VIOLENT EXTREMISM AND RADICALIZATION AMONG YOUTH IN PRISONS: A CASE OF LANGATA WOMENS, KAMITI AND SHIMO LA TEWA PRISONS IN KENYA

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DECLARATION

I, the undersigned declare that this is my original work and has not been submitted to any other college, institution or University other than the United States international University- Africa in Nairobi Kenya. All material obtained herein from other sources is duly acknowledged.

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ABSTRACT

There has been a global increase in the rates terrorism, violent extremism and radicalization throughout the world. Therefore, prisons are having to house and increasing number of radicalized inmates. This is especially pertinent, as it has been seen that terrorists and violent extremists often use their time within prison trying to radicalize their fellow inmates. The main objectives of this research were to determine the causes and challenges of violent extremism and radicalization among youth in Kenyan prisons. Subsequently, give recommendations to tackle violent extremism and radicalization among youth in Kenyan Prisons. The literature review commented upon research regarding how prisons often act as hotbeds for terrorist recruitment, with suggestions on reform to make prisons and their staff more capable in dealing with the problems associated with terrorist inmates.

A number of findings and conclusions were made: - Firstly, there is indeed an increase of radicalization and violent extremism within the prison system, both globally and within Kenya. Social, economic and political exclusion can indeed lead to individuals turning to a life of crime, becoming radicalized and/or becoming terrorists or violent extremists. Furthermore, there is a strong correlation between the rate of recidivism and radicalization of inmates within prisons, as prisons have been seen to be recruitment havens for terrorists.

The study recommends that radicalized prisoners be segregated from other inmates during incarceration, which will require better allocation of resources from Government. Prison staff should be adequately trained, so as to implement such rules to keep terrorists and other offenders away from one another. Penal and constitutional reforms should be made so that ex-inmates receive adequate support to successfully reintegrate back into society once they have left prison. Furthermore, holistic and comprehensive de-radicalization programmes should be put in place for terrorist inmates.
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background to the study

Benazir Bhutto (2014) quoted that ‘Extremism can flourish only in an environment where basic governmental social responsibility for the welfare of the people is neglected. Political dictatorship and social hopelessness create the desperation that fuels terrorism and religious extremism (p. 14)’

Violent extremism and radicalization is a global issue and can be seen in every continent of the world, from the developed world to the developing. The threat of terrorism is now felt in Europe, America, Africa and Asia and whilst there are regional peculiarities, it must be noted that the rise in terrorism and radical extremism is truly a global concern (El-Said, 2012). The United States has for some time now been having a very public war against terrorism. Whilst this has primarily focussed on foreign states that are seen to be breeding grounds for terrorists and terrorist organizations, attention has been increasingly shifted within their own borders, so as to identify US citizens that are being radicalized towards extremist ideologies (Garfinkel, 2014).

According to the U.S. House of representatives committee on homeland security subcommittee (2015), by October 2015, at least 55 American citizens were arrested due to links with ISIS. Furthermore, a report in the same year, issued by the US House of Representatives, reported that over 200 US citizens had travelled to the Middle East, most likely with the intention of joining and fighting for terrorist organizations. The former FBI Director, Comey, also stated that almost 1000 active investigation were ongoing throughout the United States, where there were suspected Islamic State inspired operatives.
Comey (2015) went on to say that his biggest concern was not those already under suspicion and surveillance, but all the unknown people who are potentially being radicalized. Comey further states that with radical material being so easy to access online, there is a growing problem for otherwise ‘unconnected’ individuals to access extremist propaganda from the confined of their own home and to develop their own radicalized beliefs. Cases such as these have been seen a lot throughout Europe in recent months, where radicalized individuals who were previously not on any authority’s radar have carried out terrorist attacks of an ad-hoc nature, with little to no planning. The attack on London Bridge in the United Kingdom is one such example of this.

Milestones such as the Amman Youth Declaration (Global Forum on Youth, Peace and Security, 2015) and the Global Youth Summit Against Violent Extremism later that year paved the way for the adoption of the first-ever United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) on Youth, Peace, and Security in December 2015, UNSCR 2250 (UN Security Council, 2015) Calling for youth inclusion in peace and decision-making processes that affect their lives, UNSCR 2250 highlights the need to engage and invest in young women and men as partners in preventing conflict and pursuing peace.

Young males and youths comprise the key demographic for terrorist organizations throughout the world, not just in East Africa. Boko Harem fighters in West Africa are mostly teenagers and the average age of an ISIS recruit is just 26 years old (Schneider, 2015). This is not surprising. The average age of the population in countries undergoing conflict and those that have notable political or social unrest is typically very young. The youth, then, are often regarded as both the perpetrators and victims of terrorism and radicalization and should not just be regarded as ‘the problem’. It is noted in the
‘Youth Action Agenda to Prevent Violence and Promote Peace, “that most young people are part of the solution… working to build peace and prevent violent extremism,” and the majority of youth simply reject violence (Global Youth Summit Against Violent Extremism, 2015).

A report by the International Crisis Group (2014), noted that extremist groups have been targeting people within Kenya of varying ages, with the remit of radicalizing them and turning them into militants. Whilst the typical age that seems to be targeted is youth, between the ages of 15-30 (IBRD, 2015), there have been a number of reports where children of much younger ages have been targeted.

One such incident was that of the Musa mosque in Mombasa, where security officers rescued over 200 children who were seen to be undergoing radicalization. Kenyan Human Rights Watch (2014) reported that some of the children were as young as 12 years old. The total amount of Kenyans who have left to join terrorist groups is not certain. Some reports states that 255 persons have so far been recruited, however others believe the number could be much higher. For example, in Isiolo Country, in Eastern Kenya, an estimated 200 children have been reported missing since 2014. It is assumed that the majority of them have crossed over the border into Somalia, to join terrorist groups (Kenya Human Rights Watch, 2014).

There has been a steady rise in the number of terrorist attacks in Kenya annually. For example, between 2011 and 2014, the rise in armed attacks within Kenya has been unprecedented, with over 70 different attacks being reported (Wafula, 2014). Most notably in recent history was the attack at the Garissa University College, where 148 people were killed and another 79 injured (Bailey, 2015). Prior to this, the most widely
reported attack was that of the Westgate shopping mall, in September 2013, where 70 people lost their lives and another 200 were injured. These are just two examples of the threat posed to Kenya by terrorism and radical extremism. Besides the attacks themselves, another worrying factor is that extremist groups, such as Al Shabaab, have been seen to try to radicalize and recruit young people from within Kenya itself (Neumann, 2015). This threat can therefore no longer be seen as purely ‘coming from outside’, but must be tackled and addressed within Kenya’s borders too.

With the increase in number of terrorist groups globally and as the number of attacks has increased, so has the number of terrorists being caught and incarcerated risen. In the wake of the 9/11 attack in the United States, the US Federal State and law enforcement identified and arrested a number of potential terrorists and indeed, until today, the authorities continue to discover more and more terrorist cells and individuals, who are in turn prosecuted and incarcerated (OECD, 2015). The problem, however, is what happens to these terrorists whilst they are behind bars – and what happens to them when they are released? It is reported that the US has never been faced with such large numbers of terror inmates before. When the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Homeland Security (2015) held a hearing on prison radicalization, the primary focus was on the threat of inmates being radicalized once in prison.

Terrorists who have been caught and imprisoned, they cannot be regarded as typical offenders. It has been noted that terrorists typically use their time in incarceration to try to recruit other inmates into terrorism (Rappaport, 2012). Not only this, but being immobilized themselves, they often try to use this opportunity to mobilize others on the outside to carry out their commands – and to recreate operational command structures
within the prison (International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence (ICSR), 2010).

Prisons, then, are often regarded as breeding grounds for radicalization. This is not surprising, given that a typical prison population will comprise greater numbers of identity and protection seekers, rebels and those more psychologically inclined to succumb to approached made by terrorists towards them. For a terrorist wishing to radicalize others, prisons provide near-perfect conditions in which radical, religiously framed ideologies can flourish (ICSR, 2010). Whilst the number of terrorists and the number of terrorist related incidents increases globally, so does the amount of terrorists who are caught and imprisoned.

According to Angell (2011), prisons have the potential to become ideal breeding grounds for radicalization and terrorism; they not only give extremists the opportunity to develop violent ideology but provide a favourable setting in which proselytization efforts can be set in motion. Whilst this may be a growing phenomenon, it is certainly not a new one.

It is not a new phenomenon for prisons to be breeding grounds for radical extremism. Throughout history, there have been notable examples of prisons not only acting as recruitment centres, but also headquarters for religious and ideological extremists. For example, both Adolf Hitler and Joseph Stalin used their time behind bars to develop and refine their extremist ideologies, as have key figures in the shaping of modern jihadist thought such as Sayyid Qutb and Abu Mohammad al-Maqdisi (Brandon, 2009).
Similarly, any serious discussion of modern jihadist movements like al-Qaeda would be remiss without reference to Abu Musab, al-Zarqawi and Ayman al-Zawahiri, both of whom academic observers believe were radicalised during their imprisonment (Brandon, 2009). With regards to Islamic extremism in particular, prisons have been seen to play a particularly destructive and catalytic role, where new recruits have been easy to indoctrinate. In such environments, inmates are vulnerable and are more likely to explore more and more radical ideologies. It must be noted, however, that whilst prisons often act as breeding grounds for terrorists, they must also be seen as part of the potential ‘solution’ towards combating terrorism (Schneider, 2015).

Prisons provide an ideal location for state officials to implement procedures that can assist with the process of de-radicalisation and rehabilitation; procedures which are designed to tackle the underlying causes that led to the radicalisation of extremist individuals and induce a renunciation of their violent ideology (Drummond, 2002). Knowing how to deal with terrorists within prison and how to reduce recidivism is very challenging. Typically, prison authorities are not properly equipped to deal with these challenges and so opportunities are missed to de-radicalize terrorists. This has been noted in several studies globally (Schneider, 2015).

Ismail and Susan Sim (2015) carried out a study of violent extremism and radicalization in prisons in Indonesia. They visited several of the 25 Indonesian prisons and detention centres that hold terrorist convicts, including Cipinang and Nusakambangan and reviewed the case histories of 40 known terrorist recidivists. They also interviewed prison officials, inmates, as well as recently released prisoners – and their findings were profoundly depressing. They found that the majority of terrorists within the prison
system answer to no one except themselves. They decide on their own routines and complying with prison regulations and so-called ‘de-radicalization workshops’, as and when they choose.

The prison staff were found to be untrained and unprepared and would rather leave the terrorists alone that to risk riots or internal fighting (Ismail & Sim, 2015). Furthermore, the research revealed that for Indonesian jihadists, rather than being a deterrent or intervention stage, prison is seen as a way station to further their ideology and glory. Many leave prison not only unreformed, but also more influential in local jihadi circles (Ismail & Sim, 2015). With the number of terrorists leaving prison ‘unreformed’, so there is a high rate of recidivism.

According to UNDP (2015), recidivism is the relapse into criminal activity and is generally measured by a former prisoner’s return to prison for a new offence. The rate of recidivism in Kenya is estimated to be about two thirds, which means that two thirds of released inmates will be re-incarcerated after their release from prison (Kenya Prisons Service, 2014). This is a staggeringly high figure, meaning that crime by former inmates constitutes a significantly high proportion of all future crimes committed, on the whole.

There is an increasing number of people being incarcerated for terrorism and eventually [being] released back to the community - and the high risk of re-arrest and re-incarceration is a concern for policymakers, criminologists, and those involved in corrections (Whitaker, 2008). The costs of this are very high, both in terms of public safety and in terms of the money being spent to keep on capturing, prosecuting and detaining the same individuals. Given the challenges noted above in terms of trying to
de-radicalise terrorists whilst they are within the prison system, one starts to get a clearer picture as to why prisons continue to be ideal recruitment ground for would-be terrorists.

The study recommends that radicalized prisoners be segregated from other inmates during incarceration, which will require better allocation of resources from Government. Prison staff should be adequately informed, so as to implement such rules to keep terrorists and other offenders away from one another. Penal and constitutional reforms should be made so that ex-inmates receive adequate support to successfully reintegrate back into society once they have left prison. Furthermore, Judges and Magistrates should be sensitized to the link between incarceration, recidivism and terrorism, so that it is kept in mind when sentencing offenders. Also, holistic and comprehensive de-radicalization programmes should be put in place for terrorist inmates and that Government reforms help to address the inequalities that lead towards social exclusion of citizens and the stigmatization of inmates after their release.

