Charter to carry out a peacekeeping operation in a member state. Second, the authorized force strength of 10,500 troops was difficult to generate from among IGAD member states (Lucey & Mesfin, 2016). Third, IGAD member states were biased, supporting some of the parties involved in the conflict. In fact, Eritrea, Ethiopia’s archrival, objected to the IGASOM deployment. Fourth, IGAD lacks peacekeeping capacity. Fifth, IGASOM was believed to be a Washington-backed Western means to halt the growth of Islamic movement in Somalia (Mulugeta 2008; Nduwimana 2013).

These factors, plus the UN’s reluctance to agree to the AU’s request to lift the 1992 arms embargo, which would have allowed the government forces to restore security and help in the deployment of IGAD’s peace mission, meant that the IGASOM was never deployed (Demeke & Gebru, 2014). Thus, the PSC deployed AMISOM because of the inability of IGAD to deploy peacekeepers and the continued unfavorable security conditions that prevailed in Somalia, especially in Mogadishu (Lucey & Mesfin, 2016).

2.3 Summary and Gaps to Fill

Certain gaps can be witnessed in current literature. Firstly, the existing literature does not account for why, despite the presence of UN-backed AMISOM, Somalia remains a country in a state of insecurity. And while this demonstrates the inability of AMISOM to provide sustainable peace in Somalia raises concern over the effectiveness of the mission. No studies have focused on the assessment of the effectiveness of the AMISOM. In fact, not any literature was found relating to the assessment of the AMISOM based on the underpinning drivers and predators of conflict identified in much of the literature on Somalia. Furthermore, while literature do exist regarding the role international bodies
especially the IGAD played in the Somalia peace process, the literature is silent with respect to what underpinning issues of the conflict IGAD addressed in the negotiations.

2.4 Theoretical Framework

The essence of theory is to provide a general perspective upon which an issue can be conceptualized, interpreted and extrapolated (Dunne, Kurki & Smith, 2010). The issue of international peacekeeping has been central to the conduct of international relations and ultimately several theoretical perspectives have emerged attempting to provide a theoretical platform upon which peacekeeping can be conceptualized. Some of the theoretical perspectives on peacekeeping include; pluralism, solidarism, mid-range theory, neo-liberalism, critical theory, rational choice theory and public good theory. This study, is interested in the last three because they are primarily a product of the harmonization of the other theories and therefore provide better framework for examining international peacekeeping in the context of Somalia, which is the main focus of this study.

2.4.1 Rational Choice Theory of Peacekeeping

The rational choice theory (RCT) was developed by George Homans in 1961 (Scott, 2012). RCT is conceptualized as a theoretical model that explains a social phenomenon by demonstrating how they emerge from intentional or deliberate pursuit of self-interest by the actors, specifically individuals or nation-states (Dunne, et al., 2010). It is further perceived as an element of functional explanation, where RCT shows that particular social phenomena are explainable with respect to their utility in resolving problems that may arise from the general pursuit of national self-interest (Senai, 2012; Lovett, 2006).

As such, there are two dimensions to the understanding of RCT, the intentional or causal explanation and the functional explanation (Trott, 2013; Lovett, 2006). The rational choice
theory makes some significant assumptions; it contends that individuals or states are rational and self-interest actors which seek to maximize their gains. It also proposes that since nation-states are driven by self-interest this is epitomized in the national-interest (Lovett, 2006).

Another main assumption of the RCT is that since nation-state have national interests, every action that they take is aimed at achieving the national interest (Trott, 2013). Furthermore, RCT proposes that states order preferences with the hope of realizing their broad or narrow interests. Hence, states will move to help other nation-states or cooperate with other nation-states or nonstate actors if it assumes that such acts will facilitate the realization of its own perceived interests (Senai, 2012).

Therefore, the RCT makes arguments which are significant especially with regard to international peacekeeping operations, such as those taken by the United Nations (UN), nation-states decide to offer support when it is in their own interest (Trott, 2013). In essence therefore, nation-states support for the UN peacekeeping operations is extended only as long as that state considered its support to provide benefits to it (Kahla, 2014). What the RCT implies is that nation-state support for various UN missions in Africa such as UNMISS, MINUSMA, MONUSCO, UNAMSIL is as a result of a cost-benefit evaluation in which they deem support of the mission as having potential benefit to them with regard to the realization of their own national interests.

According the RCT therefore, each nation state, pursues a different agenda owing to the discrepancy in their national interests and as such supports peacekeeping operations differently (Kahla, 2014). Nation-state national self-interests is at the core of support for UN PSOs and as such the effectiveness of the operations is contingent on the nature of the
support and whether the majority of the nation-states in the UN feel that peacekeeping is in their best interest.

Senai (2012) contends that when leaders are invited to participate in peacekeeping operations, the calculate the marginal utility or potential benefits of intervention by considering their preferred alternatives (letting others intervene, actively participating in the intervention or appeasement), the associated risks (casualty, deaths and damage to its own security and economy) and the national capacity to participate (logistical capabilities and force size) (Colman, 2012; Trott, 2013).

Nonetheless, the RCT does not provide a comprehensive understanding of peacekeeping due to inherent weaknesses and omissions. Lovett (2006) summarizes these weaknesses or criticisms into three main categories; those pertaining to methodology, those pertaining to rationality and those pertaining to utility. In terms of methodology, RCT is ahistorical, excluding the influence or interactions and social contexts that may influence the behavior of states (Trott, 2012).

For instance, Africa and Somalia in particular is notorious for intermittent and perpetuated conflict. As such, removing the context from decision making definitely has implications not only for understanding the Somalia conflict but for assessing the effectiveness of AMISOM. In terms of rationality, the RCT omits from analysis, motivations that are not directly linked to self-interest behavior (Trott, 2012; Lovett, 2006).

And with regard to utility, RCT does to fully account for state behaviors that do not conform to the functional explanations (Trott, 2012). For instance, in the case of AMISOM it does not account for Uganda and particularly Burundi’s contribution of troops to the
mission. Certainly, Burundi’s participation in the AMISOM cannot be explained in terms of both rationality and utility.

2.4.2 Critical Theory of Peacekeeping

The critical theory (CT) of peacekeeping departs from the realist-leaning RCT and focuses the analysis of peacekeeping at the framework of international politics with which the act of peacekeeping is undertaken (Ogunrotifa, 2011). The critical theory contends that peacekeeping operations serve a narrow or limited, problem-solving role to perpetuate a specific representation of global governance principles under the patronage of liberal imperialism. Senai (2015) explains that critical theory is grounded in the Marxist-Leninist ontology in that internal conflicts and international conflicts are driven by class struggle and competition among states for resources respectively.

Critical theory (CT) suggests that once global institutions dealing with peacekeeping are liberated, they should comprise small and agile teams of peacekeepers whose principle mandate is conflict prevention and not post-conflict reconstructions (Pugh, 2005). It provides a deconstruction of the role and essence of peace support operations postulating that PSOs sustain particular order or global politics which privilege the powerful and rich states in their effort to bring order to or isolate unruly or ungovernable parts of the world (Pugh, 2005). The critical theory therefore, perceives contemporary peacekeeping as a counter-insurgency operation, technically funded as way of realizing military and political dominance and interest (Ogunrotifa, 2011). It postulates that modern international peacekeeping operations serve narrow imperialist and corporate interests.

