RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN FOREIGN INTERVENTION AND TERRORISM: A CASE STUDY OF ETHIOPIA`S MILITARY INTERVENTION IN SOMALIA

BY

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DECLARATION

I, the undersigned, declare that this is my original work and has not been submitted to any other college, institution or university other than the United States International University in Nairobi for academic credit.

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This thesis has been presented for examination with my approval as the appointed supervisor.

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ABSTRACT

The central goal of this research is to determine the relationship between foreign intervention and terrorism. The study uses Ethiopia’s military intervention in Somalia in late 2006 against the Islamic Courts Union as its focal area of concern. The research findings indicate that there exists a relationship between Ethiopia’s intervention and the rise of Al-Shabaab in Somalia. From a methodological perspective, the research relied on secondary sources of data with a qualitative approach to data collection and analysis used throughout the study. In the course of data analysis the causes, consequences, and legality of Ethiopia’s intervention are examined in depth. The study finds that Ethiopia’s intervention drastically affected the political as well as security landscape inside Somalia. The study finds that by dismantling the Islamic Courts Union, Ethiopia significantly accelerated the rise of Al-Shabaab and the deployment of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). The study further goes on to give recommendations to both the International Community as well as to Somalia on policies and strategies on how to combat Al-Shabaab within the region as well as inside Somalia.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

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ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

AIAI: Ali-Itahad Al-Islamiya

AMISOM: AU Mission in Somalia

ARPCT: Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and Counter-Terrorism

ASWJ: Ahlu Sunnah Wal Jama

AU: Africa Union

CIA: Central Intelligence Agency

CT: Counter Terrorism

ENDF: Ethiopian National Defense Forces

EPRDF: Ethiopian Peoples’ Revolutionary Democratic Front

EU: European Union

ICJ: International Court of Justice

ICU: Islamic Courts Union

IGAD: Intergovernmental Authority on Development

IGASOM: IGAD Somalia Mission

IMI: International Military intervention

IPSS: Institute for Peace and Security Studies

KDF: Kenya Defense Forces

MP: Member of Parliament

NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NSF: National Security Force
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tr>
<td>OAU</td>
<td>Organization of African Unity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OLF</td>
<td>Oromo Liberation Front</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ONLF</td>
<td>Ogaden National Liberation Front</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R2P</td>
<td>Responsibility to Protect</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SNA</td>
<td>Somali National Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPF</td>
<td>Somali Police Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SRRC</td>
<td>Somalia Reconciliation and Restoration Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TNG</td>
<td>Transitional National Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TFG</td>
<td>Transitional Federal Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UEDP</td>
<td>United Ethiopian Democratic Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMGOS</td>
<td>United Nations Monitoring Group on Somalia</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNSC</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USC</td>
<td>United Somali Congress</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNOSOM</td>
<td>United Nations Operation in Somalia</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNITAF</td>
<td>US-led unified Task Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>United Soviet Socialist Republic</td>
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<tr>
<td>WMD</td>
<td>Weapons of Mass Destruction</td>
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<td>WSLF</td>
<td>Western Somalia Liberation Front</td>
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CHAPTER ONE: GENERAL INTRODUCTION

Foreign involvement in the domestic affairs of a sovereign state, society or people by external entities is not a new phenomenon in the history of human civilization. External powers have long sought to influence and control the decisions of other nations. Slavery, Colonialism and the Cold War have all had one feature in common, they were all driven by imperialistic ambitions of great powers at various periods in time. However, unlike all other previous foreign interferences, the ongoing US-led War on Terror has greatly altered the fabric of the international system. The emergence of violent terrorist groups and their acts of indiscriminate violence that are transnational have significantly challenged long-held international norms by states that have ensured global peace.

The US-led War on Terror which started after the attacks of 9/11 has become one of the most defining issues of the 21st Century, having rippling effects on almost all corners of the globe with disastrous consequences, particularly in the Muslim world. The Middle East as a region has borne the brunt of this new war, with some states invaded, governments deposed, and several terror groups emerging from the power vacuum left in the absence of effective central governments to wreak havoc while posing an existential threat to global peace and security. This research will seek to understand whether there is a relationship between foreign intervention and terrorism using Ethiopia’s military intervention in Somalia as its case study.
1.1 BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY

The modern republic of Somalia was formed when the two former colonies of British Somaliland and Italian Somaliland merged together on the 1st of July 1960 (Ingiriis, 2012). One of the first countries to be hailed as ushering in democracy in the continent when the first Somalia president Aden Abdullah Osman handed power to Abdirashid Ali Shermarke, the country has since spiraled out of control into chaos and anarchy and has long been dubbed a “failed state”. Somalia’s history is key in understanding the long cycle of conflict that has ravaged it since the fall of the Barre military regime in 1991 (Joyner, 2009). In particular are its trouble historical relations with its two main neighbors- Kenya and Ethiopia.

The civilian government of Abdirashid Sharmake was ravaged by rampant corruption and chronic nepotism and was increasingly becoming disliked by Somalis. The political conditions domestically became conducive for resentment and frustration to build up in all segments of society. On October 1969 General Siad Barre orchestrated a coup and overthrew the civilian democratic government after the assassination of Abdirashid Sharmake (Menkhaus, 2008). Barre immediately suspended the constitution, prohibited the existence of any political party and in their place created the Supreme Revolutionary Council exclusively made up of military, police and other security officials. The military regime quickly adopted scientific socialism and firmly cemented its position on the Soviet bloc during the Cold War, gaining both military and economic support from the USSR (Little, 2012).

Soon after gaining independence when British Somaliland and Italian Somaliland unified, the government in Mogadishu wanted to fulfill the dream of “Greater Somalia”- that is, all Somalis should live under the newly formed Republic of Somalia. Since its founding the Somali state has
effectively pursued its irredentist claims on the territories of its two neighbor; Kenya`s NFD and Ethiopia`s Ogaden (Mahadallah, 2008). To emphasize this one only has to look at the Somali flag and understand its meaning. The blue flag of the Republic of Somalia has a single star at its core, with five edges. Each edge represents a portion of Somali-inhabited regions in the Horn of Africa. The Ogaden in Ethiopia, Northern Frontier District in Kenya, French Somaliland (Djibouti), British Somaliland and Italian Somaliland (Saadia, 1963).

The Somali state has engaged both Ethiopia and Kenya through proxy wars and full-on armed conflicts to regain the Somali inhabited territories. In Kenya, the Somali government supported, armed and financed the *Shifta* (Somali word meaning Bandit) insurgency in Northern Kenya (Erich, 1997). The Bandits attacked military personnel as well as police outposts, severally undermining the authority of the newly created Kenyan government. The Kenyatta government reacted by imposing emergency rule on the region effectively placing it under military rule. This resulted in widespread human rights abuses, summary killings, systemic rape by security forces which only came to be known years later after the Kenyan government commissioned the Truth Justice and Reconciliation Commission (Weine, 2013).

In 1977 Somalia launched a surprise invasion of the Ogaden in Ethiopia. While a military coup was unfolding in Addis Ababa where the monarchy of Haile Selassie was overthrown by a group of military officers and declared Ethiopia a socialist state, Somalia used this chaos to invade the Ogaden. The Soviet-Somalia relationship had allowed Somalia to amass one of the largest and most equipped military forces on the continent. However soon after invading Ethiopia, Somalia fell into a political, ideological and military dilemma with the Soviet Union (Connaughton, 1992). The Soviets tried to mediate between Somalia and Ethiopia since they were both socialist states and its cold war allies. After failing to convince Somalia to relinquish its claims over the
Ogaden, it switched sides and fully backed the Ethiopia with military aid and thousands of Cuban and Yemeni troops to bolster the embattled Ethiopian army. The defeat severely hampered the military regime in Somalia and soon after dissatisfied military officers began an armed rebellion against Barre. These groups included: the Somali National Movement (SNM), Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF), United Somali Congress (USC) and Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM) (Little, 2012).

The armed factions ultimately succeeded and overthrew the military government of Siad Barre in 1991. With the central government no longer in existence, the armed factions had lost the only uniting factor that had kept them together and began fighting each other along clan lines to control the country. As the civil war was under way, Somalia also experiencing one of its worst droughts in decades and urgently needed humanitarian assistance. The international community spearheaded by the US passed resolution 751 on April 24, 1992, to protect and safeguard the humanitarian shipments to reach the suffering civilians and the US was to protect humanitarian relief shipments (Samatar, 1997). Unfortunately both the UN and the US became embroiled in the conflict as militias attacked US forces and killed several UN and US peacekeepers. This resulted in the US pulling out its forces and shortly after the UN withdrew from Somalia, leaving the country in a complete state of chaos thus creating the ideal conditions for terrorist organizations to spring up and thrive (Hoehne, 2009).

The emergence of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) in 2006 offered a glimmer of hope to the Somali people; the long-standing conflict in their country would be winding down and eventually cease to exist once and for all (Butcher, 2016). However, the group emerged at a time when Washington was at the height of its “War on Terror” and it viewed any Islamic movement with a lot of suspicion. As Zarey (2007) illustrates, the US used its regional ally Meles Zenawi to
invade, dislodge and dismantle the ICU from its positions in Somalia and in particular the capital Mogadishu. The main justifications given by Ethiopia in its invasion were shaky at most and ill-framed at best. To begin with, the narrative of the imminent threat posed by the ICU to Ethiopia was proved to be grossly over exaggerated (Allo, 2010). Second, the legality of the invasion was very questionable because Ethiopia argued that it was the TFG that requested for its assistance, despite the fact that the TFG had no legitimacy since it was not elected by the Somali people and was viewed by Somalis as a coalition of warlords (Newman, 2007). At the time the ICU was engaged in conflict with the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) which was at the then based in Baidoa. In what is described by authors such as Zarey (2007) and Tiffany (2010) as a security disaster, the invasion by Ethiopia has resulted in the worst geopolitical blunder of the decade in the continent. By disbanding the ICU the Ethiopian invasion ended up paving the way for Al-Shabaab, a group whose actions not only affect regional security but also challenges global peace and security.

The demise of the ICU at the hands of the ENDF and the TFG has had disastrous consequences for regional security and stability. The emergence of Al-Shabaab which has attacked far away capitals such as Kampala, and Nairobi’s Westgate Mall, far from the war theaters of Mogadishu is a testament to the threat posed by Al-Shabaab (Butcher, 2016). The abduction of foreign tourists and aid workers from Kenyan territories by Al-Shabaab operatives signaled the invasion of Kenya Defense Force (KDF) into Somalia to dismantle Al-Shabaab and create a secure buffer zone between Kenya and Somalia that would deter similar incidents in future. However, after the deployment of KDF into Somalia in October 2011, internal attacks in Kenya have increased significantly with Al-Shabaab claiming responsibility for each attack.
In 2014 Kenya experienced one of its worst acts of terror, when Al-Shabaab militants attacked a popular shopping mall in the suburb of Westlands called the Westgate Shopping Mall, killing several Kenyans as well as foreign expatriates who frequented the Mall. Furthermore, Kenya has experienced other attacks such as the Garissa University attack where several students were killed, an attack on a military base in the coastal province, an attack on a mining quarry in Mandera and sporadic attacks on police and military outposts in the north-east of the country. It is also worth mentioning that ever since the Kenyan military intervened in Somalia Al-Shabaab has increased its recruitment of Kenyan youth and in particular in Kenya’s coastal province, where the group exploits frustrated and unemployed young men to join its organization. Although the war against Al-Shabaab is being fought by the joint forces of Kenya, Uganda, Ethiopia, Burundi and Somalia, it seems that Kenya is paying the highest price in this war. The attacks by Al-Shabaab are aimed to force Kenya to withdraw its soldiers from Somalia where they are jointly fighting the group as part of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM).

1.2 STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

Foreign intervention is not a new concept when it comes to understanding the dynamics and origins of conflict in Africa (Talentino, 2005). Given the number of armed conflicts in the continent, there is sufficient literature such as the works of Tiffany (2010), Little (2012) and Butcher (2016) which supports the argument that foreign intervention and terrorism have a dynamic relationship. Even though various academic studies that have been done on the issue of foreign interventions and in particular about Somalia, scholars such as Holliday (2003), Chakrabarti (1974), Tae-Hyo (2003), Simons & Tucker (2007) and Piombo (2007) have not adequately focused on the connection between foreign intervention and the rise of extremist terrorist groups and their impact on domestic, regional and global peace and security.
Several scholars, on the other hand, have documented the nexus between foreign inventions and the rise of indigenous terrorist groups. Byman (2003), Talentino (2005), Zarey (2007) and Ahmad (2009), Butcher (2016) and Newman (2007) have argued that there exist a link between foreign intervention and the impact it has in the creation of groups with xenophobic religious extremist ideologies. The various researches done about foreign interventions in Somalia have however been unable to link the territorial claims made by Somalia and the threat that it poses to Somalia’s neighbors, particularly Ethiopia. The shortage of sufficient academic works on the motives of Ethiopia’s intervention in Somalia, as well as the role of the Ethiopia’s intervention in leading to the demise of the ICU and the rise of Al-Shabaab, is the gap that this research wishes to fill.

1.3 OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY

The overall objective of this study is to examine the relationship between foreign intervention and terrorism using Ethiopia’s military intervention in Somalia. The specific objectives of the study are:-

1. To examine the historical dynamics of the Ethiopia-Somalia conflict with regard to the legality of Ethiopia’s intervention under International Law.

2. To determine the nexus between Ethiopia’s military intervention and the rise of Al-Shabaab.

3. To explore the consequences of Ethiopia’s military intervention in Somalia.
1.4 RESEARCH QUESTIONS

This study will be guided by the following questions:

1. How does the historical dynamics of the Ethiopia-Somalia conflict impact on the legality of Ethiopia`s intervention under International Law?

2. What is the nexus between Ethiopia`s military intervention and the rise of Al-Shabaab?

3. What are the consequences of Ethiopia`s intervention in Somalia?

1.5 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY

The end of the Cold War has essentially opened up the world to the forces of globalization; economies are more interdependent and integrated. Similarly, conflicts have become a phenomenon that is not confined to an individual nation; they instead have a spillover effect and end up affecting other states regionally as well as internationally. The conflict in Somalia is no different, what initially started off as a civil war and has now metamorphosed into a regional as well as a global threat to peace and stability primarily through the brutal insurgency of Al-Shabaab. The attacks in Kampala and Westgate in Nairobi have illustrated the group’s ability to pose a viable threat to the security of neighboring states (Butcher, 2016). This combined with the US and its Western allies covert war in Somalia to capture or kill members of Al-Shabaab and Al-Qaeda has further altered the political and security landscape inside Somalia.

