THE IMPACT OF DISARMAMENT OF PASTORAL COMMUNITIES ON THEIR SECURITY: THE CASE OF KARAMOJA REGION OF UGANDA

BY

HASSAN KHAMIS

ID No. 644156

A Proposal Submitted To the School Of Humanities & Social Sciences in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirement for the Degree of Master of Arts in International Relations

2016
DECLARATION

I, the undersigned, declare that this is my original work and has not been submitted to any other college, institution or university other than the United States International University in Nairobi for academic credit.

Signed: ______________________  Date: ______________________

Hassan Khamis

Student ID: 644156

This thesis has been presented for examination with my approval as the appointed supervisor.

Signed: ______________________  Date: ______________________

Supervisor: Mr Kabongah George

Signed: ______________________  Date: ______________________

Dr. Tom L. Onditi

Dean, School of Arts & Social Sciences

Signed: ______________________  Date: ______________________

Amb. Professor Ruthie Rono

Deputy Vice Chancellor, Academic Affairs
DEDICATION

To my beloved mother, the late Mrs. Loono Zainab.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

To the almighty God for bestowing upon me the required knowledge necessary for the completion of this work.

To my father Mr. Hamis Lowany Duale of Kaabong for instilling in me humility, kindness and love for humanity.

I thank Mrs. Christine Sekadde for her timely wise counsel and unwavering encouragement throughout my time in school.

I am beholden to the School of Social Sciences and Humanities at the United States International University – Africa for offering me the opportunity to participate in the Master of Arts in International Relations. I am grateful to my motivating Instructors, Professor Macharia Munene, Dr Kennedy A. Mkutu for their resourceful help.

My Special thanks go to Ms. Vivian Bertha Sekadde, the person who most believed in me; who encouraged me throughout my academic sojourn.

Lastly, but my no means least, I am indebted to my supervisor Mr. George Kabongah for taking time off his busy schedule to provide guidance and encouragement throughout the writing this study.
List of Abbreviations

ACHPR  African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights
ADOL  Action for Development of Local Communities
APCs  Armored Personnel Carriers
ASTU  Anti-Stock Theft Unit
AU  African Union
INGOs  International Non Governmental Organizations
CSOs  Civil Society Organizations
DANIDA  Danish International Development Agency
DDR  Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration
EPD  Ethiopia Pastoralist Day
FDRE  Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia
GoU  Government of Uganda
HRBA  Human Rights Based Approach
ICCPRA  International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
ICESCR  International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
IGAD  Intergovernmental Authority on Development
ILO  International Labour Organisation
KDAA  Karamoja Development Agency Act
KIDDP  Karamoja Integrated Disarmament and Development Programme
KPW  Kenya Pastoralist Week
LDUs  Local Defense Units
MDGs  Millennium Development Goals
NGOs  Non Governmental Organizations
OPM  Office of the Prime Minister
PCDP  Pastoralist Community Development Programme
PFE  Pastoralist Forum Ethiopia
RLP  Refugee Law Project
SALWs  Small Arms and Light Weapons
UDHR  Universal Declaration on Human Rights
UHRC  Uganda Human Rights Commission
UNESCO  United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation
UNDP  United Nations Development Programme
UN  United Nations
OCHA  Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
UPDF  Uganda Peoples Defense Forces
WISP  World Initiative for Sustainable Pastoralism
WPDC  Wajir Peace and Development Committee
Abstract

This thesis explores the problem of recurrent armed violence among the pastoral communities in Karamoja and the neighboring communities. It shall investigate why after many attempts at eradicating insecurity in the Karamoja region, there remains persistent armed violence. The study argues that while Karamoja is no stranger to armed violence and insecurity, the conflict has brought in new players and new dynamics.

The Karamojong have survived through a mix of natural disasters and human-induced hardships through scramble for scarce natural resources such as water and pasture for their animals and cattle rustling. Although the situation can be said to be abnormal, the local communities continue to forge life throughout extreme violence in an appalling humanitarian setting.

With their unwavering association with modern weapons, it was no surprise that government of Uganda and International Non-Governmental Organizations turned their focus on a possible intervention in the Karamoja sub region.

Following the 2003-2006 disarmament campaign, the population in Karamoja was exposed to untold violence carried out by communities that did not surrender firearms in their possession. The Uganda People’s Defense Forces in carrying out forceful disarmament tortured innocent civilians in the hope of recovering a firearm.

Throughout the 2003-2006 disarmament campaign the Government and foreign funders failed to address the reason why Karamojong pastoralists needed to arm themselves. The Operation was ill prepared, rushed and implemented. This eventually resulted in gross human rights violations as well as opportunity lost to ensure total disarmament.

Besides investigating government of Uganda reasons for a disarmament campaign, this study will also establish that armed violence in Karamoja was not a result of heavy presence of Small Arms and Light Weapons in the hands of the Karamojong.

Key Words:
Disarmament; Karamoja; Small Arms and Light Weapons; Pastoralism; Insecurity; Armed Violence; Forceful disarmament; Human Rights
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

DECLARATION ........................................................................................................................................... i  
DEDICATION ............................................................................................................................................... ii  
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT .............................................................................................................................. iii  
List of Abbreviations ................................................................................................................................ iv  
Map showing Karamoja Region .............................................................................................................. v  
Abstract ................................................................................................................................................... vi  
TABLE OF CONTENTS .............................................................................................................................. vii  

## CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................... 1  
1.0. Introduction ......................................................................................................................................... 1  
1.1. Background ......................................................................................................................................... 3  
1.2. Statement of the Problem ................................................................................................................ 4  
1.3. Objectives of the Study ................................................................................................................... 6  
  1.3.1. Overall Objective ....................................................................................................................... 7  
  1.3.2 Specific Objectives ...................................................................................................................... 7  
1.4. Research Questions ........................................................................................................................... 7  
1.5. Justification of the Study ................................................................................................................ 7  
1.6. Hypothesis ......................................................................................................................................... 9  
1.7. Theoretical Framework ................................................................................................................... 9  
1.8. Scope of the Study .......................................................................................................................... 12  
1.9. Conclusion ....................................................................................................................................... 12  

## CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW ............................................................................................... 15  
2.0. Introduction ....................................................................................................................................... 15  
2.1. Government’s policy on Karamoja ................................................................................................. 16  
2.2. Disarmament .................................................................................................................................... 18  
2.3. Conclusion ....................................................................................................................................... 19  

## CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY ........................................................................................................ 20  

## CHAPTER IV: THE DISARMAMENT PROCESS .............................................................................. 22  
2.4. Trajectory of Disarmament in Karamoja ...................................................................................... 24  
  2.4.1. Anti-Stock Theft Unit ............................................................................................................. 24  
  2.6. Phase I (2001-2004) .................................................................................................................... 26  
  2.7. Phase II (2004-2005) .................................................................................................................... 33
2.8. The ‘cordon and search’ phase (2006-2007)................................................................. 36

CHAPTER V: CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE KARAMOJA DISARMAMENT PROCESS.............. 40
  5.0. Introduction................................................................................................................. 40
  5.1. Good Intentions Bad approaches ............................................................................ 40
  5.2. Impossible Disarmament? ....................................................................................... 46
  5.3. Were goals achieved? ............................................................................................. 50
  5.4. Conclusion ............................................................................................................... 55

CHAPTER VI: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ............................................. 57
  5.1. Conclusions ............................................................................................................. 57
  5.2. Recommendations ................................................................................................. 61

REFERENCES ...................................................................................................................... 66
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

1.0. Introduction

The Karamoja region of north-eastern Uganda is a far-flung and semi-arid region with extremely variable rain, pastoral and subsistence farming. It is also characterized by very little infrastructural development and continuous security threats.

Unless it was to subdue the trafficking of Small Arms and Light Weapons (hereafter, SALW) that was seen as a potential source of border and regional instability, or as a means to sustain the profitable trade in ivory by the British, consecutive regimes in Uganda just like colonialists can largely be said to have ignored Karamoja (Barber, 1968).

Prior to the 2005 disarmament campaign by the Uganda government, there had been a number of attempts aimed at disarming the ethnic Karamojong tribesmen right from the beginning of the 20th century. However, such campaigns ended with less or no economic benefit or infrastructural development (Bevan, 2008).

Notwithstanding, marginalization by previous governments cannot be said to be the only source of Karamoja’s enduring troubles. Insecurity is still evident and is manifested in poor standards of living. Violence has been part of Karamoja for generations and is committed by
male civilians, regularly with the help of their communities. However, the most common kind of violence is cattle rustling (Markakis, 2009).

From time immemorial, cattle herding had been the center of economic activity in the Karamoja sub-region. It was a sign of affluence, and was crucial in marriage and cultural practice (Dyson-Hudson, 1966). In the medieval era, Karamojong used spears for cattle rustling and wild hunting until the late 19th century when Asian traders first introduced rifles into the region (Mirzeler & Young, 2000).

By the mid 20th century, the inflow of firearms in Karamoja had steadily increased and as a result, violent and deadly attacks within Karamoja and the neighboring regions increased exponentially (Mkutu, 2008). Fatalities within all demographic groups swelled suddenly at the start of the Nineteen-eighties and the youths remained the prime victims and at the same time, the offenders in the armed violence (Gray et al., 2003).

The objective of this thesis is to document and evaluate the impact on livelihood in Karamoja following the 2005 (and ongoing) disarmament campaign. I seek to grasp the involvements of individuals, families and the general population in Karamoja and the sensitivities of the transformations in their lives as a consequence of disarmament. However, I recognize that disarmament cannot be isolated from other factors like drought and insecurity in the region.
1.1. Background

The Firearms Act (1970) in Uganda imposed firearm registration and gun-owner licensing with harsh requirements. This legislation made it unlawful to own a gun, except for those who leaned towards the government of Apollo Milton Obote.

Twelve months later, Army Chief of Staff Idi Amin Dada took control of the country in a coup d’état. The proceeding terror the Amin regime meted on a population of people whose primitive weaponry did not match the efficiency of the killer government apparatus led to mass murder and killing. By 1979 when Amin was overthrown, 30,000 of the 300,000 slain Ugandans were the Karamojong.