In its perception of international peacekeeping as serving self-interests of certain powerful states, critical theory is not far removed from the RCT of peacekeeping. However, the point
of departure is that the critical theory adopts an economist perspective in its interpretation of the role and purpose of international peacekeeping (Pugh, 2005). It argues that effective peacekeeping can only be successful when the prevailing global institutions and trade systems are radically transformed (Pugh, 2005; Ogunrotifa, 2011). Critical theorists contend therefore that peacekeeping operations can only be considered effective if the global institutions through which they are executed are liberated from the control and domination of powerful states (Senai, 2015). Therefore, critical theory provides another considerable and significant alternative perspective for examining peacekeeping operations.

2.4.3 Public Good Theory of Peacekeeping

Public goods theory (PGT) is a central economic theory of public sector (Holcombe, 2000). The public goods theory was popularized by Paul Samuelson in the articles he published in 1954 and 1955 (Sheehan, 2011; Holcombe, 2000). Public goods theory endeavors to account for why goods with rigorously defined features of publicness cannot be efficiently produced by the private sector resulting into a market failure which implies government's role in the supply of those goods that the market has failed to produce. Theorists of public good contend that public good differs from private goods in the sense that their consumption can be enjoyed in common (Shimizu & Sandler, 2002). This means that the consumption of the good does not subtract the consumption of the same by another person.

Furthermore, unlike private goods, this theory holds that public goods cannot be divided or supplied discriminately to different populations and have to be fully consumed. The benefits accruing from public goods are indivisibly shared by the entire populace regardless of whether they want to purchase it or not (Sheehan, 2011). According to Sheehan (2011), public goods must satisfy three conditions to be considered as such, namely; (i) its
consumption must not be excludable by price; (ii) it must be enjoyed by the population; and (iii) there is no rivalry associated with it. The non-excludability feature implies that people can enjoy benefits associated with public goods without having to pay for it. As such, access to public goods is not contingent on a person's purchasing power (Shimizu & Sandler, 2002).

In relation to the peacekeeping, PGT provides important insight. The peacekeeping operations of the UN produce mixed public goods having both domestic and international implications (Shimizu & Sandler, 2002). The outputs or results of peacekeeping missions are mixed because they generate to the country in which the mission is deployed and when it succeeds, it generates peace at the international level (international peace) (Sheehan, 2011; Russett & Oneal, 2011). Humanitarian assistance undertaken under peacekeeping operations produce public goods that benefit the international community by improving the well-being of populations in need. The peace that peacekeeping operations generate spill from the domestic (local level) to the regional level through to the international (global) level (Shimizu & Sandler, 2002). The idea of public goods helps render legitimacy and purpose to UN peacekeeping missions hence influence its potential for being effective.

This means that peacekeeping results in the generation of transnational public goods; peace and stability. As such, stability and peace achieved through peacekeeping give rise to non-rival and non-excludable benefits. As opposed to the pessimistic conceptualization of peacekeeping presented by the RCT and the CT, the PGT contends that nations participate in peacekeeping with the altruistic intention of delivering public good (peace and tranquility) to the less fortunate and trouble state (Russet & Oneal, 2011). Therefore, in the case of Burundi and Ugandan engagement in the AMISOM can be perceived as a move
by the two countries to perform an altruistic mission of providing public good to the Somali population.

Nonetheless, in the strict reading of the PGT, UN peacekeeping activities cannot be considered as public goods since its provision generates joint products. It provides extra goods which are not essentially public (Sheehan, 2011). For instance, peace creates proper conditions for economic activities and commercial relations to thrive thereby generating domestic and international private good. Besides, public goods do not imply that everyone will be able to consume the good (Shimizu & Sandler, 2002).

2.6 Chapter Summary

This chapter has examined literature pertaining to the interest areas of the study as per research objectives. The review has examined the history of the conflict in Somalia tracing it back to the precolonial years. The literature review pertaining to the conflict in Somalia revealed that historical, political and economic factors have resulted in the state of anarchy in the country. The chapter assessed African Union's peace and security architecture and found that while APSA is still very much under construction, the transformation of the OAU into the AU has created important frameworks for intervention including peacekeeping operations.

The literature review has also revealed that the UN, while having been the primary actor in peacekeeping, is increasingly accepting of regional mechanisms and the growing debates for home grown solutions. These debates have made it possible for the UN to strategically engage the Africans in peacekeeping. The review has revealed that the AMISOM is one of the many strategic encounters between the UN and the AU. The chapter has also provided
the theoretical framework and unearthed different theoretical perspectives on the essence of peacekeeping. Chapter Three discusses the research methodology for the study.
CHAPTER THREE

3.0 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

3.1 Introduction

This chapter identifies and highlights the methodology that was deployed in the study. It explains the research design that was used in the study and clarifies steps and the procedures that the researcher used in the study. Hence, the chapter does the following; it explains and justifies the research design, the sources of data to be used, the techniques that were deployed in data collection and the data analysis methods. The chapter also identifies some of the ethical considerations that the researcher considered in the course of the study. This chapter also identifies a few limitations of the study pertaining to methodological hindrances as well as time constraints.

3.2 Research Design

This study adopted a descriptive research design. The choice for this research design was informed by the knowledge that a descriptive approach would provide the researcher with a platform upon which to portray an accurate profile of events and circumstances concerning peacekeeping and AMISOM. This descriptive research design that was used is both fixed and flexible. Fixed in the sense that it is theory-driven and flexible in the sense that the researcher enjoys some freedom in data collection.

As such the researcher preferred the descriptive research design as it permitted the researcher to investigate and accurately portray the root causes of conflict, its dynamics and its consequences in Somalia and the HOA; scrutinize and portray in a proper way the African Union's effectiveness and ineffectiveness in peace keeping missions in Somalia;
examine and accurately report the methods and approaches that the African Union has used in trying to resolve the Somalia conflict; analyze the role that different regional bodies such as IGAD have in the conflict resolution and the extent to which they affect and hamper the African Union in handling crisis. As such the descriptive research design is preferred for its ability to provide a platform for a comprehensive assessment of the 'what', 'why' and 'how' of the Somalia conflict and the AMISOM.

3.3 Sources of Data

This study was a desktop review or qualitative study in nature, hence it fully relied exclusively on the qualitative or secondary sources of data. The data sources were therefore, the information available in published books, journal articles, press releases by the UN and other relevant bodies as well as relevant electronic sources including websites and blogs. The majority of these information sources were accessed from USIU Library and Information Center. The library had a huge collection of the relevant material in hardcopy and provides access to online databases for e-journals and e-books.

3.4 Data Collection Techniques

This study deployed a historical or background technique for data collection in qualitative research. As such, it involved a systematic and subjective evaluation of data related to the development of conflict in Somalia. It collected available information regarding AMISOM including its deployment and mandate in Somalia. The historical or background technique therefore, allowed the researcher to investigate the trends in the conflict in Somalia that precipitated the deployment of AMISOM and permitted the collection of information regarding the effects of AMISOM's peacekeeping objectives in Somalia. The researcher also preferred the historical approach as it enabled the explanation of the linkages between
the events and perhaps the prediction of what was to be anticipated regarding the AMISOM's promise in Somalia.

3.5 Data Analysis Methods

The research deployed a mix of content and thematic analysis since the study was mainly a descriptive and partly historical. This qualitative analysis technique was employed because it provided deeper description and interpretation and was mutually reinforcing. For instance, while the content analysis takes little interest in contextual dimensions of a phenomenon or event (in this case the conflict in Somalia and the deployment of AMISOM) thematic analysis emphasizes the context (the underpinning motivations of the conflict and the implications of AMISOM).

