ASSESSING KENYA’S ROLE IN THE RESTORATION OF PEACE IN SOMALIA

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A Thesis Submitted to the School of Arts & Sciences in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirement for the Degree of Master of Arts in International Relations
DECLARATION

I, the undersigned, declare that this thesis is my original work and has not been presented for the award of a degree in this University or any other Institution of higher learning for examination.

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This thesis has been submitted for examination with my approval as the University Supervisor.

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ABSTRACT

Since the advent of the civil strife in 1991 after Barre’s regime was overthrown, numerous peace initiatives have been initiated in attempts to stabilize Somalia. Nevertheless, these initiatives faced various challenges generated internally and externally hence the success limitations. However, the Kenyan intervention to Somalia “Operation Linda Nchi” that was initiated in October 2011 has since bore fruits in peace restoration inside Somalia.

This study research seeks to access the roles played by Kenya in restoration of peace in Somalia. This has been done by analyzing various theories such as the war and peacekeeping theories. This study further determines whether Kenya’s 2011 military interventions to Somalia are justifiable under the international legal framework and international moral and ethical norms. This study also examines the previous interventions made by the UN and US in the early years and examine how the two influence and affect the Kenyan peace building activities in Somalia.
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Without his precious support it would not have been possible to complete this course. I also want to thank Dr. Fatuma Ali for regular support and consultation, and also thank the entire faculty and the USIU fraternity.

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DEDICATION

I dedicate this project to my family for being a source of inspiration in my life and for the great support and encouragement to me throughout my life that I can achieve anything that I desire and for them being there for me during the research period. I thank them all.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

DECLARATION ........................................................................................................... ii
COPYRIGHTS ............................................................................................................. iii
ABSTRACT ................................................................................................................. iv
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT ............................................................................................... v
DEDICATION ............................................................................................................... vi
ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS ........................................................................... ix

CHAPTER ONE ........................................................................................................... 1

1.0 INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................. 1

1.1 Historical Background ........................................................................................ 1
1.2 Problem Statement ............................................................................................. 2
1.3 Objectives of the Study ...................................................................................... 5
1.4 Research Questions ............................................................................................ 5
1.5 Study Limitations ............................................................................................... 5

CHAPTER TWO ......................................................................................................... 6

2.0 LITERATURE REVIEW ...................................................................................... 6

2.1 Introduction ....................................................................................................... 6
2.2 Literature Review ............................................................................................... 6
2.3 Analysis of the Somalia Conflict ......................................................................... 10
2.4 Kenya’s Involvement in the Restoration of Peace in Somali .................................. 10
2.5 Theoretical Framework ..................................................................................... 12
2.6 Conceptual Framework ..................................................................................... 13

CHAPTER THREE .................................................................................................... 14

3.0 METHODOLOGY ............................................................................................... 14

3.1 Introduction ....................................................................................................... 14
3.2 Research Design ............................................................................................... 14
3.3 Target Population and Sources of Information ......................................................... 14
3.4 Data Collection Procedures .................................................................................... 15
3.5 Data Analysis Techniques ........................................................................................ 15

CHAPTER FOUR .............................................................................................................. 16

4.0 ANALYSIS .................................................................................................................. 16
4.1 Introduction ................................................................................................................ 16
4.2 Causes of Conflict in Somalia .................................................................................... 16
4.3 Reasons that Prompted Kenya to Engage in Restoration of Peace in Somalia ............. 25
4.4 The Roles played By the International Agencies and the International Community in Supporting the Kenya’s Efforts of Peace Building in Somalia ...................................................... 30
4.5 The Role of the IGAD and International Community in Restoration of Peace in Somalia ........................................................................................................................................ 31
4.6 Strides Made by the Kenya Defense Forces in Restoring Peace in Somalia .............. 36

CHAPTER FIVE .................................................................................................................. 39

5.0 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ...................................................... 39
5.1 Introduction ................................................................................................................ 39
5.2 Conclusions ............................................................................................................... 39
5.3 Recommendations .................................................................................................... 40

REFERENCES .................................................................................................................. 42
ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AMISOM- African Union Mission in Somalia

AU- African Union

GTD- Global Terrorism Database

ICU-Islamic Courts Union

IGAD- Intergovernmental Authority on Development

KDF- Kenyan Defense Force

TNG- Transitional National Government

TFG- Transitional Federal Government of Somalia

SSDF- Somali Salvation Democratic Front

SNM- Somali National Movement

SRRC-Somali Reconciliation and Restoration Council

UN- United Nations

UNHCR - United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

USC-United Somali Congress

US- United States
CHAPTER ONE

1.0 INTRODUCTION

This chapter introduces the background of the study, problem statement, justification, research objectives, research questions and the scope of the study.

1.1 Historical Background

Somalia borders Ethiopia to the west, Kenya to the south, Djibouti to the north whilst sharing a coast with the Gulf of Aden to the north and the Indian Ocean to the south (United Nations, 2010). Its close proximity to the Middle East and the Arabian Peninsula has embedded a long rich history of Somali trade and cultural dynamics and its religious interaction of the earlier days (Lewis 1980). The Somalis have a very unique and dynamic societal composition as compared to that of the other African nations. They do speak similar language, are of the same religion and culture, notwithstanding, their path to destiny.

The Somalis are found in Kenya, Ethiopia, Djibouti and Somalia making it easy to cross over the border of these countries at will without being turned away as alien. They do share relation a cross border. Somalia has an approximated population of about ten million people. Somalia before attaining her independence was divided into two Regions: The north was under the British colonial rule and the South was under the Italian colonial rule. The northern Somalia region got its independence on 26th June 1960 while the south attained hers on 1st July 1960. An alliance was forged between the two regions that gave birth to the Somali Republic with a civilian Government. However, this changed on 21st October 1969 when a revolution took place under the leadership of General Mohamed Siad Barre (Norris, 2011).
Barre created a socialistic state inclining towards the Soviet Union; he built very strong armed forces in Africa, and then decided to annex the Ogaden Region from Ethiopia since the people of that region were of Somali origin. His aim was to bring all Somalis under one flag. After two decades of ruling with an iron fist, rebel forces ousted the Barre regime in 1991 (Norris, 2011). This action by the rebels sparked unforeseen turmoil in Somalia that led to the springing up of factional fighting groups that plunged the country into anarchy. The Somali National Movement (SNM) gained control of the North, currently known as Somaliland, and the capital Mogadishu the larger part of southern Somalia. The other parts of the country were under the control of the United Somali Congress (USC). Personal interests, power struggles, a huge economic appetite and economic ambitions of warlords caused the rebel factions to fail in the establishment of an inclusive government to heal the country from the past injustices committed by the military regime under Siad Barre. Consequently, this was the beginning of anarchy in Somalia since 1991 (Eriksson, 2013).

1.2 Problem Statement

Considered to be Africa’s most poor and unstable country, Somalia has been in existence for less than half a century. However, she has spent much of her time at war or struggling to retain stability within her borders. With the absence of legitimate government, security and the rule of law has been elusive for nearly three decades. It has been divided between warlords and Islamic militants who control most of its population and its natural resources (Afyare, 2006).

Not all parts of the larger Somalia area is facing anarchy. Somaliland and Puntland enjoys relative peace and stability since the formation of an autonomous administration following a successful negotiation and reconciliation process spearheaded by indigenous leaders and
politicians (Afyare and Barise, 2006). The international community has continuously endeavored to restore peace in the whole Somalia region. For example, the United Nations engaged in the coordination of a peace agreement between the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia (TFG) and Islamic Courts Union in 1995, under the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution Number 751 of 1992 was approved to sanction a unilateral United Nations Humanitarian Intervention to Somalia (Harper, 2012).