Consequentially, the Karamojong began making their own guns. It is these guns that would later be used in attacks on isolated military outposts where they would acquire modern machine guns. However, the toppling of Idi Amin gave the Karamojong a chance to lay hands on modern guns in Moroto Military barracks armory abandoned by the fleeing army.

Milton Obote, who had been reinstated after the overthrow of Amin, attempted to disarm the Karamojong but this effort failed miserably. Meanwhile, the Karamojong had begun to acknowledge the important role a gun played in their security and that of their cows. There
was a build-up of guns across the pastoral communities and the one with most guns was the most dreaded.

In 1986, President Yoweri Museveni after fighting his way to power rebuilt his rebel outfit, the National Resistance Army (NRA) to a national army, later named Uganda Peoples’ Defense Forces (UPDF).

But owing to concerns of insecurity in communities neighboring Karamoja region, Museveni started a new voluntary disarmament program with the blessing of the United Nations. The voluntary phase expired on February 15, 2002, with just above 7,000 guns collected. President Museveni removed the kid gloves and the forceful phase of disarmament was launched. The U.N. Integrated Regional Information Network (IRIN) reported that the forceful disarmament operation would include the use of ‘police methods’ (IRIN, 2002).

1.2. Statement of the Problem

The government of Uganda under Yoweri Museveni embarked on disarmament in the pastoralists communities in the north-eastern part of Uganda. This exercise returned in 2002 after complaints from districts neighboring Karamoja region. The Uganda People’s Defense Forces was deployed in Karamoja to effect forceful disarmament of the ethnic Karamojong people.
This partially conducted, disarmament campaign produced a sharp decrease in the number of illicit weapons in circulation in the Karamoja sub-region. Also, there was a rise in the level of the presence of the army to carry out the campaign. Meanwhile, across the border in Kenya, there was no similar campaign aimed at the armed ethnic Turkana, notwithstanding the fact that Uganda and Kenya share a border stretch of about 850 km border, with over 450 km of this border dividing the Karamoja Cluster (Kenya’s Turkana and Uganda’s Karamojong) region in the middle.

According to the Karamoja Integrated Disarmament and Development Programme (KIDDP), a government campaign, the overall goal was “to contribute to human security and promote conditions for recovery and development in Karamoja” (KIDDP, 2007: 43). It was also aimed at ‘Providing and ensuring adequate security for the people of Karamoja’. This was intended as a response to a number of challenges that included, among others, securing Karamoja from external attacks and to curtail the transference and trade in SALWs as well as effectively avert any form of intra and inter-clan raids and recovery of rustled livestock (Ibid., 48-50).

The UPDF charged, beating and afflicting Ugandans, raping and raiding at will hiding behind disarmament to justify its violence. No one could stand between the army and the locals; not even Rev Father Declan O’Toole of Mill Hill Missionaries in Uganda. He was killed for being the only person to stand up and question government disarmament excesses in Jie county, Kotido district. The murderers, serving soldiers, were summarily executed in, what is believed to be an elaborate cover-up. Only seven days later after O’Toole’s killing, the New Vision, a
government-owned paper, reported the death of a pregnant mother who died of complications after a soldier kicked her in the belly in the forceful disarmament. Also, the article noted that there had been complaints of torture of civilians by the army (Etengu Nathan, 2002).

Following a fierce resistance from the Karamojong, the Ugandan army engaged armed civilians. Thirty civilians and two soldiers were killed for about the 30 rifles repossessed by the army (IRIN, 2002). With many homes now bombed and harvests destroyed, the Karamojong fled through the border to the Turkana region on the Kenyan territory. It is estimated that up to 80,000 people were internally banished,” (Ibid. 2002). The Catholic Church stated that thousands of people of Karamoja became refugees after their homes were scorched by the UPDF in the disarmament crusade.

Museveni blamed the victim Karamojong, whose pain by the army was the source for O’Toole’s complaint. He held that the best way to end such occurrences in future is for the Karamojong to surrender their guns to stop any validation for the UPDF actions among the local communities (Etengu, 2002).

1.3. Objectives of the Study

This study shall have two interrelated objectives - overall and specific. The disarmament campaign in Karamoja will be looked into with a pragmatic approach in order to reach an informed conclusion.
1.3.1. Overall Objective
The main objective of this study is to investigate the impact of disarmament on the security of the Karamojong communities.

1.3.2 Specific Objectives

1.3.2.1 To Assess the level of security following the disarmament of the Karamojong.

1.3.2.2 To evaluate the success of the 2006 disarmament campaign.

1.4. Research Questions

1.4.2.1 Was peace and security restored after disarmament?

1.4.2.2 How successful was the disarmament exercise of the Karamojong?

1.5. Justification of the Study

A lot of scholarship abound on the effects of gun control laws in Uganda. While there is no outright consensus on whether firearms in the hands of the civilians increase or decrease criminality and insecurity, studies have found out that guns tend to facilitate violence rather than deter it. Some security experts looked at the impact of gun violence in the third world (Dube et al., 2011) and deduced that, there was an increase in firearm deaths which they blamed on the increased proliferation of guns. The same scenario played out in Karamoja.
However, even fewer researchers have attempted to write on exponential increase of raids and violence resulting from the unrecovered weapons in the hands of the civilian population in Karamoja, where those that surrendered their weapons turn victim (Mkutu 2006: 55). This thesis will attempt to explain the paradox of disarmament in Karamoja and provide evidence that without a gun (a tool of deterrence), there was increased frequency of raids not only from the Turkana across the border but also within Karamoja.

Just like his predecessors, Museveni attempted to pacify the Karamojong. In his article in the Africa Studies Quarterly, Michael Quam (2002) describes that soldiers disregarded human rights, terrorized the public and robbing stores and thus, undoubtedly, convinced the Karamojong that their only recourse for protection from the government forces was determined by possessing guns. The government’s forcible disarmament efforts were resisted and Museveni abandoned the idea in 1989.

Whereas it will focus on Karamoja region of North-eastern Uganda, this thesis with stimulate the debate on whether guns, in the hands of the civilian population, lead to more or less criminality. It shall discuss the deterrent factor of SALWs among the pastoral communities of East Africa. Having been part of Uganda marred by violent armed raids and cattle rustling, the Government of Uganda launched the disarmament exercise to establish order and security. The study is limited to studies that have been conducted on stakeholders who have lived, visited or worked in Karamoja. Finally, in an attempt to distinguish the goals of disarmament
of the Karamojong, the thesis will delve in examining the prevalence of conflict rather than assume there will be no conflict after disarmament.

1.6. Hypothesis

This thesis hypothesizes that although disarmament leads to improved security for the citizens, there is no evidence that disarmament leads to security given the evidence provided in this thesis.

1.7. Theoretical Framework

The concept of cooperative security forms part of this theoretical framework. According to Jeffery Larsen (1995), cooperative security refers to a commitment to regulate the size, technical composition, investment patterns, and operational practices of all military forces by mutual consent for mutual benefit. Thus, disarmament from this approach is more diplomatic, peaceful and has a wider range of beneficiaries. The 1999 joint disarmament exercise between South Africa and Mozambique commonly referred to as Operation Rachel is an example of the above.
The idealist approach to disarmament also takes a humanitarian position. It focuses on human security and not just state security which is the main focus of realism. This framework seeks to explore security threats from all sources including non-state actors like terrorists, insurgency groups or criminal organizations. In addition, this approach also recognizes the role played by governments in causing insecurity within their own populations (Muller, M. 2005).

The idealist theoretical approach also retains what can be called a developmental agenda. In other words, disarmament is seen as necessary for development in post-conflict regions and the unrestrained multiplication of weapons is seen as a direct obstacle to development.

Solomon & Matthews (2002) point out that since the mid-1980’s, 15 of the 20 poorest countries on earth have experienced violent conflict, thus supporting the argument that there is a link between violent conflict and a lack of development.

In order for development to happen, violent clashes would have to be fixed, and since disarmament is an essential part of conflict resolution, it would be consequently necessary for effective disarmament to be in place. Disarmament from this perspective is thus not just a means for maintaining a favorable balance of power, but also indispensable for development. Since the end of the Cold War, assumptions of a link between human development and human security have grown even stronger. This approach to security is embodied by the UNDP 1994 Human Development Report.
Whilst the theoretical framework of this work (idealist approach) shall be meaningfully less state-centric than the realist approaches of the Cold War era, it does not mean that the state shall be totally abandoned as an important unit of analysis within this approach.

The security dilemma is a phenomenon that has generally been part of realist explanations of inter-state war (Evans and Newnham 1998, 495-496). According to realists, the international system is defined by anarchy and the prime concern of states in this system is to enhance their security in order to survive (Dunne and Schmidt 2008, 93, 101-102). John H. Herz defines the security dilemma as follows:

“States are driven to acquire more and more power in order to escape the impact of the power of others. This, in turn, renders the others more insecure and compels them to prepare for the worst. Since none can ever feel entirely secure in such a world of competing units, power competition ensues, and the vicious circle of security and power accumulations is on.” (1950, 157).

Security in the Karamoja cluster is one that is based on this theory. As mentioned in the preceding pages, while other communities surrendered their guns, those that had not given them up automatically became stronger and were feared. It then led to rearmament and as one community rearmed, the others followed suit. Thus, the dilemma essentially means that the improvement in one’s own security leads others to increase their own security, with the consequence of making all less secure. Nancy Gallagher (1998) refers to the theoretical approach explained above as the optimist approach to disarmament theory.
1.8. Scope of the Study

The study will focus on the Karamoja region of North-eastern Uganda between 2002 and 2005. Since Karamoja was a part of Uganda marred by violent armed raids and cattle rustling, the GoU launched the disarmament exercise to establish order and security. The study is limited to studies that have been conducted on stakeholders who have lived, visited or worked in Karamoja. Areas to be covered will include, Kotido, Kaabong, Nakapiripirit as well as Napak, Amudat and Moroto districts among others.

