ASSESSING THE HUMANITARIAN-DEVELOPMENT NEXUS WITHIN PROTRACTED CRISIS CONTEXTS: A CASE STUDY OF SOMALIA

BY

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A thesis submitted to the School of Humanities and Social Sciences in partial fulfilment of the requirement for the award of degree of a Masters of Arts degree in International Relations

UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL UNIVERSITY – AFRICA

SPRING 2018
STUDENT’S DECLARATION

I hereby declare that this thesis is my own original work and has to the best of my knowledge not been presented or published in any other institution other than USIU – Africa for an academic credit. All materials obtained from other sources are dully acknowledged.

Signature ………………………………… Date ………………………………………

Wanjiru Hinga (631425)

This thesis has been presented for examination with my approval as the appointed Supervisor

Signature……………………………… Date ………………………………………

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Signature……………………………… Date……………………………………

Amb. Prof. Ruthie C. Rono, HSC

Deputy Vice Chancellor, Academic and Student Affairs
DEDICATION

I dedicate this thesis to my daughter, Nasha Hinga, who has been patient as I pursued this academic pursuit.

Nasha,

You may see me struggle

But you will never see me quit

Neither should you.
Acknowledgement

This thesis was made possible with the great support of several people and institutions. My gratitude goes to Dr. Aleksi Ylönen for his assistance in conceptualisation and organization of this thesis. His continued support, feedback and advice are a stepping stone for this thesis. Special thanks to my reader, Dr. Dan Odaba, USIU-A faculty and my peers who one way or another contributed to the conceptualization of this thesis.
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AMISOM</td>
<td>African Union Mission to Somalia</td>
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<tr>
<td>CCA</td>
<td>Common Country Assessment (UN)</td>
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<tr>
<td>CEDAW</td>
<td>Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women</td>
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<tr>
<td>DAC</td>
<td>Development Assistance Committee (OECD)</td>
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<tr>
<td>DFID</td>
<td>Department for International Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECHO</td>
<td>European Commission Humanitarian Aid</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>FAO</td>
<td>Food and Agriculture Organization</td>
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<td>FBO</td>
<td>Faith based organizations</td>
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<td>H&amp;D</td>
<td>Humanitarian and Development</td>
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<td>HPG</td>
<td>Humanitarian Policy Group</td>
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<td>HRBA</td>
<td>Human rights-based approach</td>
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<td>HRP</td>
<td>Humanitarian Response Plan</td>
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<td>Acronym</td>
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<tr>
<td>IDP</td>
<td>Internally displaced persons</td>
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<td>IGO</td>
<td>Inter-governmental organization</td>
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<td>ILO</td>
<td>International Labour Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>KDF</td>
<td>Kenya Defence Force</td>
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<td>LIFT</td>
<td>Livelihoods and Food Security Trust Fund</td>
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<td>LRRD</td>
<td>Linking relief, rehabilitation and development</td>
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<tr>
<td>MOU</td>
<td>Memorandum of Understanding</td>
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<td>MDG</td>
<td>Millennium Development Goal</td>
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<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-governmental organisation</td>
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<td>NSFS</td>
<td>National Security Forces of Somalia</td>
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<td>NSP</td>
<td>National Safety Program</td>
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<td>ODA</td>
<td>Official Development Assistance</td>
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<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development</td>
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<td>OHCHR</td>
<td>Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights</td>
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<td>OIC</td>
<td>Organization of Islam Cooperation</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<td>OXFAM</td>
<td>Oxford Committee for Famine Relief</td>
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<td>PSG</td>
<td>Peace building and state building goals</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees</td>
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<td>UNDAF</td>
<td>United Nations Development Assistance Framework</td>
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<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
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<td>UNPF</td>
<td>United Nations Population Fund</td>
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<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>United Nations Children’s Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>United States (of America)</td>
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<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>WASH</td>
<td>Water, sanitation and hygiene</td>
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<td>WFP</td>
<td>World Food Program</td>
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<td>WHO</td>
<td>World Health Organization</td>
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Definition of terms

Acceptable Risk

This is the level of loss a society or community considers acceptable given existing social, economic, political, cultural and technical conditions.¹

Bilateral Aid / Assistance

This refers to aid that is controlled and spent by donor countries at their own discretion. It may include staff, supplies, equipment, funding to receipt governments and funding to NGOs. It also includes assistance channeled as earmarked funding through international and UN organizations.

Bureaucratization

The hierarchical arrangement of lines of authority, communication, rights and duties of an organization, or an Organizational structure determining how the roles, power and responsibilities are assigned, controlled and coordinated, as well as how information flows between the different levels of management.

Development Aid

This is financial aid given by governments and other agencies to support the economic, environmental, social and political development within developing countries.

¹ 2009 UNISDR Terminology on Disaster Risk Reduction
**Humanitarian Aid**

This refers to aid that seeks to save lives and alleviate suffering of a crisis affected population. Humanitarian assistance must be provided in accordance with the basic humanitarian principles of humanity, impartiality and neutrality, as stated in United Nations Charter.

**Integration**

An act or the process of incorporating different actors as equals into society or an organization

In addition, the UN seeks to provide humanitarian assistance, continued with full respect for the sovereignty of states. Assistance may be divided into three categories - direct assistance, indirect assistance and infrastructure support - which have diminishing degrees of contact with the affected population. ²

**Protracted Crisis**

This refers to situations in which a significant portion of a population is facing a heightened risk of death, disease and breakdown of their livelihoods.

**Remittances**

This consists of the funds an expatriate sends back to their country of origin via wire, mail, or online transfer.

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² International Disaster Response Law edited by Guttry, Gestri & Venturini
Abstract
A comment made by Trygve Lie, the first Secretary General of the United Nations, endures to date. He said, “There is a close connection between the peace problem and the economic and social conditions of the countries of the world. The creation of better economic and social conditions for all people is one of the principal aims of the United Nations.” Humanitarian crises have become increasingly complex, protracted and commonly caused by conflict. The incumbent sustainable development goals (SDGs) are more inclusive than their predecessors, the millennium development goals (MDGs). The former has been formulated to ensure ‘Leave No One Behind’ comes to fruition. This is the recognition by the international community on the requirement for improved coherence of the humanitarian and development efforts. The humanitarian-development discussion needs to reach beyond the humanitarian community, capitals and headquarters. As ideas emerge externally, inclusion of other initiatives could provide substantial inputs. Additionally, the connection has to be made at country level in order to enhance humanitarian- development nexus on the ground, to operationalize policy and to engage and involve other development actors. Ultimately, peace and development are inseparable.
CHAPTER ONE

1.0 Introduction

This chapter introduces the background of the study, problem statement, justification, research objectives, research question and the scope of the study. The core mandate of the humanitarian-development nexus is to activate and spire the resilience of the population under immense threat of unmitigated crisis, while tracing the root causes of recurrent crises and making aid more efficient and effective. Nonetheless, the essence for having a conjuncture between humanitarian aid and development action has attracted lots of discussion both at the local level to the international level, with the public endorsement it attracts being overwhelming as it is the case of the World Humanitarian Summit that was held last year in 2017.

Contextually, the proactive collaboration between development and peace building actors could largely affect the respect of the humanitarian principles of neutrality, humanity, impartiality, and independence. The humanitarian actors’ main role is to provide life-saving services-while enabling the access to those services in an immediate, time efficient, neutral, impartial and independent manner, with little or no chance for dialogue with all stakeholders such as the government and other actors. Humanitarian actors are directly involved and present in the front line where the main needs are. Development actors are normally sitting in capitals or in more secured areas with restricted movements, hence losing contact with the person in need.
This study will therefore critically look at the chances at which the developmental actors and the humanitarian actors can collaboratively work together and deduce the effects of such collaboration at all levels of engagement. To get this right, the study will largely rely on the previous similar studies by analyzing the thoughts of other researchers in similar thematic study.

1.1 Background of the study

In cognition of the context of fragile states, disasters, conflict and other acute vulnerabilities, progressive, meaningful and sustainable impact requires a synergized approach. It requires a complementarity to action by humanitarian and development actors within a specific locus. There are several significant, systemic overhauls that can be applied in coherence to the international interventions to meet and ease the dire need for aid. They should complement local mechanisms to realize specific developmental goal (Devereux, 2007).

Anchored within the spectral tenets as a reflection of the consensus of humanitarianism and development professionalism is an ascription to the United Nations prescription on humanitarian financing, more flexible funding mechanisms and programmatic approaches that must seriously be considered by the HD actors (ICVA, 2017).

It is also important to recognize that efforts to meet the Sustainable Development Goals as a universally agreed prescription to developing an ideal world have an inherent weakness. Progress towards these goals can be lost in a snap due to natural disasters or completely reversed for decades due to human tailored causes and crisis.
An ideal world is more of a mirage beyond imagination. When mankind is faced with an evolution in humanitarian and development needs it is constantly propelled within the cruelty of poverty, violence, pandemic, geological and ecological crisis. Despite all the misery and despair in the world, human beings are often moved by compassion and solidarity. It goes without saying that goodwill always prevails over injustice, fear and anguish a common school of thought shared by the idealists (DEMAC, 2017).

There are countless interventions of international development and humanitarian agencies aimed at improving the social and economic circumstances of the world’s poorest, most vulnerable, people in a sustainable manner. The primary objective of humanitarian action is to save lives, alleviate suffering and maintain human dignity with programming that adheres to the guiding principles of humanitarian action: humanity, impartiality, neutrality, and independence. Through their commitments, humanitarian workers epitomize a truth intrinsic to the African saying Ubuntu: “My humanity is bound up in yours.”

Currently more than 125 million people are in dire need of humanitarian aid out of which more than 65 million are refugees and internally displaced persons around the world because of untamed violence and conflicts. In retrospect, between 2002 and 2013, eighty-six percent of resources requested through UN humanitarian appeals were destined to humanitarian action in conflict situations (Hinds, 2015). Such complex humanitarian emergencies have been intractable and protracted with an average length of displacement due to war and persecution of 17 years. Recurring shocks have worsened humanitarian needs in these contexts and reversed development gains. Natural disasters alone caused a total of $1.5 trillion in damage worldwide between 2003 and 2013, with less than a third
of costs covered by insurance (Hinds, 2015). Furthermore, the refunding of inter-agency humanitarian appeals have increased six-fold from $3.4 billion in 2004 to $19.5 billion in 2015 (Hinds, 2015).

Going by the Global Humanitarian Assistance Report (2017: 8), an escalation of the existing crisis and the re-emergence of new complications left an estimated 164.2 million people in 47 countries in need of international humanitarian assistance in 2016. Over a quarter of people in need were citizens of four countries: Somalia, Yemen, Syria and Iraq. Political impasses, multiplicity of unforeseen challenges ranging from geological disasters, pandemics, natural disasters notwithstanding, the escalation of an acute humanitarian crisis comes to the fore because of dysfunctional governments. The number of people forced into displacement by conflict or violence reached 65.6 million by the end of 2016 (Global Humanitarian Assistance Report, 2017: 8). Nearly two-thirds of these people were internally displaced.

Poverty, vulnerability and crisis are clearly linked. At the latest count, an estimated 87 per cent of those living in extreme poverty at least 661 million people were in countries affected by fragility, environmental vulnerability or both (Global Humanitarian Assistance Report, 2017: 8). In vulnerable countries where poverty data is missing, it is expected that the populations living in poverty to be much higher. While global levels of extreme poverty fell, the proportion of extremely poor people in high-risk settings increased since the previous count, prompting fresh commitments for joined-up humanitarian, development and peacebuilding efforts.
The international community recognizes that the goal of eradicating poverty will remain beyond the reach of fragile and conflict-affected states unless there are concentrated efforts in these challenging contexts of resolving human needs in the most challenging atmosphere (World Bank, 2011) (OECD, 2015). Responding to these crises and assisting these countries and communities to move towards sustainable development and resilience to shocks requires more effective approaches.

1.2 Historical and geographical background of Somalia as a case study

Somalia borders Ethiopia to the west, Kenya to the south, Djibouti to the north whilst sharing a coast with the Gulf of Aden to the north and the Indian Ocean to the south. Its proximity to the Middle East and the Arabian Peninsula has embedded a long rich history of Somali trade and cultural dynamics as well as its religious interaction of the earlier days (UN, 2012). The Somalis have a very unique and dynamic societal composition. They speak a similar language, are of the same religion and culture, notwithstanding, their path to destiny (Lewis, 1998).