However, under the watch of the international community, the most feared parts of Somalia have been neglected by their own destruction. These areas have become a potential breeding ground for terrorism and thus exposing its youthful population to religious extremism and economic piracy. The dysfunction administrative conditions within Somalia have not only created a humanitarian catastrophe to its neighbors, but it has also threatened their national security, stability and interests.

Kenya has long suffered from spillover of the civil unrest in Somalia. Enormous flows of Somali refugees fleeing into Kenya since the start of the conflict in 1991, has placed a considerable strain on the Kenyan humanitarian and economic capacity. Kenya handles more than 480,000 Somali refugees excluding those from other countries such as South Sudan. These refugees have found shelters at a United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) camp in Dadaab. Another group of hundreds of thousands illegal Somali immigrants has constantly relocated to Kenya’s main cities of Nairobi and Mombasa in quest for greener pastures and safety. Armed conflict and lawlessness within Somalia has in recent times been brought right into the Kenyan door step (Mankhaus 2012). Kenya’s Somali-inhabited region of the former North Eastern province has been destabilized to the extent that the Kenyan security forces and the Kenyan citizens have either been killed or abducted by
the Somali insurgents who cross over to Kenya at will. This has hence become a critical security challenge beyond the effective control of the Kenyan government (Mankhaus 2012).

These unprecedented attacks executed by non-state actors within Kenyan borders has prompted the Kenyan Government to invoke its right to self-defense in 2011, through a military incursion known as Operation Linda Nchi. This action was taken in light of the three core principles governing the lawful exercise of the right of self-defense or in other words proportionality and immediacy criteria enshrined under the customary international law. This research study seeks to address the recent humanitarian and military intervention initiated in October 2011 by Kenya, under the banner of Operation Linda Nchi, a Swahili word that mean a national defense operation. The study will rely on war theory and acceptable norms and processes as defined by international law and leadership in foreign policy and diplomacy to shed more light on this matter.

This study will walk us down memory lane to underscore the reasons that prompted Kenya to enter Somalia in the first place and turns of event before Kenya joined AMISOM (African Mission in Somalia) in 2013. Furthermore, the study will also access the previous mission led by the United Nations and the military intervention of 1993 by the United States Marines to capture the warlord Mohammed Farrah Aidid and protect the UN Aid mission to Somalia. With this among other international law stipulation, the study will also examine the effectiveness of non-military interventions that Kenya has ever engaged in since the Somalia conflict began.
1.3 Objectives of the Study

The General Objective of this study is to assess the role Kenya plays in the peace building process in Somalia. Specifically, this study aimed at addressing the following objectives:

1.3.1 To examine the actual cause of conflict in Somalia;
1.3.2 To analyze the reasons that prompted Kenya to engage in the restoration of peace in Somalia;
1.3.3 To assess the roles played by the international agencies and the international community in supporting the Kenya’s efforts in restoring peace in Somalia;
1.3.4 To analyze the strides made by the Kenyan forces operating inside Somalia in their efforts to restore peace in Somalia.

1.4 Research Questions

1.4.1 What are the causes of conflict in Somalia?
1.4.2 What prompted Kenya to engage in the restoring peace in Somalia 2011?
1.4.3 What results have been realized due to Kenya’s peace building efforts in Somalia?
1.4.4 What are the roles played by the international community and the USA in resolving the conflict in Somalia and how has these efforts affected Kenya’s peace building processes in Somalia?

1.5 Study Limitations

Due to the current insecurity in Somalia, the research is widely relied on secondary data sources and critically analyzed to build the body of this research, also the study was limited to the peacekeeping operation of the KDF that started on October 16, 2011 and as such, any peacekeeping efforts prior to this time may not be relevant, unless otherwise alluded to.
CHAPTER TWO

2.0 LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 Introduction

This chapter discloses the theoretical framework to be used in developing coherence of concepts and analogies in this study. This section explains the relevance of the identified theories to this study and how they can be applied in the study of the subject matter. Moreover, the theoretical framework of this study will conclusively provide a literature review about the contemporary conflict resolution mechanism and their characters as well as the Kenyan dimension to conflict resolution in Somalia. Through this analogy, the study will develop a conceptual framework to give a precise summary of the theoretical flow. At this point the research will try and relate this study with previous researchers work and points out the research gap that this study will be addressing.

2.2 Literature Review

This section will present a literature review on the assessment of the Kenyan role in the restoration of peace in Somalia. At this point this study will examine the previous and current role played by other external actors in any kind of conflict and in particular the roles they played in the Somali conflict and how this role affects or influences the Kenyan position in Somalia. A number of scholars agree that the international laws and principles of peace and war spells out the conditions under which a third parties can implore to intervene in an internal conflict of another state. Pearson et al, 1998 said that geographical location, geopolitical motives and the level of conflict are the most important factors directly associated with military interventions of third parties in an intrastate conflict. He (Pearson) believed that, external states always have a higher intervention prerogative when the level of
conflict is high, or has cross-border effect or ethnic affinity with the targeted state, or when the conflict affect the transactional interest of the intervening state (Pearson et al, Regan: 1998).

*Operation Linda Nchi* has grown and attracted international recognition and attention. For over two decades, the United Nations and the United States have been actively involved in an attempt to broker a peace deal among the warring factions in Somalia. For instance, the United Nations coordinated a peace agreement between the TFG and Islamic Courts Union in 2006; however, the majority of the extremist groups within the Islamic Courts Union opted out of the peace agreement rendering it useless. One of the key groups that opted out of the agreement was the Al-Shabbab (Norris, 2011). The Al-Shabbab is the most prominent and lethal extremist groups in Somalia and has perennial links with the Al-Qaeda and now ISIL terror network into the region. This group is believed to have active terror cell across the East African region with the majority of its cell members found within Somalia and Kenya (Mankhaus 2012).

As early as 1973, the United States was deeply embedded in the Somalia state of affairs and the inactions along the Arabian Peninsula. This period of time was characterized by the cold war between the West and the Soviet Union. The United States voiced its concern about Somalia through it then Secretary of State Henry Kissinger who drafted a memo to the to the Secretary of Defense and Central Intelligence Agency, directing them to carry out a study to determine the potential threats posed by the Somalia issue to America’s interests and activities in the Eastern African and the Horn of Africa in particular. The memo was further directed to the American military in Djibouti, it read as follows:
‘Estimate the significance of Soviet activities in Somalia and how they relate to Soviet objectives in the Horn of Africa, Arabian Peninsula, Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean, and the extent to which they pose a threat to American interests in the area’. (Kissinger 1973)

The memo further predicted an overshadowed future conflict between Somalia and its closest neighbors. This Kissinger’s prediction became true and it’s currently the best argument to support the Kenyan and Ethiopian military activities in Somalia.

