
BY
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UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL UNIVERSITY -A

SPRING 2016
DECLARATION

I hereby declare that this thesis is my original work and not submitted to any other college, institution or university other than the United States International University in Nairobi for academic credit.

Signature………………………………… Date………………………

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This thesis has been presented for examination with my approval as the appointed supervisor

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I would like to acknowledge my family support and courage back in the USA.
DEDICATION

To my beloved parents Mr. and Mrs. Earnest Asunda who have selflessly endured with sacrifice the burden of educating me to these heights. To my brothers Paul, John and Jeremiah for tirelessly watching over me. I would also like to thank Mrs. Christine Asunda, for all the support she has provided me. I would also like to take this opportunity to thank Mr. Salil Shah; I love you all.
Abstract

The main objective of this study was to determine the role that the media and international relations played in the 1994 Rwanda Genocide. The specific objectives were to examine the role of media and International Relations the effects of ethnic tensions, failure of international community to intervene in the genocide immediately it began, impunity and the failure of humanitarian intervention in the 1994 Rwanda genocide.

Secondary data was used to investigate the role that the media and International Relations played in the 1994 Rwanda genocide. This study presented recommendations and suggestions for media ethics and the involvement of the international community in order to be successful; there was a need to have humanitarian intervention during genocide. The study found out that the international community actively sought to avoid any responsibility it might have for acting to prevent the killing. Individual states sought refuge for their choice not to act by asserting that the killing was the result of ancient tribal hatreds that could not be resolved. Others relied on the claim that intervention would violate Rwandan sovereignty.

The researcher recommended that further research should test the hypothesis that media involvement in human rights campaign should be intensified. This is necessary considering the fact that the media are also rights holders in order to know if the organizations should set a limit to any positive contribution they make in regard to human rights promotion. Therefore, media involvement in charities or nonprofit organizations should be investigated to find out the impact of such involvement on media credibility and expertise.
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background of the Study
After the horrible events of the Second World War, the international community and the United Nations, accepted the Genocide Convention in 1948 which was ratified in 1951 (Totten and Parsons, 2004:3-4). In this treaty the definition of genocide is stated as: ‘In the present treaty, genocide means any of the subsequent acts done with the intention to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, tribal, national, or spiritual groups, as such: murdering members of the group; b. Causing severe bodily or psychological harm to members of the group; c. Purposely inflicting on the group situations of life intended to bring about its physical demolition in whole or in part; d. Imposing methods intended to avert births within the group; e. Forcibly relocating children of the groups to another group.’ ‘The following acts shall be illegal: Genocide; Scheme to commit genocide; Direct and public provocation to commit genocide; Effort to commit genocide; e. Complicity in genocide.’(Genocide Convention, 1948)
According to this convention, the international community should prevent genocide from happening if signs of planning genocide are present. It is said that genocide cannot suddenly come up, it has to be prepared and planned and therefore it can be prevented (Totten and Parsons, 2004:3, Lemarchand, 2004:395 and Hintjes, 1999:245).

Unfortunately, incidences of genocide or acts of genocides can be found in the post-Second World War period. One could interpret this as a failure of the Convention and the UN, because of their passiveness (Jongman, 1996:1-3). In the Great Lakes Region of Africa (see cover picture), three genocides can be identified. The most notable is the Rwandan genocide which occurred from April 1994 to July 1994, in which around 800,000 people, mainly Tutsis, were slaughtered to death by Hutus.

Rwanda is a country that experienced a lot of violence and mass killings after their independence in which two separate ethnicities: the ‘Hutu’ people and the ‘Tutsi’ people, played an important role. The 1994 genocide seems to be the point where these conflicts escalated. In 1990, a civil war had started in Rwanda between these two ethnicities. The international community did intervene in this conflict, because it had been mediating between the belligerent parties for three
years. In 1993, the civil war was officially ended by the Arusha Declaration however this was only officially. The parties did not trust this declaration and violence continued (Jones, 1995:225 and Prunier, 1995:159).

The genocide was among the most appalling catastrophes of the 20th century, and media played a significant part both internally and internationally. Globally, nationally and locally, the mass media plays a crucial role in public policy, agenda setting, national, and international conflicts. Conflicts do not occur spontaneously but tend to have a history. The purpose of the study was to determine what role both the Rwandan and the international media played in the Rwandan genocide. The study examined and analyzed the factors that forced the media to pushing violence in conflict situations in third world countries instead of promoting democracy and peace.

The media can play different roles in terms of escalating, moderating, or balancing a conflict. The case of the Rwandan Genocide is a good example of how media can be directly involved in escalating of conflict. The mass media has been of great importance in the war leading to the genocides in Rwanda as well as in many other internal conflicts.

While several scholars assessing the role of the media in Rwanda attribute hate media within Rwanda as a major cause of the genocide (James 2008; Melvern 2000: 155; Wittman 2008), the international media and reports of the situation, or lack thereof, had their own significance and role in the international community’s failure to prevent and stop the genocide. The international media had little interest in Rwanda. With conflict occurring in Bosnia at the same time, much of the media’s reporting was centered on European conflict, which was far more satisfying for international public interest than the Rwandan genocide (Chaon 2007: 162)

Denial in the media was also particularly problematic, as it had dire implications for political response. United States officials relied on international news media coverage, and yet with a censored and uninformed account of what was happening, little action was taken (Kuperman 2001: 23). Barely any credibility was derived from official sources of information such as Dallaire’s cable on January 11, which indicated that genocide was occurring and that a response
was necessary to prevent and stop it. The media did not demonstrate any will to respond; instead, it left audiences disinterested and disengaged.

This study highlights the factors that will make the media vulnerable to political manipulation, examining the role played by the media, both local and international, in escalating violence in the Rwandan genocide, and examining the challenges faced by the media operations under the political umbrella in Rwanda. The study will be useful to the management of conflicts globally, to academicians, to the government and other researchers.

1.2 Statement of the Problem

The media has been seen as a player that contributed to the escalation of violence during the 1994 genocide in Rwanda. James (2008), Melvern (2008) and Wittman (2008) looked into how the media was vulnerable to political manipulation and the challenges that were faced by the media. This will differ from their work by focusing on what role the media and international community did play in the Rwanda genocide. If a lack of commitment were to characterize the UN’s political response, the same can be said for the international media’s reporting on the genocide and the UN’s dissemination of information to the international public (James 2008; Melvern 2000: 155; Wittman 2008). The international media and reports of the situation, or lack thereof, had their own significance and role in the international community’s failure to prevent and stop the genocide.

The international media had little interest in Rwanda. With conflict occurring in Bosnia at the same time, much of the media’s reporting was centered on European conflict, which was far more satisfying for international public interest than the Rwandan genocide (Chaon 2007: 162). Little effort was put into ensuring journalists were able to properly cover the genocide, particularly given the dangers of media personnel in Rwanda. The security situation in Rwanda led journalists to leave Rwanda upon worsening of the situation, most significantly by mid-April when the killings began (Chaon 2007: 162; Melvern 2001: 91). Many who worked for media organizations were pulled out, with the exception of few journalists from Radio France International, the BBC, the AFP, and a small number of others (Chaon 2007: 162). By this point, stories in the international news media had turned to the evacuation of personnel from Rwanda
rather than the genocide unfolding. Attention was diverted from the increasing severity of the situation and the need for prompt action on the part of the international community.

1.3 Research Questions
1. What role did the RTLM media play in the genocide?
2. Why was the international community unwilling to intervene to stop the genocide?
3. Is it accurate to talk about "ancient tribal hatreds" between these two groups?
4. Which factors prevented or delayed intervention by the International community?

1.4 Objectives of the Study
The main objective of this study will be to see the role of the media and International Relations with respect to the 1994 Rwanda Genocide.

1.4.1 Specific Objectives
1. To determine the role of RTLM media in the genocide.
2. To determine why international community was unwilling to intervene to stop the genocide.
3. To establish whether it is accurate to talk about ancient tribal hatreds between the two groups.
4. To find out the factors which prevented or delayed international community intervention in the Rwandan genocide.

1.5 Significance of the Study
This study will be important to the government agencies for instance in the field of human rights because it will help in proposing a strategy for human rights programs to stand a chance of being given priority in an era when different media programs are vying for attention. The study will also help non-governmental organizations to provide a viable strategy for engaging human rights activism through the act of reporting on human rights issues. This research will also make a contribution by highlighting the intricacies of media’s involvement in promoting human rights. It will show that in one way or the other, everybody might either willfully or otherwise be complicit in human rights violations, especially when it comes to the use of some consumer products such as chocolate products.
Lastly the study will be of value to students and researchers. To students, this study will add to the limited empirical research on the effects of media and international relations in Rwanda genocide. It will therefore provide students with additional empirical evidences on media and international relations skills gap. To future researchers, the study will provide suggestions for future research that will require future researchers to act on

1.6 Literature Review

Introduction
The literature review on the Rwandan genocide provides the leading and most important explaining factor: the behavior and response of the state to numerous crises, the fundamental factors, in the country – cultural battle, war, media and political power tussles.,

1.6.1 Ethnicity Tensions
By the 1990s, Rwanda, a small country with a tremendous agricultural economy, had one of the utmost population densities in Africa. About 85 percent of its inhabitants is Hutu; the rest is Tutsi, along with a minor number of Twa, a Pygmy group who were the original residents of Rwanda. Part of German East Africa from 1894 to 1918 Rwanda came under the Coalition of Nations obligation of Belgium after World War I, along with bordering Burundi. Rwanda’s colonial period, during which the governing Belgians preferred the smaller Tutsis over the Hutus, worsened the tendency of the few to harass the many, creating a bequest of tension that exploded into violence even before Rwanda got its independence. (Adelman H. 1999: 31)

A Hutu insurgency in 1959 forced as many as 300,000 Tutsis to escape the country, making them an even negligible minority. By early 1961, prize-winning Hutus had forced Rwanda’s Tutsi emperor into banishment and avowed the country a republic. After a U.N. referendum that same year, Belgium formally approved independence to Rwanda in July 1962. (Pottier J. 2002:109)

Other theoretical frameworks can also explain the construction of ethnic divergence between Tutsis and Hutus. First, the creation of salient ethnic identities can be seen as a better mechanism of capturing class resentment on the part of Hutus; layering an ethnic dimension over class identities was a better strategy for mobilizing the masses and legitimizing resistance against upper-class, ethnically different Tutsis. Hutus perceived that the Tutsis were forming a distinct
ethnic identity, pushed by the Belgians, to legitimize political control. Whether or not this perception was true, as Mann’s classic security dilemma maintains, Hutus responded to this supposed “ethnic attack” by forming their own ethnic identity. In reaction to being labeled the superior ethnic group by the Belgians and in the face of rising Hutu ethnicity, the Tutsis actually accepted and internalized this ethnic label, promoting Tutsi ethnic identity as a defense. (Mann Michael, 2004) This ethnic security dilemma model is a feasible theoretical explanation for the construction of divergent ethnic identities.