1.9. Conclusion

The 2001–02 disarmament operation was to be carried out in a combination of providing security to Karamoja as well as compensating those who handed their guns. Communities were promised a lot in terms of strategies to secure them and their animals from internal and external raids.

However, it is doubtful that people received what had been promised them upon surrendering firearms. There is no record of the construction of the security road, UPDF was removed from Karamoja and redeployed in northern Uganda as the LDUs abandoned their posts for lack of payment. (Uganda, 2005a, pp. 8–9).
It also, arguably, exhibited a lack of knowledge among policy makers on the gravity of insecurity in Karamoja. That small arms play a critical role in defending communities was not considered and neither was how long it would take to implement even the most basic improvements in Karamojong security.

Furthermore, the cordon and search approach bore benchmarks of what regional governments had already implemented to their respective pastoralist communities—perhaps based on the supposition that pastoralists reject ‘modern’ livelihoods and purposely hinder development and the exercise of government control. Consequently, and perhaps out of frustration, government reactions have often been heavy-handed and only focus on muscular short-term fixes.

The second phase also revealed a deep frustration that higher authorities in the Ugandan government felt towards the Karamoja. Military operations launched in 2002 included the shooting on sight of anyone found holding a gun along the road and cordonning off and searching manyattas where guns were suspected to be present.

However, the two-month voluntary disarmament window can be said to have been successful because with incentives that were offered, albeit, irregularly, the warriors surrendered around 10,000 weapons in the period between 2001 and 2003 (Uganda Government, 2005a). It is, therefore, excusable to assume that a mixture of government discussions at the highest levels,
coupled with the promises of compensations for disarmament, was responsible for this success. However, these successes were dwarfed by weaknesses within the initiative itself. The voluntary phase was too short and this deprived the people ample time to internalize, accept and realize the advantages of voluntary disarmament.
CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW

2.0. Introduction

This chapter will examine past studies carried that have been carried out on disarmament. Laura Ralson (2012) in Less Guns, More Violence: Evidence of Disarmament in Uganda gives a useful insight into the disarmament and the consequences it had on the Karamojong tribes. I will also look into, among others, the works of Agade Mkutu (2004; 2006), Akabway & Ateyo (2007), to trace the origins of arms and armed conflict in Karamoja.

In Armed violence and poverty in northern Kenya: a case study for the armed violence and poverty initiative, (Buchanan-Smith & Lind 2005) traces the disarmament of the armed Turkana in Kenya that has direct consequences on the Karamoja region of Uganda.

Mkutu (2006) provides invaluable information on the proliferation of SALWs in across the pastoral communities of East Africa. This is particularly important in understanding the dynamics, players and scope of illicit arms transfer in relation to community policing and security.

In spite of the fact that Uganda is a long way from successfully eradicating the issue of illicit arms in the hands of the Karamojong, the conditions of Kenya and Uganda can, from various perspectives, be seen as at the front line of endeavors to address the issue. By 2007, it was approximated 400,000 small arms circulated in Uganda. This figure included those in the
hands of rebel LRA ranks. It was also believed that Karamoja region alone was home to over 40,000 illegal arms resulting in insecurity and displacement of people, loss of lives and livestock and criminality in the Karamojong society (Wepundi, Ndung'u & Rynn 2011).

2.1. Government’s policy on Karamoja

Local government interventions in Karamoja have largely focused on making it “modern” as well as making sure that the immobility of the Karamojong is maintained. This has, therefore, kept them in unfamiliar circumstances and unproductive (Mwaura 2005). Although sedentarisation happens to be Uganda’s main development policy with regard to Karamoja sub-region, it is based on the lack of knowledge of pastoral production and climatic challenges while peddling ways of production imported elsewhere riding on the back of ‘the tragedy of the commons’ theory.

There is motivation to question the wisdom of plans that do not see pastoralism as a suitable employment strategy and do not include beneficiaries in the planning process. Such plans more often than not, don’t take the basic rights and freedoms of the herders into consideration and indeed, they don’t get to learn from historical perspectives. Also, the of knowledge on the local environment and the “parachuting in” of modernization into the pastoralist ecology has resulted in a waste of taxpayers’ money. Accordingly, the Karamojong have devised different methods for dealing with stress to handle their problem and preserve their way of life since government schemes have failed to address their challenges.
In the past ten years, Uganda government has exercised all kinds of technocratic efforts to tether Karamojong within one area through the creation of multiple districts as a means of containment and control (Juba 2009). This followed district boundaries created and left by the British colonialists as a measure to restrict the nomadism of the Karamojong so they are able to be located whenever they are required to pay tax and court fines. Consequently, the region was zoned into controllable administrative units using borderlines and eventually sealed off into a ‘closed district’ (Knaute & Kagan 2009).

It is noteworthy that whereas Karamoja remained one district up to independence, it has now been subdivided into 7 districts under one government ministry (Ministry of Karamoja); this made even more difficult the mobility of the Karamojong and their animals thus denying them access to scarce resources like watering points and Elet – a nutritious grazing and salting areas (Juba 2009). Although the creation of districts in Karamoja is meant to decentralize government programs, employment and service delivery, it is not effective since the mobility and adaptability of the Karamojong people has been scuttled (McCabe et al. 1994). It has demonstrated that it is unsuccessful and ineffective as little notice of the borders is observed during droughts. For the Karamojong, the idea of restrictions is linked to the basic needs of their livestock and not geography and therefore their areas of dwelling can widen or narrow according to the accessibility to pasture and water for their animals (Knaute & Kagan 2009).
2.2. Disarmament

When disarmament is talked about in the Western world, Africa is always mentioned first because of the proliferation of small arms that are a threat not only to the state, but also human security (Mkutu 2008a: 1-7, 116-44). The idea of practical disarmament made its first entry in the UN’s “Supplement to an Agenda for Peace”, underpinning arms cutback efforts in reaction to the new menace of small arms in the hands of non-state actors. It mirrored the need to take aim at this new player with practical measures distinct from the policies and sanctions for states. Members of the UN that grappled with negative effects of the proliferation of SALWs especially after civil war, all nodded to this concept. Practical Disarmament procedures were intended as a conceptual framework that would, comprehensively, tackle the issue of illicit weapons (Giustozzi 2012).

Therefore, Practical Disarmament is not a mere recovering and managing the resultant stashes but thwarts conflicts, strengthens the rule of law and promotes peace and security. Furthermore, it is intended to reduce armed violence and demand for SALW while improving the management of the state in effecting its security role. Although Practical Disarmament has been combined with Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) programs, it can also be regarded as an element of ‘disarmament’ during DDR programs. This theory has expanded in recent years from simple technical intervention to encompass demand factors as well as the accountability and reform of state security apparatus (Willems 2008).
Like elsewhere in the world, sequential governments in Uganda and Kenya have launched disarmament programs as a response to the problem with varied success. Recovering firearms, from the civilian disarmament is different from DDR as it is the procedure to control small arms and light weapons in the civilian population. For countries like South Sudan, measures to disarm the civilian population and former combatants were undertaken through the law governing disarmament across South Sudan in 2008. Unfortunately, the picture of armed conflict in the region is getting worse as years go by.

2.3. Conclusion

There have been numerous and well-intended campaigns designed to develop Karamoja but have been largely inappropriate to the nomadic lifestyle prevailing in the region. Such campaigns can be said to always fail because they are more preoccupied with implementing the programs and not the needs of the Karamojong as core beneficiaries (Knighton 2002). While it is possible to tremendously improve the nomad's way of life, it should involve their active and meaningful participation in activities aimed at development without trying to restrict their movement (Stites & Akabwai 2009). Uganda could have borrowed a leaf from neighboring countries with a pastoralist community on the best way to deal and address the pastoralist dilemma before it prepared to implement the KIDDP campaign.
CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY

The purpose of this design is to meet the objectives of the study and to determine the opinion of Karamojong with regard to disarmament as far as violation of human rights, enhancing peace and security in Karamoja are concerned.

The study will cover Karamoja sub region of eastern Uganda inhabited by armed pastoral communities. The study will cover a period between 2003 and 2015.

The population to be considered will include those that have been directly affected by disarmament are residents or were residents in Karamoja during the exercise. The study will mainly target local leaders, human rights organization, the government of Uganda as well as other stakeholders for more appropriate information.

It was not viable to collect primary data from the Karamoja region and thus, this study is carried out by way of document analysis of secondary data available on the topic and Karamoja as a region. My choice of research has been warranted due to limitations explained in the succeeding paragraphs.

Time constraint: - Karamoja is far flung and a remote area usually referred to as ‘hard to reach’. Time spent on travel alone would be detrimental to the timely completion of these study. On the positive side, there is adequate useable literature on illicit Small Arms, disarmament, and pastoral communities available. A number of experts like Mkutu, Bevan, Knighton et al. provide valuable work that was useful for this study.
Resources: - the lack of funds needed for travel and accommodation for the duration of this study made it hard for me to travel to the field to collect primary data.

Insecurity: - Even with the availability of funds and time, it would still have been unwise to travel to Karamoja around the time of this study due to insecurity in the area.

Due to the above factors, the secondary data analyzed was sourced from the internet, published books, journals, peer-reviewed articles as well as e-library.
CHAPTER IV: THE DISARMAMENT PROCESS.

Since it was declared a protectorate by the British, the Karamojong have been well aware that if they gave up their role of defending themselves, they would have made a mistake. This is the fact that even the local leaders know. It is therefore not surprising that even with the heavy militarization of the Karamoja region, the Uganda government is unable to protect the Karamojong and their animals.

In Africa today, small arms are more high-tech, inexpensive and easily accessible. Illicit arms in the civilian community can promote criminality and challenge the legitimacy of weak states. The government of Uganda embarked on an ambitious operation to disarm the Karamojong tribes in January 2001.

