ROLE OF MILITARY INTERVENTION IN CONFLICT SITUATIONS: A CASE STUDY OF SOMALIA

BY
TUSMO IBRAHIM OGLE
629513

A Thesis Submitted to the School of Humanities and Social Sciences in Partial Fulfilment of the Requirement for the Award of the Degree of Master of Arts in International Relations (Diplomacy and Foreign Policy Concentration)

UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL UNIVERSITY – AFRICA

SPRING, 2016
STUDENT’S DECLARATION

I, the undersigned, declare that this is my original work and has not been submitted to any other colleges, institutions or universities other than the United States International University Africa in Nairobi for academic credit.

Signed: __________________________ Date: __________________________

Tusmo Ibrahim Ogle

This thesis has been presented for examination with my approval as the appointed supervisor.

Signed: __________________________ Date: __________________________

Mr. Weldon Nge’eno

Dr. Tom L. S. Onditi
Dean, School of Humanities and Social Sciences (SHSS)

Signed: __________________________ Date: __________________________

Amb. Prof. Ruthie C. Rono, HSC
Deputy Vice Chancellor- Academic Affairs (DVCAA)

Signed: __________________________ Date: __________________________
COPYRIGHT

All rights reserved. No part of this project report should be reproduced in any form or by any means including photocopying, recording without prior written authorization from the author.

Tusmo Ogle © 2016
ABSTRACT

The general objective of this study is to determine the role of military intervention in conflict situations: A Case Study of Somalia. Specifically, the study was to: one, establish the influence of military intervention in peace enforcement in Somalia; two, examine the influence of military intervention in facilitating humanitarian assistance in Somalia and three to explore the influence of military intervention in peace building in Somalia. This study was an analysis of the literature. Secondary data was obtained from analysis and review of books, academic journals, existing papers and other available literature on the topic under study. The data was analyzed using content analysis. The results were presented under identified themes.

On the military intervention in peace enforcement literature; the study discussed the concept of peace enforcement; and then analyzed a number of military interventions in peace enforcement missions around the world, for instance, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the Former Yugoslavia, Haiti, Kosovo, Somalia. On military intervention in humanitarian assistance literature, the concept of Responsibility to Protect was discussed. The study analysed the case studies of military intervention in humanitarian assistance in countries such as Libya, DRC Congo and Somalia. On military intervention in peace-building, the study established that Peace-building is a familiar concept within the United Nations and it involves a range of measures targeted to reduce the risk of lapsing or relapsing into conflict by strengthening national capacities at all levels for conflict management, and to lay the foundations for sustainable peace and development. However, there is no standard template for peace-building, there is no one-size-fits-all. Each initiative needs to be crafted in the fullest awareness of the specificity of the context and of the dynamics of the conflict.

The study found many UN missions lack the capacity to repel opponents and change the course of war. In Rwanda the UN did not have capability to deploy a force rapidly and no nation was willing to send in enough troops to solve an internal conflict. Conflicts in Rwanda, Bosnia and Somalia were turning points where some lessons were learnt which
has led to changes to improve peace support operations. In Somalia, the lessons learnt from UNITAF and UNOSOM I & II and AMISOM revealed that peacekeeping can be better managed by: matching mandates to needs, communicating the purpose of the mission to the local community; and where the use of force is inevitable in self-defence or where the use of force may be counterproductive.

The study concludes that peacekeeping through use of military after civil wars was found to be a contributing factor to attaining peace and stability. However, peacekeeping cannot guarantee real peace. Even after the fighting has been stopped through military intervention, the risk of renewed conflict is still high. Though military activities reduce the damage of the crisis and creating room for diplomatic and humanitarian actors to address the underlying causes of the conflict; it cannot guarantee real peace. However, they can establish a framework in order to allow the local and international community to do what is necessary to resolve conflicts. The study also concludes military as an essential component of many peace-building operations, presupposes that the presence of the military reduces the propensity for direct conflict and creates a safe space for peace building activities and other categories of intervention that is designed to address the root causes of the violence. However, while using the military, peace-building activities and actors must take a conflict-sensitive approach.

The study recommends that the military while undertaking peace-building activities must take a conflict-sensitive approach. This requires engagement in a conflict analysis exercise in order to identify both the structural causes of conflict, and (which may be different) the current triggers or accelerators of potential renewed conflict. The time has come when the international community needs to let Somalis take charge of their political determination.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

Firstly I want to thank Allah (SWT) for the gift of life for bringing me this far and for the constant protection He has gifted me with. His mercy has brought me this far. Secondly I would like to thank my loving parents Capt. Ibrahim Ogle and Khadija Abdulkadir for the unwavering sacrifices that they have undergone to see me through school and life. Everything I am, I am because of them.

I also wish to thank my supervisor Mr. Weldon Ng’eno for constant encouragement, positive criticism on the document, guidance, and dedication to support this thesis.

Special thanks go to my family members who stood by me and gave me the moral support to complete my studies. We are a large family but each one of them played an important role in my life. My greatest thanks goes to my grandparents: the late Awowo Abdi Ogle and the late Ayeyo Dofa Santur and the late Awowo Abdulkadir Jama (Mzee Barsalinga) and Ayeyo Ebla Santur. It is the basis that these two great families that I was gifted with the amazing family that I have. All the blessings I have been gifted with in my life stem from the great and awesome family that I have.

Abduwahab, Mr. Mo, Jabir, Abdulahi, Jibril. Abduwahab and Toto, my amazing sisters, Siman, Fozia, Nanay, Jackee, Faiza, Samira, Yasmin, Dolly Mama, Shamim, Fahima, Ebla, Shamsa, Hibz, Nimiz, Mulkhey, Amay, Sarah, Asha, Amaleo, my nephews Jiji, Abulkadir, Mohamed Amin, Dekha, and lovely Zakariya and Maryam. Unfortunately this list does no justice to all my family members and I apologize for not being able to put up everyone’s name who has helped me through this journey.

For friends that became family I will forever thank God for bringing you in my life. Winnie Nasaka, Baxsaney, Aziza, Khadija Horrow, Ivy, Victoria, Sylvia, Shukri, Ubax, Malka, Madhiha, Wendy, Mike, Roble, Adan, Maina and all my amazing friends that I met in USIU, Africa Nazarene University, NMA and Bush 08, I am forever grateful for your companionship and friendship.

Last but not least I want to thank all the USIU staff, our lecturers specifically in the Masters class who went out of their way to make our stay at USIU as educative as possible. I would like to pass a special thanks to my supervisor Mr. Ng’eno, Prof. Adar, Miss Fatma Abdulatif and Dr. George Katete. I really appreciate your guidance and wisdom throughout this whole time.

To all those people I mentioned and those I forgot, I am forever indebted to you. Thank you forever.
DEDICATION

This thesis is dedicated to my amazing mother and father: Khadija Abdulakdir Barsalinga and Captain Ibrahim Abdi Ogle. Because of the mercy of the Almighty Allah (SWT) and you, I am what I am today. Thank you for all you have done and continue doing for me. I love you to eternity and beyond.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

STUDENT’S DECLARATION ................................................................. ii
COPYRIGHT ................................................................................ iii
ABSTRACT ....................................................................................... iv
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT ................................................................... vi
DEDICATION ..................................................................................... viii
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS ................................ xi

CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION ...................................................... 1
  1.1 Background of the Study .......................................................... 1
  1.2 Statement of the Problem ....................................................... 7
  1.3 Objectives of the Study ........................................................... 9
    1.3.1 General Objective .............................................................. 9
    1.3.2 Specific Objectives ............................................................ 9
  1.4 Significance of the Study ......................................................... 9
  1.5 Literature Review .................................................................. 10
  1.6 Hypothesis ............................................................................ 13
  1.7 Theoretical Framework of Analysis ....................................... 13
  1.8 Methodology ......................................................................... 15

CHAPTER TWO .................................................................................. 16
MILITARY INTERVENTION IN PEACE ENFORCEMENT .................... 16
  2.1 Introduction ........................................................................... 16
  2.2 Concept of Peace Enforcement ............................................. 16
  2.3 Emergence of Military Intervention in Peace Enforcement .......... 20
  2.4 Analysis of Military Interventions in Peace Enforcement .......... 22
    2.4.1 Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the Former Yugoslavia .... 22
    2.4.2 Haiti .................................................................................. 25
    2.4.3 Kosovo ............................................................................. 26
    2.4.4 Military Intervention in Somalia ...................................... 28
# LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACR</td>
<td>Armed Conflicts Report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECOMOG</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICISS</td>
<td>International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICRtoP</td>
<td>International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDPs</td>
<td>Internally Displaced Persons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IHL</td>
<td>International Humanitarian Law</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TFG</td>
<td>Transitional Federal Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UIC</td>
<td>Islamic Courts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNITAF</td>
<td>Unified Task Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNOSOM</td>
<td>United Nations Operation in Somalia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNPKO</td>
<td>United Nations Peacekeeping Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNPROFOR</td>
<td>UN Protection Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNSC</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>United States</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background of the Study

The demand for international interventions in conflict situations has grown in recent years and is set to grow further. This action is motivated by the need to protect civilians and provide humanitarian assistance in conflict situations. Military intervention is one of the international interventions which have a compelling foreign policy issue. It is on the front line of debates about when to use military force; it presents a fundamental challenge to state sovereignty; it radically influences the way humanitarian aid organizations and military organizations work; and it is a matter of life or death for thousands upon thousands of people (Seybolt, 2007). Tragedies such as the war in Lebanon between Israel and Hezbollah in the summer of 2006 and the fighting and massacres in Darfur, Sudan, seize the world’s attention with harrowing stories of human suffering and political complexity.

Traditionally, the use of force by belligerents was seen to be regulated almost exclusively by the conduct of hostilities. Force was used against enemy combatants who could be clearly distinguished from the civilian population. The use of force in order to maintain or restore public security, law and order was seen as a domestic task fulfilled by the police. Today, in many contemporary armed conflict situations, armed forces are increasingly expected to conduct not only combat operations against the adversary but also law enforcement operations in order to maintain or restore public security, law and order (Gaggioli, 2013).
The modern international system is founded on the premise that sovereign states have to be free from unwanted external involvement in their internal affairs. Yet repeated humanitarian interventions since 1991 have confronted the idea of sovereign immunity in the name of protecting civilians from harm. This human security perspective on the use of force, grounded in the belief that the rights of people, not states, are the bedrock of a just and secure world, has found its voice in the concept that states have a responsibility to protect civilians within their jurisdiction (Seybolt, 2007). Military humanitarian intervention has recently undergone a revival in circumstances where national sovereignty has manifestly failed to serve the citizens of a given state. The most recent instances (Iraqi Kurdistan and Somalia) have been undertaken under the auspices of the UN intervention in Bosnia has been considered under a similar mandate (Waal & Omaar, 2015).