Despite the previous efforts by the USA and the UN, Somalia has persistently remained a pariah state which lacks a central government, political and religious stability and the overall functionality as a state. With these facts at hand, the diplomatic distress and political sabotage has constantly faced the United States and this has further endangered U.S. interests in the region. For instance, terror threat on the U.S. national security and towards its citizen operating in the region, and threats to its trade and economic interests from the Somali pirates has made this Somali problem an American and global problem. Several legislations and hearings have been convened in the USA to ventilate on the Somalia issues. In July 2011 months before the Kenyan military incursion to Somalia, the United States House of Representatives Committee on Africa, Global Health and Human Rights, the Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, Trade and Committee on Foreign Affairs held a hearing, to “Assess the Consequences of the Failed State of Somalia”. Piracy, terrorism and security were the prominent issues discussed (U.S. Congress, House of Representatives 2011)

However, the Kenyan decision to enter Somalia was not influenced by any external actors as it was just a coincidence that it happened barely months after the U.S congress discussion. Kenya has for a long time exercised a low-risk, non-interventionist foreign policy to peace
building and peacemaking all grounded in good neighborliness and respect to national sovereignty of her neighbors (Evoy, 2013). This policy however took a dramatically turn in October 2011 when the Kenyan parliament approved a military and humanitarian operation in Somalia to restore peace and stability. This shift was underpinned on Kenya’s growing confidence as an emerging East African military and economic power, alongside her economic and strategic responsibility to protect her local and regional interests. Kenya is currently successful in her military interventions aimed at stabilizing Somalia, a venture that even the great powers such as the United States failed to achieve. However, this has come with a mixed political bonus such as high-risk retaliatory actions from the Somali insurgents, regional and global recognition, and multifaceted diplomatic stabilization support internationally.

To access the role that Kenya plays in the restoration of peace in Somalia this study will articulate and evaluate the rationale of 2011 Kenyan military operation in light to three core principles governing the lawful exercise of the right of self-defense and peace enforcement process in a stateless nation such as necessity for the military intervention, its proportionality and immediacy. This section will assess the legitimacy, and legality of the Kenya comprehensive mechanism to peacemaking, peacekeeping and peace enforcement measures towards effective conflict prevention, management and resolution in Somalia. It will focus on the criteria found under customary international law, applied social science, the war theory and the previous military and international interventions history of similar nature. The study will also access the non-military interventions that Kenya pursued prior to the 2011 peace enforcement process.
2.3 Analysis of the Somalia Conflict

As earlier discussed it is important to explain the role and effect of external actors in Somalia’s conflict, this chapter will map the conflict and the actors involving in it as well as their issues and interest. Although the study will include all the important actors in the map, not all of them will be discussed. As the study focuses only on Kenya as an external actor in the Somalia conflict. While doing so, all the other actors shown in the map will also be involved in the discussion in connection to their effects to the Kenyan efforts in peace building in Somalia.

2.4 Kenya’s Involvement in the Restoration of Peace in Somali

Kenya shared historical factors with Somalia in regards to ethnic distribution and geographical aspects. The large North Eastern province of Kenya is predominantly inhabited by a Somali ethnic population. Kenya has constantly drawn its weight in respect to influencing regional geopolitics. In the absence of a moral sense that articulates Kenya’s changing geostrategic interests and implementation strategies (ISS, 2012). Kenya has branded and promoted its foreign policy of modesty, peace-loving, a firm respecter of sovereignty of its neighboring states, and thus upholding good neighborliness and peaceful settlement of disputes and non-interference policy in the internal affairs of other states. With this principled foreign policy, Kenya remained a beacon of peace and stability in the region and beyond in spite of being surrounded by unstable neighbors. This elaborative non-interference foreign policy explains the consistency of Kenyan inactions/restrain from behaving in an interventionist or aggressive manner towards her neighbors. This political and diplomatic restrain gave Kenya a long standing reputation of an “unwilling regional power” a passive object of neighboring countries’ in geostrategic interests (ISS, 2012).
(Brown 1996: pp. 599, 600) stated that the local conflicts have great possibility to “spill over” and create a military situation between neighboring states. He explains that internal conflict has always resulted into instability in neighboring states, creating a political and economic instability. An editorial opinion in the Standard Newspaper paints a clear picture on the case of Somalia and Kenya. The newspaper narrated the story of the Somalia bred terror group Al-Shabaab abducting Kenyan and foreign aid workers and tourists within the Kenyan boundary creating security and economic sabotage within Kenya (The Standard Newspaper, 2013). As a result of terrorism and insecurity challenges brought about by the Al-Shabaab in Kenya, many Western countries warned their citizens against travelling to specific parts of Kenya (BBC, 2011). As a result Kenya got painted negatively by international media as the bedrock of terrorism denting its image and reputation globally (CNN, 2015).

Kenya’s experiences from piracy in Somalia added salt to the wound, which was already caused by the poor security situation in Somalia. This action has been affecting the country both socially and economically. Somali pirates constantly attacked cargo ships and tourist vessels destined to the Kenyan Coast disrupting Kenya economic venture (Daily Nation newspaper, 2013). In response to these challenges, Kenya decided to increase her presence in Somalia by integrating its forces in Somalia with the AMISOM peacekeeping forces construed under UNSC Resolution 2036 of February 2012 that provided a legal framework, mandate and resource to the Kenyan Defense Forces to fight Al-Shabaab inside Somalia under the mandate of the AU and UNSC (AMISOM, 2014).
2.5 Theoretical Framework

Taking into account the complexity of the Somalia conflict, this study will apply war theory and acceptable norms and processes as defined by international law and leadership in foreign policy and also other scholarly opinions of other scholars. On war theory the study will rely on Mary Kaldor’s concept of the “new wars”, which explains dimensions and contexts of conflicts in the new era (Kaldor, 2012). And a scholarly opinion of Michael E. Brown’s concept of “The causes and Regional Dimensions of Internal Conflict” which explains on how internal conflicts/ civil wars begin, how neighboring states can be involved, and to what extent the international community can be involved in resolving it (Brown, 1996).

Anchored on four main theories guiding policy making and practice in understanding the concept of peacekeeping, the study will also mention briefly the four theories of peacekeeping that is the: liberalism theory, global cultural theory, cosmopolitanism and critical theory. Based on the above mentioned concept, theories coupled with scholarly and international legal framework of conflict resolution by third party, this research will present a detailed discussion of the theoretical frameworks.

This study will be also based on the liberalism theory which is also found to be one of the main schools of the international relations theory. The core issues that the liberalism theory seeks to address are the problems of achieving lasting peace and cooperation in international relations and the methods that can be put into place to achieve this. State preferences give governments an underlying stake in the international issues that they face, which therefore means that state preferences is a fundamental cause of state behavior in world politics.
2.6 Conceptual Framework

Bryman defines conceptual framework as an analytical tool with several variations and contexts. He further explains its application in making a conceptual distinctions and organization of thoughts and ideas. He emphasized that strong conceptual frameworks should capture something real and must do this in a way that is easy to remember and apply (Bryman, 2011).

This theory shows that Kenya’s role in the restoration of peace in Somalia gears towards securing Somalia which will not affect the peace and stability of its neighbor’s which is crucial and essential for Kenya. Liberalism theory also goes further to demonstrate the role of international law in governing the behavior of states towards each other. It also shows how the values and actions of individual states have impacts on other states’ behavior
CHAPTER THREE

3.0 METHODOLOGY

3.1 Introduction

This study used secondary data which was derived from first-hand information written by other field researchers. It used reports written by relevant government authorities, inter-governmental organizations and also non-governmental organizations. The literature review is from published books obtained from the library of the United States international university, local and international media interviews, publications and articles. The research also used authentic internet sources and journals from previous scholars and authors. The study approached all relevant documents available from also previously covered course content. The data collected has been analyzed for the final product of this research project.