1.2 Statement of the Problem

Violent extremism and radicalization is on the rise throughout the Kenyan prison system (Kenya Prisons Service, 2015). The Kenya Prisons (2015) states that Kamiti Maximum Security Prison in Nairobi and the Shimo la Tewa Prison in Mombasa, have the largest number of inmates incarcerated for terrorist related activities, with numbers of such inmates being reported as approximately two hundred and forty. Whilst these numbers are quite high, there have been few convictions of terrorists within Kenya. As a result, prisons such as Shimo la Tewa are often seen as conduits for recruitment in other prisons across the country.
It has been reported that some terrorists have an easy time inside such prisons, where they can move around freely and communicate with other inmates, with little to no supervision (K24, 2015). However, this is a claim that Prisons authorities have denied. There have also been incidents where gunmen in Mombasa have stormed prisons, firing at prison guards and trying to gain entry. It is speculated and still being investigated as to whether these gunmen may have been terrorists, trying to free their comrades from within the prison walls. National media houses also reported that one prison warden who spoke in confidence, said their colleagues have also been accomplices in the radicalization project after they were compromised with money.

Under such prevailing conditions, terrorists (most notably from the Al Shabaab terrorist group) within the Kenyan prison system have a somewhat unchallenged time to try to recruit fellow inmates to their radicalized beliefs and agenda. The situation is compounded by the rife corruption from within Kenyan prisons, which facilitates inmates to easily communicate and to access to money from outside prison walls - something Al Shabaab must be taking full advantage of to establish terrorist cells inside prisons (Kenya Prisons Service, 2015). Furthermore, the Kenya prison infrastructure is currently falling very short of the demands on the system.

The prison population is more than double the holding capacity of the system, with the population standing at 54,579; against a capacity of 26,687 in 108 prisons across the country (Kenya Bureau of Statistics, 2015). Capacity is not the only strain on the system, however, as issues such as gender and age must also be taken into account. It is reported that 5.3% of the prison population is female, raising questions around housing female terror suspects and the protection of child suspects of terrorism offences.
Correctional services Principal Secretary Micah Powon said the government is working on decongestion plans. Among the mechanisms being considered include insisting on non-custodial sentences for lesser offenses committed by first time offenders.

Furthermore, to decongest the prisons, non-custodial sentences such as community service are used by courts as alternative to jail terms (Kenya Crime & Safety Report, 2008), however, it seems this has not yet been implemented and that congestion remains a very real problem in the Kenya prison system. Previous counter-terrorism actions taken by the Government have been more reactionary than preventative in their nature.

This has proven to be costly and ultimately unsustainable, as the number of terrorists arrested throughout the country continues to grow. During the ‘Operation Usalama Watch’ in 2014, there were numerous reports of Somali individuals being profiled, arbitrarily arrested and detained (ISS, 2015). This was made worse by a reported failure of the police to document suspects in their records, thus making it difficult to locate them. There were also allegations of terror suspects being held for extended periods of time in dubious locations, such as in forests, following security sweeps in Lamu in 2014 (ISS, 2016). These reports bring into question the capacity, competence and respect of implicated state actors for laws relating to the detention and arrests of terror suspects.

1.3 Research Questions

The study will be guided by the following questions

1. What are the causes of Violent Extremism and Radicalization among Youth in Kenyan prisons?
2. What are the challenges faced in tackling Violent Extremism and Radicalization among Youth in Kenyan prisons?

3. What opportunities and recommendations are there to tackle Violent Extremism and Radicalization among Youth in Kenyan Prisons?

1.4 Objectives of the Study

The study will seek specifically to:

1. Determine the causes of Violent Extremism and Radicalization among Youth in Kenyan prisons.

2. Find out the challenges faced in tackling Violent Extremism and Radicalization among Youth in Kenyan prisons.

3. Establish the opportunities and give recommendations to tackle Violent Extremism and Radicalization among Youth in Kenyan Prisons.

1.5 Justification and Significance

The issue of violent extremism and radicalization of the youth throughout the Kenyan prison system has not been adequately addressed, where it has been addressed at all. As the rise of violent extremism continues, the dynamics of the problem continue to change. It is therefore pertinent to stay abreast of evolving trends and not to rely solely on research and observations from the past, but to take a fresh look at the problem.

The study therefore aims to build upon previous academic studies and to throw new light on the issue of radical extremism within the prison system. It is hoped the study
will assist in the formulation of strategies to combat the problem of terrorism by Governments and other bodies of significance, such as the security forces. Furthermore, the study aims to provide recommendations to policy makers, highlighting the socio-economic, political, legal and ethical issues surround the notion of de-radicalization from within the prison system. It is hoped that by adding new research and recommendations to the existing body of work on the matter, that this paper will help to enable various actors to successfully address the threat.

The paper will take a specific look at recidivism within the prison system, understanding that recidivism is a key catalyst fuelling the problem of radical extremism within Kenya. This will assist in the effectiveness of the Prisons Service in Kenya and understanding the progress and challenges of the Prisons Service will be vital for future crime and criminal rehabilitation interventions.

1.6 Scope of the Study

The study is limited to Kenya, specifically in the Langata Women’s Prison in Nairobi, Kamiti Maximum Prison and the Shimo la Tewa Maximum Security Prison in Mombasa. The main focus of the study was to identify and analyse the underlying causes and factors that lead to recidivism and violent extremism within the Kenya prison system. In addition, the study aimed at exploring the effectiveness of prison programmes designed to address radical extremism within the prisons, with a particular look at how well equipped Kenyan prison officers are to aid in the rehabilitation of terrorists within the system. The study also addresses the many challenges faced when trying to counter radical extremism, along with best-practise suggestion on how to combat radical extremism and terrorist recidivism in future.
1.7 Limitation of the Study

In the introduction it was shown how there is a significant link between terrorism and recidivism within prisons. As such, one could argue that an effective way to measure the success of a programme designed to counter and prevent radicalization and extremism, is to measure the rate of recidivism in a particular prison or prisons and more specifically, the rate of recidivism amongst terrorist related inmates. One limitation with this method is that monitoring the rate of recidivism can be quite challenging. Often, adequate records regarding recidivism are not made, or are not made available to researchers. Another such limitation is that it is often unclear as to what exactly a particular rehabilitation programme may entail – for example, the programme methods and approaches that were used. With this in mind, it can be somewhat difficult to ascertain why a particular programme may or not be successful.

Another challenge, or limitation, of the study, takes into account the terminology and classification of radical extremism and terrorism. What or who exactly constitutes a terrorist? Whilst this may seem clear, the issue of classification is not as easy as one may initial think. After all, there is a saying that one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter. Similarly, it is very difficult to ascertain if a once radicalised person has truly become de-radicalised. How can this be measured and how can we know for sure? This is a limitation and whilst we can look at certain indicators, such as violent extremism and radicalization rates amongst terrorists, one must be mindful of the fact we can never truly know another human beings true thoughts, ideologies and beliefs.

The cost and research related expenses were limiting factors of this study, as trips to visit prisons in both Nairobi and Mombasa were undertaken. It was also a challenge to
gather literature regarding violent extremism and radicalization within Kenya prisons, presumably because this is somewhat of a new trend within Kenya and because such trends are not researched upon as heavily in East Africa as they might be in Europe or the United States, for example.

Terrorism related offenses are typically regarded as national security related matters and as such, it can be difficult to gather information on the same, due to the state’s secrecy for protection purposes. Another challenge faced when seeking information was that some officers requested bribes in order to share information, so corruption proved to be a limiting factor when carrying out my research. Finally, issues of radicalization and terrorism are sensitive issues and most people felt uncomfortable to discuss freely and honestly.
1.8 Definition of Terms

In this section, the key terms used throughout the paper will be defined.

Radicalization

Radicalisation is the process (or processes) whereby individuals or groups come to approve of and (ultimately) participate in the use of violence for political aims (Neumann, 2010). Some authors refer to ‘violent radicalisation’ in order to emphasise the violent outcome and distinguish the process from non-violent forms of ‘radical’ thinking. According to the UK government (2016), radicalisation refers to the process by which a person comes to support terrorism and extremist ideologies associated with terrorist groups.

De-radicalization and Disengagement

De-radicalization refers to a substantive change in a person’s mindset, so that they no longer hold radical ideologies or beliefs and in turn, no longer engage in terrorist related activities due to that change in beliefs. Disengagement, however, does not seek to specifically change a person’s radicalized beliefs, but rather to concentrate on implementing behavioural changes in that person, so that their beliefs do no manifest themselves violently through terrorism (Kundnani, 2009)

Terrorism

Terrorism is broadly construed as the unconventional use of violence against civilians for political gain’ (Ganor, 2002; Grimland, Apter, & Kerkhof, 2006; Knight, 2007,
Loza, 2007). The usual generalisations made about terrorism are: it involves violence, the threat of violence, (Laqueur, 1999 cited by Schmidt and Jongman, 1988).

**Violent Extremism**

Violent extremism has been defined as a willingness to use or support the use of violence to further particular beliefs, including those of a political, social or ideological nature. This may include acts of terrorism. The reason for the use of violence has been noted to include: to create high profile impacts on the public with the goal of undermining public confidence in their own government; to make routine social activity difficult; to inflict as much damage as possible; to seek vengeance; and to create physical pain and paralysing psychological emotions such as panic, chaos, unrest, fear, paranoia, anxiety, anger, grief, and a sense of tragedy (Ardila, 2002; Furnish, 2005; Hudson, 1999; Lawal, 2002; McCauley, 2002; Reid, 2002; Thackrah, 2004).

**Recidivism**

Recidivism refers to a person’s relapse into crime, after an initial conviction. It can therefore be regarded as ‘the act of re-offending’ or the rate at which criminals commit other, new crimes, either by arrest or conviction baselines (UNODC 2015).
2.1 Introduction

The following section provides an overview of the relevant literature on the topic and highlights pertinent concepts, major theoretical debates and perspectives violent extremism and recidivism in prisons. This literature review will focus on the definition of terms and their relation to violent extremism and radicalization in the prisons. The chapter will also explore the causes and the underlying problems relating to violent extremism and radicalization in the prisons.

2.2 Discussion of Thematic Areas

2.2.1 Radicalization

According to Neumann (2010), radicalisation is the process (or processes) whereby individuals or groups come to approve of and (ultimately) participate in the use of violence for political aims. Some authors refer to ‘violent radicalisation’ in order to emphasise the violent outcome and distinguish the process from non-violent forms of ‘radical’ thinking. According to the UK government (2016), radicalisation refers to the process by which a person comes to support terrorism and extremist ideologies associated with terrorist groups. It seems, however, that there is no definition that is widely agreed upon throughout literary resources. With no clear definition for ‘radicalization’, there is conversely no clear definition for exactly what de-radicalization means, or entails. Rik Coolsaet, a Belgian expert who was part of an Expert Group on Violent Radicalisation established by the European Commission to study the problem, recently described the very notion of radicalisation as ‘ill-defined, complex and controversial’. Others have commented on radicalization by saying that, ‘About the only thing that radicalisation experts agree on is that radicalisation is a
process. Beyond that there is considerable variation as to make existing research incomparable’ (Nasser-Eddine, 2011). The problem with the lack of definition is that it leads to discussions being about conceptualizations and further defining, than to directly addressing the root issues.

However, despite the unclear meaning of the word ‘radicalization’, it has become an increasingly popular subject for debate and study. Arun Kundnani comments:

‘Since 2004, the term ‘radicalisation’ has become central to terrorism studies and counterterrorism policy-making. As US and European governments have focused on stemming ‘homegrown’ Islamist political violence, the concept of radicalisation has become the master signifier of the late ‘war on terror’ and provided a new lens through which to view Muslim minorities. The introduction of policies designed to ‘counter-radicalise’ has been accompanied by the emergence of a government-funded industry of advisers, analysts, scholars, entrepreneurs and self-appointed community representatives who claim that their knowledge of a theological or psychological radicalisation process enables them to propose interventions in Muslim communities to prevent extremism (Kundnani, 2012).

Most of the literature and studies regarding radicalization have been published within the past 10 years, most likely as a direct response to the high profile attacks in the UK and the United States.
2.2.2 De-Radicalization and Disengagement

The words de-radicalization and disengagement in relation to terrorism have similar yet distinctly different meanings. According to Kundnani (2009) De-radicalization refers to a substantive change in a person’s mindset, so that they no longer hold radical ideologies or beliefs and in turn, no longer engage in terrorist related activities due to that change in beliefs. Disengagement, however, does not seek to specifically change a person’s radicalized beliefs, but rather to concentrate on implementing behavioural changes in that person, so that their beliefs do no manifest themselves violently through terrorism. That is to say, disengagement is more to do with preventing those with radicalized views from engaging in violent activities and attacks. While de-radicalization is ideologically-based, disengagement is behaviourally-based (Horgan J, 2008). Horgan goes on to state that, ‘the disengaged terrorist may not be “de-radicalized” or repentant at all. Often physical disengagement may not result in any concomitant change or reduction in ideological support’ (Horgan J., Individual disengagement: a psychological analysis, 2009). A distinction can also be made between individual and group de-radicalization, depending on the focus of the de-radicalization efforts (Ashour, The Deradicalization of Jihadists, 2009).