The content analysis therefore enabled the researcher to develop themes (in this case the peacekeeping role of AMISOM) based on frequency of events and the thematic analysis permitted the researcher to draw a thematic map (especially regarding effectiveness of AMISOM). Both approaches allowed the researcher to integrate manifest content (the observable events) and latent content (the meaning behind events and occurrences).

3.6 Ethical Consideration

Informed by the nature of this study, the researcher considered two ethical issues. These are; one, ethical considerations pertaining to use of privileges on the part of the researcher; and two, ethical issues relating to the research process. With respect to the privileges, the researcher was aware that every research especially at Master's level is meant to resolve a social problem in the society. As such, the researcher sought to provide accurate information that may assist policymakers and analysts to enhance the effectiveness of AMISOM and other peacekeeping missions. Hence, the ethical goal that the researcher
sought, was to fulfill an ethical good of providing solutions to Somali’s and the international community regarding peacekeeping.

With respect to the research process, the researcher attempted to ensure integrity of the research process by avoiding fraud and plagiarism. The researcher took heed that fraud contradicts the aims of professional research and therefore attempts to conduct the study as best as possible in line with the resources that were available. The researcher sought to avoid plagiarism by avoiding outright copying of existing studies, and ensures that all borrowed ideas and information were correctly cited using the American Psychological Association (APA) referencing guideline.

3.7 Validity and Reliability

Validity means the measuring instruments in the study which fill the demand to measure what it means to measure (Blumberg et al., 2005). On the other side reliability refers to a measurement that supplies consistent results (Blumberg et al., 2005). When considering validity, in relations to reliability, validity is more essential. If a research is not valid, it hardly matters if it is reliable. In this regard, inaccurate measurements may lead to flawed or artificial conclusions or inferences.

To ensure validity of the research, conflict experts (in this case thesis supervisor) were consulted to scrutinize the relevance of the research questions against the set objectives of the study. Moreover, the researcher read widely so as to gain a deeper understanding of the issues investigated. To ensure reliability especially of the secondary data that was used, the literature was given to a reader to examine whether they could identify the same patterns and themes in the data as the researcher had originally identified.
3.8 Study Limitations

Just a few issues had the potential to limit the effectiveness of the study. First, the study was principally a desktop review and as such highly relied upon secondary sources of data. Consequently, the effectiveness of the study could have been constrained by the theoretical and ideological biases of researchers in the consulted research. To counter this limitation, the researcher read widely and consulted several sources and scholars in order to have a broader perspective of the issues pertaining to Somalia conflict, the role and effectiveness of AMISOM in peacebuilding in the country as well as the role of the regional bodies or government and the international community on Somalia's peace process.

Second, Somalia has witnessed conflict for several decades and as such a plethora of issues have emerged that have exacerbated the conflict in the country. For this reason, it was potentially difficult to provide a comprehensive picture of issues relating to Somalia conflict including the motivators of the conflict. Furthermore, both the Transitional Federal Government in Somalia and the AMISOM as well as regional bodies may not have been forthcoming with accurate information regarding the conflict or their role in the peacebuilding process. In fact, information provided by these stakeholders may have been skewed for political and ideological reasons hence hinder the accuracy of the findings. To safeguard against these, the researcher adopted a historical technique for data collection and a combination of content and thematic analysis that would enhance the acquisition of data and proper interpretation of the data.

3.8 Chapter Summary

This chapter has both identified and provided the justification of the research design. It has also highlighted the sources of data that were consulted and explained how these sources were accessed. The study has identified the methods of data collection and the techniques
for data analysis. It has explained that the data collection technique was a historical or background study and highlighted why the researcher chose this approach. The researcher has also explained why content and thematic techniques for data analysis were preferred. This chapter has also discussed the ethical issues that the researcher considered and identified the limitations of the study. The chapter has further discussed how the researcher attempted to counter the limitations to guarantee the satisfaction of the study objectives.
CHAPTER FOUR

4.0 FINDINGS OF THE STUDY

4.1 Introduction

This chapter provides the results and findings of the study. The chapter is subdivided into three parts as per the objectives of the study. The first part of chapter four provides findings regarding the root causes of conflict in Somalia, its dynamics and its consequences in the region. Part two provides findings on the methods and approaches that the African Union through the AMISOM has used in trying to resolve the Somalia conflict and the effectiveness of the approaches. The third and last part of the chapter provides study findings on the role of the IGAD has in the conflict resolution and the extent to which they affect and hamper the African Union in handling crisis.

4.2 Dynamics of The Somalia Conflict and Its Consequences in the Region

The Somalia conflict is a complex one, precipitated by a number of mutually reinforcing factors. These drivers of the conflict in Somalia include political fragmentation, absence of democratic institution of governance, poverty, high youth unemployment, illiteracy, natural disasters, proliferation of small arms and infiltration by foreign actors (Dahre, 2011, Menkhaus, 2011). These factors can be grouped into two broad categories as, history-political factors and socio-economic factors. The outcome of the interplay between and among these factors has been manifested through Islamic fundamentalism, piracy, insurgency, cattle-rustling, non-existent or weak state institutions, poor infrastructure, state sanctioned violence, infiltration of the state by international terrorist groups (Harper, 2012; Kinfe, 2006).
The historical precipitants of the Somalia conflict predate the independent state and can be traced to the colonial period and specifically the betrayal of the Somali by the Italian colonial government, the British colonial governments and the French colonial administration. The French establishment in the Port of Obock – modern Djibouti in 1862 and the Italians had established a protectorate in Southern Somaliland in 1885 (Dahre, 2011). In 1897, Ethiopia and the British colonial government in Somaliland (a former British Protectorate in Northern Somalia) reached what has become known as the Anglo-Ethiopian Treaty of 1897 (Dahre, 2011). According to this treaty Britain ceded the Ogaden region and the Haud territories (Region 5) to Ethiopia (Bisrat, 2011).

Beginning in the early 1940s and much of 1950s, Somalia nationalism took shape and the rallying point of Somalia nationalism was the idea of a united post-independent Somalia in which all Somali groups were to be citizens, what is known as Somalia irredentism (Harper, 2012). The Anglo-Ethiopian Treaty and the subsequent partition of Somali inhabited territory in to five geographical units, British-Somaliland, French-Somaliland (modern Djibouti, the Ogaden (Region 5), Italy-Somaliland and the NFD in British East Africa (Kenya) was critical in the organization of domestic politics and Somalia foreign policy in post-independent Somalia (Bisrat, 2011).

The British colonial administration had taken effective control of the whole of Somalia after the defeat of the Italians in the Second World War. The British initially supported the unification of Somali-speaking groups – a Greater Somalia in a new state under the British Commonwealth (Bisrat, 2011). Nonetheless, they reneged on this and gave the Ogaden to Ethiopia, the NFD to Kenya and significant number of Somali-speaking people were left in independent Djibouti at Somalia’s independence in 1960 (Jamar, 2011). This inspired a sense of betrayal among Somalia first post-independent
statesmen and the general public, including those that were in the Region 5 in Ethiopia and in the NFD (Bisrat, 2012).