The intention of this campaign was to increase security to pastoralists by limiting the ability of each tribe to participate in raiding activities. The object of this operation was to buy off guns with ox-ploughs and corrugated iron roofing sheets and certificates for those that surrendered their firearms (Powell 2010). However, it did not achieve the intended goals. Uganda government claimed to have extracted close to 10,000 firearms in only two months (KIDDP 2007), unfortunately the handouts of iron sheets and ploughs exposed the vulnerability of those who had surrendered their guns.
The government has repeatedly said that, in the circumstances that it cannot avert or lessen the prevalence of raiding, it can, in the least, recover the stolen livestock. Definitely, the UPDF has often acted and pursued raiders and returned the stolen animals. However, what was recovered is less than the number of animals that were rustled (Knighton 2010). Knighton writes that: … “agents in the locality, who at least picked up official movements of livestock, record the total number of cattle recovered for the owners to be 110, plus at least 116 sheep and goats. In Karamojong cattle-equivalents, that is 122, compared with 4,587 that were taken. That is a recovery rate of less than 3 per cent of raided livestock. In only 10 raids out of 352, again less than 3 per cent, did the UPDF recover any livestock at all” (Ibid., p. 130).

Given that data recorded by observers used the victims as a point of reference, they could only record animals that were returned to them. The UPDF has not made public complete figures of raided animals or those that were recovered and this has given skeptics reason to doubt if actual numbers of animals returned, reach the rightful owners. It is not uncommon for the army to be accused of “keeping some” of the recovered livestock. “If the government follows up the cows with an intense operation, recovers them and returns them to the owners, there would be no cause for revenge raids” (Sub-County Chief, quoted in Oxfam 2000: 25). It has also been reported that the local leaders benefit from the animals recovered from raiders – further complicating the matter.

Therefore, any future plan grounded on the assumption of protecting the Karamojong against raids is bound to fail. This is because even if the authorities in Juba and Nairobi control the
Toposa or Turkana respectively, there is no guarantee that the UPDF can thwart cattle raiding within Karamoja itself. Knighton (2003) notes and asks: “…the removal of all guns does not end cattle raiding, as the fifty years of colonial administration demonstrated. Are the state's security forces able to foster equity and equilibrium among the sections by disarmament?”.

2.4. Trajectory of Disarmament in Karamoja

The progress of disarmament took a number of forms. It started by an attempt of introducing the rule of law and security in the region by formation of vigilante groups, then Anti-Stock Theft Unit (ASTU) a kind militia outfit to counter cattle raids. Due to unforeseen logistical challenges, it collapsed. In the run-up to General elections of 2006, another attempt to disarm Karamoja was launched consisting of the voluntary and forceful disarmament phases. The two phases, which form the main area of this thesis with be explained in the succeeding pages.

2.4.1. Anti-Stock Theft Unit

Following the 1996 general elections, there was a cabinet reshuffle and Karamoja state ministry was given a new minister. It was clearly evident that the vigilante tactic was failing and thus the new minister decided to amend the strategy in response to rising lawlessness in the region. This shift in strategy was to create a new force called Anti-Stock Theft Unit
(ASTU) charged with preventing the marauding armed raiders from attacking neighboring districts of Teso, Lango, Kapchorwa, Sironko and Mbale.

The deployment of this hybrid force resulted in a big reduction of regular forces in the region. The hitherto ineffective LDUs were recalled and redeployed to fill the void created by the departure of the UPDF. With a thin military presence, government covered the space by deploying military armored personnel carriers (APCs) aimed at maintaining supremacy over the AK47-wielding Karamojong warriors. However, this strategy was unusable against raids from external actors (Turkana, Didinga and Toposa) whose raids had become a common occurrence. Instead, GoU facilitated peace talks between the Karamojong and Turkana with the first of such mediations held in Kakuma town in the westerly district of Turkana in 1996.

While this was playing out at the regional security level, locally, the ASTU fell victim to the same challenges that decimated the vigilante program – corruption within the ranks of the UPDF. Only this time, the headcount of ASTU personnel on the ground was grossly overstated on the army’s payroll. In what was christened “ghost soldiers”, army commanders created a fictitious troop number in the ASTU records for purposes of receiving their salaries. This vice misled the government and understated the dire need for men in boots in Karamoja.

Furthermore, it led to embezzlement of funds. This was taken advantage of by the Karamojong as they amassed firearms and organized large formidable force of raiding parties
that were no match for the meek military force left in the region. Moreover, the UPDF’s 4th division fighting in Karamoja had more ‘ghosts soldiers’ on the ground. As if to make matters even worse, the wages of the soldiers and the ASTU personnel were not being paid promptly. Left with nothing to survive on, soldiers devised means of survival by engaging in counterproductive activities. There was massive desertion by especially the LDUs as well as soldiers selling off ammunition and recovered guns to the powerful Karamojong raiding gangs. This put to light the way government helped sustain insecurity in Karamoja.


ASTU failed to bring the rule of law in the region and this led to an increase in incidences of violence that affected the neighboring districts. Concerns of escalating livestock raids and loss of lives to the armed Karamojong was expressed by local leadership and members of parliament. In March 2000, parliament of Uganda passed a resolution that forbid armed Karamojong from freely moving around the districts mentioned above. It followed a motion tabled by area MPs demanding for government’s action against the warriors.

On the disarmament program that was to be carried out in Karamoja, a ministerial policy announcement was issued to the effect that the GoU was going to robustly engage in increasing the quantity and quality of police, intelligence and LDUs in the region to guarantee human security. The campaign would also establish permanent military bases along the Uganda borderline with Sudan and Kenya. Furthermore, there would be a construction of a
security road from Namalu in Napak district towards Kenya and Sudan borders. Also in the program was a recruitment of 146 vigilantes per sub-county in the region as well as 292 vigilantes per sub-county that neighbors Kenya and Sudan. These were to be armed and salaried workers of the government.

In December 2001, president Museveni officially launched the ‘voluntary phase’ of the disarmament campaign. It consisted of creating an environment that would allow the warriors to hand over their gun to the army. In compensation, they would receive farm implements and building materials. A promise to construct schools for the Karamojong children was made as was provision of water points, capital for investment and the deployment of regular forces to guarantee security of the region.

Additionally, incentives would be provided to those who willingly surrender their guns to government. The army would be under strict orders to use minimum reasonable force whereas cattle raiders and highway robbers would be prosecuted and jailed. These among others provided a blueprint of the whole disarmament operation to be carried in Karamoja (Muhereza 2010). The program also emphasized that the army was poised to stop, what it called, terrorism with Karamoja and her neighbors. With this derivative of terrorism, the conflict in Karamoja found a place in the mainstream semantics of modern-day terrorism and from then on the GoU referred to them as terrorists – tools and agents of instability that needed to be destroyed with full force. This new reference to domestic conflict was carefully crafted and
passed into law by parliament ostensibly to attract funding from donors in the guise of fighting terrorism.

However, consultations with all stakeholders had to be carried out before the campaign was to be embarked on. Action for Development of Local Communities (ADOL), a community-based organization carried out a survey to collect people’s views on disarmament. These were later shared with INGOs and local NGOs before they were presented to the president.

Among the key findings was that firearms alone were not a major problem in the region. It was stressed that the main problems intensifying insecurity in Karamoja were the lack of state presence, nonexistence of law and order, and the government’s failure to provide infrastructural development (Stites et al. 2007). The practice of the Karamojong to own guns was defended as an act of self-defense in the absence of the state security organs.

In order to address those problems, it was recommended that massive sensitization programs be formulated, effective law and order enforcement and workable security mechanism be introduced before the armed warriors are convinced to surrender their arms.

However, implementation of these recommendations was not met with equal goodwill, and, in total disregard, disarmament of Karamoja was launched in December 2001 with a voluntary phase of only 2 months. Besides recommendations not being implemented, even the promises
by the president were either not fulfilled or money was misappropriated. With this impromptu operation underway, it was only able to recover a grand total of 10,000 guns - of the projected 100,000 were recovered by the end of 2003 (KIDDP, p9). In other words, 90 per cent of the guns was unrecovered and stayed concealed in the hands of the community.

With such a dismal performance by the operation, a very grave problem was exposed. The whole exercise was poorly coordinated and irregularly implemented. For example, there was no security provided to protect those that had willingly surrendered their arms in the voluntary phase. Attacked by communities who still held guns, the victim communities lost their animals and the army could do little to recover them. In Kaabong, no sooner had the native Dodoth handed in their guns willingly than the Jie raided all their cattle two days later. They were struck by the reality that even the chest-thumping government would not protect them against raids and attacks. Also around the same time, it emerged that Karamoja had only 145 policemen.

The disappointment of this project dissolved the general population's confidence in government protection. The state fizzled in its major responsibility - guaranteeing the safety of its subjects. The local population did not trust anything the government said, not even president Museveni could convince them. Owing to past experiences where they were told to hand over their guns only to fall victims and lost cattle, they simply had reason not to hand over their guns. Those who risked were later to face serious repercussions when they were attacked by other communities.
Having failed to trust the army, the Jie and the Dodoth have continued to possess modern firearms given their proximity to Sudan (Mkutu 2007:106) and Kenya. Moreover, Mkutu argues that cows are battered for guns and it was unfathomable that government wanted to take away their expensive guns for free. It was on record that government had chronically backtracked on its promises and the armed communities had had enough of it. Therefore, regarding the surrender of guns, their logic was that since guns were exchanged for gun, government, too, should enter a similar transaction with them and give them cows in return.

There is some literary work that has focused on the part played by modern weapons in aggravating the Karamoja conflict. Mirzeler and Young (2000), argue that, the entry of SALWs in the mix of resource completion in times of scarcity has escalated violence thereby changing the normative order. Whereas this may be correct, it should be noted that the type of the policy assumed by different players with their own agenda further complicated the matter. Like it was mentioned in the preceding pages, the colonial policies purposely marginalized and enclosed the Karamojong and it is now apparent that subsequent governments since independence have continued where the British stopped. Although government can make promises, fails to fulfill them, it expects the Karamojong to hand over guns ‘in good will’.