Omar Ashour, goes on to state that: - de-radicalization as “a process that leads an individual or group to change his attitudes about violence-specifically about the appropriateness of violence against civilians”. De-radicalization, he goes on to state, tries to de-legitimize the terrorist held ideologies which lead terrorists to violate what is socially acceptable. Put simply, he states that de-radicalization results from a change in beliefs or ideology, whereas disengagement refers to changes in actions with an end
of violence. More specifically, in disengagement, the individual has left the group, but has not necessarily altered or renounced his ideology. As a result, disengagement is not sufficient to guarantee de-radicalization, but it often can precede de-radicalization (Pressman, 2009). While de-radicalization programs are a relatively new concept, disengagement is not. This view is supported by one of the world’s leading terrorism experts, John Horgan, who states that disengagement is “a process in which the individual’s role within an organization changes from violent participation to a less active role” (Horgan, 2009). He goes on to say that de-radicalization is not a necessary accompaniment to disengagement and that disengagement should include both psychological and physical elements.

One of the key psychological components to address in terrorists is their sense of belonging to a particular radicalised group. If one can change the way in which a terrorist regards the group to which they feel associated to, then it may become easier to de-radicalize that individual. This would involve creating a sense of disillusionment within the individual towards the ideologies and beliefs of the group, so that they are psychologically starting to ‘move away’ from the group. Physical disengagement refers to an individual ceasing to engage in violent behaviour as a result of their beliefs, however disengagement in this sense may not always be voluntary on the part of the individual. For example, Arrest, imprisonment and death are characteristic of the typical kinds of disengagement (Horgan, 2005).

A number of studies have been conducted to research various disengagement processes, though these have not always been in relation to terrorists and terrorist groups. A number of studies, have, for example, looked at disengagement of individuals who once
belonged to a cult. One of the key factors identified in the likelihood of a person disengaging from a cult is their level of engagement with the ‘outside world’. Cult members who had contact with people from outside the cult, were far more likely to disengage, than those whose lives revolve only around the cult and its members. Similarly to this, cult members who remained engaged with their families outside the cult, were more likely to ultimately disengage. This is especially true in the instance that the family disapproves of the cult. From an ideological perspective, cult members who did not regard the cult to be critical to promoting their beliefs were also more likely to defect. Finally, if the cult failed to meet the emotional needs of its members, they would be more likely to disengage from the group.

Many parallels can be drawn between cults and terrorist groups. Undoubtedly, the disengaged extremist may not necessarily be repentant or ‘de-radicalized’ at all (Bjorgo, 2009). Bjorgo identifies that there are both ‘push’ and ‘pull’ factors that are equally important in the decision for a terrorist to leave their terrorist group. Pull factors regard positive motivators from outside the group influencing the individual. They may become intimately attached to someone from outside the group, for example, or they may be drawn away from the group to pursue a new career. Push factors can typically be seen a negative motivators, such as the individual becoming disillusioned with the ideologies of the group, or fearing lack of protection or retaliation.

Terrorists have anti-social beliefs and use violence and scare tactics to put forward their agenda. The focus of de-radicalization, therefore, is to transform these beliefs and attitudes so that former terrorists can re-integrate back into society, with ideologies that no longer conflict with what is considered to be ‘socially acceptable’. In undertaking
this literary review, it became apparent quite quickly, that there is very little research into the different theories and methodologies towards de-radicalization. Furthermore, the success of de-radicalization programmes is even less written about, making it unclear how effective such programs are and how likely it is for terrorists to re-engage in militancy after completing such programmes. As there is no real substantive way to know what a person believes in, one can only measure ‘success’ by observing the subsequent behaviours of (former) terrorists. Of great relevance is the need to comprehend the complex relationship between attitudes, beliefs and behaviours (Bjorgo, 2009). This leads to the question as to what can lead an individual to become de-radicalized and to change their belief systems.

It is of course difficult to de-radicalize an individual who is a violent extremist unless he has experienced some kind of doubt (cognitive opening) and some disengagement (Pressman, Risk Assessment Decisions for Violent Political Extremism, 2009). According to Renee Garfinkel, a renowned psychologist, the decision to de-radicalize was often an individual decision and reference to role models was often cited as an important factor in distancing from radical beliefs. In the radicalization process, experiencing trauma was identified as an element that precipitated the decision to de-radicalize (Garfinkel, 2007). This points towards the notion that to de-radicalize a terrorist, one must start at the very foundations of their belief systems – their ideological grounding. This was noted by Omar Ashour, a political scientist in 2008, who stated that the key foundation of re-education and rehabilitation programs is ideological, encompassing the reinterpretation of theological arguments to delegitimize the use of
violence against the state, the society, and the “other” (Ashour, Perspectives on Terrorism, 2008).

Another approach to de-radicalization is highlighted by Arie Kruglanski, who illustrates the need to suitably motivate a terrorist towards changing their ideologies and beliefs. For instance, the prospect of being released from prison and leading a normal life might represent compelling rewards, motivating individuals to embrace the de-radicalization arguments. In contrast, prospects of rejection by of comrades may induce a negative motivation (Arie W. Kruglanski, 2010).

Understanding what may make a terrorist disengage from their former associations and activities is somewhat difficult, which has led some Governments to take a more proactive approach to de-radicalization. The Government in the United Kingdom, for example, take the approach that prevention is better than cure, when it comes to tackling radicalization. Here, data and information gathering can assist in ascertaining whether or not a person is likely to become drawn into terrorist related activities due to radicalization. This is a sensitive topic, however, as many regard this sort of data gathering a profiling as an invasion of one’s privacy. When an assessment of the information gathered indicates that an individual may be vulnerable to radicalization, a referral can be made for closer monitoring and/or for an intervention to be made (UK Government, 2016). Despite these efforts, however, truly understanding why a terrorist might choose to de-radicalize is difficult. The Radicalization Research Organization state that, several issues lie at the root of our limited understanding of disengagement from terrorism. Most obviously, terrorism is not a common occurrence, and efforts to support disengagement from terrorism are a relatively recent phenomenon, which
means data are sparse. Added to which, valuable information can often be classified, and it can be difficult to gain access to prisoners to learn, first hand, what has influenced them. Together, this means we don’t have a strong evidence base from which to work. (http://www.radicalisationresearch.org/debate/marsden-deradicalisation/).

2.2.3 Terrorism

In the same way that there is no real consensus on the definition of the words ‘radicalization’ and ‘de-radicalization’, there is also no consensus on the exact definition of terrorism despite decades of research being undertaken in the area of studies of terrorism (Drummond, 2002; Schmid & Jongman, 1988). According to Sinai, the reasons for this are political and ideological and because there are multiple disciplines contributing towards the study of terrorism (Sinai, 2007). Elzain notes that these definitions and theorisations are ‘drowned in complexity’ (Elzain, 2008). The definition of terrorism has been widely debated by the United Nations, who identified the need to have a standard definition for the word. By July 2005 the UN Secretary General Kofi Annan urged world leaders to agree to a universal definition. The definition included: “Terrorism...constitutes one of the most serious threats to international peace and security” and added that, "The targeting and deliberate killing of civilians and non-combatants cannot be justified or legitimised by any cause or grievance”.

One of the main issues when considering how terrorism should be defined regards the notion of who is right and who is wrong. It was noted previously in this paper that one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter. It therefore becomes difficult to define terrorism, without first passing moral judgement. There is a general consensus,
however, that terrorism is a pejorative term. It is a word with intrinsically negative connotations that is generally applied to one’s enemies and opponents, or to those with whom one disagrees and would otherwise prefer to ignore. If one identifies with the victim of the violence, for example, then the act is terrorism. If, however, one identifies with the perpetrator, the violent act is regarded in a more sympathetic, if not positive (or, at the worst, an ambivalent) light; and it is not terrorism (Hoffman, 1998, cited by Newman, 2006).

Academically, most authors assert that to define ‘terrorism’ there are generally two elements required: ‘actual or threatened violence against civilians or persons not actively taking part in hostilities’ and ‘the implicit or explicit purpose of the act being to intimidate or compel a population, government or organisation into some course of action’ (Maogoto, 2003). It may be ‘broadly construed as the unconventional use of violence against civilians for political gain’ (Ganor, 2002; Grimland, Apter, & Kerkhof, 2006; Knight, 2007, Loza, 2007). The usual generalisations made about terrorism are: it involves violence, the threat of violence, (Laqueur, 1999 cited by Schmidt and Jongman, 1988). Other academics say that for an act to be considered as terrorism, it must be premeditated and that it must be a threat against people or property; rally support for the terrorist cause (Baliga & Sjöström, 2009; Winkates, 2006); designed to intimidate non-combatants, innocent bystanders, and with the aim to change public policy or give up something of value (Loza, 2007); focus on the group’s mode of operation, motivations, characteristics, modus operandi (Ganor, 2002).

Despite the lack of a universally accepted definition of terrorism, the international community has consequently taken a piecemeal approach by addressing the problem of
international terrorism with particular criminal acts, inherently terrorist in nature, by preventing them or punishing them by domestic law (Maogoto, 2003). One of the most commonly used definitions for terrorism is that defined by the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI) definition, which states that terrorism is ‘the unlawful use of force or violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives.’

2.2.4 Violent Extremism

In June 2005, intelligence directors and special force commanders were summoned to the Special Operations Command Headquarters in Tampa, Florida, for deliberations over a new anti-terror approach. At the meeting it was declared that the ‘war on terror’ was over and that a new acronym was to be used, ‘SAVE’. ‘SAVE’ stood for the Struggle against Violent Extremism (Fox, 2015). This was a term that had previously been used by the Australian Government, but it became more prevalent from this point onwards. The Australian National Counter-Terrorism Committee Framework defines violent extremism as: a willingness to use or support the use of violence to further particular beliefs, including those of a political, social or ideological nature. This may include acts of terrorism. The reason for the use of violence has been noted to include: to create high profile impacts on the public with the goal of undermining public confidence in their own government; to make routine social activity difficult; to inflict as much damage as possible; to seek vengeance; and to create physical pain and paralysing psychological emotions such as panic, chaos, unrest, fear, paranoia, anxiety,
anger, grief, and a sense of tragedy (Ardila, 2002; Furnish, 2005; Hudson, 1999; Lawal, 2002; McCauley, 2002; Reid, 2002; Thackrah, 2004).

There are some key differences between terrorism and violent extremism. Violent extremism is used to provoke the target into a disproportionate response, to build support for its objectives in the long term and to radicalise moderates. Terrorism however, is used to endogenise the capabilities of both the terrorists and the target (Lake, 2002). Mroz (2009) describes the difference between the two in the following way. Violent extremism is ‘violence in the absence of reason’, or rather, the belief that committing an act of violence will produce benefits that outweigh the cost of human life. Violent extremism is homicide, genocide, fratricide, and, yes, it can also be terrorism’. Terrorism can be countered, violent extremism cannot, as most forms of violent extremism are undertaken as ‘lone wolf attacks’, (Mroz, 2009). Recent attacks in London, where loan wolf attackers have carried out ad-hoc attacks with little to no planning, are recent examples of violent extremism. There was little capacity for the British Government to anticipate and intercept such attacks. This depicts a significant shift away from terrorism, which is typically an attack against the State, which could potentially be countered by the Government.

The nature of violent extremism can make it very different to counter and indeed, traditional methods of combating terrorism often fall short. This paradigm shift has led law enforcement agencies to have to reconsider their approach, especially with regards to dealing with an increase in asymmetrical and transnational environments. The unpredictability of loan wolf attacks and the difficulty in gathering relevant intelligence on potential violent extremists makes countering violent extremism very difficult. This
is the challenge that intelligence and law enforcement communities have acknowledged that counter terrorism policies cannot necessarily predict or reach (Mroz, 2009).

2.2.5 Recidivism

Recidivism refers to a person’s relapse into crime, after an initial conviction. It can therefore be regarded as ‘the act of re-offending’ or the rate at which criminals commit other, new crimes, either by arrest or conviction baselines (UNODC 2015). Taken literally, as Maltz points out, the word recidivism derives from the Latin ‘recidere’, which means to ‘fall back’. A recidivist, he says is “... one who after release from custody having committed a crime is not rehabilitated, instead he or she falls back or relapses into former behaviour patterns and commits crime again” (Maltz, 2001).

There are a growing number of inmates within the Kenya prison service, with over 60% of that population being youth, under the age of 35 years (Kenya Prison Service, 2016). Statistics have shown that recidivism rates within Kenya are up to 58%, meaning that over half of the inmates released will ultimately reoffend and be arrested again. The problem here then, despite the offenses themselves, is that the longer an individual remains within the system, the higher the chance there is of that person becoming radicalized by other inmates. The youth in particular are vulnerable to the forces of radicalism, violent extremism and criminality due to the feelings of real and perceived marginalization, hopelessness, identity crisis, exclusion from national resources, frustrated expectations, and relative deprivation (UNDP, 2015).