3.2 Research Design

A research design is the specification of methods and procedures for acquiring the information needed. It is the overall operational pattern or framework of the project that stipulates what information is to be collected from which source by what procedures. This secondary data was collected from reports from official policy documents from the Government of Kenya and Somalia, the United Nations and other agencies reports, journals, academic findings and newspapers.

3.3 Target Population and Sources of Information

Kenyan Government official documents and policy statements from the Ministry of Defense, Interior and National security and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Somali Government officials were included in this study.
3.4 Data Collection Procedures

The researcher made a formal request to the relevant agencies then did a follow up to obtain them. Those that are posted online were accessed and cited in the study.

3.5 Data Analysis Techniques

Literature was thoroughly and critically reviewed and the findings reported under various sub-headings and titles.

3.6 Limitation of the study

To carry out the research study the following limitations were expected and faced during the research study:

(a) Availability of secondary data from the needed records of the agencies was difficult.

(b) Time, cost and location factors become major difficulties in completion of research.

However, to overcome the limitations and maintain the effectiveness of research work sincere efforts were put.
CHAPTER FOUR

4.0 ANALYSIS

4.1 Introduction

This chapter discusses in detail, the findings of the in-depth analysis of the literary works in the topic of discussions. It seeks to explain why variables exist in the manner which they do. This section analyses the Kenya’s role in restoration of peace in Somalia and the challenges that it has faced in its drive, together with partners, to secure Somalia. Somalia has a functioning central government and its populace is slowly re-building their shattered lives. AMISOM including KDF working together with the Government of Somalia, continue to liberate and hold more ground previously held by the al-Shabaab. The study pointed out that the achievements of Kenya’s Government presence in Somalia, the FGS and their partners. This study has likewise identified various challenges that KDF faces and their quest to enhance security and enhance peace in Somalia.

4.2 Causes of Conflict in Somalia

The Somali population, contrary to other African Nations, is largely a single, homogeneous group. They are all Muslims, and share in a singular language and cultural backgrounds. However, Somalia has witnessed one of the worst civil wars in Africa, now spanning more than two decades. Since the ousting of Mohammed Said Barre in 1991, Somalia has not had a functional government. This section examines the root causes of Somalia’s conflict and the plagues that have thwarted peace building efforts. Key among the reasons highlighted herein includes repressed military rule, colonial legacy and competition for control of key resources and political power. In addition, clan identity is politicized, large proportions of the youth are
unemployed and weapons are available at will, owing to lack of a functional government that can instill law and order.

The Somali civil war has multiple and complex causes including political, economic, cultural and psychological. Various external and internal actors have played different roles during the various stages of the conflict. Based on our observations and readings of peace-building literature, we argue that the root causes of the Somali conflict were competition for resources and/or power, a repressive state and the colonial legacy. We also regard as contributing causes the politicized clan identity, the availability of weapons, the large numbers of unemployed youth, and certain aspects of the Somali culture that sanction the use of violence. The most important factor that has created and sustained the clan-based militias’ conflicts is competition for power and resources.

4.2.1 Conflicts over Resources

As literature in this area suggests and the collective memories of the Somalis attest, Somali clans had often clashed over resources such as water, livestock (camels) and grazing long before Somalia became a sovereign country. Using the widely accepted Somali traditional legal system (*Heer*), historically traditional leaders settled these conflicts (Lewis2002, pp 1–18). However, after Somalia gained its independence, many Somalis moved to urban areas, so the types of resources that are needed and the means used to obtain them have changed. Political leaders realized that whoever controlled the state would control the nation’s resources. Access to government resources, recruitment of civil servants and control of foreign aid replaced control of water wells and access to grazing issues in the countryside. For instance, Mohamed Jama Urdoh, a Somali journalist, observed Somalia’s police forces in 1967. He revealed in an investigative report that more than 70 per cent (51 out of 71) of
police-station chiefs were members of the same clan as the then police chiefs. Moreover, the police chief was just one example of how government officials were misusing their power. Besides the political patronage appointments that characterized the civil service, corruption affected all levels and departments of the government. With regards to government policy, the frequently cited examples include the use of Somalia’s police and army forces for clannish reasons. Within two clans, the Lelkase and the Ayr, there is a widespread belief that the government of the day and the police used excessive force against them. As corrupt as it was, Somalia’s first government was democratic. It had checks and balances and people could talk and address the corruption. The Somali leaders of the time were poorly educated novices with little experience in running a government.

Nevertheless, the former Prime Minister, Abdirizak Haji Hussein, had some success in dealing with security and corruption problems during his reign. However, when General Mohamed Siad Barre took over power in October 1969 things changed. For the first few years the revolutionary council built new institutions and wrote down the Somali language. However, the general’s obsession with controlling and consolidating his power to the benefit of members of his clan became clear to all Somalis. Opposition groups were outlawed and no one could criticize the military leaders. Since elites from specific clans controlled all levers of state power and the economy, the leadership of the opposition capitalized on this opportunity. After the 1977/1978 war between Somalia and Ethiopia, a number of military officers attempted to take over the government. When this coup failed, the Siad Barre regime started to use excessive force against the Majerteen clan to which most of the officers belonged (Ssereo, 2003).
This event was the beginning of Somalia’s civil war. Other clans such as the Isaaq, Ogaden, Hawiye and Digil and Mirifle also started opposition groups in order to seize power. Current realities confirm this assertion that competition for power and/or resources was the leading cause of conflict among clans and militia groups (Merryman, 2003)

The civil war within the Hawiye, Darod, Digil, Mirifle, and the Isaaq clans was a resource- and/or power-motivated conflict. For instance, the Abgal and the Habargidir clans had never fought throughout their history and in fact belong to the same clan (Hawiye) and sub-clan (Hiraab). However, when Mogadishu fell to the United Somali Congress (USC) (to which they both belonged) a power struggle broke out between General Mohamed Farah Aideed and Ali Mahdi Mohamed. In addition, people interviewed confirmed that the civil war between the Habargidir and the Hawadle clans started in Kismayo over the control of Kismayo port (when the USC controlled the city). Then there were other conflicts over the state farms in Qoryooleey district.

Finally, this war spread to the Mogadishu and Hiiraan regions. The war between the Darod clans was similarly motivated. First, the Absame and the Harti militias fought over the control of Kismayo. Then the Mareehaan and the Harti clans clashed over the same issue. The recent civil war between the Majerteen sub-clans in Puntland was also motivated by power and resources. When Abdullahi Yusuf was voted out in 2001, he refused to accept his defeat and sought to retain control of the government by force.

The same kinds of events occurred during the civil violence between the Isaaq clans in Bur’o and Hargeysa, and the continuing clashes between the Digil and Mirifle clans in the Bay and Bakool regions. Looking at both past and present Somali conflicts, we think the most
A determinant and persistent factor that has ignited and/or sustained the violence has been competition for resources and/or power (Ssereko, 2003).

As a result, control of a key city (Mogadishu, Kismayo or Baidoa), key ports or airports, important checkpoints, the resource-rich regions, banknotes, foreign aid or ‘technicals’ (the cars that carry heavy weapons) became closely contested resources among militia groups and various clans.

4.2.2 State Repression

State repression was the second major cause of the civil war. The Somali people experienced 21 years of a repressive military state (1969–1991). The military regime used excessive force and collective punishment to suppress opposition. The people had no mechanisms for registering their discontent. The system did not allow opposition forces to exist, let alone have a voice in important issues. In 1978 some military officers attempted to overthrow the military regime, the Siad Barre government used the national army and police to punish civilian members of the Majerteen clan (Cohen 2001: pp 9).