Shortly after its independence in 1960, Somalia started to push for the reunification of Somali-speaking people into one Somalia. This manifested in Somalia engagement in support of the Shifter wars with the Kenyan government in the former NFD in the late 1960s and in support guerrillas in Ogaden such as the Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF) beginning in 1975. The latter resulted in full out war with Ethiopia in 1977 – 78, the so-called Ogaden war (Menkhaus, 2011; Jama, 2011).

The primary armed groups currently combating the Ethiopian Government, the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) was founded in 1984 and considers itself to be fighting for the people of Ogaden and is allegedly supported by groups in Somalia (Bisrat, 2011). Somalia’s support for the WSLF and the resulting Ogaden war, and its alleged support of ONLF are especially important in that it precipitated reciprocal support for animosity and insurgency groups inside Somalia by Ethiopia (Menkhaus, 2011).

In this sense, the political and external aspects to precipitants of the Somalia conflict can be observed and this linked to the domestic politics of Somalia especially the political turmoil of post-independent Somalia. The strong send of colonial machinations that undermined the desires of a united post-colonial estate established a deep sense for a prosperous and formidable Greater Somalia (Soomaaliweyn) resulting in greater expectations of the post-independent Somalia (Odowa, 2013).

Even so, these hopes quickly dissipated as the emergent political elites actively initiated nepotism, injustice and corruption (Elmi, 2010). While in the immediate post-independence, progress was made with respect to creating state institutions and building
the state, the behavior of the leadership hindered the effectiveness of these efforts (Odowa, 2013).

The leaders engaged in blatant corruption and gave little attention to the growing public disappointment and with this emerged the issue of clan representation as people perceived clan acquisition of power as the only way to benefiting from public resources (Menkhaus, 2011). Thus, this issue was at the basis of the power takeover by Siad Barre in 1969 after President Abdirashid Ali Shermarke’s assassination (Odowa, 2013). The power vacuum and the immediate power struggle was both precarious and scandalous. The members of parliament offered their support to the highest bidder created a perception of mistrust of politicians by the public as they became considered as willing to sell their vote regardless of public interest (Elmi, 2010).

It was at the backdrop of this political turmoil that General Siad Barre took power in a bloodless coup with a promise to stop political corruption and eradicate clannism. Indeed, clannism which had been the basic social institution Somalia for a long time was deemed inimical and incompatible to socialism, which Siad Barre preferred (Odowa, 2013). It was considered a fundamental cause of the social problems Somalia was realizing (Dahre, 2011). Siad Barre contented that “…it is unfortunate that our nation is too clannism” (Lewis, 2002, p.22).

Nonetheless, clannism persisted even despite the Barre’s Somalia Revolutionary Socialist Party (SRSP) transcending clan lines in terms of composition (Odowa, 2013). For instance, the SRC, the ruling junta, was dominated by Barre’s own clan the Daarood (40%) and the SRSP was also dominated by the Daarood (Odowa, 2013). What is evident, is that Barre’s
military regime while preaching against clannism was essentially the same as the government before it.

Barre’s regime was an essentially a dictatorial one bent on restricting any kind of opposition and the National Security Service (NSS) was deployed strategically to deal with any form of political dissent (Jamar, 2011). Barre suspended the constitution, banned all political parties, trade unions and the Supreme Court and went ahead to replace the National Assembly with SRC (Menkhaus, 2011; Jama, 2011). Summary assassinations and arbitrary detention of political opponent was the order of the day and people grew increasingly uncomfortable of Barre (Stamford, 2011).

For instance, after mishandling the Ogaden war, there emerged an Isaaq-clan dominated Somalia National Movement in early 1980s. The regime responded to this by reigning terror on the member of the Isaaq and Majeerteen and Hawiye which the Daarood-dominated regime considered a threat to its continued stay in power. With deaths rising to thousands the Hawiye launched an active rebellion that led to the overthrow of Siad Barre’s junta regime (Birsrat, 2011).

What is critical about this development was that they established mistrust among Somali clans and strengthen the notion that the clan was the basis for social identification and political mobilization and organization (Stamford, 2011). Barre’s regime was also critical in establishing state-sanctioned clan-instigated violence within Somalia’s domestic politics (Elmi, 2010; Odowa, 2013).

In fact, the power vacuum that the fall of the Barre regime created resulted in a struggle of political power that saw to the escalation of clan violence in Somalia (Menkhaus, 2011; Menkhaus, 2007). This was the onset of clan militia and ‘warlordism’ (Harper, 2012). The
emergent conflict between General Aideed and General Mahdi in the aftermath of Barre’s exit were the final blows to the enduring Somali social fabric (Badmus, 2015). Furthermore, while these two fought for control of Mogadishu, Colonel Omar Jess and General Siad “Morgan”, two warlords, fought for the control of Kismayo (Dahre, 2011).

It is within this political backdrop that the dynamic of economic and environmental factors which have also exacerbated the conflict in Somalia must be understood. Even before the outbreak of the civil war in Somalia in 1991, Somalia was among the poorest in the world having a high dependence on foreign aid. In 1991, the life expectancy in Somalia was 47 and its gross national product (GNP) was just US$ 170 (Birsrat, 2011). Somalia’s income per capita in 2002 was $ 226 compared to the average of the rest of Africa which was $515 (Kristina, 2013). Between 2005 and 2013, the country has received US$ 150 million (254%) in Country Program Aid (CPA) (Kristina, 2013).

The economic regression in Somalia since the outbreak of the war in 1991 has had its impacts on the country’s poverty, employment and literacy levels. Factors which have not only been a constant catalyst for war but has also acted as an opportunity for the recruitment of the youth into acts of violence, terrorism, insurgency and piracy (Dahre, 2011). Somalia is ranked the lowest in educational participation rates with the total illiteracy level estimated at 37.8% in 2015 (Williams & Cummings, 2015). It is further estimated that the literacy rate for Somali men and women is just 36% and 14% respectively (Kristina, 2013).

Such low literacy levels have a direct correlation with the conflict in Somalia, especially youth engagement in illegal activities and conflict including terrorism, insurgency and piracy (Williams & Cummings, 2015). For instance, a study conducted by Edwards
(2016) found a direct correlation between high illiteracy levels and youth radicalization and recruitment into terrorist groups, piracy and insurgency. Illiterate youth have also been found to be vulnerable to political manipulation by Somali leaders and warlords to engage in illegal acts for selfish political gains (Menkhaus, 2013).

While the general breakdown in government is responsible for the unemployment, the high illiteracy levels are also directly linked to high youth unemployment levels in Somalia (Hilker & Fraser, 2009). The average unemployment rate in Somalia is 54% between age 15 and 64 (Mbugua, 2013). For the youth aged between 14 and 29 years, the unemployment level is 67%, the highest in the world (Bertocchi & Gierzoni, 2012). For the unemployed youth membership in insurgent groups, terror groups and piracy is considered a means of employment (Mbugua, 2013).

Hassan (2012) found that at least 5 out of 15 youths thought that recruitment into the Al-Shabaab was an opportunity for employment offering members between US$50 and US$150 monthly. The Al-Shabaab is a terrorist group with links with the Al-Qaeda and which is responsible thousands of deaths in Somalia and numerous fatal attacks in Kenya, Ethiopia and Uganda (Menkaus, 2011; Mbugua, 2013).