It has been shown that there is a very strong correlation between radicalization and violent extremism and the rate of recidivism within prisons. The Kenya Prison Service (2017) noted that with higher rates of recidivism, so there is a greater risk for inmates
to be radicalized towards violent extremist ideologies. This was observed in Langata Women’s prison, where inmates incarcerated due to terrorism related offenses will often prey on petty offenders. The petty offenders often act as a means of relaying communication between incarcerated terrorists and their contacts in the outside world, due to the frequency of their arrests and releases. In other cases, petty offenders are approached and ‘brainwashed’, or bribed, sometimes with large sums of money, to subscribe to a particular terrorist group.

Winnicott (1984) notes that recidivism can be defined as an offender’s tendency to repeat his/her criminal activity despite efforts towards reformation. Where terrorism is concerned, one can regard this to mean that despite programmes to reform terrorists whilst within prison, such programmes are not always (or even, are rarely) successful, given that the rate of recidivism amongst terrorists remains high. One could also argue that, given the fertile breeding grounds that prisons prove to be for terrorist sympathisers, that some terrorists may deliberately get incarcerated, so as to have access to other vulnerable inmates who can be easy to indoctrinate.

Van Ness and Strong (1999) highlight how personal, societal and spiritual obstacles often hinder inmates when it comes to reintegration in society. After failing to do so and upon ending back within the prison system, such individuals are even more vulnerable to the advances of terrorists. Van Ness and Strong go on to strengthen this point by highlighting how few released prisoners go on to lead productive, crime free lives following on from their release. For the purposes of this study, the term recidivism is taken to refer to an offender/parolee/probationer who re-commits a
crime or crimes after their initial release from a correctional centre and who has been re-incarcerated.

2.3 Factors Leading Towards Violent Extremism and Radicalization in Prisons

2.3.1 Rehabilitation Programmes in Prisons

Rehabilitation is the result of a process that combines the correction of offending behaviour, human development and the promotion of social responsibility and values (Muntingh, 2005). Muntingh goes on to say that rehabilitation should be viewed as a desired outcome from processes incorporating both the social responsibility of the nation and that of Governmental responsibility. In this regard, rehabilitation should be viewed as a holistic approach of encouraging and incorporating, of social justice and responsibility, active participation in democratic activities, empowerment (including life skills and other skills) and a contribution towards making a better society. It should not be viewed purely as a preventative measure towards crime.

This is of particular importance in Kenya, where crime prevention and counter terrorism measures have typically been of a reactionary and not pro-active nature (K24, 2015). This has proven to be costly and ultimately unsustainable, as the number of terrorists arrested throughout the country has continued to grow (Kenya Prisons Service, 2015). The Government and law enforcement agencies would be better placed to formulate proper rehabilitation programs within the prisons – to take a more holistic approach to rehabilitation, as noted by Muntingh (2005) – than to continue with the status quo. Ultimately, this would help offenders to successfully reintegrate into society and to lead meaningful crime free lives, but what does ‘reintegration’ in this sense truly mean?
The term ‘reintegration’ has been growing in popularity in recent years. The word to some degree mirrors the overall purpose of this topic – that ex inmates can eventually find themselves “re-integrated back into society”. There is a problem with this terminology, however, in that many prisoners never truly felt integrated into society in the first place, so to ‘reintegrate’ is somewhat of a misnomer. This is especially true in Kenya, where it is often the less privileged, the disenfranchised and the neglected who ultimately end up within the prison system. An article from Kenya’s Star newspaper notes that even after release and supposed ‘rehabilitation’, that ex-offenders often feel ‘the scorn, ridicule, discrimination and isolation by the society that they sometimes encounter after their release from makes their free life full of misery’ (The Star Newspaper, 2016). Furthermore, recent research, done mainly in the United Kingdom (2016), has shown that the typical prisoner, or ex-prisoner, has probably never felt part of or integrated into society and the notion of being re-integrated becomes somewhat tenuous (Borzycki & Baldry, 2003).

In Langata women’s prison, for example, a number of inmates are there for seemingly petty crimes, such as hawking. A number of the women spoken to were not well educated and had made a living hawking since they were old enough to do so. The problem, then, may not be due to any inherent fault or flaw within these people, but rather of the system and society in which they grew up in.

‘Rehabilitation’ as a term has its own unwanted connotations too. Borzycki and Baldry (2003) avoid the term rehabilitation given that it originates from within the medical professional and therefore implies that there is pathology in the individual that needs to be corrected. Again, whilst one can argue that being pedantic with language does not
add anything to the discussion, the analysis of such words does raise an interesting point – that many prisoners never did feel integrated into society nor was there a ‘better state’ or way of life, that they could be rehabilitated back to. Many of these people were marginalised and/or excluded by society before they committed their first crime, so it is important to look at what social exclusion really means.

2.3.2 Social Exclusion

The work done by the Social Exclusion Unit of the UK government (2016) in particular alluded to the histories of social exclusion that many prisoners had suffered prior to, and as a result, of their incarceration (Social Exclusion Unit, 2002). As Benazir Bhutto (2014) quoted ‘Extremism can flourish only in an environment where basic governmental social responsibility for the welfare of the people is neglected. Political dictatorship and social hopelessness create the desperation that fuels terrorism and religious extremism.’ Given that there is a link between social exclusion and a person being incarcerated – and given that this paper has shown how being incarcerated and recidivism can lead towards more terrorists being indoctrinated, one can see a logical correlation between social exclusion and terrorism.

Social exclusion can be the result of one or many factors, not just those related to income or wealth. Social exclusion can happen as a result of discrimination, marginalization, unemployment, lack of education, training and low skill sets, poor housing conditions, high rates of crime, family breakdowns, drugs and so on (Schneider, 2015). Whilst any one of these factors could potentially lead to social exclusion, the real problems arise when two or more of these factors combine, as this can often create a vicious cycle. The Social Exclusion Unit (2002) stated that, social
exclusion can happen as a result of problems that face one person in their life. But it can also start from birth. Being born into poverty or to parents with low skills still has a major influence on future life chances.

Looking at the factors that can lead to social exclusion, one can see why there is a lot of social exclusion in Kenya. Firstly, there is a great deal of poverty in the country, which has a knock on effect into other issues. For example, poverty can be linked to lower of accessible education and poor housing, for example. There are few social structures in place to help people in such marginalised situations within Kenya, in comparison to European countries and the United States, for example. This hints once more that a holistic and broad approach towards combating terrorism is key. One needs to understand how socio-economic factors can lead towards an individual becoming socially excluded and in turn, how this may lead that person towards a life of crime.

2.3.4 Increased number of terrorists in the prisons

Over the past ten years, there has been a stark increase in the number of people arrested for terrorism related offenses and those who have radical extremist ideologies, in prisons throughout the world (Ross, 2007). The presence of these inmates may create a new set of challenges that can require different approaches, policies, or practices (Global Center on Cooperative Security, 2016). As mentioned previously, terrorists often use prisons as recruit grounds for other in mates, however the prison staff must also learn to deal with their extremist attitudes and intentions. It is not unheard of for terrorists in incarceration to try to recruit prison officers for terrorism purposes, or try to plot attacks inside or outside prison (Global Center on Cooperative Security, 2016). A report by the Hans Seidel Foundation, which corroborates the recruitment from
within, noted that Al Shabaab were exploiting Kenya’s ill-run prisons, turning them into thriving recruitment grounds (Standard Media Group, March 2017).

Even from interactions during this study with police officers, it was noted how some do not hold up the highest of moral standards. On a number of occasions, bribes were asked for in return for information. Whilst this is a petty example, it illustrates the point that one should not regards all prison officers as ‘good’ – and conversely, especially in light of the previous section on social exclusion, one cannot and should regard all prisoners as ‘bad’.

In contradiction with other scholars, Jerome (2015) argues that since the US attacks of September 11, 2001 (9/11), there had been a large number of home-grown jihadists radicalized in prison. Socio-economic factors and influences have led to the shift of law-abiding citizens to terrorists. This also links to marginalisation and social exclusion – and potentially towards aspects such as the ease of accessibility to information online.

It has become extremely easy to access radical materials from the internet.

With an increasing number of terrorists being incarcerated, the problems surrounding their detention are becoming compounded. Their increasing numbers have started to undermine the effectiveness and safety of the prison system. At a global level there is an increasing recognition of the problem of militant jihadi extremists in prison and their ability to recruit new members among other prisoners (Sinai, 2013). The numbers of such prisoners are low but growing and, as a result, prisons are becoming centres of radicalisation; indeed, in some cases, terrorist plots appear to have been based entirely on networks that were radicalised in prison (Silke, 2014).
Sturgeon (2007) spoke about the growing risk of terrorism in jails and prisons. He stated that:

‘Throughout history prisons have proven to be the targets for numerous disgruntled groups with names such as: terrorists, rebels, freedom fighters, revolutionaries and so on. I don’t think that anyone would argue that prisons throughout history have been places where some horrible atrocities have taken place. In a variety of foreign countries, prisons represent brutal and inhumane governments. These prisons employ torture, murder, rape, mutilation, etc. The international terrorists know only what they have been told. For instance, they don’t know that there are private not-for-profit organizations that set standards for the care and custody of inmates. They also have not been told that inmates can access the courts to address, what they believe to be, constitutional violations of their civil rights. Because of the above example, prisons and jails are seen as tentacles of the “federal” government and thereby are justifiable targets.’ (Sturgeon, 2007).

Sturgeon raises an important issue, which is particularly pertinent in Kenya. Prisons are often seen as extended arms of the Government and as such, the way in which they are regarded often parallels the way in which the ruling government of that country is also regarded. Where there is mistrust or disregard for a country’s government, it is logical that the same mistrust and disregard be extended to the prison system within that country. It is fair to say that Kenya does not have the most stable or transparent of governments, which is fairly typical for countries in the global south. Sturgeon’s point is that prisons in such countries are regarded with even more contempt than they may
otherwise have been, due to the reputation of the government. To add fuel to the fire, there have been a number of cases of police brutality within Kenyan prisons (Mutuma, 2014). Therefore, to expect a terrorist to enter a Kenyan prison and be receptive to ‘rehabilitation’, in whatever form that may take, is a little too optimistic. To address this specific issue, one would again have to take a more holistic approach towards the problem, by addressing the underlying reasons as to why the Government and the prisons have become targets of hatred for certain groups (Wanyama, 2012).

There is a delicate balance to be struck within prisons; strict enough for them to be a deterrent and to keep order, but not the sorts of brutal and inhumane sorts of places that Sturgeon (2007) has described. Indeed, a prison that is too ‘soft’ on its in mates creates the very sort of breeding ground that is trying to be avoided. Some experts in the field believe that Western prisons have already become too soft. Ian Cuthbertson (2011) and the American criminologist Harvey Kushner (2011) have both argued that prisons have become hotbeds for terrorism and that prisons in the US have become the main focus for recruitment by Al Qaeda. They stated that Al Qaeda had ‘taken full advantage of Western prisons and their relatively lax practises’ Cuthbertson & Kushner (2011).

2.3.5 Unemployment

Since there is a notable link between recidivism and terrorism, it is imperative to look at ways to increase the percentage of ex-inmates who successfully reintegrate back into society. Ex-inmates face a number of challenges when trying to reintegrate back into society, which can ultimately act as catalysts towards them reoffending (Loza, 2007). The most plausible reasons to explain the relatively high recidivism rate among released offenders were centered on the offenders’ educational illiteracy, lack of vocational job
skills, lack of interpersonal skills, or criminal history. Particularly, a consistent finding from previous studies showed 89% of them were previously unemployed at the time of their first arrest and 98% were unemployed on their second arrest (Rossman & Roman 2003; Vacca 2004). The released offenders were likely to be “unemployed” after release from prison due to their inadequate education and job skills (Miller & Drake, 2006). Karimi (2011) also noted that employment was the key factor in ensure an ex inmate can successfully reintegrate back into society, noting that finding employment would sustain their financial needs, in order to get by. The Star Newspaper (2016) notes that, ‘Many of the ex-convicts grapple with rejection when seeking employment. “Unfair” denial of job opportunities, ungrounded suspicion at the work place has been the order of day for ex-prisoners seeking a livelihood and those lucky enough to have landed a job. The discrimination and suspicion is rife in the private as well as public sector” (The Star Newspaper, 2016). Kenya National Commission on Human Rights CEO Patricia Nyaundi said in the same article that there should be a lot of public awareness campaigns to help people understand that once someone has served a jail term, they have paid for their crimes and we need to open doors for them and support them to rebuild their lives. She states:-

“We say punishment retributive especially custodial ones. Most of them (ex-prisoners) come out of prisons with nothing and depend of the community around them to help them re-establish their lives. When that support is not present, they are likely to go back to other means to sustain themselves,” (Patricia Nyaundi, The Star Newspaper, 2016).

Employment is already a major challenge for any ordinary youth in Kenya, with unemployment rates as high as 40% countywide and as high as 70% among the youth
(Otieno, 2015). An ex-inmate faces double the challenge with the negative perceptions society holds about prisoners and without a certificate of good conduct, they are the least likely candidate chosen for employment. The few who get employment work in low skilled jobs earning poor wages (Nafisika, 2014). In such conditions, they are unable to make enough to sustain themselves, as well as their families, and are therefore more likely to relapse back to crime and are more vulnerable to being lured into extremism.