As conflicts around the world turn more and more into sectarian and ethnic based civil wars and in particular in the Middle East, turn from regional conflicts to genuine threats to international stability for example in Syria and Yemen. There are growing calls for interventions in the region primarily aimed at ceasing the fighting and acting as a mechanism to kick start peace talks to
resolve the conflicts. However, it is vital to look at previous interventions in the region and their role in influencing and starting the same conflicts trying to be resolved. The US invasion of Iraq and the NATO intervention in Libya are some of the main examples of how foreign intervention noble as the intentions may be, they, at times, end up exacerbating the intensity and duration of conflict (Butcher, 2016). This study thus seeks to shed light on the consequences of foreign intervention and will try to understand how foreign interventions fails to lead to cessation of violence but rather changes the nature of the conflict.

1.6 ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY

The remaining chapters of the study will be divided as follows:-

Chapter two will be an in-depth review of previous literature on the topic. Chapter three will be about the methodology that will be operationalized throughout the study. This involves a description of the study, methods of data collection, data analysis, ethical considerations and the limitations of the study. Chapter four will be a critical analysis of Ethiopia’s military intervention. Chapter five will be a conclusion as well as recommendations for both Somalia and the International community on how to deal with the issue of Al-Shabaab.
CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW AND
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

2.0 INTRODUCTION

Foreign involvement in the affairs of other nations has been a norm for as long as civilizations have been in existence, powerful states often had direct or indirect control and influence over territories that were not their own (Ahmad, 2009). The African continent is no different to this, as it was carved up between European powers in the Berlin conference of 1886. European powers divided the continent, exploited its natural resources and people to facilitate industrial revolutions back in their respective capitals. The phenomenon of European colonialism was not limited to Africa alone, European powers sought out colonies around the world to expand their economic needs and spread their imperialistic culture which they thought was civilized compared to the rest of the world at the time (Chakrabarti, 1974).

In the 21st Century there no longer exist colonial territories, although Western imperialism is still rife around the world (Kaldor, 2012). The US-led War on Terror was declared by President Bush soon after the US had experienced its worst terrorist attack on American soil; the events of 9/11 had deeply traumatized the US public and shocked the US government and its allies around the world. A Saudi national by the name of Osama bin Laden had single-handedly caused the highest death toll of American citizens since the end of World War Two (Byman, 2003). The events of that day would drastically shape American Foreign Policy for decades to come and directly led to two wars being fought; the toppling of Saddam’s Iraq and the ousting of the Taliban in Afghanistan. Days after the attacks on the World Trade Centre the US officially declared its War
on Terror and thus the most challenging and highly controversial issue of the 21st century began, the fight against radical Islamist extremist groups around the world (Talentino, 2005).

2.1 US INVASION OF IRAQ

The attacks on the World Trade Centre had not only affected the United States but also had deadly consequences for the whole world. The US-led War on Terror which started after the aftermath of 9/11 would have a ripple effect that was to be and is still being felt today across the world. The history between the US and Iraq is a one shaped by past conflicts, mutual suspicion and riddled with deep mistrust. After the failed first Gulf War of 1991, in which Iraq experienced heavy losses at the hands of the US and other coalition forces, Saddam Hussein was labeled by the US as a threat to regional stability (Newman, 2007). Long being suspected of having biological weapons by most Western Intelligence agencies, the Iraqi regime was at the top of the list of “rogue” states which the US felt were either harboring or financing acts of terror against the US that had to be dealt with by all means necessary (Tae-Hyo, 2003). Although later on it would be proved that Saddam Hussein was not involved in planning or financing Al-Qaeda contrary to the narrative that George Bush was spreading throughout American and International news outlets, the regime of Saddam was toppled by the US military (Simons & Tucker, 2007).

It is important to first understand that after Osman Bin Laden had claimed responsibility for the actions of 9/11 he did not have any ties with Saddam, rather, he had been given shelter and supported by Al-Qaeda followers hiding in the tribal regions of Pakistan far away from the Middle East. Secondly, that it is the US and its ally Saudi Arabia that had created, armed and financed the rise of the Taliban, and that there was an alignment of interests between the Taliban and the US and a shared enemy which was the USSR (Talentino, 2005). Years later this once
mutually symbiotic relationship ended up causing the deaths of thousands of America citizens, however, Washington would turn on its cold war ally, invade and occupy Afghanistan and dismantle the Taliban under the guise of hunting down Osama Bin Laden (Holliday, 2003).

The invasion of Iraq was declared by President Bush on March 20, 2003, after the US senate had authorized the use of force against the Ba`athist government of Saddam Hussein. Facing little resistance from the Iraqi military which was ill-equipped and trained, the US and its coalition allies; the UK, Australia, and Poland took over the capital Bagdad (Tiffany, 2010). The power vacuum left by dismantling the Iraqi military and police force had created and opening for Al-Qaeda-linked groups to spring up and use insurgency tactics against US forces (Newman, 2007). Byman (2003) explains that prior to the US invasion Iraq had no history of violent extremist groups operating in its territory. The subsequent invasion by the US together with the dismantling of Iraqi security forces and the perception that the US was seen as an occupying force only served to play into the hands of Al-Qaeda (Weine, 2013).

The group declared their fight against the Americans as a ‘holy war’ and that Muslims around the world should join Al-Qaeda in expelling the US from Muslim lands. This made thousands of foreign jihadist fighters to pour into Iraq and conduct suicide bombings and Improvised Explosive Devices (IED) attacks against US military forces and their allies. The influx of Sunni fighters also shifted the religious balance in the country and soon enough, after the US pulled out in 2003 the county was in a full blown sectarian civil war between Shias and Sunnis (Simons & Tucker, 2007).

The American invasion of Iraq and its subsequent toppling of the Saddam government opened the floodgates for the country to become a safe haven for Al-Qaeda elements fleeing from
Afghanistan and elsewhere around the world (Ahmad, 2009). Some 15 years late Iraq is still fractured and fragmented across religious lines and now an even more sinister organization has replaced Al-Qaeda in the country known as the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) (Butcher, 2016). ISIS has taken over large swaths of territory from the weak Iraqi government and is even in Syria trying to establish what they call an “Islamic State”, in what security experts say is the most radical, complex and dangerous threat to International peace and stability.

2.2 US INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN

Afghanistan has had a turbulent history dating back to the colonial period of the British. The country has experienced several civil wars as the conflict between the Taliban and Government forces still continues to the present day. Foreign invasion and occupation of Afghanistan is not a new phenomenon, the country was colonized by the British, occupied by the Soviets at the height of the Cold War and later invaded by the US after the 9/11 attacks in 2001.

The Soviet occupation of Afghanistan started in 1979 after the assassination of Nur Muhamad Taraki of the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA). Armed rebellions broke out in parts of the countryside under the leadership of a group known as the Mujahedeen. The Mujahedeen were receiving arms and financial support from the United States, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia as well as thousands of “Arab and Muslim” fighters from the Middle East (Ahmad, 2009). The Soviet-Afghan war was marked by heavy losses on both sides with cases of civilian targeting being a common war tactic utilized by both sides. After more than a decade of conflict, the Soviet Union withdrew from Afghanistan leaving the then government headed by Mohammed Najibullah to continue the fight against the Mujahedeen. With mounting internal pressure, rampant corruption, chronic unemployment combined with the collapse of the Soviet
Union, the Najibullah government collapsed and Afghanistan slid into a civil war (Byman, 2003).

The Afghan civil war had created a power vacuum with the subsequent fall of the government, which rival tribal warlords had struggled to fill. Each warlord maintained control over his tribal area and constantly fought other warlords for territory and the acquisition of taxes which in turn financed their militias. The emergence of the Taliban had however caused a serious challenge to the various tribal warlords scattered throughout the country, the political and religious foundations of the Taliban made it distinctly different from other armed groups (Simon & Tucker, 2007). The idea of using Islam as a uniting tool and its appeal to a broad national identity made the group extremely popular with the people of Afghanistan and in 1994 the group had effectively taken control of most of the Afghan countryside. By 1996 the Taliban had assumed control of Kabul and began imposing their interpretation of Islamic Sharia. The group would stay in control of Afghanistan until 2001 when the US military overthrew them and installed the government of Hamid Karzai (Weine, 2013).

The US had invaded and occupied Afghanistan under the guise of hunting down Osama Bin Laden and Al-Qaeda. US intelligence officials, as well as White House reports, had suspected Bin Laden to be hiding in the mountainous regions of Afghanistan under the protection of the Taliban government. The US had also believed that the Taliban had provided Al-Qaeda with funding and training to carry out the 9/11 attacks thus the US held the Taliban also responsible and to an extent complicit in the attacks (Tae-Hyo, 2003). The US invasion and occupation together with its NATO allies under the International Security Force provided the major fighting component in the fight against the Taliban.
The US and the Taliban shared a history of aligned interests as Talentino (2005) puts it, since it was the US that funded the Mujahedeen insurgency against the Soviets which later became the Taliban. However, after the 9/11 attacks, the Bush government put out a staunch rhetoric that the Taliban and Al-Qaeda were one and the same when in fact the two were completely different in terms of their goals, objectives and even ideological leanings (Byman, 2003). The Taliban before the US invasion had no interest in attacking the US, and as Holliday (2003) points out, before the US attacks, there were several high-level delegates from the Taliban in the US to discuss the terms of an oil pipeline that was to pass through Afghanistan and into the Caspian Sea. Secondly the evidence given by the Bush administration that the Taliban played a significant role in the planning and execution of the 9/11 attacks were peculiar, since the Taliban would have known that such a high profile attack was bound to invoke an armed response by the US, an adversary they could not possibly hope to defeat in combat (Hoehne, 2009).

The ensuing invasion by the US ended up causing more problems not only within Afghanistan but also across the world (Ahmad, 2009). The invasion had caused Al-Qaeda to disperse itself in the region and across the greater Middle East, with Al-Qaeda as a result of the US invasion of Afghanistan springing up in Iraq, Yemen, Jordan, Somalia, Libya, Mali and many other countries. In Pakistan increased Al-Qaeda activity has resulted in numerous attacks in major cities such as Lahore and Islamabad. The Al-Qaeda affiliates in Yemen, for example, became bolder in their attacks on government forces and the increase in fighters had eased their movements in the region (Simon & Tucker, 2007).

By toppling the Taliban government the US had laid the foundations for a prolonged insurgency in the region and did the exact opposite of diminishing Al-Qaeda, they instead ended up strengthening it by making its’ Jihadist rhetoric even greater. The occupation of Afghanistan
which is predominantly a Muslim country had made it recruit even more fighters by portraying the group’s war with the American military as a war against Infidels occupying sacred Muslim lands (Ahmad, 2009).

Butcher (2016) argues that dismantling the Taliban from power has had some negative consequences for the region, primarily that the removal of the Taliban has allowed more radical groups such as Al-Qaeda and ISIS to become more active in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The deteriorating security vacuum in Afghanistan combined with the inability of the Central Government to exert control and influence in the provinces expelled from the Taliban has proven to be a breeding ground for anti-government and anarchist sentiments. Groups such as Hizbul-Islami and others have systematically waged guerilla based wars and at times, full-scale assaults on government and military installations severely undermine the authority of the central government.

2.3 NATO INTERVENTION IN LIBYA

The Arab spring started in late 2010 in Tunisia when a fruit vendor by the name of Mohammed Wazizi set himself on fire in order to protest government harassment and corruption. This single act triggered the entire country and protests began against the government for growing levels of corruption, economic mismanagement and the repressive nature of the Tunisian government. This led to the ousting of Tunisia’s President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali in a matter of weeks much to the surprise of the world (Little, 2012). What started out as an isolated incident in Tunisia would soon spread to several countries in the region such as Egypt, Libya, Syria, and Yemen shaking the political establishments of those countries to their core. The Arab spring had acted as a catalyst for citizens of the various countries to air their grievances against their governments.
Protests in Libya began in early 2011 as large numbers of civilians began to peacefully demonstrate against the authoritarian nature of the Gaddafi regime and called for political reforms. However, later on, the protests began to turn violent as the government cracked down on dissident and started arbitrarily arresting human rights activists and opposition groups. There was a growing concern among Western powers that Gaddafi would start indiscriminately targeting civilians as the instability continued to grow throughout the country (Weine, 2013). The brutal tactics of the regime and the assassination of political opponents who were against Gaddafi eventually led to an armed revolt by rebel groups which aimed to topple the regime. Government troops and pro-government militias began to strike rebel-held territories in the countryside which led to massive civilian casualties.

NATO on the 19th of March 2011 began “Operation Unified Protector” a military intervention in Libya, by enforcing United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973, which called for the protection of civilians (Butcher, 2016). As the fighting intensified NATO began enforcing a no-fly zone in Libya under the guise of ‘Right to protect’. Soon after NATO was granted permission to use deadly force by the Security Council it began to engage Libyan ground forces and military installations to strengthen their ability to protect civilian lives. Ostebo (2012) argues the Arab spring presented the anti-Gaddafi elements in the west with an opportunity to implement regime change in Libya, which had proven to be an elusive and cumbersome task in the past. The rise of anti-regime groups and the heavy-handed response from Gaddafi created ideal conditions to institute a full-on regime change in Libya, with pro-democracy groups gaining favor with NATO.

The subsequent involvement of NATO in the Libyan crisis altered the balance of power in the conflict. NATO’s air superiority combined with the enforcement of the no-fly zones severely
undermined Gaddafi’s forces from exerting any meaningful chance to stem the tide of growing territorial advances made by rebel groups. Massive military coordination efforts by the US and France, in particular, put the final nail in the coffin of Gaddafi’s Libya, and the last Pro-Gaddafi stronghold of Sirte which was under government forces fell in October 2011. Following the controversial death of Muammar Gaddafi around the same time, marked the end of Gaddafi’s 42-year rule over the country and NATO declared Libya “Liberated”. Libya after the demise of Gaddafi slid into a full-blown civil war. All the institutions of the state were desecrated and no public institution was left intact; the Judiciary, Police, Military and Executive were nonexistent (Butcher, 2016). The collapse of the central government led to the breakdown in the rule of law and the country was left in the hands of armed factions with competing interests. This absence of security combined with the looting of government armories turned Libya into a safe haven for various militant extremist groups such as Al-Qaeda, ISIS, and Hizbul-Islam (Gegout, 2012).

Little (2012) explains that though the NATO intervention had noble intentions at first, the alliance did not consider the long-term implications of its involvement in the domestic affairs of a sovereign state. Furthermore, NATO did not have a clear exit strategy and left Libya in worse off condition than under Gaddafi. No peacekeeping mission was left behind to ensure civilians did not get caught up in the conflict between the various militias groups. Butcher (2016) makes the argument that NATO’s long-term objective of removing Gaddafi from power did not seem to match its expectations of post-Gaddafi Libya, but rather highlighted NATO’s own shortcomings, which is the ever growing role of the organization on the global stage.

In the case of Libya, the influence that foreign involvement and radical ideologies have played a role in propagating the cycle of conflict and this can be directly attributed to the availability of arms in the country. After the civil war started foreign jihadist groups such as ISIS have gotten a
 foothold in the country and even control major cities such as Sirte and Cyrenaica. Hizbul-Islam also has a presence in some remote parts of Libya with occasional engagements reported by the Libyan National Army. The existence of these groups and their use of unconventional violence have threatened to derail the peace process in Libya and have severely eroded the populations` confidence in the Transitional Governments` ability to maintain security in the country (Weine, 2013).