The military subsequently was involved in the killing of civilians, mass abuses and the destruction of areas inhabited by that clan. The 1978 failed coup set a precedent for attempts by other Somali groups to challenge the regime. In 1981 some politicians of the Isaaq clan established an opposition movement (the Somali National Movement, SNM) in London, England. Again, the military government started to punish civilians. The Siad Barre regime destroyed Hargeysa and Bur’o and murdered many innocent civilians when the SNM attacked these cities in 1988. Human rights organizations reported that more than fifty thousand people were killed in these conflicts. (Cohen 2001: pp 20)
The greater the number of innocent civilians the government leaders killed or imprisoned, the more people rebelled and joined the opposition forces. When the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF) started their armed struggle against the military regime, Somalia and Ethiopia had hostile relations, so Ethiopia welcomed and armed all opposition groups fleeing from the repression in Somalia.

Other opposition groups, such as the USC (the Hawiye clan’s opposition party) and the Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM) (the Ogaden clan’s party) organized their military activities from Ethiopia. Somalia’s military government denied people the opportunity to participate in governing. Denied all other avenues to affect the change of the regime, opposition groups resorted to violence. The state’s repression, violence and excessive force justified the power-hungry opposition leaders when they crossed the border and attacked Somalia from Ethiopia.

4.2.3 Colonial Legacy

The third major cause of Somalia’s civil war was the colonial legacy. The European powers (Britain, Italy and France) partitioned what some would call greater Somalia into five parts. Britain took two, Italy one and France one, and the fifth one was by the European powers gave the Somali region of Ogaden to Ethiopia’s King Menelik to appease him. As Geshekter noted, from 1891 to the present, Ethiopia has been expanding to the east. The partitioning of Somalia permanently damaged the Somali people. Hadrari, a great Somali poet, argues persuasively in several poems that most of the malaise in today’s Somalia stems from the colonial system. He claims that the colonial powers destroyed Somalia’s socio-economic system (Issa-Salwe 1996: 5).
In addition, most of the resources of Somalia’s weak and poor government were used to reunify the Somali people. The effect of the partition continues to haunt the Somali people since, according to this view, two Somali territories remain under the control of Ethiopia and Kenya. In addition, the two regions that formed independent Somalia is experiencing serious problems and the northern region (former British Somaliland) want to secede from the south. Competition for resources and power, military repression and the colonial legacy were the long-term or background causes of the Somali conflict. In addition, misuse of clan identity, the availability of weapons, the large number of unemployed youth, and some features of Somali culture that reward the use of violence significantly contributed to the formation and escalation of the conflict.

4.2.4 Clan Differences

Mere differences in clan identities themselves did not cause the conflict. Clan identity is not static, but changes depending on the situation. One can claim to be ‘Somali’ if doing so serves one’s interests or wish to emphasize the link between two clans at national level. That same person may claim to be ‘Irir’, ‘Hawiye’, ‘Hirab’, ‘Habargidir’, ‘Sa’ad’ or ‘Reer Hilowle’. These terms involve an example of descending levels of one’s clan identity. The same is true of other clans regardless of whether they are in the north or the south. Clan identity is flexible ((Laitin and Samatar 1987: 30).

The emphasis on one level over another reflects the interests and goals of the elites of that level. For example, when opposition leaders wanted to mobilize forces, they emphasized the most inclusive identities: the SNM leaders emphasized the grievances of the Isaq clan, whereas the USC leaders mobilised the Hawiye clan. The Somali Democratic Movement (SDM), on the other hand, organized the Digil and Mirifle clans in the south. General
Mohamed Siad Barre depended heavily on his own Mareehan sub-clan of the Darod clans. Opposition leaders from the Darod clan could not use the Darod banner because General Siad Barre was himself a member of the Darod clan.

Therefore, the SSDF leaders depended on the Majerteen sub-clan of the Darod clans, while the Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM) drew its supporters from the Ogaden sub-clan of the Darod clans. After 1992 the emphasis changed from inclusive clan identities (for example Darod or Hawiye) to sub-clan identities such as Harti, Mareehaan, Habargidir or Mudullood. For instance, when the power struggle broke out in 1991 between Ali Mahdi Mohamed and General Mohamed Farah Aideed (who both belong to the Hiraab sub-clan), the clan identities that mattered became those of the Muddullod and the Habargidir (their respective sub-clans). These clan identities fueled the conflicts in Somalia, but did not, by themselves, cause the war. In other words, clan identity became an instrument for mobilization.

4.2.5 Availability of Weapons

The availability of weapons exacerbated the Somali conflict and the Somali people were well armed. There were two major sources of weapons- The first source, Somalia’s strategic location, which the two superpowers at the time (the former Soviet Union and the US) competed to arm the former dictator. The second source was the Ethiopian regime, which was arming opposition groups. The availability of weapons, combined with all the above grievances and disputes, resulted in all-out civil war in 1988.

4.2.6 Youth Unemployment

Somalia’s large number of unemployed youth added fuel to the conflict. In the 1970s the Somali population was estimated to be about 5 million. Although no credible census has been
taken, Somalia now has an estimated population of about 9-10 million. In the 1980s this increase created a young population with no employment opportunities. Somalia’s government could not provide employment or a meaningful education. The private sector was under-developed as well. As a result, many young men were in a hopeless situation. Their despair provided the greed-driven elites, who wanted to pursue their own interests, with readily available human resources with grievances in a collapsed state context. Ultimately, the elites capitalized on this opportunity and organized the young men in a way that appealed to them.

4.2.7 Pastoralist Culture

Finally, some features of Somali culture played a significant role in providing the rationale for creating or perpetuating the conflict. As Kriesberg notes, people use their culture as a “standard when judging what is fair and just.” In addition, Galtung argues that cultural violence legitimizes other forms of violence (direct and structural). He writes, “Cultural violence makes direct and structural violence look, even feel, right – or at least not wrong.” He identifies four classes of basic needs: survival needs, wellbeing needs, identity needs, and freedom needs. If some aspects of Somali pastoralist culture entail or encourage the use of force, it does not mean that Somali culture is violent as a whole but they fight through land and water (Kriesberg 1998).

The study argues that three features of Somali culture reward violence, namely clan rivalry, collective punishment and negative competition. At times, a destructive conflict between clans starts over a mere expression of hostility. One may kill a member of another clan simply because the victim’s clansmen have killed a person from the perpetrator’s clan. The situation between the Dir and the Mareehaan clans in the Heraale district in 2003 is a recent
example of such conflict. A member of the Mareehaan clan had killed a businessman from the Dir clan about thirteen years before. The victim’s son took revenge by killing a wealthy businessman from the Mareehaan clan in 2003. Unfortunately, this conflict exploded and many people (some estimated about four hundred) lost their lives, while thousands were displaced. In addition to such expressions of hostility, most Somalis witness people using violence and benefiting from it. In the countryside, young men used to attack other clans and steal their camels. In the cities, the thousands of armed men benefit from using violence to force people to pay them illegally, and then justify their aggression by arguing that Somali clans have been fighting and robbing each other since time immemorial.

Moreover, some Somali pastoralist literature provides many examples of poets defending the use of violence against other clans, or at least attempting to legitimize stealing their camels. Use of force as an acceptable strategy is therefore rooted in Somali culture. In fact, one could argue that some features of Somali culture reward criminals who engage in violent activities. Both greed and grievances are present in the Somali conflict as Somalia’s political elites were driven by greed for power and resources, as Abdi Samatar has rightly observed. However, most of Somalia’s people have legitimate grievances. The state failed to provide basic services such as security, education, healthcare and jobs. Moreover, the military government used force to repress people.