The mass massacres in Rwanda quickly spread from Kigali to the rest of the country, with some 800,000 people killed over the subsequent three months. Throughout this period, local administrators and government-sponsored radio stations called on normal Rwandan citizens to kill their neighbors. The RPF continued fighting, and civil war exploded along with the genocide. By early July, RPF forces had increased control over most of country, together with Kigali. In response, more than 2 million people, approximately all Hutus, escaped Rwanda, flocking into refugee camps in the Congo (then called Zaire) and other bordering countries. (Thompson A. 1994: 242)

After its success, the RPF established an alliance government alike to that agreed upon at Arusha, with Pasteur Bizimungu, a Hutu, as president and Paul Kagame, a Tutsi, as vice president and defense minister. Habyarimana’s NRMD party, which had played a major part in establishing the genocide, was barred, and a new constitution assumed in 2003 abolished reference to ethnicity. The new constitution was tracked by Kagame’s election to a 10-year term as Rwanda’s president and the country’s first-ever judicial elections. (Thompson A. 1994:136).

1.6.2 The failure of the International Community (composed of the US and UN)

The United States and the United Nations are working in concert in providing aid and guidance to Rwanda. To be able to cover both entities it is necessary to review their particular perspectives. The UN is the vehicle in which the IC will be involved as a single unit. The international community perspective is that the failure to intervene was due to prejudice, and not in the national interests of any of the major countries. The incident in Mogadishu, Somalia kept the US and the UN out for fear of another international embarrassment. The magnitude of
the killings completely caught the IC of guard. The aid and support given now is partly the proper humanitarian thing to do to put a country on its feet, but much of it from guilt. It is possible that the current government is getting a pass by the IC with some of the policies they have put in place to maintain security.

1.6.2.1 United States
The U.S. sees the solution from the perspective of their national interests and from the failure to act in 1994. There are two programs that are the lead for the handling of the aid and assistance. USAID and a State Department program called the African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA). (Thompson A. 1994: 242)

USAID’s program is to improve governance through increased citizen participation and enhance democratic local government and decentralization, democratic national governance, civil society, and improve community-based reconciliation efforts. USAID will continue to support Rwanda’s groundbreaking decentralization program, assist new legislative bodies to carry out their mandates, increase dialogue with citizens, and help civil society organizations (CSOs) increase citizen participation in local and national governmental decision-making USAID will continue.

This participation in UN and AU peacekeeping mission gets buy-in from Rwanda for the success of the entire region and raises the influence of the small African country in the AU. This has also elevated the importance of success in Rwanda. Rwanda does not necessarily have a strategic location or any natural resources. Coffee is their biggest export. Instability in this border country can destabilize the East African sub-region of the AGL, which consists of Kenya, Uganda, Burundi, and Tanzania. (Thompson A.1994:242)

These national interests are not survival or vital interests of the U.S. On the surface they appear to be only humanitarian interests falling into the category of peripheral interests defined as; if unfulfilled, will result in damage that is unlikely to affect core national interests. (Bartholomees, 2008, 56)
1.6.2.2 United Nations

The United Nations doesn’t have the reputation of successful military intervention or even voting to support military intervention. The UN and the international community did recognize that there was a problem in the AGL, mainly Burundi and Rwanda. The assignment was called the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda UNAMIR. The operation was to help in execution of the Arusha Treaties. The Accords were signed August 4, 1993 to end the Rwandan Civil War. The Arusha Accords and UNAMIR activities were to aid in the peace process between the Hutu dominated Rwandan government and the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF). As the tensions rose the UN pulled all but about 250 UN soldiers out of Rwanda. (Adelman H. 1999: 231)

The failure of the UN to intervene was monumental even for the United Nations. This credibility gap is one that the UN and its affiliated International Organizations (IO’s) need to correct. There are usually not too many restrictions for UN aid, except for security for the systems to function and provide Humanitarian aid. This does leave a source like the US to apply milestones in governance and inclusiveness to some of their funding.

Majority of the world stood on the sidelines throughout the Rwandan genocide, eager to escape the loss of life and political mess that the American calamity in Somalia had generated. As reports of the genocide extend over the media, the Security Council provided more than five thousand flocks to give a tough force. But because of the interference and rejection of endorsements, the arrayed prohibited the force from receiving there on time and reached months after the genocide was over. (Adelman H. 1999: 231)

In the occasions that took place after the genocide, majority of government officials in the community grieved over the loss of many and were amazed about the world’s reluctance to the situation that could have stopped the genocide from taking place. The Rwandan genocide did not interest the outside world as the Yugoslavia genocide did. (Donatella, L, 1995). The outbreaks in Rwanda were seen as not of sufficient interest and value to prevention of the violence and were not interested to warrant the expense of resources and the risk to losing more casualties. The
delay caused thousands of Rwandan lives to be lost and mentally and psychologically scarred millions of those who lived the story.

1.6.3 Impunity

In relation with politics of prohibiting in the context of violence, conflict and war; impunity strengthened the behavior of the government and local population. This is not explicitly described by scholars in the theory, but inevitable in the analyses after research on common underlying explaining factors. Rwanda experienced impunity before and during genocides. In the Rwandan case, (Lemarchand 2004: 89) even argues that impunity had a great impact on the calculation, organization and implementation of genocide.

Since the lack of functioning justice systems had caused a history of impunity. Later crimes can be caused by earlier unpunished crimes in the past. The leaders of Rwanda could rule without being held responsible for their deeds. This definitely had an impact on the calculations of beliefs, motives and the possibility of reaching the goals of the leaders of Rwanda (Lemarchand, 2009:127).

1.6.4 Hate Media as a Crime against Humanity

Thomas Kamilindi, author of *Journalism in a Time of Hate Media*, describes hate media as a form of violence, which helps to demonize and stigmatize people that belong to different groups. (Kamilindi, Thomas 2007:165). This type of media has had an influential role in the incitement of genocide, with its most infamous cases perhaps being Radio TelevizijaSrbije during wars in Yugoslavia, Radio Télévision Libre des Milles Collines (RTLM) during the Rwandan Genocide and Nazi Germany’s *Der Stürmer*.

While the hate speech promoted by these type of media can be prosecuted differently under the national laws of several countries, because of its proven ability to contribute to and incite genocide the use of hate media in order to foment the cleansing of a particular national, ethnical, racial or religious group in whole or in part can be prosecuted under international law for
Incitement to genocide. Incitement to Genocide was declared a crime against humanity under the Nuremberg Trials. Nevertheless under the laws of Nuremberg only hate media propaganda which calls for direct extermination is considered a crime against humanity. (Biju- Duval, Jean-Marie, 2007) After the crimes committed in former Yugoslavia and Rwanda this definition was modified and a new definition was provided for the Rwandan tribunals.

According to this definition hate media propaganda considered to be a crime against humanity must be involved in the direct and indirect incitement of genocide which "must be defined as directly provoking the perpetrator(s) to commit genocide, whether through speeches shouting or threats uttered in public spaces or at public gatherings or through the sale or dissemination of... written material or printed matter... or through the public display of placards or posters, or through any other means of audiovisual communication".(Biju-, Duval, Jean-Marie, 2007)

1.6.5 The failure of Humanitarian Intervention

Only the Realist school of IR looks to states essential rivals, interest-driven entities. Many observers have claimed that timely intervention would have prevented the genocide. Some even asserted at first that UNAMIR itself could have done so, although most now acknowledge that the peacekeepers lacked sufficient arms, equipment, and supplies. Conventional wisdom still holds that 5,000 well-armed reinforcements could have prevented the genocide had they been deployed promptly when the killing began -- and that the West's failure to stop the slaughter resulted exclusively from a lack of will. Rigorous scrutiny of six prominent variations of this assertion, however, finds all but one dubious.

Human Rights Watch makes the boldest claim: Diplomatic intervention could have averted the genocide without additional military deployment. 5,000 U.N. troops deployed immediately upon the outbreak of violence could have prevented the genocide. But this assertion is problematic on three grounds. It assumes such troops could have been deployed virtually overnight.

U.N. headquarters had three months' advance notice of genocide and could have averted the killing simply by authorizing raids on weapons caches.
1.6.6 International Media Coverage of the Genocide

In The Rwandan Massacre Melvern, (2004), claims that global media backed directly the killings by misreading the killing in the first weeks as unprompted, tribal conflict rather than a methodical campaign to eliminate a minority.

First of all, media exposure in general was not extensive and lacked adequate footage of all of the heartbreaking things that went on. While some journalists did request governmental care, the media’s authorities are limited, and reporters were not abundant enough to endorse any essential movement of categories. The public’s limited publicity rounds out the justification as to why this influence failed Rwanda and reporters. International media played a very dissimilar, yet closely fictional role, than that of the Rwandan media.

Coverage of Africa in general modelled quite the trial to different news establishments at the time. President Mobutu SeseSeko was not hospitable to journalists and they were only accepted in with special invite. Because of this, and numerous other reasons debated, one of the most terrible crimes of the 20th century failed to make headline news.

Very scarce U.S. newsgroups get offices in Africa due to the complications that prosper within the unpredictable continent. U.S. reporters knew slight of the region, and attention of the genocide showed no diverse than typical exposure of Africa, which often relied on labels that were established on stories from other wartorn African countries – Uganda, Somalia, Ethiopia and Sudan, for instance.

In spite of 800,000 dead, international media still continued to be unenthusiastic in coverage pf the genocide. The threat to journalists was just too much for most Western administrations to tolerate. Richard Dowden defines Rwanda as being “insignificant” to most editors in Great Britain, and it is likely that the emotional state were barely isolated. A reporter for CNN, Gary Strieker, told Jo Ellen Fair that, with the absence of reporters around to cover South Africa’s polls, Rwanda might have received even fewer coverage.
The RTLM’s radio broadcasts got more coverage than the real happenings taking place in the country. *The Washington Post* was brave enough to quote a Rwandan radio broadcast that read: “You cockroaches must know you are made of flesh! We won’t let you murder! We will murder you!” *The Christian Science Monitor* did the same, quoting General Dallaire’s statement concerning RTLM broadcasts inciting the murder of Tutsis.

The few journalists who did make appeals for UN action did not walk away from the country unharmed. Tom Giles trusts that many, comprising him, still carry the blame and shame that came along with the media’s indecision during the battle. Looking over the versions of journalists, media administrations, scholars and global governmental agencies offers a well-rounded, unblemished picture of what truly materialized over the course of that memorable spring and summer.

Unhappily enough, a lack of consideration and media disregard resulted in apathy until hundreds of thousands were left for dead. Rwanda’s story is a major example of the authority journalists exercise, sometimes even without their information. (Internews Network, 1996)

### 1.7 Hypotheses
The research will be built on the below hypotheses:

Though the media stressed the viciousness that was taking place during the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, the international community did not get involved.

### 1.8 Scope of the Study
This study focuses on the role of Media and International Relations in the 1994 Rwanda Genocide. The study will involve secondary data and a cover a range of international media and the international community, their influence and its consequences to the genocide. It seeks to find out the role of the media and international relations in the Rwanda genocide and offer solutions to avoid similar scenario. This study will take a period of three months from April-June 2015. The areas of research will include: ethnicity, international community, media, humanitarian intervention and impunity.
1.9 Theoretical Framework
There are theories that explain how the media can be influenced by the theories. These are realism, liberal and critical approach.