Oil plays a vital role in the Libyan economy and promises to be a catalyst for the economic recovery of the state. As in Iraq and Syria, ISIL has learned the fiscal power of controlling the flow of oil during the conflict. The group has already made several attempts to storm and occupy oil fields and oil terminals in the country causing deep concerns not only for the Transitional Government but also for the US and its allies in their war on terror (Butcher, 2016). It is crucial to note that Libya prior to the demise of Gaddafi had no recorded incident of domestic acts of terrorism, and to the Libyan people, the violent and radical ideology of militant Islam was an alien concept.

2.4 ETHIOPIAN INVASION OF SOMALIA

Ethiopia, Kenya, and Somalia share a long and complex history riddled with mutual fear, suspicion and territorial expansionist ideologies. To comprehend the cycle of conflict between these three states it is imperative as Saadia (1963) puts it, to understand their shared colonial history. It is in the era of European colonialism and the subsequent unilateral demarcation of borders that has become the foundation of conflict among these neighbors in the region. The numerous wars fought, proxy clashes and funding of secessionist groups by all three states are evidence of the deep scars that colonialism has had on the region (Lyons, 2008).
Hostile behavior, recurrent conflict, and deep nationalism are but some of the characteristics that may be used to describe the relationship between Ethiopia and Somalia. Both countries lay claim to each other’s territories and as history has shown these territorial claims have resulted in several wars (Little, 2012). The Berlin Conference held by the European powers can be traced as the igniting cause of conflict between the two states with the awarding of the predominantly Somali-inhabited Ogaden to Ethiopia. As a result when Somalia gained its independence and unified it wanted to regain its lost territories by all means available to the Somali state.

In 1977, at the peak of the Cold War, Somalia invaded Ethiopia to reclaim the Ogaden, a region predominately inhabited by ethnic Somalis. Allied with the Soviet Union Somalia had amassed one of the most potent military forces on the continent as a result of years of Soviet military aid. On the other hand Ethiopia was at the time undergoing political turmoil with the overthrow of the Emperor Haile Selassie by a group of military officers who had Leninist ideological leanings (Samatar, 1997). The Ogaden war had shifted not only the balance of power in the region but also the swapping of cold war superpowers.

The initial success of the Somali military had soon evaporated after the Soviet Union shifted sides and fully supported the Ethiopian government and halted all arms supplies to Somalia. The Soviet Union had also begun to airlift thousands of Cuban troops to Ethiopia to strengthen their military and push back the Somali forces. Erich (1977) argues that it was this shift in support by the Soviet Union to aid Ethiopia that had in the end overwhelmed and led to the defeat of Somalia in the war while also acknowledging that the lack of military support by the US compounded the challenges facing the Somali military and its eventual defeat.
Somalia soon after the defeat in the Ogaden began to experience political instability and internal control by the Barre regime began to be diminishing. A coalition of former officers formed militias and eventually deposed the Barre regime from power sliding the country into a brutal civil war. Decades later, Ethiopia invades Somalia with the aim of dismantling the Union of Islamic Courts and reinforce the capability of the Transitional Federal Government. Ahmad (2009) explains that rise of prominent religious leaders such as Sheikh Sharif and others severely boosted the local appeal of the ICU and in particular the settling of disputes through religion, gave the organization legitimacy in the eyes of local Somalis.

However as Newman (2007) point out it is the Islamic nature of the ICU that Ethiopia used as a basis for its intervention argument, stating that the group had ties to Al-Qaeda and posed an imminent threat to the security and stability of Ethiopia. Zarey (2007) challenges the imminent threat logic given by Ethiopia and highlights that even though the ICU would have posed a threat to the interests of Ethiopia in the long term, it is the abrupt and brutal tactics used by Ethiopian forces that ended up making the threat of retaliatory attacks much more tangible and possibly incite domestic uprisings in Ethiopia`s Somali-inhabited regions in the Ogaden. It is interesting to note that the Ethiopian influence is quite visible in the way the TFG has been organized. The 4.5 power sharing system which implicates that seats in the Somali parliament shall be shared by the four major clans and the remaining 0.5 being allocated to an alliance of smaller clans, is more or less similar to the ethnic division found in the Ethiopian Parliament.

Appealing to the long history of animosity and distrust while simultaneously using strong religious rhetoric of a holy war against the invading Ethiopians, the ICU mobilized Somalis to fight back against the Ethiopian military and the Transitional Government (Weine, 2013). The long and bloody conflict ended in 2007 after the Ethiopian military declared it was withdrawing
its troops having achieved its objectives. The result of the intervention was twofold; firstly the ICU had been completely dislodged from Mogadishu and some towns in the Somali countryside. Secondly the ICU’s military wing “Al-Shabaab” had rejuvenated itself and replaced the ICU (Little, 2012). The intervention in Somalia was indeed an emergency action, possible partly because once again Ethiopia succeeded in managing the terrorist concerns of the international political agenda to its benefit. Nevertheless, beyond any legitimate concern in 2006 regarding the evolution of the conflict in Somalia, this securitization move served also to improve domination of the Ethiopian society by the Meles Zenawi government. The securitization of Somalia helped to legitimize Ethiopian engagement in the country and was complemented by justification from international law. The main significant security outcome of the intervention was the rise of Al-Shabaab as a holistic organization rather than its subordinate role in the ICU. Al-Shabaab as security analysts have argued has become a much more potent and bloody entity than its predecessor, posing as the single largest threat to regional peace and security in the Horn of Africa.

2.5 KENYAN MILITARY IN SOMALIA

Little (2012) highlights that the one country in the region that has directly and severely felt the impact of Al-Shabaab and Al-Qaeda has been Kenya. Over the past two decades, Kenya has experienced some of the worst terror attacks in its history since it was created. In 1998 the US embassy in Nairobi was bombed by Al-Qaeda resulting in the deaths of hundreds of Kenyans. Kenya has also experienced bombings, grenade attacks and the kidnapping of foreign nationals in its coastal province.
Butcher (2016) puts forward an array of reasons that explain Kenya’s decision to cross the border into Somalia being caused by several factors prime among them being the abduction of tourist from the coastal regions by Al-Shabaab militants. Secondly, Kenya had for a long time wanted to create a buffer better itself and the conflict in Somalia with the fear that the war in the neighboring state would spill over into Kenya. Little (2012) however argues that Kenya’s reason for invading Somalia is simply because Kenya’s economic interests were threatened by Al-Shabaab with the abduction of tourists. Kenya was merely defending its national interests by protecting its tourism sector which accounts for the largest source of foreign exchange for the country, thus by going into Somalia to dismantle Al-Shabaab Kenya was safeguarding its long-term economic and national security interests.

Engaging Al-Shabaab has come at a cost for Kenya with increased numbers of attacks within the country significantly going up as a result of the invasion. Al-Shabaab has launched several retaliatory attacks inside Kenya targeting churches, schools, police stations and shopping malls to mention but a few of the group's targets (Erin, 2013). The attack on the Westgate shopping mall was Al-Shabaab’s most high-profile attack in Kenya, laying siege to the mall for several days resulting in the deaths of 67 civilians and eventual bombing of the mall with hidden explosives (Butcher, 2016). The attack on Westgate was one of the bloodiest attacks carried out by Al-Shabaab. Several grenade attacks have also been carried out by the group and in particular, the attack on a public transport vehicle in the suburb of Nairobi’s Eastleigh which resulted in the deaths of several passengers.

Retaliatory attacks of Al-Shabaab have not been limited to only Nairobi but also to the Northern provinces of Kenya where the group has carried some of its most heinous attacks. In late 2014 the group attacked a quarry and killed 36 people, with the group stepping up its attacks as they
continued to suffer territorial losses in Somalia (O’Brien, 2016). On 2 April, the group carried out its deadliest attack on Kenyan soil by attacking the Garissa College University killing 148 students and injuring 78 others. As Little (2012) explains Al-Shabaab, by attacking civilian targets want to cause a rift between Kenyans along religious lines and that by the purposely separating Muslims and Non-Muslims in their attacks, is meant to put tremendous strains on the fabric of religious tolerance in Kenya. The unpredictable attacks by Al-Shabaab have had a drastic psychological effect on Kenyans with the introduction of vigorous security checks in almost all aspects of life in the country from boarding buses to entering malls and public buildings (Olsen, 2014).

The recent attacks in Kenya have affected the country in many ways. Firstly, tourism, which is one of Kenya’s major revenue earners, has been adversely affected. With the attacks largely aimed at foreigners and Western interests, it has caused the governments from western countries to issue travel advisories to their citizens warning them against travelling to Kenya or visiting certain areas of the country. Secondly, more importantly than the fact that the West is worried and concerned about their security, the Al-Shabaab attacks in the country have also affected the Kenyan people and this is a very important consideration.

2.6 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Foreign intervention and terrorism have become almost synonymous with each other over the past two decades with the start of the US-led War on Terror. To fully grasp and comprehend the full extent of the connection between these two deeply controversial issues and help to answer the question if there is a relationship between them, some theoretical perspectives have been
used to guide this study. The study has used two theories that are central to explaining and understanding the international system: Realism and Liberalism.

2.6.1 REALISM

Realism is among the major in theories International Relations. It places emphasis on state-based analytical approach to International Relations making it particularly vital in explaining state behavior. Realists view the world from the lenses of perpetual conflict, anarchy, power, state survival and national interests in analyzing the actions of states in the international system. For realists, power is the ultimate tool used by states to attain their interests and by exercising their power in pursuit of their interest is what ultimately leads to conflict among states.

From a Realist perspective, foreign intervention stems from an innate desire by states to acquire, conquer and exploit territories of other states in order to maximize on strategic gains and fulfill their interests (Mearsheimer, 2001). Therefore territorial issues such as natural resources and geostrategic significance can be a direct incentive for intervention. Variants of realism such as neorealism also offer an explanation of foreign intervention. Waltz (1979) states that defensive realism encourages states to maintain staunch security policies which are far less likely to act as a catalyst for conflict, as opposed to offensive realism which explains that states should strive to maximize their power through hegemonic tendencies thereby directly confronting threats to a state’s security.

Following this realist thought therefore thus it can be said that Ethiopia’s intervention in Somalia was designed to confront the threat that posed an imminent danger to the existence of the state hence the act of intervention was justified. Given that state interests are paramount in realism, any action taken by states to deal with the threats of national interests are justified among
realists. Therefore when the ICU posed a threat to Ethiopia’s political, security and economic interests in the region and later on Al-Shabaab posed similar economic and security threats to Kenya, then it can be argued that state interests played a crucial role in understanding the causes of intervention in Somalia.

2.6.2 LIBERALISM

The theory of Liberalism offers a different explanation of inter-state relations as well as International Relations in general. Liberals are completely against the realist notion that states are the central and only actors in the International System. For liberals, states play a role in shaping the events of the International System, however, other non-state actors such as Terrorist groups, International Organizations and Multinational Corporations (MNCs) also play a significant role in influencing the decision of states (Edward, 2007).

The core assumption of liberalism is essentially at odds with those of realism and in particular is the notion of power as explained by both theories. The liberal understanding of power is rather elusive and fluid. Nardin (2006) points out, the liberal view of power is not confined to the hallmarks of military (hard) power, rather, it views power as more economical (soft) based on the fact that state interests are shaped by individuals in the society and whose core reasons stem from a deep sense of cooperation. For liberals, the zero-sum view of conflict vastly differs from that of realism since one of the main assumptions of liberal theory is that deeper cooperation on economic interdependence and trade act as a failsafe which ensure wars among states do not occur.

International organizations play a significant in understanding global events from the perspective of liberalism. The United Nations, European Union, and the African Union and NATO can thus
from liberal lenses explain the phenomenon of foreign intervention. The NATO intervention in Libya acts as contrary to this norm in neo-liberalism. Western powers use the argument of spreading democratic values and freedoms while invading foreign nations as was the case in Iraq and in Libya, however, critics of neo-liberalism point out to the Imperial nature of these interventions while also having ulterior motives (Butcher, 2016).

Non-state actors play a vital role in explaining the structure of the International System from the lenses of liberalism. Terrorist organizations fall under the category of non-state actors, and one of the core tenants of liberalism is the relationship between individuals and the society. The ideology shared by terror groups whether it is Al-Qaeda or Al-Shabaab is closely similar to Fascism. According to Simon & Tucker (2007), the misinterpretation of religious texts combined with political, social and economic marginalization provide for a deadly combination when fostering extremist views. Furthermore, Zarey (2007) recognizes the threat of Islamic Courts Union and therefore would justify Ethiopia’s action as a rational choice to confront a threat to the existence of the state.
CHAPTER THREE: METHODOLOGY

3.1 RESEARCH DESIGN

This research has taken a qualitative analytical approach in order to answer the research questions that were guiding the study. Qualitative research has an aim of addressing questions concerned with developing an understanding of the meaning and experience dimension of human’s lives and social worlds. Since the issue of intervention is heavily interconnected with the social world and human beings who coin different meanings to different phenomena like terrorism, it is imperative to use qualitative methodology. The qualitative research used in this research thus seeks to make the most of the data collected.

This research will use a case study approach because as Patton (1980) explains, it allows for the collection of vast amounts of relevant literature and allows for the question of “who” “what” and “how” to be answered through a systematic empirical inquiry. The selection of a case study approach also allows the researcher to methodically as well as qualitatively answer the research questions guiding the study due to the vast amounts of data available (Black, 1999).

3.2 DATA COLLECTION METHOD

The research made use of electronic media sources mainly newspapers, magazines, and some websites, to provide up to date information that is easily accessed and verified. After collecting the appropriate amount of data an attempt was made to organize, analyze and interpret the data in a sound and systemic manner. The research used information from secondary sources of data which have been drawn from very sources related to the issues of foreign intervention and terrorism has been vigorously checked.
3.3 DATA ANALYSIS

Conventional conflict analysis was used throughout the study so as to gain crucial insight and to understand the dynamics and nature of the conflict in Somalia. The main actors and structures of the conflict have thus been identified, investigated and looked at from the perspective of contemporary unconventional warfare against a non-state actor. This research used secondary sources data mainly books, journals, newspapers, articles, reports, scholarly works as well as up to date internet sources. A detailed review of written literature provided the basis for the analysis of the research topic. In this part of the research, the datum was systematically organized in a sound and meaningful manner. The researcher made a deliberate attempt to make the analysis and interpretation of the data as clear, logical, objective and reliable as possible.

