

**WHAT HINDERS END OF CIVIL WARS IN WAR TORN COUNTRIES EVEN
AFTER CIVIL WAR SETTLEMENTS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF SIERRA
LEONE AND LIBERIA.**

BY

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DECLARATION

I, the undersigned, declare that this is my original work and has not been submitted to any other college, institution or university other than United States International University – Africa in Nairobi, Kenya for academic credit. All material obtained herein from other sources is duly acknowledged.

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ABSTRACT.

Several devastating conflicts have devastated and are still devastating Africa for the past twenty years or more. Indeed, the persistence of these conflicts has decimated communities and seriously fractured their demography with baneful consequences on the development process occurring in the continent. According to the 1999 report of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Africa is the most conflict ridden region in the world and the only region in which the number of armed conflict was on the increase at the time the report was published. Although inter-state wars have occurred in Africa, most have been intra-state and civil wars. According to the International Peace Research Institute report on armed conflict, 2003, between 1960 and 2000, Africa witnessed 56 wars out of a total of 141 wars fought worldwide. Despite efforts by International Organizations such as The United Nations and African Union at regulating armed conflicts, war remains the form of the test whereby the claim of states and groups are decided. The purpose of this research is to explain why civil war settlements often are followed by a recurrence of conflicts. War has been used as a means to settle differences among antagonistic parties. Since 1995 the number of recurring conflicts outnumbered new onsets by significant margins. This thesis will investigate the problems of civil war recurrence and the different negotiated settlements, in an attempt to give additional information to the understanding of civil wars and hopefully be of assistance practically to the people involved in negotiated settlements.

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Finally, God has been great during this academic journey.

DEDICATION

I dedicate this study to all victims of war, innocent civilians who are caught up in civil wars and those that know no peace when the civil war recurs. This is hope in Africa towards achieving peace and stability in the continent.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AFL	Armed Forces of Liberia
AFRC	Armed Forces Revolutionary Council
AIIB	Agricultural Industrial Training Board
APC	All People's Congress
AU	African Union
BFW	Barbara F. Walter
CDA	Corporative Development Agencies
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration
ECOMOG	Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
FDA	Forestry Development Authority
IMF	International Monetary Fund
LAO	Limited Access Order
LURD	Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy
MODEL	Movement for Democracy in Liberia
MOJA	The movement, for justice in Africa
NCDDR	National Committee for Disarmament, Demobilization and
NCF	New Conceptual Framework
NGO	Non- Governmental Organization
NPFL	National Patriotic Front of Liberia
NWW	North, Wallis and Weingast
OAO	Open Access Order
PAL	Progressive Alliance of Liberians
PRC	Peoples Redemption Council

SAPs	Structural Adjustment Programs
SLA	Sierra Leone Army
SLPP	Sierra Leone People's Party
SMC	Standing Mediation Committee
TEP	Training and Employment Program
ULIMO	United Liberation Movement for Democracy in Liberia
UN	United Nations
UNAMSIL	United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone
UNDHA-HACO	Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Office of the United Nations Department of Humanitarian Organizations
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
UNOMIL	United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia
UNOMSIL	United Nations Observer Mission for Sierra Leone

CHAPTER ONE: GENERAL INTRODUCTION

1.0 Introduction.

Conflict can be defined as a hostile and unilateral expression of incompatible differences within and among states (Michael Lund, 1997). He goes on further to note that conflicts arises when two or more parties recognize that their interests are incompatible and therefore express aggressive attitudes, or even pursue their interests through acts that may incapacitate or completely eliminate the opponents. Doyle and Sambanis (2000) define civil war as an armed conflict that has caused more than 1,000 battle deaths, presents a challenge to the sovereignty of an internationally recognized state, it involved the state as one of its combatants and there is presence of rebels who are able to mount an organized military opposition to the state and to inflict significant casualties on the state.

According to the 1999 report of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Africa was the most conflict ridden region in the world and the only region in which the number of armed conflict was on the increase at the time the report was published. Although inter-state wars have occurred in Africa, most have been intra-state and civil wars. According to the International Peace Research Institute report on armed conflict, 2003, between 1960 and 2000, Africa witnessed 56 wars out of a total of 141 wars fought worldwide. Despite efforts by International Organizations such as The United Nations and African Union at regulating armed conflicts, war remains the form of the test whereby the claim of states and groups are decided.

The armed conflicts in Africa have taken different dimensions including interethnic, civil, interstate, regional and global. No matter the scale and scope of the conflicts, they have mostly involved struggles for economic and political advantages.

The impacts of these wars and conflicts have also reverberated across the world as local and transnational actors have been summoned for humanitarian and peacekeeping programs, participate in refugees' resettlements, and are involved in demilitarization, democratization and other forms of post conflict reconstruction or political balancing.

Soon after Independence African states, were faced with the challenge of constructing Nation hood out of myriads of ethnicities forced into being by the colonial masters. The high expectations of independence were therefore threatened by rebellions and civil wars. These are some of the ways the masses used to express their disillusionment with both the past colonial state and the succeeding postcolonial state.

As of November 2015, there have been 71 UN peacekeeping missions in the world since 1948 according to the UN Peacekeeping Operations factsheet. There are currently sixteen peacekeeping operations either trying to solve or mediate civil wars.