1.9.1 Realism
Media are presented by realist theory as irrelevant to understanding international politics. For realist theory, the most important factor to consider is the state. Foreign policy is formulated not under the influence of domestic media and publics but by foreign policy elites who under the influence of an anarchic international system, define and pursue the national interest. As such, realism argues that foreign policy is generated by forces external to the state rather than forces internal to the state such as media and public opinion. Media, like other societal actors, can take control of a government’s policy only when that government loses control. The role media play in setting the public agenda is primarily determined by the conditions that officials themselves create (Warren Strobel, 2008:124)

1.9.2 Liberalism
Unlike realism, liberalism places far greater analytical importance upon the role of public opinion and media. As a theory of international relations liberalism focuses on the rules and norms that have evolved between states. In the international level, liberal claims regarding free speech and the global free flow of information. Liberalism assumes people generally prefer peace to war; public opinion acts a powerful constraint upon elected leaders.

The media and publics are capable of both influencing and driving foreign policy, liberal theories are strengthened. A significant debate during the 1990s revolved around the emergence of a new norm of humanitarian intervention, whereby the international community intervened in the internal affairs of a state to uphold human rights (Steve Smith, 2008).

Liberal arguments persist regarding the internet and its tendency to undermine the control of authoritarian states over what the populations see and hear. The assumption here is free flow of information through global media and the internet are part of globalization.

1.10 Research Methodology
Research for this thesis is library based and it will involve the collection of information based on secondary data. It involves the analysis of different books, statutes, journals, newspapers, respective documents and electronic sources. Data analysis shall mainly be on the theoretical
conceptualization of specific international relations concepts. The United States International University library and the Journal Centre at the Rwanda High Commission in Kenya have been most useful in the research.

1.11 Organization of the Study
The thesis is organized into five different chapters with individual themes. Chapter One gives an introduction to the study; a background to the study; research questions; objectives; comprehensive literature review; to a theoretical framework.

Chapter Two examines the ethnicity in Rwanda and the march to the genocide analyzing the inherent complexities involved in the decision making.

Chapter Three will look into the different issues areas and factors that delayed the humanitarian intervention and what role the international community played.

Chapter Four will examine the media and international community during the Rwanda genocide. This chapter will look at the media and consequently analyze the internal and external factors that influenced.

Chapter Five will give the summary and conclusion of the thesis
CHAPTER TWO: MEDIA AND GLOBAL COMMUNITY DURING THE RWANDA KILLINGS

2.1 Introduction
This chapter will look into how the media and international community the roles they both played and the second part the geopolitical context of the Western interests during the Rwanda Genocide. It will expound more on the Rwandan civil war what happened and its impacts to the Rwanda economy and, the people. Thompson, (2007) claims that because of lack of [the journalists and failure to sufficiently see and record events, journalists backed to the behavior of the culprits of the genocide who were cheered by the world’s droopiness and acted with exemption. Therefore this chapter will be answering the question, what was the role of media and international community during the Rwanda genocide?

2.1 Media
The encouragement of ethnic hatred on the radio together with the creation and arming militias was one of the clearest early warning signs of an imminent genocide (U.S. Congress, Senate 1994, 46) By African standards, Rwandese enjoyed good access to RTLM and Radio Rwanda broadcasts. The BBC estimates that the media and saturation of radios in sub – Saharan Africa in 1992 was about 13.5 per one hundred persons, while radio ownership in Rwanda is 25 per one hundred persons. The United States Information Agency (USIA) reports that RTLM’s broadcasts of four hours per day in Kinyarwanda and French were clearly heard in the Kigali area, and Reporters sans Frontiers indicates that RTLM ‘s programs were relayed to all parts of the country via a network of transmitters owned and operated by the government’s Radio Rwanda

The western media blame the international community for not intervening quickly, but the media must share the blame for not immediately recognizing the extent of the carnage and mobilizing world attention to it as such “The United States is often blamed as being most responsible for inaction in Rwanda. This is partially since the end of the Cold War, “no global action can be taken without the foremost role of the United States” (Kuperman 2000) claims the media must share the guilt for the world’s disappointment to end the killings. Media content is heavily laden with emotional freight concerning distant injuries and brewing evil.
In full agreement with this critique, but aware that this manipulation was mostly confined to media coverage in Britain and America, the present chapter adds that the media was also used, albeit with varying degrees of success to help shape a one sided perspective on society, history and politics. (Kuperman, 2000)

This shows how media used to push propaganda of hatred for the purpose of genocide. In this era of globalization, when information and communication technologies have become mainstay of international economic and political activities, many African governments are shifting their policies to enhance growth of the communication sector and engaging in cooperative efforts to improve communications.

Freedom of speech arguments fail when radio broadcasts directly violate Article III (c) of the U.N Genocide convention, naming .Africa is one of the continents about which we often know little news coverage about it takes on special importance. While reporting from an area with such violence can be logistically difficult, there were other ways to obtain information. The media coverage of Rwanda crisis proves no exception to the negative, shallow coverage of the past. Granted, events such as this conflict were complicated and violent, using “nyenze”to was a disservice not only to Africans but also to American news consumers. (Lemarchard M., 2004)

2.2 Messages of Hate
In Rwanda, the incitement of ethnic hatred on radio, together with the creation and arming of militias, was one of the clearest early warning signs of an imminent genocide. The dissemination of hate propaganda, which included spreading ethnic hatred and inciting ethnocide and genocide, began in earnest in 1990 with newspaper and magazine articles aimed at convincing Hutu intellectuals and other literate members of the population that their lives were menaced from inside and outside Rwanda by Tutsi infiltrators and Hutu supporters of democracy.

Despite the large number of Rwandese hate publications the written press had only limited circulation. The newspaper rarely printed more than 3000 copies of an issue and they circulated mainly in Kigali where their high prices further limited their leadership. With 400,000 to 500,000 Am/FM short wave radios that reached a broad public audience especially the 90 percent of the population which lived in rural areas.
The messages of hate spread through the airwaves in 1992 when Radio Rwanda broadcast all day long false news reports that a leaflet issued by the Tutsi had been discovered in Nairobi advocating the terrorist killing of twenty-two leading Hutu politicians. The preamble of RTLM’s articles of incorporation represents it as aspiring to: become a model disseminator of democratic values; contribute to the positive evolution of a pluralist democracy. The majority people and to awaken and defend them. (Hintes J, 1999)

2.3 Radio and Ideology of Genocide
There is little disparity that RTLM spread discriminatory anti-Tutsi ideology, drawing on chronological myths, typecasts of the Tutsi and pleas to Hutu unity and that it frequently did so in a finely disguised code mentioning to “work” instead of killing “cockroaches” instead of Tutsi.

To address the points the examination of the philosophy of the killing as spread through RTLM wants to be broadened outside it’s sufficiently documented anti-Tutsi images. Furthermore, RTLM assisted Rwandans make sense of their lively contribution in the killing in terms that were wider than simple abhorrence or anxiety of Tutsis by making a situation in which understatement such as work and cockroaches could easily be tacit through an complexity that left nothing unsaid.

Throughout the genocide, the RTLM exposed the progress attained since revolution as under threat from RPF subsiding past into current and calling on Rwandans to re-enact the do-or-die moment of 1959. The radio station also played on the idea of fairness by retelling people of the arithmetical weakness of the country’s Tutsi lesser, which would not only assure their overthrow but pardon Hutu of any blameworthiness.

While Radio Rwanda seemed delayed in the past and Radio Muhabara appeared to foreshadow a scary future, RTLM somehow hit a balance between steadiness and change, positioning itself in relative to leading dissertations while leaving from them in exactly compelling ways. At the same time it misappropriated ideologies that had earlier produced consent and consciousness raising and gave them a participating, mobilization edge which reverberated with the vitality of political plurality. (Hintes J, 1999)
2.4 Radio and Performance in the Genocide
RTLM did more than just articulate the philosophical world vision of the genocide. The key per influential feature was the skill with which RTLM amateurs played off the philosophies of the genocide, giving a dimple of frankness and honesty that also gave the ideology flexibility in dealing with possibility. It also openly informed talks that took place away from the physical settings of listening as well. Broadcasts were rejuvenated elsewhere as gossip, where the possibilities for embroidery or reinterpretation could only expand. RTLM sustained the larger network of the ideology of the killings on a continuously fluctuating foundation of smaller facts per formative instants that concentrated amateurs appealing or familiar or else authoritative to viewers. (The Times, 2008)

2.5 The Jamming Issue
The United Nations had been equipped with proper jamming devices; many lives might have been spared in Rwanda. The danger posed by hate radio aroused little United Nations reaction beyond its Kigali headquarters until August when the genocide had been accomplished and the massive flow of Hutu refugees had been underway for a month. After monitoring Radio Rwanda and RTLM broadcasts inciting violence against UNAMIR troops, several fruitless requests to interdict the radio attacks was turned down.

A jamming force using the experts and the special technology of the former Western or Eastern blocs would actually find it easier to put FM jamming equipment quickly into position than to establish a high powered AM broadcasting system to counter the perpetrator’s propaganda

For too long, proponents of the extension of human rights and democratic development have neglected radio’s potential as an influential medium. The architects of hate radio, using Western equipment and techniques, won the battle of the airwaves in Rwanda. (New York Times, 2008)

2.6 International community
The reality of peacemaking efforts in Rwanda appears directly contrary to the conventional wisdom that has developed. International conflict management efforts to deal with the civil war were substantial, not less than wide-ranging, and innovative at least in parts.

The United Nations peacekeeping efforts that followed the signing of a peace accord were ill-coordinated with the mediation process, and therefore based on false premises. For this reason
and because of the minimal strategic relevance of Rwanda to the major powers, the peace keeping efforts were wholly insufficient to implement the peace.

Most postmortems on the Rwandan peace efforts blame the weakness of the UN peacekeeping operation. Had the United Nations operation been more substantial, the argument goes, the flaws of earlier negotiations would not have mattered and the genocide could have been halted. As (Howard Adelman 2000) has compellingly argued that peacemaking efforts must be grounded in both realistic analyses of conflicts dynamics and realistic assessments of the capacities and capabilities of the diplomatic and international organizations involved in the response.

The Rwanda crisis sheds light on the doctrinal shortcomings of international peace operations. The U. N. Secretary –General’s concept of peace, introduced in his An Agenda for peace, 1992 would have been applicable in this case. The Rwanda crisis also highlighted the need for a rapid and more predictable reaction capacity. The U.N decision making structures and laborious system for mobilizing personnel have repeatedly proved in adequate. (BBC News, 2008). Arguably western reluctance to get involved militarily in African conflicts must also be met by an effort to enhance the regional capacity for conflict management on the continent. Despite the optimism, the international community was slow to offer direct aid to Rwanda’s new government. By the time of the first anniversary of the genocide most pledges were yet to be converted into hard cash. The crisis and human suffering were sure to be perpetuated. The government’s frustration over the lack of international support peaked in late 1995, when the Rwandan authorities failed to peacefully close down the last of the IDP camps, Kibeho.