3.4 STUDY AREA

3.4.1 SOMALIA

Known as the land of Punt during antiquity, Somali cities were important commercial port located strategically along trade routes. During the late 15th-16th-century Somali nomadic tribes engaged Ethiopian forces over grazing lands due to the nomadic nature of these tribes. Soon after British colonization of Aden Yemen, northern Somalia became an important re-supplying post for the British on their voyages to India. Other European powers soon also established colonies in Somalia, with the French colonizing modern-day Djibouti, the British in the North and Italians taking the South. Somalia fully became a colony for three European powers in the beginning of the 19th century. The modern Somali Republic was formed with the unification of former British Somaliland and Italian Somaliland by 1960 (Saadia, 1963). In 1963 Somalia broke diplomatic
relations with the United Kingdom (UK) after Britain awarded the Somali-inhabited regions of Kenya known as the NFD to the new Kenyan government.

Little (2012) argues that this decision by the British was one of the main causes of Somali irredentism and the founding reason for its hostile relations with its neighbors soon after the state of Somalia was created. The assassination of prime minister Abdirashid Sharmake on October in 1969 lead to a bloodless coup by General Siad Barre shifting the country’s Foreign Policy and aligning it with the Soviet Union. The Ogaden war broke out in 1977 after Somalia invaded the Ethiopia where it was previously backing secessionist groups in the Ogaden. Ethiopia with massive military assistance from the Soviet Union and thousands of Cuban and Yemeni troops drove out the Somali forces out of the Ogaden and in 1978 Ethiopia was in full control of the area.

In 1991 a coalition of rival clan militias toppled the military government and Barre was ousted from power in a bloody civil. The civil war raging on combined with a drought had caused one of the worst humanitarian disasters of the 21st century. The UN led by the US intervened in the country, however, the US was forced to pull out after an attack on a US helicopter killed several US forces. After 11 years of government absence in Somalia, a fragile parliamentary government was created backed by the International Community. Through this period a coalition of Sheikhs called the ICU formed and pushed out the warlords which run the capital while also waging war against the TFG. Ethiopia invaded in late 2006 and defeated the group and bolstered the strength of the TFG with the dismantling of the ICU leading to the rise of Al-Shabaab. In 2011 the group orchestrates attacks and kidnappings in Kenya forcing Kenya to intervene in Somalia to dismantle and eradicate the group permanently.
3.4.1.1 KEY DATA AND POPULATION PROFILE

Somalia is located in the Horn of Africa and is neighbored by Ethiopia to the west, Djibouti in the North and Kenya in the Southwest. According to the UNDP, the population of Somalia is estimated at around 10 million as of 2015 with around 75% of the population being below the age of 35 years. The ethnic composition of Somalia is 85% Somali, 13% Bantu-Somali, and 2% Arab-Somali. The major clans in Somalia are Darod, Hawiye, Issaq, Dir, and Digil-Mirifle. Despite having no government for more than two decades Somalia maintains a relatively large informal economy with agriculture, livestock and Remittances called (Hawala) contributing significantly to the economy. The Hawala’s play the role of Banks and facilitate the transfer of money from Somalis from abroad to their relatives in Somalia; this system is estimated to handle approximately $1 Billion annually (UNDP, 2016).

3.4.2 ETHIOPIA

Ethiopia is one of the oldest nations on earth and the only country in Africa that was not colonized by any European power after the Berlin conference of 1886. Tracing its founding to 1 AD under the kingdom of Aksum, ancient Ethiopia had interactions with Arabia and early European merchants. Conflicts between Ethiopia and Somali Sultans can be traced to the rule of Zemene Mesafint and Sayyid Mohammed Abdille (The Mad Mullah) and other ottoman backed Somali Sultans supported by Egyptian merchants.

By the end of the 19th Century, Ethiopia had ended its isolationist policy and began to send emissaries to European countries and soon formed relations with the British in late 1889 and with the rest of European countries as early as 1900. Italian occupation of Ethiopia began with Italo-Ethiopian war from 1936, Fascist Italy had invaded Ethiopia and Emperor Haile Selassie fled to London. With the ending of World War 2 and the defeat of Italy, Ethiopia was once again
under the rule of Emperor Haile Selassie (Erlich, 1977). The Cold War brought about a military coup in Ethiopia with the Emperor overthrown by a group of military officers led by Colonel Mengistu and later proclaimed Ethiopia was a Marxist State.

The rule of Mengistu and the chaos of the coup caused Somalia to invade the Ogaden and the subsequent start of the Ogaden war in 1977. The indispensable military aid and troop support from the Eastern Block helped Ethiopia to push out Somali forces and declare victory. The military regime of Mengistu and the Derg were in 1991 overthrown by the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), led by Meles Zenawi ousting Mengistu from power and forced into exile in Zimbabwe. In 2006 the ENDF invaded Somalia to depose the ICU from power in Mogadishu, this military intervention caused ripple effects in the region with the creation of Al-Shabaab, an extremist and violent group which pledged allegiance to Al-Qaeda.

3.5.1.1 KEY DATA AND POPULATION PROFILE

Ethiopia is located in the horn of Africa region and is neighbored by Somalia, Djibouti, Kenya, Sudan and Eritrea. According to the CIA, Ethiopia is one of Africa’s largest countries with a total land mass of 426,400 mi² and a population of 99,465,819 as of 2016. The ethnic composition of Ethiopia is: Oromo 34.4%, Amhara (Amara) 27%, Somali (Somalie) 6.2%, Tigray (Tigrinya) 6.1%, Sidama 4%, Gurage 2.5%, Welaita 2.3%, Hadiya 1.7%, Afar (Affar) 1.7%, Gamo 1.5%, Gedeo 1.3%, Silte 1.3%, Kefficho 1.2%, other 8.8%. Ethiopia’s main exports are agricultural products like coffee and tea, dairy products and leather. The country’s main export partners are China, Saudi Arabia, Germany and the USA. Ethiopia has one of the fastest growing economies in the world with an estimated growth rate of around 9% per year; however, this is predicted by the IMF to be slowed down due to the ongoing political situation in the country (CIA 2016).
3.5 ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS

Research conducted in the field of social science is often prone to bias and partisanship, especially when it comes to sensitive matters such as terrorism and foreign interventions. However given the thought provoking nature of this study and the literature gap identified the researcher with regard to the topic made a deliberate of effort to avoid any bias and remain objective.

3.6 LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY

The main limitation of this study has been the geographical obstacle of traveling to the study area to collect primary data. The ongoing conflict in Somalia had been a challenge since it has prevented the researcher from traveling to the country and gathering primary data. The political upheaval at the time in Ethiopia had also prevented the researcher from going to the field to collect data. As a result of these two reasons this study has relied on secondary sources of data.
CHAPTER FOUR: ANALYSIS

4.0 INTRODUCTION

The conflict between Somalia and Ethiopia can be traced back as early as the 15th Century, long before the era of colonialism and long after Somalia became a unified and independent state. The main bone of contention between these two nations has been the Somali-inhabited region of Ogaden. Inhabited predominately by Somalis and territorially part of Ethiopia, this region has been divided along both religious as well as ethnic lines (Lewis, 2008). Somali Emirs have historically had a substantial level of control over the region, however, the Abyssinian Empire had also exercised some insignificant level of influence in the region as well. The conflict between these two regional rivals dates back to the 16th Century during the reign of Sayid Mohamed Abdille known as the “Mad Mullah” by the British. The forceful incorporation of Ogadenia by Ethiopia’s Emperor after the Second World War combined with the recognition that the Europeans acknowledged the Ogaden as part of Ethiopia, only amplified the level of animosity, mistrust, and suspicion held by Somalis of Ethiopia’s ill intentions (Elmi & Barise 2006).

The arbitrary drawing up of colonial borders by colonial powers had laid the foundations of a non-ending cycle of conflict and hostilities among Ethiopians and Somalis. The Ogaden is particularly important to Somalia because of what is known as “Greater Somalia”, this refers to having all ethnic Somalis living in one single Somali state.
4.1 GREATER SOMALIA

The concept of “Greater Somalia” gained a lot of traction during the period of decolonization when British Somaliland and Italian Somaliland unified and formed the modern Republic of Somalia. Greater Somalia was essentially aimed at unifying all five regions inhabited by Somalis in the region; the Ogaden in Ethiopia, Northern Frontier Districts in Kenya, and Djibouti into a single state. Menkhaus (2008) explains that the philosophy of Greater Somalia was there even before Somalia was divided into fragmented parts long before colonialism. Menkhaus’ observation is backed up by Shinn (2006) who also argues that the notion of Greater Somalia was neither abruptly formed by the Somali Youth League (SYL) nor was it created by the Military regime of Siad Barre.

The Somali flag, Kibble (2001) says, illustrates the manifestation of Greater Somalia, a flag that is aesthetically simple but holds a very deep philosophical meaning. Five corners on a white star represent the five regions inhabited by Somalis; French Somaliland, British Somaliland, Italian Somaliland, the Ogaden and the Northern Frontier Districts in Kenya. United by a common language, religion, ethnicity and race, Somalis across the Horn of Africa are the most homogenous group of people on the continent.

This new profound sense of nationalism and solidarity among Somalis in Mogadishu had created high ambitions that the dream of Greater Somalia could be achieved. However both the Kenyan and Ethiopian governments were very suspicious of the newly formed Somali states’ intentions and in particular, they were categorically against re-drawing of colonial boundaries (HSPI, 2013).
The founding father of Kenya Jomo Kenyatta and the Ethiopian Emperor Haile Selassie were very close friends and both were key players in the formation of the Pan-African movement (Menkhaus, 2003). Ethiopia supported Mau Mau fighters in Kenya with their fight for independence against the British while Ethiopian forces received substantial assistance from Kenyan territories during the second Italo-Ethiopian war of 1935, therefore the two nations shared an intertwined relationship. Menkhaus (2010) observes that with the unification of British and Italian Somaliland, both Ethiopia and Kenya were suspicious of the newly formed Somali Republic because both countries had a significant Somali population in their respective territories.

Despite being viewed with suspicion and hostility by its neighbors, Somalia during its early stages of statehood had not posed any significant military challenge to either Kenya or Ethiopia. New African (2015) observes that the aggressive stance taken by Kenya and Ethiopia and in particular the signing of a mutual defense pact between Nairobi and Addis Ababa, had turned Somalia into a “pariah” state in the region forcing it to start building up its own military capabilities. Although the defense pact publicly was stated as the mutual defense of both nations it was an open secret that it was aimed at containing Somalia’s irredentist claims. Given the fact that both Ethiopia and Kenya were members of the UN and had accepted Article 1 of the UN charter, which states that people are granted the right to self-determination; Somalia could not understand why its neighbors were not willing to allow the Somali people to exercise this right (Ruys, 2008).

After coming to the realization that neither of its neighbors was going to allow secessionist talks to even be fathomed, Somalia adopted a more aggressive stand (Marangio, 2012). The Mogadishu-based government began to arm and train secessionist groups in both Kenya and
Ethiopia. In Kenya, Somalia supported the Shifta insurgency and provided financial assistance to the group in order to forcefully make the Kenyan government give up its control of the Northern Frontier Districts (NFD). On the Ethiopian front, the Somali government financed, trained and equipped the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF). The ONLF waged a guerilla war on Ethiopian security personnel as well as military forces based in the Ogaden region. There were also numerous documented cases of cross-border fire exchange between Ethiopian and Somali military forces. Lyons (2008) argues that the deep historical mistrust between Somalia and Ethiopia is not confined to territorial disputes rather it is an inherent clash of civilizations where one cannot stand the regional supremacy of the other, both wrapped in a shroud perennial mistrust and violence.

Furthermore, Menkhaus (2010) reiterates that prior to colonization Somali tribes had been constantly clashing with forces from the Ethiopian empire predominantly over grazing lands. This deep distrust and legacy of conflict between Somalis and Ethiopians can thus be attributed to a lack of any common ground, be it religious or cultural. The wars waged by the Somali Sultan Sayid Mohamed Abdille did have a religious bearing at the time. Marchal (2013) argues that given the pastoralist nature of Somalis, the search for fresh pastures forced them to move to greater distances to find grazing areas for their livestock which at times led to occupying other communities` territory.

Greater Somalia began gaining more and more influence and popularity among Somali political elites, with immense public support, the Mogadishu government began playing an even greater role in the region (Samatar, 2007). The growing wave of popular support however soon drastically changed after the Somali Prime minister Abdirashid Sharmake was assassinated by one of his bodyguards while he was on a visit to the northern regions of Somalia. Elmi & Barise
(2006) noted that the collapse of the civilian government and the ascension to power by General Siad Barre had serious geopolitical ramifications for Ethio-Somali relations decades later. By orchestrating a bloodless coup in the Somali capital, Siad Barre would use the Cold War rivalry between the Soviet Union and the USA to temporarily regain the Ogaden region and finally achieve the unification of Somalis across the region under a single state, an achievement that had eluded previous governments since gaining independence in 1963.

**4.2 OGADEN WAR 1977-1978**

At the height of the Cold War, the Horn of Africa became a battleground for the US and the Soviet Union with competing ideologies shaping the region. On the one hand, it can be argued that the cold war did have a positive effect on the region primarily in terms of security. Military hardware being provided by both the US and USSR provided the governments in the region with a means to defend themselves from external aggression (Davidovic, 2008). However, according to Talentino (2005), the rivalry between the East and West combined with the huge amounts of weaponry available to governments in the region acted as an inevitable catalyst for conflict.

Ethiopia during the better part of the seventies had experienced severe political, economic and social upheavals. The monarchy of Ethiopia was becoming more and more scrutinized by the political elites and in particular the military. Growing more repressive as the days went by the monarchy of emperor Haile Selassie was finally overthrown by a military coup led by colonel Mengistu (Lawless, 2007). Ethiopia’s military officers were inspired by the writings of Karl Max and Lenin and viewed the monarchy to be against the will of the people. By overthrowing the emperor, Mengistu and his officers believed that they were returning power to the hands of the common man who was exploited by the ruling elites (Lewis 2008).
Mengistu’s leadership, however, turned out to be much worse than the monarchy that was before it. Rebellions broke out in the North of the country and the Eritreans began seeking independence and form their own state. To the East, the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) was also waging war against Ethiopian forces in the region with rebels looting military weapons and attacks on police armories increasing in number and frequency (Menkhaus, 2009). On top of these domestic political problems the country was also suffering through one of its worst droughts in decades, to the citizens, Mengistu’s promise of a prosperous Ethiopia under a Marxist government was proving to be all talk and no action. In its long history as a nation, Ethiopia was almost on the brink of collapse and a full blown civil war was rapidly starting to become a reality (Meierrieks & Gries, 2013).

According to Ibrahim (2010), the political and security dynamics in Addis Ababa had proved to be fruitful for Somalia. Politically weak and militarily fragmented, the regime of Said Barre saw an opportunity to capitalize and finally take control of the Ogaden. Despite being an ally of both Ethiopia and Somalia, the Soviet Union was poised to be the winner in the region given its support from both states. Kibble (2001) explains that the Soviets wanted to establish a federation of communist countries in the region comprising of Ethiopia, Somalia and Yemen giving it full control of one of the most strategic locations on earth. Furthermore, the Strait of Hormuz which passes through Somali and Yemeni waters would enable the Soviet Union in the event of an altercation with the West to halt oil shipments to the US and its allies (Elu, 2012).