Somalia aside, the Somalis are found in Kenya, Ethiopia and Djibouti, with a considerable diaspora living in continental Africa, Europe and North America. The regional geographic spread makes it easy for Somalis to cross over the border to the neighboring countries at will without being turned away as aliens. The Somalis tend to share familial relations across borders, with extended families present in diverse parts of the region surrounding Somalian territory. Somalia has an approximated population of about ten million people. Somalia, before attaining her independence was divided into two regions. The north was under the
British colonial rule and the South was under the Italian colonial rule. The northern Somalia region got its independence on 26th June 1960 while the south attained hers on 1st July 1960. Then they forged an alliance that gave birth to the Somali Republic with a civilian government. However, this status changed on 21st October 1969 when a revolution took place under the leadership of General Mohamed Siyad Barre (Norris, 2012). Barre was later ousted through a bloody coup in 1991 that sparked unforeseen turmoil in Somalia which led to the springing up of factional fighting groups that plunged the country into anarchy (Norris, 2012).

This study analyzes the operational experiences of a broad range of humanitarian and developmental actors both international and national within the case scenario of the Somalia crisis, while dissecting through its ripple effects to her neighboring countries. This analysis aims at defining how development and humanitarian aid actors can best support the population affected by the Somalia crisis through the optimization of coordination of their response, incorporating inter-linkages and synergies between the different actors.

The study seeks to identify opportunities for developing greater complementarity between the two types of assistance. It has a special focus on protracted crises and conflict-affected contexts because these contexts pose the greatest challenges to providing coherent international responses. It is increasingly urgent to address the challenges in these environments because more than two thirds of international humanitarian funding are spent each year in long-term protracted and recurrent crises (T.I, 2016). Meanwhile, development
actors recognize that they cannot deliver on poverty eradication goals unless they engage more extensively in protracted and conflict-related crises.

1.3 Problem statement

Considered to be Africa’s poorest and most unstable country, Somalia as an independent state has been in existence for less than half a century. However, she has spent much of her time at war or struggling to retain stability within her borders. With the long absence of legitimate government, security and rule of law has been elusive for nearly three decades. Since the ouster of Said Barre in 1991, Somalia has been divided between warlord and Islamic militants who control most of its population and its natural resources (Afyare, 2006).

The precursor of the political crisis that Somalia has experienced for decades now, is the acute humanitarian disaster which remains one of the worst humanitarian crisis, with a child dying every six minutes in Somalia according to (Relief Web, 2018). Political and military turmoil has continued to overshadow the humanitarian crisis, however the newly formed regime, the Federal Government of Somalia through the military assistance of the AMISOM, have made considerable strides to contain the Al-Shabaab incursion in the south and central Somalia, while liberating lots of towns and villages. This has therefore enabled the humanitarian and developmental actors to penetrate the South and Central Somalia that was previously inaccessible and dangerous (Cabot-Venton, 2014).

Nearly 5 million Somalis, almost half the country’s current population, require humanitarian aid, including food, water, vaccinations, and health care, with about 3 million
of those are in conflict zones and difficult-to-reach areas (Garvelink, 2011). An estimated 1.46 million people are displaced in Somalia. Mogadishu alone has become the site of over 300 internally displaced person (IDP) camps with the neighboring countries, such as Kenya shouldering the burden of hosting more than half the number Somalia refugees fleeing the county for safety (Garvelink, 2011).

The environmental degradation and ecological disruptions in the vast area of Somalia have been among the most impeccable challenges that have since devastated its population. Food insecurity and nutritional imbalances have for decades been ascribed as a death knell for her people. If not prevailed upon to provide aid to the Somalis facing imminent starvation, these factors could affect more than 250,000 people at the Lower Shabelle, Bay and Bakool regions. With the onset of the wet season in Somalia, the famine-critical number gets reduced, however, the conditions on the ground are always deteriorated (Afyare, 2006).

The same rains that were previously hyped as a source of solace, become a nightmare that impede relief efforts according to the UN Office of the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). The inundation of the torrential rainfall within the southern Somalia, constantly disrupted the logistical plans for the delivery of food, vaccinations and medical supplies to the affected areas. In addition to accessibility challenges, rainfall increases the likelihood of waterborne diseases spreading among the displaced populations (Garvelink, 2011). Heavy rains force farmers and their families to leave their homes, resulting in low farm production which creates more complex challenges as the rainfall persists. At the same time, food prices are prohibitively high for most Somalis. Overall, through the years, the severity of the humanitarian need has not diminished.
Insecurity and insurgency remain the biggest challenges in the region of Somalia and the neighboring countries. These circumstances make it impossible to forecast the likelihood of an improved humanitarian situation now and in the future. A drought alone does not create the conditions for famine, but drought coupled with conflict does. For example, the Kenyan incursion, the military operation in Somalia and Al Shabaab retaliation against the AMISOM forces, renewed mass migration which has continuously jeopardized the relief efforts between 2011-16, where the Somalia migrating refugees were scattered. This made it difficult for the aid agencies to locate and assist them with ease. This irregular migration patterns therefore resulted into huge losses of lives. AMISOM troops advancement to the unliberated areas of Somalia has however slowed humanitarian operations according to the humanitarian agencies on the ground (Garvelink, 2011). As the forces make their way in, thousands of displaced Somalis must move out of harm’s way. Each time the IDP population flees, they are only able to take little with them and conditions only worsen, with children dying more often. Amid this disorder, warlords continue to reassert themselves, demanding money and abusing the IDPs as they attempt to reach temporary safety (Dunn & Brewin, 2014). Constant abduction and way laying of the relief workers and the relief trucks has further worsened the situation (Aal, 2000).

1.4 Purpose of the study

The intent of this thesis is to analyze the “humanitarian and development nexus within protracted crisis to achieve better effective results by looking at the geo-political context; size and capacity of the actors and NGOs; incentives and drivers to act in crisis; history
of the aid recipient; financial capability and resource mobilization capacity as defined 
variables.

Does the size of an NGO determine its level of response? Is it that the larger the NGO, 
the more available its resources and technical ability to respond to crises? Larger 
organizations usually have more staff, more world offices and are more integrated with 
other organizations, which in turn, leads to a higher level of bureaucratization. Regardless 
of the high level of bureaucratization, which potentially could retard the ability to 
respond to crises, NGOs receive an exceptional amount of funding from governments and 
IGOs, which provides these NGOs with the capability to respond at higher levels. In 
addition, economies of scale and the media usually tend to favor the larger NGOs, 
increasing their ability to obtain funds and visibility (Federal Government of Somalia, 
2017). However, the larger the organization in size and capacity the less independent they 
are because of their integration with cooperations, IGOs and governments. Nonetheless 
their probability for responding at higher levels is greater.

Smaller NGOs have less bureaucratization, thus less integration, which leads to low 
funding and a lower response. They therefore maintain more of their independence, but 
there is also a potential cost of mounting smaller programs and less of a critical mass in 
the field. In addition, they do not have the capability or proficiency to adequately respond 
to major emergencies that overrun their capacity.

This study is poised to determine the type of the organization, faith-based or secular, in 
relation to the level of response. It expects faith-based NGOs to respond with higher level
of resources in instances of humanitarian crisis. Religion has always been powerful, moving large groups of people to action. Thus, religion could serve as a definitive factor in organizational action in humanitarian emergencies. The religious organizations are more apt to act independently and universally, whereas secular organizations may alter their concepts of universality depending on the context of the emergency and the strings attached by the donors.

The study will also determine how the type of crisis affects an NGOs level of response. An organization is more likely to respond to a natural disaster than a conflict, and even more so, to a protracted conflict. Natural disasters lack much of the complications that are inherent in conflicts. For instance, natural disasters do not target one ethnic set up, social strata, or economic group over other groups. In conflict situations, access to the population affected is difficult due to the highly intense and violent situations. Not only is it difficult to adequately assist the affected population, but also the organizational staff are also at risk and in danger in these volatile areas. This purpose statement is in accordance to the above problem statement and will help in the development of the research objectives and the determination of the appropriate theories to be used.

1.5 Justification of the research

In most cases humanitarian and development aid actors provide assistance in the same contexts but work separately and within minimal strategic coordination. There is a long history of policy debates on the desirability of coherent approaches to international engagement in protracted crises one of such debates is the Protracted conflict and
humanitarian action a proposition of ICRC (Slim, 2016). Attempts to realize greater coherence are closely entwined with the global political contexts in which they were conceived and the nature of the humanitarian and development challenges that they are trying to address. It is important to acknowledge some of the key arguments, concepts and ideas emerging from these debates and to identify the reasons why they have largely failed to bring about substantial change.

Literature focusing on linking humanitarian and development assistance has tended to focus on aid architecture, including financing mechanisms and or been aimed at the systemic or conceptual level (Hinds, 2015). This thesis adopts a fresh approach, seeking to capture field and organizational realities that may hinder, or provide, opportunities for achieving greater complementarity between humanitarian and development programming in fragile and conflict-affected contexts.

The thesis aims to take advantage of the recent political opportunities to re-focus and reconfigure international assistance. With the formulation of the Sustainable Development Goals and the 2030 Agenda, the principle of “leaving no-one behind”, it will require both development and humanitarian actors to work together to address the needs of the most vulnerable, to create conditions for building resilient states and societies. The consultations for the World Humanitarian Summit in Istanbul in 2016 also clearly indicate that stronger links between humanitarian and development action are necessary to make the international aid system fit for purpose (Macrae, 2002). This is an important moment, therefore, to re-examine this agenda in order to make a practical contribution to improve synergies between humanitarian and development work. The thesis argues that political contexts, incentives
and drivers are and have always been critical to the feasibility of achieving coherence, between humanitarian and development aid actors.

1.6 Research objectives

The general objective of this study is to assess the humanitarian - development nexus within protracted crisis contexts with a case study of Somalia.

Specifically, this thesis aims at addressing the following objectives:

1. To examine the impact of uncoordinated Aid efforts within a protracted crisis context by the humanitarian and development aid actors

2. To analyze the effects of the uncoordinated Aid mission to both the recipient country and the agencies/ NGOs involved as a precursor of lack of cooperation and synergy

3. To examine the origins and impact of the arrival of the AMISOM troops in Somalia on the humanitarian and development aid mission

4. To identify opportunities for improving complementarity and building synergies between the humanitarian and development aid actors as well as local governing bodies.

1.7 Research questions

The general research question in this study seeks to examine how the humanitarian and development aid sectors in Somalia can be synergized to achieve better results. Out of this general question the following specific questions are drawn.
1. How do humanitarian and development aid actors make programming choices?

2. What is the impact when humanitarian and development actors work in silos and without enhanced strategic coordination to the entire aid mission?

3. What is the impact of the Somalia situation to neighboring countries such as Kenya?

4. What opportunities exist to improve complementarity and to build synergies between humanitarian and development aid sectors?

1.8 Scope of the study

The scope of this study is limited to Somalia within the African continent. It specifically articulates the findings in relation to active and previous programs implemented in the country by humanitarian and development aid actors. It is limited to examining the relationship between the two actors; how coordinated or uncoordinated the relationship has been, what has been the impact of the coordination or lack of and what could have been the impact if the two aid actors were more coordinated in their programming.

1.9 Chapter organisation

This thesis is organized into five chapters.

Chapter One gives an introduction that consists of a number of sections defining the study. Chapter one includes the following sections: Background of the study, statement of the problem, purpose of the study / the general objective, research questions, specific objectives, significance of the study/ justification of the study, the scope of the study and limitations of the study.
Chapter Two gives a comprehensive theoretical and literature review by discussing examining how and why humanitarian and development aid sectors make different programming choices in protracted crisis contexts. The chapter will also highlight the impact of humanitarian and development aid actors often providing assistance in the same contexts but working separately and in an uncoordinated manner. It will further identify existing policies and opportunities for improving complementarity and building synergies between humanitarian and development aid sectors.

Chapter Three includes a designation of the research methods and techniques that will be used, the parameters which must be measured to test the hypotheses or answer the questions asked in the problem analysis, the sources of such data and the techniques used to gather and analyse the data. The chapter provides a description of subjects, sampling materials and/or apparatus, design, procedure and plans for data analysis plus additional details about the study.