4.3 Reasons that Prompted Kenya to Engage in Restoration of Peace in Somalia

Kenya has played a significant role in restoring peace in Somalia since the 1980s that is universally recognized: in 2010 UN secretary-general Ban Ki-moon congratulated President Kibaki on Kenya’s lead role in brokering peace in the region, especially in Sudan and Somalia (Kenya, 2010). As a well-established host, broker and facilitator of negotiations,
Kenya is the frequent choice of venue for both regional and global peace- and security-related talks. Most recently, for example, it hosted talks on the political future of Somalia’s Jubbaland region (June 2012 and March 2013); co-hosted an international anti-piracy conference with the UN (February 2012); and attempted to mediate talks between Ethiopia and the Ogaden National Liberation Front (October 2012).

Kenya’s engagement in peace support has evolved from peacekeeping operations to more complex peace restoration in conjunction with the AU. This is in recognition of the global emphasis on a collective interest in peace and security. UN peace support operations have been a priority since 1989, following Kenya’s participation in its first peace mission to Zimbabwe (then Rhodesia) in 1979.

Currently Kenya has 846 peace support personnel stationed abroad in South Sudan (723), Sudan (78), the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) (23), Liberia (21) and Lebanon, mostly comprising troops, but also other experts and police (UN, 2013). In practice its policy – one that will continue – is always to respond positively to related requests from either the UN or the AU. With a certain number of troops always deployed, soldiers build their skills and training, in addition to earning good salaries ($1,028 per month for AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) personnel).

At the continental level Kenya plays an active role at the AU, in part through the Kenyan deputy chair of the AU Commission. In general, however, it is not seen to be a particularly strong, visionary or proactive leader, in contrast to other continental heavyweights such as South Africa. Neither does it seek to position itself as an equivalent or rival to other African economies, such as South Africa and Nigeria, preferring to maintain a “modest posture”,

26
according to Brigadier Henry Onyango, head of administration at the EASF. There are three main factors that led to a changed approach in Kenya’s regional geo-politics;

4.3.1. The Terrorist Threats

The decision Kenya took in October 2011 to deploy thousands of troops in Somalia’s Jubbaland regional state in southern part of Somalia to wage war on Al-Shabaab which was the biggest security gamble Kenya has taken since independence, a radical departure for a country that has never sent its soldiers abroad to fight. Operation Linda Nchi (Protect the Country) was given the go-ahead with what has shown itself to be inadequate political, diplomatic and military preparation; the potential for getting bogged down is high; the risks of an Al-Shabaab retaliatory terror campaign were real; and the prospects for a viable, extremist-free and stable polity emerging in the Juba Valley are slim. The government is unlikely to heed any calls for a troop pullout: it has invested too much, and pride was at stake. Financial and logistical pressures will ease once its force becomes part of the African Union (AU) mission in Somalia (AMISOM).

Al Shabaab, which emerged from the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) in 2007, was among the most active terrorist groups in the world in 2014, according to preliminary data from START’s Global Terrorism Database (GTD). While al Shabaab is most active in Somalia, it has also committed numerous attacks in Kenya, which has contributed troops to military missions in Somalia and hosts large numbers of Somali refugees.

4.3.2 Understanding Operation Linda Nchi

The Kenyan government has faced a serious terrorist threat from radical Islamists since at least 1998, when twin bombs exploded at the U.S. embassies in Nairobi and Dar Es Salaam
in neighboring Tanzania. But its earlier policy of non-intervention – with the exception of the political track pursued as part of the Mbagathi peace talks on Somalia held in Kenya in 2002-04 – saw it responding slowly, even complacently.

The idea of a military intervention in Somalia was born in about 2008, but failed to garner international support. In 2009-10 Kenya lobbied heavily to gain support for a “Jubbaland/Azania initiative” to establish a buffer zone in a proposed Jubbaland (comprising Middle Jubba, Lower Jubba and Gedo in Somalia) through military proxies and a friendly administration (Moses Wetangula Former Foreign Cabinet Affairs of Kenya). By 2011 Kenya had changed track and decided to send its own troops to Somalia, fighting alongside local allies. The latter comprised the Ras-Kamboni Brigade led by former al-Shabaab member Sheikh Ahmed Mohamed Islam Madobe, the Isiolo militia and the Somali military. The Ras-Kamboni Brigade and the Isiolo militia were trained, supported and armed by the KDF.

Operation Linda Nchi (Kiswahili for “Protect the Nation”) was launched in mid-October 2011, driven by a group of prominent Ogaden Somali Kenyans – the majority Kenyan Somali clan – in self-defence of Kenya’s interests. The intervention is broadly considered to have been both strategically prudent and inevitable: neighboring Uganda, Burundi and Ethiopia were all involved in Somalia militarily; there was a growing perception of heightened insecurity; Somali piracy was on the increase; the LAPSSET project needed protection; and Kenya had for several years been trying unsuccessfully to create a buffer zone between itself and Somalia.
Kenya also wants to be seen as a responsible member of the UN that is engaging in Somalia in the interests of the entire international community. In addition, following the surprise discovery in the 2010 census that that there are some 2.4 million ethnic Somalis in the country, Kenya – concerned about its demographics– is keen to get rid of its more than 500,000 Somali refugees; it hopes to achieve this by stabilizing Jubbaland, from where many of them originate.

4.3.3 Growing Corruption

The deeply dysfunctional government that resulted from Kenya’s National Accord and Reconciliation Act of 2008 was a “free-for-all” with regard to corruption. The rot extended to the heart of the Ministry of Defence, which has been repeatedly implicated in a series of procurement and other corruption scandals since 2010 (Nairobi Law Monthly, 2011). Meanwhile, the KDF, which are considered to conduct professional recruitment, training and oversight, are viewed as having become increasingly ethicized, powerful and – according to a professor of African politics and fellow of Oxford University, David Anderson – “politically belligerent” in the last couple of years (Journalists for Justice 2015 Report).

4.3.4 The War Economy

With a number of funding streams for AMISOM troop contributors – i.e. AMISOM’s trust fund (pre-February 2012), UN funding, bilateral support for AMISOM and U.S. support to troop-contributing countries – there are clear opportunities for associated militaries. The EU alone contributed €356.7 million in bilateral support between March 2007 and the end of January 2013.
4.3.5. Other Diplomatic Relations between Kenya and Somalia

4.3.5.1 The Somali Refugee in Kenya

Kenya hosts 500,000 Somali refugees, the largest number of Somali refugees on the continent, in Dadaab refugee camp in North Eastern Province. Although the large influx of refugees in itself poses a great social and economic crisis for Kenya, the bigger issue has been the reported infiltration of al-Shabaab militias, disguised as refugees, into the camps. Al-Shabaab members have allegedly been entering Kenya as refugees, using the camps as bases to plan and launch attacks on Kenyan territory. There are further claims that they also use the camps as recruiting grounds for new members. As the conflict in Somalia continues, it has become increasingly difficult for Kenya’s government to control the flow of refugees and to adequately screen them so as to separate members of al-Shabaab from bona fide refugees. Further, by helping to stabilize Somalia, Kenya would be able to support the resettlement of refugees from the camps to Somalia, thus relieving the government of the social, political and economic costs of hosting the refugees.