The use of lethal or potentially lethal force in situations by armed forces and law-enforcement officials is governed by two different paradigms: the conduct of hostilities paradigm, derived from international humanitarian law (IHL) and the law enforcement paradigm, mainly derived from international human rights law. According to UN (2013) military intervention is considered due to the compelling need to protect unarmed populations targeted by belligerents in armed conflict or victimized as an unintended result of the fighting. However, effective determination of the appropriate applicable paradigm may have a crucial impact on the humanitarian consequences of an operation, since the content of these two paradigms is different. For example, the conduct of hostilities paradigm allows for the killing of legitimate targets, whereas the law
enforcement paradigm prescribes that one must “capture rather than kill” suspected persons, unless they pose an imminent threat to life (Gaggioli, 2013).

Rigby (2006) revealed that the basic aim of any intervening military force is to create the necessary conditions of physical security such that reconstruction and reconciliation processes can take place. However, there are two dimensions to this role, and they do not rest easily alongside each other. On the one hand there is the use of coercive force to protect threatened populations and enforce a ceasefire. Then there is the policing function of establishing and maintaining a degree of public order (and the avoidance of civil chaos) such that some variant of normal social life can begin to grow. These two roles, the war fighting and the policing, require different approaches and different mentalities (Rigby, 2006).

The international fight against terrorism has led to the direct involvement of the military into conflicts. O’Rourke (2005) revealed that the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan would not exist in their current form were it not for the US-led military intervention campaign against terrorism. Indeed, the effects of the fight against international terrorism have been felt in many of the intra-state conflicts identified in Project Ploughshares’ annual Armed Conflicts Report (ACR). However, it is far too early to draw any solid conclusions about the impact of the military intervention on terrorism. Increase in military funding since 2001 to countries experiencing conflict vary greatly, as do their effects. Pakistan, Nepal, Algeria, Chad, the Philippines, Colombia, Kenya, India, Indonesia, Serbia and Montenegro, Nigeria, Uganda, Senegal, and Ethiopia have all
experienced either an increase in US military assistance. Although countries such as Kenya and Indonesia have experienced small increases in funding that may not have a significant long-term impact on the country or conflict, others, like Pakistan, have experienced huge increases in military assistance that are likely to have serious long-term effects (McLaughlin, 2004).

In Africa, Civil wars and terrorism have threatened human security in many African countries. Somalia, Sudan, Angola, Sierra Leone, Liberia and Rwanda are such examples where conflicts have led to devastating effects. Conflicts in African countries have led to killing of civilians and soldiers are killed in combat, and increased violent crimes. Wars force mass migration and people die because there is a higher prevalence of preventable communicable diseases (Hoeffler, 2008). With increased civil wars and terrorism, Several African countries are using military involvement to counter such conflicts. With support from developed countries such as US, and agencies such as UN and AU; African countries are using military intervention in conflict situations. An example is the Pan-Sahel Initiative, also known as the Trans-Sahara Counter-Terrorism Initiative, which was established in 2002 and was based in Djibouti. Between 1,200 and 1,500 US marines were training security personnel in a number of African countries (O’Rourke, 2005).

In Somalia, the conflict is a long-standing one, which has had a profound regional impact. The main conflicts in Somalia include inter-clan clashes and rivalry for power, warlords trying to assert their control over various regions in the country, piracy off the
Somali coast, acts of terrorism perpetuated mostly by al-Shabaab and border conflicts with neighboring states, particularly Ethiopia and Kenya. Conflict in Somalia started prior to 1991 with the toppling of military dictator Mohamed Siad Barre in 1991 and the subsequent collapse of central order accelerated civil unrest, resulting in the country experiencing over two decades. During the lengthy conflict, thousands of lives were lost, property was destroyed and people were forced to flee their homes and seek refuge in other countries, while others became internally displaced persons (IDPs) living in Somalia. In 2012, a reported 1,017,649 Somali refugees were being hosted in other countries, mainly in Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda and Yemen, while approximately 1.4 million people were internally displaced and settled in Somaliland and the south-central regions of the country (UNHCR, 2012).

In the midst of Somalia’s decades of conflict, al-Shabaab, a Somalia-based terrorist group with al-Qaeda links, has become particularly noticeable not only nationally but also regionally. In this regard, the crisis in Somalia has received significant regional and international attention over the years, with a variety of actors intervening in a bid to help restore stability. This has led to foreign interventions by the United Nations (UN) which were launched periodically from 1992 to 1995. The first United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM I), launched in August 1992, was comprised of 500 Pakistani peacekeepers. Its main mandate was to monitor a ceasefire between belligerent warlords in the capital, Mogadishu and protect relief workers operating within Somalia following a humanitarian crisis caused by famine in the country (Human Rights Watch,
1992). This UN operation, however, failed to meet its mandate. This failure necessitated the formation of the Unified Task Force (UNITAF), the result of collaboration between UNOSOM I and the United States (US), in December 1992.

Unified Task Force (UNITAF) was mandated to establish a safe environment for the delivery of humanitarian assistance to civilians and to protect food deliveries from warlord attacks. This operation, which ran until 1993, was also referred to as ‘Operation Restore Hope’. The operation formed the basis for Somali resentment of the US as it was viewed as having sided with one faction of the warring parties during the operation. In 1993, UNITAF was replaced by UNOSOM II, which operated until 1995 when it was withdrawn from Somalia. In 2006, neighboring Ethiopia invaded Somalia, sending in its troops at the behest of then president of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed. The president called upon his eastern neighbors to help fight the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) that was considered a challenge to the government’s operations in the capital (Central Intelligence Agency, 2012). This intervention was widely viewed as one aimed at achieving regime change and the imposition of a strong Somali government.

Later on 16 October 2011, Kenyan troops entered Somalia to launch a military offensive against al-Shabaab, called Operation *Linda Nchi* (Protect the Country), the reality of the al-shabaab menace in the region was highlighted. Currently Kenya is under AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) which was deployed in the country earlier in 2007, and is dominated by Uganda and Ethiopia, Burundi and Uganda, whilst Ghana, Malawi
and Nigeria also contribute forces to join AMISOM (United Nations Department of Political Affairs, 2012). There is need to establish the key mandate and role of AMISOM’s in Somalia.

1.2 Statement of the Problem

In recent years, the debate about when and how military should get involved has focused on the concept of a ‘responsibility to protect’ civilians during violent conflicts. This controversial idea now enshrined in a document adopted by the UN Summit of September 2005, but still contested in practice by many governments, puts the onus on the UN and its members to step in and protect the citizens of a country when that country’s government cannot protect them or turns its own weapons on them. However, it has been difficult to reach consensus in principle on this idea, hence making implementation harder (Seybolt, 2007).

According to Rigby (2006), whereas overwhelming force might be necessary in combating conflict, it can be counter-productive in policing; sending the tanks in to disperse a mob is not the way to maintain law and order in the long-term. The author argues that it is unrealistic to expect combat troops who have risked life and limb on the battlefield to take on a post-ceasefire policing function, to shift from being instruments of deadly violence to being protectors of public order within the community. Combat troops are not accustomed to treating those they encounter with dignity. Yet, unless locals are treated with respect, then the intervening force will lose legitimacy.
The invasion of Somalia may have made the east Africa region more vulnerable and risked the countries national security as a result of the offensive in Somalia (Pflanz, 2011). It is clear that al-Shabaab militias are against any foreign intervention in Somalia. On the other hand, Civilian casualties of the intervention are being reported, both in Somalia and in Kenya. As AMISOM launches its attacks in the al-Shabaab-controlled areas of Somalia, cases of civilians including children, being killed has been reported (Miyandazi, 2012). This has led to hostilities even by the local community against foreign military intervention. In examining military intervention in Somalia, heated debate, both scholarly and popular, is stimulated. Intervention in a country like Somalia has proved to be a daunting task, even for international organisations and countries with more military might and experience.

Despite the fact that military interventions have long been considered in peace keeping in conflicts zones; the basic question that remains largely unanswered is whether the use of military enhances peace or escalates the war. Moreover, do use of military strengthen or further weaken fragile states facing conflicts? These questions can be answered by first understanding the establishing the role played by foreign military in conflict situations. It is against this background that the study seeks to determine the role of military intervention in conflict situations, with a specific focus on Somalia.
1.3 Objectives of the Study

1.3.1 General Objective

The main objective of the study is to determine the role of military intervention in conflict situations: A Case Study of Somalia.

1.3.2 Specific Objectives

The study will be guided by the following specific objectives:

1. To establish the influence of military intervention in peace enforcement in Somalia.
2. To examine the influence of military intervention in facilitating humanitarian assistance in Somalia.
3. To explore the influence of military intervention in peace building in Somalia.

1.4 Significance of the Study

1.4.1. To Regional and International Agencies

Foreign military interventions in Somalia have been made possible by the support from UN and AU to achieve various goals among them, building peace in Somalia. The findings of this study will therefore inform and enlighten them on the effects the military intervention is having in achieving their goals. The agencies would also get insights on how best they can use the military to conduct peace support operations to stabilise the situation in Somalia and to create conducive conditions for the implementation of humanitarian activities, without causing hostilities.
1.4.2. Countries with Militaries in Somalia

The study will be of value to the governments or countries offering military assistance in Somalia (for instance, Kenya, Uganda, Ethiopia, Burundi, Uganda among others), since they will get insights on how their military support is impacting on Somalia. The findings of this study would make help the governments of these countries make sound decisions on whether to get the military involved; when to get military involvement, or how to get military involvement in other countries conflicts.

1.4.3. Academicians and Researchers

The study may be of great importance to the scholars and researchers as it adds value to the body of knowledge by expanding the existing literature in the field of role of military intervention in conflict situations and specifically in Africa. Moreover, the study may act as a basis for future research.