Somalia’s seemingly intermittent conflict became a concern for the regional governments and the international community. Under the ambit of the UN and the AU, both African countries and the international community sought to intervene in the country to protect human lives, restore peace and tranquility in Somalia and attempt to halt its spread into neighboring states and its tendency to destabilize countries of the greater Horn of Africa (GHOA) (Bah, et al., 2014).
Nonetheless, due to the complexity of the war in Somalia, Western governments and ultimately the UN was reluctant to deploy troops in peacekeeping operations in the country and this reluctance was also informed by knowledge of Somalia’s armed groups’ aversion to external forces (Badmus, 2015). UN’s indifference is well founded owing to the massive challenges that it had encountered in the UN Operation in Somalia (UNOSOMII) which ended in a fiasco when bodies of US peacekeeping forces were dragged on the streets of Mogadishu in 1993 (Samatar, 2007). The US withdrew from Somalia in March the following year followed by Western States (Menkhaus, 2011). There was no peacekeeping mission in Somalia between 1993 and 2007 when the AU PSC authorized the deployment of the AMISOM troops (Badmus, 2015).

With regards to the AU, the transformation of the OAU into the African Union in 2002 gave the AU a moral and legal authority to intervene in the domestic jurisdiction of members states whenever it deems fundamental human rights to be grossly violated or threatened (with authorization from the UNSC of course) (Caprini, 2016). AU’s involvement in PSO’s is enshrined in the Consultative Act of 2002 and is undertaken through the APSA (Berhe & De Waal, 2015).

AU’s principled obligation to democratic constitutionalism is underscored in its Constitutive Act of 2002 under Articles 4 (m) and Article 4 (p) (Desmidt & Hauck, 2016). The former calls for member states’ respect for democratic principles, the rule of law, human rights and good governance, and the latter condemns unconstitutional changes to government (Desmidt & Hauck, 2016; Berhe & De Waal, 2015). It is within this broader understanding that the AU’s role in facilitating African solution to African problems is found (Karock, 2014).
4.3 AU’s Methods, Approaches in Resolving the Conflict and Their Effectiveness

The APSA is the intervention framework through which the AU has approached the Somalia peace process. The APSA comprises of five pillars; PSC, Panel of the Wise (PoW), CEWS, ASF and the African Peace Facility (APF) and as such does not formerly include RECs (Desmidt & Hauck, 2016). The relations between the RECs or Regional Mechanisms and the AU are governed by a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) for Conflict Resolution and Management (CRM) which is signed by all the eight recognized RECs (Berhe & De Waal, 2015). Both the UN and AU have both their own unique weaknesses and strengths regarding the question of legitimacy (Berhe & De Waal, 2015).

Nonetheless, the success of peace operation is often dependent on legitimacy, that is, the extent to which such operations are perceived by the receiving government, the citizens of the receiving state and the international community as acceptable or warranted (Carsten, 2007). African missions in particular have a greater-level degree of legitimacy relative to missions mandated by and consisting of non-African forces (Berhe & De Waal, 2015). For instance, deployment of non-African troops to Somalia may raise a narrative of ‘infidel’. Furthermore, compared to the UN, the AU is closer to hotspots and is capable of deploying PSO more promptly (Berhe & De Waal, 2015).

The UN, through the UNSC, however still has the international legal mandate for PSO, but which it can delegate to regional organizations (Aning, 2008). In fact, AU’s peace missions are still contingent on the approval of the UNSC and it is upon the UNSC’s approval and support that AMISOM was deployed. As such, it is upon this basis that AU’s use of RECs as an approach to PSOs in the continent and specifically Somalia must be construed (Berhe & De Waal, 2015).
AMISOM was initiated in 2007 following UNSCR 1725 and UNSCR 744 which authorized a limited deployment of troops from the IGAD and AU in Somalia town of Baidoa to protect the TFG (Murithi, 2009). This multilateral and consultative approach accorded the mission greater legitimacy and support of both the majority of the Somalis and the key international stakeholders. As such, the multilevel approach was effective in laying the foundation for the mission’s success. The deployment of the AMISOM was in response to the request made by the IGAD to support the TFG (Murithi, 2009).

The deployment of the AMISOM came at the backdrop of IGAD’s failure to deploy 10,500-strong peacekeeping troops, the IGASOM (Demeke & Gebru, 2014). A failure which is linked to differences among the IGAD member states regarding their roles in the conflict and their lack of peacekeeping capacity (Badmus, 2015). The AU PSC in its 69th Meeting in January 2007 resolved to deploy AMISOM as a transition mission with the understanding that it would be integrated into broader peace mission of the UN to support for post-conflict reconstruction and enduring stabilization (Bah, et al., 2014).

From this backdrop, certain underpinning indicators can be identified in AU’s approach to the conflict in Somalia. First, it is evident that AU’s approach is a multilateral, multilevel approach that is incorporates the UN and the RECs, in this case the IGAD (Dersso, 2008). The AU peacekeeping mission was initiated following a report issued by the AU Commission Chairperson regarding Somalia’s fluid security situation, the evaluation and recommendations of its MSC and UNSCR 1725 (Kuwali, 2009). This gave credence to the mission as far as conceiving the legitimacy of the intervention that was to follow.

In UNSCR 1744, the UN backed AU’s decision to deploy AMISOM and Secondly, the AU PSO operations including AMISOM is orchestrated under the APSA (Badmus,
In line with this approach that was mainly aimed at ascertaining legitimacy for the mission and thereby enhancing the effectiveness of AMISOM, the AU adopted specific methods and approaches that would further facilitate the efficacy of the mission. These can broadly be understood as the concept of operations (CONOPs) (Karock, 2014).

AMISOM’s preliminary concept of operations (CONOPs) comprised of a 4-phase expansion over the mission area and exit phase. It involved the initial deployment of the mission to control and stabilize the security in Sector 2 of Mogadishu (Karock, 2014). This was to be done before the mission could spread out into the so-called Sectors 1 and Sector 3. The initial phase (Phase 1) of the AMISOM known as Initial Deployment Phase was executed by the Force Commander. Phase 1 involved the deployment of the three infantry battalions in Sector 2 with the goal of establishing security in and around Mogadishu and served as prerequisite to Phase 2 (Badmus, 2015; Boulden, 2013).

Phase 2 was aimed at creating a secure ground that would allow the Head of Mission (HoM) of AMISOM to relocate to Somalia from Kenya (Badmus, 2015). Phase 2 was also to allow the creation of AMISOM headquarters and the Expansion of the Deployment Phase, that is, deployment of troops to other Sectors. Phase 3 was the Consolidation Phase in which AMISOM’s mandate and principal operational tasks were to be executed according to the advice and direction of the AU and the PSC. Phase 4 was the integration of AMISOM into UN peace mission (Caprini, 2016).

The most immediate effect of the deployment of the AMISOM in Somalia was the significant improvement in the security situation in the country. The security that the mission brought to the country is directly associated with the establishment of the
government and the appointment of new president in 2012 (Wiklund, 2013). The election of the President by the 275 Member of Parliament was considered the most representative and transparent in the country in over two decades. It is also true that such a process was only possible due the improvements in the security situation brought about by the AMISOM deployment (Kristimers.com, 2017).