It would be belaboring the point to say that the period 1990-1994 witnessed unprecedented killings in Rwanda. The work of the extremists was not work started with the Habyarimana plane crash, but began with the ideology of dividing Rwanda on ethnic grounds as a tool that had been used by the colonial masters. The post-colonial masters developed the ideology further until the 1990s when it consolidated into genocide. All pointers that there would be a massacre in Rwanda were there; however ignorance of the history of Rwanda and the disinformation of the extremist’s regime, helped by some members of the international community, delayed or blocked any possible intervention to save lives in Rwanda. Ethnicity, which the colonial masters had used to suit their convenience, was also used by the post-colonial leaders, who politicized and later militarized an ethnic ideology. Extremism was a deliberate measure to suit one section of the
Rwanda society. The massacres were not a result of the spontaneous response by people who so loved Habyarimana, and were pained by his death, and therefore acted to eliminate his killers (as some circles have wanted the world believe). The genocide was planned and implemented. (BBC News, 2008).

2.6.0 Geopolitical Irrelevance of Rwanda and Western Interests
Geopolitical irrelevance during the genocide saw some projects being imposed by multilateral organizations were fiascoes were contributed by the Hutu –Tutsi enmity. This saw more economic woes resulting into more social problems in particular the coffee price which collapsed.

2.6.1 Economic Problems and Structural Adjustments
Economic difficulties started in 1980s rose from Rwanda’s monoculture coffee economy. This began in 1987 when the system quotas recognized under the International Coffee Agreement (ICA) began to collapse and world prices dropped. “Rwanda’s state measured fund that supported coffee price steadiness became enormously appreciative. (Moise Jean, 2007)

The World Bank sent a group to Rwanda in 1988 to review Rwanda’s public disbursement program and they executed a Physical Adjustment Program with many circumstances. This corresponded with the start of the Rwandan civil war (1990-1993) which shaped the Hutu nobility became separated against each other and at the same time a irregular group encompassed of a mainstream of Tutsi refugees,

The Structural Adjustment program was executed in this politically unbalanced context and needed 50 percent reduction of the Rwandan franc passed out in November 1990. The economic shock worsened the civil war and stemmed in massive increase and noteworthy increases in the price of fuel and food. (Michael Chossudovsky, 2003.

2.6.2 Societal Collapse
The state enterprises were pushed into bankruptcy and public services collapsed, ‘including health and education. In 1992 throughout the summit of the civil war, the IMF ordered a second depreciation which led to extra price increases. Extensive famines which tracked, which in turn led to the enactment of a World Bank and IMF mechanical adjustment Program needing the liberalization of trade, economic deregulation and low-priced food importations and aid which
subvert local markets. Under the Structural Alteration Program Rwanda retained onto with the subscriber institutions, large loans were given to the Rwanda Central Bank for introducing supplies. Many of the loans were averted by the regime.

2.6.3 Debt Repayment
In less than a year after the 1994 killings Rwanda creditors approached the Tutsi-led RPF government about the debts of the previous regime that had been used to fund the bloodshed. Rather than demanding the withdrawal of Rwanda’s odious debts, had received the Bretton Woods institutions with open arms because they wanted the IMF green light to increase growth of the military, ‘which is precisely where the new loans went.

The goal was to mount an Anglo-American territory in Rwanda which helped the US to form a neocolonial position in Central Africa. This was positively attained as the language of the private and government divisions moved from French to English (Andrew Gavin, 2008)

2.6.4 Western Military Backing
The years of Rwandan Civil war and the genocide took place during the time when Madeline Albright was Bill Clinton’s Ambassador to the United Nations and Kofi Annan was the head of the UN’s peacekeeping operations. The initial invasion of Rwanda from Uganda in 1990 had the military backing of the first Bush administration (1989-1993). Paul Kagame was trained in the US Army installations in the United States and when, during the 1990 invasion of the Rwanda, the RPF’s leader was killed Kagame became the head of the guerrilla army. It came out of the French military that the U.S even supplied the RPF with the Soviet-made surface to air missiles that were used to shoot down the Rwandan presidential aircraft.

The investigation was completed in 2004 by the French in regards to the shooting down of the plane. Composed of powerful political and oil interests, commonly known as the International Strategic and Tactical Organization (Andrew Gavin, 2008)

2.6.5 Humanitarian Intervention
The Rwandan genocide was the result of years of tension and conflict between two ethnic groups in Rwanda: the Hutu and the Tutsi. The tension appeared at the end of the 19th century when the Rwandan population was separated into three distinct castes; the presiding Tutsi (14%), the employed class Hutu (85%), and Twa (1%). The battle was amongst the Hutu and the Tutsi. In
1918, following World War I, Rwanda was deemed a mandate of Belgium by the League of Nations and in 1959 Belgian support allowed the Hutu to overthrow Tutsi rule (Barnett, 2005). Rwanda became independent in 1962 and in 1973 the moderate (non-oppressive) Hutu government was overturned thus allowing a more radical (anti-Tutsi) Hutu government, under which the genocide occurred, to take its place. In 1990 the Rwandan Loyal Front (RPF), an army composed of generally Tutsi Rwandan outcasts, criticized Rwanda from Uganda. The ensuing war lasted for three years during which a "violent and exclusivist Hutu unity was intentionally being forged in opposition to these scorned foreigners [the Tutsi]". This conflict resulted in the creation of the Arusha Peace Agreement for a cessation of hostilities between the RPF and the Hutu government (Destexhe, 1994).

Negotiations also resulted in the creation of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR), which was a 2,500-person force meant to "monitor the ceasefire and contribute to the security of [the capital city] Kigali". The killings is said to have started on April 6, 1994 when the airplane ferrying Hutu President Juvenal Habyarimana of Rwanda and President Cyprien Ntaryamira of Burundi was shot down just outside of Kigali (Jennings, 2001). The killing was carried out by the Hutu "Rwandan army, interahamwe, and party militias" which targeted not only Tutsi but Hutu opposition members, Hutu moderates, media critics, professionals, and others who opposed the Hutu-supremacist regime. The killings as the "special concentration on the mass removal of all Tutsi" did not start until April 12. In the 100 days which followed, an estimated 800,000 men, women, and children were killed.

2.6.6 International Community Intervention
The 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide obliges "all States to prevent or punish acts of genocide". There was clear evidence that the international community had been made aware that the situation in Rwanda met the Genocide Convention's definition of genocide as early as August 1993 and yet once the genocide had begun weeks were wasted in determining whether the killing fully met the strict legal definition of 'genocide". The international community had a delayed response to the genocide, largely due to "criticism and opposition by the United States"(Maquet, 1961). As such, no military action was taken in the interest of human rights in the midst of the "concentrated frenzy of mass murder". The delay of the international community in addressing "the gross crimes against humanity it knew were
being committed" was a significant failure to uphold the Geneva human rights conventions. Potentially more shocking was the misuse of UNAMIR during the genocide. Under the Arusha Peace Agreement, UNAMIR had been dispatched to Kigali and consequently, it was there when the slaughter began in the city. The mission was initially "forbidden to intervene if it meant using force". Canadian General Romeo Dallaire had requested new Rules of Engagement so that his troops could "protect innocent civilians". This request was rejected by UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali thus rendering General Dallaire's force little more than observers to the massacre. In mid-April Belgium withdrew 440 of its troops because "ten of its disarmed soldiers had been murdered on April 7 by members of the Presidential Guard". This was followed by the withdrawal of "several hundred Bangladeshi soldiers". On April 21, the UNSC "voted unanimously to reduce UNAMIR to a skeleton force of just 250 men". This mass reduction of UNAMIR military forces, coupled with its passive Rules of Engagement signified that the international community had essentially decided against providing humanitarian military intervention(Karen, 1996). Thus, military aid during the Rwandan genocide was virtually non-existent. The only positive effect came from General Dallaire whose well-known efforts to expose the genocide to the world through public media helped bring attention to the crisis. The genocide ended on July 18, 1994 when the RPF finally defeated the Rwandan army. Hundreds of thousands of people had been killed in the conflict and it was at this point that the international community as a whole began to play an active role in the recovery of the war-torn nation by implementing a socioeconomic program that was intended to provide aid to the Rwandan people. This aid resulted in a variety of short-term effects, some of which are considered below.

Relative to the military inaction during the genocide, the socioeconomic aid provided after the genocide was very effective. In the short term, Jeff Drumtra, an Africa policy analyst, called Rwanda "a post-genocide society that [had] also experienced civil war, massive refugee displacement, and economic ruin". Today, Rwanda has come to be "hailed for its remarkable socioeconomic recovery". The change is, in large part, due to international socioeconomic intervention and commitment to social and economic reform in the country(Semelin, 2005). Following the victory of the RPF, Rwanda was left with only minimal remnants of an economy, no infrastructure, and was a nation of people with physical and psychological needs to be met. It was a country which had experienced massive human rights violations and which continued to experience human insecurity as a result of uncertainty about future procurement of basic needs.
In the weeks after the genocide ended, the "international community and the media opened their
eyes and overflowed with sympathy and help". Between 1994 and 2000 the international
community sent the new Rwandan government "nearly $4 billion in aid".

In November 1994, Paul Watson wrote that "it will be impossible to bury the past along with the
corpse as long as thousands of suspected murderers hide from justice in refugee camps just
across Rwanda's borders". This was especially true immediately following the genocide (Mann,
2005, p. 90). The Rwandan legal infrastructure had been decimated and could not viably hope to
carry out justice against the perpetrators of the genocide itself. Thus, the international
community had the opportunity to intervene socially by providing a source of legal
accountability in hopes of bringing reconciliation for some of the human rights violations it had
allowed to be committed. Legal intervention came in the form of the Arusha Tribunal. The
Arusha Tribunal was officially created in November 1994 when the UNSC approved Resolution
955. The Resolution created the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) which was
intended to "judge persons accused of genocide and crimes against humanity" (Destexhe, 1994).

2.7 Conclusion
Habyarimana’s regime had fostered the belief that it was the minority’s fault they were killed.
This created such consternation worldwide that it became impossible not to feel empathy with
the incoming RPF, which had the courage to halt genocide. This rude awakening, coupled with
Western guilt at not preventing the genocide, made in many international community reluctant to
point a finger at Rwanda’s RPF and the government it had put in place in July 1994.

Despite the optimism the international community was slow to offer direct aid to Rwanda’s new
government. The government of Rwanda felt it was still on its own and would now rebuild the
nation without significant international help. The crisis and human suffering were sure to be
perpetuated. The government’s frustration over the lack of international support peaked in late
April 1995, when the Rwandan authorities failed to peacefully close down the last of the IDP
Camps. The objective or research question used here is to establish whether RTLM radio station
had an impact in implementation of the Rwanda Genocide.
CHAPTER THREE: DELAYED HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND THE ROLE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY PLAYED

3.0 Introduction

This chapter examines the lackluster international and humanitarian response to the Rwanda intra-conflict of 1994, afterwards called the Genocide. There has never been any crisis of this magnitude since the holocaust of Nazi Germany and there has never been any since then to date (Grunfeld, 2014).

The objective in the conflict was to have majority Hutu domination through the extermination of Tutsi populations (Vermeulen, 2014). In a hundred days of death and suffering 800,000 Tutsis were massacred in deadly proportions such as never been seen in modern times. Machetes, clubs and other crude weapons were used to pillage and kill people, men, women and children alike.

Based on research and a lot of arguments, it has been concluded that there were internal and external factors that precipitated the conflict. This chapter will answer questions that will be used to understand the discourse on Rwanda genocide research. What were the decisions that were taken? What were the systemic failures that caused delays in the intervention? Why did International Organizations fail in the quest to intervene in the genocide?