Chapter Four presents the findings of the research based on the objectives and the research questions. In this regard, the study will identify and analyse certain outstanding recommendations for policies and actions that can promote greater complementarity between humanitarian and development programming. The chapter offers the argument that political contexts, incentives and drivers are, and have always been, critical to the feasibility of achieving better coordination between the two actors using Somalia as a case study.
Chapter Five generally, concludes the study. It discusses research findings and provides policy recommendations.
CHAPTER TWO

2.0 Literature review

This chapter will review the current and past literature on the thematic area of this study to explain their existing relevance to this study. Moreover, out of the review of the past and present material, the theoretical framework shall be developed to define the theories to be used in this study. The chapter will also highlight the impact of humanitarian and development aid actors providing assistance in the same contexts but working separately and in an uncoordinated manner. The chapter will further identify existing policies and opportunities for improving complementarity and building synergies between humanitarian and development aid sectors. Through this analogy, the study will develop a conceptual framework to give a precise summary of the theoretical flow. At this point the research will try and relate this study with previous researchers work and points out the research gap that this study will be addressing.

In the recent years growing need for convergence between the politics of aid and policing; emergency and military governance; securitization and the production of collective fear has constantly been advocated for as a remedy to the restoration of humanity and development in the world of crisis. According to (Lie, 2012), international aid can be grouped into two separate realms; humanitarianism and development. To a large extent, these segments of the international system rub shoulders, sometimes even overlapping and challenging each other. The realms of humanitarianism and development draw on distinct rationales involving different actors with their particular mandates: humanitarianism’s
imminent needs-based approaches building on the principles of neutrality, impartiality and independence are as such fundamentally different from the more long-term, political, rights-based development approaches.

Humanitarian crises have become increasingly complex, protracted and likely to be caused by conflict. As the scope of the SDGs increased over the original MDGs, so did the scale in terms of who would be factored in. Serving as a humanitarian or aid worker in the conflict areas requires resilience and un-proportionate courage, particularly the local staff working under bleak conditions. The organizations grapple with humanitarian space and aid worker security as emergent areas of risk. The inclusion of crisis setting in the reach and evaluation of the goals is probably the most significant aspect of the post-2015. This is due to the uneven achievement of the MDGs and untimely implementation within the earlier defined timeliness. Thus, a recognition has grown within the international community that a better coherence between humanitarian and development efforts must be ensured in order to address better to “Leave No One Behind”. This has recently led to a number of initiatives involving several key stakeholders.

Incoherence, inconsistency, lack of synergy in programmatic and operation structure of the humanitarian and the developmental actors working in a similar crisis has been consistently mentioned in the past global engagements. These have further blurred the contours of what constitutes neutral and independent humanitarian action and subsequently escalates on new unresolved questions as regards to the effectiveness of aid missions in crisis. The aid worker and humanitarian and developmental agency space in every humanitarian mission is very critical. This makes the need for continuous conversations and deliberations on how
best collaboration can be instituted among all the players serving within a similar humanitarian crisis space.

2.1 Theoretical foundation of the study

This thesis shall rely on the constructivist philosophy of science and functionalism theory as an axis to help circumvent through the study. In most cases, the standpoint of constructivism informs several international debates and engagements criss-crossing the topical areas of this study. Notwithstanding, the functionalism theory brings to perspective the essence of cooperation of the humanitarian and developmental actors on scientific, humanitarian, social and economic issues. Mapping out the overarching thoughts of constructivist thinking means positioning ontology and epistemology as a start - that is the perception of the nature of being as well as the treatment of knowledge. On the other hand, functionalism articulates the essence of a prepositioned hegemony and synchrony of players towards similar locus and course.

2.1.1 Constructivism theory

Constructivism initially emerged as an opposition to the longstanding naturalist tradition to which the positivist philosophy of science adheres. Ontologically speaking, for the constructivist the world does not exist independent of our senses but is contextually dependent on the person that is observing or studying it (Reus-Smit, 2015). It implies that the world appears diversely to different people, depending on various dimensions of their contextual settings such as time, geographical location, profession, cultural belief, gender among others. This stands in sharp contrast to the naturalist belief of one measurable truth.
that can be uncovered by the scientist, documented and communicated via language. Many constructivists agree that the physical world is material, concrete and given by nature but when it comes to the social world they voice that it is socially constructed and different to all of us. As Reus notes (Reus-Smit, 2015), this is not due to conscious action by human beings building separate realities based on some original blueprint, but rather because the world as it appears to each and every one of us respectively is a result of the continuous interactions that occur across all dimensions of society.

This dismissal of one universal truth among many constructivists, leads to the discussion of epistemology and how knowledge about this highly complex and varying social world is acquired. Constructivists can be viewed as “epistemological pluralists”, in the sense that they are willing to employ a variety of tools to understand the unique facets of the world that is being explored. “Truth isn’t just ‘out there’. Knowledge about the social world is always knowledge-in-context; it is socially situated and has social consequences. The perception is that the world itself is real, however knowledge about it is intersubjective and therefore the observer has to proceed with caution due to the constructed nature of the social world. As Robert W. Cox stated, “knowledge is always for someone and for some purpose” (Cox, 2007). The close link between knowledge and power that this implies for the constructivist, places responsibility on scientists as applicable to this context to exercise great self-awareness, since it means that the context and manner in which knowledge is transmitted and perceived is highly relevant – that relates both to the sender and receiver of the given dimensional illumination and perception.
2.1.2 Functionalism theory

The principles of functionalism as a theory lay emphasis in the assumption that governance forms because of essential or functional needs of people and the states. Therefore, governance in organizations are more opulent towards the development of capacities to meet the expected body of needs. Just a like to the neo-liberals, functionalists argue that cooperation on a systemic scale is possible, and “that international economic and social cooperation is a prerequisite for political cooperation and eliminating war” (Mingst, et al, 2004). In a sense, epistemic communities, or communities of technical experts, as a function of cooperation, will shift their allegiance away from states and deliver services according to needs of society. In neo-realism, there is an emphasis on the structure of the international system as determined by anarchy or the absence of an overarching authority and distribution of power among states. Since states’ actions are “driven largely by calculations about relative power” and capabilities, cooperation is infrequent (Mearsheimer, 2002). International regimes and institutions, according to realists, are not important actors within the system.

The traditional understanding of humanitarian and development actors’ decision-making is based primarily on functionalist theory that defines and dictates how and where aid and help goes the most. The broad perspective in social science to interpret society as a structure with interrelated complimentary parts forms the idea of structural functionalism. Functionalism defines society as a single unit in terms of the function of its constituent elements; namely norms, customs, traditions and institutions. Herbert Spencer presents an
allegory on this subject stating that there are multiple parts of society as “organs” that work toward the proper functioning of the “body” as a whole (Urry, 2000). In the most basic terms, it simply affirms “the effort to impute, as rigorously as possible, to each feature, custom, or practice; its effect on the functioning of a supposedly stable, cohesive system” (Bourricaud, 2013). Talcott Parsons perceives functionalism as a methodological development of social science rather than a specific school of thought.

Therefore, functionalism defines the formation of the international organizations in respect to the applicable approaches such as functionality and programmatic takes, that must be coherent to international cooperation on scientific, humanitarian, social - political, and economic issues. The proponents of this theory, both from the classical and post modernism, argued that mutual trust and cooperation tendencies between governments, developmental agencies and humanitarian actors, as well as the community are more likely to develop through the sharing of discrete public-sector responsibilities rather than through attempts to cooperate on more sensitive issues within individual set up. A key feature to the functional approach is the formation of agencies with specific powers that are limited and defined by the mandate that these agencies perform. Functional agencies operate only within the territories of the states that choose to join them and do not therefore threaten state sovereignty.

For the humanitarian agencies/developmental actors to operate and function effectively, they must receive un-proportionate support in terms of money from public and private coffers alike. As such, “their expected intervention, numbers and impact shall be at
unprecedented levels” (Bennett, 2010). This therefore qualifies the fact that the humanitarian agencies, the actors in governance and the society, where the crisis exist, should avoid attempts to always function as single units. This was earlier suggested by the father of functionalism theory Herbert Spencer, who presented the parts of society as “organs” that work toward the proper functioning of the “body” as a whole. This therefore suggests that the humanitarian agencies and developmental actors must always correlate and synergize their various efforts to maximize on their individual strength for an ideal result and course.

2.2.1 An overview on linking humanitarian and development aid actors

The first generation of policy approaches to greater coherence to humanitarian and development engagement in protracted crises emerged in the early 1990s from within the humanitarian community. It was concerned with better “linking” of relief, rehabilitation and development (LRRD) approaches in a positive progressive theory that envisaged mutually reinforcing outcomes where development investments would reduce vulnerability, and well-calibrated relief efforts that would “kick-start” development and protect (Macrae, 2002).

Two persistent and influential theories exist. The first theory is that a normal trajectory of state-led development exists and that crises are a temporary interruption. The second is that under-development is a key driver of conflict. These theories were applied in the thinking on linking relief and development in natural disaster contexts and to protracted emergencies as well. (Macrae, 2005).
These early efforts to achieve greater coherence should be seen in the context of a countervailing trend towards a sharper distinction of humanitarian action vis-à-vis development assistance. In the 1990s, there was a formal codification of sets of guiding principles, standards and approaches, based on the core belief of the “humanitarian imperative” which has been interpreted as a moral “duty” to respond (Simms, 2011). The 1990s also saw dramatic growth in the scale and complexity of humanitarian action, in terms of the volume of funds channeled to humanitarian response and the corresponding increase in the number and size of international humanitarian organizations. The growth in the number of humanitarian non-governmental organizations (NGOs) was also related to the changing post-Cold War politics of the 1980s and 1990s, in which the affected state fell out of favor as a potential recipient of international humanitarian assistance. Civil society emerged in popular political theory (particularly in the US and UK) as a favored alternative provider of public goods and services (Macrae, 2002). In practice, international humanitarian action became habitually “state-avoiding” in its approaches (Harvey, 2009).

LRRD approaches gradually fell out of favor, criticized for their naïve readings of the complexity of conflict, particularly the belief in a linear transition towards a resumption of a ‘normal’ trajectory of state - led development. Moreover, reforms inspired by LRRD approaches were largely incremental and focused on small adjustments to, for example, the length of relief project cycles, the creation of trust funds, and country and headquarters - level coordination mechanisms (Macrae, 2002).

A second generation of policy thinking and practice included a more nuanced understanding of the nature of conflict, acknowledging its often protracted and recurrent
nature and the unlikelihood of a linear transition out of conflict. The concept of a relief to
development “continuum” gave way to the concept of a “contiguum” where setbacks and
reversals were likely and which acknowledged the need for simultaneous engagement with
a variety of actors and at different levels.

This next iteration of policy work attempted to bring coherence not just across development
and humanitarian engagement, but also the growing fields of peace-building and
stabilization (Maxwell, 2014). This was driven in part by the rapid growth in the scale and
scope of multilateral peace-keeping operations during the 1990s, underpinned by a growing
global consensus around a collective responsibility towards human security that emerged
following the crises in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda (Macrae, 2006).

It was also partly the result of greater emphasis by bilateral partners on stabilization,
security, and on the “securitization of development”, which followed the engagement in
Afghanistan and Iraq and the global war on terror in the early 2000s. The development of
the UN peace-building architecture and doctrine, including the creation of the
Peacebuilding Commission and a renewed commitment to understanding, preventing and
addressing the causes of conflict and the role of development in this, also contributed to
shifting the theory and practice of engagement in protracted crisis situations (Denney,
2015).

Building on realists and idealist theories of under-development as a root cause of conflict,
and by extension the possibility of development assistance contributing to a transformation
in the root causes of conflict, development (and to a much lesser extent humanitarian
assistance) became recast by several important bilateral donors as a tool within their repertoire of instruments to achieve stabilization, alongside diplomacy and defense (Macrae, 2002).

In practical terms, this policy shift led to the creation of ‘whole-of-government’ institutional arrangements integrating development, defense and diplomatic approaches. Additionally, it led to the creation of a number of ‘stabilization’ and peace-building teams and funds (Macrae, 2005). Within the multilateral system, comprehensive approaches led to the creation of the UN Integrated Mission. However, the divide between these new approaches and humanitarian work persisted, meanwhile new tensions emerged in the relationship between development and peace-building, and later state-building work.