By mid-February 2002 when the voluntary grace period closed, it was clear that the disarmament campaign had failed to meet its objectives. To save face from this disappointing campaign, President Museveni was forced to act tough. A circular, from the State House, was
issued with new directives for nature and the path the disarmament exercise would take. These directives marked the beginning of the forceful disarmament approach (Phase II) and mentioned, shooting on sight persons found with a gun on the roads; cordoning and searching suspected villages and kraals; arresting and prosecuting suspected criminals; curbing cattle raids and facilitating the recovery of livestock; patrolling the international borders with Sudan and Kenya; recruiting the remaining quota of vigilantes per sub-county and providing an entandikwa (seed-capital) scheme.

To counter this new set of directives issued by the president, the Karamojong started hiding guns in the shrubs and also stopped keeping their guns in their manyattas. Also resisted was the idea of using non-Karamojong commanders in the operation. They reasoned that non-Karamojong commanders would be victims of the conflict of interest, and thus issue orders in revenge for the suffering and cattle theft meted on their people in their neighboring districts. True to their word, such commanders came out as ruthless at the beginning of the forceful phase of disarmament. It was no surprise to the Karamojong, that this operation was characteristic of revenge and they felt justified in putting up resistance.

Around the same time, LRA had struck hard and the security situation in northern Uganda was deteriorating and the Army had to respond to the attack. The UPDF was withdrawn from Karamoja to go and engage the rebels and only a skeleton army contingent remained behind. Which this vacuum created, cattle rustling increased tremendously and those communities that had disarmed saw a compelling reason in rearming themselves. For example, the Dodoth
made better use of the short distance to Sudan to build alliances with the Didinga and the Toposa who, in return, supplied them with sophisticated firearms. Indeed, ever since, the Dodoth stand out as one of most well-armed ethnic communities in Karamoja.

Elsewhere in the south of Karamoja, the Pokot, who defied disarmament and had even escaped to Kenya, came back home and seized the chance of the prevailing vacuum to raid many of the Pian and Bokora cows. The Matheniko and Jie also mounted raids on Bokora and Pian who had, to a greater extent, surrendered their guns. The Pian were forced to re-arm and organized retaliatory raids on the Pokot and Bokora. The Dodoth raided the Jie and the Matheniko, and vice versa (KIDDP 2007). From across the border, the armed Turkana pastoralists crashed the party and invaded the Matheniko.

By the end of 2002, the whole of Karamoja sub-region was in an overwhelming security confusion and the cattle raids affected people in the neighboring districts of Katakwi and Pader (SNV and Pax Christi, 2004:39; UHRC, 2004:77). At the end of this phase, the paradox was that the UPDF had failed in its key obligation to protecting its citizens, and was now an active participant in the conflict and brutalized them.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnic Group</th>
<th>Number of guns</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bokora</td>
<td>1,782</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Location</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----</td>
<td>------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Matheniko</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Dodoth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Jie</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Labwor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Chekwii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Pian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Pokot</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>TOTAL</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Figure 2 Summary of recovered guns by end of Phase I disarmament*

Source: Mburu 2001

2.7. Phase II (2004-2005)

The army’s presence in Karamoja region remained thin for much of the period 2002 – 2004 following their deployment in Northern Uganda to fight LRA. The security of the region went from bad to worse concluding with the breakdown of law and order. Those whose arms were taken away the 2001 disarmament and had remained in a precarious position embarked on an aggressive mission to rearm themselves and new alliances were founded to balance the regional powers.
It was now clear that the pastoralists had taken back responsibility for their own fate and it continued this way till rumors of the 2004 impending disarmament started flying around. Having learned their lesson in the previous encounters with the army, anxiety overcame the region as they waited for another faceoff with the ‘brutal army’. To show their dissatisfaction with the way the army had treated their people previously the elders protested. Stites et al (2007) illuminates this with an occurrence of May 2005.

Before the disarmament, the army command sought the views of the policymakers and so a meeting of UPDF, elders and Kraal leaders was called. It was in this meeting that the forceful phase of disarmament was first introduced to the Karamojong. Even then it was strongly objected and the government was cautioned against it. They reasoned that it would only make the situation even worse. The adamant UPDF insisted the operation would go as planned after all is said and done to which a dejected elder who lost his children stood up and threw his disarmament certificate at the army officer, spat at him and rebuked the soldier not to talk about disarmament when his life had been reduced to that of a dog by communities who had not disarmed. The point the elder was making was that disarmament undermines the very essence of survival and the ability to defend self and own herds.

The timing of this phase was just not appropriate given that the government faced immense security challenges in the period between 2003 – 2004 following LRA’s resurgent attacks in Acholi and parts of Teso region in eastern Uganda. Although stakeholder consultations had been conducted to rally public support before the operations, the various Karamojong
communities were totally opposed and the government’s intentions appeared suspect as well. They suspected that this phase of disarmament was influenced by army commanders from Teso - a region that has time and again suffered from raids carried out by Karamojong warriors from the Jie and Bokora communities. As a matter of fact, the intimidating way in which the exercise was begun raised a red flag for the Karamojong.

The deployment of heavily armed soldiers, armored personnel carriers, armed tanks and two military gunships heralded the start of the campaign. There was also talk that Teso’s Amuka and Arrow boys who had helped the army repulse LRA were to be used in disarming the pastoralists; tensions and anxiety rose as a result (Mkutu 2008: 108). While the army took charge of the operation, the inclusion of the frustrated militia was a way to disaster. Why did the army integrate them in the disarmament of the Karamojong? Why did their involvement come at the time it happened?

The area politicians have intimated that the whole operation took place in the run-up to 2006 presidential and the president was afraid that the Teso block vote wasn’t secure enough. Therefore, to convince them that the president was working on their security, their own sons would oversee and participate in the disarmament of their nemesis. In summary, this phase of disarmament was supposed to appease them and demonstrate that government was out to deal a fatal blow to cattle rustling in the Teso region (Akabwai and Ateyo 2008).
2.8. The ‘cordon and search’ phase (2006-2007)

It came in response to the several stakeholder dialogues following the introduction of the 2004-2005 disarmament campaigns and was directed from the Office of the Prime Minister (OPM) that houses the Karamoja ministry. With support from the Danish International Development Agency (DANIDA), it focused on consolidating lessons learned from the failure of the 2001 – 2002 disarmament. These discussions produced a working document that came to be known as the Karamoja Integrated Disarmament and Development Program was made (KIDDP 2007).

The KIDDP agenda was to merge disarmament with development interventions right from 2007 when cabinet sanctioned it (Stites, Mazurana & Akabwai 2007). Although it acknowledged that firearms had become part of Karamojong lifestyle, the program also accepted the need for the state to embark on procedures that would guarantee security and safety in the framework of a well organized and coordinated recovery of firearms. The overall goal of the KIDDP therefore, was to contribute to the security of persons and cultivate an environment for recovery and development of the communities. It proposed disarming the Karamojong in the context of peace building (KIDDP 2007).

One of the most important elements of this program was ‘cordon and search disarmament’. Characteristically it was a military-driven operation where the army and the militia (Amuka and Arrow Boys) encircled Karamojong manyattas at dawn and forced occupants out of their
huts to the cold so they could search for concealed weapons. The first victims of cordon and search were the Jie in Kotido, in May 2006, where several manyattas were torched followed by indiscriminate arrests and detentions.

The cordon and search phase drew a lot of criticism relating to the arbitrary use of extreme military force. A report by Human Rights Watch summed the cordon and search operation as a gross abuse of human rights (Kopel, Eisen & Gallant 2008). The local population decried the harsh and brutal manner in with the operation was being carried out and that, motivated some Karamojong to rearm themselves and revert to violence.

The 2007 report of the UN High Commissioner mentions a number of violations of human rights and included: arbitrary detentions, burning of homesteads and granaries, unlawful killings, torture, and theft of property, including cattle. The use of MI-24 attack helicopter gunships by the UPDF to conduct sorties of indiscriminate aerial bombing was specifically pointed out as disastrous. It left thousands of Karamojong cattle dead and, unacceptably, affected their economic livelihood.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Total of guns recovered from cordon and search</td>
<td>1,008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Ammunition of different calibers recovered</td>
<td>3,089</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Warriors arrested or captured</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Warriors charged in court</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Warriors killed in battle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Civilians killed by warriors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Civilians injured by warriors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Soldiers killed in action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Soldiers injured in action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Rustled cattle which have been recovered</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Livestock branded</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 8 Summary of cordon and search results for the period November 2006 – March 2007**


This hostility from the UPDF usually ended up with torturing, maiming, shooting of innocent women, children and men. Persons suspected to be escaping or accused of alerting others about the deployment and pending similar operation were targeted. For the most part, soldiers often failed to recover the guns they expected to find, and men were forcefully detained in the military camps. Interestingly, their wives were ordered to bring the guns if they wished for the release of their husbands. When there was no gun, they would be expected to somehow find one from somewhere (Mkutu 2008).

Occasionally cows would be asked as payment for release of relatives in military detention if there was no gun. Personal interviews within Kaabong report all manner of abuses in the
Morungole Hills where the army arrested and beat up men and appropriated cattle. According to the villagers, the UPDF commanders allegedly sold the cattle brought in exchange for detainees at the local livestock markets (Kopel, Eisen & Gallant 2008).

The reaction to cordon and search was bound to be brutal. In the much talked about slaughter of the Jie carried out by the UPDF in October 2006, scores of people were killed in a traditional dance festival. In a retaliatory attack, the armed Jie warriors attacked and killed many soldiers. Such attacks also extended to an area said to be owned or managed by government.