3.1 Arusha Accords

Rwanda’s government war with the rebels of the Rwanda Patriotic Front in 1990-1992 occurred and was the precursor to many things that caused the problems of the crisis in 1994. At the behest of the Organization of African Unity Habyarimana the then President of Rwanda, Hutu agreed to a ceasefire under terms that were signed in Arusha, Tanzania. The circumstances of the consensuses required amongst other things, a stop fire, power allocation government, homecoming of refugees to Rwanda and an incorporation of the armed forces. (Magnarella, 2014).

The accords emphasized that Tutsi refugees return to Rwanda, the government to integrate 40% of the army to minority Tutsis including 50% of the officer corps, allocation of five ministries to
Tutsis in a broad based government that was joint and shared power. The treaties also postulated that the presidency should become mainly ritual. The final treaty was signed on August 3rd 1993. Gourevitch properly notes that for Habyarimana the Arusha Solidarities resulted to a suicide note (Gouvertich, 1999).

Hutu power leaders could not accept this arrangement and were harshly and vehemently against it. They cried treason and refused to accept the accords in any way or form. The tribal hatred was bad and the president would not live to see the accord implemented in full (Govertich, 1999). The Hutu majority had been in power for 20 years and it was going to be difficult to comprehend an implementation on the terms of the accords.

The political situation began to get worse and though the guns were silent after the accord had been signed, it was not going to be long before hostilities began again; conflict and anarchy would begin to rein leading to the genocide in April 1994. Many Hutus would lose their positions of privilege and many others would lose their political influence and power if the accord was implemented (Magnarella, 2014). As a consequence, something had to be done and it would have been opportune to have a foreign presence within Rwanda before tensions simmered to a full blown conflict.

The streets, media and the largely Hutu controlled instruments of power began gradually to distance themselves from the president, his government and the merits of the Arusha accords. Inside days of the passing, Radio Milles Collines, a new, secretive station zealous to genocidal propaganda, started spreading anti-Accord and anti-Tutsi attacks from Kigali. (Magnarella, 2014).

On the 6th of April 1994 as the president Habyarimanna was returning from Arusha, his plane was shot down and he was killed among other government officials (Prudier, 2000). The president’s plane was struck by a missile as he attempted to land in Kigali’s main airport. The identity of his would be an assassin is largely unknown but it began to emerge days later that elements within his own government could have been behind the assassination. Hutu extremists in his own government, army and his own presidential guard of 1900 strong had carefully orchestrated a plan to bring the nation to chaos, death and pillage. The president’s own Forces
Armees Rwandaises is believed indeed to have been squarely behind his assassination. The army was deeply polarized and divided and was in no way going to implement the terms of the Arusha accords.

Consequently the killings began and in little less than three months 800,000 Tutsi people lay dead in Rwanda and between 10,000 to 30,000 Hutus were also killed. This was almost 11 percent of the total population of the tiny nation of Rwanda. (Magnarella, 2014) There were 2 million refugees who fled their homes and were displaced in foreign and neighboring nations. (Gouvertich, 1999). The carnage was so much that there was an almost breakdown in social and civil order in Rwanda. Not even one Tutsi family could claim that it did not have family member killed in the genocide. This came to be the worst humanitarian situation of humongous proportions and scale since World War II (Maganarella, 2014)

For this reason, the fear and for the sake of social disorder and an apparent difficulty in handling crisis, no country was ready to be the first to heed the call for help. The international response was lukewarm and nobody wanted to have their hands soiled by the Rwanda problem. It was a crisis of herculean proportions and for the first few weeks after the conflict, countries stayed away.

3.2 General Daladier’s Fax  
The UN force commander in Rwanda was a French General who had been serving in the area under a UN Mission since 1992. From as early as 1992 he had observed credibly that the genocide was coming. He had investigated and had every reason to believe that there was going to be a Tutsi massacre. According to Fred Grunfeld many UN force commanders and NGO rapporteurs and largely the international community had known that there were ethnic tensions in and around the capital Kigali. There was an uneasy calm and silent whispers of simmering tensions could be felt.

A fax by General Dallaire dated January 1994 was sent to the United Nations Department of Peace keeping Operations in New York, warning that Hutu extremists were planning and arming up (Grunfeld, 2014). Unfortunately, this fax to the Department of Peace Keeping Operations (DPKO) did not reach the desk of the Secretary General of the United Nations and went largely unheeded.
Mr. Riza who was an advisor to the Secretary General is said to have received the fax but did not relay it for urgent action. This caused a prolonged delay of the information that would have necessitated a humanitarian response early on into the crisis (Vermeulen, 2014).

### 3.3 Third Parties and Fence Sitters
Third parties did not help intervene to raise alarm that there was a problem in Rwanda that required urgent action. Foreign powers and countries that were involved in Rwanda did not see the seriousness of the matter. When ten Belgian peace keepers were murdered early on during the conflict, there could have been a serious enough ground to demand humanitarian intervention (Grunfeld, 2014). These high level political murders of soldiers instead had far reaching consequences that even caused international outcry. The United Nations force had to fold and the United Nations Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR) had to end (UNSG, Report, 1996).

According to Vermeulen the court of public opinion in 1994 lambasted Rwanda for the murder of ten Belgian peace keepers. This action impeded on the ability of having a sound policy on humanitarian aid once the violence began. There was a delay in the response and more people died than there should have been. Public opinion also was lost due to other reasons as well. It had only been two years since the slaughter of American soldiers in Mogadishu, Somalia (Vermeulen, 2014). It was highly unlikely that there would have been any humanitarian response if a world super power and the highest financial contributor to aid did not want to be involved in Rwanda.

### 3.4 Rational Actor Policy
The rational actor model can also explain the silence of France in the Security Council during the period when the genocide was taking place in Rwanda (Grunfeld et al, 2014) France supported a Hutu victory because it needed to restore the government of the Hutus after the president had been assassinated in an airplane accident. France even led *Opération Turquoise*, for the Hutu militias authorized by the United Nations whilst the Genocide was going on June 22, 1994.

The rational actor model also explains why the other countries which had a presence in Rwanda at the time also decide to save and pull out their people and officials who were serving in Kigali and Rwanda as a whole during that time. At the beginning of the genocide, a total of over 1,700 elite troops from the US, France, Italy, and Belgium were either flown in or put on standby in neighboring countries immediately after the attack on President Habyarimana’s plane to aid in
the evacuation of their nationals. (Vermeulen 2014). According to Grunfeld If these 1,700 well-armed and trained elite troops had been added to the 2,500 UNAMIR soldiers, the total number of troops on the ground in Rwanda would have been 4,200 – exactly the number of soldiers all Rwandan parties to the Arusha Peace Accords had asked for in 1993 and the number that was considered realistic by the military who prepared the peacekeeping mission (Grunfeld et al, 2014). Rational actor policy is demonstrated in how countries caused a delay in humanitarian aid. It would have been inconceivable to think about aiding people at a time when countries were evacuating their citizens from Rwanda. Most likely than not through rational actor policy Rwanda was abandoned by the international community.

3.5 Bureaucracy

Bureaucracy contributed to the slow response of the UN in the Rwanda genocide. The United Nations makes decisions through approvals of adopting resolutions on the floor of the United Nations. The Security Council did not adopt any resolution or take any measure to stop the atrocities in Rwanda (Vermeulen, 2014). The Department of Peace Keeping Operations (DPKO) under the leadership of Kofi Annan did not provide adequate information about the situation on the ground. The reprisals were based on the fact that the office of DPKO was scared of a backlash by the Security Council on the situation in Rwanda. Also at the time there were numerous conflicts that were going on around the world. The conflicts numbered 122 and the United Nations Peace keepers had boots on the ground in most of them. Asking the Security Council to commit troops in Rwanda was going to be a challenge that the DPKO wanted to be involved in. By consequence therefore the humanitarian response was not forthcoming and it would have been quite impossible to see any activity on the part of the DPKO if indeed the Security Council had not received a request to commit troops.

In Somalia, only two years earlier, there had been a massacre of American soldiers in Mogadishu. In Yugoslavia, there was an international effort by NATO to quell the civil war that was going on there. Africa was therefore, not a priority. More so, a small state called Rwanda was not important in world politics. The United Nations Security council did not see any reason why it would have had to get involved in inter-tribal conflict in Rwanda. The DPKO did their utmost to distort all incoming information by rejecting all the views that the peace could no longer be kept and that the Rwandese rulers were preparing for genocide (Krommendijk, 2014).
3.6 Cognitive Dissonance

Cognitive dissonance is basically the practice of disagreeing with what is considered the norm. It is doing things differently from other people or not necessarily following the rules as they would seem to be. The United Nations ignored the likelihood of an emerging genocide in Rwanda in 1994. Most officials in New York thought that the situation was going to end speedily and that the government in transition was going to call for elections and the people would vote in a new president. They all thought that there was going to be peace in the nation after the president was assassinated (Vermeulen, 2014)

The Rwandan representative to the United Nations was a Hutu. Later on, it came to be understood that this delegate was a genocidaire who was supporting the killings (Grunfeld et al, 2014). With these reasons it would have been inconceivable that he would represent objectively the interests of Rwanda at the floor of the United Nations. It was quite obvious a genocidaire in New York would not quell the genocide and vouch for humanitarian aid to be flown to Kigali. According to Grunfeld actors in the issues in Rwanda also filtered the real information that was coming from Rwanda through the office of the Rwanda delegate at the United Nations.

3.7 Normalization Technique

Actors in the international community chose to ignore how important it was to intervene in Rwanda because of the popular perception that killings and the violence are perennial in African states (Krommendijk, 2014).

For a long time Africa was the theatre of conflict and many images from across the continent depicted an Africa of violence, hunger and pestilence. Many believed that this was a normal scenario. Ultimately, the International Community was slow in acting and the killings went uncontrolled for a straight 100 days and 800,000 people lay dead before any Humanitarian intervention and Aid was summoned. This is what Krommendijk called the Normalization Technique. US Acting Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Bushnell at the time even stated in an interview stated, “People didn’t know that it was genocide What I was told was, ‘Look, Pru, these people do this from time to time.’”(Bushnell Prudence, 1994). Later on in a report of the African Union Commission of the Genocide did in fact mention and talked about
implicit racism; a situation whereby the lives of African people did not matter and that it was a normal occurrence for Africans to fight causing a choice to ignore a much needed intervention in the genocide. (Vermeulen, 2014) The conflict in Rwanda was also described as ‘chaotic, mad and tribal.’(Grunfeld, 2014) The conflict was compared to Somalia and described as an internal state matter. It was described numerous times as a civil conflict despite the fact that people were killing each other in murderous campaigns of bloodletting

By standers were slow in intervening because just like in Africa so many times before e this situation was normal. It was what Africans were used to doing and it would not require Intervention whilst other theaters in Eastern Europe required urgent attention.