Against the wishes of the Soviet Union and the entire Eastern bloc, Somalia invaded Ethiopia and occupied the Ogaden. The Somali military had been for years armed and trained by the Soviet Union, with the help of the Soviets Somalia had amassed one of the largest and well-equipped militaries in Sub-Saharan Africa (Yussuf, 2014). This overwhelming military
superiority was realized when within three months the Somali National Army (SNA) had completely taken control of the Ogaden and had effectively pushed backed the Ethiopian forces. Somalia’s quick reaction in overtaking the Ogaden had shocked even the Soviets who had anticipated that the Ethiopian military would be able to confront and even repel the Somalis without any external assistance (News African, 2015).

Negotiations began soon after Somalia had completely seized and exercised full control of the Ogaden. The Soviet Union had tried to mediate between Somalia and Ethiopia trying to convince both parties to use their shared communist ideology as a common ground to build on peace talks (Front Matter, 2007). Moreover, the Soviet Union knew that the Ethiopian military in its current state of being ill-equipped and severely overpowered could not defeat the Somali forces. Secondly, the Soviet leadership knew the importance of Greater Somalia and its significance to the Somali government, therefore, the Soviet Union decided to abandon Somalia and fully support Ethiopia (Talentino 2005).

Shinn (2006) explains that the Soviet Union’s decision to bolster Ethiopia’s military by airlifting thousands of Yemeni and Cuban troops as well as hundreds of tanks, artillery and fighter jets halted Somalia’s advance. Soon after the reinforcements arrived, Somalia began losing ground and started being pushed back and eventually the SNA was driven out of the Ogaden. Marangio (2012) notes that among Cuban and Soviet leadership there were talks of even occupying Somalia, however, the Soviets later decided against it in fear of a backlash from western powers.

The legacy of perpetual conflict between Somalia and Ethiopia stems from the Ogaden, it is, therefore, relevant to analyze the Somali and Ethiopian perspectives on the Ogaden. This contentious territory has been a constant problem in Ethio-Somali relations since the early 60s.
4.3 SOMALI AND ETHIOPIAN PERSPECTIVES ON THE OGADEN

The Ogaden has been a contentious area and a constant source of conflict between Ethiopia and Somalia. Menkhaus (2008) states that for one to properly understand why the Ogaden is important to both Somalia and Ethiopia, one must first understand the perspective of both parties to get a sense of magnitude on the issue.

4.3.1 SOMALIA’S PERSPECTIVE

According to Moussa (2008) for Somalia, the people of the Ogaden should be given the right to self-determination, as is enshrined in the UN and the AU charters. The inhabitants should be free to choose whether they wish to remain with Ethiopia, secede from Ethiopia and be an independent state or join Somalia. By giving the people of the Ogaden the right and the opportunity to decide their own fate Somalia believes that the issue of the Ogaden can be laid to rest once and for all.

Secondly, Somalia argues that it does not recognize the border demarcations made after colonialism the reason being that Ethiopia entered into treaties with European powers without the approval or acknowledgment of Somali communities in the area (Shinn, 2006). Thirdly it is essential to point out that Africa’s borders were drawn up by European powers without any prior knowledge or consideration of indigenous tribes/clans of the continent and therefore Somalia is not party to unilateral agreements entered without its consent (Henderson, 2008).

Based on these three fundamental reasons Somalia views the issue of the Ogaden to be ultimately left to the inhabitants of the Ogaden it is therefore only the people of the Ogaden and only them that can determine the outcome of this issue. Allo (2009) concurs with this viewpoint by reiterating that Somalia will never relinquish its claims on the Ogaden and for one to
acknowledge this one simply needs to understand the symbolic importance of the flag of the Somali Republic. Somalia ultimately argues that if Ethiopia is confident the residents of the Ogaden are happy to remain in Ethiopia then given the choice, they the people should overwhelming vote to remain a part of Ethiopia, however, if they do not wish to remain their views should be respected (Saleh, 2010).

The Ogaden conflict is thus a struggle against incorporation by the Abyssinian Empire and its successor state, Ethiopia. However since Ethiopia’s claim over the Ogaden was affirmed by global powers, the UK and the US, in 1948 the struggle against incorporation into Ethiopia also became entangled with the struggle against colonial boundaries. From point of view of the Ogaden Somalis and the Republic of Somalia, the Ogaden problem was an issue of self-determination since the struggle was against forced incorporation on the basis of pre-colonial boundaries.

4.3.2 ETHIOPIA`S PERSPECTIVE

Reinold (2011) argues that the Ethiopians view the claims by Somalia to be null and void arguing that the Ethiopian empire had stretched all the way to the Indian Ocean and the Red Sea therefore even historically Ogaden was part of Ethiopia long before even the creation of Somalia. However Allo (2010) questions this argument stating that the Ogaden was given to the Ethiopian monarchy as a gesture of gratitude by the British for its assistance after its victory over Italy at the end of World War Two and that the Ogaden was never part of Ethiopia prior to Italy’s defeat in the Second World War.

Secondly, Ethiopia challenges Somalia’s claim to self-determination, arguing that Somalis in the Ogaden are allowed to make their own laws, the have the right to govern themselves and elect
members to Ethiopia`s parliament. From Ethiopia`s perspective Somalis in the Ogaden have the same equal rights as any other Ethiopian citizen and therefore the region of the Ogaden is an equal member of Ethiopia`s Federal System (Neumayer & Plümper 2009).

Thirdly, Ethiopia uses Article 62 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which states that when a treaty is signed by two state entities without any change to a prior circumstance, may not be used or invoke by a third party as grounds for terminating or suspending the treaty if the treaty establishes a boundary. Gegout (2012) explains that Ethiopia does have grounds for adhering to the Organization of African Union (OAU) currently the African Union (AU) given that OAU members agreed to adhere to colonial boundaries in order to avoid perpetual border disputes among member states.

However, Article 62 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties can only be applicable when two state entities that share a disputed border sign the treaty. For this to be applicable Ethiopia has to have signed an agreement with the country it shares the border in question with which is Somalia. Since Britain signed the agreement by default makes the treaty null and void, since, it is Britain that entered into agreement with Ethiopia and not the Sovereign state of Somalia (Seybolt, 2007). When the ICU, therefore, declared its intention of annexing the Ogaden and incorporating all Somali speaking people in the region to be under one government this immediately triggered a reaction from Ethiopia arguing that the ICU was an imminent threat to Ethiopia`s existence and territorial integrity.
4.4 LEGALITY OF ETHIOPIAN INTERVENTION IN SOMALIA

Under International Law the use of force is allowed only if it is for the repulsion of an act of aggression by another State, however, the United Nations Security Council can authorize the use of force only if it under self-defense. Self-defense as the word explains itself is regarded under International Law as the right of a state to use force for its own defense. When States use force especially among other states or as is the case in the 21st Century against non-state actors such as terrorist groups they usually use the argument or rationale of self-defense (Gegout, 2012).

The argument of self-defense and in particular its application and interpretation is found in Article 51 of the UN charter. This Article provides the legal argument for the use of force, the Article states that a nation is allowed to use force only under the condition that it is strictly for the defense of the state. To give a clear picture of how this Article works Moussa (2008) looks at the US invasion of Iraq in 2002 where the US government made the argument that Iraq had nuclear weapons and thus the attack by the US was a pre-emptive measure meant to protect the US by striking first.

In 2006 the Ethiopian military intervened in Somalia after it was authorized by the Ethiopian parliament to take all the necessary steps to ensure that the ICU was dealt with until it posed no significant threat to Ethiopia. The Ethiopian parliament had declared war against the ICU and authorized the Ethiopian National Defense Forces (ENDF) to take military action against the ICU in November 2006. Ethiopian warplanes began bombing ICU positions in Mogadishu and Baidoa soon after. The Security Council had also given permission for a peacekeeping force to be deployed however the ICU was not interested in accepting this decision and officially declared war against Ethiopia and the Transitional Federal Government (TFG). There are three
main points of contention that surround the legality of Ethiopia`s intervention. First is the issue of Ethiopia`s right to self-defense, then the argument of an imminent terrorist threat and finally the controversial issue of intervention by invitation (Samatar, 2007).

### 4.4.1 SELF-DEFENSE

International Relations are based on several norms key among them is the principle of Sovereignty and the inherent right of a nation to protect itself from any internal and external aggression. A state can claim the right to self-defense when it is facing a clear and imminent threat to its sovereignty and territorial integrity. Ruys (2008) observes that although having the UNSC approval is proper it is not necessarily a must it can sometimes be neglected. He uses the case of Israeli attacks on Iraqi nuclear facilities while Israel cited self-defense it received international condemnation for violating Iraq`s airspace.

After Ethiopian forces went into Somalia, the narrative of the Ethiopian government was that the state had resorted to using military force because it felt threatened by the ICU (Seybolt, 2007). The reason why Ethiopia deemed the ICU to be a threat was as Murithi (2009) puts it, the ICU threatened to revive the idea of Greater Somalia. By declaring that the objective of the ICU was to ensure that all Somali speaking regions of the horn would be under a single Somali state, the group posed significant territorial problems to Ethiopia. For decades Ethiopia has been at war with the idea of Greater Somalia, with the Western part of Ethiopia having for years been against the rule of the brutal regime in Addis Ababa. Growing domestic problems within the country also such as political frustrations and economic stagnation had prompted the government of Meles Zenawi to look for a means of diverting criticisms from the failings of his government (Ibrahim, 2010).
Indeed Ethiopia had every right to defend itself from what it perceived to be a threat. However in what realistic capacity had the ICU posed a genuine military threat to Ethiopia? Menkhaus (2009) argues that Ethiopia’s paranoia, particularly its phobia of Somalia actually goes a long way in shaping the decisions of policy makers in Addis Ababa. The terrorist threat argument made by Ethiopia is also very shaky, the fact that the ICU was not a designated a terrorist organization by neither the UN nor the AU begs the question as to how Ethiopia broadly determined the ICU was a terrorist organization (Brown, 2010). Given that states pursue their interests irrespective of the consequences then Ethiopia’s intervention against the ICU falls under the category of a State pursuing its interests and has nothing to do with stopping terrorism. Allo (2010) observes that although Ethiopia made a compelling argument that the core elements of the ICU were former members of Al-Itahad Al-Islamiya (AIAI) the narrative that just because some members of the ICU were former members of a designated terror groups does not directly translate to the whole organization being a terror group.

Another compelling argument made by the Ethiopian government was based on the AU charter of article 4 which stipulates that the Peace and Security Council may authorize the use of force in a member state. Despite the fact that the AU Peace and Security Council endorsed Ethiopia’s actions the legitimacy of the AU in making such decisions is in itself questionable. Reinold (2011) explains that the OAU had a nasty reputation because some of the organization’s leaders have been brutal dictators such as Idi Amin who was the chair of the OAU during the 1970’s while committing crimes against humanity in Uganda. Fast forward to 2006 and the AU is still mirrored by allegations of being a “club of dictators” with most of the continent’s leaders being in power for well over a decade. The likes of Robert Mugabe and Yoweri Museveni have
become a stain on not only the legitimacy of the AU but also on the credibility of the Organization as a whole (Allo, 2010).

Ruys (2008) explains that a requirement to invoking self-defense is that the state is required to show sufficient evidence that the reason for declaring self-defense is to protect civilian lives. The state has to give concrete reasons as to how attacking a threat may help to identify the source of the attack, prevent the attack from recurring, as well the appropriate level of force required to deal with the threat. For the case of Ethiopia, the capability of the ICU according to the UN did not warrant a full-scale military invasion of Somalia. Moussa (2008) argues that the ICU did not have any extremist views during its early stages rather it was primarily concerned with restoring law and order to south central Somalia using Islamic Sharia. It was the subsequent invasion and toppling of the ICU that had led to the more extremist elements in the group to splinter off and form Al-Shabaab. Though the invasion of Ethiopia had conceived to remove the ICU from power they ended up creating the perfect conditions for a more aggressive terror group to emerge from its ashes in the form of Al-Shabaab (Menkhaus, 2010).

4.4.2 IMMINENT THREAT

The nature of self-defense has changed significantly after the events of 9/11. The dynamics of warfare have equally also changed and now states use pre-emptive force in order to confront an imminent threat facing a State. Marchal (2013) uses the case of the US after 9/11 where the Bush administration argued that Iraq possessed Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs) and that by striking first the security of the US was guaranteed. In this case, the US did not wait for it to be attacked for it to react rather the pre-emptive strike was aimed at not allowing the enemy to have a military advantage (Blomberg, Fernholz & Levin, 2013). Similarly, the Ethiopian invasion of
Somalia against the ICU was allegedly aimed at confronting the threat posed the ICU rather than reacting after the group had already attacked.

According to Gegout (2012), self-defense can be seen as coming after a threat is determined by the state in relation to the proportionality of the ability of the threat to inflict casualties to the state. By determining whether a threat is exaggerated or serious the issue of immanece has to be weighed in the decision-making process. Meles Zenawi argued that the ICU had clearly stated that it would forcefully return the Ogaden to be part of Somalia and that Islamic Sharia would be used throughout the Horn of Africa. The proclamation of the ICU of its intentions in the region as New African (2015) points out, caused alarm bells to ring in the halls of Ethiopia’s parliament.

However Samatar (2007) disputes claims of the then Ethiopian Prime Minister by proposing a counter argument. He states that the ICU had made the pledge to return the Ogaden to Somalia, not in the near future, but, rather after the ICU had established full control over Somalia which was a daunting task in itself let alone confronting Ethiopia simultaneously. Allo (2010) similarly echoes the arguments by Samatar, stating that though the ICU had mobilized support among the clans in the south it did not have the same level of influence among the predominant clans in the North of the country. Lyons (2008) explains that the allure of tangling the idea of having Greater Somalia was a tactic used by the group to draw more nationalist-leaning individuals to join the organization and that the chances of actually fulfilling this dream were a fallacy.

Elmi & Barise (2006) also dispel the argument of imminent threat used by Ethiopia as a justification for its invasion of Somalia. The two authors argue that the military strength of the ICU in relation to ENDF was drastically in favor of the Ethiopians and that the ICU was neither
a professional army nor was it equipped to be able to battle an established military like Ethiopia’s.

4.4.3 INTERVENTION BY INVITATION

Under International Law a State my request for assistance from another state to help it expel an enemy or help it to combat an enemy that is occupying its territory. The main example that can be used to illustrate this is Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1991 and Kuwait asked for international assistance to help them drive out Iraqi forces from their country (Marchal, 2013). Similarly, when Ethiopia invaded Somalia it came at the behest of the TFG which was based in Baidoa. The request by the TFG to call upon the ENDF was mirrored by controversy. The issue of the legitimacy of the TFG was key among them, Allo (2009) explains, that although the TFG was internationally recognized, it however, was neither elected by the Somali people nor had it any ability to impose its rule in Baidoa let alone the whole of Somalia.