1.5 Literature Review

Most of the African states are marred with conflicts; some are currently experiencing violent conflict while many more face the threat of violent conflict. In the sub-Saharan Africa, over the last 50 years shows that about 30 countries- some 65 per cent of the total has experienced armed conflict since independence (Reno, 2011). The number of conflicts increased in the first three decades of independence and spiked after the end of the Cold War in the 1990s (Reno, 2011). These included the long wars in Sudan, Mozambique, Somalia and Angola and also regional conflict such as that seen in the Horn of Africa. Straus (2009) notes that about 64 per cent of these African internal
conflicts lasted five years or less, while some 22 per cent lasted eleven years or more. These conflicts have resulted in massive deaths and caused a lot of suffering (African Development Report 2008/2009 (2008).

The common threats to regional peace and security include toppling the governments, displacing populations, humanitarian disasters, diseases, the massacre of civilians and climate change. However, there has been an emergence of new threats particularly terrorism and piracy in the wider Horn of Africa. In the recent past, Al Shabaab in Somalia has been conducting terror activities majorly in Kenya. In 2011, they intensified their terror activities. This has threatened the tourism sector which is a major foreign exchange earner. This prompted the Kenya’s military incursion (together with other counties under AMISOM) into Somalia so that it could create a buffer zone (Oluch, 2015).

Afaha (2013) examined the cost of peace by assessing the domestic impacts of Nigeria’s military deployments to ECOMOG operations. The study established that Nigeria’s experiences in spearheading the ECOMOG missions in Liberia and Sierra Leone was not without some far reaching impacts on the home front, it came with not with tales of war but other extra-military impacts suffered by the country during and after those operations. The findings concur with those of Azeng (2013) who investigated the role of military resources in conflict relapse and found out that military spending is particularly associated with an increasing risk of renewed conflict. The study demonstrated the adverse consequences of the use of military spending to sustain peace,
particularly on case of civil conflict. The study also established that the risk of renewed conflict in highly democratic governments drops rapidly after the conflict has ended, rather than in starkly autocratic regimes, where the process is much longer.

Waal and Omaar (2015) examined whether military intervention could be humanitarian. The authors argue that entry of international military forces represents a failure of the international community’s earlier efforts. They also revealed that relief operations and diplomatic interventions should be done earlier and better than they have been in the past, so as to make military intervention unnecessary. When military intervention does take place, there are certain standards of independent verification of facts, accountability and human rights that must be respected. Above all, the international community must recognize that military intervention cannot solve humanitarian or conflict resolution problems; it can only alter them.

A report by ICISS (2001) on “Responsibility to Protect” which sought to present a rationale for armed humanitarian intervention based on traditional just war thinking concluded its observations regarding ‘human protection operations’ with the recommendation that there must be maximum coordination between military and civilian authorities and organizations. Coordination should begin prior to the actual intervention, and that peace building should be integrated into the planning of the intervention. The report indicated that if military intervention is to be contemplated, the need for a post-intervention strategy is also of paramount importance. Military intervention is one instrument in a broader spectrum of tools designed to prevent conflicts and humanitarian
emergencies from arising, intensifying, spreading, persisting or recurring. The objective of such a strategy must be to help ensure that the conditions that prompted the military intervention do not repeat themselves or simply resurface. The consolidation of peace in the aftermath of conflict requires more than purely diplomatic and military action. An integrated peace building effort is needed to address the various factors which have caused or are threatening a conflict.

1.6 Research questions

The study will be based on the following research questions:

1.6.1. Does the military intervention in conflict influence peace enforcement in Somalia?

1.6.2. How does military intervention in conflict facilitate humanitarian assistance in Somalia?

1.6.3. To what extent does the military intervention in conflict enhance peace building in Somalia?

1.7 Theoretical Framework of Analysis

Deterrence is both a theory in international relations and a strategy of conflict management. Deterrence is an attempt to influence another actor's assessment of its interests. It seeks to prevent an undesired behavior by convincing the party who may be contemplating such an action that its cost will exceed any possible gain (Lebow, 2008). Proponents of deterrence believe that people choose to obey or violate the law after calculating the gains and consequences of their actions. Overall, however, it is difficult to
prove the effectiveness of deterrence since only those offenders not deterred come to the notice of law enforcement (Hobbes, 2010).

Deterrence presupposes that decisions are made in response to some kind of rational cost-benefit calculus, that this calculus can be successfully manipulated from the outside, and that the best way to do so is to increase the cost side of the ledger. General deterrence is based on the existing power relationship and attempts to prevent an adversary from seriously considering any kind of military challenge because of its expected adverse consequences. Immediate deterrence is specific; it attempts to forestall an anticipated challenge to a well-defined and publicized commitment. Immediate deterrence is practiced when general deterrence is thought to be failing. It is almost impossible to know when general deterrence succeeds because non-action by a target state can be the result of many reasons, including any lack of intention to use force (Hobbes, 2010).

Under “military measures” to enhance deterrence, Gray (2003) offers, and explains, four broad principles in regard to US military intervention. The author claims that force posture must be flexible and adaptable; that land power is essential that no particular military posture is uniquely deterring; and that U.S. land power must be capable of contributing to strategic success in different kinds of conflicts.
1.8 Methodology

This study was an analysis of the literature. Secondary data was obtained from analysis and review of books, journals, papers and other available literature on the issue under study. The chosen research methodology was deemed to be sufficient considering the analytical approach to the study. The data was analyzed using content analysis. Content analysis is a technique for making inferences by objectively and systematically identifying specified characteristics of responses. The results were presented under identified themes.
CHAPTER TWO
MILITARY INTERVENTION IN PEACE ENFORCEMENT

2.1 Introduction

This section sought to establish the influence of military intervention in peace enforcement. The study seeks to obtain a better understanding of the effectiveness of Peace Enforcement through military in conflict situations, by comparing and contrasting a number of peace keeping missions across the world. The study starts by discussing the concept of peace enforcement and then analyzing a number of military interventions in peace enforcement missions. Among those discussed includes, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the Former Yugoslavia, Haiti, Kosovo, Somalia. The chapter ends with a section on conclusions.

2.2 Concept of Peace Enforcement

According to Coleman (2007), Peace Enforcement are forcible military interventions by one or more states into a third country. The express objective is to maintain or restore international, regional or local peace and security by ending a violent conflict within that country. The term peace enforcement is found in the UN Charter under Chapter VII and Articles 39, 41, and 42. Article 47 goes on to outline the procedures for managing breaches of peace and acts of aggression. It establishes a Military Staff Committee to manage the armed forces placed at the disposal of the UN Security Council (Charter of the United Nations, 1945)\(^1\).
In her book ‘Peace Enforcement: The United Nations Experience in Congo, Somalia, and Bosnia’, Jane Boulden provides an in-depth and excellent overview of peace enforcement operations. Her analysis focuses on the three missions listed in the title, but in the introduction she states that the impact of the Cold War prevented the Charter’s intent of enforcement action from becoming a reality. With the end of the Cold War there was renewed optimism on the use of the UN’s security arrangements (Boulden, 2001).

The first real use of the term peace enforcement came in Boutros Boutros Ghali’s January 1992 Secretary General’s report to the UN Security Council. The report, more commonly known as the Agenda for Peace, outlined procedures for the use of “peace enforcement forces” by stating that Member States should place at the UN’s disposal volunteers to manage broken or ineffective cease fires (Ghali, 1995). He also stated that the forces must be more heavily armed than peacekeepers and undergo extensive preparatory training. Such forces would be under the command of the UN Secretary General.

In his report, Boutros Boutros Ghali defines preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peacekeeping, and post conflict peace building, but does not define peace enforcement. In his supplement to the Agenda for Peace, published in 1995, he further stated: “Even though the use of force is authorized under Chapter VII of the Charter, the United Nations remains neutral and impartial between warring parties.” Later in the same supplement he stated: One of the achievements of the Charter of the United Nations was
to empower the Organization [UN] to take enforcement action against those responsible for threats to the peace, breaches of peace or acts of aggression. Neither the Security Council nor the Secretary General at present has the capacity to deploy, direct, command and control operations for this purpose, except perhaps on a limited scale (Ghali, 1995).

A clear definition of peace enforcement did not emerge until the British and the American military doctrines on peacekeeping were published in 1994. The armies developed doctrine to guide the training of military forces, and in such documents, terms were defined. The US Army’s Field Manual 100-23 of December 1994 defined preventive diplomacy and peace building along the lines described in Agenda for Peace. The manual also defined peace enforcement as, “the application of military force or the threat of its use, normally pursuant to international authorization, to compel compliance with generally accepted resolutions or sanctions.”

The British field manual, Wider Peacekeeping, published in September 1994 defined peace enforcement as: “operations carried out to restore peace between belligerent parties who do not all consent to interventions and who may be engaged in combat activities.”

The British manual also addressed consent of the warring or belligerent parties in some detail. Consent of the local parties is the critical difference between peacekeeping and peace enforcement (Oliver, 2002).

In August 2000, Ambassador Lakhdar Brahimi submitted his report on the Panel of United Nations Peacekeeping (more commonly known as the Brahimi Report). The report, done by an experienced panel of peacekeepers, was the most comprehensive
review of UN peacekeeping done to date. The panel recommended that consent of the local parties, impartiality, and the use of force only in self defense should remain the bedrock principles of peacekeeping (Brahimi Report, 2000).

In this report Brahimi also only defined peacemaking, peacekeeping, and peace-building, but did not define peace enforcement. He goes on to describe spoilers and manipulation of the peace process. The report states: “In the past, the United Nations has often found itself unable to respond effectively to such challenges. It is a fundamental premise of the present report, however, that it must be able to do so”. Brahimi later recommends that the mandate must authorize the use of force and those bigger, better-equipped forces, and more costly forces should be used to present a more credible deterrent threat. The Brahimi Report goes on. “Where enforcement action is required, it has consistently been entrusted to coalitions of willing States, with authorization of the Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter” (Brahimi Report, 2000, pp. 13-14). This brief review of the term peace enforcement does not clarify whether the UN should or should not do peace enforcement operations. It even muddies the water further.

The Brahimi Report (2000) implies that the UN should develop the capacity to conduct peace enforcement. In some UN circles there are discussions about “robust peacekeeping.” This means providing UN forces with the necessary authority and capability, both size and combat equipment, to conduct enforcement actions. If one analyzes past missions, general trends emerge. The trend is regional organizations or
coalitions of the willing are more suitable in conducting peace enforcement missions. Such actions support the Charter and the latest analyses on modern peace operations.