3.8 Organizational Process Model

Early warning mechanisms in international affairs and how to solve international problems including conflicts requires quick thinking and actions. Organizational processes in international affairs according to Grunfeld were also a direct consequence of why international humanitarian assistance delayed in helping alleviate conflict in Rwanda. He says that the International organizations and the procedure thereof tend to curtail the progress of conflict intervention and early warning. Meaning that rules of procedure and decision making impede on the availability of finding a lasting viable solution to conflicts. (Grunfeld Et al, 2014)

According to the United Nations operational command structure and routine, the situation in Rwanda was fast deteriorating that the soldiers could not keep up with the unfolding events. Because of organizational problems and the command channels communication and relaying of orders was frustrating. This according to writers was causing a slow process in the conduct of peace keeping operations at the time. The soldiers had mandate to wait for commands from the UN headquarters in New York through their service commanders on the ground and it would mean that the channels of communication were frustrating any efforts of an expeditious resolution of the problems (Grunfeld, et al, 2014). The organizational structure frustrated any quick efforts that would have caused a speedy resolution of the genocide. Even after the conflict had ended the humanitarian intervention mechanism also did take a long time that it would be hard for the Aid to be forthcoming. The organizations were compelled to follow procedures and
get organized to come to Rwanda and help the people who needed International help a lot. This took time and caused the whole effort to delay while innocent people were dying.

At the outbreak of the genocide, the peacekeeper commander General Dallaire phoned five times with the heads of the DPKO in New York (Annan and Riza), but they decided to prohibit the use of force to give safety to the members of the moderate Rwandese government (Vermeulen, 2014). They reacted by following procedures and going by the book waiting for commands from bosses to allow intervention to occur. They had to follow rules and protocols. The situation on the ground was brutal as there were neither rules of engagement nor an organized conduct of conflict. There were no factions or conventional armies taking part in the conflict. Dallaire’s men were few, the rebels were backed by other lords of war the people on the streets did not know about conduct of conflict and armistice and rules of war. The situation was chaotic and the fighting only ceased after 100 days. It was anarchy whilst the United Nations command structure relied on long arduous procedures and it was long before these procedures were realized on the ground to cause a sensible workable intervention. In which state therefore the conflict could not be saved.

When United Nations peace keeping soldiers were killed in the beginning of the genocide, the United Nations required that the Mission be suspended and the soldiers to pull out from Rwanda. (Krommendijk, 2014). This procedural requirement was a big blunder that led to further delay of any Humanitarian Intervention. Soldiers of UNAMIR left Rwanda and left the genocide active. This compounded the crisis to astronomical proportions. The fighting continued with reckless abandon and it was hard to stop the conflict. Squarely blamed on procedure and action, Rwanda was left burning days after the UN soldiers had left. To the extent that even the Prime minister was killed and nobody flinched also a sure procedural and a consequence of organizational blunder. It would have been obvious to intervene in a crisis where even members of a transitional government were attacked. Immediately there was a constitutional crisis then it would have required that the soldiers stay on to at least protest elements of the government that required the help. (Vermeulen, 2014).

It is not unreasonable to argue that genocide requires a total opposition from the United Nations, because genocide can be seen as threatening everything the UN has stood for, as laid down in its
Charter. But this did not happen. Instead, the UN and UN officials were primarily concerned with the interests of the UN. A UN official in New York stated, “I was more committed to the survival of the UN than I was to the Rwandans (Barnett, M. 1997).

Gross human violations were committed in Rwanda and the United Nations Charter was completely ignored. Many people died that should have not. The organization charged with helping alleviate suffering and preserving lives did not play its role. The United Nations let the people of Rwanda down and as such 800,000 lives were lost. Because of Organizational Procedures and a lot of bureaucratic tendency it became very hard for any help to come through. Many International Organizations to date continue to suffer the yoke of procedures and laws. In many conflicts around the world lack of quick fix solutions continue to stifle peaceful resolutions to many hot spots situations around the world.

3.9 Failure of International Community

In mid-1994, over 800,000 Tutsi an adequate number were murdered by the Hutu in the Rwandan massacre (Destexhe, 1994). The international community completely failed to halt and stop this outrage. There are many interlocked and composite issues that led to global inaction, such as a mistaken interpretation of African battles, the inflexible nature of the United Nations and peacekeeping tiredness in general. Though, this essay will concentrate on three reasons that the authors consider to be the important ones: The “shadow of Somalia” was still current and made states as well as the UN Secretariat reluctant to participate in another Peace Operation in Africa. Second, indecision was due to national curiosity: the United States decided not to interfere in Rwanda as there was no national concern at post. France, which had national benefits at stake, did not attempt to save Rwandan lives, but aggressively contributed to the killings. Third, due to the media’s botch to report on the killings there was no internal stress from citizens that could have swayed policy makers. My fight develops as follows. The main actors– Belgium, the UN Secretariat, the US and France – knew that there were killings ongoing in Rwanda; thus, they had a duty to avert and stop the genocide but as required political will. Each actor will be gauged separately. Following this investigation, I will show that the three issues stated above steered to indecision at the level of the Security Council, where member states dedicated themselves on the constant civil war rather than debating the genocide, which would have
enforced them to act under the 1948 Genocide Agreement. Finally, it will be shown that this international letdown had terrible penalties for the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR), which, with neither a strong mandate nor sufficient resources, became a witness to the genocide (Jennings, 2001).

Belgium, as the previous colonial chief of Rwanda, had a deep civil connection with that country. When UNAMIR was made in October 1993, they donated the largest Western contingent (UNDPI 1996). There were supplementary reasons for Belgian participation in the mission. After the Cold War, Belgium looked-for a justification for protection large and well-appointed national army; in command to reserve its rank, Belgium strained to present itself as the African mediation expert (African Rights 1995). Early on, Belgium knew of the cultural and political massacre so it began to debate for a tougher UNAMIR obligation, but no other state was concerned in supporting the mission (Des Forges 1999). After ten Belgian intermediaries were killed on April 7, one day after the killings had begun, Belgian public judgement that had been unresponsive before, began to lobby for “the boys to be sent home” (African Rights 1995). In order to protect face and not to lose its position as “African peacekeeping specialists”, Belgium began to appeal for the ample extraction of UNAMIR, which was reinforced at the Security Council as no other state had a concern in the mission (Des Forges 1999). UN Secretary General Boutros-Ghali, (1999) said that Belgium was “distressed with ‘the Somalia Syndrome’: pull out at the first meeting with serious trouble”. After the debacle with the dead Belgian peacekeepers, the only time the country showed any interest in Rwanda was when Belgian, French and US soldiers came to salvage expats between April 7 and 10 (Melven, 2000). The speedy and actual rescue mission of foreigners confirmed what would have been likely had the international community been staid about ending the genocide (PBS 2004). Belgium knew about the nature of the murders and had the ability to avert and stop the genocide. Though, the “shadow of Somalia”, its fears about losing face and nourishing voters at home clogged them from doing so.

The UN Secretariat is the United Nations’ administrative arm. As such, it passes on vigorous info to decision-making forms such as the Security Council, which is accountable for “the upkeep of international peace and security” (UN Charter). The Secretariat and the Secretary General, though, have come under significant censure for fading to pass on info before and during the Rwandan genocide. Regardless of ample information about the killings, staff spoke in
terms of a “civil war” and the need to get a ceasefire (Des Forges 1999). UNAMIR Force Commander Dallaire (2004) recalls how his “reports appeared to keep disappearing into the gulf of non-action in New York”. As a result, non-permanent members in the Security Council, who depend on on the Secretariat for info, did not come to see the assassinations as genocide (OAU 2000).

The Department of Diplomacy Operations (DPKO) only counted a few hundred over-worked staff, who were accountable for 17 missions and over 70,000 mediators. With large and composite tasks in Bosnia and Somalia, Rwanda presumed a low status (Wheeler 2000). Furthermore, US president Clinton’s blaming of the UN for the dead US rangers in Mogadishu shaped pressure on the Secretariat. UN staff were firm to evade another peacekeeping bomb, due to anxieties that this could mean the end of UN peacekeeping (Des Forges 1999). In Barnett’s words (2002), “it is almost impossible to amplify the impact of Somalia on the UN. What would later be called ‘the shadow of Somalia’ was ever-present, forming a dark cloud across the headquarters, directing future practices.” While the UN staff were “hard-working and moral individuals”, their administrative minds made them trust that they were acting sensibly in suppressing important info from the ground in order to bar the future of peacekeeping (Barnett 2002).

3.10 Conclusion

In short, the *sine qua non* and eventual cause of the Rwanda’s absence of apt Humanitarian reply to its genocide was the growing discrepancy in land, food, and people that led to malnourishment, starvation, periodic famine, and aggressive struggle for land to farm. These factors among many others caused brother to rise up against brother. These reasons for a long time caused endemic systemic cancers that ate on the people of a country that had seen peace for a long time (Magnarella, 2014)

The humanitarian community in Rwanda 1994 failed to act when indeed it was needed the most. The players from the United Nations to the countries in the first world failed to see why and how Rwanda could be helped and the fighting stop. These countries delayed and chose to ignore the much needed Humanitarian aid that Rwanda needed to come out of the crisis it was facing.
No effective measures were imposed by third party actors and the atrocities continued for 100 days. (Grunfeld et al, 2014). At the end of World War II in 1945 during the founding of the United Nations it was reiterated time without no. such atrocities should “never again” be allowed to happen. The United Nations was set up to primarily to unite Nations to speak in one voice against atrocities that engulfed Rwanda. The International community and actors let down a bona-fide member of the United Nations when it failed to act to stop the slaughter and anarchy that characterized April 1994.

What is the role of these repeated pledges by an International Organization that is charged with the protection of the community of Nations? United Nations failed to act, the International Community and the country’s former colonial power France and Belgium also failed to act. The country’s neighbors in Africa around the Great lakes and East Africa as a whole failed to act to save Rwanda from itself.
CHAPTER FOUR: CAUSES OF GENOCIDE IN RWANDA

4.0 Introduction

This chapter will look at the issues which led to the genocide in Rwanda. Both the RTML and the extremist newspaper, Kangura referred to the Tutsis as Inyenzis, meaning cockroaches (Des Forges, 2007) to be totally wiped out. People listened to their radios in their homes, bars, and sometimes in groups, waiting for the next action they would take (Li, 2004). One broadcast by Radio Rwanda urged the people (Hutus) to take it as their responsibility to kill Tutsis or they themselves would get killed. The message was such that the killings were referred to as work. (Sindikubwabo, 1994, in Des Forges, 2007). As CleaKoff noted, and perhaps most startling given the magnitude and unprecedented speed with which the killing was carried out, the death toll was not the result of the efficiency of violence made possible by modern weaponry; rather, the implements of the Rwandan genocide were clubs and machetes wielded by citizens and neighbors. In this studies, the causes of the genocide have not clearly been highlighted therefore, this study will look in to the real and major causes of the genocide by answering the question, what were the major issues that led to genocide in Rwanda in 1994? The causes are as highlighted below;

4.1 Ethnicity

A Hutu insurgency in 1959 forced as numerous as 300,000 Tutsis to escape the country, making them an even lesser minority. By early 1961, triumphant Hutus had forced Rwanda’s Tutsi sovereign into banishment and confirmed the country a republic. After a U.N. poll that same year, Belgium formally approved independence to Rwanda in July 1962. (Pottier J. 2002:109)