Another incident happened in Kakumongole sub-county in Nakapiripirit district where the army surrounded the villages at dawn and a fierce battle ensued with the UPDF. Two warriors were killed; but it seems it was not yet over for, in the subsequent reprisal attack, the warriors too attacked and plundered a UPDF military camp in Tokora and found only women; nevertheless, they thoroughly beat the soldier’s wives to payback for the beating their own wives had been subjected to by their soldier husbands (Akabwai & Ateyo 2007). In this hostilities see-saw, the army responded by blocking the Tokora – Nakapiripirit road to any form of transport. Not to be outdone, warriors started ambushing any vehicles linked to government.
CHAPTER V: CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE KARAMOJA DISARMAMENT PROCESS

5.0. Introduction

This chapter analyzes the efficacy of the 2005 disarmament campaign by GoU on the armed pastoral communities in the Karamoja sub-region. It will critique the campaign by looking at its successes or failures before, during and after the disarmament. The study indicates that following disarmament campaigns in Karamoja, the conventional basis for nomadic pastoralism as the only sustainable livelihood alternative has suffered serious blows in the last decade. Firstly, droughts and other environmental consequences have become severe; again, a market economy as introduced to the region has monetized formerly socio-cultural goods and services. In such a circumstance, both the pastoralists and the state are devising parallel strategies to adapt to these new challenges.

5.1. Good Intentions Bad approaches

Addressing the United Nations on Small Arms conference in June 2006, Cyrus T. Gituai, Permanent Secretary in the Office of the President of Kenya, claimed that the transfer of arms promoted violence stagnated human development and undermined peace efforts (UN, 2006).
While presenting his paper at the Oxford University conference, Knighton reported an incriminatory list of human rights abuses which constituted the disarmament program. He remarked that in the absence of guns every Karamojong was left at the mercy of ruthless soldiers. He compared the state to any other marauding raider (Ben Knighton, 2002).

Disarmed civilians became the target of those who had evaded disarmament. Karamojong who innocently had surrendered their firearms did not get state protection. Earlier on, the New Vision had reported that most of the locals whose herds were taken in a raid in the lately disarmed Napak district, had surrendered their guns to the government in the on-going forceful arms reduction exercise. (Etengu, 2002).

Knighton notes that the violence was a result of an escalation in raiding directly stimulated by a disarmament program and that even the strength of the pastoralists may have been inflated by gun prohibition activists and the Ugandan government. He said that, in Karamoja, because there is a lack of medical reporting, tabulating accurate figures is impossible: With 130 gunshot wounds being treated a year in both the main hospitals and health center IVs (0.35/1000), this is small figure compared with over 22,000 murders in South Africa in 2000 that stood at 0.51/1000. This analysis directly counters international alarmist’s aid views that the foundation of the current violence in Karamoja is automatic firearms (Knighton 2002).

In his concluding remarks, Knighton cautions that if the Ugandan forced disarmament program succeeded it would have accomplished the ethnocide of the nomadic pastoralists culture if not their outright genocide.” (ibid. 2002)
The Washington Post publication of June 28, 2006 carried a piece by Associated Press reporting that the U.N. Development Program (UNDP) had sent a letter to Museveni, announcing the halt of U.N. financial assistance for the disarmament program in Karamoja. The letter stressed the issue of killings, beatings, random detention, intimidation and harassment committed by the Ugandan “security” forces.

This action by the UN is impressive, and should be commended by all human rights groups. This was the first time that the United Nations had ever criticized human rights cruelties in a disarmament program. The global community should have followed suit and taken sterner actions but it did not. As a result, thousands of Ugandans were turned into refugees, their communities torched, and their livelihood ruined by the disarmament program.

It is noteworthy that although the background information focusses on disarmament in Uganda, there are other countries that violated international human rights while conducting disarmament. Arms in the wrong hands are a worldwide problem, and so are human rights violations instigated by forced disarmament in states such as Bougainville, Zimbabwe, Albania, and Cambodia and many others, where a clamp down of the free press prevented the world from knowing the full range of further human rights abuses.
Controlling the rapid increase of SALWs in a given society is a perplexing undertaking that includes three-way approach: decreasing the need, regulating supply and stock recovery.

Governments can decrease the need for weapons in a community guaranteeing security and safety, creating employment opportunities, promotion of the rule of law, political inclusivity and reaching resolution without resorting to war. The accomplishment of these endeavors will be dependent on the effective co-operation of business and the local community.

By disparity, in the modern state system, it is the responsibility of the ruling regime to control the supply of SALWs. Failure to do this will result in the undermining of its authority and effectiveness. Besides controlling small arms, governments likewise need to effect strict controls by implementing the by-laws governing the use and possession of firearms. Obviously, the proliferation of SALWs is a threat to public safety and security as well as the cause for political stability. This is why the United Nations calls for ‘practical disarmament measures’.

Ultimately, by using inducements and authorizations whereas cooperating with the business and civil communities, the government has a duty to recover weapons held illegally in the community and also ensure their definite but secure disposal; this should also apply to government’s surplus stock.
While there is a variance of opinion on the conditions for possession of weapons by the public, there is a consensus that military-type weapons must be a preserve of the properly trained and accountable government agencies. Both the reduction of small arms and their control are necessary if public order is to be maintained.

A successful disarmament consolidates government's monopoly of the tools of violence and this is applicable both to crime prevention and peacebuilding after the conflict. However, for realistic reasons, a monopoly to tools of violence must augment with the rule of law and respect for human and civil rights. Handled in seclusion, its failure is imminent. This is because people will be reluctant to surrender firearms unless the underlying need for weapons is compellingly addressed. Forceful disarmament will only heighten the desire for ownership of firearms.

Practices like cattle raiding were traditionally employed as a method of dispersal and redistribution of animal wealth in times of want. Also, bride wealth and elevation in social status lay on performing certain kinds of ‘violence’. For the forceful nature of disarmament, cattle raiding and generally the social function has been distorted and adjusted to match the contemporary trends in both regional and international standing point. Similarly, classification of Karamojong society moved to ‘modern’ ways of gaining social recognition like ownership of automatic firearms and capacity to guarantee community defense.
Hence, this thesis shows that there is a need to go far beyond our perspective on pastoralists’ violence and show that challenging government by armed non-state actors is a constant affair if history is anything to go by. From the historical standpoint, the Karamojong have not been immobile groups merely fighting to protect and maintain their traditions or religion. On the contrary, they continuously reposition themselves within the context of other contesting developments.

This forms a part of the phenomenon Kaldor (2006) portrays as “new wars” which connects violence to failed states. In Africa, a state can fail to exert control on her borders and citizens. In Uganda, the case was that, armed Karamojong were fully in charge and the state becomes unsafe from own population. With the state failing to operationalize its institutions, armed pastoralists assume the power to influence the daily occurrences.

When government retreats from its responsibilities, humanitarian agencies then fill the gap and assume the role of the state. A classic example is Karamoja’s continued reliance on Matany hospital – an NGO missionary founded facility, because health centers put up by the government are dysfunctional, without medical stuff or just don’t have medicine. Ironically even government prefers to send its wounded to Matany. Why then was government sustaining an operation whose budget run into billions yet government health facilities in Karamoja were dysfunctional?
5.2. Impossible Disarmament?

There have been a number of attempts by government to disarm the Karamoja region. The 2006 attempt launched by the Uganda government is the 9th in the many campaigns aimed at disarming Karamoja since 1945. It is important to note that not one of these proposals has proven successful in lessening incidences of armed violence in the area. As a matter of fact, the 2006 operation appears to have had an escalatory effect on armed violence. The campaign was reasonably well planned and had gained the support of the Karamojong (the Bokora, Jie and Dodoth surrendered 30 per cent of guns in their possession (Bevan 2008).

However, the 2001 initiative was frustrating, for consequent disarmament initiatives given its failure on several counts. Although at first it was voluntary, the process became forcible after a suddenly shortened period. Firstly, it often involved violence meted on the local community by the army and it estranged communities, especially those whose members had willingly handed over their firearms (DANIDA Report 2008). Also, the hurried exit of the UPDF in 2002 left the disarmed region exposed to aggression from neighboring clans. For instance, the Jie (Ngijie) of Kotido raided the Bokora (Ngibokora) of Napak – the latter having surrendered practically 44 per cent of their arms (Bevan 2008). Elsewhere, the Kenyan Pokot, joined forces with Uganda’s Tepeth (Ngitepeth or Ngitepes) of mount Moroto and raided the Pian (Ngipian). Finally, Government had promised incentives for willingly handing over firearms, the promises that were not fulfilled.
With the accounts above in mind, the renewal of hostilities among the regional pastoral communities was just a matter of time. The root causes of insecurity in Karamoja had not been resolved by disarmament. This is because the whole operation did not have a pragmatic approach due to government’s failure to guarantee security to the Karamojong. Although some communities had handed in their guns, others had kept and concealed them. This created a power imbalance and added to, not only escalating insecurity but also rejuvenated the anger to rearm. It was also in protest against government’s repression thus creating the readiness atmosphere for any subsequent standoff with the army on any disarmament attempt.

Studies have shown that in the absence of human security and of property, there is no guarantee of meaningful livelihoods. Nomadic pastoralism is only possible with prevailing peace and security in place, but this has been threatened by frequent livestock raiding.

Traditional rules of engagement in livestock rustling have been heavily impacted by modernization. Unlike in medieval times, machine guns and mobile telephony has been adapted by the pastoralists it has exponentially increased the scale and risk of violent armed conflict. While getting rid of small arms in the hands of civilians was a widely a welcome idea, its effects and the method in which it was carried out proved tricky for government to interact with the locals.
The army has also been ineffective in protecting the Karamojong from attacks by failing to adapt to the local terrain; often being blame of failing to thwart cattle theft by armed pastoral neighbors. Stites and Akwabai (Stites & Akabwai 2009) argue that regardless of the methods used, the act of disarmament has had ‘what might be called unintended consequences’ heightened insecurity for communities; the erosion of traditional mechanisms to cope with vulnerability and food insecurity; shifts in gender-based labor roles, responsibilities and identities; transfer of animal management responsibilities; and the collapse of the dual settlement and migratory systems central to the success of pastoral and agro-pastoral livelihoods.

The voluntary nature of the exercise was encouraged by inclusion of community elders in the planning process and participation of civil society organizations including the UHRC in the disarmament exercise. Nonetheless, the process called for a substantial time and resources owing to the complexity of the matter because it affected fundamental features of the life of the Karamojong.