2.3 Emergence of Military Intervention in Peace Enforcement

During the early days of the UN, Cold War tensions kept the UN from engaging in the more complex operations. With the exception of the 1960-1964 mission in the Congo, UN peacekeeping missions were what is now known as traditional peacekeeping. When nations involved in a conflict needed a force to monitor a peace agreement, military units under the UN flag were the best methods to ensure pure neutrality. A small interposition force or unarmed observer force was deployed to monitor the peace and report and investigate violations. At the close of the Cold War the UN became the preferred solution for all crises (Lewis, 2015).

The UN’s role in international security become more and more confined to assisting in the negotiation of cease-fires or handling other disputes where the superpower interests were not compromised. In the course of playing this role, the UN gradually developed a new kind of military activity known as peacekeeping. This arrangement called for putting in place a military force that would act reasonably effectively; and be competent; but at the same time not too effectively. This authorization of a competent force’s authority would however be strictly controlled. This technique of peacekeeping was developed in order to compromise the then divided Security Council (O’Neill & Rees, 2005).
The UN documents the first peacekeeping mission as that of 1948 in the Middle East when the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization in Palestine (UNTSO) was established to supervise a truce already in place, in an effort to end the Arab-Israeli war.

Mere observer missions like UNTSO, were much less demanding than more complex conflicts such as the Suez Crisis in 1956 which required far more activity on the part of peacekeepers, including overseeing the withdrawal of invading forces. As the first Emergency Force to be deployed under the banner of the UN, the mission to Suez in 1956 (UNEF 1) is an exemplar of Cold War UN Peacekeeping. The immediate objective of this mission was to create a situation whereby a peace agreement could be reached and maintained, while overseeing the withdrawal of the invading forces and the creation of a buffer zone in the conflict region (Lewis, 2015).

The explosion of information technology made the world more informed of wars around the globe. On several occasions, UN peacekeepers were asked to take on missions well beyond their capability. Somalia and the early days of Bosnia are good examples. These were essentially peace enforcement operations. Force size and capability were often limited during debates in the Security Council. More often than not, the force did not have the necessary combat power to be considered a credible deterrent force by the parties to the conflict (Oliver, 2002).

After the cold war, there was increased competition with nations struggling to find their way in the postcolonial world. This created conditions where more and more intrastate crises emerged. The international community and governments felt something
needed to be done to stop the ethnic cleansing and human rights abuses associated with civil wars and intrastate strife. The UN was usually the best answer. UN peacekeepers were relatively successful in Cambodia, El Salvador, Eastern Slavonia, Macedonia, Mozambique, and Guatemala, but struggled with missions in Bosnia, Somalia, Angola, and Sierra Leone. Other missions in Cyprus, Western Sahara, the Middle East, Georgia, Kuwait and Tajikistan lingered with no resolve, but no war either. Indeed, there is some merit to the argument that certain open-ended missions such as Cyprus are preferable to pulling “Blue Helmets” out and risking a greater crisis (Yilmaz, 2005).

It was the missions in Bosnia, Somalia, and Rwanda that made UN members declare that the organization could not enforce peace. Because of those difficult UN experiences when peace enforcement actions were required, a new form of multinational action emerged. In Bosnia, Haiti, Kosovo, East Timor, and most recently Afghanistan, coalitions of the willing, which were led by individual nations, came forward to ensure peace in these more complex operations. A new paradigm of peace enforcement was created (MacQueen, 2006).

2.4 Analysis of Military Interventions in Peace Enforcement

2.4.1 Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the Former Yugoslavia

As tensions rose in the former republics of Yugoslavia in 1991, the UN seemed to be the most likely organization to resolve this conflict. Again, there was no signed peace agreement and an unwillingness of the parties to the conflict to solve their differences peacefully. Regardless, the UN Security Council in Resolution 743 established the UN
Protection Force (UNPROFOR). Its task was to establish United Nations Protected Areas (UNPA), demilitarize these UNPAs, and protect persons residing in them from armed attack and human rights abuses. Despite the initial deployment (April 1992) of almost 8,000 military personnel, the civil war raged on with increased fighting (United nations, 1996).

In the course of three years (1992-1995) the UN Security Council passed 72 resolutions regarding the war in the former republics of Yugoslavia. UN forces continued to grow to meet the challenges of the mission. Thirteen times the mission was expanded and by November 1994 the military strength was 38,810 (United Nations Report, 2002). The force was tasked to protect the delivery of humanitarian supplies and provide protection to civilians in the UN protection zones. Negotiators tried to find a solution to the growing civil war, but were unsuccessful (Oliver, 2002).

Finally, under the pressure of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), whose nations provided the bulk of the UN force, a plan was developed where a UN force commander could call for NATO air attacks to force the Serbs to back down on their attacks against Bosnian Muslims. This was a heavily debated issue (Oliver, 2002). The final result was a dual key approach. Both NATO and the UN had to agree before aircraft could be launched. When the time came, there was a fundamental disagreement on the targets to strike, and the action failed to have its intended effect (Bolger, 1995). The delayed decision process resulted in targets fleeing or changing locations, thus attacks were not effective in deterring the Serb military.
The end of the UNPROFOR came in July 1995 in the safe area of Srebrenica. The Serb Army surrounded and captured a Dutch Battalion. Hereto, disagreement on the use of NATO air delayed and marginalized the impact on the use of force. The Dutch Battalion was forced to leave the area. The Serbs corralled the civilians into a soccer stadium and separated the men from their families. A few escaped to tell of the over 7,000 that perished in a nearby factory. This event led to more intense diplomatic efforts. By December 1995, a hard fought peace agreement was brokered in Dayton, Ohio. The Dayton Accords were complicated and tenuous at best. Under Chapter VII of the UN Charter and approved by the Security Council, NATO and many other non-NATO countries deployed 60,000 troops to conduct peace enforcement (UN Secretary General’s Report, 1999).

NATO’s highly effective and combined headquarters worked for years perfecting its planning and decision-making apparatus. The military force was well trained, and the bulk of the force came from the best-trained armies in the world. Armed with tanks, attack helicopters and all the elements needed to fight a war, NATO came prepared to solve this problem once and for all. The effective combat force deterred further outbreaks of violence and brought peace to the region. As of November 2002, the military force in Bosnia was still over 20,000 troops, but the mission had devolved to peacekeeping rather than the more risky peace enforcement (Waller, 2013).

In retrospect, the international community was convinced that the UN was the right organization to conduct a peace enforcement mission to end the civil war erupting in
the former republics of Yugoslavia. However, over the course of three years the mission did not have its intended affect. Despite continued expansions of the UN force and the authorization by the Security Council to use “all necessary measures” under Chapter VII of the Charter, the UN force never accomplished what it was sent to do, to set the conditions to stop the civil war. Even when the employment of attack aircraft was approved, the decision to use it became a political decision and, in the end, was not effective (Waller, 2013).

2.4.2 Haiti

In 1993 and 1994 the US experienced the political unrest in Haiti first hand. Numerous boats filled with people tried to leave their troubled homeland. After the ship, USS Harlan County, was turned back in October 1993 carrying a small UN monitoring mission to assist in the Governor’s Island Agreement, unrest and turmoil escalated. American Coast Guard cutters picked up hundreds of fleeing refugees and whisked them off to a US run refugee camp at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. As the situation came to a head in September, the Security Council authorized a multinational force under Chapter VII, and the US was willing to take the lead role (Security Council Resolution 940, 1994).

On 17 September 1994, a negotiating team, headed by former US President Jimmy Carter, met with General Cedras, the self appointed military head of the country. At 4:00 p.m., negotiations were progressing, but no agreement had been reached. General Phillipe Biamby, the number two in the Haitian military, came into the room and informed Cedras that the 82nd Airborne, America’s most elite fighting force, was
preparing to invade the island (Pastor, 1999). The US was willing to solve this crisis forcefully if it could not be solved diplomatically. Cedras conceded. The US military altered its plans, in mid steam, and executed Operation Uphold Democracy. By the end of the day a smaller, yet very capable force of almost 6,000 soldiers was on the ground all over Haiti. Within a few days General Cedras and a few staff were escorted out of the country. The headquarters and decision-making authority of the force rested with the United States’ contingent, but CARICOM, a Caribbean regional organization, and 20 other nations helped round out the multinational force.

As law and order were restored and the Haitian military was neutralized, President Aristide, the duly elected president, came forward to assume leadership of the country. As one US Brigade Commander assessed the initial operation: “We arrived in Haiti with more than enough combat force …The overwhelming show of force guaranteed that there would be little or no resistance from the military junta” (Casper, 2001, p. 250). Six months later with security conditions much improved the US led force transitioned to a UN run peacekeeping mission. This mission established a model for others to follow – a lead nation taking charge of the peace enforcement role, under a UN mandate, followed by a United Nations peacekeeping operation (Oliver, 2002).

2.4.3 Kosovo

Several years later, unfinished business in the Balkan region erupted in Kosovo. President Slobodan Milosevic, President of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, wanted to regain control over the historic Serbian province. The majority of the people in the
region were ethnic Albanians. Albanian freedom fighters wanted an independent country, and Milosevic was determined to reassert his control. Throughout 1998 and 1999, Milosevic carried out a campaign to cleanse Kosovo of all Albanians. The world again witnessed ethnic conflicts and with Rwanda still in the minds of world leaders, something needed to be done. Human rights were being abused and action was necessary. US envoy Richard Holbrooke and other world leaders tried in vain to negotiate with Milosevic. Although he initially agreed to international demands and permitted the deployment of an Organization for the Security and Cooperation of Europe observer mission, Milosevic continued his campaign against the Kosovar Albanians (Clark, 2001).

The only alternative was to use force. This time, NATO took the lead and conducted a massive air campaign to force the Serbs back to the bargaining table. The Yugoslav people and leadership demonstrated enormous stamina. Most political decision makers felt the Serbs would give in to NATO’s demands in a few days, but the air campaign lasted 78 days. In the final days of the air war there was considerable debate on who would administer the province of Kosovo. NATO was willing to do it, but Russia was uncomfortable with NATO being responsible for everything. The UN had to play a role (Sanremo, 2008).

Finally an agreement was reached. Milosevic would move his forces out of Kosovo; the UN would administer the province, while NATO troops would provide security. UN Security Council Resolution 1244 authorized under Chapter VII, a peace enforcement force comprised of 40,000 NATO and other non-NATO troops. Their
mission was to make sure the Serb military and national police lived up to the agreements. The UN, assisted by several European regional organizations, began preparations to be the transitional administrator. This mission was a new role for the UN – total control of a region. The Secretariat had some experience in this type of mission, but not to the magnitude it faced in Kosovo (O’Neil, 2002).