Other theoretical frameworks can also explain the construction of ethnic divergence between Tutsis and Hutus. First, the creation of salient ethnic identities can be seen as a better mechanism of capturing class resentment on the part of Hutus; layering an ethnic dimension over class identities was a better strategy for mobilizing the masses and legitimizing resistance against upper-class, ethnically different Tutsis. Hutus perceived that the Tutsis were forming a distinct ethnic identity, pushed by the Belgians, to legitimize political control. Whether or not this perception was true, as Mann’s classic security dilemma maintains, Hutus responded to this
supposed “ethnic attack” by forming their own ethnic identity. In reaction to being labeled the superior ethnic group by the Belgians and in the face of rising Hutu ethnicity, the Tutsis actually accepted and internalized this ethnic label, promoting Tutsi ethnic identity as a defense. (Mann Michael, 2004) This tribal security predicament model is a practical theoretical ex

By the early 1990s, Rwanda, an insignificant country with an tremendously agricultural economy, had one of the major population concentrations in Africa. About 85 percent of its residents was Hutu; the rest is Tutsi, alongside with a small number of Twa, a Pygmy set who were the innovative occupants of Rwanda. A Portion of German East Africa from 1894 to 1918.Rwanda came under the Coalition of Nations obligation of Belgium after World War I, along with bordering Burundi. Rwanda’s overseas period, during which the reigning Belgians preferred the lesser Tutsis over the Hutus, intensified the propensity of the few to dominate the many, making a legacy of tension that blasted into ferocity even before Rwanda got its independence.( Adelman H. 1999: 31)

The mass assassinations in Rwanda rapidly spread from Kigali to the rest of the country, with some 800,000 people crushed over the next three months. Throughout this period, local officials and government-sponsored radio stations called on normal Rwandan citizens to murder their fellow citizen. The RPF continued fighting, and civil war fumed alongside the killings. By early July, RPF forces had extended control over large part of country, including Kigali. In reaction, more than 2 million people, practically all Hutus, fled Rwanda, gathering into refugee camps in the Congo (then called Zaire) and other bordering countries. (Thompson A. 1994: 242)

After its triumph, the RPF established an alliance government like the one agreed upon at Arusha, with Pasteur Bizimungu, a Hutu, as president and Paul Kagame, a Tutsi, as vice president and security minister. Habyarimana’s NRMD party, which had played a key role in establishing the genocide, was barred, and a new constitution approved in 2003 eliminated reference to culture. The new constitution was shadowed by Kagame’s selection to a 10-year term as Rwanda’s president and the country’s first-ever judicial elections. (Thompson A. 1994:136)
4.2 History of Rwanda

The first inhabitants of what is called Rwanda were the pygmoid people a hunting and gatherer ancestors of the present day Twa. At around 1000 AD circa the Bantu speaking Hutu people migrated to that region and settled there around the hills. The language Kinyarwanda developed in to expression language of Rwanda. Hutu became the majority and slowly engulfed the Twa who were the original inhabitants of Rwanda. (Prunier, 1997)

It is said by various Rwanda traditional folk lore that Tutsi warrior king Kigeri Rwabugiri conquered and took over most of central Rwandan territories between 1860-1900. The Tutsis were too under populated almost 10 percent of the total population of the area (Jacque, 1961). They however managed to dominate the lands that had been settled upon earlier by the Hutus. The Tutsi set up a divine absolute monarch because of his military and political prowess.

Modern historians and several historical accounts intimate that there was no conflict between the Hutu and Tutsi population that settled in Rwanda during the early years (Prunier, 1997). However so; it was widely accepted that the Minority Tutsi ruled with an almost absolutism. The Tutsi aristocracy ruled by divine iron rule and dissent would not be tolerated. The Tutsi believed in their superiority and even trained their young warriors in this kind of edict. This kind of rule set apart the Tutsi from the non-Tutsi in an almost water and oil sort of mix.

Economically the Tutsi were wealthy and owned large herd of cattle and many sheep and goats. They also had large tracts of fertile land that had been stolen from the majority Hutu (Pottier, 1995). As the Hutu population continued to grow, it became increasingly difficult for the Hutu to be able to sustain himself economically. They began to lack food and progressively slid to abject poverty. This dire situation forced to enter into restrictive humiliative feudal arrangements with the minority prosperous Tutsi that made them inferior to their counterparts.

In the 19th Century; a time of great travels from explorers coming from Europe. Anthropologist observation and Historians have documented much on the disparities that plagued the Tutsi, Hutu and original Twa populations in Rwanda. For example, anthropologist Codere wrote that, “though there has been adequate intermixture [over intermarriage and concubine age] to distort ethnic lines, the mainstream of each class is ethnically [sic] distinct. In physique, for example,
the alterations are striking: the average stature of the Tutsi is 1 m. 75; the Hutu 1 m. 66; and the Twa 1 m. 55.” (Codere, 1962). Pottier wrote that “ethnic divisions and ‘clear hatred’ toward the Tutsi overlords, were well embedded by 1898, the time the Germans began to colonize Rwanda.” (Pottier, 1909) They frequently argue that Rwanda was a land of communal harmony and peace before the Europeans landed.

4.3 German and Belgian Rule

Germany colonized present day Tanzania, Rwanda and Burundi, Together it was called the German East Africa protectorate. From 1894 to the end of World War 1, Germany was in firm control of these territories. Following the Versailles treaty after the end of the war, Belgium became the protector of the regions that had belonged to Germany. In 1924 Belgium assumed control of these great lakes region. Belgium ruled these regions asunder one single administrative trusteeship up and till (Magranella, 2014)

The colonialists decided for a long time to rule through the local existing monarchs and leadership systems. Many colonialists believed that the Tutsi form of leadership was effective. Social Darwinism was widely accepted at the time in Europe and therefore the colonialist saw Tutsis as the best survivors among the fittest. The colonialist made it clear to the Hutu and the Twa that they directly favored the Tutsi mode of leadership and would favor them. They made the other tribes inferior and the inferiority worsened further the situation in an already inferior system (Mamdani, 2001)

Like many other African regions, the colonizer introduced a system of identification using a tag called an Identity card. In Kenya such a card was and is still called akipande. This card system was a form of distinct between the different tribes that existed in Rwanda. The people were identified through their cards and a further subjugation of identity through the use of the 10 cow census and Identity rule (Magranarella, 2001). This rule sited that for every 10 cows titleholder was one Tutsi and those with less than 10 cows were the Hutu or Twa. The census dogged 85% Hutu, 14% Tutsi and 1% Twa (Magranarella, 2001).

That indeed even if intermarriage had happened between a Hutu father and a Tutsi mother the children would be viewed as Hutu regardless. This practice continued to cause negative
connotations and began to sow among other reasons as discussed earlier, a sense of anger and hatred between the ethnic groups. Only in 1994 after the genocide was this abolished to now begin identifying all people registered in Rwanda to be Rwandese.(Mamdani, 2001)

4.4 Independence

In 1957 nine Hutu intellectuals published a document they called the Hutu Manifesto. This manifesto highlighted the economic, social and political malaise that the Hutu had been subjugated upon for a long time in Rwanda. It spoke about the Tutsi favoritism and complained the monopoly of the Tutsi in the whole system of Rwandan life and societies. It characterized the Tutsi as an invader and a collaborator of the colonialist (Lemarchand, 1970). The group called for the maintenance of the identity card to distinguish the two largest ethnic compositions in Rwanda.

In November of 1959, the pro Hutu movement PARMAHUTU party led a revolt that resulted into ethnic tensions and toppling of Tutsi King Kigri V. Starting 1960 change began to happen and the colonialist began to appoint Hutus as chiefs and into government and positions of authority as well. Persecution campaigns began against the Tutsis and by independence in 1963 Tutsi deaths had increased dramatically to unprecedented levels to about 130,000 and almost 50,000 had fled to neighboring Burundi (Prunier, 1997).

In mid- 1960 the first elections were organized and the Hutu majority PARMAHUTU party won a landslide. Owing to the fact that they were majority, they became manifold in representation of legislative areas around communities and this dwindled further Tutsi political control. In 1961 elections under UN supervision Gregoire Kanyibanda became president designate. He was the leader of PARMAHUTU and he was sure to continue the Hutu agenda of exterminating the Tutsi hegemony (Nyankanzi, 1998).

Rwanda was affirmed independent on 1st July 1962 having Kayibanda as their first president. This Hutu president became dictatorial in a short while and he began favoring Hutus over Tutsis even in lucrative government appointments (Prunier, 1997) his leadership style was one of the precursors of the 1994 genocide for which this research is all about.
In neighboring Burundi, the government was Tutsi led. This government was a fierce opposition of Kigali. Rwandan Tutsi Refugees began launching reprisal attacks against Hutu populations in Rwanda. These attacks were followed by bitter revenge attacks on Tutsis inside Rwanda and between 1963 and 1964 10,000 Tutsis had been killed in Rwanda out of retaliatory attacks. All surviving Tutsi politicians still living in Rwanda were all slaughtered (Prunier, 1997)

4.5 The Second Republic

In July 1973, Juvenal Habyarimana overthrew President Gregoire Kanayiobanda in a bloodless coup. He declared himself the president of the second republic of Rwanda and began to rule with an iron fist. In the next few years, his presidential soviet style guard began to eliminate his own opponents and in due cause he killed the former president. His party MRND became a single party dictatorship and outlawed opposition including constitutional provisions that would have had it to the contrary. He continued the purge on the Tutsi population and relegated them to controlled private sector business alliances that would not thrее much economic or political opposition (Marshall, 2008)

The Habyarimana government stifled Tutsi opposition by blocking the return of Tutsi refugees into the country. At the time there were over 1 million Rwandan in neighboring African states plus, thousands more living in Europe and America. Habyarimana vehemently refused their return and association insisting that Rwanda was crowded (Magaranella, 2014). Some of these refugees who had fled from Rwanda joined forces with Yoweri Museveni’s rebel army. The force was fighting to unseat Milton Obote. Many of the Rwandan refugees helped in Museveni’s cause. In 1990- 1992 Rwandan Patriotic Front troops conducted a number of assaults into Rwanda. The struggling caused shift of hundreds. These assaults had also been supported by some Hutu refugees too who had morphed and became moderate Hutu and friends of the Tutsi effort. Habyarimana as usual continued to inflict assaults on local Tutsi populations inside of Rwanda (Jefremovas, 1995). From 1992 Hutu ultra-Nationalists again inflicted damage and killed up to 2000 Tutsi and other Human Right advocates in Rwanda regardless of their ethnic inclinations (Newbury, 1995)

Habyarimana also invited ethnic Hutu coalitions into his government to discuss and strategies against this new opposition from outside Rwanda. (CDR) was one such party of alliance with
MRND. Hasan Ngeze, a CDR member and Hutu supremacist, became a major critique and even on his newspaper Kangura published seditious “10 commandments of the Hutu”. These commandments largely castigated the Tutsi and urged people to stop feeling pity for the Tutsi. They were made public and were spread everywhere as forms of hate speech even in public meetings and remote villages.