Furthermore, in 2012, AMISOM managed to recapture Mogadishu besides having full control of all the six sectors that had been conceived under its objectives for establishing peace in Somalia (AMISOM, 2018). It was these gains in the security aspects between 2010 and 2012 that allowed for the transition of the TNG into the TFG with the election of President Hassan Sheikh Mohamed (country’s first President in 40 years) (Abukar, 2015). With AMISOM, the clan elders would not have had the security that allowed them to elect the members of the parliament (Kristimers.com, 2017). These developments attest to the effectiveness of the mission and of AU’s approaches in addressing the Somalia problem.

Throughout 2015-2017 period, several elections were held around Somalia and the AMISOM provided the security and logistical support that saw to the success of these events. Additionally, it facilitated the coordination of government process by providing the much-needed security to the TFG officials and leaders of the states to hold high-level consultative and partnership forum between the two levels of government (Abukar, 2015). It is noted that creation of the sub-national Federal States was of potential importance to the process of establishing a formidable and effective Somalia government. Therefore, by creating conditions conducive for the consultations, AMISOM facilitated the establishment of not only the sub-national Federal States but of a more governance framework (Mastro, 2015).
Apart from supporting the then TFG and the current FGS (Federal Government of Somalia) and facilitating reconciliation and dialogue in Somalia, AMISOM has also facilitated the supply of humanitarian aid and assistance. In this sense, the mission has lived to its mandate of creating enabling security situation that would allow humanitarian organizations to operate. The mission has been somewhat effective in creating enabling conditions for the supply of humanitarian aid and has engaged in providing armed escorts to the organizations delivering humanitarian aid. Furthermore, AMISOM troops have engaged in providing “limited” humanitarian support to the Somali population (Hull & Svensson, 2018).

4.4 IGAD’s Role in the Somali Peace Process and its Impact on AU’s Conflict Resolution

Two issues were critical in Somalia peace process in the post-1991 epoch; the withdrawal of the UN from Somalia, the lack of peacekeeping mission in Somalia between 1993 and 2007 (Gelot, et al., 2012). This meant that there was limited diplomatic means of addressing the stateless order and anarchy that emerged and prevailed in Somalia beginning in the 1990s especially with the death of General Aideed in 1996, despite his responsibility for the death of the American Marines in 1993, General Aideed had exercised limited control over Mogadishu (Badmus, 2015). Warlordism, the violent struggle for power and fiefdoms made it almost impossible to bring anybody to the negotiating table (Lucey & Mesfin, 2016).

In Article 7 of its Charter, IGAD established the promotion of stability and peace as its key priority (Makinda & Okumu, 2008). To realize this objective, IGAD has established a conflict resolution mechanism which is comprised of two organs; the Assembly of the heads of states and government and the Council of Ministers (Nduwimana, 2013).
In 2002, it established early warning and response mechanisms (Makinda & Okumu, 2008).

The very first attempt at bringing tranquility in the country was initiated in 2000 when the IGAD-backed government of Djibouti began a National Reconciliation Conference, at Arta, Djibouti. (Lucey & Mesfin, 2016). The Arta Conference of 2000 aimed to establish some form of transitional charter in which the warrying factions could engage in a transitional government (Nduwimana, 2013). The Arta peace process was backed by a significant number of both Arab and African countries in Africa as it was perceived as a groundbreaking attempt to address the Somalia questions after nearly a decade of international indifference (Mulugeta, 2008).

The outcome of the Arta Peace Process was the establishment of the Transitional National Government (TNG) which was created to rule for three years (Lucey & Mesfin, 2016). Nonetheless, any hopes that the TNG had for creating peace soon dissipated as it was considered have little legitimacy in Somalia (Dersso, 2014). This was due to the fact that the Arta Peace Process had excluded the participation of the various warlords who effectively controlled vast territories of Somalia (Badmus, 2016). For this reason, the TNG encountered a lot of opposition and had no authority whatsoever outside Mogadishu and those warlords who opposed with alleged support of Ethiopia formed the Somalia Reconciliation and Restoration Council (SRRC), a military alliance which violently attacked the TNG led by Abdissaam Salad Hassan (Badmus, 2015).

Thus, IGAD’s failure in the Arta process was that the process was not inclusive enough and as such failed to establish universal support in Somalia beyond Mogadishu (Lucey & Mesfin, 2016; Kinfe, 2007). Furthermore, it was alleged that member states of the
IGAD supported parties to the conflict and as such had their own clandestine agendas with respect to resolving the Somali conflict (Badmus, 2016). Ethiopia sought to determine IGAD’s role in the body’s peace initiative (Kamudhayi, 2004). All these, contributed in making the TNG become incapacitated to effectively govern and exercise its authority (Badmus, 2016).

It meant that the peace process had to continue and IGAD again took the center stage in facilitating and steering the Somali peace process. In a Summit held in Khartoum in 2001, IGAD mandated Kenya to assume a political leadership in the Somalia peace process and facilitate peace negotiations (Badmus, 2016). Between 2002 and 2004 Kenya initiated what became known as the Nairobi Peace Process, the Kenya-based Somalia’s National Reconciliation Conference (SNRC) (Nduwimana, 2013). The outcome of the Nairobi Peace Process was the TFIs which incorporated the TFG and the TFP (Dersso, 2014). The TFIs was to rule and prepare Somalia for an election in 2009. Abdullahi Yusuf, who had ruled Puntland (an autonomous region in Somalia) was elected to rule Somalia and started to run the government from Nairobi Kenya before relocating to Jowhar city in Somalia in June 2005 (Kasaija, 2010).

The TFG was also confronted with multiple challenges which hindered its ability to govern and create effective control all over Somalia. It lacked legitimacy as some groups including armed factions with links to international terrorist organizations challenged it contending that was a puppet of external power especially Ethiopia, and IGAD member state (Dersso, 2014). Furthermore, the TFG was perceived by Mogadishu clans as comprising of enemies since it consisted of more people from Puntland including the President (Badmus, 2015).
As such, it was considered to present only the clan interests and narrow swathe of interests in the country (Cilliers, Boshoff & Aboagye, 2010). The fact that there were internal divisions within the TFG further compounded its problems. Two seemingly irreconcilable factions, the President and the Prime Minister on one side and the Parliamentarians and cabinet members from the Hawiye clan on the other (Kasaija, 2010). The bone of contention between the two factions was on where the TFG would operate from and on the plan to invite international peacekeeper to assist the TFG establish effective control in the country (Badmus, 2015; Kasaija, 2010). Increasingly, the local Islamic courts under the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) emerged gained power in 2006 (Dersso, 2014).

While the IGAD failed with regards to seeing to TFG gain effective control in Somalia, the bodies efforts were especially important in bring the warrying parties to the table and establishing the TNG and the TFG (Lucey & Mesfin, 2016). But even so, the intricacy of Somalia’s political context meant that more needed to be done if any hopes for peace in Somalia were to be kept alive. IGADs Head of State and Government, reviewed the developing situation in Somalia and considered deployment of IGASOM troops in aid of Yusuf Abdullahi’s administration as far back as January 2005 (Badmus, 2015). The idea was endorsed by the AU, nonetheless, IGAD was constrained by its own challenges and was unable to actualize the deployment.

At a conference in Djibouti in 2008, dubbed the Djibouti Peace Talks that was conducted between the top representatives of the TFG and moderate Islamists, the Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia (ARS), it was agreed that the Ethiopian troops should withdraw from Somalia. According to Dahre (2011), the term of tenure of the TFG was to end in 2011 (Abukar, 2015). In the following year in 2012, the newly composed Federal
Parliament of Somalia elected Hassan Sheikh Mahamoud as the country’s first President in 40 years (Abukar, 2015).