Nasser (2011) argues that with unemployment rates being so high, the correlation between unemployment and criminal arrests should be closely looked at. We can see how socio-economic factors within the country – in this case, unemployment rates – may be contributing to a system where criminals are arrested, serve their prison time, then reoffend soon after their release. Statistics have shown that ex inmates are up to 5 times more likely to reoffend if they don’t secure employment (Kenya Prisons Service, 2014). Given this, efforts should be made as part of rehabilitation programs to prepare inmates to secure employment when they are released. This could include educational programmes for inmates, vocational training programmes, or even assisting inmates to gain qualifications during their time in prison (Kundnani, 2009).

2.4 Theoretical Framework

There are numerous theories throughout literature relating to terrorism, violent extremism, social cohesion and radicalization. In the same way that there are few agreed definitions for these terms, due to the number of different disciplines that contribute towards their understanding and research, so too are there a number of different theoretical frameworks, emanating from the different disciplines. Like most ‘theories’
in the social sciences, they are a reflection of the types of thinking and debates that are occurring within any given discipline rather than in terms of formal propositions that have been empirically and conclusively tested (Schmid & Jongman, 1988).

2.4.1 Rational Choice Theory

Rational choice theory suggests that a person deciding whether or not to engage in an act of violent extremism, terrorism or political violence, does so on the evaluation of a cost benefit analysis. That is to say, for an individual, the personal benefits of engaging in such an act, outweigh the negatives. When participating as part of a group, the benefits to the individual are often regarded as ‘selective incentives’, where personal benefit can be gained from acting as a group member. Collective goods or benefits may also be gained for the group or the public, even for individuals who may not have participated (Moore 1995; Muller and Opp 1986 as cited by Eager, 2008). For example, if terrorism and/or violent extremism results in over throwing an oppressive regime, the benefits may be felt by the general public and not just the members of that terrorist group.

This theory relies on a few key assumptions, the first of which being that humans are inherently self-interested and make choices based on the results they are trying to achieve, with minimal material or personal cost. This may not be the case with all instances of terrorism and violent extremism. A potential flaw of this theory also arises, in that individual contribution towards a group’s activity is not always necessary to reap the rewards of the group’s actions. Eager (2008) argues that individuals recognise that their individual contribution to the group will not significantly increase the group's chances of success, and the likelihood of a group succeeding may serve as a disincentive
for individuals not to participate (Eager, 2008). Similarly, an individual who chooses to avoid all costs whilst participating in the group will still benefit from the outcome.

Rational choice theorists have reconsidered their position post-9/11 and now put forward the argument that by not choosing to participate in an act of VE or terrorism equates to adopting a less rational option and ‘selective disincentives increase the costs associated with non-participation’ (Eager, 2008). Eager goes on to outline another consider, however, in that if a group is successful in its objectives, there may not be any direct and specific gain for an individual who participated (for example, financial reward or a promotion within the group). Therefore, personal incentives of participation could be viewed to be neutral.

### 2.4.2 Structural or Societal Theory

Given the shortcomings of rational choice theory when considering individual verses group incentives, a new theory has come to the fore. Structural or Societal Theory states that ‘violent political groups choose political violence as a strategic method’ and that ‘the group possesses collective preferences or values and selects terrorism as a course of action from a range of perceived alternatives’ (Eager, 2008 citing Crenshaw 1990; Gurr, 2006; Sinai, 2007). The difference between this theory and rational choice theory, then, is that here, individuals have a rational choice but the problems associated with individuals being ‘free riders’ is not applicable. Here, individuals are aware that without their participation a group’s objectives are unattainable.

In addition to the above, structural theorists state that, psychological factors can act as limitations to an individual’s rational choice (Eager, 2008 cites Crenshaw 1990; Ranstorp, 2007).
2.4.3 Relative Deprivation Theory

With relative deprivation theory, theorists believe that an individual’s motives stem from comparing themselves with others and believing that in some way they are deprived, be that politically, socially or economically. This theory is mostly used by economists, sociologists and psychologists, who argue that individuals who score poorly on socioeconomic variables are at risk of radicalisation or violence. This stems from the belief that poor socioeconomic performance (i.e. poverty, unemployment and underemployment, low educational attainment) leads to frustration, which makes them susceptible to radicalisation (Al-Lami, 2009). This was noted as a contributing factor towards terrorism, incarceration and recidivism on numerous occasions during my research on the matter in Kenya, where social exclusion could lead to an individual becoming particularly vulnerable to exploitation. (Pargeter, 2006). Pargeter suggests that young, male, North African illegal immigrants, who are already in precarious situations as a result of this status, coupled with increased religiosity and general radicalisation of opinion among North Africans make them a highly susceptible group to accepting extreme religious interpretation. Such people are deemed “highly unstable characters”, who are prone to violence and utilise Islam to justify their actions (Pargeter, 2006). Such behaviour can be seen in the West too, however. Here, factors such as higher educational achievement and socioeconomic status as well as marriage, is associated with decreased likelihood of criminal offending. While short-term goals of terrorism may include obtaining funding and resources, the long-term-goals are not financially motivated (Mullins, 2009).

2.4.4 Psychological Theories
Psychological theories of terrorism and violent extremism are primarily focussed on understanding how groups of factors might lead to an individual engaging in such activities (Al-Lami, 2009). Psychological theorists look at the personalities and mental functioning of terrorists to try to ascertain why they may have become radicalized. Authors of this field are not necessarily psychologists or psychiatrists by profession but rather draw their conclusions on psychological responses to sociological influences or the result of individual mental illness and/or trauma (Brynjar & Katja, 2005). Further, psychological profiling attempts have failed to provide a consistent ‘terrorist profile’ (Al-Lami, 2009). For example, terrorists have been seen to come from both wealthy and poor backgrounds, from all levels of academic achievement; from both married and single backgrounds; from a history of crime, or those who have never previously offended. This makes profiling a terrorist very difficult.

About the only thing ‘jihadi’ terrorists have in common is that they appear to be exceedingly ‘normal’ under most measures (Al-Lami, 2009; Githens-Mazer, 2010; Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2010; Brighton, 2007; Vidino, 2009; Githens-Mazer and Lambert, 2010). As a result, the standard socioeconomic explanations for radicalization have failed to explain the variety of profiles seen when researching terrorists.

2.5 Countering Violent Extremism

As per many of the definitions already discussed in this paper, the idea of ‘countering violent extremism’ is not well defined. This may be as a result of its foundations in Government policy, rather than in literary articles and research papers. Where the literature does exist, it tends to describe ‘countering violent extremism’, as strategies that aim to respond to, or prevent violence, with recommendations for policy rather than
on understanding how ‘countering violent extremism’ is constituted and emerges in particular ways. Despite the lack of authorship on the subject, there are some general ideas and themes that can be gleaned from written material on the matter.

Understandings of violent extremism and countering violent extremism are mutually constitutive. What this suggests is that the ways in which violent extremism is conceptualised informs how counter strategies are developed and applied (Coaffee, 2006; Goldsmith, 2008). As a result of this, as ‘countering violent extremism’ becomes better researched and understood, so too does a better understanding of what exactly violent extremism is in the first place. This symbionticism is important to understand, as it can help to explain how the conceptualisation how violence enables particular responses, but also might reduce and exclude other possibilities. Crelinsten (2009) states that, “How people talk about problems, frame them, and conceptualise them often determines what they do about them...restricting their imagination and narrowing their options”.

The dominant frame for understanding the threat of violent extremism and terrorism, as presented in the contemporary literature, is that of transnational Islamist networks. This frame has largely become dominant in the context of the post 9/11 US led ‘War on Terror’ and is associated with ‘new’ forms of terrorism characterised by networks driven by extremist and political Islamic ideology of which al-Qaeda constitutes the exemplar (De Graaff, 2010; B.M. Jenkins, 2002). Such networks are widely regarded as the single most contributing factor threatening the safety of Western countries – and indeed, from my studies, in Eastern Africa as well. Kundnani argues, however, that this almost singular focus on what is considered ‘extremist Islam’ is reductive and excludes
analyses “which focus less on religio-cultural ideology and more on terrorism as a manifestation of a political conflict over western foreign policy or as part of a general problem of youth violence” Kundnani (2009).

Considering global networks as the key contributing factors towards Western safety, does put the emphasis on the root cause being ‘global’ in nature. Pollard states that, “Modern globalisation resulted in modern terrorism” Pollard (2007). This somewhat new global threat is characterised by “shifting networks, constantly mutating configurations and constellations” (B.M. Jenkins, 2002). As a response to the growing threat of global terrorist networks, scholars have called to “develop new and more effective diplomatic and other tools as well as nonconventional ways of dealing with this new form of terrorism”(Albini, 2001), however, some scholars have questioned whether this ‘new’ form of terrorism really is that new – and whether indeed it requires new ‘counter-terrorism’ measures that are distinctly different from previous approaches (e.g. McCulloch, & Lentini, Pickering, Wright-Neville, 2007).

It is generally accepted, despite questions as to how different modern terrorism is to that of old, is that violent extremism and terrorism require an integration of domestic and international responses such that “the traditional separation between domestic and foreign policy can no longer be strictly maintained” (Crelinsten, 2007). Multilateral solutions must be formulated to ‘counter networks with networks’ (Ranstorp, 2006). To do this would require partnerships between governments and nations so that the various actors of law enforcement and policy making can work together (Byman, 2006; Huq, 2008; B.M. Jenkins, 2002; O’Neil, 2007; Ogilvie-White, 2006; Pollard, 2007; Ross, 2007). Such partnerships need to be supported by a “framework of international and
regional cooperation and global governance” Crelinsten (2007). This viewpoint is shared by Huq, who notes that collaborative and multi-disciplinary approaches through partnerships within national governments and between governments, non-government organisations, industry groups and civil society (Huq, 2008; Kokoda Foundation, 2008; Wilkinson, 2001).

Other scholars have noted that new and multifaceted approaches are needed to counter modern terrorism (Atran, 2004; Crelinsten, 2009; Mroz, 2009). This is partly strategies are due to the fact that counter terrorism measure are increasingly oriented towards preventative rather than reactive approaches. In this context ‘traditional’ countering approaches involving military, policing, intelligence and legislation are seen as necessary but insufficient to establish an effective and sustainable long term strategy for preventing violent extremism (Crelinsten, 2009; Freedman, 2005).

In response to the call for a more global response to terrorist networks, the importance of “public-private partnerships” has been increasingly referenced in literature (Kokoda Foundation, 2008: 174; Michaels, 2008; Pollard, 2007; Whitaker, 2008). It has been noted that the private sector are increasingly important in responding to the threat of terrorism, as the targets of such attacks are becoming more diverse, thus requiring more actors to form part of a cohesive response to the threat. Pollard notes that the critical infrastructure that might be targeted by violent extremists “are about 90 percent owned by private sector providers” (Kokoda Foundation, 2008; Pollard, 2007) entails implications for corporate responsibility and therefore potentially accountability (Michaels, 2008) in relation to securing and protecting infrastructure. Kokoda goes on to note that the private sector is also increasingly being viewed as an alternative source
of intelligence (Kokoda Foundation, 2008). Other scholars warn, however, that issues
arise regarding “security and privacy risks when involving the private sector” in
information sharing (Napoleoni & Carisch, 2005)

Responding to the root causes of modern day terrorism therefore requires a cohesive
approach to countering violent extremism, which needs to be embedded in
consideration of the social, economic, political and historical contexts in which violence
arises and the applicability and transferability of strategies between nations (Guiora,
2009; Richmond, 2003). Brimley suggests that part of new counter terrorism measure
must be in capacity building and innovation (Brimley, 2006). Other notable counter
terrorism strategies can typically be categorised under either ‘soft’ or ‘hard’ strategies.
‘Hard’ power is conceptualised as “a means to achieve desired outcomes through the
ostensible use of force” (Coronado, 2005) and strategies include military intervention,
coercive diplomacy, and economic sanctions for example (Wilson III, 2008). ‘Soft’
power was proposed by Nye in 1990 and conceptualised in terms of power that “co-ops
people rather than coerces them” (Nye Jr., 2008). Soft power is associated with
“intangible assets such as an attractive personality, culture, political values and
institutions, and policies that are seen as legitimate or having moral authority” (Nye Jr.,
2008) and encompasses nearly everything other than economic and military power
(Wilson III, 2008). From my review, it is clear that there is a general consensus for a
multifaceted approach to counter terrorism that combines hard and soft power strategies
(Bergin, Jones, & Ungerer, 2007; Cvrtila & Perešin, 2009).
CHAPTER THREE: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

3.1 Methods of Data Collection

Data collection refers to the ways in which relevant data and information can be obtained with regards to a particular study or research topic for a given study. In this paper, three different data collection techniques were used, namely, observation from visiting prisons, a survey and secondary data (data, which is already available in the public realm).