Whilst traditional development actors saw their role as focusing on the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals, in practice, development funding was (and continues to be) the main vehicle for supporting peace-building and state-building initiatives in conflict-affected environments (Levine, 2014).

A key challenge with this approach is the emphasis, promoted by the aid effectiveness agenda, on the state as the primary duty-bearer and agent in the delivery of development outcomes and in ensuring security, peace and stability. Development interventions in conflict-affected situations have increasingly focused on state-building as a key strategy to promote peace-building and to create the foundation for development. This has shifted the focus away from challenges such as reducing people’s vulnerability and from addressing the real drivers of conflict, which are often connected to the state (Bennett, 2010).
If the first generation of coherence, thinking was naïve about the politics and complexity of conflict, the second generation was intensely politicized and state-focused. This has created acute dilemmas for humanitarian actors about the extent to which they can reconcile the principles guiding their action with new approaches to stabilization, peace-building and state-building, all of which fall within the realm of development programming (Bourricaud, 2013).

2.3.1. Issues and challenges in decision-making by humanitarian agencies in protracted crisis contexts

As humanitarian crises across the globe escalates, aid appeals are frequently made by individuals, faith based entities as well as the state and non-state actors, thereafter, channeled through the humanitarian agencies and developmental actors. This venture gradually transformed from small scale charities into multi-million-institutions. This initiative started in the 1980’s as a result of the acute famine in Ethiopia that claimed many lives and the Bob Geldof’s Band Aid appeal. Since the first appeal was made and turned into a strategic goal, the exponential growth of the humanitarian agencies and the developmental players has made a significant growth. However, donations by the public are not proportional to the experience growth of these agencies. This has therefore positioned the agencies in a very precarious situation where they must depend on government funding to keep aloft. While strict limits to government funding were previously in place, they are currently nonexistent. Within this kind of engagement and relationship between state and non-state actors, raises the question of the H&D agencies
independence. Melissa Labonte, in her research paper on the humanitarian principles of NGOs, brings to light the idea of “humanitarian marketplace,” in which donors care more about the bottom line of delivery than the mission statement of a particular NGO (Labonte, 2015).

Labonte suggests that NGOs constantly amend their missions and concepts of universality on a case-by-case basis to please or rather adapt the donor’s ideologies as part of their operation manual. This therefore show the extent to which the donors give their donation with strings attached. Larry Minear also emphasizes the necessity of humanitarian and developmental agencies independence from the states and other developmental actors, as he perceives the recipient governments to be skeptical towards foreign NGOs as they frequently term them to be the most ideal tool used by the Western influences and the rising contributions made by donor governments (Minear, 2004).

The realists who are more inclined to pragmatic philosophies, often allude to the fact that the humanitarian agencies both at the local and international front are constantly subjected to political pressures of the states that provide their funding. In addition, it is these funding issues and the areas in which the humanitarian agencies work that provide a context to other variables that may influence their decision-making capacity.

While Simmons acknowledges that NGOs have many advantages and can affect change quite successfully, he emphasizes the substantial problems of NGO involvement in humanitarian crises. The national governments can easily undermine coordination and cooperation systems of humanitarian and developmental agencies in large-scale
emergencies situation, this is through the government over commitment to support the non-state actors at the expense of the multi-national agencies. H&D agencies, in light of funds acquisition and striking a balance on public opinion issues, can be rather political in nature and thus affecting their entire operational structure. As a matter of fact, they “sometimes seize on issues that seem designed more to promote their own image and fundraising efforts than to advance the public interest”.

Minear concurs with Simmons’s opinion by stating that several groups “are anything but non-governmental in their revenue sources,” yet they “retain their credentials as private institutions” thus making the humanitarian aid process look like a social enterprise venture. The United States of America law, permits the NGOs based in the US to solicit as much as 80 percent of their resources from non-private sources an opportunity that may differs to other countries laws on NGOs. Due to this trend, NGOs run the risk of becoming increasingly obliged to national governments rather than being independent. Andrew Natsios, the former administrator of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), stated that, in order to continue receiving funding, American NGOs must emphasize links to the United States administration (Macrae, 2002).

In his books review, Alex Bellamy highlights a realist approach to humanitarian intervention by the specialized agencies. Despite the fact that he only brushes over NGO response and focuses primarily on state action, his synopsis sheds light as to the political nature, in general, of humanitarian intervention (Bellamy, 2003). Simon Chesterman sheds more light in support of Bellamy’s school of thought that, organizational norms, like the sovereignty of a nation, does not prevent the international community from responding to
these crises, but rather the political will of the agencies, or lack thereof. Chesterman discusses the inconsistency of states in interpreting the relationship between human rights and recipient government’s sovereignty, and thus inclining more toward the different actions in similar cases of intervention. David Chandler provides a prime example of a more realist approach to humanitarian action suggesting that it is the interests of the interveners that matter and not those of the victims. The deepening of humanitarian ventures, the selectivity of intervention, including that of NGOs and aid conditionality are all examples of intervention as Western tools of control.

London based HPG researchers namely Margie Buchanan-Smith, Sarah Collinson, Adele Harmer, Joanna Macrae, Tasneem Mowjee, Nicola Reindorp and Anna Schmidt have recently published a report entitled “Uncertain Power: The Changing Role of Donors in Humanitarian Action,” in which they examined the trend of bilateralism. The group argued, that governments are exerting greater influence over relief agencies. In fact, there has been a significant shift away from multilateral humanitarian action through bi-lateralization which has since increased focus to the UN agencies, other multilateral humanitarian actions and towards NGOs. By so doing, governments have increased earmarking of funds, the role of donors in coordination and issued tougher contracts to “scrutinize implementing partners and increase donor presence in the field” (Gidley, 2003).

Joanna Macrae, a researcher for the Humanitarian Policy Group at the Overseas Development Institute, states that there is “an increasing proximity of official donors to decision making and operations” (Macrae, 2002). The United States of America, the largest donor, accounted for one-third of total humanitarian spending globally. The United
States increasingly earmarked funds for specific regions or areas of work. The report also stated that many U.S. grants became contracts instead of grants. There is also an increase in the establishment of framework agreements, “which for some agencies consumed too much senior management time and were an intrusion of independence” (Gidley, 2003). The research group stated that while it might make funding for NGOs more predictable, it might also sideline smaller organizations and leave the allocation of resources to a few NGOs. While donors have decidedly heightened their presence in the field, “it is an important yet unanswered question whether donors’ capacity to appraise and monitor contracts has expanded sufficiently since the first crisis was experienced (Hughes, 2014).

Daniel Bell and Joseph Carens (Bell & Carens, 2006), also discuss rather ethical challenges for NGOs, including the tension between “human rights principles and local cultural norms” as well as “collaboration with non-democratic governments”. If humanitarian aid were truly universal, it would require assistance to both parties of a conflict, even though the cause may be offering support to members of groups whose actions feed on violence within the affected area and thus creating a complicated or exacerbated a crisis (Bell & Carens, 2006).

In the NGO decision making process, it is evident that there are legal and human rights implications. NGOs must also consider the situation “on the ground” with respect to the decision to commit resources towards humanitarian assistance. Jean-Baptiste Richardier states that NGOs must realize that their participation in a relief operation in each state may only serve to aggravate what was already a fragile social order ante crisis (Richardier, 1999).
2.4.1 Overview of humanitarian and development aid actors in Somalia

Most authors like Cabot-Venton, Denney, Mallett and Mazurana among others allude that the Somalia crisis should be understood as a complex and protracted crisis which includes both conflict and cyclical natural disasters whose impact tends to become aggravated due to difficult access for humanitarian actors. After the collapse of the Said Barre’s regime, personal interests, power struggle and huge economic appetite as well as economic ambitions of warlords caused the rebel factions to fail in the establishment of an inclusive government to heal the country from the past injustices committed by the military regime under Said Barre. Consequently, this was the beginning of anarchy in Somalia since 1991 (Eriksson, 2013).

Somalia suffers from a chronic fragility of state institutions because of two decades of civil war that gave birth to the rise of insurgency, piracy and territorial controls by war lords. This has therefore made it extremely dangerous to access the hardest hit areas due to the tough geographical conditions and the dangerous terrains that are large controlled by the Islamist terror group, Al Shabaab, who have constantly ambushed the aid convoys and abducted aid workers.

Not all parts of the larger Somalia area are facing anarchy, Somaliland and Puntland enjoys relative peace and stability since the formation of an autonomous administration. This followed a successful negotiation and reconciliation process spearheaded by indigenous leaders and politicians (Afyare, 2006). The international community has continuously endeavored to restore peace in the whole Somalia region. For instance, the United Nation
engaged in the coordination of a peace agreement between the TFG and Islamic Courts Union in 1995, under the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) a resolution number 751 of 1992 which was approved to sanction a unilateral United Nations humanitarian intervention to Somalia (Harper, 2012).

The dysfunctional administrative conditions within Somalia have not only created a humanitarian catastrophe to its neighbors. They have also threatened national security, sovereignty, stability, territorial integrity and interests. Apart from the breach of her territorial integrity, Kenya as an example has shouldered the greatest responsibility in dealing with the Somalia humanitarian crisis. Enormous flows of Somali refugees fleeing into Kenya since the start of the conflict in 1991, have placed a considerable strain on the Kenyan humanitarian and economic capacity. Kenya handles more than 480,000 Somali refugees excluding those from other countries such as South Sudan, Burundi and Congo (Garvelink, 2011). These refugees have found shelters at the UNHCR refugee camps at Dadaab and Kakuma. Another group of hundreds of thousands illegal Somali immigrants has constantly relocated to Kenya’s main cities of Nairobi and Mombasa in quest for better opportunities and safety.

Armed conflict and lawlessness within Somalia has in recent times been brought right into the Kenyan door step (Menkhaus, 2016). The Kenya’s Somali-inhabited region of the former North-Eastern and Coastal provinces have been destabilized to the extent that the Kenyan security forces, Kenyan citizens, foreign aid workers and tourists have either been killed or abducted by the Somali insurgents who cross over to Kenya at will. This turned
into a serious security and humanitarian challenge beyond the effective control of the Kenyan Government (Menkhaus, 2016).

These unprecedented attacks executed by non-state actors within the Kenya borders prompted the Kenyan Government to invoke its right to self-defense in 2011, through a military incursion known as *Operation Linda Nchi*. This action was taken considering the three core principles governing the lawful exercise of the right of self-defense or in other words proportionality and immediacy criteria enshrined under the customary international law. The thesis objective three seeks to address effects of the recent humanitarian aid and military intervention initiated in October 2011 by Kenya, under the banner of *Operation Linda Nchi* a Swahili phrase that means a national defense operation.

Kenya joined AMISOM (African Mission in Somalia) in 2013. AMISOM is an African Union peace-support force with 22,126 staff (this includes both troops and police). It presently seeks to provide security and reduce the threat of Al-Shabaab together with the National Security Forces of Somalia (NSFS). AMISOM consists of soldiers both from neighboring countries (Ethiopia, Kenya, Djibouti) and other African nations (Burundi, Uganda and others). It operates under a mandate (UNSC resolution 2182/2014) to protect the Somali Federal Government, but also take offensive action against Al Shabaab (Denney, 2015).

As a result of the protracted fighting as well as recurrent natural hazards, Somalia, with a population of 12.3 million now has 1.1 million internally displaced persons (IDPs), gathered in informal settlements mainly in the urban areas, and another million which has
fled to other countries, mainly to Kenya (480,000), Ethiopia (250,000) and Yemen (250,000) (Denney, 2015) The current conflict in Yemen has further complicated the situation with returning Somalis and Yemeni refugees entering Somalia from the north (Denney, 2015).

Furthermore, localized armed disputes between regions and ethnic groups create temporary pockets of insecurity and limited access. These outbursts of violence are either inter-clan conflicts over grazing lands or other natural resources, or political disputes due to the uncertainty of political borders in the federal state formation process which shows how fragile and volatile the current political situation is. Natural hazards such as flooding and drought are part of everyday life in Somalia and because of high levels of vulnerability the hazards often turn into disasters.