As of November 2002, there are still over 40,000 NATO troops in Kosovo and another 10,000 outside Kosovo keeping the peace, while the United Nations is coordinating the many facets of nation building. The synchronized efforts of the European Union (EU), the Organization for the Security and Cooperation of Europe (OSCE), and the UN are making considerable progress. In this case a very capable regional organization was conducting the peace enforcement roles while the UN with the help of other regional organizations rebuilds the nation (United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (UNPKO, 2013).

2.4.4 Military Intervention in Somalia

In 1992, Somalia became center stage for world news. Images of thousands of people dying of starvation and disease were broadcasted around the globe. Countries and individual citizens felt something needed to be done. The UN Security Council passed a resolution calling for the establishment of UNOSOM I. The mission was humanitarian in nature, but the challenge was beyond the UN’s immature structure. With no established government in Somalia, and a civil war raging around the peacekeepers, the force was too small and did not have enough resources to meet this challenge. The United States
responded by sending in a force of over 28,000 troops to conduct the mission. To assist those 9,000 soldiers from 20 other countries also participated (United Nation Report, 1996). Responding initially with Marines, and then the 10th Mountain Division, the US-led force in Operation Restore Hope overcame the malady of the millions of starving people. Once the situation was relatively under control, the mission was taken up by the United Nations to provide a more long-term solution. The United States remained engaged by providing a quick reaction force to the UN under a separate, not UN, command arrangement (Oliver, 2002).

In August 1993, in response to the ambush and killing of 24 Pakistani soldiers and other incidents of violence against UN forces, the United States deployed an elite force of US Army Rangers to find and detain those responsible for the attacks (UN Report, 1996). Command arrangements for all these forces were complicated and strained to say the least (Allard, 1995). In October 1993, the US Ranger force attempted to capture the Somali warlord, Mohammed Farah Aideed. The mission went terribly wrong, and images of dead US soldiers being dragged through the streets of Mogadishu and the death of 18 American soldiers caused the United States to re-evaluate what it was doing in this failed nation. The end result was that the United States pulled out, and the UN was left to go it alone. Again, the challenges were insurmountable and beyond the organization’s capability. Within a few months the UN was gone as well (Oliver, 2002).

This peace enforcement mission was the international communities’ first attempt to control a civil war. Many lessons were learned from this experience but the most
important one was that command and control of combat forces in peace enforcement operations must be clear and unambiguous. Somalia demonstrated the worst case of coordinating and controlling the use of force in peace enforcement missions (Waller, 2013).

2.4 Conclusion

The reluctance of western countries to provide troops has meant that other countries have provided troops. Like western countries other countries provide troops due to vested interests but also to build strategic alliances and sometimes for economic reasons (UN and AU salaries are attractive to many armed forces around the world) and to improve their own military’s capability as opposed to fulfilling the mandate. States have stubbornly resisted relinquishing their monopoly on the means of warfare by placing significant forces at the disposal of international organisations like the UN.

Many UN missions lack the capacity to overwhelm opponents and change the course of war. In Rwanda the UN did not have capability to deploy a force rapidly and no nation was willing to send in enough troops to solve an internal conflict. Rwanda, Bosnia and Somalia were turning points which have led to the many criticisms cited today, but they have also been lessons learned and led to changes and improvements in peace support operations.
CHAPTER THREE
MILITARY INTERVENTION IN HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE

3.1 Introduction

An essential element of peacekeeping operations in conflict situations is provision of humanitarian support in areas of operations. In this section, the study sought to examine the influence of military intervention in facilitating humanitarian assistance. The chapter starts by discussing the concept of Responsibility to Protect. It further analyses case studies of military intervention in humanitarian assistance in countries such as Libya, DRC Congo and Somalia.

3.2 Responsibility to Protect Humanitarian Aim

The Responsibility to Protect (R2P) is an important liberal principle of the twenty-first century. The term emerged in 2001 in a report by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), and was borne of a combination of institutional crises and guilt following the half a million people that perished in the Rwandan genocide. The principle specifies the responsibility of individual states towards their populations, and the responsibility of international society to protect those populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity when states manifestly fail to do so within their own borders. R2P provides liberal states with a justification (in the form of a responsibility) for going to war, or for intervening in the domestic jurisdiction of a sovereign state (Churchill, 2012).
The UN has expanded and become more mobile and has been given more resources and funding to enhance its peacemaking capabilities (Gambari, 2006). With the incorporation of war into the development discourse as part of an emerging global system the UN has been placed at the forefront of responding to conflict, even if it was not fully equipped to do so (Duffield, 2001).

The ultimate goal of a mission is the protection of civilians. Civilians have increasingly become the victims of armed conflict. So UNSC has mandated a number of peacekeeping operations to protect civilians from physical violence. It is an unrealistic expectation that they will be able to protect all civilians at all times. Civilians have also become more engaged in wars through the local war economy and it being harder to distinguish between combatants and non-combatants. Where missions are part of an internationally armed conflict they are governed by the International Humanitarian Laws. All combatants are legitimate targets not because of what they are doing but because of who they are and the threat they pose. It has become more difficult to distinguish between combatants and non-combatants (Sanremo, 2008).

United Nations Security Council (UNSC) has the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. During the last two decades UNSC has increasingly directed its attention to the plight of civilians in situations of armed conflict, recognising that this is an important dimension of its responsibility to maintain international peace and security (Sanremo, 2008). However these are the most dangerous missions and the UN has not been best equipped to respond to these challenges to impose
its mandate. The need to do something effective to stop or prevent violence against civilians has led to the concept of the Responsibility to Protect (Sanremo, 2008). This need for action has become pertinent when one or more of the UNSC Permanent 5 have vital state interests involved and one is prepared to veto. In an increasingly interconnected world there are always vested interests.

R2P places the responsibility of intervention on the international community when a state is unwilling and/or unable to prevent or halt a humanitarian disaster. It is mainly associated with complex violent internal crises. The core principles of Responsibility to protect are: State sovereignty implies responsibility and the primary responsibility for the protection of its people lies with the state itself. Responsibility to protect has three specific responsibilities: Prevent, React and Rebuild. If humanitarian reasons are a key factor in launching peace enforcement missions the logic then is that the mission must be effective and respect human rights (Sanremo, 2008).

However, a times there is forceful intervention to provide humanitarian assistance when essential needs in an emergency are not being met. There is the contradiction of using force for humanitarian reasons; issues around sovereignty and consent if the host government is considered to be the violator and the possible consequences of doing more harm than good (Sanremo, 2009). The responsibility to protect should not be automatically equated to armed intervention when a country continues to fail to live up to its responsibilities (Sanremo, 2008).
R2P has been associated with forceful intervention because other methods (diplomacy and sanctions) to respond in a timely manner to stop large scale loss of life, large scale ethnic cleansing has been deemed unsuccessful. Diplomacy is too slow and targeted sanctions take time to take effect. Intervention in the domestic affairs of states can do more harm than good. It can destabilise the order of states, undermine the rule of law and may fan ethnic or civil strife. The rule against intervention in internal affairs is supposed to encourage states to solve their internal problems and prevent these from spilling over into a threat to international peace and security. However it can also lead to a denial that a problem exists and ongoing suffering. To prevent a humanitarian disaster a quick and decisive action is needed to stop or avert it (International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect (ICRtoP), 2011).

Interveners consider a number of factors to help in their decision making process to intervene or not. Intervention by most is considered as a last resort. Wars are costly in regards to lives, reputation and costs. As the costs and risks are so high it needs to be more your own interests to intervene than not to intervene and you must be sure that your intervention has reasonable prospects. The last resort for interveners is not necessarily the last resort for those suffering. If we intervene too late we may force civilians to pick up arms and defend themselves which causes further bloodshed and changes the perception of the crisis from civilians being attacked to a civil war. For politicians intervention is also risky as interventions can be divisive. You need the right intentions for intervention to obtain the support of the local people and your own people. The scale, duration and
intensity of the planned military intervention should be the minimum necessary to secure
the humanitarian objective in question (ICRtoP, 2011).

Interveners need to be a deterrent to prevent atrocities. To deter you need to be
perceived as a threat and demonstrate a capability and will to use. A perceived soft
approach and non-confrontational approach means that even when UN has the capability
the perception is that it will not effectively intervene so it is not a deterrent. The aim of a
human protection operation is to enforce compliance with human rights and the rule of
law as quickly and as comprehensively as possible. It is not the defeat of a state and this
must properly be reflected in the application of force (Evans, 2009).

While it is a term that has been associated with many conflicts ranging from the
Sudan to Kyrgyzstan, it has only been exercised by the Security Council twice, to justify
interventions in Cote d’Ivoire and Libya in March 2011 (Churchill, 2012). The recent
uprising in Libya may have set precedents and problems in regards to developing the
responsibility to protect. A positive thing was that the intervention was quite quick; this
may have been in part due to some of the vested interests of some members of UNSC.

However NATO stretched the UN mandate on Libya to the limit by attacking
Gaddafi’s palaces which were regarded as control and control centres and this helped to
push regime change. This mission blurred the responsibility to protect. On the one hand it
raised expectations that in complex humanitarian crises western powers could intervene
to protect the people. However as there was so much mission creep it has led to mistrust
3.3. Military Mission to Protect Civilians in Libya

On 19 March 2011 military forces from France, Italy, Canada, the UK and the US began implementing a no-fly zone, specifically to protect civilians, striking the air defences and soldiers of Colonel Muammar Gaddafi’s regime in Libya, under the mandate of UNSCR 1973. It was the first military intervention of its kind, authorised by the Security Council using the specific language of R2P. The Resolution reiterated “the responsibility of the Libyan authorities to protect the Libyan population” and because of the Libyan governments failure in this, called for “the imposition of a no-fly zone on Libyan military aviation” in order to “establish safe areas in places exposed to shelling as a precautionary measure that would allow the protection of the Libyan people and foreign nations residing in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya” (The International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect (ICRtoP), 2011).

However, to some observers, the sight of attack aircraft targeting Libyan command and control facilities certainly did not look like a humanitarian venture. Rather, it was fuelled by the availability of limited resources, and was reminiscent of the lengthy air campaign under NATO’s Operation Allied Force over Kosovo in 1999. That mission, designed to degrade the vastly weaker Serbian opponent’s political and military infrastructure, was shadowed by political disunity over both the mandate and strategic coordination about targeting. Such debates have become prominent once again, and the
problematic relationship between military means and humanitarian ends is as rife today as it was in 1999 (Churchill, 2012).