A few reasons account for IGAD’s failure to deploy IGASOM. The first reason is linked to whether the IGAD has the legal mandate to conduct such a mission. Under the AU Charter IGAD was not empowered to conduct a peacekeeping operation in any AU member state (Badmus, 2015). The second reason was that IGAD had no capacity to generate the 10,500 troops that had been proposed for IGASOM (Freear & de Conning, 2013). The third reason for IGAD’s failure to deploy IGASOM was due to its member state’s biasness in the process and both Ethiopia and Eritrea objected to peacekeeping forces deployment (Badmus, 2015).

4.5 Chapter Summary

This chapter has examined the findings of the study regarding the three research questions. It has found that there are multiple history-political factors and socio-economic factors that caused the conflict and which continue to mutually reinforce to precipitate the continuance of the conflict. These factors include; political fragmentation, absence of democratic institution of governance, poverty, high youth unemployment, illiteracy, natural disasters, proliferation of small arms and light weapons (SALWs) and infiltration by foreign actors. It has indicated that AU’s approach to the Somalia conflict was a multilateral, multilevel approach that incorporates the UN and the RECs, in this case the IGAD. The methods used was one that entailed a systematic deployment of troops to fulfill the objectives that the AMISOM sought to meet and incorporated four strategic phases three of which are being met. It found that the IGAD played a crucial role in the Somalia peace process,
the creation of the TNG, the TFG and in the deployment of the AMISOM. The chapter provides the conclusion and recommendations of this study.
CHAPTER FIVE

5.0 CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 Introduction

This chapter provides the conclusion and the recommendations of the study. It commences with the summary of this study and the discussion of the study findings regarding the three objectives that it aimed to achieve. It also discussed the relevance of the theories which had been suggested for evaluating the research problem.

5.2 Summary of Major Findings

The purpose of the study was to examine the root causes of conflict in Somalia and to investigate the effectiveness of the methods and approaches of AMISOM in peace-keeping process in Somalia. The study aimed to achieve three objectives, namely; to investigate the root causes of the conflict, its dynamics and its consequences in the Horn of Africa region; to determine the extent of African Union's effectiveness and ineffectiveness in peace keeping missions in Somalia; to examine the methods and approaches that the African Union has used in trying to resolve the Somalia conflict; and, to investigate the role that different regional bodies such as Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) have in the conflict resolution and the extent to which they affect and hamper the African Union in handling crisis.

This study adopted a descriptive research design. This study was a desktop review in nature, hence it fully relied exclusively on the secondary sources of data. This study deployed a historical or background technique for data collection in qualitative research. The research deployed a mix of content and thematic analysis since the study was mainly a descriptive and partly historical.
5.2.1 Dynamics of The Somalia Conflict and Its Consequences in the Region

The study has found that the conflict in Somalia has been caused and driven by multiple socio-economic and political factors. These factors are mutually reinforcing and include political fragmentation, absence of democratic institution of governance, poverty, high youth unemployment, illiteracy, natural disasters and infiltration by foreign actors. Found that these factors facilitated Islamic fundamentalism, piracy, insurgency, cattle-rustling, nonexistent or weak state institutions, poor infrastructure, state sanctioned violence, infiltration of the state by international terrorist groups.

It found that the colonial administrations had placed the country and the Somalia society on a recourse to conflict in the post independent period by dividing Somali-speaking people into five regions. It has established the colonial machinations resulted in Somalia’s irredentist claims for a greater Somalia, a policy which brought independent Somalia into conflict with regional countries of Kenya and Ethiopia, and which resulted in the Shifter and Ogaden war with the former and the latter respectively. It found that the wars and clannism that dominated domestic politics resulted in dictatorial regime of Siad Barre. The dictatorial regime not only exacerbated the growing clan tensions but also engaged in acts that created misery and mistrust among groups in Somalia.

The study found that the collapse of the Barre regime plunged the country into anarchy and warlordism as different groups and clans fought over the control of the country. It found that the sustained state of conflict in Somalia led to total collapse of state institutions and this further resulted in high unemployment and illiteracy levels. It found that this situation allowed the politicians and terrorist organization to recruit and radicalize the youth into insurgency, terrorism and piracy. The study found that terrorist groups such as the Al-Shabaab were able
to recruit illiterate unemployed youth as the youth perceived membership in the organization a means of employment.

5.2.2 AU’s Methods, Approaches in Resolving the Conflict and Their Effectiveness

The study found that the AU’s approach to the resolution of the Somalia conflict was a multi-level one which incorporated the UN and the RECs with the AU. It found that the AU preferred to utilize the IGAD to initiate and direct the peace negotiations in Somalia. It found that the AU endorsed the Arta Peace Process of 2000 which was the first peace negotiations for Somalia in close to a decade. It found that the AU was very supportive of the Arta Peace Process of 2000 and endorsed the agreement which established the TNG.

The AU also mandated the IGAD to oversee the Nairobi Peace Process that established the TFG. The AU further endorsed the IGAD’s decisions to deploy IGASOM (even though this never materialized). After reviewing the situation in Somalia and in response to IGAD’s request for peacekeeping troop deployment, the AU through the APSA resolved to deploy peacekeeping troops to Somalia and included IGAD members states’ soldiers as its main peacekeeping forces in Somalia. It found that AMISOM was a multilateral undertaking backed by the UN through resolutions UNSCR 1725 and UNSCR 1744.

The study found that the method that the AU used through the APSA when it deployed the AMISOM was a 4-Phase approach. It found that this involved securing Mogadishu and its surrounding for the relocation of the TFG to Somalia and establishing AMISOM headquarters in Mogadishu. Expanding troop deployment beyond Mogadishu into Sector 2 and 3 and ensuring overall security of Somalia and facilitating elections in the country. The AU also established an exit plan under Phase 4 in which the AMISOM was to be absorbed into a broader UN-peacekeeping force.
5.2.3 IGAD’s Role in the Somali Peace Process and its Impact on AU’s Conflict Resolution

This study found that IGAD has the issue of promotion of stability and peace as its key priority. It also found that the IGAD has established a conflict resolution mechanism which is comprised of two organs; the Assembly of the heads of states and government, the Council of Ministers and early warning and response mechanisms. This study found that the IGAD played a crucial role in the Somalia peace process and in so doing facilitated AU’s conflict resolution mandate in Africa. The IGAD initiated the first peace talks in Somalia after close to ten years of international indifference. This initial intervention by the IGAD was known as the Arta Peace Process and it was groundbreaking in that it led to the establishment of the TNG.

The study found that the IGAD also spearheaded the Nairobi Peace Process that resulted in the creation of the TFG. It found that the IGAD offered the TFG logistical support in an attempt to establish effective control beyond Mogadishu and all over Somalia. After the collapse of the TFG upon the rise of the ICU, the IGAD was also critical in re-establishing the Djibouti Peace Talks in 2008. As such the IGAD was critical in facilitating the Somalia peace process.