The main part of the Somali population is dependent on pastoralism and rain-fed agricultural activities for their survival. Climate change and deforestation due to a long term predatory use of charcoal have contributed to an environment extremely sensitive to shocks. In addition, KDF’s charcoal collusion with Al-Shabaab may have contributed to persisting insecurity by giving it more resources to operate. Droughts and floods are common. In 2011 a severe drought hit the Horn of Africa and famine was declared in parts of Somalia for the first time since 1991.

According to (Denney, 2015), in late 2015 the cyclical weather phenomena El Niño hit the region, exacerbating the existing drought in Somalia, parts of Kenya and Ethiopia. This was followed by heavy rains and flooding in Somalia as well as Kenya with further
displacement and water-borne disease outbreaks. The resilience and coping mechanisms of the agro pastoralist populations are constantly under strain. The 2011 crisis killed 260,000 people and a large percentage of the livestock and crops, which has yet to be restocked to pre-famine levels (Garvelink, 2011). The weak institutional capacity in Somalia and difficult access for humanitarian actor’s force people to flee or migrate to neighboring countries.

In the year 2017, the Kenyan government initiated a process of repatriating the Somalia refugees hosted within her boarders for the past two decades due to the out spread attacks by the Al-Shabaab sympathizers and fighters who have since infiltrated the camps as refugees. What are the humanitarian implication of Kenya shutting the door of the camps and repatriating the refugees back to Somalia? Is Somalia safe and with the capacity to take care of the repatriates? These are some of the loud but ambiguous questions asked by the global humanitarian actors and the aid agencies. It is therefore critical to analyze the repatriation process in respect to the procedures to be used, what the international laws and policies on refugees’ dictates and how these repatriates shall be reintegrated back to the society they left decades ago (Cox, 2007). All these processes shall take the humanitarian angle and therefore the direct participation of both the Kenyan, Somalia government, the NGOs and other humanitarian actors working within the region shall be appreciated.

**2.5.1 Opportunities for improving collaboration amid complexity**

This thesis has been conducted at a time when on-going crises present risks and challenges that are too great for any country, government, agency or community to address alone.
Displacement is at a historic high and people’s vulnerabilities have been compounded by long-term and recurrent crises. Humanitarian and development actors continue to try to address the consequences of the failure of national and international actors to find political solutions to conflicts and protracted crises.

The international humanitarian response system is struggling with almost inconceivable levels of demand. For example, between 2005 and 2014, the funding requirements of inter-agency appeals have increased by 373 per cent from US$3.8 billion to US$18 billion (Bennett, 2010). This is partly because humanitarian actors often find themselves largely alone in addressing the needs of vulnerable people, year after year, although the causes of their vulnerability are structural. In the last few years particularly, acute resource constraints have prompted humanitarian actors to reflect seriously on the extent of their remit and effectiveness of their investments in protracted crises and conflict-affected contexts. Meanwhile, development responses are not fast enough and do not seem suited to address the causes and the consequences of on-going crises.

Despite growing attention to the human costs, economic and political risks associated with shocks, the development community seems trapped in a state-centric approach to responding to conflict and protracted crises.

The development of theory and practice around the UN peace-building architecture and the New Deal, with its peace-building and state-building goals (PSGs), should have provided an opportunity for international actors to focus more effectively on addressing the causes of conflicts and crises in the immediate and longer term. These approaches sought to bring
together different efforts and capacities. These could include humanitarian, peace-building, state-building, peace-keeping and development actions and activities. For example, the creation of the UN peace-building architecture in 2005 aimed to provide “...a single intergovernmental organ dedicated to peace-building, empowered to monitor and pay close attention to countries at risk, ensure concerted action by donors, agencies, programmes and financial institutions, and mobilize financial resources for sustainable peace” (Global Policy Forum, 2004).

The New Deal also advocated for inclusive country-owned and led visions and plans to transition from conflict and fragility and for coherent support from international actors. However, in practice, international actors continue to be confronted with the challenge of standing behind state-led processes (rather than inclusive national processes) in contexts where governments may be party to a conflict and where opportunities of promoting inclusive processes are limited. After years of concerted effort and investment, peace-building and state-building efforts are not delivering hoped-for results. The New Deal has not yet translated into more effective and coherent engagement by the international community in crisis-affected environments (Cabot-Venton, 2014).

Despite major challenges with existing paradigms, models and approaches, the urgency and scale of global crises is fostering new alliances and approaches. New initiatives, including using resilience as an organizing analytical approach and a greater emphasis on understanding and addressing risks at different levels of the state and society. These are helping to refocus international engagement in protracted and recurrent crisis on the key structural causes of vulnerability. Global processes and commitments including the Sendai
Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030, the Sustainable Development Goals, the World Humanitarian Summit and the on-going reform of the UN peace-building architecture provide unique political opportunities to substantially change the discourse and to promote more coherent responses across the humanitarian and development communities. (Bellamy, 2003). But, as the study highlights, without senior leadership and committed efforts to build coherent approaches, these separate processes risk replicating isolated approaches to engaging with fundamental global challenges within crisis-affected contexts.

2.5.2 Challenges and gaps identified in the literature review

Despite a broad body of literature on the relationship between humanitarian and development aid, there is limited specific guidance on how to address perceived gaps, and few practical examples of how donors’ and others have implemented change. Commonly cited challenges and methods to address them, include: conceptual, institutional and strategic gaps; differences in working principles, mandates and assumptions – all of which could present challenges for operationalizing LRRD.

Internally, the institutional arrangements of some donors present a clear division in the delivery of humanitarian and development aid. Externally, however, disunity among donor agencies and a lack of dynamism to respond to events have created strategic gaps in the delivery of different forms of aid approaches to tackling such gaps include: decentralizing planning, analysis and funding allocation (Simmons, 1998); establishing joint humanitarian and development offices; creating operational frameworks that incorporate
both a long-term perspective into humanitarian work and issues of vulnerability and risk in development work (Mearsheimer, 1994-1995).

**Funding gaps:** There is inconsistent evidence about the existence of a temporal funding gap between the humanitarian and development phases of a response. Comprehensive evidence of funding gaps for recovery activities is evident within the spectrum of recovery activities, showing that fragile states do not receive the requisite support. The financing available is also fragmented and acutely compartmentalized. (Hoffman, 2002). Lack of flexibility in funding arrangements is a particular concern.

Approaches to making humanitarian funding more flexible and longer-term include multi-year funding options, strategic partnerships and coordination. However, implementing partners at times may lack the technical expertise or capacity to work across different forms of aid or coordinate their activities. Others may specialize in either humanitarian or development aid and find it difficult to draw linkages between the two. In terms of approaches, evaluations have found that programmes with strong local engagement and local partnerships on the ground are often more successful at marrying short- and long-term perspectives (Beattie, 2003). Some of the approaches to improve donor coordination include compacts, multilateral joint assessments and mutual accountability frameworks (Initiative, 2015).

**Refugees and displaced persons:** The perception that displaced persons can only be addressed through humanitarian means can impede or delay the achievement of sustainable solutions and lead to protracted displacements as well as a cycle of dependence on
humanitarian assistance (Cabot-Venton, 2014). In terms of approaches, the transitional solutions initiative and the Solutions Alliance aim to position displacement at the core of recovery and development strategies through advocacy, coordination, capacity building and resource mobilisation. The bilateral and multilateral actors are the focus of these approaches, to enhance the building of relationships. The aim is to support local processes and local ownership while finding sustainable solutions for displaced persons and local communities.

A central challenge in conceptualizing the humanitarian-development nexus is a lack of clarity in concepts and definitions. According to (Hinds, 2015), terms such as LRRD, relief and development are not clearly defined or are commonly misunderstood. There is often a lack of clarity in what the humanitarian-development problem is, which can have practical implications for connecting the two approaches. There is also still some ambiguity about objectives and funding streams for rehabilitation work. Therefore, more research needs to be conducted, an oversight this research intends to rectify.

2.6.1 Contextual framework

A conceptual framework is defined as an analytical tool with several variations and contexts. Its application is relevant in making a conceptual distinctions and organization of thoughts and ideas. A strong conceptual framework should capture something real and must do this in a way that is easy memorable and applicable manner. (Bryman, 2004).
**Dependent variables**

1. Level of Need
2. Resources vs finances/grants
3. History of humanitarian need of a country
4. The type of the organization (faith based or secular)
5. The size of the organization (large or small)
6. Type of the crisis, natural disaster or man caused crisis
7. Policy differences and organogram

**Independent variables**

1. The level of need in the country because of the crisis
2. The responding NGO’s consistency responded to the same country with the same crisis
3. Politics of crisis country government
4. Operating budget
5. Small or large NGO
6. Faith based or secular NGO
7. Existing natural resources in the recipient country vs the amount of the donor funds committed
CHAPTER THREE

3.0 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

This chapter presents the methodology adopted for the research and the analysis of the data gathered in the course of the research. It dwells on the mix of methodology deemed appropriate for the research study including the research design, sources of data, methods of data collection and analysis.

3.1 Research design

The specification of methods and procedures for acquiring the information needed informs the research design. It is the overall operational pattern or framework of the project that stipulates what information is to be collected, from which source and by what procedures. (Mugenda, 1999) defines research design as the scheme, outline or plan that is used to generate answers to research problems. It is an arrangement of conditions of data collection and analysis. This study employs descriptive survey to assess the humanitarian-development nexus within protracted crisis contexts scoping on the Somalia scenario. A researcher utilizing a descriptive research design aims at presenting the variables without influencing or manipulating the results or outcomes. Thus, the utility of surveys and fact-finding inquiries of different kinds assist in describing the state of affairs as they occurred in the past or are happening in real time.

To further address the study objectives, explanatory research design was used to find out the performance and problems challenges faced by the NGOs in a protracted crisis in
volatile situation. Explanatory research is defined as an attempt to connect ideas to understand cause and effect, meaning researchers want to explain what is going on (Borg, 2003). The main aim of explanatory research was to identify causal links between the humanitarian-development nexus and the protracted crisis in humanitarian aid context.

### 3.2 Data collection

This research is based on a descriptive research design to examine the impact of a more coordinated relationship between humanitarian and development aid actors. Descriptive research entails various steps and procedures to draw conclusions about the description of two or more variables under the study with an intention to answer the research question without any influence (Mugenda, 1999).

The research employed the case study approach to determine the impact of the lack of coordination between humanitarian and aid agencies. It also uses exploratory desktop research based on secondary data couple with a linear sample primary data in form of speeches and conference proceedings not withstanding an extensive literature review based on publications include journal articles, research work and official documents. The study conducted searches on both electronic databases and websites of relevant ministries, institutions, departments and organizations. Primary sources such as UN documents, constitutions, agency reports among others was also used.

Primary sources such as legal documents e.g. UN, AU documents and historical documents, interviews found in the web, or any other sources of first-hand information were also used in the development of this thesis.
3.3 Data analysis techniques

The data collection variances were coded then arranged in groups and categorized into nominal, ordinal, ratio and interval scales of measurements. After coding the organized data, they were analyzed through a Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) Version 17 computerized software. The open-ended questions that are qualitative in nature were examined through explanations and interpretations of findings by use of descriptive methods. Description of patterns and uniqueness in the data collected was determined, then conclusions drawn from the variables through quantification process for the purposes of comparisons and validation of the findings. The data was used to generate descriptive statistics such as measures of central tendencies and relationship between the variables consequently drawing meaningful interpretations.

3.4 Ethical issues

In conducting this research, some key ethical issues were put in consideration. This was to ensure the research abides by the rules of responsibility, accountability and liability within the context of positionality.

3.5 Limitation of the study

In any research work, challenges are inevitable as one can never be fully prepared. These can be caused by the external environment or because of the issues directly related to the study. One key issue is the limited access to updated information on the direct impact of a better coordinated relationship between humanitarian and development aid actors. The
significant limitations of a smaller data set and potential selection bias, the lack of sufficient
time and reliable data on funding and humanitarian crises are the key limitations faced
during this research study.
CHAPTER FOUR

4.0 Results and findings

The backbone of the humanitarian-development nexus is to stir up resilience of the most vulnerable, tracing the root causes of recurrent crises and making aid more efficient and effective. However, the essence for having a strong collaboration between humanitarian aid and development action has long been discussed at the international level. The public endorsement it received at the World Humanitarian Summit that was held in the year 2017 assured that it is now part of the core commitments of the Agenda for Humanity (Change, 2017). According to the context, engaging with development and peace building actors could jeopardize the respect of the humanitarian principles of neutrality, humanity, impartiality, and independence (Costa, 2017).