Regarding Libya, initially it seems that the primary intention for the intervention was for exercising the responsibility to protect civilians, as the military targets selected for bombing were an obvious threat to civilians and much caution was exercised in trying to avoid civilian casualties (Pattison, 2011). Yet as the mission evolved, the intention seemed to change, and within a month it became clear that NATO was supporting the rebel movement and pushing towards forcible regime change. UNSCR 1973, however, made no mention of regime change; only that “all necessary measures” must be taken to “protect civilians”. It is these words ‘all necessary measures’ that have been the result of adverse interpretations.

For example, on 15 April 2011, Obama, Sarkozy, and Cameron published a joint pledge asserting that regime change must take place in order to achieve the overall humanitarian goal. They stated, “Gaddafi must go, and go for good” so that “a genuine transition from dictatorship to an inclusive constitutional process can really begin, led by a new generation of leaders.” They maintained that NATO could use its force to promote these goals, asserting, “So long as Gaddafi is in power, NATO must maintain its operations so that civilians remain protected and the pressure on the regime builds (The Telegraph, 2011).

Critics complained that NATO went too far in its interpretation of UNSCR 1973, and argued that the resolution did not give the green light for taking sides or regime
change. Three members of the emerging ‘BRICS’ group - countries that had been gradually moving over the past few years towards accommodation with the principle of R2P - spoke out strongly against the UN’s and NATO’s actions in Libya. China, for example, asserted that: The responsibility to protect civilians lies first and foremost with the Government of the country concerned. The international community and external organisations can provide constructive assistance, but they must observe the principles of objectivity and neutrality and fully respect the independence, sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of the country concerned. There must be no attempt at regime change or involvement in civil war by any party under the guise of protecting civilians (United Nations Security Council Report, 2011).

Similarly, Brazil argued that the protection of civilians is a humanitarian imperative. It is a distinct concept that must not be confused or conflated with threats to international peace and security, as described in the Charter, or with the responsibility to protect. We must avoid excessively broad interpretations of the protection of civilians, which could link it to the exacerbation of conflict, compromise the impartiality of the United Nations or create the perception that it is being used as a smokescreen for intervention or regime change. To that end, we must ensure that all efforts to protect civilians be strictly in keeping with the Charter and based on rigorous and nonselective application of international humanitarian law (United Nations Security Council Report, 2011).
South Africa complained that they were concerned that the implementation of these resolutions [on Libya and Cote d'Ivoire] appears to go beyond their letter and spirit. It is important that, as international actors and external organisations provide constructive assistance, they should nonetheless comply with the provisions of the United Nations Charter, fully respect the will, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the country concerned, and refrain from advancing political agendas that go beyond the protection of civilian mandates, including regime change. In our view, such actions will undermine the gains made in this discourse and provide ammunition to those who have always been skeptical of the concept. In the final analysis, the implementation of these resolutions will determine whether our actions have yielded the intended result of protecting civilians (United Nations Security Council Report, 2011).

Venezuela proclaimed, “It is regrettable that certain countries are seeking regime change in Libya, in violation of the Charter of the United Nations. Those actions contravene Resolution 1973 (2011), which calls for respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Libya” (United Nations Security Council Report, 2011). Even Gareth Evans, co-chair of the ICISS report, argued that NATO “should have been stricter in really sticking to the pure civilian protection mandate” without “getting quite so caught up... in the object of regime change” (Cunningham, 2012).
3.4 United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) I

As permanent members of the Security Council and hegemons at the time, both Russia and the USA ran significant arrears in their peacekeeping schemes even before the Somali crisis emerged on the Security Council’s agenda. Hence both governments influenced the decision that the intervention in early 1992 be limited to humanitarian assistance (Sophie, 2002). The UN Secretary General, Boutros- Ghali did not hide his disappointment with regards to the slow response and reiterated his calls for more tangible UN action through the deployment of a peacekeeping force. He accused developing countries on focusing their attention on fighting a rich man’s war in Yugoslavia and not bothering with the Somalia plight (George, 2005).

As a result of the mounting pressure from the Secretary General, the UN Security Council on 24th April 1992 unanimously passed resolution 751 which established UNOSOM. However, it took nearly three months for the first 50 unarmed observers to arrive in Mogadishu in order to monitor the cease fire that was agreed by the warring Somali clans. While these developments took place, Non Governmental Organizations (NGOs) relief supplies were still being looted by bandits and extorted by militia and the unarmed UN-military observers could not stop them (Sriram & Adekeye, 2001).

Under the direction of the Special Representative for Somalia, Mohamed Shanoun, the force of 50 technical observers was authorized to monitor a ceasefire in Mogadishu. He was also to act as a mediator between the clan leaders and negotiate the flow of humanitarian assistance by the UN and NGOs (Richmond, 2002). The observers
arrived in Mogadishu on 2rd July 1992. Due to this delay the cease-fire had already been broken by both factions (Sophie, 2002).

In addition, Somali warlords un-intimidated continued to loot food convoys; and the UNOSOM I unarmed military observers were unable to stop them. Following this, Mohamed Shanoun managed to convince a reluctant Mohamed Aideed to allow UNOSOM to deploy 500 traditional peacekeepers from Pakistan (Clark & Herbst, 1997). Being a traditional peacekeeping operation, UNOSOM deployment could not take place until August 1992 when the de facto political leaders gave their consent. The peacekeeping troops were to escort deliveries of humanitarian supplies and provide security for personnel. Although the UN acknowledged that the civil war was the main cause of the famine in Mogadishu, UNOSOM I did not take the responsibility of ending the fighting; or resolving the political stalemate but instead chose to focus on the cease-fire (O’Neill & Rees, 2005).

Another complication arose when Mohamed Farah Aideed’s consent was withdrawn after a Russia plane with UN markings delivered military hardware and newly printed Somali currency to his rival Ali Mohamed Mahdi. The Russian crew’s contract with the UN for air services had since expired but the UN lacked a ready explanation for this massive blunder. Mohamed Farah Aideed was outraged by this and accused the UN of supporting Ali Mohamed Mahdi and consequently opposed the deployment of the 50 UN observers as well as the 500 armed peacekeepers. Already agitated, Mohamed Farah Aideed was eventually convinced by Mohamed Sahnoun to agree to the deployment of
the 500 UNOSOM I troops but was once again angered when the UN Security Council authorized an additional 3,000 troops without consulting with Him or Mohamed Shanoun (O’Neill & Rees, 2005). In fact, Shanoun came to hear about this decision through the British Broadcasting Cooperation (BBC) radio (Sophie, 2002).

In his defence, the UN Secretary General explained that although the cease-fire was being respected, Mogadishu was still insecure due to banditry and looting and that the main challenge was the protection on convoys delivering humanitarian aid to distribution centres. This prompted the Security Council to adapt Resolution 775 that called for additional troops. In addition to this, UNOSOM would carry out demobilization and disarmament and assist national reconciliation (Thakur, 1994).

The USA assisted in airlifting the Pakistani contingent in early September 1992; but the troops were prevented from leaving the airport by the warring factions and consequently were unable to execute any of the mandates objectives. During the same period, the Security Council had authorized the deployment of 4,219 troops but by the time only 900 had arrived in Mogadishu (Phillip, 2005). The proposed additional troops never arrived although is argued that it was unlikely that they would have made any difference to the status quo (O’Neill & Rees, 2005).

By November, 1992 the Pakistani troops were regarded as adversaries by Mohamed Farah Aideed’s force and came under heavy fire. The security situation became so fluid that the troops had to hire 1,000 armed Somalis for ‘protection’ of the airport. The Security Council acknowledged the traditional peace keeping were not suited
for Somali context (Sophie, 2002). This prompted the Security Council to agree that the situation in Mogadishu had gotten out of hand and that the use of force under Chapter VII of the charter to deliver humanitarian aid needed to be explored (O’Neill & Rees, 2005). Even though the warring parties did not explicitly withdraw consent, Mohamed Farah Aideed’s actions provided justification for the Security Council to consider using enforcement measures to address the situation before the entire mission failed.

USA made it known that it was ready to take the lead in organizing the peace enforcement mission. The UN members did not object to the USA proposal as the UN had not succeeded in the deployment of the additional 3,000 troops and felt that the USA provided a workable alternative solution (O’Neill & Rees, 2005). Due to the lack of a functioning government, at least a dozen or more factions struggled over power. Neither Mohamed Farah Aideed nor Ali Mohamed Mahdi could control the situation. The political chaos that ensued continued to prevent the delivery of humanitarian supplies. Somali authorities began to compete for any resources perceived as being valuable and international aid assumed its place as a major source of income. Looting of warehouses and convoys became a daily norm. A significant amount of relief food was available but they could not be distributed due to security fears (Phillip, 2005).

3.5 United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)

MONUC is one of the most criticised UN missions but it is operating across a very large area but at the same time limited to this area so it cannot address regional issues. Progress over a decade has been limited. MONUC and UNSC responded to a lack
of progress by ramping up (increased force from 5000 troops in 2000 to 20,000 in 2010) and widening its roles. It is still debatable if the increase in troop numbers has meant that the mission is any closer to its desired end-state. MONUC had a wide range of responsibilities including the implementation of the Ceasefire Agreement; DDR; release of prisoners of war; humanitarian assistance; human rights monitoring; governmental capacity building and elections monitoring and mine action (Dahrendorf, 2008).

Under Chapter VII, UNSC decided that MONUC may take actions to protect UN personnel and facilities and ensure the security and freedom of movement of its personnel and to protect civilians under threat of violence. MONUC was criticised for not implementing its mandate but also for not having or been given the resources to carry out its mandate, especially the protection of the civilian population. The initial forces provided to MONUC were not infantry units. MONUC lacked an effective communications strategy to reach out to and manage the expectations of the civilian population. During a war people expect soldiers to die not civilians, especially when civilians are being attacked and soldiers are safe in their bases. MONUC troops were protecting UN staff more than civilians. However things would be much worse without MONUC, but without progress the UN will continue to be criticized (Bernath & Edgerton 2003).