3.2 Survey

For this study, two different survey approached were utilised. The first was a descriptive survey, which aims to research how various behaviours and events are instrumental in among others, describing the factors that lead to violent extremism and recidivism in the Kenya of prisons. It also looked at the prison officers and the prison system that seek to detain and potentially rehabilitate incarcerated terrorists. The analytic survey looks more towards the ‘how’ and ‘why’ questions associated with understanding why certain individuals become terrorists and how the system plays a role in what can sometimes be regarded as a vicious cycle of arrest, detention, radicalisation, release and re-offence. The analytics survey looks specifically at the relationship socio-economic factors and the status of offenders and ex-offenders, with the quality of supervision (and/or rehabilitation) and the success in the rehabilitation of offenders.

Having been granted access to prison officers and prisoners in two Kenyan prisons (Langata Womens and Shimo la Tewa), structured face to-face interviews with individuals were carried out. There were conducted in secluded rooms, where the respondents' confidentiality of responses was secured. Group interviews were avoided.
as this may have deterred inmates and prison staff from speaking openly about their views, beliefs and experiences. There was significant fear of victimization of ex-prisoners and prison officers, which also necessitated individual interviews. Individual identities have been concealed by deliberately omitting to record their names against interviews. Indeed, often the names of the people being interviewed were not known.

In total 30 ex-inmates were interviewed and 25 prison officers.

The ex-inmates were sources through a couple of different channels. Firstly, the Clean Start organization helped to set up a number of interviews with ex-inmates. Clean Start is a social enterprise organization that helps to break the chronic poverty-petty crimes-incarceration cycle and as such, they have contact with many ex-offenders. In addition to this, the Nafisika trust helped to source a number of ex-inmates. Nafisika Trust is a prison rehabilitation programme designed to provide opportunities to inmates through education, arts and sports.

At the end of the structured part of each interview, the ex-inmate or prison staff member was prompted to add any additional comments or points that they may want to get across. As part of the structured interview segment, both fixed and open ended type questions were asked – all within the scope of the research topic, so as to confirm the validity of the process. Each interviewee was asked the same questions and in the same order as each other as a means to aid comparability and the reliability of responses. This approach proved to be crucial when analysing the results of the interviews. Whilst the interviews questions were written in English and whilst some of the interviews were verbally conducted in English, on a number of occasions Kiswahili was used instead, in order to facilitate easier communication of the part of the interviewee. In the formal
parts of the survey, qualitative data, like the socio-economic profile of offenders, ex-offenders and their families, the types of crimes committed by offenders, the prison environment and system within district and the impact of imprisonment on ex-prisoners (and the people close to them) was obtained.

In addition to the data gleaned from the face-to-face one on one interviews, a great deal of qualitative data was also obtained. This included data such as, inmate population within each prison (and district), the number of prison staff at each facility, the lengths of sentences being served by the inmates and the sorts of crimes they have committed, the financial provisions available to each institution and the infrastructural facilities available within the district. Where available, data was also collected regarding the estimated levels of income of the inmates and the prison staff working within the districts. Other ad-hoc interviews with interested parties were also carried out as a means of enriching the other data obtained. Such interviews included the District security Intelligence Officer, the Officer Commanding Police Division, the District Probation Officer and other members of prison staff (and indeed the public). This data was mostly qualitative in nature and helped to give some perspective on the quantitative data obtained.

### 3.3 Observation

Alongside the structured interviews that were undertaken, the observational technique was also used as a tool of scientific enquiry for data collection – the results of which were mostly used to supplement the data obtained during the interview process. Simple observational techniques were used to obtain data relating to the types (quantity and quality) of the physical prison infrastructure, the facilities available to prison staff and
inmates, as well as the day to day movement of inmates, the prison staff and so on. Some notable observations included; some inmates were not housed in suitable standard accommodation, often residing in worn out dilapidated houses; inmates often had very bad tattered clothing (in fact, this was observed with prison officers as well); children of inmates often did not attend school or have any form of formal education; many inmates did not look healthy and presented as if they may have serious health conditions; inmates were often transported in overcrowded buses and vans and that there were no real rehabilitation programmes.

3.4 Secondary Data

The secondary data used in this study, obtained by the researcher, mostly included governmental records, scholarly articles on violent extremism and recidivism, statistical records, journals, books, scientific papers and information available in mass media.

One important source of secondary data was the Central Bureau of Statistics' library at the Ministry of Planning and Development in Nairobi. This provided key statistics on the sorts of crimes typically reported in Kenya each year, broken down by region. This library also offered insights into the various facilities available at Langata Women’s prison over the years, the lengths of sentences typically served by inmates there and so forth. As per the literary review section of this study, a great number of books and resources from the field of Criminology and Sociology were also analysed. These provided insights into information on imprisonment, violent extremism and recidivism both globally and within Kenya. Publically available documents on crime, terrorism, recidivism and imprisonment compiled from various workshops, conferences and
seminars also proved to be useful sources of information. Finally, television and radio broadcasts, as well as articles from various newspapers and magazines (‘mass media’) also aided in obtaining useful data. These particularly helped to give a view on past and statistics regarding the crime problem in Kenya, and regarding the reforms being undertaken in the field of penology and correctional policy.

3.5 Data Analysis

Data was analyzed both qualitatively and quantitatively. Qualitative method was used to analyze the data collected through questionnaires. Data was then presented in the form of frequency distribution tables and graphs that facilitated description and explanation of the study findings.

3.6 Ethical Consideration for Human Subjects of Research

Given the sensitive nature of the study, respondents were not comfortable giving information that may be held against them, therefore they were very sceptical to give information at first. After assuring them that this would be used only in my research and showing them the consent, they were able to talk but preferred anonymity.

Informed Consent: The respondents were provided with a summary of the key aspects of the interview prior to the commencing of the interview.

Anonymity: Respondents were informed before the interview that they would remain anonymous and any information they give will be confidential and used only for the purpose of academic research.
Interview Ethics: The interviews are conducted in a pleasant relaxing atmosphere with sufficient privacy. As far as possible, the interviews were conducted in premises the respondents felt most comfortable.

Permission to carry out the Research: The researcher had to get permission from the Kenya Prisons Headquarters to be allowed to carry out the research.
CHAPTER FOUR: DATA PRESENTATION

4.1 Introduction

This chapter makes use of descriptive statistics and quantitative data that was collected from the field during research, regarding radicalization, violent extremism and recidivism in Kenya. The data is mostly related to socio-economic and demographic details of the respondents, who were mostly ex-inmates and prison staff members from Langata Women’s Prison in Nairobi, Shimo La Tewa Prison in Mombassa and Kamiti Prison in Nairobi.

4.2 Socio-Demographic Characteristics of Study Sample

As previously indicated, this study focused on two main groups of respondents; ex-prisoners and prison officials. In total, 30 ex-inmates and 25 prison officials were interviewed. Of the 25 prison officers, 4 held senior positions within the prison. In this section, the socio-demographic details of the two groups are presented, starting with the ex-prisoners. For both groups, details are given regarding age, gender, ethnicity, marital status, level of income and education. For ease of interpretation, percentages have been rounded down to the nearest whole number in the discussions.

4.3 Socio-Demographic Characteristics of Ex-Prisoners

Out of the 30 ex-inmates interviewed, 20 were male and 10 female. This was not a surprising finding, given that males are typically and historically associated with committing more crimes than women. In addition, it is worth noting that a number of ex-inmates were referred by Langata Women’s prison. Without this association, the percentage of males interviewed would probably be a lot higher. Men are typically seen as the main providers for families where income is concerned, which may be a possible
explanation for this, in terms of financial motivation. This also mirrors the statistics that young males and youths comprise the key demographic for terrorist organizations throughout the world, not just in East Africa.

*Table 1: Gender of Ex-Prisoner Respondents*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>73.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>26.6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Research Data (2017)*

The age demographics of ex-inmates showed that the majority were between the ages of 20 to 29 years, with 43% being in this grouping. After this, the most popular age group was between 30 and 39 years, with 40% of respondents being inside this category. Few inmates were younger than 20, or older 40. This again is fairly typical of what one would imagine in terms of the spread of ages amongst offender – with the expectation that most would be youth or young adults. This falls in line with Kenyan crime statistics and indeed the statistics regarding the typical ages of people typically involved with or recruited into terrorism, where ‘the typical age that seems to be targeted is youth, between the ages of 15-30’ (IBRD, 2015). This echoes what Schneider (2015) notes, in that young males and youths comprise the key demographic for terrorist organizations throughout the world, not just in East Africa. Boko Haram fighters in West Africa are mostly teenagers and the average age of an ISIS recruit is just 26 years old (Schneider, 2015).

The average age of ex-offenders further amplifies the need for measures to be made to increase the likelihood of their successful reintegration to society once they have been
released, as they are still very much of ‘working age’ – and will most likely have financial burdens and responsibilities to cater for, both for themselves, but also for family members. Indeed, lack of employment and financial freedom has been seen in the literary review as being one of the key components contributing towards individuals committing crimes in the first place.

Table 2: Age of Ex-Prisoner Respondents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age at time of imprisonment</th>
<th>Current Age</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Frequency</td>
<td>Percentage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-19</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20-29</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-39</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40-49</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Research Data (2017)

The level of education of former inmates was researched, in order to establish if there is any link between education and incarceration. The results are implicitly compared with higher levels of education that might be expected in the general population. The results showed that the majority of ex-offenders had a primary level education, but no more. In addition to this, all respondents were asked whether or not they furthered their education on being released from prison. All responded in the negative. This highlights another of the issues for inmates when trying to reintegrate into society, that they are either not motivated to, or are not given adequate opportunities to further their level of education. This in turn would feed into their challenge of securing suitable employment. This confirms Schneider’s (2015) comments about lack of education as a key factor of social exclusion, in that Social exclusion can happen as a result of discrimination, marginalization, unemployment, lack of education, training and low skill sets, poor
housing conditions, high rates of crime, family breakdowns, drugs and so on (Schneider, 2015).

Table 3: Level of Formal Education of Ex-Prisoner Respondents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level of Education at time of imprisonment</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>16.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>56.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>23.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3.3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Research Data (2017)

One of the leading contributing factors where social exclusion was concerned was in the rate of unemployment of offenders and repeat offenders. To that end, the former inmates where asked about their current employment status and their status at the time they were arrested (for their first offence).

The results showed that before being arrested, 60% of respondents were unemployed, with only 6% being in full time paid employment. Other respondents were carrying out manual ad-hoc labour for money. Their current employment status was not much more encouraging, suggesting that the ex-inmates were little more equipped to find work after being released from prison than they were in the first place. 16% were now in full time employment, however 33% remained unemployed, with the rest carrying out ad-hoc or part time work. This is not surprising, given the difficulty that ex inmates have in finding work, however it does suggest that there is a long way to go in providing support and suitable training so that ex inmates can successfully reintegrate into society after being released from prison. This echoes Otieno’s (2015) comment, that
employment is already a major challenge for any ordinary youth in Kenya, with unemployment rates as high as 40% countywide and as high as 70% among the youth (Otieno, 2015).

Table 4: Employment Before and After Imprisonment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Employment status before being arrested</th>
<th>Current employment status after being re-released</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Frequency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Full time employment</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Part time employment</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ad-hoc employment (manual jobs)</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not employed</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Research Data (2017)

One of the most challenging questions asked of the ex-inmates was regarding whether or not they had been approached by terrorists and/or violent extremists or those with radicalized views during their time in incarceration. It is assumed that some ex-inmates were not willing to discuss this openly for fear that they may somehow be seen to be involved with terrorist groups or activities. To address this issue, the option of ‘I would rather not say’, was given to the respondents, rather than a simple yes or no. The questioning focussed on two main areas; 1) whether or not the respondent had ever been in the same room as a known terrorist(s) within the prison and 2) whether they felt a terrorist or violent extremist had ever tried to coerce them into terrorist related activities, ideologies or beliefs during their time in incarceration.
The results of these questions were very worrying – and this is despite the obvious apprehension of the respondents to discuss openly about such matter. Of the 30 ex-inmates surveyed, over 70% reported that they believed to have been in the same room as a known terrorist or violent extremist during their time in prison. Of that 70%, over 26% went on to say that they believed they had been approached by a terrorists or violent extremist during their time in prison, with the remit of being coerced into terrorist related activities, ideologies or beliefs. This data strongly supports the finding from the literary review – that prisons are often hotbeds for terrorist recruitment. This concurs with Rappaport’s (2012) findings, that terrorists typically use their time in incarceration to try to recruit other inmates into terrorism (Rappaport, 2012).

In order to combat this, stronger efforts need to be made to segregate known terrorists, violent extremists and individuals who are known to have anti-social and radicalized views.