The IGAD was also at center stage when it sought to deploy peacekeeping troops to Somalia towards the collapse of the TFG in 2005. Nonetheless, internal differences and weak capacity of the organization prevented the IGAD from deploying IGASOM troops into Somalia and requested the AU to send peacekeeping troops to Somalia. The study found that the reasons for IGADs failure to deploy troops in Somalia included the fact that under the AU Charter IGAD was not empowered to conduct a peacekeeping operation in any AU member state. It had no capacity to generate the 10,500 troops that had been proposed for IGASOM. Furthermore, its member state’s biasness in the process and both Ethiopia and Eritrea objected to peacekeeping forces deployment.
As per implied by the RCT nation-states engage in PSOs to increase their own benefits presents and this can explain behaviors of the IGAD member states in the Somalia peace process and regarding the deployment of IGASOM. Nation-states habitually prefer peace than conflict owing to the potential of the conflict to spill across borders and result in regional conflict and tension. As such, regional nation-states are likely to contribute troops to the mission in the hope of establishing regional peace as has happened with Uganda, Kenya, Djibouti, Burundi and Ethiopia participation in AMISOM. These countries, especially Kenya, Djibouti and Ethiopia share borders with Somalia hence peace in Somalia would be important to their own security.

The CT is also relevant in this regard. In fact, it can be argued that AMISOM while the international peacekeeping operations went well in the early years and resulted in a ceasefire among the warring clans and the delivery of humanitarian assistance, the national interest of the IGAD member states especially Ethiopia and Eritrea impeded the process from further success. Furthermore, critical theory does not only give insight into the decision by regional countries including Ethiopia, Uganda and lately Kenya to contribute troops to AMISOM but may also help account for Burundi and Djibouti decision to participate through troop contribution to the mission. In this sense, these countries would have wanted to enhance their international presence and reputation within the region not just as producers of conflict but as part of the solution to conflicts in the continent.

5.3 Conclusion

5.3.1 Dynamics of The Somalia Conflict and Its Consequences in the Region

The multiplicity of political factors which pre-date the independent state of Somalia were critical precipitants of the civil war in Somalia. These political dynamics further precipitated economic challenges that worked further to exacerbate the turmoil the remains persistent in
Somalia. After close to three decades of political chaos and atavistic violence, the socio-political and economic factors including clannism, political corruption, nepotism, Islamic fundamentalism, illiteracy, extreme poverty, high unemployment poor infrastructure have continued to define Somalia’s political discourse.

These factors are directly contributing to Islamic fundamentalism, piracy, insurgency and terrorism that continue plague Somalia. This demands that the focus of the AMISOM and the international community should be on addressing this fundamental causes and drivers of the conflict. It can be argued that the establishment of the TFG while important, is not sufficient to effectively address these issues in a way that may lead to the realization of sustainable peace.

5.3.2 AU’s Methods, Approaches in Resolving the Conflict and Their Effectiveness

The Charter of the AU empowers it to intervene in domestic jurisdiction of members states if human rights and life are threatened. The AU approach to conflict resolution in Africa is mandated to the APSA. Nonetheless, the AU approach also involves a multi-level method that incorporates both the UN and the RECs. AU’s approach is to the Somalia peace process was to use diplomacy and to seeks UN’s approval for its peace operations in the country.

Its approach included the delegation of the conduct of the Somalia peace process to the IGAD and to offer support for IGAD’s endeavors. It is through the IGAD that the peace negotiations were done and the establishment of the TNG and the TFG was achieved through the IGAD. AU’s decision to deploy AMISOM was also done after the request of the IGAD for such a deployment. The AMISOM comprises mostly of soldiers from the IGAD countries which implies that AU has high regards for use of RECs in its PSOs in the continent.

5.3.3 IGAD’s Role in the Somali Peace Process and its Impact on AU’s Conflict Resolution
IGAD played crucial role in the Somalia Peace Process. It initiated peace negotiations when the rest of the world through the UN had given up on the country. The IGAD was able to facilitate talks that saw to the establishment of the TNG and the TFG. Nonetheless, IGAD’s own internal weaknesses affected its ability to effectively bring about enduring peace and tranquility in the country. The biasness of the IGAD member states in the Somalia Peace Process undercut the ability of both the TNG and the TFG to have legitimacy and to exercise authority throughout Somalia. Furthermore, its weakness and inability to actualize the deployment of the IGASOM at a most critical time was costly in terms of installing lasting peace in the country.

Nevertheless, the role that the IGAD played in the Somalia peace process indicates that the RECs are better placed to facilitate AU’s peace objectives in the continent. It also reveals that the RECs have the ability to facilitate the initiation of negotiations for peace even in some of Africa’s most conflictual situations. Thus, in general the role that the IGAD played the Somalia peace process indicates AU’s use of regional mechanisms for conflict resolution can be effective if the RECs themselves approach the situations objectively.

5.4 Recommendation

Based on information gathered and the study findings, the study makes the following recommendations for improvement and for further research concerning the findings made.

5.4.1 Recommendations for Improvement

5.4.1.1 Dynamics of The Somalia Conflict and Its Consequences in the Region

The FGS, the AU and the IGAD should understand that the multiple factors that caused the conflict in Somalia continue to shape the discourse of peace in the country. These authorities should prioritize these factors and provide effective mechanisms for addressing them
simultaneously. The FGS should understand that the issue of inclusivity is at the basis of the persistence of Somalia conflict and that clannism, nepotism and corruption are especially important factors that have continued to shape the discourse for establishing sustainable peace in Somalia. The FGS, the AU, IGAD, the UN and donor countries should single out high level of youth unemployment and high levels of illiteracy as crucial factors that have made the youth especially vulnerable for recruitment in illegal activities. As such, they should prioritize the provision of educational facilities and vocational training for the youth as a strategy for sustainable peace.

5.4.1.2 AU’s Methods, Approaches in Resolving the Conflict and Their Effectiveness

The AU should continue to engage the RECs in the peace processes throughout the continent. Both the UN and the AU should continue promoting the RECs and encouraging them to engage in peace process and peacekeeping missions in countries in their regions. The AU and the UN should appreciate the RECs’ involvement in peace process and peacekeeping operations as most effective way of addressing the issue of legitimacy of the process and the acceptance of outcomes of peace processes. The AU should read from the gains that the IGAD made in Somalia and provide RECs with both logistical and financial resources to enhance the capacity of these bodies to promptly respond to conflict situations before they escalate.

5.4.1.3 IGAD’s Role in the Somali Peace Process and its Impact on AU’s Conflict Resolution

The AU should give the RECs legal authority to intervene in countries within their region when the situation warrants under international law. The AU can enhance the ability of the RECs in conflict resolution and peacekeeping by giving the RECs, such as the IGAD the legal authority and mandate to intervene in conflict situations. The AU should allocate part of its financial resources to RECs and provide logistical support to the RECs to enhance their ability to respond
to conflict situations. The RECs should push for the creation of a legal framework that establishes a standby peacekeeping force that can be rapidly deployed to intervene in conflict situations. IGAD member states should abide by the provisions of their Charter and avoid biases in addressing the conflicts within the region. IGAD member states should develop a mechanism that will allow them to generate the required number of troops whenever there is need for quick peacekeeping troop deployment.

5.4.1.4 Suggestions for Future Research

Researchers should do more studies in regard to the role of RECs in peacekeeping operations. The research should envisage a way in which the UN and the AU can utilize the RECs more effectively in negotiating peace and initiating peace operations. Furthermore, researchers should conduct more studies and explain the approaches, methods and techniques that the AU has used in addressing some of Africa’s violent and enduring conflicts such as the Somalia conflict and the war in South Sudan. In so doing, the researcher should suggest ways in which the AU can effectively intervene in such conflicts without the issue of legitimacy being raised.
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