Lyons (2008) argues that the TFG had neither the military ability nor the political appetite to challenge Ethiopia’s invasion of Somalia. The TFG had been recognized by the AU and the UN and even the UNSC was considering loosening the arms embargo on the country so as to allow for the rebuilding of Somalia’s security forces. However, Zoppi (2015) points out that legitimacy does not stem from the International Community or Regional Organizations rather genuine legitimacy lies with the people of the state and it is they who elect the government and hold it accountable. Given the internal political situation in Somalia at the time, the TFG argued it was the officially recognized representative of the Somali people despite the ICU enjoying wider support and greater legitimacy (Hoehne, Feyissa & Abdile, 2011). It is clear from the foregoing that the TFG does not satisfy the effectiveness criterion and lacks popular approval, and in that respect, it cannot give any lawful consent to outside military intervention. Moreover, and perhaps
more significantly, in January 2013, after the end of the transitional period in Somalia, the United States publicly recognized the government of Somalia for the first time since 1991.

According to Zarakol (2011), the ENDF’s intervention was aimed at projecting Ethiopia’s hard power in the region with the intention of achieving military hegemony in the region and that the guise of an imminent terrorist threat to regional as well as international peace and security merely a ruse. The notion of intervention by invitation opens up a whole new debate on the legality of foreign intervention. State behavior is undoubtedly driven by self-interests, and interest as Mwangi (2010) explains, inherently change with time depending on the duration with which these interests fall under, long term or short term.

Ethiopia’s intervention in Somalia needs to be looked from the same lenses that the US invasion of Iraq is viewed. Despite achieving what the TFG and several other governments before it could not achieve, the ICU restored law and order in much of south-central Somalia. Although the ICU is unrecognized under International Law one needs to ask therefore who legitimizes an intervention, is it the International Community, Regional Organizations or the host state? (Yussuf, 2014).

4.5 ETHIOPIAN INTERVENTION IN RELATION TO EMERGENCE OF AL-SHAABAAB

The power vacuum created after a government collapse creates ideal conditions for a terrorist group to emerge and thrive (Stanford, 2016). When state institutions and in particular the security apparatus such as the police and military disintegrate a nation is virtually defenseless from all enemies (Campbell, 2007). Similarly in Somalia after the regime of Siad Barre collapsed
there began to emerge a growing influence by religious leaders who tried to use religion as a means of ending the cycle of conflict that had crippled Somalia.

4.5.1 EXTREMISM IN SOMALIA

Prior to the fall of the central government, Somalia did not have any recorded incidents of religious violence. In fact, the regime of Siad Barre viewed any religious leader who had extremist views as a threat to the integrity of Somalia. Aynte (2009) argues that under authoritarian regimes, there is a zero tolerance policy on terrorist groups because repressive regimes view such groups as a threat to their grip on power. Given this heavy-handed approach by authoritarian regimes combined with the political propaganda they use, religious fundamentalism is not able to penetrate or influence the thoughts of the masses.

4.5.2 AL-ITIHAAD AL-ISLAMIYA (AIAI)

After the collapse of the central government and the subsequent failure of the US-led UN humanitarian intervention, there were growing calls for some semblance of peace and stability to be established in the country. In the late 1990’s a coalition of religious leaders called “Sheikhs” emerged in south central Somalia with the intention of using Islam as a unifying tool and more importantly as a mechanism of settling disputes using Islamic sharia they called themselves Al-Itihaad al-Islamiya (AIAI). Anton Du (2001) explains that AIAI began setting Sharia Courts with great success in the southern regions of Somalia which had suffered immensely during the height of the civil war. However, Zoppi (2015) states that the group got the attention of Ethiopia after it began operating in the Ogaden region and actively began propagating anti-Ethiopian sentiments and began to launch raids on security posts. By late 1994 AIAI had grown in number and influence not only in Somalia but also in Ethiopia and Kenya.
One of the groups founding members Sheikh Aweys was quoted as saying that the AIAI would re-unite the Somali speaking regions in the Horn of Africa under one Islamic state headed by the AIAI. This caused the AIAI to be viewed by both Kenya and Ethiopia as an organization that is significantly motivated by the philosophy of Greater Somalia (Piombo, 2007).

4.5.3 THE ISLAMIC COURTS UNION AND THE WAR ON TERROR

The Islamic Courts Union originated in the South of Somalia, the group first appeared in Mogadishu in late August of 1994. The subsequent collapse of the Central Government and the rule of law, had forced several religious leaders to come together and form some semblance of stability under Islamic jurisprudence (Ahmad, 2009). The ICU was predominantly dominated by the Southern clan which made up the bulk of the group's fighters and financiers. Originally aimed at using Sharia to settle disputes among individuals and warring clans the ICU soon became known as free, impartial and above petty clan disputes, giving it a sterling reputation among Somalis (Yussuf, 2014).

According to Mahadallah (2008), the ICU emerged and gained widespread prominence at a time when the US viewed Islamic Political Movements with a tremendous amount of suspicion. Washington was paranoid of any entity that waged war in the name of Islam. What was even more threatening were the alleged links between the ICU and Al-Qaeda and in particular were the shared ideological ties between the top leadership of both organizations (Prunier & Wilson, 2006). Despite having brought relative peace and security to much of southern Somalia the ICU it seemed at least from Washington’s perspective was an organization that had to be dealt with along the lines of the Taliban. Secondly, the US feared that Somalia would become a safe haven for members of Al-Qaeda fleeing the Middle East (Ramsbotham, Woodhouse & Mial, 2012).
However, the US as Wiktorowicz (2006) puts it, had a very complicated past with Somalia, with the images of dead US servicemen being dragged on the streets of Mogadishu still fresh in the minds of American policymakers. The ICU on the one hand had to be dislodged from Somalia at all costs, on the other hand, the US military was spread thin with its battles in Iraq and Afghanistan and therefore an alternative to US boots on the ground would be needed. America’s Central Intelligence Agency was tasked with coming up with and implementing a multifaceted approach to dismantling the ICU. On its part, the CIA supported the creation of a group called the Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and Counter-Terrorism (ARPCT), which was a coalition of warlords that controlled Mogadishu to be financed and used to fight the ICU in Somalia (Norell, 2008).

The ARPCT was heavily financed and armed by the US with the sole aim of tracking and hunting down members of the ICU and Al-Qaeda in Mogadishu. Arbitrary arrests and the disappearances of prominent religious leaders in the city began to increase with systematic looting and execution of suspected terrorists causing public outcry (Sperotto, 2011). The US in its goal of fighting terrorism had begun to willingly support individuals and militias it was fighting against during its intervention in 1992, this posed a serious threat to the credibility of the US as a genuine force for peace in Mogadishu (Ploch, 2010). This was re-affirmed by the growing support that the ICU had among Somalis who began to view the US and the ARPCT as genuine obstacles to peace in Somalia.

The growing resentment, frustration, and tension between the ARPCT and the residents of Mogadishu boiled over into a full-blown war between the ICU and the ARPCT in late June 2006. Westcott (2011) observes that the short conflict between the ARPCT and the ICU provided the ideal platform for Al-Shabaab which was then the armed wing of the ICU to gain recognition as
playing a significant role in defeating the ARPCT. The willingness by the US to cooperate with those it called “warlords” in 1992 during its humanitarian intervention in Somalia, which it deemed allies in its War on Terror made the US unpopular in Somalia (Prestholdt, 2011). The ICU by pointing out that the US military had been supporting the ARPCT with air strikes which were in violation of Somalia’s territorial integrity and sovereignty enhanced the nationalist image of the ICU (Kaldor, 2012).

For the ARPCT the growth of the ICU posed two main major problems that had to be dealt with immediately. Firstly the ICU was based on Islamic principles of Sharia and equality under Islam, for the ARPCT their main weapon in the Somali conflict was the use of clan hostilities which ensured the perpetual continuation of the war in the country (Little, 2012). Given that Somalis hold Islam above clans, the unifying role of Islam would mean that the conflict in Somalia could be settled effectively using Islamic law between all warring clans and factions (Olsen, 2014). Secondly, some members of the ARPCT had grown wealthy from the conflict in Somalia and were in control of the wartime economy of the country while receiving taxes from the ports and airports (Olsen, 2014).

The ICU had threatened this economic dominance of the warlords in Mogadishu and had promised to return all those properties seized illegally after the civil war broke out to their rightful owners (Terdman, 2008). Furthermore, the ARPCT was supported by the Transitional Government based out of Baidoa. Having to rely on local militias the TNG stood to gain the most by using the ARPCT militias against the ICU despite not having an armed force of its own. The only way it could ensure the cooperation of the ARPCT was by offering ministerial positions to the warlords in exchange for their militias (Menkhaus, 2009). Nevertheless, the ICU had managed to completely overrun the ARPCT and remove them from Mogadishu. Brown
(2010) argues that the coalition of warlords had decimated the capital city, with militias aligned with the ARPCT having destroyed vital government infrastructure such as the port as well as the airport.

Having defeated the ARPCT the ICU embarked upon genuine reconciliation among Somalis in Mogadishu and the south of the country. Some analysts observe that the ICU had achieved the impossible after the collapse of the Barre government, Mogadishu began relatively safe again with cases of violence, theft, and clan clashes becoming almost non-existent. In essence, the group had re-established law and order in Mogadishu with dispute settlement being based on Islamic Sharia (Elmi & Barise, 2006). Despite being branded a terror group by the Transitional Government and Ethiopia the ICU had little resemblance to a terror group. The group as Eliot (2009) observes, introduced taxes to the port and began genuine reconciliation among Somali clans and despite some of its members sharing the same sentiments as Al-Qaeda, the moderates in the organization overwhelmingly outweighed that group when it came to the decision-making process. For the ICU the stabilization of Somalia was the main aim of the group and this objective stemmed from an inherent desire by Somalis to end the civil war that had plagued their country (Eliot, 2009).

Following the ICU’s capture of Mogadishu from the ARPCT, the Transitional Government based in Baidoa began to have negotiations with the ICU. The talks were aimed at consolidating the power of the ICU and reinforcing the legitimacy of the TNG as the representative of the Somali people. The initial talks between the ICU and the TNG started out positively despite being mirrored with obstacles it was the UNSC resolution 1725 that ultimately caused a rift between the two groups (Murithi, 2009). The resolution called for the deployment of a multinational peacekeeping force that would ensure the protection of civilians as well as the
training of TNG forces. Terdman (2008) explains that the ICU perceived the resolution as directly undermining it as well as enhancing the legitimacy of the TNG while discrediting the ICU as merely a militia to be controlled by the government. The ICU responded by attacking TNG towns and territories in effect ceasing the peace negotiations that had started in Baidoa. This unilateral decision taken by the ICU prompted the TNG to request for military assistance from Ethiopia which ultimately dismantled the group and caused it to splinter into two distinct factions: Harakatul Al-Shabaab Al-Mujahideen and the Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia (ARS) (Ramsbotham, Woodhouse & Mial, 2012).

### 4.5.4 HARAMKUL AL-SHABAAB AL-MUJAHIDEEN (AL-SHABAAB)

Harakatul Al-Shabaab Al-Mujahideen was initially part of the ICU and in particular its’ military branch. The structure of the ICU was divided into three main parts: the Courts, the militant wing and the Ashura (Supreme council). The ICU’s three arms in a sense resembled a normal governments Legislature, Judiciary and Executive, illustrating that the core of the ICU was composed of moderates who kept more radical elements in the organization at bay (Saleh, 2010). According to Brown (2010), Ethiopia’s military campaign against the ICU together with the Transitional Government pushed the group to its collapse. Although the ICU played a great role in dislodging the warlords from much of South Somalia and restored Law and Order it was inevitable defeated by the sheer might of the ENDF (Lawless, 2007). While the ENDF and the TFG forces managed to expel and push ICU fighter from Mogadishu it should, however, be noted that they faced stiff resistance. The historical dynamics of the Ethio-Somalia relationship coupled with the deep animosity held by Somalis towards Ethiopians proved to be a lethal mix for the Ethiopian military. The ICU on its part called on Somalis to mobilize and come out to
defend their territory from their arch rival and it was this nationalistic appeal that drew hundreds of young Somalis to join Al-Shabaab (Aynte 2009).

The Ethiopian invasion of Somalia in December 2006 marked a watershed in the development and radicalization of Al-Shabaab. First, it provided Al-Shabaab with the opportunity to draw on deep-seated Somali hostility towards Ethiopia to recruit thousands of nationalist volunteers. Second, the invasion forced Al-Shabaab to adopt an effective guerrilla-style operational strategy as a means of resisting Ethiopian advance into the South. Third, by forcing the Islamic Courts Union leaders who had exerted a level of moderating influence on Al-Shabaab to flee Somalia, the invasion allowed the group to become even more radical, while at the same time severing its ties to other Somali organizations. Although the Ethiopian invasion succeeded in routing the ICU and pushing Al-Shabaab to the south of the country, it failed to end Islamic radicalism in Somalia; in fact, it was a primary factor in the ultra-radical turn of Al-Shabaab, transforming the group from a small, relatively unimportant part of a more moderate Islamic movement into the most powerful and radical armed faction in the country.

Al-Shabaab which means “Youth” in Arabic had become a formidable fighting force. As the name suggests the group was largely made up of young Somalis often aged under the age of 30. Norell (2008) explains that what made Al-Shabaab such a battle hardened group essentially came down to the age group of fighters, arguing that because most of the fighters were born after the civil war they had already become used to the hardships of war. The air campaigns by the US and the Ethiopian air force had significantly reduced the ability of the ICU and Al-Shabaab despite there being claims that Eritrea had been providing the ICU with arms and military advisors (Olsen, 2014).
Moreover, the ICU and Al-Shabaab had been receiving arms and fighters from the Middle East thereby giving the conflict an international dynamic. Despite the US navy patrolling the waters of Somalia under the guise of tracking Al-Qaeda movements in Yemen, the Americans also bombarded ICU held port towns and villages causing the cost of living to drastically increase (Piazza, 2013). As of early 2009 Ethiopian troops had taken control of Mogadishu and for the first time, the TFG was in control of Mogadishu. After conceding defeat the top leadership of the ICU was dispersed and fled Somalia and the organization had splinted into several other new groups such as Al-Shabaab, ARS (made up of former ICU officials), Jabhatul Islamiya, Hizbul Islam and the Ras Kamboni brigade (Sullivan & Koch, 2009). Of all the factions that came out of the disintegration of the ICU, Al-Shabaab was the most equipped and well-financed group, on top of which it filled the territorial as well as the administrative vacuum left by the ICU and governed a significant portion of southern Somalia. Al-Shabaab is a combination of Somali armed groups and various foreigner fighters from Europe, North America and the Middle East dispelling the notation that the group is a purely Somali jihadist organization and its pledge of allegiance to Al-Qaeda does not resonate with Somalis (Piombo, 2007).