Consequently, the UPDF turned impatient and ignored other parties and local players in the planning and implementation of the campaign, thus turning it into a fully-fledged military forceful disarmament in the now infamous “cordon and search” operation (Mkutu 2008). With this method, the army encircled villages and kraals, any time of day or night, force the Karamojong out of their manyattas (traditional mud and wattle houses) and haphazardly search for guns. Mkutu mentions that with the military acting alone, its helicopters carried out
indiscriminate bombing leading to massive loss of human life and animals (ibid., pp. 138-139).

Following such tragic campaigns by the army, scores of Karamojong fled to neighboring Kenya, Ethiopia as well as South Sudan where they could get refuge from their fellow pastoralists (Amutabi 2005).

The forceful phase did not only withdraw absolution and incentives that had been offered in the voluntary surrender of guns, it also kicked out the role played by the Civil Society Organizations (CBOs). All these was done without a prior warning or explanation given for the expulsion of the CBOs. The forceful exit of civil society handed the military the opportunity to act with so much impunity that it detained even those who willingly handed their firearms. Knighton writes: … “If you turn in a gun then both you and your gun are detained! It made no difference whether one kept a gun in his house or surrendered it to the barracks; either way, one is in trouble (Knighton 2002). Following these happenings, the local population gradually mistrusted UPDF and, in defiance, refused to surrender any firearms in response to state as a party to their own survival.

Human Rights Watch has condemned the army’s modus operandi in the disarmament of Karamojong and also accused it of engaging in summary executions, torture and debasing treatment, arbitrary detention, theft and destruction of property.
It is therefore somewhat ironical that the campaign that had been embraced by the Karamojong had now metamorphosed from bringing peace and development into a source of human rights abuses in the region. By continuously controlling movement, including restriction on mobility of both herders and their animals, government placed total control of the Karamojong livelihood under the military. Moreover, the locals were expected to seek a special permit to sell their animals. This contributed to the increased non-productiveness and heavy dependence on relief food (Stites & Akabwai 2009). Consequently, the Karamojong have returned to their medieval survival strategies including resorting to fabricating locally homemade guns (Ngamatidae; sing. Amatida) with metal pipes often stolen from neighboring schools and boreholes (Akabwai & Ateyo 2007).

5.3. Were goals achieved?

The disarmament agenda visualized by President Museveni in 2001 would take the form of three phases. Initially, it would send the UPDF to Karamoja to collect information and, through local chiefs encourage the communities to surrender arms willingly. Secondly, the government would form and arm a militia outfit that would continue disarmament of their kin and kith long after the military has relocated away from the region. Finally, in the case of failure of the two phases above, the army would then be deployed and remain in the region to conduct military sweeps and armed patrols directed at specific clans and counties (Mburu 2002).
Although GoU efforts are admirable, the strategy applied was bound to fail in the long run for the simple reason that it failed to understand the connotation of ethno-military nature of the Karamojong and their agro-pastoral neighbors – Turkana and Toposa (in Kenya and Sudan respectively). Ultimately, to achieve enduring peace the authorities should address factors that have led to the failure of disarmament in the past and involve neighboring ethnic communities of Kenya and Sudan. Since cattle raiding is the driver for arming, disarmament must come hand in hand with strategies that convalesce prevailing and provide alternative source of livelihoods (Mburu 2002).

The UPDF, in an attempt to secure the victims, decided to provide some communities with guns for self-defense. This arrangement was effected through a kind of local militia called Local Defense Units (LDU). This decision by the army poses the question: Did the guns recovered actually leave the Karamoja region? Furthermore, between 2002 and 2003, there were intensified skirmishes by the Lord’s Resistance Army attacks in the districts neighboring Uganda namely: Lango, Acholi and Teso. This rebel resurgence pushed the army into withdrawing from the region and opened a window for rearmament as Karamojong replenished their firearms count by buying more from South Sudan (Stites et al. 2007).

Consequently, with the exit of the UPDF from Karamoja and the abysmal failure of the 2001-2002 disarmament, the region recorded a high frequency of incidences of raids and revenge
raids. This worrying turn of events forced the Uganda government to go back to the drawing board to launch another disarmament campaign.

Prior to the February 2006 presidential elections, the Karamojong had appealed to the president to tackle the issue of marginalization and scramble for limited resources that they deemed are the cause of instability. It was, therefore, shocking that upon securing the election victory, President Museveni embarked on a very aggressive military disarmament operation that disregarded basic human rights. The UPDF introduced "Cordon and Search Operations" in May 2006, the operations that ensured that the military stayed in the community until such a time when “all the guns” have been handed over to them (Ralston 2012). Interestingly there was no analogous exercise carried out by neighboring Kenya to disarm the Turkana pastoralists – the nemesis of the Karamojong.

There is no doubt that small arms have led to the loss of lives in Karamoja. There is also no doubt that persistent insecurity may be the nuisance of United Nations indicators. However, there is no sufficient evidence that guns are the chief cause of deaths among the Karamojong. Certainly, without the “non-Karamoja” shocks provided by the Uganda government that causes an imbalance across territorial sections, casualties could even be fewer in the long run.

The army has frequently maintained that they are bringing peace and development in the Karamoja by way of forced disarmament. However, is this claim verifiable? Of the 350
incidences where UPDF claimed recovery of illegal arms in the hands of the Karamojong, only 12 of them have actually resulted in actual recovery.

Mkutu (2007b: 42) obtained statistics of the treatment of wounds resulting from direct gunshots in health centers in South Karamoja, but even then, these numbers totaled 980 patients between 1998 and 2004. This number is not representative of the idea that small arms were a source of deaths in Karamoja. The assumption here is that for the 24 years President has been in power, only 3,360 gun-related injuries have been recorded even after adding unreported incidences (unrecovered dead bodies left to rot in the shrubs and unaccounted for). Contrary to the Uganda government narrative, these figures lend credence to the argument that, even at the height of gun trotting in Karamoja region, guns accounted for fewer casualties and deaths since 24 years ago (1986 to 2010).

Furthermore, Gray et al. (2003) have quantified violent deaths from the memories of family members. Interviewees remembered more vividly those who died violently. However, violent deaths cannot be attributed to raiding, but to traditional fighting with sticks, UPDF actions, accidents, and the summary executions of conventional courts. They also point out that only 28 of 268 adult men died violently. (Table 2 in Gray et al. 2003). In stark contrast, males aged between 30 and 49 is quite exaggerated to over 70 per cent and this can only be explained by the possible inclusion of the number of deaths resulting from famine and related diseases (Ibid. 22).
Laura Ralston (2012) argues that although the disarmament policy reduced guns among the tribes of Karamoja, it did not affect their pastoralist counterparts in the neighboring countries of Kenya and South Sudan. This, she says, rendered the disarmed Karamojong vulnerable to attacks. She also emphasizes the fact that there was an increase in attacks among the Karamojong tribes. She did not find evidence indicating that the raids originating from across the borders increased. She did not have the recent figures and cases of raids carried out by the Turkana into Uganda a year after her publication. However, Ralston points out that the deterrent effect of guns has outweighed their impact as a tool of violence.

Buchanan-Smith, Margie and Jeremy Lind (2005) give insightful information about the Turkana, a pastoral community in Kenya. The study gives the example of armed violence in the sidelines, in the far-flung, semi-arid northern districts of Kenya. The economy there is dependent on pastoralism, and armed violence is associated with livestock rustling. This case study focuses on two contrasting districts of northern Kenya: Turkana in the north-west, which has tolerated a couple of decades of armed conflict; and Wajir in the northeast which, after a blood-stained history, has enjoyed relative peace and security in recent years, due to local peace-building efforts by the Wajir Peace and Development Committee (WPDC).

The study, however, does not give a bigger picture on what consequences disarmament would have had on, especially, indigenous Turkana. It nevertheless gives a credible source, secondary data, in the comparative studies of the Turkana and the Karamojong of Uganda.
Akabway and Ateyo’s work provide a holistic approach in covering the disarmament in Karamoja region. This is done through interviews with more than 400 respondents and traversing the bigger part of the Ateker Cluster, that brings together the ethnic pastoralist groups that were divided by formalizing the boundaries. Their work doesn’t adhere to normal research style of writing. This is, however, a welcome idea since it gives the research a feel of storytelling. The authors are critical of the “cordon-and-search” strategy employed by the UPDF and argue that along with it came wanton abuses of human rights. They note that GoU failed to protect those it had disarmed from those who still had guns. The work is a classic piece of work that gives a reader a flowing analysis of forceful disarmament in Karamoja. However, having been born in Karamoja, the writers could have subjected themselves to a conflict of interest and eventually gave a biased view. The research does not provide any evidence of sustainable peace achieved by disarmament.

5.4. Conclusion

The principal aim of this thesis is to investigate and provide a clearer understanding of the persistence of armed raids following the disarmament campaign in the Karamoja region of Uganda. Karamojong is chosen for deeper scrutiny of the perpetual violence among its armed
ethnic communities. It also assessed the various interventions by the GoU, INGOs, NGOs and other stakeholders in finding peace and spur development. In general, the 2001–02 disarmament initiative was a wasted opportunity where GoU failed to fulfill promises it had made resulting in the community’s negative opinions of forced disarmament.

It can be seen that the program had garnered support among the INGOs, CSOs and donors, for a pragmatic and even more combined focus on a voluntary approach to disarmament as the preferred choice for past military deployments and eventual operations. The 2004 Uganda National Action Plan (NAP) on SALWs (Uganda, 2004, pp. 16–17) stressed the importance of amalgamating gun recovery with wider peace-building activities. However, the strong deduction in the NAP was that ‘[a]n appropriate balance needs to be struck between the levying of sanctions and the provision of incentives to encourage surrender of [small arms and light weapons]’ (Uganda, 2004, p. 17).