Table 5: Respondent Contact with Terrorists during Incarceration

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Were you ever in the same room as a known terrorist, violent extremist or person with radical ideological views during your time in prison?</th>
<th>Do you believe any terrorists or violent extremists ever tried to coerce you into terrorist related activities, ideologies or beliefs during your time in incarceration?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Frequency Percentage</td>
<td>Frequency Percentage</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>73.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rather not say</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6.6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Research Data (2017)
The literary review identified a need for rehabilitation programs to be viewed as ‘a holistic approach of encouraging and incorporating, of social justice and responsibility, active participation in democratic activities, empowerment (including life skills and other skills) and a contribution towards making a better society. It should not be viewed purely as a preventative measure towards crime. This is of particular importance in Kenya, where crime prevention and counter terrorism measures have typically been of a reactionary and not pro-active nature. In this light, it was important to research how ex-offenders would comment on the rehabilitation (if any) they received during their time in prison. Only 26% of respondents indicated that they had received some form of rehabilitation during their time in prison. Of the 8 respondents who answered in the affirmative, only 1 believed that the rehabilitation helped them to ultimately reintegrate into society.

The findings here again support some of the key points from the literary review, in that there is typically a lack of effective rehabilitation programs within prisons. This in turn leads to ex-inmates failing to gain jobs after being released from prison, failing to reintegrate back into society and ultimately falling back into a life of crime. Thus, rehabilitation programs are not currently effective in addressing the problem of recidivism. This certainly seems true in Kenya, if this sample set of results is anything to go by. This is especially worrying, as resources (all be they limited) are spent towards rehabilitation and training programs for inmates, yet they are shown to be ineffective in addressing the problems they are supposed to help resolve. This particularly echoes Munting’s (2005) views, that The Government and law enforcement agencies would be better placed to formulate proper rehabilitation programs within the prisons – to take a
more holistic approach to rehabilitation, as noted by Muntingh (2005) – than to continue with the status quo.

Table 6: Rehabilitation Programmes and Ex-Offenders

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Did you receive any form of rehabilitation, training or education during your time in prison?</th>
<th>Do you feel as though the rehabilitation you underwent in prison helped you to reintegrate back into society and find suitable employment?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Frequency</td>
<td>Percentage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Research Data (2017)

Table 7: Types of Rehabilitation / Training Undertaken by Inmates

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>What type of rehabilitation or training did you receive?</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Industrial / Vocational</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>12.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Building</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farming</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>37.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Counselling / Mentorship</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>12.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Welfare / Chaplaincy</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>12.5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Research Data (2017)

In trying to investigate the shortcomings of resources and police capacity to deal with the rehabilitation of offenders, questions were asked of the former inmates, to ascertain their views on how well equipped they believed prison staff were to help with their rehabilitation and successful reintegration into society on their release. In particular, the respondents were asked whether or not they felt the wardens cared about their rehabilitation, or if ‘punishment’ was the main focus of the warden’s work.
Only 16% of respondents felt that the prison wardens they encountered during their time in imprisonment cared about their rehabilitation, however, more worrying than this was that 70% of respondents had either been victim of, or had witnessed, police brutality or bullying during their time in prison. Whilst this should never be acceptable, of course, in the context of the issue of rehabilitation, it is a far cry from the idea of prison staff helping to suitably equip inmates for a life after release. To expect an inmate, be they a terrorist or otherwise, to be receptive to ‘rehabilitation’, in whatever form that may take, under such conditions, is a little too optimistic. After all, terrorists are usually strongly opposed to the government and regime that has detained them in the first instance, so for them to be brutalised by the very people they oppose, only serves to strengthen their ideologies and beliefs. This was mentioned in the literary study, which noted that, to address this specific issue, one would again have to take a more holistic approach by addressing the underlying reasons as to why the Government and the prisons have become targets of hatred for certain groups. Particularly, Mutuma (2014) noted that, there have been a number of cases of police brutality within Kenyan prisons. As the results of this research have shown, the systematic failures that facilitate police brutality and the bullying of inmates need to be addressed as well.
### Table 8: Prison Staff and Rehabilitation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Do you feel that prison warden’s cared about your rehabilitation and made positive steps towards rehabilitating you?</th>
<th>Did you witness or experience any bullying, intimidation or brutality from prison staff during your time in prison?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Frequency</td>
<td>Percentage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>16.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>66.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>16.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Would rather not say</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Research Data (2017)

### 4.4 Socio-Demographic Characteristics of Prison Wardens

The majority of officers in Shimo La Tewa and Kamiti Prisons were male. In fact, from the officers interviewed in these prisons, only 1 was female. In Langata women’s prison, all wardens were female. Given that the average criminal tends to be male, there is no surprise that the majority of officers tend to be male. Similarly, prison warden jobs are typically regarded as being more male dominated, possibly due to the physical risk involved in undertaking such a position.

The majority of respondents were aged in the 30-39 category, with 43.4%. After this, the most prevalent categories were 40-49, 50-59 and 20-29 in respective order of prevalence.
Table 9: Age of Prison Warden Respondents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age category of prison warden</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>20-29</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-39</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>43.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40-49</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>36.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50-59</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>13.3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Research Data (2017)

In this section of research, the prison wardens were asked which aspect of their job functionality they felt was most important. This was to ascertain the percentage of wardens who regard the rehabilitation of inmates as being one of their primary focuses. In order to disguise the reason for the question (thus, to hopefully receive a more honest response), the wardens were given a number of options to choose from, each with 2 or more key job functionalities.

The results show that the majority of wardens (40%) regard their primary job function to be in the general supervision and protection of inmates. The second and third most popular categories were ‘training and rehabilitating inmates’ and ‘furthering inmate education levels and life skills’, with 23.3% and 20% respectively. These figures are somewhat encouraging, however as the results from the survey carried out with the ex-offenders show, clearly the types of training and rehabilitation programs being offered are falling short of the mark and are not actually effective.
Table 10: Job Function Importance as Regarded by Prison Wardens

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Which job functionalities do you regard as most important as a prison warden?</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>General supervision and protection of inmates</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training and rehabilitating inmates</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>23.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spiritual and Vocational Guidance</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Punishing and Rehabilitating inmates</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Furthering inmate education levels and life skills</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Research Data (2017)

With prisons often being used as recruitment centres for terrorists – and with a growing number of known terrorists being arrested and incarcerated, there is a clear need for police officers to be suitably sensitized and trained to deal with such people. Training should be focussed towards equipping officers to identify potential terrorists within the prison, to keep terrorists away from other prison inmates and strategies to adopt to try to de-radicalise such inmates. The literary study suggested that officers did not typically have the training to deal with such inmates and the Prisons Service lacked adequate and well trained guidance and counselling personnel (Ministry of Home Affairs, 1998).

The results show that the majority of prison wardens to not feel suitably equipped to deal with terrorist, violent extremist and radicalized inmates, with only 7 respondents out of 30 stating that they do feel equipped. A more worrying statistic from this sample set, however, is that only 6% of wardens interviewed had received any form of formal vocational training to help then to deal with terrorist and violent extremist inmates. This reaffirms Schneider (2015) who noted that, typically, prison authorities are not properly equipped to deal with these challenges and so opportunities are missed to de-radicalize terrorists. This has been noted in several studies globally (Schneider, 2015). With a lack
of understanding of such issues, it is easy to ascertain by deduction why there are such high rates of terrorist recidivism - the prison staff are not suitably equipped to de-radicalize and disengage such inmates.

Further conversations with prison wardens noted that terrorists and violent extremists often mix with other inmates who are incarcerated for other crimes, which are often petty in nature. In fact, a number of respondents stated that they often do not know the crimes that have led to each individual being incarcerated. It would therefore be impossible for those wardens to impose any form of segregation.
Table 11: De-radicalization Training and Sensitizing of Wardens to Terrorist, Violent Extremist and Radicalized Inmates

Do you feel adequately equipped to deal with terrorist, violent extremist and radicalized inmates? Have you received any formal vocational training to help you understand the sensitivities of dealing with terrorist and violent extremist inmates?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>23.3%</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>73.3%</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>93.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't know</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3.3%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Research Data (2017)
CHAPTER FIVE: SUMMARY OF FINDINGS, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

In this chapter, the various findings from the paper will be discussed, including those from the literary review and the data collection. From these, conclusions will be drawn and recommendations made towards policy formulation and implementation regarding the best approach in dealing with violent extremism, terrorism and recidivism within the Kenyan prison system. Further areas of study may also be suggested, where appropriate.

5.1 Summary of Findings

The purpose of this study was to examine the link between violent extremism and recidivism within the Kenyan prison system. The assumption before embarking on the study was that the imprisonment of terrorists did not play a part in the de-radicalization or disengagement of those individuals from terrorist activities. In this regard, anti-terrorism rehabilitation programmes within the prisons were looked at to ascertain why they may or may not be successful, along with the capacity of the prison system and staff to deal with the rehabilitation of detained terrorists. In addition to this, the role that prison environments play as recruitment grounds for new terrorists was also investigated, which suggested that prisons not only fail to deter existing terrorists, but may actually contribute towards more individuals becoming radicalized. More generally, factors that lead to an individual becoming involved in terrorism or violent extremism, such as social exclusion, were looked at. By understanding such issues more thoroughly, it was hoped that more comprehensive conclusions and recommendation could be made.
The findings of the study showed terrorism to be a global problem, with young men typically being the perpetrators of such acts. Scholars noted, however, that the youth should also be seen as part of the ‘solution’ to terrorism and not just part of the problem. In Kenya, case studies were given to show how young men between the ages of 15-20 were typically targeted by terrorists with the remit of recruiting them into their terrorist groups and ideologies. With an increase in the number of terrorist attacks, both globally and within Kenya, the number of terrorists being arrested and incarcerated has also increased. It was shown that this has led to a new problem – that incarcerated terrorists often use their time within prison to try to recruit other inmates into their terrorist groups. Given that many inmates are in a vulnerable state, it is often easy for terrorists to influence and manipulate them. The use of prisons as terrorist recruitment hot beds was shown to be a historical and global problem, though indeed there has been a significant rise in this activity in recent years.

Recidivism was defined as the relapse into criminal activity and is generally measured by a former prisoner’s return to prison for a new offence. The rate of recidivism in Kenya is estimated to be about two thirds, which means that two thirds of released inmates will be re-incarcerated after their release from prison (Kenya Prisons Service, 2014). Given this statistic, a clear association was shown between recidivism and terrorism, due to the prison system acting as a catalyst for terrorist recruitment. This led to questioning the capacity of the prison system to deal with the rehabilitation of terrorists and what can be done to improve the system and reduce the rates of recidivism. This included factors concerning a terrorist or inmate whilst they are inside the prison system, such as the effectiveness of rehabilitation programmes and factors
relevant to those people after they are ultimately released. In this regard, the variables that contributes to the success or otherwise of an ex-inmate reintegrating into society were looked at. De-radicalization and disengagement were researched, along with the various theories associated with why a person may embark on terrorist activities and the motivators that may subsequently make them stop.

Key factors were shown to contribute towards a person failing into a life of crime, be it for a first offence or after re-offending. One such factor was social exclusion, which can happen as a result of discrimination, marginalization, unemployment, lack of education, training and low skill sets, poor housing conditions, and high rates of crime, family breakdowns, and drugs and so on. Of these, the failure of an ex-inmate to find suitable employment after leaving prison, was shown to be of particular importance. Therefore, it was concluded that preparing inmates for employment upon leaving prison was very important in lowering recidivism rates.

**5.1.2 Prisons as Recruitment Centres for Terrorists**

The notion of prisons being recruitment grounds for terrorists has been discussed at length in this paper, specifically within the literary review section. Inmates are often vulnerable to influence and can be easily manipulated and brainwashed by those with radical beliefs and ideologies. The findings from the data collected have shown that this is indeed a real problem on the ground, with over 26% of ex-inmates reporting that they had been approached by people they believed to be terrorists or violent extremists during their time in prison. Other ex-inmates interviews were clearly reluctant to divulge such information and responded that they would rather not say.
5.1.3 Social Exclusion, Unemployment and Recidivism

The role of various factors that can lead to an individual being excluded from society were investigated as part of the literary study, with levels of unemployment being seen to have a specifically strong correlation with criminal offence and recidivism. The findings from the ex-inmate interviews correlated with this, with 60% of respondents being unemployed before their first arrest and 33% currently remaining unemployed.

5.1.4 Rehabilitation Programs and Inmate Services

The study investigates the supervision of inmates and the activities within prison to help inmates to not reoffend after their release, such as the various rehabilitation programmes that are offered. The data collected showed that where rehabilitation programmes were offered, the programmes did not reach all of the inmates, so efforts should be made to strengthen their reach. From the data collected, it was shown that only 26% of respondents had received formal training or rehabilitation whilst in prison. Most responses from ex-prisoners who had undertaken such programmes during their time in incarceration, suggested that the focus of the programmes was mostly towards vocational training. There was a general consensus, however, that this training was somewhat of a token gesture and for the prison ‘to be seen to be doing the right thing’, rather than really offering a tangible solution to the rates of ex-offenders finding employment after their release. As an extension of these findings, a number of prisoners reported that they did not feel as though prison helps to rehabilitate or de-radicalize most offenders.