The humanitarian imperative is to provide life-saving services, access to those services should be immediate, time efficient, neutral, impartial and independent. They cannot depend or wait for a dialogue with all stakeholders involved with such different mandate (Cherrie, 2017). Humanitarian actors are directly involved and present in the front line where the main needs are. Development actors are normally sitting in capitals or in more secured areas with restricted movements, hence losing contact with the person in need (Bell & Carens, 2006).

The primacy of humanitarian principles continues to be an anchorage of the humanitarian actions done in the crisis situation across the globe. With transcended humanitarian and developmental divides working in unison toward some collective outcomes, will ensure
humanitarian needs are met. With this, there shall be an obvious reduction in risk and vulnerability over multiple years as a precursor to the collaborative efforts and the comparative advantage of a diverse range of actors working within the same crisis area (Cherrie, 2017).

Rationally, peace plays an integral part, together with humanitarian and development effort to promote the 16th SDG that aims at developing a peaceful society for all to live in. It goes without saying that peace cannot exist without development and the reverse is true. And of course, in emergency contexts, humanitarian aid remains fundamental in stabilization of the existing crisis (Devereux, 2007).

In Somalia, the peace building process, in areas under the control of the Federal Government, goes in tandem with expanding that territory through the military. This means that the armed forces are paid for and carried out by the same actors that support the peace building. (Dunn, 2014). With these actors engaging with local and national authorities it has been viewed as the main effect of taking a specific “political” side in the conflict. This hence creates a paradox of their actual mandate of peace building. In protracted crises, corruption is deeply rooted in the governmental system. Collaborating with this system especially when setting up long term MoU, means to accept and contribute to this trend. Frequent internal reshuffle of authorities and government representatives makes it difficult to have a continuous dialogue for a long-term plan (Haan, 2012).

Local and national authorities are in most cases not yet able to take over from NGOs the provision of basic services. Engaging with government actors and representatives has
further increase the risks for humanitarian actors to be a soft target for the non-state actors who thrive in the clan conflicts and political faction conflicts. As examples in crisis situations clearly show, the results of merging and lumping humanitarian aid and development action into a nexus of shared responsibility comes at the detriment of the people in need (Afyare, 2006).

Development and peace-building are of course fundamental efforts worth pursuing. But when it comes to emergencies, we cannot ignore that our responsibility is to provide a quick and effective response while saving lives - which is exactly what humanitarian aid is about. Thus, in this context, shifting the focus from responding to human suffering today to reducing the likelihood of suffering tomorrow, not only is problematic, but is not a priority (Change, 2017).

As from the advent of the anarchy as a precursor to the 1991 bloody coup de tat that dislodged the tyrannical regime of Said Barre, Somalia has experience one crisis after the other. In the year 2011, southern Somalia faced a famine in which an estimated 260,000 people died and which generated a huge humanitarian response; the famine was the result of a severe regional drought, global and local food price rises and a political-security context that delayed and constrained the humanitarian response (Maxwell & Fitzpatrick, 2012). In 2017, another major drought hit Somalia despite of the political and security conditions being better than it was in 2011, major limitations in accessibility has continued to affect the response and the disaster preparedness of famine, pandemics and other major shocks over the years.
A sequence of state collapse, clan-based militia rule, local governance based on customary and religious authority; and a fledgling state formation is what has been characterizing the political, social and economic strata in Somalia. Being one of the poorest countries in the world, Somalia has been subjected to recurrent and precarious natural and man-made shocks and aftershocks (Afyare, 2006).

Several areas in Somalia are under the grip of effective government structures. The local and regional administrations at different levels have a very large degree of autonomy but remain very weak. The state-building creation process has advanced with the establishment in South-Central Somalia of new states, that united together different regions (Costa, 2017).

However, the desperate effort of the state building process has constantly hit a snag as a result of, clan authority (Seer/Xeer) and Islamic law (Sharia) that has heavily influenced the administration of justice and the rule of law (Manuel, 2017). Sharia law is often referred as it is applicable to family law and civil dispute resolution. The extremist domains such as the Al Shabaab controlled areas are ruled by a particularly conservative interpretation of Sharia that is more intense as compared to the actual dictates of the Sharia Law. Today Somalia is the world’s third highest source country for refugees, after Syria and Afghanistan. The country has one of the world’s lowest primary school enrollment rates – just over 40% of children are in school, coupled with one of world’s highest youth unemployment rates. (DEMAC, 2017).

The Somalia national policy and political atmosphere is currently more solid than ever to envision and develop a long-term goal for a Government-owned social protection
programme. However, in the short to medium term, the focus should be on the development of a more harmonized safety net approach, building on the humanitarian and resilience experience and programming in the country. This would lay the foundation for a transition to a national social protection programme (Somalia, 2017).

Developing and following a ‘national’ framework, in the short, medium and long-term, has the potential to streamline international aid provided to Somalia that is widely acknowledged to be fragmented at all levels (across and between donors and agencies; between locations of Nairobi and Mogadishu and between humanitarian and developmental objectives) (Darville, 2012). A pre-requisite to developing a more coherent approach is donor leadership, drive and the necessary capacity. Without this willingness and action short, medium and long-term goals and programmes are likely to remain limited and fragmented (Bellamy, 2003).

Somalia government ownership, the streamlining of international and local agency engagement is key to this process. The development of a preliminary work-plan underpinned on a synergized effort of all actors, based on an identification of the characteristics and core functions of a system and a prioritization of key activities is vital in such cases as Somalia. A number of policy and programmatic initiatives have been shaped in recent years in Somalia that have been informed by social protection, safety-net thinking and a holistic and integrated approach (Dunn & Brewin, 2014).

While Somalia humanitarian crisis remains the most longstanding, volatile contextually and extremely complex globally, it also provides opportunities for innovativeness in aid
delivery methods. The spirit of innovativeness as has long been the case in the development of cash-based humanitarian and development programming. It has long been revitalized to meet the needs of the local populations affected in Somalia. There was a large-scale famine in 2017 that continuously attracted several mitigating actors but the humanitarian impact of the drought aftermath remains very disastrous (Ali, 2005).

Across the state of Somalia, more than 6.2 million people, half of the population, are now in need of humanitarian assistance and protection (Costa, 2017). This includes 87,250 children suffering from severe acute malnutrition who are far more vulnerable than any other group. Overall about 1.2 million children are expected to be suffering from acute malnutrition (Costa, 2017).

Nearly two million people are estimated to be living in hard to reach, conflict affected rural areas in southern and central Somalia. This includes areas that are inaccessible due to presence of non-state armed actors or heavy fighting between the government forces and the armed militias. Humanitarian presence in conflict areas has therefore remains limited. These communities have high vulnerability and are disproportionally affected by food insecurity, malnutrition, inadequate WASH and disease outbreaks (Haan, 2012).

Large-scale social assistance systems take years, if not decades, to develop and refine. The effectiveness and impact of these systems are considered positive but also complex to assess. These (large-scale assistance) programmes are in part designed to smooth out what would otherwise be recurrent ‘humanitarian’ caseloads (as is the case in Somalia) and may
in part be assessed by what would be required in their absence (Development Initiatives, 2017).

Donor fatigue, protracted humanitarian needs and the emergence of other humanitarian crisis in the world, are heavily affecting international funds allocated for Somalia. Donor agencies are highlighting the importance to focus on longer-term, more durable solutions and responses linked to the development agenda for Somalia (Cherrie, 2017). The impact of cash transfers in Somalia is itself challenging to determine. There is no doubt that cash-based programming is appropriate to the context. At the household level, food security and wider economic and market levels, the use and impact of cash is well known and has been well documented in Somalia (Davis, 2016).

Evidence shows that cash transfers are predominantly used by recipients to improve access to food (improving quantity and quality); reduce household debt (and therefore re-open credit lines); and improve access to other (non-food) household essentials, water and education (Hedlund, 2003). However, this positive impact is mitigated by a number of further issues: such as, the effectiveness of targeting processes, in particular in reaching the most vulnerable populations including marginalized and minority populations. This is not a specific concern for cash-based programming but affects all forms of aid distribution in Somalia and may contribute to limiting improved welfare outcomes to most vulnerable groups; and the impact of cash on nutritional indicators; for example the (2017) largescale cash programme had been implemented while numbers of people increased significantly; malnutrition levels for many IDPs have remained high in spite of IDPs being amongst the
most (geographically) accessible population group to aid agencies and cash programmes in Somalia (Change, 2017).

The governance and policy context for Somalia presents a very mixed and complex landscape, with both reasons for and examples of political and administrative progress, as well as major caveats and concerns. This is a little surprising given the long-prevailing political fragility of the country. It is exemplified by the overall message of progress and opportunity expressed by those within and outside of Government during the current assignment, but which also occurred while the current Government was itself in a moment of significant instability (Cherrie, 2017). In terms of the overall governance arena, the ‘national’ level is itself contested with Somaliland remaining a secessionist polity, with its own administration, currency, ‘national’ ID system and (limited) regulatory environment. In addition, the authority, administrative capacity and governance arrangements at the Federal level and between the Federal and Member State levels remain highly variable and often volatile (Cabot-Venton, 2014).

As of October 2017, slightly over 40% of the overall funding requested for the 2017 Somalia Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP) for health and nutrition was met; this resulted to significant unmet gaps within the health and nutrition sectors. However, the failure of the humanitarian response and the need to look for alternative solutions in the health sector has resulted to it being poorly developed, externally driven, expensive and inefficiently planned, implemented and managed. Almost all the providers are supported by bilateral donors (DEMAC, 2017).
These political, economic and equity factors are known to be extremely complex and problematic in fragile contexts, such as Somalia (Denney, 2015). In addition, the high mobility and vulnerability of the Somali population (including high numbers of IDPs) has been considered an important factor in reducing the positive impact of cash on nutrition outcomes, and this study therefore concludes that cash on its own was not effective at preventing wasting and that high levels of morbidity and low vaccination coverage were likely undermining ability to address wasting properly (Development Initiatives, 2017).

4.1 Analysis of the state of Somalia within a protracted crisis context

The study research also noted that the Somalia population is highly heterogeneous and vulnerability (and hence risk for malnutrition) varied depending on date and origin of displacement (T.I, 2016). To sum it up, while there are widely recognized benefits of large-scale, predictable social assistance programmes in other contexts, (and positive evaluations for shorter-term highly prolific programmes in Somalia), and assertions that these can contribute to improved ‘resilience’ against shocks, there are a range of factors, including, but not with standing, the efficacy of targeting measures and the availability of basic services that can influence these outcomes (Cherrie, 2017). It is therefore of great importance to be very clear about what the objectives of a long-term predictable programmes are and to be cognizant that the diversity of impacts that long-term humanitarian and developmental programmes are proven to make will depend on the particular design of that programme. In addition, a livelihood framework provides a more appropriate and holistic conceptual and programmatic approach to assistance, enabling
social capital and basic services objectives to be incorporated alongside food security objectives (Cherrie, 2017).

The current aid architecture in Somalia consists of many donors funding a wide range of programmes and projects through different bilateral and multi-lateral financial instruments and arrangements. The major donors to Somalia include the US, DFID and the EU/ECHO (the three largest OECD funders) (Relief Web, 2018). There is also significant donor support from OIC (Organisation for Islamic Cooperation) countries. Beyond this donor-country level support are the usual set of developmental and humanitarian actors (and those that cover both). This includes a wide range of UN agencies, including UNDP, UNICEF, WFP, ILO, WHO, FAO, UNHCR, some of whom are multi-mandate organizations, the World Bank Group, a large number of international NGOs and many national NGOs (Relief Web, 2018).

Donor and implementing agencies from OIC countries are also present. Programme implementation and support is also undertaken by a number of private contractors, who may in most cases can be national, regional or global in scale (Relief Web, 2018). A range of support functions are provided, both internal to the UN and NGO system, such as the UN Risk Management Unit, OCHA, the Somalia NGO Consortium and National Safety Programme (NSP), as well as from the private sector, including international and national consulting companies and private contractors, involved in a range of activities from third-party monitoring roles, research and direct implementation of projects etc. (Aal, 2000).
Leadership across this array of actors is, in principle, located primarily within the donor agencies, and in close collaboration with the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Somalia, and his Deputy (who is also the Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator) (DEMAC, 2017). This set of actors should have and should always aim to develop short, medium and longer-term perspectives incorporating humanitarian and developmental goals.