Furthermore, by toppling the ICU, Ethiopia unleashed the hardline radicals in Al-Shabaab and forced them to pursue their jihadist goals. Prior to the intervention the moderates in the group firmly controlled the direction the organization was headed, leaders such as Sheikh Sharif did not share the same views as the core leadership of Al-Shabaab (Ahmad, 2009). Secondly, Ethiopian military officials seemed not to have a “post-ICU plan” after the ICU was dislodged; the ENDF also did not anticipate the hardcore jihadist elements in the ICU to still remain in Somalia and regroup (Kaldor, 2012).
Mahadallah (2008) points out that despite being members of the ICU Sheikh Sharif and other senior leaders while in exile formed the Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia (ARS) which played a significant role in the formation of the Transitional Federal Government. The creation of the ARS directly challenged Al-Shabaab’s notion of the TFG being foreign led and manipulated seriously undermining the credibility of Al-Shabaab.

Al-Shabaab has grown in size since its inception not only by being the dominant military group in the region but also due to its ideological following. Not only is Al-Shabaab one of the offsprings of the War on Terror but it also sums up the result of the US-led War on Terror (Wise, 2011). The US since the attacks on 9/11 has waged a War on Terror and from the name, the ambiguous nature of the war comes to mind. Saleh (2010) argues that unlike conventional war where there are states fighting one another and the success or failure is clear to be seen, the war on terror is a very complicated war, the definition of terror, to begin with, is vague, since terror is not an entity. Furthermore, the US though it attempts to crush terrorist groups it inevitably ends up causing the creation of more extremist groups, as was the case with its support of Ethiopia’s invasion of Somalia (Wiktorowicz, 2006). By dismantling the ICU the US and Ethiopia have unleashed a more violent and bloodthirsty group that is a threat not only in Somalia but to the whole region and even to an extent global peace and security (Ploch, 2010).

4.6 DIFFERENCES BETWEEN AL-SHABAAB AND THE ISLAMIC COURTS UNION

4.6.1 IDEOLOGY

Al-Shabaab like any other global jihadist entity around the globe is a Salafist-jihadist movement. This means that Al-Shabaab interprets the Quran along the lines of Wahhabist ideology which
imposes the strictest version of Sharia (Zarakol, 2011). From an ideological perspective, Al-Shabaab has a global jihadist outlook; this was highlighted when it declared its allegiance to Al-Qaeda and Osama Bin Laden. Ostebo (2012) argues that by declaring its support to Al-Qaeda, Al-Shabaab had lost legitimacy in the eyes of Somalis. Prior to Al-Shabaab gaining global prominence the Somali conflict was limited to warring clans and was never about a global jihad.

Since 2009, Al-Shabaab’s deepening ties with Al-Qaeda has had profound effects on its structure and operational strategy. First, Al-Shabaab’s affiliation with Al-Qaeda significantly altered its leadership component. After the death of its leader, Aden Hashi Ayro, in May 2008, Al-Shabaab’s command structure welcomed a number of Al-Qaeda core members into top leadership roles. Second, until 2008, Al-Shabaab made use of relatively conventional guerrilla tactics in its attacks against the invading Ethiopian forces. However, the group’s increasing ties with Al-Qaeda has led it down the path of suicide attacks as a means of achieving its ends. Reflecting a shift largely driven by its growing friendship with Al-Qaeda, Al-Shabaab has emphasized the development of training camps for suicide bombers across Somalia and beyond.

Recruiting and absorbing large amounts of foreign fighter also fuels Al-Shabaab’s jihadist rhetoric. Initially, when fighting the ENDF, the group declared jihad and appealed to Muslims across the world to join them in their fight against the invading Christian forces of Ethiopia, however after the invasion was over the group declared the TFG as apostles despite the TFG being Muslims (Aynte, 2009). Al-Shabaab’s main weapon is the branding of all those who oppose it as infidels and non-believers, this not only curbs any doubts among its fighters it also justifies to the public about the group's wars. This openly shows the group’s blatant disregard for Somali lives as it constantly targets civilians in its attacks. Furthermore, Al-Shabaab’s total disregard for the Somali flag illustrated the group’s intention with its own flag being
indistinguishable from Al-Qaeda`s black flag. Al-Shabaab`s ideological leanings are completely incompatible with Somali nationalism despite the group`s reiteration about having the wellbeing of Somalia at heart (Stanford, 2010).

The ICU, on the other hand, had a nationalistic ideological framework and was fueled by deep sentiments of Somali nationalism. Mwangi (2010) noted that upon its conquest of Mogadishu the ICU began to formulate foreign policies that were aimed at having equal relations with Somalia`s neighbors and the international community. Although the TNG headed by Abdullahi Yussuf was the internationally recognized government of Somalia, the ICU was in charge of the Somali capital ensuring rule of law was upheld, security enforced and reconciliation initiated (Harper, 2012). Contrary to Al-Shabaab the ICU did not have any jihadist ties with any known terrorist group, the fact that the ICU was not under any UN or international terror list was a testament to the political ideology of the group (Zarakol, 2011).

4.6.2 MILITARY TACTICS

Since its creation Al-Shabaab has relied heavily on brutality and instilling fear such that it can control towns and cities and the mindset of the people. Suicide attacks are the number one weapon used by the group, this type attack was never used in Somalia even during its darkest days at the peak of the civil war (Kaldor, 2012). Counter-terrorism experts note that the concept of an individual blowing themselves up with the false belief that they will go to paradise was a completely alien concept to Somalis (Brown, 2010). One of the most devastating attacks carried out by Al-Shabaab in Somalia was a graduation ceremony of more than 400 hundred doctors in Mogadishu`s Benadir District. The attack left more than 300 dead including dozens of civilians, students and university professors as well as three ministers, the attack marked a turning point for the Somali conflict (Saleh, 2010).
Al-Shabaab has been known to attack soft targets such as hotels, restaurants and graduation ceremonies, and any public gathering. By intentionally targeting civilians Al-Shabaab has shattered any confidence ordinary citizens have in the ability of the government to protect them. Yussuf (2014) observes that by attacking constantly firing bombs and mortar shells Al-Shabaab wishes to create a permanent state of fear and chaos such that the people will be so fed up with the state of their lives that they will yearn for someone to control the situation permanently. The lives and property of Somalis hold no value to Al-Shabaab, therefore, the indiscriminate killing of civilians comes as second nature to the group (Naija, 2014). The sheer barbarity of the group was shown to the world when it attacked Kenya’s Westgate Mall where it left dozens of civilians dead in one of Kenya’s most horrendous terror attacks.

The ICU, on the other hand, used more conventional military tactics. This is illustrated by the groups’ withdrawal from Mogadishu after being defeated by the ENDF and TFG forces. Despite being militarily inferior to Ethiopia the ICU fought the ENDF and the TFG without the use asymmetrical warfare (Ostebo, 2011). The nationalist orientation of the ICU is predominately highlighted by former members of the group forming the Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia. The subsequent election of the former ICU chairman Sheikh Sharif as the president of the TFG also re-affirms the distinct military and ideological difference between the ICU and Al-Shabaab, as the ICU genuinely had high hopes for using religion as a means to pacify and unite Somalis above petty clan politics, while the Al-Shabaab is hell bent on the perpetual continuation of the conflict through religious fanaticism (Ostebo, 2012).
4.7 CONSEQUENCES OF ETHIOPIA`S MILITARY INTERVENTION IN SOMALIA

4.7.1 REGIONAL IMPLICATIONS

4.7.1.1 DEPLOYMENT OF AMISOM

One of the main direct impacts of Ethiopia`s intervention in Somalia is the creation and deployment of AMISOM. AMISOM was created due to the failures of IGASOM and its inability to play a decisive role in the battle against the ICU (O`Brien, 2016). IGASOM was deployed in 2005 for the sole purpose of being a peacekeeping force meant to protect civilians. However, the main obstacle that IGASOM face was its direct interaction with the TNG particularly the training of government soldiers which put it on a collision course with the ICU. For the ICU IGASOM was merely a manifestation of the West`s involvement in Somalia and the peacekeeping force was purely a tool to be used in the suppression of political Islamic movement groups in Somalia (Mwangi, 2010).

The African Union Mission in Somalia started in 2007 with the approval of the UNSC and the AU with a mandate of assisting the TFG in securing Somalia from armed extremist groups. The mission initially had troops from various countries such as Djibouti, Uganda, and Burundi although later by 2013 it expanded with additional countries joining such as Kenya and Ethiopia (Erin, 2013). AMISOM had replaced IGASOM which had been deployed earlier in 2005 but had failed to support the TNG in based in Baidoa against its fight against the ICU. AMISOM was deployed after the Ethiopian military had declared “victory” against the ICU, thus AMISOM was expected to bolster the security of the TFG against Al-Shabaab militants and fill the military vacuum left by the ENDF (Kaldor, 2012).
According to Westcott (2011), AMISOM has demonstrated a high degree of success in Somalia and in particular in allowing the Government to extend its authority beyond Mogadishu. Prior to the deployment of AMISOM, the Somali government did not even control the whole of Mogadishu and was confined to the airport under constant siege from mortar attacks by Al-Shabaab which at the time was at its peak both militarily and politically. Riding high on the momentum of a political and military victory over the ENDF, Al-Shabaab had massive support from the Somali people although it was short lived (Menkhaus, 2009).

The achievements of AMISOM have been tremendous in relation to enhancing security and bringing stability to Somalia. AMISOM has achieved what all other previous intervention had failed to accomplish in Somalia, which is the bolstering of Somalia`s government in its war against Al-Shabaab (Whitaker, 2010). Some of the tangible successes of AMISOM have been the liberation of Somali towns and cities from the grip of Al-Shabaab. The peacekeeping mission has directly been responsible for the retreat of Al-Shabaab from most of Southern Somalia and this is highlighted by the liberation of Kismayo, the third largest city in Somalia (Stanford, 2010).

AMISOM has also made tremendous strides in rebuilding the security institutions in Somalia such as the Military, Intelligence, and Police force. The Police component of AMISOM has been training the Somali Police Force to be able to uphold the rule of law in cities liberated from Al-Shabaab and enforce the central government’s authority. AMISOM has also played a leading role in the rebuilding of the Somali National Army (SNA) with thousands of SNA soldiers being taken to Uganda, Kenya and Djibouti to undergo military training with the ultimate aim of the SNA assuming the security of Somalia after AMISOM forces leave the country (AMISOM, 2012).
Despite initially being the cause of the creation of AMISOM Ethiopia soon returned to Somalia and became part of AMISOM. The addition of Ethiopia to AMISOM seriously poses a threat to the legitimacy of AMISOM as a whole due to the legacy of Ethiopian forces from its war against the ICU which acted as the main catalyst for Al-Shabaab to emerge (Erin, 2013). Similarly, a parallel assessment can be made that the deep distrust between Somalia and Ethiopia combined with the perception of Ethiopian troops being viewed as occupiers hurt AMISOM’s ability to win the hearts and minds of people in Somalia while increasing Al-Shabaab’s jihadist rhetoric (Marangio, 2012).

4.7.1.2 KENYA DEFENSE FORCES IN SOMALIA

Perhaps one of the most severely affected countries by the existence of Al-Shabaab has been Kenya. Kenya has suffered at the hands of terrorists in its past but none as devastating as its war with Al-Shabaab. On 7 August 1998, the American embassy in Nairobi was bombed by Al-Qaeda leading to the deaths of several Americans as well as Kenyans who were working in the embassy, the 1998 bombings laid the foundations for closer US and Kenyan military and intelligence ties in the fight against radical terrorism (Williams, 2012).

The Kenya Defense Forces (KDF) went into Somalia in October 2011 in pursuit of Al-Shabaab fighters who were responsible for the abduction of foreign tourists and aid workers. The invasion of Somalia by the KDF resulted in retaliatory attacks being carried out in within Kenya by Al-Shabaab (Weine, 2013). By getting involved in Somalia, Kenya had left itself open for attacks by the militant group despite Kenya having concrete concerns about its national security being threatened. Abayomi (2013) notes that by abducting tourists from Kenya’s coastal region Al-Shabaab threatened the country’s main source of income which is tourism and that by portraying
Kenya to be unsafe for tourists heavily damaged the tourism sector resulting in an economic decline for Kenya.

Al-Shabaab as a result of Kenya’s involvement in Somalia began to carry out attacks within Kenya and in particular Nairobi. The attack on the Westgate shopping mall one of Kenya’s most prestigious shopping malls frequented by expatriates and locals alike highlighted the impact of Al-Shabaab on the lives of ordinary Kenyans (Abayomi, 2013). The siege which left dozens killed and hundreds injured illustrated the potency of Al-Shabaab’s attacks. Moreover, the group has also carried out attacks in the Northern districts of Kenya near the border with Somalia (HSPI, 2013). By far the most horrific of the group’s cowardly attacks was the attack on Garrisa University which left tens of innocent students dead, several more injured and psychologically traumatized. In both these attacks, Al-Shabaab has demonstrated its capability of being able to attack Kenyans regardless of their religion or social status. The group’s recent brazen attacks against military bases in Mpeketoni highlights not only its unpredictable nature but also its steady decline as a military force by relying on guerilla attacks as well as hit and run tactics (Zoppi, 2015).

Despite having paid a high price in its battle against Al-Shabaab, Kenya and in particular the KDF have demonstrated a long-lasting commitment to ensuring regional peace and security is strengthen by defeating Al-Shabaab. Despite having a large Somali ethnic population the strategy used by the KDF of working with local communities to identify and combat the ideology of Al-Shabaab has played a vital role in alienating the group in not only in Kenya but also throughout the region (O’Brien, 2016). The integration of KDF into AMISOM further enhances the overall strengthening of the peacekeeping body by providing much-needed personnel for continuing the fight against Al-Shabaab. Moreover with the removal of Al-
Shabaab from Kismayo which was its main source of funding, the KDF have dealt a huge economic and military blow to the group ultimately laying the foundations for it eventually demise (Butcher, 2016).

4.7.1.2 EXPANSION OF MILITANCY IN THE REGION

The fight against Al-Shabaab has come at a cost to the region. The insurgency of Al-Shabaab is a multifaceted conflict based on an array of factors. Since the demise of the ICU at the hands of the ENDF Al-Shabaab has emerged from the rubble and has proven to be an, even more, greater threat that its predecessor. Firstly Al-Shabaab is made up of jihadist fighters who come from all corners of the globe despite a significant number of its fighters being drawn from Kenya, Somalia, and Ethiopia (Tams, 2010). The dissolution of the ICU compelled some its more hardliners to melt back into the populations of the region and in effect causing the radicalization of hundreds of young people in various regions in Somalia and beyond (Terrence, 2007).

In Kenya, for example, Al-Shabaab has a strong foothold in the Coast region and in the Northern districts. By indoctrinating the youths of these regions Al-Shabaab is becoming embedded in society making it even more difficult for security forces to identify them posing an existential threat to Kenya’s national security (Tams, 2010). The return of Al-Shabaab fighters back to their home countries also adds to the growing concerns that the skills acquired in the field of battle by these terrorists can be used to launch domestic attacks within Kenya and even has the potential of creating terrorist sleeper cells in the country which can be activated at any moment (Butcher, 2016).