4.6 Socio-Political Causes

There is no common cause of genocide; it all depends on the different historical background of each country and how perpetrators define the group and how they determine who is a member (Karen, 1996). On the Asian continent, communism as a socio-political and economic doctrine was the context in which genocide occurred, notably in Cambodia and China the Khmer Rouge communist leaders in Cambodia combined extremist ideology with ethnic animosity and disregarded human life to repress and murder and cause misery on a massive scale. In Africa genocide and the strategy of dividing people in colonies were used to conquer and exploit people and gain economic and political power (Mann, 2005). In the case of Rwanda, genocide was a carefully planned and executed exercise to annihilate Rwanda’s Tutsi and Hutu populations who disagreed with extremist politics. Here, genocide had much more complex roots than just deep ethnic hatred. Its main causes were socio-political. They were rooted in the manipulation of the history of Rwanda by both colonial and post-colonial leaders and can therefore be attributed to both internal and external factors. The history of Rwanda was manipulated before independence by Western colonizers (Germany and Belgium) and after independence by inefficient local leadership and the failure of democracy (Mann 2005). International indifference and the involvement of some Western countries who are accomplices made it possible for genocide to occur (Barnett, 2005).

4.7 Economic Causes

Economic factors have also shaped and worsened the effects and the extent of the genocide. Utterwulghe(1999) notes that four socioeconomic factors shaped the extent of genocide: (1) the abrupt drop in the price of coffee, coupled with a 1989 currency devaluation and rapid inflation after 1990; (2) a structural adjustment program combined with a drought in the southern regions which turned into a famine; (3) the war in the north (1990) that drained government resources
and created huge refugee camps in the north of Kigali; and (4) the ‘paradox of democratisation in Africa’ which caused opposition to the already embattled government.

4.8 Cultural Causes

The roots of violence in Rwanda are ‘more complex than most people had imagined’ and the terms Hutus and Tutsis refer to constructed categories of different socio-economic positions within Rwandan society (Jennings, 2001). Melvern (2000) states that these two ethnic groups shared the same language, culture and lived in the same village with intermarrying and people exchanging identities. A ‘pure ethnic divide is a myth’. According to Mamdani (2001), it was the Belgian reform of the colonial State in the decade from the mid-1920s to the mid-1930s that established Hutus as indigenous Bantu and Tutsis as alien Hamites. This Hamitic hypothesis, he argues, explained away every sign of civilization in tropical Africa as a foreign import. Hutu and Tutsi became political identities connected to the origins of the violence. The Rwandan genocide ‘was not a simple matter of mutual hatred between tribes erupting into irrational violence’. Documentary evidence shows that the killings were planned in advance by a clique (family and in-laws) close to President Habyarimana who resented power-sharing with the Tutsi. According to Pottier, (2002), ‘Rwanda’s bloodbath was not tribal. It was rather a distinctly modern tragedy, a degenerated class conflict minutely prepared and callously executed’ which the world failed to see. This indicates the complexity of the genocide in Rwanda and suggests that if class (related to resource access as well) issues are not adequately addressed, the prospect of another genocide exists.

4.9 Environmental Factors

Environmental factors also played a key role in shaping the genocide. Rwanda, is a small country whose population increased from 1 887 000 in 1948 to more than 7 500 000 in 1992 (IRIN 2002). Such a high population within a small land area makes it one of the most densely populated countries in Africa (IRIN 2002). Population densities range between 310 (UNDP 2003) to 410 (Pan African News Agency 2000) inhabitants per square kilometre. There is no doubt that Rwanda’s overpopulation and poverty problems somehow lay at the heart of increasing ethnic tensions. As the population grew and sub-divisions amongst family members increased, the amount of available land for subsistence purposes decreased drastically, leaving
many landless and unemployed. As a result, people were easily encouraged by political leaders to kill the Tutsis so that they could take possession of their land. African Rights,(1995) state that ‘the men who planned and implemented the genocide, called upon the population to loot the property of Tutsis, the people marked out for extinction as a principal strategy for encouraging mass participation in the slaughter’. Land, therefore, became an object of lasting conflict not only in Rwanda but also in other African countries (Robbins, 2003).

This manipulation by the Habyarimana regime through its policies is clearly evident in Boudreaux’s, (2009) article on ‘Land Conflict and Genocide in Rwanda’ as discussed below. Boudreaux’s (2009) critical review of Diamond’s (2005) book ‘Collapse’ in her article provides some useful insights on why Rwanda is not ‘a modern day Malthusian Crisis’. Diamond, she contends, did not consider the reasons for Rwandans being tied to their land. The problem of small land is certainly not enough to explain the atrocities which took place in Rwanda. Countries such as Belgium and Swaziland are as small as Rwanda, but they never experienced genocide. Thus poverty, overpopulation and unemployment are not the determinant causes of the genocide in Rwanda but are among factors which facilitated the recruitment of militias among young people, who had nothing to lose, just before 1994 (Semelin, 2005). According to African Rights (1995), a superficial analysis of the genocide would blame poverty, overpopulation, the environmental and economic crisis for the tensions which led to the killings. They also contend that possible reasons lie within the socio-political structures that manipulated people from sources of resentment and despair to commit acts of violence (African Rights 1995).
4.10 Conclusion

On 6 April 1994, Habyarimana’s plane neared Kigali Airport on his return from Arusha; it was struck by a missile killing the president and all aboard. Though the exact distinctiveness of his murderers is still not normally known, many alien observers trust Habyarimana was killed by Hutu rebels in his own army, the Forces Armées Rwandaises (FAR) (Prunier, 1995)

The Hutus here out of the tribal maliciousness must have sensed that the president would have had to pass on and therefore give room for killing of the Tutsi. Within the hour already the Interahamwe had begun setting up roadblocks and began singling out Tutsis. The Interahamwe was a tribal/ethnic paramilitary unit made up of Hutu extremists. On 6th and 7th young men monitored movement of Tutsis around Kigali s the radio began spreading hate speech messages against the Tutsis calling for their extermination and culling. Anyone who was not Hutu extremists, i.e. Tutsis, moderate Hutus, human right champions and even foreigners were set upon by iron bars and machetes in a modern day pogrom that lasted 100 days. People were expected to show their Identity cards so that they would be assassins would distinguish the good and the bad. The military guard was in charge of assassinating political opponents and those in government perceived to be against the pogrom.

And so began the program for which came to be called famously. The Rwanda Killings of April 1994.
CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

5.0 Introduction

The study has been able to demonstrate what happened that came to cause this genocide. From the outset the international community actively sought to avoid any responsibility it might have for acting to prevent the killing. Individual states sought refuge for their choice not to act by asserting that the killing was the result of ancient tribal hatreds that could not be resolved. Others relied on the claim that intervention would violate Rwandan sovereignty.

5.1 Media and International Community during the Rwanda Genocide

This was the first study objective which was aimed at establishing whether RTLM radio station had an impact in implementation of the Rwanda Genocide. Despite the optimism the international community was slow to offer direct aid to Rwanda’s new government. The government of Rwanda felt it was still on its own and would now rebuild the nation without significant international help. The crisis and human suffering were sure to be perpetuated. The government’s frustration over the lack of international support peaked in late April 1995, when the Rwandan authorities failed to peacefully close down the last of the IDP Camps.

5.2 Delayed Humanitarian Intervention and the Role International Community Played

This was the second study objective which was to determine why there was delayed intervention by humanitarian and the role which international community played in the Rwandan genocide. The study found that the humanitarian community in Rwanda 1994 failed to act when indeed it was needed the most. The players from the United Nations to the countries in the first world failed to see why and how Rwanda could be helped and the fighting stop. These countries delayed and chose to ignore the much needed Humanitarian aid that Rwanda needed to come out of the crisis it was facing.

No effective measures were imposed by third party actors and the atrocities continued for 100 days. (Grunfeld et al, 2014). At the end of World War II in 1945 during the founding of the United Nations it was reiterated time without no. such atrocities should “never again” be allowed to happen. The United Nations was set up to primarily to unite Nations to speak in one voice against atrocities that engulfed Rwanda. The International community and actors let down
a bona-fide member of the United Nations when it failed to act to stop the slaughter and anarchy that characterized April 1994.

Lastly is the concern that the intervening nations and their populations would have to make unreasonable sacrifices to effectively carry out the intervention. Again, at least with regards to Rwanda, the facts belie such an assertion. As Romeo Dallaire noted, the genocide could have been stopped, order restored, and the Arusha Accords put back on track with a relatively small contingent of well-armed and properly mandated UN Peacekeepers. (Ibid) Nor should one forget Koff’s comment regarding the nature of the threat. This was not a highly trained military carrying out these killings. The slaughter of civilians was being carried out by individuals carrying machetes. (Koff, 2002) When confronted by a well-trained and seasoned military force, it is likely that the militias could be stopped without significant violence. In addition, one simple and highly effective tactic to thwart the genocidal intentions of the genocidaires would have required little more than a “violation” of Rwandan airspace. The United States could easily have blocked the radio broadcasts of the Radio Mille Collines, which were being used to identify Tutsis in hiding and exhort the Hutu population to go to “work” killing the Tutsi “cockroaches”. (Powers, 1998) The United States refused.

5.3 Causes of Genocide in Rwanda.

This was the third study objective which was to find that which led to the Rwandan genocide of 1994. The study found that like many other African regions, the colonizer introduced a system of identification using a tag called an Identity card. In Kenya such a card was and is still called kipande. This card system was a form of distinct between the different tribes that existed in Rwanda. The people were identified through their cards and a further subjugation of identity through the use of the 10 cow census and Identity rule (Maganarella, 2001). This rule said that for every 10 cows possessor was one Tutsi and those with less than 10 cows were the Hutu or Twa. The count dogged 85% Hutu, 14% Tutsi and 1% Twa (Maganarella, 2001).

As a result of the personality system; that had placated that everyone was of patrilineal root, even by birth of inter-marriage. That indeed even if intermarriage had happened between a Hutu father and a Tutsi mother the children would be viewed as Hutu regardless. This practice continued to cause negative connotations and began to sow among other reasons as discussed earlier, a sense
of anger and hatred between the ethnic groups. Only in 1994 after the genocide was this abolished to now begin identifying all people registered in Rwanda to be Rwandese. (Mamdani, 2001)

However, and despite the political rhetoric that appealed to the orthodox conception of sovereignty, not only was humanitarian military intervention permissible in Rwanda, it was a matter of moral obligation. One line of argument in support of this claim can be found in a variety of special relationships that were integral to the Hutu-led slaughter of countless people. Specifically, French diplomats worked to shield the Francophone Hutu government from scrutiny. The eventual French “intervention” (“Operation Turquoise”), intentionally or not, served to protect the fleeing genocidaires. The machetes used were smuggled from China through Saudi Arabia to the Interahamwe, the Hutu militia responsible for orchestrating much of the killing. In each of these cases, one might reasonably argue that the responsible countries had a special obligation to act.

5.4 Recommendations

This study can serve as resource material for future research on a similar field, especially research on human rights and the media. Future research should strive to include more journalists to ascertain their views on what the role of the media should be in a case like the one for Rwanda. Other media organizations should also be studied to know the extent they go to in incorporating human rights issues in their programs, as well as how far they are prepared to invest in such programs.

Further research should test the hypothesis that media involvement in human rights campaign will lead to loss of credibility. This is necessary considering the fact that the media are also rights holders in order to know if the organizations should set a limit to any positive contribution they make in regard to human rights promotion. Therefore, media involvement in charities or nonprofit organizations should be investigated to find out the impact of such involvement on media credibility and expertise.
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