Since the research was qualitative in nature, the analysis was done using descriptive statistics, which allowed use of inferential statistics to make predictions (“inferences”) from that data. The qualitative data was thematically categorized in accordance with research objectives and reported in narrative form. In this thesis, the method of classical content analysis was used to assess the humanitarian-development nexus within protracted crisis contexts in Somalia in 2014-2017.

While recognizing the significant limitations of a smaller data set and potential selection bias, the lack of sufficient time and reliable data on funding and humanitarian crises restricted the data to a few sampled organizations as earlier indicated. Due to the confines of available data and time, the data set only includes three years (2014-17). If it were possible to obtain from each targeted NGO a detailed account of financial giving to each individual crisis the data could be improved upon. However, NGOs themselves often do not have this information as they record only the region and country to which they give and not the specific crisis.
Much of the financial and intervention data was drawn from Relief Web and the Financial Tracking System (Relief Web, 2018), which is managed by the UN Office of Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and reports the amount and type of aid contributed to a given crisis. Classical content analysis comprises techniques for reducing texts to a unit-by-variable matrix and analyzing that matrix quantitatively to test hypotheses. With the hypothesis, the researcher can produce a matrix by applying a set of patterns to a set of qualitative data for example written texts. This is operationalized with the assumption being that the patterns of interest have already been discovered and described beforehand (Bellamy, 2003).

Level of need in this research was computed as an index based on GDP per capita levels, the severity of the crisis (percent of the population affected by the crisis in Somalia) in natural emergencies, and the under-5 mortality rate (the mortality rate of children under five years old) in complex emergencies (defined as conflict-related or caused by conflict and natural events).

The analysis is based on the three derived research statements as earlier indicated in the first chapter to draw the variable that defined the sample data. As indicated in the first hypothesis the size of an NGO determines its level of response and its need for collaboration with other agencies working in for a similar course in a location. In the data we sample through a desktop review, it was evident through the analysis of the operation and programmatic module of the sample organization that the larger organization tends to develop collaborations with ease unlike the smaller NGOs. Therefore, the larger an NGO, the more resources and ability it has to respond to a given crisis. The large NGOs sample
in this study, World Vision, CARE, Amnesty International, Red Cross Society and OXFAM are usually more established organizations and frequently work in conjunction with international governmental organizations or governments themselves to mitigate on a specified humanitarian or developmental need. These large organizations have both financial and personnel muscle, more world offices, hence more integrated with other organizations, which in turn, leads to a higher level of bureaucratization and cooperation.

While NGOs receive high amounts of funding from governments and IGOs, the high level of bureaucratization has a potential to impede the response to crisis. In addition, economies of scale such as the multinational corporation and the media always leans to towards the larger NGOs, increasing their ability to obtain funds. Though large NGOs may be less independent because of their integration with IGOs and governments, their probability for responding at higher levels is greater.

The four sampled large NGOs are among the eight major NGOs that consume more than 50% of the humanitarian funding market, thus essentially knocking out the smaller NGOs competing for funding for the same course. 75% of the funding allocated by the UN to mitigate on global humanitarian and developmental crisis has consistently found its way into the large pockets of the largest NGOs, “which does not always lead to aid going where it was needed most because the least well-known NGOs may be the ones working on the most neglected problems” (Hoffman, 2002).

Acknowledging the hurdles associated to fundraising (Karns & Mingst, 2004), also pointed out that NGOs face issues regarding the intrusion upon a state’s sovereignty and the
challenge to remain and to appear to remain universal. Melissa Labonte in her report (Labonte, 2007) argued that the foundational tenets of most of the large NGOs more specifically the Red Cross are no longer in tandem with the reality in which humanitarian NGOs currently find themselves. Referring to a “humanitarian marketplace”, in which donors care more about the bottom line of delivery than the mission statement of a particular NGO, the independence of NGOs is put into question.

NGOs intervening on humanitarian and developmental issues are also faced with issues with integration, cooperation and synergy regarding their work on the ground. As a result of the escalation of the humanitarian crisis globally, NGOs are resolving to integrate into their relief work some developmental aspects. However, financial modalities to support collective outcomes must always be put into serious consideration. Analysis of the commonality of the undertaking, risk, need and responsibility in sync with the mission statement of the mission visive of the respective organization is always put to test to gauge commitment, and good bargain practices before committing to such course.

Size, programmatic approach and the type of the NGOs area some of the common factors that determines the establishment of this integration and synergizing effort. Karns and Mingst (Karns & Mingst, 2004) follow with this line of thought. They state that NGOs that are more involved in service-delivery through IGO or government subcontracting and integration of concerted effort, including gaining UN consultative status, are more likely to face the danger of bureaucratization. It may be that smaller NGOs or networks of smaller NGOs may be less likely to have governments as substantial donors and hence may have a
better chance of protecting their independence, regardless of type of NGO (religious or secular).

Larry Minear also discusses the difference in size and resources of various NGOs. In fact, he argues that heterogeneity may alter the re-utilization of humanitarian action. Some NGOs on the other hand, are impromptu in their formation (Hoffman, 2002). Further, Smillie argues that while larger NGOs might have the capability and proficiency to respond to major emergencies, the large bureaucracy can shroud the humanity needed in the situation. (Smillie, 2003).

These NGOs work in relief and development at grassroots level, increasingly with indigenous NGOs, which is labor intensive from a staff perspective, both expatriate and indigenous. Many have large field staffs that allow them to conduct complex operations in remote areas.

Melissa Labonte, in tandem to her discussion of NGO independence as earlier indicated, proposes that faith-based NGOs are best positioned to remain truly independent and to operate universally, unlike the other secular NGOs that may need to adapt their missions and concepts of universality on a case-by case basis, to coincide with the interest of the donor. Michael McGinnis, alludes that a faith based organization includes “an agent’s role partially justifying one or more of their shared sense of community, rituals, beliefs, codes, or corporate structure to some supernatural being or force. If none of these aspects are religious in that sense, then the configuration is self-contained and the agents in question are motivated solely by practical matters” (McGinnis, 2006). He further states that FBOs
just like any religious members must always claim complete allegiance, independence and obedience as religion acts as an equilibrium to the authority of the state actors.

Furthermore, the agents of faith-based organizations strictly adhere to spiritual and religious goals unlikely they would do the non-tangible goals of the secular NGOs, such as political power, economic wealth, or social status in the world. These religious agents understand the behavior expected of them and conduct themselves in accordance to their set of belief (McGinnis, 2006).

Does religion matter in organizational function? This has remained one of the most critical question traversed through by several researchers, Mark Charves being one of them (Darville, 2012). Charves argues that religious organizations could possibly differ from secular organizations for various reasons: institutional environments they are founded upon differ and they display organogram and programmatic differences. They however, may or may not manifest religious content in their on-the-ground culture and practice during an intervention. Charves argues that religious organizations could possibly differ from secular organizations for various reasons: they might be embedded in different institutional environments, and they might have different internal structures, they may or may not manifest religious content in their on-the-ground culture and practice (Darville, 2012).

In addition to providing more holistic kinds of service, many researchers argue that faith-based organizations are more agile and responsive than secular organizations and government agencies when it comes to dealing with complex humanitarian situations as they are more holistic in their interventions. Empirical foundation however lacks to show
case the assumption that religious organizations perform differently than do secular organizations, nonetheless, the religious organizations are more expected to be effective in reaching the hardest-to-serve population.

Humanity versus nature has also been imputed as one of the challenges affecting humanitarian - development interventions within a protracted crisis context. Larry Minear and Ian Smillie in their combine research contextualize the existing relationship between donor funding and NGO response to different kinds of crisis. In their findings that has made part of this research, they pointed out that lack of donor capability in funding for recovery and reconstruction work, NGOs are compelled to apply only for short term grants, which last from three to six months, and create inconsistencies in response. It is largely believed that most NGOs will pack-out the soonest they believe that the emergency is over (Manuel, 2017).

(Manuel, 2017) furthers his argument by alluding that the faster the onset of the emergency, the more donor attention an emergency will receive in comparison to others. The short-term considerations are the facets that drive humanitarian policy and donor response in humanitarian situation. Essentially, the longer the timeframe, the more difficult it becomes to attract funding opportunity. They further say, “Longer-term values and commitment are a hard sell, making the financing of extended emergencies and of transitional programming to development difficult” (Minear & Smillie, 2005).

In addition, NGOs working in crisis situation constantly faces uphill task in obtaining funding for multi-year programs in parts of the world of lower profile or interventions of
extreme risk that can attract to it more political risk. Such interventions whose precursor be terrorism to the donor countries as a retaliatory response to the humanitarian actions are constantly ignored by the donor community. This therefore limits the humanitarian and developmental agencies in what to deal with, where to operate and who to cluster with during the humanitarian crisis response. Generally, it is easier for donors and NGOs to access the affected populations in natural disaster that occurred in a passive area as compared to intervening in a volatile area. In accessing the Somalia context, this research has therefore discovered heightened animosity and tension complicate the delivery of effective aid and developmental assistance. In complex emergencies that more political, aid workers are constantly attacked, killed or abducted thus complicating matters and sullied - resulting into a blame shift situation (Spiegel, 2015).

Natural disasters lack much of the complications that are inherent in conflicts. In conflict situations, access to the population affected is difficult due to the highly intense and violent situations while natural disasters are also easier to assess, especially in terms of the length of operations. This therefore implies that conflicts, are more complex to foresee its end, not to mention whether the conflict will ease or deepen unlike natural disasters. Therefore, the nature of the crisis and its causes vehemently affects humanitarian-development Nexus within a humanitarian mission.

This research analysis further provides another expectation regarding the history of conflict in the crisis country: NGOs are less likely to respond to crisis countries that have had a significant history of conflict within their borders. Nonetheless, the results of the regression do not necessarily qualify this expectation. Therefore, the increasing history of conflict in
an area can be imputed to have had a serious influence on the probable chanced of a having high response. In the Somalia case, “history of conflict” and a “history of war” since 1991 can be attributed to explaining the rising interest of both the NGOs, INGOs and FBOs towards this country.

The specific history of a conflict or crisis, attracts considerable portions of their budgetary allocation from both the government and the donor community. However, the governments and the large Multinational companies acting as donors are self-interested actors who may consider the amount of resources a country has when deciding whether to respond to a humanitarian crisis or not, the amount of resources a crisis country possessed has been determined through this research to be a great contributor to the way the NGOs respond to her predicaments.

According to the Somalia Fragility Assessment conducted by Poole (2015), there had been multiple sector or agency-specific assessments to inform individual agency or donor programming. While NGO and UN resilience consortia were conducting a range of vulnerability and livelihood assessments in various parts of the country, the African Development Bank was conducting infrastructure needs assessments for the information technology, water and sanitation, transport and energy sectors. In some cases, the government is usually conducting its own type of assessments driven by the actors funding the assessments. The challenge with these separate assessments is that they do not contribute to a shared vision and prioritised plan of action.
Practical obstacles and entrenched ways of working play a major role in discouraging shared analysis and planning. Mismatched planning timeframes for humanitarian and development assistance act as a barrier to the development of shared plans across the humanitarian and development communities. While development actors generally operate on five-year plans, humanitarian actors tend to work on annual planning and/or funding cycles. Even in the Sahel, where there is a three-year regional Humanitarian Response Plan, each country in the region has a UN Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) that starts and ends at a different time, making it impossible to align the HRP with the UNDAFs.

The architecture has also resulted in separate coordination structures for humanitarian and development activities with no mechanisms to bridge them. This is even though, in the case of donors with limited human resources at field level and multi-mandated UN agencies, the same staff members participate in the separate coordination meetings. In Somalia, the participation of humanitarian agencies in the PSG working groups set up as part of the Compact architecture has been limited. However, proposals by the EU to establish a joint task force under PSGs 4 and 5 to cover the issues of resilience, protection and durable solutions, all of which bring humanitarian and development actors together, are a potential step in the direction of greater complementarity.