While labeled as a program, KIDDP should be better understood as a hurriedly-drawn sketch of many interventions aimed at promoting peace and security to facilitate disarmament in Karamoja. Originally published by the OPM, it required more exploration and clarity; it advocated for a voluntary disarmament strategy, providing security throughout Karamoja and offering alternative livelihoods. As such, it is, undoubtedly, the most inclusive and thoughtful proposal for lessening armed violence aimed at Karamoja and for a moment it appeared to be in tandem with cessation of military solutions in the great lake’s region.
CHAPTER VI: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1. Conclusions

The link between the Karamojong and the state brings up several contentious issues. The first is that the relationship continues to be characterized by severe armed hostility. Increasingly government’s policies on Karamoja seem to be scaling up the violence. Just as various studies have noted, GoU totally failed to appreciate that pastoralism is a feasible economic activity for the region. (Gray et al 2003; Barber 1962, 1998; Quam 1996, 1966; Ocan 1992; Muhereza; Dyson-Hudson 1966; Mkutu 2003; Akabwai & Ateyo 2007). This discouragement by the government has left the Karamojong exposed to sporadic violence (Galaty & Pierre 1991; Gulliver 1953; Dyson-Hudson 1966; Barber 1969; Thomas 1965).

After the 2006 disarmament, problems in the Karamoja sub region have been manifested in the form of severe famine – following the declined pastoral economy (an overall sharp decline of livestock), cattle raids, ambushes, wanton killings among many other unlawful acts. While the GoU has, many a time, acknowledged the gravity of the problem in the region, corruption and lack of political will to address Karamoja challenges has consequentially left the escalation of external armed violence unchecked. Due to the fact that government’s presence in the region is negligible and it has created the climate for violence to blossom. The violence in the region can only lead to even more violence as the only real power in the community is that of the firearm (Hutchinson 1996; Keen 1994; Ocan 1994).
For decades, government programs for modernization and development have been known for displacing people, violence and relentless pressures on the scarce resources. The Karamojong blame government of not providing better choices than what they are able to do by themselves. Since the British rule, the state policy on Karamoja was simple: protect them from cross-border armed raiders, maintain order and leave them to observe their customs. While making sure this policy was in place, it did interfere with their customs, restricted their nomadic lifestyle, displaced some people as well as reduction of grazing areas. It would just be a matter of time before violence erupted (Gartrell 1988; 202; Barber 1962).

The government has never valued cattle the way the Karamojong do. It only concentrated a little too much on the weapons held by the Karamojong. Bent on disarming them at all costs, the government did not consider that cattle raiding is, was and will forever be an integral part of the pastoral life. Yet, cattle are more than just a way of life; they are part of their cultural identity. To be Karamojong is to own cattle by whatever means (Gray et al 2003).

Therefore, as it is the case with other cattle-keeping people of Africa’s savannah grassland, the Karamojong insecurity has a lot to do with the collapse of the Westphalian state in the neo-colonial era (Broch-Due 2004; Knighton 2002; 2006). A few experts (Mirzeler &Young 2000; Gray 2000; Mkutu 2006) blame the rise in the intensity of armed cattle raiding on the proliferation of SALWs which has changed the dynamics of raids to much worse compared to the past. Even with the repeated promises, GoU has not only failed to provide security along
the porous territorial borders but also social services and legal institutions to the Karamoja (Huria 2008).

It is apparent that enduring discrimination against them has driven Karamojong to resist any form of integration with the rest of Uganda. Discriminatory state laws against them focus on abolishing their livelihoods and tough military action but nothing else. Salzman (2004) established a hypothesis where pastoralists who succumb to the state and lose their self-sufficiency by being incorporated into centralized states become ‘pastoral peasants’ and often lose their liberty to pursue a pastoral livelihood (Little 2006).

The point of contention is that the intentions of the state are typically geared towards full sedentarization of Karamoja for purposes of control and disarmament. Of course, the Karamojong seemed to be in privy of such a conspiracy and so they resisted disarmament. They claimed they have never been considered when the ‘national cake’ (public goods and services) is distributed as exemplified by the sorry state of infrastructural development in the region.

Furthermore, Karamojong have been left out of government’s development planning and if included, the plans are never implemented. It is also intriguing to note that the state rarely guarantees their security. The only time Karamoja region gets considerable attention and intervention is when there is brutal disarmament or some kind of quelling dissenting elements.
and during political campaigns. As long as the state keeps on trying to make the pastoralists conform to a ‘civilized’ livelihood, their resolve to defy the state continues to rise. Therefore, while it is very significant, the violence in Karamoja is not just about the inflow of firearms—or uneven balance of power and the clashes to control access to scarce resources; it encompasses a much more multifaceted system of what seems to be the state's loss of public credibility and influence in the management of violence and Karamojong.

Failure of security intervention in Karamoja seems to pop up from government’s constricted evaluation on security. If not understood properly, security embodies a kind of process beyond the physical disarmament. It must be seen to integrate the physical, social-cultural and psychosocial facets of the community.

Therefore, security in Karamoja should not have been addressed without due consideration to the socio-economic framework of the Karamojong way of life, because that is where root causes of violence within societies can be located (Annan 2001).

The government of Uganda had more often called Karamojong criminals who don’t love peace and security. This statement can be seen as departing from the truth. For example, Mkutu (2008) weighs in on the need to dissect raiding and look into the underlying motives that comprise of a variety of society actors other than the entire community. He focuses on commercial raiding, which comes with 'its own internal complexity because of its private and "unauthorized" nature, shady players, widespread networks, and important synergies with the market'.
Therefore, treating every violence in Karamoja as merely 'traditional raiding', blessed by entire communities, validates short-cut law-enforcement practices based on communal mistreatment. What happens then is that communities feel alienated and from being part of law enforcement thus discouraging any form of collaboration; this is what is exploited by those who to raid for commercial purposes.

Relatedly Knighton (2010) confronts government’s narrative that violence in Karamoja is better explained using the presence of guns, and so to bring about security Karamojong have to be disarmed first. He analyses the 2007-2008 data on incidences of raiding between the three biggest territories of Karamoja. Just like Ralston (2012), he finds evidence from this data which indicates that there was an exponential increase in raiding following the UPDF’s disarmament campaign.

5.2. Recommendations

Disarmament is not a one-off event. Rather it must take a pragmatic approach to inculcate development progress from a human standpoint that takes into account the forms of security. It must also incorporate broader strategies aimed at promoting sustainable development. This is for the reason that, in order to carry out a successful disarmament operation, there is a need
for community sensitization and mobilization. Commitments from the state should lead
disarmament and promises like providing security and development must be fulfilled to the
letter to avoid mistrust and resentment from the locals. Regional countries with pastoral
communities should act in tandem in carrying out simultaneous disarmament campaigns to
prevent opportunistic cross-border raiding expeditions. Basing on past experiences, like in
Mozambique or Sierra Leone, voluntary disarmament is preferred to the cordon and search
type that was employed in Karamoja. Moreover, there is a need for active participation of civil
society organizations and the traditional framework of any disarmament campaign to serve the
purpose of creating awareness, building trust and limitation and control of arms.

Laura Ralston (2012) also examines the consequences of disarmament in her paper Less Guns,
More Violence: Evidence from Disarmament in Uganda. She argues that disarmament led to
the exponential increase in conflicts among the Karamojong tribes as well as raids from
and Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (2007), after the general
elections 2006 the Uganda government’s strategy for disarming Karamoja took a violent and
an entirely military character. Government unrestrained behavior has drawn widespread
criticism not only from the victim tribes but from the international community.

Buchanan-Smith and Lind (2005) examines the role a gun plays in pastoralist community of
the Turkana in Kenya. They argue that pastoralists must be given a bigger voice in the
expansion of any policies that are aimed at establishing security and development. Helping
them restock and finding substitutions to pastoralism are far more important than having to forcefully disarm them for their own security.

They aver that disarmament never guarantees sustainable peace and rather advice that positive examples of local level peace-building, must be built on, but above all must be linked to national policy level and supported with a real political will.

In border areas, such initiatives can only be successful if they are regional. After disarmament, relative peace can be said to prevail but it will also be marked by an increase of insecurity and raids. Those that were disarmed are vulnerable to those that did not disarm from within and across the borders.

There must also be greater investment in collecting and analyzing insecurity trends data that shows the influence of conflict and violence on livelihoods over time, not least, to comprehend and monitor the impact of the various peace efforts. Lastly, foreign donors play a significant role in ensuring that their support is also geared to confronting the root causes of conflict, but with a long-term obligation and in a synchronized and logical way.

Figure 1.0 below will illustrate a model of the optimum stages of disarmament and why it should be carried out only after security has been guaranteed for the community.
As illustrated in the model above, the government must provide its citizens with security first. Then the legislature should also be able to enact and pass bills aimed at securing the communities from any form of foreign or homegrown aggression. Without security, people are then forced to arm themselves with all kinds of weapons for them to be able to defend themselves. Conversely, there would be no need for civilians to possess illicit weapons if the government played its role of making sure citizens and their property is secured.

It is also noteworthy that as government guarantees security for all citizens, it then follows that for the remaining firearms in the hands of civilians, the legislature and judiciary must
formulate laws that regulate such weapons. These will range from, certificate of good conduct, to the registration of such firearms to the issuance of owner certificates and to punitive measures for non-compliance. With the two phases complete, disarmament would then be conducted for those who still possess illicit firearms.

However, throughout these phases, the civil society, and local community leadership should be part of the campaign especially with disarmament. Failure to integrate them will discredit the whole exercise.
REFERENCES

Akabwai, D. & Ateyo, P.E. 2007, 'The scramble for cattle, power and guns in Karamoja', *Feinstein International Center, Tufts University, Medford, MA.*


James Bevan. *Crisis in Karamoja: Armed Violence and the Failure of Disarmament in*


Knighton, B. (2010). "'Disarmament': The End or Fulfillment of Cattle Raiding?" Nomadic Peoples: 123-146.


Knighton, B. 2010, "'Disarmament': The End or Fulfillment of Cattle Raiding?", Nomadic Peoples, pp. 123-46.