The proliferation of light arms has been an issue for governments in the regions due to the collapse of the Somali government in 1991. There has been a genuine concern that light arms can
be smuggled into the country through the porous borders shared with Somalia by both Kenya and Ethiopia. Kidist (2009) explains that it is this availability of arms combined with a porous border that had allowed Al-Shabaab fighters to be able to carry out the Westgate attack. The rise of Al-Shabaab and in particular its control of the illegal arms trade in the region has also been attributed to the increase of gun related crimes in Kenya.

Given the already porous border with Ethiopia and Somalia, the Kenyan government has faced an uphill battle in reducing the number of illegal firearms getting in the country from the cattle rustlers in Turkana to Al-Shabaab fighters in North Eastern Kenya (Africa-Confidential, 2011). The continued conflict in Somalia is fueling an increase in crime in Nairobi with cases of criminals committing crimes with firearms gradually increasing threatening the internal security of Kenya.

Secessionists groups have long been battling the Ethiopian military and other security apparatus for the better part of three decades. The fear of greater Somalia forced Ethiopia to intervene in Somalia given its volatile regions of Oromia and Ogaden being in a constant state of conflict. The rise of Al-Shabaab and its claim of establishing an Islamic state throughout the region pose a threat to the territorial integrity of Somalia, Ethiopia, and Kenya (Norell, 2008). There is some speculation by regional experts that there is a relationship between the ONLF and some nationalist elements in Al-Shabaab and that not only does Al-Shabaab at times provide arms to the group but it also allows the ONLF to plan attacks from the territories it controls (Menkhaus, 2009).

One cannot but help but notice the irony that Ethiopia faces, one the one had Al-Shabaab is a far more dangerous entity than the ICU which has declared allegiance to Al-Qaeda and embraced
global jihad (Marangio, 2012). On the other hand, Eritrea actively supports Al-Shabaab, ONLF and the Oromo Liberation Movement. In its quest to dismantle the ICU which it argued was a threat to the existence of Ethiopia’s territorial integrity the ENDF invasion ended up causing Ethiopia to be even more isolated in the region and in particular its relationship with Somalia (Wise, 2011).

4.7.2 INTERNATIONAL IMPLICATIONS

4.7.2.1 INCREASED US INVOLVEMENT IN THE HORN OF AFRICA

The US has been actively involved in Somalia for the past two decades with the War on Terror putting Somalia firmly in the sights of Washington. Given the rise of the ICU at a time when the US was at its peak in the War on Terror, Washington had learned from its UN involvement in Somalia back in 1992. The US had been actively supporting the ENDF in its war against the ICU. Menkhaus (2009) goes as far as implicating the US as being the main driver of Ethiopia’s invasion of Somalia stating that the regime of Meles Zenawi was merely acting as a tool for Washington’s war in the Horn of Africa. The strategic location of Somalia offers the US and its Western allies a key vantage point in its war against Al-Qaeda in Yemen and the broader Middle East. From combating piracy which cost the global economy hundreds of billions of dollars to the fight against Al-Shabaab the US has become actively embroiled in not only Somalia but the whole of East Africa (Ibrahim, 2010).

Washington’s weapon of choice however in Somalia has been the use of Aerial vehicle more commonly known as drones. Marchal (2013) explains that the use of drones has two main strategic benefits to the US, firstly there is zero risk of America soldiers being put in harm’s way and no chance of a repeat of a “Black Hawk down” incident. Secondly UAV’s provide for the
pinpoint targeting, tracking and elimination of terrorists significantly reducing the risk of collateral damage. Drone strikes combined with the deployment of a small number of special operations soldiers has proven to be most effective way of degrading Al-Shabaab’s military capabilities (Moussa, 2008). The New York times reported the elimination of Al-Shabaab’s top leadership Ahmed Godane in a drone strike in late 2014 dealing a significant blow to the militant group. Increased US presence in Somalia stems from the existential threat posed by Al-Shabaab and in particular the groups numerous foreign and mostly western fighters some of whom hold American passports, with the fear of the US being, the return of these individuals back to the US and carrying out “lone wolf” attacks (Marangio, 2012).

The US has been one of the largest contributors of AMISOM’s budget in recent years. AMISOM contributing troops have seen substance military aid packages for their respective countries. In Kenya, for example, the US has been funding the training of Anti-Terrorism security forces as well as increasing the amount of military aid given to Kenya. In the financial year of 2016, the US had given 97 million dollars in military aid to be used for the purchase of advanced weapons systems and Military as well as police counter-terrorism training programs (Butcher, 2016).

Somalia’s National Army has also greatly benefited from increased US funding, training and equipping of its forces. The US has provided millions in military assistance aimed at rebuilding the military capabilities of Somalia. For the US, the most efficient way to go about the rebuilding of the SNA has been the training of elite Special Forces groups that will not only provide an edge in fighting Al-Shabaab but will also act as an exoskeleton for the SNA in terms of structure and disciple (Ostebo, 2012). The use of private military contractors used to train two elite units of the SNA’s special forces shows the financial as well as the technical assistance offered by the US. By training Somali soldiers and not just pouring in billions in arms and aid the US hopes to learn
from its mistakes in Kabul and Baghdad where after the US pulled out the governments of Iraq and Afghanistan almost crumbled against insurgency groups (Westcott, 2011).

4.7.2.2 STRENGTHENING OF AMISOM

The AU mission in Somalia is largely credited with the expulsion and stabilization of southern Somalia. Extensive discussions have been held by both the AU and the UN aimed at bolstering AMISOM to allow it to strengthen and consolidate its advances against Al-Shabaab with regard to troop numbers. The AU wanted AMISOM to reach 35000 at its peak in order to fully be able to exact its influence in Somalia and remove Al-Shabaab from its remaining stronghold, however, this option was dismissed to the due logistical challenge of ensuring the efficiency of such a large force (AMISOM, 2012). The UNSC passed resolution 2036 aimed at capping AMISOM personnel numbers at 22000, however, after the KDF entered Somalia the number has increased with the Kenyan forces being incorporated into AMISOM (Allo, 2010).

The US and the EU have actively been supporting AMISOM in terms of funding of troops and paying the individual salaries of soldiers. The EU through its International Development Program has been actively engaging all the stakeholders in AMISOM by coordinating with troop-contributing countries in organizing training programs (Lyons, 2008). On its part, the US military has equally been engaging Al-Shabaab by coordinating its strategies with AMISOM. This was evident when US warplanes struck an Al-Shabaab convoy on its way to attack an AMISOM base in lower Jubbaland. Dual engagement of AMISOM on the ground level as well as at the AU has been the preferred means of contact by the EU and the US combined with tactical support on certain missions especially night raids (O’Brien, 2016).
AMISOM equally receives substantial assistance from NATO in its fight against Al-Shabaab. NATO provides AMISOM with strategic air and sealift services that enable AMISOM to transport troops of willing AU members who wished to deploy in Somalia. Besides its strategic airlift support, NATO also provides AMISOM with Peace Support Operations Division (PSOD) training aimed to strengthen troops in crisis management on the field of battle through its NATO military operations representative to the AU (NATO, 2016).
CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 CONCLUSION

For the past two decades, Somalia has had one of the roughest periods in the history of any modern state. Constantly plagued by repetitive cycles of conflict which is partly blamed on Somalis themselves and also partially blamed on foreign interference and meddling. This study was aimed at finding out if there exists a relationship between Foreign intervention and the rise of terrorist groups using Ethiopia`s 2006 intervention against the ICU as its main case study.

The relationship between Somalia and Ethiopia has been one of perpetual conflict and mistrusts. Somalia invaded Ethiopia in 1977 with the aim of reclaiming the Ogaden but failed in its attempt. Decades later Ethiopia invades Somalia under the guise of fighting terrorism, given that both nations harbor deep military ambitions in the region the two had been financing rebel groups in each other`s countries until the Somali government collapsed in 1991 and the ousting of the Derg regime in Ethiopia. The legality of the latter`s invasion has been one filled with much scrutiny and shaky justifications. The study found that the conflict molded past of the two countries combined with nationalist sentiments on both sides has led the conflict in Somalia to have a new face- Global terrorism in the shape of Al-Shabaab. The study examined critically the historical ties between Ethiopia and Somalia and found that the contentious land of the Ogaden has been both the main source of conflict as well as the theater of war between the two nations.

The study found that there is a complimentary relationship between Foreign intervention and the rise of terror groups. Using Ethiopia`s intervention in 2006 the study found that by disbanding the ICU the Ethiopian military had created a conducive environment for Al-Shabaab to emerge and pose a serious threat to the peace and stability of the region. The threat of Al-Shabaab was
examined from the perspective of its attacks not only in Somalia but in Kenya and even as far as Uganda where the group has claimed responsibility for a series of attacks in both countries. Together with its ally the US, Ethiopia by dismantling the ICU has directly caused one of the greatest geopolitical blunders in the world in the same league as the United States’ mistake in removing Saddam Hussein from power causing the entire Middle East region to be on the brink of collapse through conflict spillovers.

Ethiopia’s intervention in Somalia acts a litmus test for the consequences of military intervention at a time when foreign interventions are being waged around the world. The immediate and long-term effects of an intervention have to be weighed against the short and long-term outcomes, with significant emphasis being placed on the latter. In the case of Ethiopia’s intervention against the ICU the ENDF by dismantling the ICU gave the perfect platform for Al-Shabaab to emerge and thrive. The killing, jailing, and persecution of the ICU’s moderate leadership combined with the growing resentment of the United States’ War on Terror and global extremism had proven to be a lethal combination, for Al-Shabaab to not only emerge, but to also thrive in lawless Somalia. The implications of Al-Shabaab’s rise in power and influence have substantially been felt across the region with the spillover of Al-Shabaab’s activities posing a threat to Kenya as well as being one of the root causes for the KDF to cross over into Somalia.

It is also imperative to note that the legality of military interventions is another gray area in International Law. One of the main premises for invoking Ethiopia’s intervention against the ICU was the argument of an imminent threat posed by the ICU. In today’s rapidly changing global political landscapes what prevents, say, North Korea from invoking a similar argument if it were to launch an attack against South Korea, or, Russia using the argument of intervention by invitation to justify its actions in Crimea? The arguments and justifications used to legitimize an
intervention seem to be molded by the intervening state so as to defend its actions, and allowing such perils to become a norm not only poses a threat to global peace but also to the idea of territorial integrity as enshrined in the UN charter. There needs to be a clear definition and acceptable set of conditions that need to be in place, unanimously agreed upon by all states so as to act as a validation mechanism to allow for the lawful and consistent use of force against non-state actors.

5.2 RECOMMENDATIONS

5.2.1 FOR SOMALIA

5.2.1.1 REBUILDING SOMALIA`S SECURITY APPARATUS

The civil war and the years that followed have taken a serious toll on Somalia`s military and police. For Somalia to be able to stand on its own after the withdrawal of AMISOM forces it is imperative that the country focus on its security forces. The international community, as well as regional neighbors, should provide technical as well as physical support to the Somali military and the police. AMISOM stands out on this front with regard to strengthening the capability of Somali security forces with the training of hundreds of soldiers and police officers both within Somalia and outside the country. Al-Shabaab is a Somali problem first and as such, it is only the Somali military that can effectively deal with the dismantling and eventual eradication of the group. Given ample support both financial and logistical assistance, the SNA can make significant gains against Al-Shabaab. Therefore the international community should make the revival of the SNA one of its top priorities.
5.2.1.2 PROMOTE RECONCILIATION AND INITIATE DERADICALIZATION PROGRAMS

Clan based conflicts are the root cause of Somalia`s 25-year civil war and have been a constant throne in the side of the peace process. Genuine peace cannot be achieved with some semblance of a reconciliation process which acts a deterrent for future wars to erupt. Somalia should borrow a page from Rwanda and establish indigenous local courts similar to the Gacaca (a traditional grass roots approach to community owned justice system in Rwanda). Somalia should incorporate some aspects of the Gacaca and combine it with Xeer (A Somali traditional dispute settlement mechanism based on customary law) and an impartial judiciary to effectively settle the injustices that have occurred since the start of the civil war. The establishment a free and fair judicial system will lay the foundation for the resuscitation of a viable Somali state.

Military force can only achieve so much, Al-Shabaab`s ideological beliefs are the real threat. Somalia should start a civic education program that will combat the extremist ideology propagated by Al-Shabaab. Religious sensitization policies should also be adopted by Somalia and de-radicalization programs launched with the assistance of Islamic scholars who can teach young Somali youth about Islam and provide a counter to the extremist ideological teachings of Al-Shabaab. The ideological views of Al-Shabaab should be fought equally if not harder than the military campaigns waged against the group on the battlefield since it is crucial to win the hearts and minds of the Somali people.
5.2.2 FOR THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY

5.2.2.1 CAPACITY AND INSTITUTION BUILDING

The International Community plays a great role in aiding Somalia in its quest to rebuild itself after almost two decades of conflict. The International Community can provide programs that are aimed at building Somalia`s institutions. Some of the area that the International Community can assist Somalia is in reconstituting the civil service by training civil servants and other government employees. The UN has been playing a great role in assisting the Somali government in initiating public services such as education, healthcare, water and electrical services to the people and starting training programs that are aimed at transferring technical skills to the people. The International Community needs to scale up and diversify the assistance given to Somalia and move away from temporary assistance such as food aid and start implementing strategies that enhance food security for example, that are aimed at addressing future problems. The International Community equally needs to help the Somali government in setting up effective, efficient and transparent institutions that promote accountability to the people. Both the International Community and International Organizations need to refine their existing policies towards institution building in Somalia with a significant emphasis being placed on accountability and transparency.

5.2.2.2 INCREASED ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE

The fight against Al-Shabaab is a multipronged attack waged on military, ideological as well as economic means. The number one reason why people inside Somalia join Al-Shabaab is due financial gain, therefore the international community, as well as Somalia, should seek economic measures to tackle this issue. Supporting and setting up job creating initiatives will not only reduce the number of unemployed individuals in the country but it will also provide people with
an alternative means to earn a living. This can be achieved through various means; firstly, the International Community needs to invest in Somalia and in particular the creation of sustainable sources of employment. Secondly, Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) can play a role in reviving the Somali economy by investing in areas such as fishing, livestock, agricultural and light manufacturing industries. Lastly, the Somali diaspora can play an important role in the economic rejuvenation of Somalia since the amounts of global remittances headed to Somalia amount to almost a Billion dollars annually, one of the largest in the world. The International Community can also assist Somalia in setting up its financial institutions like the central bank and the re-printing of the Somali currency to reduce the circulation and over-reliance on the US dollar in the economy. By strengthening these institutions the International Community will facilitate the gradual economic recovery of Somalia which can in turn then shift its attention to other pressing issues such as infrastructure rebuilding and the sustainable economic growth and development.
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