5.1.5 Punishment vs Rehabilitation
Another issue raised by ex-inmates was that prison officers often brutalised and/or tortured them during their time in prison and that prison staff appeared to view ‘punishment’ as their primary role, rather than to help rehabilitate offenders. The data collected from the prison officers did not correlate with this, unsurprisingly, with the majority of officers noting that they believed their primary job function was in the general supervision and protection of inmates. It was, of course, difficult to have any form of meaningful conversation about brutality and bullying with prison officers, as they were afraid of self-criticism and did not want to incriminate themselves by admitted inhumane treatment of prisoners. Worryingly, 70% of inmates suggested that they had either been subject to, or had witnessed police brutality or bullying.

5.1.6 The Capacity of Prisons to Rehabilitation of Offenders

Recidivism rates are a good way to establish whether or not inmates are successfully rehabilitated during their time within prison and as the results of this study show, there is still a long way to go in addressing the problem. Recidivism rates remain very high within Kenya, thus strengthening the notion that prisons are not playing a pivotal role in changing the patterns of reoffending for former inmates.

Further anecdotal findings from conversations with prison staff and ex-offenders suggested that the majority of prisoners incarcerated are there due to petty offenses, yet little to no effort is typically made to prevent petty offenders from mixing with more serious offenders, such as those convicted for terrorist related crimes. Not only does this lead to otherwise petty offenders becoming ‘hardened’ by more serious offenders (through acquiring more sophisticated criminal skills), but it also means that petty offenders are susceptible to approaches made by incarcerated terrorists. If rehabilitation
programs achieve any success whatsoever, it can be argued that the mixing of petty and serious offenders negates any such benefits. The Ministry of Home Affairs (1979) reported that in 1978, Kenyan prisons were holding 85.53% of petty offenders. Similarly, Mushanga (1974) in 1974 argued that 95.0% of Kenyan prisoners were not dangerous [and] thus implied that they were petty offenders.

5.1.7 Infrastructure and Resource Restraints

The findings indicated that there is a significant shortcoming in the financing of prisons within Kenya. This was observed during the research parts of this study. The data suggests that there is inadequate funding for even some of the most basic needs of prisoners and prison staff, such as food, uniforms, medicine, bedding, and sanitary ware, based on what was observed. With this being the case, it is not difficult to ascertain why suitable provisions are not made for rehabilitation programmes. Similarly, lack of funding for suitable training equipment, meant that many prisoners would leave prison with substandard skills not relevant to the modern day work place. In addition to these challenges, lack of funding has led to a number of other shortcomings. For example, after care programmes for ex-inmates are non-existent, thus increasing the chances of recidivism. Prison officers also complained about poor salaries, lack of promotions and inadequate facilities in order to carry out their day to day roles.

In order to combat the problem of low funding, suitable recommendations ought to be made to the Government, in order to demonstrate how a bolstered prison budget could ultimately help to reduce costs in the long term. For example, if more suitable de-radicalization and rehabilitation programmes were offered to inmates (which would
require more funding), ultimately, the rate of recidivism would reduce, thus reducing the number of prisoners being catered for and the resources required to support them.

Other innovations should also be investigated, such as equipping prisons and inmates with the ability to raise funds for the prisons during their time in incarceration, such as farming and/or producing goods to be sold. Farming initiatives could also help to address the problem of adequate food provisions for the inmates.

5.1.8 Prison Officer Qualifications and Training
The results of this study show that the majority of prison officers are not suitably qualified to carry out their duties in a satisfactory manner. Furthermore, officers reported that the training they received from the prison service did not adequately equip them to assist with inmate rehabilitation. Only 23% of wardens responded that they felt equipped to deal with terrorist and violent extremist inmates, with only 6% saying they had received formal training in the matter. The results also reinforced previous assumptions and concur with the views expressed in Ministry of Home Affairs, that the Prisons Service lacked adequate and well trained guidance and counselling personnel (Ministry of Home Affairs, 1998).

5.2 Conclusion
A number of conclusions can be made as a result of this study. Firstly, there is indeed an increase of radicalization and violent extremism within the prison system, both globally and within Kenya.
Social, economic and political exclusion can lead to individuals turning to a life of crime, becoming radicalized and/or becoming terrorists or violent extremists. In particular, there is a strong correlation between unemployment and criminal activity.

There is a strong correlation between the rate of recidivism and radicalization of inmates within prisons, as prisons have been seen to be recruitment havens for terrorists. This is in part due to the lack of capacity in dealing with terrorists and violent extremists during their incarceration. This includes the lack of training of prison staff to deal with such inmates, the lack of infrastructure to segregate such inmates, the lack of programmes to effectively de-radicalize, disengage and reintegrate inmates back into society and lack of support for former-inmates once they have been released back into society.

Typically, ex inmates face a lot of stigmatization once they are released from prison. This makes it especially difficult for them to find suitable employment. There is a lack of sufficient provisions by the Government to address the growing threat of terrorism and radicalization within the prisons, as it has been shown that the funding and resourcing of the prison system is not adequate. Furthermore, the Government and other actors, such as the private sector and the civil society must work together more cohesively to address the threat of terrorism within the country. Conversely, the Government must form global partnerships to combat the increasing threat of global terror networks.

Due to the difficulties in sourcing Kenya related literature regarding terrorism and violent extremism and its links to prisons, there is a call for future research to focus more closely on the Kenya prison system, where these issues are concerned.
5.3 Recommendations

Based on the findings from this paper, a number of recommendations can be made to address the root causes of terrorism, violent extremism and recidivism in Kenya.

Firstly, a great deal of the literary review and data from the research highlighted how prisons act as hot beds for terrorist recruitment. One of the most contributing factors towards this was the fact that petty offenders and more serious offenders, such as terrorists, are not typically segregated and can communicate openly with one another. Therefore, it is recommended that where at all possible, terrorists should be kept away from the general population of prison inmates. To do this would require adequate funding of the prison services so that adequate separation could be achieved. Prison staff should also be adequately informed, so as to implement such rules to keep terrorists and other offenders away from one another.

Secondly, penal and constitutional reforms should be made so that ex-inmates receive adequate support to successfully reintegrate back into society once they have left prison. This will involve equipping the Community Service Order and Probation and After-Care Services Department in order than they can provide such services. This will involve financing and training the department, with the argument that such proactive spending is more cost effective in the long run than the reactive costs associated with the re-arrest of former prisoners. In turn, with fewer prisoners ultimately reoffending and going back into prison, there is a lower change of them becoming radicalized during incarceration. Judges and Magistrates should be sensitized to the link between incarceration, recidivism and terrorism, so that it is kept in mind when sentencing offenders. There is a strong argument to be made that petty offenders should be kept
away from imprisonment and it has been shown that this can ultimately lead them
towards a life of more serious crime and indeed, terrorism. Of course, the seriousness
of each offense must be considered when making such a judgement.

As a result of the findings of this study, the following specific recommendations can be made:-

1. Establish a segregation system in the prisons. Prison administrators must ensure
the safe custody of violent extremist/terrorist inmates, away from the general
prison population. This will reduce the number of vulnerable individuals who
become radicalized whilst within prison. This will also prevent terrorists from
using more petty offenders as information mules to their terrorist contacts in the
outside world.

2. Judges and magistrates should be empowered to only incarcerate the most
serious of offenders, to keep petty offenders out of jail. This will help to prevent
the radicalization of inmates whilst inside prison – and also give petty offenders
access to better rehabilitation facilities outside of prison.

3. Establish a holistic and comprehensive de-radicalization and rehabilitation
programme for inmates whilst inside prison, for terrorist related crimes.
Measures should be taken to counter the extreme religious and ideological
beliefs that these people hold. Specialist staff such as psychologists, social
workers and faith leaders, should be appointed to lead disengagement
interventions.
4. Recommend reforms and/or change in policies to the Kenya Government that include provisions such that there is equality for all citizens in social, economic and political spheres within society. This may involve the equal distribution of resources and opportunities, civic participation of all citizens, regardless of their tribe, age, religion, gender and economic status. These measures will help to address social and economic exclusion, which has been shown to be a key factor for individuals deciding to embark on terrorist related activities and associations.

5. Sensitization of all prison staff and inmates on terrorism, violent extremism and radicalization. Train prison staff on how to identify extremists amongst the inmates and establish an effective training programme that will enable the staff to address violent extremisms and radicalization within the prisons.

6. Establish partnerships between the Government, UN Agencies, civil society and the private sector to address the issue of unemployment within the country. The Government should establish a conducive environment, a proper infrastructure and friendly policies for businesses and the private sector to thrive, in order that they create jobs. Academic institutions should ensure that the education being offered is relevant to the labour market, so that students are better equipped to deliver in the workplace.

7. Establish proper re-integration programmes, so that ex-inmates have better support when trying to rebuild their lives after prison. This will go a long way in reducing crime and recidivism rates, which have been shown to be directly linked to violent extremism and radicalization.
8. Disengagement strategies must be considered in parallel with de-radicalization strategies. This would require implementing behavioural techniques, to prevent those with radical extremist beliefs from acting out on them in a violent manner. Specialist staff, such as counsellors, psychologists and faith leaders should be appointed to assist in the disengagement interventions.

9. There needs to be both a domestic and global response to terrorism and violent extremism, given that the problem of terrorism is one on an international scale. Partnerships between governments and nations need to be formed, so that the various actors of law enforcement and policy making can work together and so that relevant information can be shared across borders.

10. All counter terrorism and violent extremist measures should be gender sensitive. Specifically, they should take into account the varying experiences specific to women.

11. Both soft and hard approaches to countering violent extremism and terrorism should be adopted. Hard approaches may include military intervention, coercive diplomacy, and economic sanctions, for example. Soft power is associated with intangible assets such as an attractive personality, culture, political values and institutions, and policies that are seen as legitimate or having moral authority.

12. There needs to be public awareness and sensitization that will reduce the stigma of ex-inmates when trying to re-integrate into society. This should involve educating society and public opinion necessary to create social awareness and
try to break barriers and prejudices around former violent extremist prisoners. This will also involve mending the relationship between ex inmates and their families.
REFERENCES


APPENDIX 1 – INTERVIEW SCHEDULE

INTERVIEW SCHEDULE FOR EX-PRISONERS

Prison:  
Respondent Number:  
Date of Interview:  
Time of Interview:  

Background Information

91
Respondent's Name:

Respondent's Sex:
1. Male
2. Female

Respondent's Age:

Marital Status:
Single/Never Married/Married/Divorced/Separated/Widowed

Level of Education:
None/Primary/Secondary/University

Employment Status before conviction:
Full time/Part time/Ad-hoc/Not employed

Current Employment Status (ie, after release):
Full time/Part time/Ad-hoc/Not employed

Were you ever in the same room as a known terrorist, violent extremist or person with radical ideological views during your time in prison?
Yes/No/Don’t know/Rather not say

Do you believe any terrorists or violent extremists ever tried to coerce you into terrorist related activities, ideologies or beliefs during your time in incarceration?
Yes/No/Don’t know/Rather not say

Did you receive any form of rehabilitation, training or education during your time in prison?
Yes/No

Do you feel as though the rehabilitation you underwent in prison helped you to reintegrate back into society and find suitable employment?
Yes/No

Do you feel that prison warden’s cared about your rehabilitation and made positive steps towards rehabilitating you?
Yes/No/Don’t know/Rather not say

Did you witness or experience any bullying, intimidation or brutality from prison staff during your time in prison?
Yes/No/Don’t know/Rather not say
INTERVIEW SCHEDULE FOR PRISON STAFF/OFFICERS

Prison:
Respondent Number:
Date of Interview:
Time of Interview:
**Background Information**

Respondent's Name:

Respondent's Sex:
1. Male
2. Female

Respondent's Age:

Marital Status:
Single/Never Married/Married/Divorced/Separated/Widowed

Level of Education:
None/Primary/Secondary/University

Which job functionalities do you regard as most important as a prison warden?

General supervision and protection of inmates
Training and rehabilitating inmates
Spiritual and Vocational Guidance
Punishing and Rehabilitating inmates
Furthering inmate education levels and life skills

Do you feel adequately equipped to deal with terrorist, violent extremist and radicalized inmates?
Yes/No/Don’t know

Have you received any formal vocational training to help you understand the sensitivities of dealing with terrorist and violent extremist inmates?
Yes/No/Don’t know

**APPENDIX 2 – LIST OF MAXIMUM SECURITY KENYAN PRISONS**
*The starred prisons are those that were visited and researched as part of this paper.

1. Shimo La Tewa, Mombassa *
2. Kamiti Maximum Prison, Nairobi *
3. Manyani, Taita Taveta
4. Naivasha Maximum Prison, Nakuru
5. Kodiaga, Kisumu
6. Kibos Maximum Prison, Kisumu
7. Kisumu Maximum Prison, Kisumu
8. Nyeri Maximum Prison, Nyeri
9. Industrial Area Remand and Allocation Prison, Nairobi
10. Langata Women’s Prison, Nairobi *