4.4 The Roles played By the International Agencies and the International Community in Supporting the Kenya’s Efforts of Peace Building in Somalia

4.4.1 The Role of Kenya Defense Forces in AMISOM

Following embarrassingly unsupportive statements from the then-Somali president, Sheikh Sharif Ahmed, by October 31st the operation was fully endorsed: a joint Somali-Kenyan statement agreed that Kenya’s right to self-defense was legitimate and stated that the mission was being led by Somali forces “with the support of the KDF” in pursuit of legitimate al-Shabaab targets, all “in the spirit of good neighbourliness” (Somalia-Kenya, 2011: paras. 1-4). In the meantime, on October 21st IGAD endorsed the intervention, thereby giving it
legitimacy, although the UN Monitoring Group (2012: 21) has since stated that between October 2011, when the KDF officially entered Somalia, and June 2\textsuperscript{nd} 2012, when it signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) with the AU.

It violated the UN arms embargo on Somalia. From June the KDF officially became part of AMISOM, with the exception of Kenyan maritime assets and aircraft. Its mandate is to take all necessary measures to “to reduce the threat posed by the al Shabaab terror group, and to create conditions for effective and legitimate governance across the country” (AU, 2013) in conjunction with the Somali government. As of April 2013 Kenya has 4,402 troops on the ground, which it is committed to removing once Somalia has been “stabilized”. No changes in this policy are expected under President Uhuru Kenyatta.

The operation represents a radical departure for Kenya because of its binary nature. Parallel to the military effort, Kenya is now central to a high-risk and complex, multifaceted, regional and global diplomatic effort at stabilizing Somalia. The two separate “tracks” have been led by separate Kenyan actors: the military intervention by the Ministry of Defense and the political track, which is closely associated with IGAD, by Kenya’s security agencies. This has led to tensions with Mogadishu, largely due to “securocrats” leading the political track instead of more experienced Foreign Ministry staff.

\textbf{4.5 The Role of the IGAD and International Community in Restoration of Peace in Somalia}

The conflict in Somalia was very different to the conflict in Sudan and stemmed from the comprehensive collapse of state institutions. When Siad Barre was overthrown in 1991, fighting erupted over control of the capital and degenerated into conflict among multiple clan
based factions. As in Sudan, Somalia’s IGAD neighbors were key stakeholders in the conflict.

The emergence of Islamism as a political force in Somalia gave the conflict a regional dimension with implications for Ethiopia and Kenya, which both have sizeable Somali communities within their borders. It also excited the interest of the US and other Western powers concerned about the threat of international terrorism. Without a government, Somalia was unable to exercise its membership of IGAD, or indeed any other international forum, and IGAD had difficulty confronting the problem of state breakdown.

In 1993 the OAU had assigned Ethiopia the lead role in supporting peace and reconciliation in Somalia, but at that stage peace and security in Somalia was firmly on the UN agenda. The country was then in the throes of significant international interventions (UNITAF, UNOSOMs I and II) designed to create a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations and restore political order. But these had ended in failure in 1995. Ethiopia’s desire to see the re-establishment of a government in Somalia stemmed from concerns about the activities of a radical Islamist group that had surfaced in various parts of the country after the downfall of Siad Barre.

Al Itihad al Islamia encouraged its followers to put aside the clan divisions that were destroying the country and embrace Islam as their political goal. They sought the reestablishment of Somalia as an Islamic state governed by Sharia law. Their vision was one that potentially embraced all the Somali peoples of the Horn of Africa, including the Somali communities in Ethiopia and Kenya. Ethiopia therefore had domestic as well as regional interests in a settlement in Somalia. Within IGAD, Ethiopia enjoyed unchallenged diplomatic
leadership on Somalia. During 1996/7 Ethiopia followed a twin-track policy. Firstly, they took military action to destroy Al-Itihad camps in the Gedo region of Somalia, claiming that these housed Arab and Afghan mujahidin and terrorists linked to Al Qaeda (Tadesse 2002). The operations attracted no adverse comment from IGAD, the OAU or the international community at large and Ethiopian forces remained in control of Somali border towns at Luq and Dolo for much of 1997.

Prime Minister Meles Zenawi nonetheless warned UN officials that ‘Somalia was becoming a major source of instability, with extremists and terrorists operating from there, the scope of which transcended the region’ (UNSC 1997: para 26 S/1997/915). On the political track, Ethiopia organized a major reconciliation for Somali factions in the Ethiopian town of Sodere. In January 1997, this produced a 41-member National Salvation Council, headed by Abdulahi Yusuf with five co-chairmen and an 11-member National Executive Committee. Their task was to convene a 465-member national reconciliation conference later that year.

The Aideed faction that controlled most of Mogadishu had boycotted the Sodere process. This opened the door for a competing initiative. In March 1998, Egypt and the Arab League jointly hosted Somali reconciliation talks with Aideed and others leading to the Cairo Agreement. This effectively undermined the Sodere peace process. The IGAD summit of March 1998 called for an end to ‘the proliferation of competing initiatives’ (a reference to Egypt’s activities) that served to undermine the peace process in Somalia (IGAD 1998).

The outbreak of conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea in May 1998 spelt the end of IGAD’s consensual approach to Somali reconciliation. Eritrea was soon reported to be arming the Aideed faction while Ethiopia stepped up assistance to its own allies in Somalia. The
Ethiopia-Eritrea war thus contributed to worsening conflict within Somalia, as the two sides sought out proxy partners. As the Ethio-Eritrea war reached its climax in early 2000, Djibouti’s new president, Ismail Omah Guelleh, launched his own Somali reconciliation process. The Somali National Peace Conference was held within the framework of IGAD, but included funding and support from external powers including Egypt, Libya and the Gulf states. Guelleh sought a new approach involving traditional and civil Somali leaders rather than the cast of warlords and faction leaders who had dominated previous Somali reconciliation meetings (Interpeace 2009).

The Arta peace process concluded in August 2000 with the creation of a Transitional National Government (TNG) headed by Abdulqasim Salat Hassan. It had support from Islamists and much of the business community in Mogadishu and close ties with the Djibouti government. IGAD, the AU and the UN recognized the TNG as the government of Somalia. Within Somalia support for the TNG was patchier. Neither the Somaliland authorities in the North West nor Abdulahi Yusuf in Puntland recognized the authority of Abdulqasim. Several of the major Somali warlords were equally disaffected. After a peace agreement was signed between Ethiopia and Eritrea in December 2000, Ethiopia turned its attention once more to Somalia.

Ethiopian opposition to the TNG hinged on suspicions of its Islamist leanings, its support from the Arab world and the exclusion of many of its own long term allies among the warlords. By March 2001 the opponents of the TNG had formed a new organization, the Somali Reconciliation and Restoration Council (SRRC). It was headed by Abdulahi Yusuf and worked with Ethiopian support to undermine the TNG. Until 2001 IGAD had played no institutional role in Somali reconciliation beyond endorsing Ethiopian and Djiboutian
initiatives. In the aftermath of the Arta process IGAD faced the uncomfortable prospect of two member states, Ethiopia and Djibouti, which were technically on good terms with each other, supporting opposite factions in Somalia. In January 2002, the

IGAD Summit commissioned President Moi of Kenya to start a joint initiative with Ethiopia and Djibouti to bring the warlords of the SRRC into negotiations with the TNG. Djibouti, Kenya and Ethiopia formed frontline states technical committee in which Djibouti backed the TNG, Ethiopia backed the SSRC and Kenya had the role of mediator. Thus began IGAD’s Somalia National Reconciliation Conference, a Kenyan-led negotiation conducted with the financial support of European development funds.