The MONUC example demonstrates, for whatever reasons (financial or UNSC vetos), that a key crisis management concept was not followed. It is better to ramp up at the beginning of the crisis and then draw down, than to start with an inadequate resource.
Perhaps if there was initial support it is better to start with the presence of a peace enforcement operation and then move to peacekeeping. This shows a real will and commitment to prevent or to stop a problem. Traditional peacekeeping missions were hardly a deterrent and over time perpetrators would test the appetite (rules of engagement and the interpretation of the mandate) of the UN mission. A mission needs to start prepared to sustain the operation and have the resources to do so. The level of resources committed sends a clear signal of resolve and intent to all concerned (ICRtoP, 2011).

3.6 Conclusion

There is clearly tension between the following positions: On the one hand, regime change must not become the primary objective of the interveners, as an intervention should seek to ‘ease suffering’ rather than ‘solve the problem’. On the other hand, sometimes the dire nature of a crisis necessitates upheaving the entire political system in order to achieve a stable and secure situation for all. In other words, regime change is required in order to achieve genuine protection.

The international community can respond to mass atrocities without challenging governance structures. This presents the claim that intervention would produce less violence and bring about more effective protection if it focused on a more localised and immediate understanding of protection, such as the creation of safe havens and/or areas of protection, or the protection of refugee camps, or groups of IDPs. In doing so, supporters of this view do not encourage explicitly taking sides in a conflict, claiming to remain impartial while focusing attention on protecting the vulnerable.
CHAPTER FOUR

MILITARY INTERVENTION IN PEACE BUILDING

4.1 Introduction

Peace-building is a generic term referring to all those activities and initiatives that are intended to create the conditions necessary for a sustainable peace in the aftermath of violent and destructive conflict. The achievement of such a durable and self-regenerating peaceful condition is only possible where the citizens enjoy a degree of human security such that the possibility of a reversion to organised and large scale violence is minimised.

4.2 Concepts of Peace building

The end of the Cold War, which significantly underscored the resolution of international conflicts between great powers without warfare marked the dawn of a new conflict age with new character, new challenges and new role for the military. Similarly, the events of September 11, 2001, have greatly changed military dynamics to include peacebuilding. Consequently, within the Third World countries, the end of the Cold War has endeared and delineated intrastate conflict of different characters through civil wars, ethno-religious conflicts, communal conflict, election violence, resource-based conflicts, militancy and terrorism (Jarikre, 2012).

The term "Peace-building" first emerged in 1970s through the work of Johan Galtung who called for the creation of peace-building structures to promote sustainable peace by addressing the "root causes" of violent conflict and supporting indigenous capacities for peace management and conflict resolution. Since then, the term Peace
building has covered a multidimensional exercise and tasks ranging from the disarming of warring factions to the rebuilding of political, economic, judicial and civil society institutions.

Peace-building became a familiar concept within the United Nations following Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali’s 1992 report, ‘An Agenda for Peace’, which defined peace-building as action to solidify peace and avoid relapse into conflict. The 2000 Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (also known as the Brahimi Report) defined it as “activities undertaken on the far side of conflict to reassemble the foundations of peace and provide the tools for building on those foundations something that is more than just the absence of war.”

In 2007, the UN Secretary-General's Policy Committee agreed on the following conceptual basis for peacebuilding to inform UN practice: Peacebuilding involves a range of measures targeted to reduce the risk of lapsing or relapsing into conflict by strengthening national capacities at all levels for conflict management, and to lay the foundations for sustainable peace and development. Peacebuilding strategies must be coherent and tailored to specific needs of the country concerned, based on national ownership, and should comprise a carefully prioritized, sequenced, and therefore relatively narrow set of activities aimed at achieving the above objectives (UN Report, 2010).

There is no standard template for peace-building; there is no ‘one-size-fits-all’. Each initiative needs to be crafted in the fullest awareness of the specificity of the context
and of the dynamics of the conflict. Any agency contemplating intervention in a conflict zone must first of all perform a very thorough conflict analysis. Any intervention, whether it be by military or non-military means and however ‘humanitarian’ in impulse it might be, must be informed by the awareness that outsiders cannot make peace for other people. Any agency intervening in a conflict zone, by military or non-military means, can hardly avoid becoming a party to the conflict. The belief that a military force can enter a conflict zone for peace-keeping purposes and remain as some kind of neutral referee is not supported by the available historical evidence. The decision to intervene is taken according to due process and as a last resort, in accordance with the normal precepts of just war theory relating to jus ad bellum (Rigby, 2006).

Peacekeeping operations increasingly play a significant role as early peace builders. In most post-conflict situations there are many actors who contribute to peace-building. For instance humanitarian and development agencies may be in a country before, during and after the conflict. Once on the ground and when the conflict ends, these actors can lay the important foundations for the peace-building process (by providing early peace dividends). The mandates of multi-dimensional operations include disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR), security sector reform (SSR) and support to electoral processes. DPA Special Political Missions and integrated peace-building missions are also given the mandate to cover a wide range of peace-building tasks (UN Report, 2010).
4.3 Peace-Building Actors

4.3.1 Civilian Actors

Civilians and humanitarian actors usually belong to either international organizations (IOs), including UN agencies, or international, regional, or local nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). During peace operations and disaster relief, IOs interact primarily with official government institutions and less directly with the local population. In order to administer aid most effectively, collect and disseminate information, and recommend or take action on the ground, IOs benefit from partnering with NGOs that, in many cases, have established ties to society and oftentimes possess relatively dependable relationships with local groups and individuals. NGOs have unique advantages in engaging the local population through their conscious efforts to establish relationships between adversarial communities, foster mutual confidence, and provide peaceful mechanisms for dispute resolution (Jeong, 2005).

Because of their understanding of the realities on the ground, NGO representatives are able to reach across their counterparts from other agencies into a web of indigenous officials and resources in order to build and maintain a sustainable infrastructure that has a better chance of ameliorating not just the manifestations, but also the causes, of conflict (Aall, 1996). Operationally, many NGOs have moved beyond the traditional relief objectives of providing food, water, shelter, and emergency health measures to monitoring human rights, substituting for local government, and encouraging the creation or reconstruction of civil society by bringing together the conflicting parties.
The substance and outcome of peace-building often hinges on exactly those conflict resolution skills honed through knowledge of and engagement with particular indigenous communities. This community-centered peacebuilding approach can effectively help assess need, employ skills and administer aid at the grassroots level (Franke, 2006).

Maintaining good relationships with the local population and knowledge of local culture has become a prerequisite for successful peacebuilding and reconstruction. For instance, Fallows (2005) attributed many problems in the American effort to stabilize and rebuild Iraq to a severe shortage of Arabic-speakers and interpreters familiar with local customs. Therefore, enhancing the operational capabilities of local NGOs and ensuring their physical security are a precondition, but also an increasingly difficult challenge to effective peacebuilding (Franke, 2006).

4.3.2 The Military

The military is the logical partner for security provision. However, military functions are steadily increasing in complexity and oftentimes overlap with those of civilian aid providers. For instance, military officers have successfully participated in negotiating cease-fires and peace settlements in Mozambique, Angola and Bosnia (Guttieri, 2004). In addition, armed forces have monitored cease-fires and elections, enforced no-fly zones and demobilization efforts, secured relief convoys and supported civilian actors by providing logistics support, establishing camps for displaced persons, and lending engineering expertise to reconstruction projects (Heinemann-Grüder and Pietz, 2004). Civil-military cooperation can effectively bridge the gap between the
intervention force and the relief organizations and civil institutions, and can become an effective force multiplier (Mockaitis, 2004).

Peace-building involves actions which support political, economic, social and military measures and structure aiming to strengthen and solidify political settlement in order to redress the root causes of conflict (British Army, 1997). Military as an essential component of many peace-building operations, presupposes that the presence of the military reduces the propensity for direct conflict and creates a safe space for peace building activities and other categories of intervention that is designed to address the root causes of the violence (Schirch, 2008).

4.4 Role of the Military in Peace Building

In the 1990’s, United Nations, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the United States Department of Defense began to recognize the need to incorporate stabilization, peace-building, and post-conflict reconstruction operations planning into missions. This was a result of the numerous humanitarian interventions that occurred in the 1990’s in places such as Bosnia-Herzegovina, Haiti, and numerous African states. Historically however, and with only a few exceptions, the efforts at peace building and post-conflict reconstruction have been woefully inadequate (Penner, 2011).

Post-conflict reconstruction, according to the World Bank, involves the rebuilding of the socioeconomic framework of society and the “reconstruction of the enabling conditions for a functioning peacetime society [to include] the framework of governance and rule of law (World Bank, 1998). While post-conflict reconstruction may be
conducted prior to the complete end of a conflict, it is most effectively conducted when there is a tenable security situation (or better). The security aspect of both peace building and post-conflict reconstruction operations is what makes the military an ideal lead agency for beginning and maintaining such operations. The concepts of peace building and post-conflict reconstruction are not mutually exclusive. In fact, there will likely be significant overlap of the two operations. It is to the benefit of all parties concerned if effective and targeted reconstruction can begin as soon as possible, given an acceptable security situation (Penner, 2011).

The military performs an essential role in all peace-building, whether the military of the host country or a foreign military presence attempting to nurture a re-built society in another country. From Haiti and Panama to Somalia, Bosnia, Macedonia, East Timor, The Solomon Islands, Côte d’Ivoire, Sierra Leone, Afghanistan and Iraq, militaries have been engaged in post-Cold War peace-building that has demonstrated relative success, total failure, and most stages in between. On even a cursory count of significant military interventions since 1989, it is possible to identify at least 21 distinct cases. Of these, 11 were explicitly peace-keeping operations from Somalia through the former Yugoslavia to the Solomon Islands and Darfur. All of these cases became peace-building operations very quickly after initial deployments and 4 more cases began as different types of intervention (Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq and Côte d’Ivoire and also then transformed into peace support and peace-building operations. 21 cases in 20 years indicates the prevalence of military interventions in the post Cold War world and 15 out of 21 cases either began as, or migrated towards, being peace-building operations.
In almost all post-conflict societies, the most pressing need after the acute emergency conditions have been dealt with is local employment. Lack of jobs and the decline in income which unemployment causes becomes a major problem in most societies. The sheer presence of the international community in high numbers (both military and civilian) tends to attract the skilled younger workers in a society to employment as translators, administrators, drivers, guides, and liaison officers. But though this becomes a lucrative source of personal income, it also increases a culture of dependency which is very difficult for a society to break.