In Somalia, resilience initiatives are trying to bring humanitarian and development actors together around a shared analysis of risks and of how these can be addressed, with the aim of enhancing the capacities of different layers of society to cope with identified risks. The famine in 2011 brought about a realisation, particularly amongst humanitarian agencies, that providing assistance in a ‘business as usual’ way was no longer sustainable. As a result,
three UN agencies, working across humanitarian and development programmes, developed a shared strategy for enhancing resilience in 2012. More recently, donor interest in supporting resilience programming in Somalia had led to the establishment of NGO consortia (such as the Somalia Resilience Program, SomRep, and Building Resilient Communities in Somalia, BRiCS).

One challenge with the proliferation of resilience initiatives in Somalia was that they had developed outside coordination structures for humanitarian and development assistance since they cut across the two forms of programming. As a result, as described in Good Practice Example 2, the RC/HC had brought the relevant actors, including the Somali government, around the table to promote better coordination. This illustrates that new trajectories and approaches need not be detrimental to coherence if they are managed effectively.

Nevertheless, according to (Bellamy, 2003) humanitarian and development actors convene around programmatic issues of common interest, both globally and at country level. Examples include convening around the concept of resilience as an organising approach; cash-based programming as an approach to addressing chronic vulnerability; and joint efforts to find long-term solutions to protracted displacement. Issue-based and inter-disciplinary collaboration can lead to the development of more complementary ways of working. Supporting these initiatives and networks could provide useful lessons for systematising complementarity within and across agencies.
Development aid is still slow, burdened by heavy and often risk-averse procedures, and by a tension between bilateral versus multilateral engagement. In Somalia, for example, it has taken around two years to put in place the multi-donor fund architecture, the Somalia Development and Reconstruction Facility (SDRF), to support the implementation of the Somali Compact.

The purposes of the SDRF include strengthening government systems and enabling donors to pool fiduciary risk so that they can provide their development funding through the government. Donors have had to balance the benefits of using state systems (even though they may take years to develop adequate absorptive capacity and comply with fiduciary risk requirements) on one hand and the need to ensure the timely delivery of basic services on the other. Most development donors made the choice to work through the state and the SDRF rather than provide assistance outside this architecture but this had slowed down the ability to provide development benefits to crisis and conflict-affected populations. Some interviewees felt that donors had been slow to provide funds because of a lack of confidence in the UN component of the SDRF and because they were uncertain about the worsening security situation in South-Central Somalia. As a result, the New Deal Monitoring Report found that donors had failed to release funds committed against the Compact (International Dialogue on Peacebuilding, 2014).

The World Bank was also hampered by a lack of flexibility in Somalia. This lack of flexible funding led to a focus on large-scale programmes that were further delayed by the deterioration in the security situation and constant changes in the FGS. A number of interviewees argued that given the huge challenges to partnership with the government and
ongoing insecurity, the World Bank’s Interim Strategy Note should have included more quick-impact projects and short-term projects with NGOs that delivered tangible benefits for local communities.

Except for the use of pooled funds to share risk, there has also been limited progress in achieving shared analysis and approaches to managing risk. This hampers the ability of development actors to engage in protracted and conflict-related crises. While some individual donors have made progress in their ability to manage risk at headquarters level, this has not always corresponded with improved risk management at the country-level (Initiative, 2015). Meanwhile, some donors have experienced increased domestic pressure to avoid exposure to risk and to demonstrate results for investments (Independent Commission for Aid Impact, 2015). This has contributed to conservative approaches to fiduciary and programmatic risk.

Donors and aid agencies can provide timely and flexible funding in some cases but these remain isolated examples. Despite current challenges, the study found some examples of fast and flexible approaches that reflect good practice. In both Myanmar and Somalia, Norway had provided fast and flexible support to the respective transition processes (the Special Financing Facility in Somalia and the Myanmar Peace Initiative). In Myanmar, donors had been more pragmatic because of the sanctions that were in place until 2013. Due to the absence of the World Bank and the severely curtailed role of UNDP, donors had decided to use the UN Office for Project Services (UNOPS) to manage MDTFs for livelihoods and health.
Donors and aid agencies have acknowledged that protracted crises require long-term financing that is also fast and flexible. However, five years after the introduction of OECD-DAC guidance on transition financing, neither this guidance nor the FSPs and the New Deal have been implemented systematically in order to deliver substantive changes to financing. Although widely discredited, the concept of a ‘continuum’ from humanitarian to development activities persists and results in attempts to switch from humanitarian to development funding instead of using the full range of instruments available and making the best use of the skills and strengths of different actors. In some cases, however, donors had combined their humanitarian and development funds to deliver more appropriate responses for protracted and/or recurrent crises.

Development aid is still slow, burdened by heavy and often risk adverse procedures. There is also tension between bilateral versus multilateral engagement. Development partners are struggling, in particular, to adapt their instruments to engage in the increasing number of crisis-affected middle-income countries. While the study found some examples of timely and flexible development funding (such as the Norwegian-funded Special Financing Facility in Somalia and the Livelihoods and Food Security Trust Fund (LIFT) in Myanmar), these remain isolated examples.

Meanwhile, humanitarian aid is still predominantly programmed on short-term horizons. Despite attempts to move towards multi-year planning and funding in order to provide greater predictability, in practice, humanitarian funding cycles and programming remain annual. Nevertheless, donors often use it as a default in protracted and crisis-affected
contexts because it remains faster, more flexible and more risk tolerant than development instruments.

At the most fundamental level, the findings clearly outline that humanitarian and development approaches diverge by being rooted in different principles and having programmes built on different evidence, planning and budgeting processes. Further compounding these differences, institutional mandates and political interests, rather than the needs on the ground, often dominate the priorities of international engagement in protracted crises. This situation is inefficient and unsustainable as it limits the scope to reduce poverty in these complex contexts and it does not deliver resilient and peaceful states and societies. Conscious efforts to bring together humanitarian and development aid streams and programmes have been going on since the early 1990s. These have led to the development of frameworks, policies, and operational guidance designed to address incoherence across international modes of engagement. However, these have failed to deliver coherent responses in practice.

The logic for greater coordination and collaboration between different forms of assistance is clear. Humanitarian actors recognise that, “the changing nature of crises has resulted in a widening gap between humanitarian needs and resources available. As this gap widens, so do the challenges. Business as usual is no longer an option” (Labonte, 2007). Increasingly, humanitarian actors are becoming more vocal in demanding that government and development actors consider the needs of vulnerable; crisis-affected populations in their plans and financing structures (Relief Web, 2018).
CHAPTER FIVE

5.0 Discussion, conclusion and recommendations

Humanitarian and developmental aid in crisis are often required concurrently, especially in complex and protracted crises. In the context of fragile states such as Somalia disasters, conflict and other acute vulnerabilities, meaningful and sustainable impact requires complementary action by humanitarian and development actors. There are important, systemic changes within an organization that can affect the international assistance efforts to meet and lessen the need for aid while also complementing local development efforts.

According to the findings of this study, NGOs do respond to humanitarian crises according to functionalist claims. However, ‘need’ is not the only consideration involved in NGO decision-making. The size of the responding organization, the type of crisis in the recipient country, the history of conflict in the crisis country, and the source of funding, all play a critical role in the decision-making process of the NGOs, on what capacity they can respond to specific humanitarian crises and whether they can complement each other in that similar situation or not.

Scholars and previous researchers seemed to support the claim that large NGOs would respond in higher capacities than would smaller NGOs. The same sentiment is shared by the findings of this study. However, other researchers believe this to be vehemently untrue as they allude that irrespective of the size of need, the smaller NGOs have a significantly higher probability of responding in a sizeable capacity as long as the need cuts across their mission and vision.
As good as the claim may be, this research maintains its initial stand on the size of the organization in relation to their responsive capacity due to financial implication. It is a common knowledge that the smaller NGOs grapples with financial challenges and low financial pooling capability as compare to the large NGOs. This therefore qualifies this research claim as all intervention requires a proportional amount of funds to achieve its high-end objective something that the smaller NGOs struggles to keep aloft.

Due of the dynamics of the occurrence of this crises and disasters, the complementarity between the large and the small NGOs is advisable, this is due to the difference in flexibility and programmatic framework in each of these categories: large NGOs may be more likely to respond to various crises from year to year while the same NGOs consistently respond to crises that are ongoing an established region. To promptly intervene in a major situation, the small sized NGOs largely depends on large NGOs and the government for funding and other donations.

Putting into perspective the nature of the humanitarian market and the nature of varying crises, it was expected that NGOs, in general, would respond more heavily to natural disasters than to complex emergencies, which usually insinuates the inclusion of conflict. When an NGO decides to assist an area affected by a natural disaster, it does not have to consider political implications, the wellbeing and safety of their staff. The probability of NGOs responding in a great capacity to complex emergencies is rather large in comparison to the probability of NGOs responding to a natural disaster.
The most reasonable explanation is that while complex emergencies may be hard to respond to, they are well planned for. Isn’t this a paradox? Most conflict situations may occur or last for as long as it takes, it can continue for months and even years. Though the fighting may not continue, the repercussions of the conflict will persist. Thus, complex emergencies may be budgeted for, while NGOs cannot plan for specific natural disasters.

The history of conflict in a crisis country works much of the same way. Though the expectation was that the more intense the conflict was, historically, the less likely NGOs would offer aid. The shift from no history of conflict to the history of minor conflict significantly increased the probability of a high response to the country, despite the level of need. If a country has a history of crisis, especially one that requires significant international response like conflict would, it is likely that NGOs will be familiar with the country and maintain technical expertise of the situation.

5.1 Recommendations

As per the tested variables and resources, it is evident that governments influence NGOs a great deal in the decision-making process. However, government and multi-national corporations, financing of humanitarian programs are not given to whomever, whenever. It is a competitive market in which NGOs struggle to obtain grants or contracts from the government. Once they are granted, conditions of the legal agreement are expected to be upheld by the NGO. This therefore feels certain that the NGOs are not very independent to make decisions on how they can operate in a humanitarian situation. This being one of the many challenges hampering free operation of the NGOs in aid crisis situations.
The recommendations, therefore, would be the following to be put into consideration by the key players in this sector:

1. **Prioritization of population needs:** When an NGO decides to intervene in an area affected by a natural disaster or a crisis, political implications should not be the major influence on their operations.

2. **Project cycle extension from one to four-year plans:** The NGOs should prioritize the task of mitigation and budget without focusing on single year project cycles as the duration of how long the natural disaster will last may vary. However, the general ease of assisting in a natural disaster does not appear to influence NGOs decisions.

3. **National and international actors need to commit to developing a shared and prioritized plan with common high-level objectives at country level within each protracted crisis.** An adaptive management plan should be underpinned by thorough and common context and risk analyses and assessments and built on the experience of resilience analyses and new approaches to joint risk assessments.

4. **Community based planning:** NGOs working in a humanitarian and developmental need situation should work around the clock to ensure that they build a good and sustainable rapport with the indigenous population.

5. **There should be consistency in donor response to the humanitarian and developmental needs while the NGOs should maintain the highest standards of transparency and accountability when it come to the way they spend the grants.**
a partnership situation, the complementary organization must at all time work within a synergized framework to dispel on the cases of overlap.

6. The donor agencies and the government financing the NGOs working in humanitarian and developmental areas, should participate actively in the implementation process to track progress unlike the current case where the donor community are only active in contract development and formulation of cooperative agreements that are contained and established within the grant.

7. The nature of the strings-attached to various funds constantly affects the way the implementing agencies will act on the ground. It is therefore important for the donor community and the implementing agency to agree on what extent of influence and neutrality should be attached to the grant so as not to have a ripple effect in the delivery of the NGOs in humanitarian situation. NGOs may be able to respond at higher levels to crises when the funds they receive are unrestricted.

8. Proper reporting and accumulation of accurate; measurable and reliable data should be encouraged at all levels of intervention through monitoring and evaluation activities. This would give guidance to futuristic research on how to handle similar crisis above board. The lack of information leads to a lack of research in this critical area.

9. The media should also maintain journalistic ethics in reporting this crisis, they should not spend much airtime on large crisis and blackout the smaller ones (the CNN effect). The media’s fixation on these larger emergencies leads to over-donating and failing to donate to other emergencies that may be equivalent or worse
in need. NGOs, who receive most of their funding from the public, are constrained by donations given solely for the sensationalized emergencies.

10. Senior leaders within donor and aid agencies should take responsibility for implementing measures to ensure greater coherence between humanitarian and development assistance. This will require having in place the necessary tools, allies and influence.
REFERENCES


   https://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/176/31472.html