Unlike IGAD’s Sudan peace process, which was going on in parallel, neither the US nor other Western powers were actively involved in the mediation process. Some saw the apparent absence of outside pressures as a hopeful sign, and thought the IGAD mediation process likely to yield positive results because of the enormous amount of time the Somali faction leaders spent bargaining with each other (Nyuot Yoh 2003).

The negotiations began in October 2002 in the Kenyan town of Eldoret and quickly reached an agreement on cessation of hostilities. Progress thereafter was exceedingly slow, particularly over nomination rights to a large parliament to agree on a transitional charter and elect a president. Whether by accident or design, no progress had been made by the time the formal mandate of the TNG expired in August 2003. Thereafter Abdulqasim was treated like any other faction leader. Djibouti was sufficiently annoyed by this turn of events to leave the facilitation committee in September 2003, but agreed to return when Uganda and Eritrea joined it. Eventually, a parliament was appointed on the basis of clan representation and
assembled in Kenya. In October 2004, it elected Abdulahi Yusuf as president of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG). After two more months and considerable wrangling within parliament, a government was formed, led by Prime Minister Gedi. It was not immediately apparent that the TFG would be unable to establish its authority inside Somalia.

From an IGAD perspective, therefore, the end of the negotiation and the creation of a government of Somalia under a new transitional charter appeared to be another successful venture in mediation. As in the Sudan process, Kenya rather than IGAD had fulfilled the secretariat function and conducted most of the mediation. IGAD’s distinctive contribution to the Somali peace process occurred in the aftermath of the mediation process when it became apparent that Abdulahi Yusuf’s government did not command sufficient support to enable it to function. IGAD therefore had to contend with conflicting interests among its member states as they tried to determine how to support the Somali government they had created. The issue at the centre of the controversy was the use of an IGAD intervention force.

### 4.6 Strides Made by the Kenya Defense Forces in Restoring Peace in Somalia

#### 4.6.1 Achieving the Six Pillar AMISOM Recovery Blueprint

The Kenya Defense Forces joined into a six pillar strategy crafted by the AMISOM for the reclamation of Somalia. These key strategic pillars included; stability, economic recovery, peace building, service delivery, international relations, and unity. In line with this, Somalia President has outlined the government’s top priorities to cover the thematic areas of security, judicial reforms and management of public finance.
4.6.2 The Kenya Defence Forces’ Strategy

The Defense Forces of Kenya have excelled in Somalia, according to Kenyan media reports, succeeding where world powerhouses such as the UK and the United States have failed. Noteworthy, several intervention efforts by Ethiopia also failed. Information from both the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Defense revealed that no foreign armies have managed to set foothold in Somalia. By sheer unique strategy, KDF has fought and won. This strategy includes eliminating the enemy, scouting and policing the liberated areas in addition to using the local authorities to exercise administration over the liberated regions. The approach preempts insurgency and guerilla attempts. In a well calculated move, KDF has facilitated the demining of liberated areas, arrest insurgents confiscate arms while sealing the liberated areas.

This ensures Al-Shabaab does not regroup and regain ground. The strategy paves way for lasting peace and social integration. Military intelligence reveals that KDF are employing logistics to win the war. Al-Shabaab moved from the south and regrouped far north close to the Ethiopian forces. Al-Shabaab has killed several Ethiopian troops but has been pushed out of Baidoa. They are now disorganized after losing leaders, equipment, and troops to KDF.

Several reports have pointed to the fact that both security and humanitarian situations have improved in Somalia since the beginning of KDF operations. The United Nations and other humanitarian agencies such as Oxfam and USAID are now able to provide relief and emergency services including food and medication to the Somali people. This has been however curtailed and hampered by extremely poor infrastructure including roads, railways, airports and telecommunication networks. The improved security situation has enabled Somalia to hold an election and establish a democratically elected government. It is widely
expected that this government will address key reforms outlined above. Besides, enhanced security has provided an enabling environment for investors to pitch camp in Somalia and build industries which will in turn provide sources of employment and a livelihood to a majority of the unemployed Somali youth.
CHAPTER FIVE

5.0 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 Introduction

This chapter underlines the conclusions and recommendations of the study.

5.2 Conclusions

The root causes of conflict in Somalia have been discussed. This study revealed that competition for power and resources, the colonial legacy and state repression were the long-term causes of the Somali conflict. It has also been noted that clan identity, the availability of weapons and the presence of unemployed youth have exacerbated the civil war. While we recognized the importance of clan identity within Somali society, we argued that the politicization of this identity is merely a guise for the elites’ pursuit of power and economic interests.

Several factors have sustained the conflict for 14 years. Ethiopia’s hostile policy toward Somalia, the warlords’ lack of interest in peace, Somalia’s meagre resources and the absence of major-power interest are the major factors that have plagued peace efforts in Somalia. Kenya’s engagement with the world is shifting as part of a general trajectory towards more strategic, self-interested and confident policymaking. Peacekeeping in Africa in general is at a critical juncture: it is increasingly required to respond to ever-more-complex threats with multifaceted and holistic peacekeeping and peace building responses (Moller, B. 2009). Kenya’s unprecedented engagement in Somalia is perhaps an inevitable part of this general shift. While it clearly represents a break from the past, it is not illustrative of a more expansionist policy or agenda than before, however. The Somalia case is deemed unique: the intervention is part of a pragmatic approach to foreign policy that was adopted by the Kibaki
government (2002-13), following the more introspective and passive Moi years (1978-2002). Kenya’s willingness to engage in complex future peace operations, particularly in its backyard, will almost certainly be influenced by events on the ground. As a test case, therefore, for a more robust and less risk-averse approach to maintaining regional security, it is of the utmost importance to Kenya’s future foreign policy trajectory.

5.3 Recommendations

This study proposed peace-building strategies that would help the search for peace. To end politically motivated clan skirmishes and organized crime we suggested that:

1. Using homegrown values and employing the assistance of all types of forces including international peacekeeping forces, local militia groups, shari’a courts and traditional leaders would help create a secure environment.

2. For the area of political institutions we posited that a clan-based power sharing formula would produce a broad-based legitimate regime in Somalia. But we questioned whether the often-endorsed parliamentary system can produce a stable regime.

3. To address justice issues we suggested that a combination of strategies is necessary to deal with past human rights atrocities. Since this important issue has been neglected, we advocate that it should be addressed formally in peacemaking processes. Timely economic assistance should be provided when various groups sign a new peace accord.

4. Widespread allegations regarding opportunistic corruption related to charcoal need to be taken seriously so that vested interests are not permitted to influence policy. The illicit cross-border trade in sugar and other goods also needs to be stemmed. As long as Kismayu is treated as a private contraband port and trade networks into Kenya are
controlled by mafia-like business networks, Kenya’s interests will be compromised and the country will remain at risk.

5. Kenyan government has to control the border between Kenya and Somalia to avoid criminal members to enter launder dirty money in Kenya, the country will also be at risk if criminal come in and create insecurities. In addition to its tough and clear guidelines on preventing the corruption of aid funding, it also funds anti-corruption initiatives. Some of these have included support for national government-led efforts. Norway should explore Kenya’s interest in and willingness to tackle corruption, including ways to support broad Kenyan anti-corruption initiatives, as well as mechanisms to limit the issues noted here specifically. It should, however, be wary of sham institutions and initiatives. Norway can rely on its experience from other initiatives such as the Joint Donor Anti-Corruption Fund in Nicaragua as examples of ways forward.
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