Whatever the nature of a military intervention and however benign the motive of the forces involved, the fact remains that most societies take on the social milieu of an “occupied people” after a year or so of extensive international presence in their country. Nothing can happen without the international authorities allowing it; the military move around in a way that is often indistinguishable from an occupying power; and civil society will almost inevitably be slow to develop in the midst of a large international presence. In other words, military intervention can appear to be a substitute for proper, sequenced, economic, social and governmental re-construction, and hinder the development of these processes.

It has been clear for the last 20 years that a “comprehensive approach” is the only way in which military interventions as peace-builders can achieve success. But this theory has proved extremely difficult to put into practice. In reality, interventions in the former Yugoslavia, beginning in Bosnia and Croatia in 1991 and extending rapidly to
Macedonia and then Kosovo in 1999, achieved a fair degree of comprehensiveness in the approaches that were eventually found to work on the ground. Painful and difficult lessons were learned and operationalised by both the military, the United Nations and the NGO community (Clarke, 2009).

By the time of the Kosovo crisis in 1999, there was a well-functioning machine ready to go into action among both the military and the civil communities once the 78 day bombing campaign had come to an end. The intervention in Kosovo, however, turned out to a high-water mark of the early “comprehensive approach” and has not been repeated since. It is not too much to say that NATO and other Western world powers were conceptually further ahead on most aspects of what is now termed the ‘comprehensive approach’ in those years than they have subsequently turned out to be.

The events of 2001 changed the military dynamic in many Western states and when peace-building became relevant in Afghanistan and Iraq – admittedly much bigger cases than anything in the Balkans, and undertaken in much more difficult circumstances – so much of what had been learned in the years previously seems to have been discarded and has had to be re-learned. The military and other agencies have striven to improve their performance in Afghanistan since 2006 and are now on the verge of some greater synergies than have ever been seen in that country in the last 8 years. But the fact remains that laudable though this progress is, it has got us, in a conceptual sense, back to where we were in 1999 in understanding and operationalising a “comprehensive approach”. There are many reasons why this has happened and it would repay a much longer study to
contrast the “comprehensive approach” as it has been practised between 1999 and 2009 (Clarke, 2009).

According to Franke (2006), the nature of complex humanitarian relief, peace-building, and reconstruction missions increasingly forces military and civilian actors to operate in the same space at the same time thereby challenging their ability to remain impartial, neutral and independent. Cooperation between the civilian and military elements involves integrating traditional military capabilities into a collective response to human need. At the outset, civilian and military actors share the long-term goal of promoting human security and developing the conditions for societies marked by conflict to transition back to peaceful and stable structures. Initially, civil-military relationships were formed in the field, when troops stepped in to fill gaps in civilian capabilities. In response to the growing complexity of operational requirements, states are increasingly recognizing the intensifying working relationship between military and civilian actors and are now developing their own doctrines specifying the nature of civil-military cooperation (CIMIC).

In July 2003, for instance, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) published its own CIMIC Doctrine, which defines CIMIC as the co-ordination and cooperation, in support of the mission, between the NATO commander and civil actors, including national population and local authorities, as well as international, national and non-governmental organizations and agencies (NATO, 2003). In essence, civil-military cooperation in stability operations includes three core functions: liaison between the
military and all civilian actors in the area of operation, assistance to the civilian environment, and support to the force.

For instance, during implementation of the General Framework Agreement for Peace (GFAP) in Bosnia and Herzegovina, CIMIC personnel coordinated with the Implementation Force (IFOR) for increased security presence when cargo of a strategic nature (e.g., electrical transformers and hydroelectric turbines) was transported through contested territory and worked closely with a number of civilian agencies to install temporary power lines, facilitate the repair and reconstruction of roads and bridges, and perform periodic joint environmental inspections of the local water supply (Landon, 1998).

In Somalia, gaps in the justice and security sector during an ongoing conflict leave communities exposed to violence and deprived of physical and legal safety. To address this in Somalia, the UNDP Rule of Law programme has focused on developing competent police and judiciary through training and rehabilitation of failing infrastructure, raising awareness of human and legal rights among communities, establishing legal aid clinics, demobilizing armed forces and groups, and studying and supporting traditional conflict resolution mechanisms. This has allowed war-affected communities to access legal information, counselling and representation – making small steps towards justice in an otherwise lawless environment.

To complement the engagement of the international community (including involvement of military) in supporting rule of law in Puntland, Somalia, the UN
Peacebuilding Fund recently approved a $1 million project to provide immediate support to critical security sector reform elements in Puntland. The purpose is to improve security by building the capacity of the civilian police in the Puntland, similar to interventions in South and Central Somalia, with an emphasis on improving command, control and management structures, and training (United Nations, 2010).

4.5 Conclusions

Contemporary peacebuilding is inherently political, often rendering a clear demarcation between humanitarian and political activities neither possible nor fruitful. While separating military and civilian elements in stability operations may be impossible, careful training sensitizing civilian and military relief providers to the cultural, organizational, operational, and normative differences will be an important step in enhancing interagency coordination to achieve the shared mission objectives that inform peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction.

While using the military, peacebuilding activities and actors must take a conflict-sensitive approach. This requires engagement in a conflict analysis exercise in order to identify both the structural causes of conflict, and (which may be different) the current triggers – or accelerators – of potential renewed conflict. A thorough understanding of the causes of conflict should allow peace building programmes to be designed and implemented in a conflict sensitive way – e.g. not hiring all programme staff from a single ethnic group; providing skills training not only to ex-combatants, but also to other community members. While this is not always in practice feasible, it should be the goal.
Peacebuilding happens in an insecure, politically fragile and therefore challenging environment. Funding needs, the number of actors involved and their (often competing) priorities and objectives, and people’s expectations of the benefits of peacebuilding: all these present additional challenges.
CHAPTER FIVE
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 Conclusions

The reviewed literature shows that peacekeeping through use of military after civil wars was found to be a contributing factor to attaining peace and stability. However, peacekeeping cannot guarantee real peace. The risk of renewed conflict is still high even after the fighting has been stopped through military intervention. Military activities tend to reduce the damage of the crisis; while at the same time, creating room for diplomatic and humanitarian actors to address the underlying causes of the conflict. International forces can use coercive means to gain stability; but attaining real peace rests mainly on the locals. Military personnel cannot guarantee real peace; but they can establish a framework; in order to allow the local and international community to do what is necessary to resolve conflicts.

The study concludes that many UN missions lack the capacity to overwhelm opponents and change the course of war. In Rwanda the UN did not have capability to deploy a force rapidly and no nation was willing to send in enough troops to solve an internal conflict. Rwanda, Bosnia and Somalia were turning points which have led to the many criticisms cited today, but they have also been lessons learned and led to changes and improvements in peace support operations.
The lessons learnt from UNITAF and UNOSOM I & II and AMISOM revealed that peacekeeping can be better managed by: matching mandates to needs, communicating the purpose of the mission to the local community and the international media, troop contributing countries focusing on preparing their citizens psychologically for some of the high risks in peacekeeping operations, having a unified command, using the appropriate response for circumstances where the use of force is inevitable in self-defence or where the use of force may be counterproductive, ensuring the timely troop deployment and, proper planning and coordination. Overall, peacekeeping operations will not be managed successfully if there is lack of the political will.

Traditional peacekeeping remains the most developed response mechanism to conflict. In principle, peacekeeping is more likely to succeed when there is an agreement to keep; when there is consent, impartiality and when non-use of force reigns except in self-defense. Enforcement measures are extremely complex and should be employed with caution under very exceptional circumstances. Enforcement should only be contemplated as a last resort solution; when all other options have been exhausted. Full scale peace-enforcements are usually very costly.

Much of the focus on Somalia has been aimed at addressing the symptoms of the conflicts rather than focusing on the causes. The Peacekeeping efforts in Somalia need to be accompanied by a political framework; otherwise the mission will eventually be ineffective and unsustainable. It is not possible to solely depend on a military solution to resolve the crisis in Somalia no matter how militarily powerful or technically superior the
intervener is; the mission can only bear fruit if accompanied by an inclusive political process. Peace enforcement efforts in Somalia have temporarily managed to restrain the violence. The peacekeepers have created a window of opportunity for the government, diplomatic, development and humanitarian actors to address the underlying causes of the conflict.

5.2 Recommendations

The study recommends that the military while undertaking peacebuilding activities must take a conflict-sensitive approach. This requires engagement in a conflict analysis exercise in order to identify both the structural causes of conflict, and (which may be different) the current triggers – or accelerators – of potential renewed conflict. A thorough understanding of the causes of conflict should allow peace building programmes to be designed and implemented in a conflict sensitive way – e.g. not hiring all programme staff from a single ethnic group; providing skills training not only to ex-combatants, but also to other community members. While this is not always in practice feasible, it should be the goal.

The time has come when the international community needs to let Somalis take charge of their political determination. The international community can however assist by providing training to the police force as well as to the military troops; and finance development and humanitarian projects whose funds are accounted for. The Somali government needs to step up and do what meets the expectations of good governance. When Somali population stabilizes business people can invest; which will lead to
economic growth; which will in turn enable ordinary Somalis to improve their livelihoods in peace.

The United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) should continue to strengthen training and discipline of military and civilian components of peacekeeping operations. More specifically: training requirements should focus on increasing cooperation between a multiplicity of actors. Department of Peacekeeping Operations should support efforts to build standardized skill sets for training military, police, and civilians. DPKO could also encourage troop contributing countries to ensure minimum training requirements among all peacekeepers, military, police and civilian. Doing so would strengthen compatibility among peacekeepers, and could even go as far as raising the morale and discipline of contingents. Peacekeepers should be given adequate resources so that they maintain the momentum and increase the gains they have made thus far. The troops contributing countries should also continue to work closely with the Somali allies.

With the security situation improving in Mogadishu and in south central, International aid agencies should step up their support in developing income generating activities and life supporting assistance to reduce mortality and restore the livelihoods of Somalis. It is also crucial to make adequate preparations for returning refugees as their arrival could potentially spur clashes over land and other resources. UNDP and World Bank should be ready at hand to support the government with regards to institutional development and public administration; to ensure they are accountable for the use of
funds and also deliver the services to the people. If institutions are strengthened they in turn may give peacekeepers as reason to exit and leave behind a country that is in peace. Furthermore the vast resources that are currently being used to maintain the peacekeeping forces in Somalia could be spent on reconstruction, generating employment for young men who don't have alternative source of income other than becoming foot soldiers for warlords.
REFERENCES

Journals


Books


---


iii Director General Land Warfare, United Kingdom, Army Field Manual Wider Peacekeeping, pp. 1-2.