The UN peacekeeping assumed an overwhelming importance in Post-cold war Africa in a bid to fill the security vacuum created by the departure of the superpowers. Although in his 1992 report, "An Agenda for peace", former UN secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali argued that regional security arrangements be used to lighten the heavy peacekeeping burden shouldered by the UN (Boutros Ghali, 1992)

SIPRI in the 2015 year book records that contrary to many beliefs, there are several African countries that have remained without violence and war. There are ten of these countries that are considered to be Zones of peace as they have been entirely free from violence. It also recorded that in 2005 there was absence of violence as no war was ongoing at the time in Africa.

According to the Global peace index of 2014, North Africa and Sub-Sahara Africa stood out as less peaceful areas which was because of the wars, which were non-state violent conflicts. A worrying trend has been the fact that since 2009 there have been no wars concluded with peace settlements. South Sudan was one of the countries that recorded the biggest fall following the internal conflict that broke out in December 2013. The civil war in South Sudan, has led to political instability and ease of access to firearms.

Although The Global Index of 2015 records that the Middle East and North Africa suffered an upsurge in violence, which was brought about by sectarian strife, civil wars and rise in Islamic extremist groups, Some of the countries such as Egypt and Tunisia saw an improvement (Global Index, 2015). Tunisia improved after it conducted successful elections in 2014 while Egypt improved when the Military backed Abdel Fattah el-Sisi who was later elected as President in May 2015 which brought, to a large extent, political stability in the country. While this region recorded some improvements, Libya on the other hand was experiencing a low level civil war, with rival governments in the East and west trying to oust each other in the fight for legitimacy. In August 2015, Libya Dawn which is the Islamic Militia seized control Tripoli, which forced Parliament and The Government to relocate to Eastern Libya.

In 2015, Sub-Sahara Africa ranked ahead of other regions like North Africa, although by a small margin, since most of its countries had no violence. For example, Guinea-Bissau and Cote d'Ivoire registered the largest improvements since they had both successfully held Free and very peaceful elections and they had also recorded a decline in the number of attacks that were carried out by former Rebels. South Sudan on the other hand declined as it was still in the Civil war that had broken out in 2013 (Global Index, 2015).

There are those countries in Africa that experience social unrest mainly due to Geography. A country like Djibouti borders Somalia which is hostile due to Al Shabaab, this increases the availability of firearms which are then used in Djibouti by those that are against the Authoritarian rule. SIPRI holds that Africa has recorded substantial improvement in peace, however as this decline in Civil wars does not reflect a long term trend, Africa still remains more peaceful today than in all periods before 2000.

1.1 Problem Statement.

Several devastating conflicts have wrecked and are still wrecking Africa for the past twenty years or more. Indeed, the persistence of these conflicts has decimated communities and seriously fractured their demography with baneful consequences on the development process occurring in the continent.

The purpose of this research is to explain why civil war settlements often are followed by a recurrence of conflicts. War has been used as a means to settle differences among antagonistic parties. Since 1995 the number of recurring conflicts outnumbered new onsets by significant margins.

This thesis will investigate the problems of civil war recurrence and the different negotiated settlements, in an attempt to give additional information to the understanding of civil wars and hopefully be of assistance practically to the people involved in negotiated settlements.

While there are several theories on the recurrence of civil war, this study will apply Barbara F. Walter's theory on how to design successful settlements. It will use her first argument that proposes that for a successful peace negotiation is one that has a third party negotiation to help the warring parties reach a peace agreement. Her second argument is that resolving a civil war requires integration of warring parties into a single state to create a new government

capable of accommodating the interests of both parties and build a national, non-partisan military force.

The study will also use North, Wallis & Weingast (NWW) New conceptual Framework to explain why some countries experience more violence and how the political organizations and institutions function. NWW propose a new conceptual framework that reflects a central structure that enables the human societies to order themselves. They go ahead to say that for a state to sustain the social order, there needs to be developed state organizations and institutions that are capable of limiting violence.

The practical assumptions and suggestions of the above theorists will be tested by applying them to real life cases through exploring previous UN Peace keeping missions in the continent. These cases will be Sierra Leone, which was a successful civil war settlement and Sudan, which has had the recurrence of civil wars.

1.2 Research Questions.

The study will use the following Research questions that will help guide the research into the two cases:

1. Was there a third party intervention that would enforce the settlement?
2. Were there institutions in place that would guide the implementation of the peace agreement?
3. Did the DDR process start too quickly?
4. What were the terms of the agreement and did they capture interests of the both groups?

1.3 Objectives of the study.

1.3.1 General Objective.

The aim of the study will be to seek an explanation on what hinders end of civil wars in war torn countries even after civil war settlements, using a comparative study of Sierra Leone and Sudan.

1.3.2 Specific Objectives

The study specifically seeks to:

1. What role did the third party guarantor play in the settlement?
2. Were there institutions in place that would guide the implementation of the peace agreement?
3. Was there recurrence of violence after DDR?
4. What were the terms of the agreement and did they capture interests of the both groups?

1.4 Hypothesis

The following study wishes to test NWW and BFW's propositions and explanations.

Therefore, from these, arose the following hypotheses:

- Civil war recurs because settlements do not take into account that the societies do not have institutions and organizations which would enforce the terms of the agreement.
- Civil war settlements breakdown because there is no third party guarantor to enforce the terms of the agreement
- Civil war settlements do not succeed because disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process of fighting parties takes place too quickly.

1.5 significance of the study.

Walter (1997) observes that between 1940 and 1990, only 20 percent of civil wars were resolved at the bargaining table. Therefore the aspect of negotiations came into play. She goes further to demonstrate the critical importance of third party mediators in persuading civil war protagonists to accept a negotiated settlement. The real issue comes in after the civil war has been settled, how to sustain the peace.

Licklider (1995) noted that nearly one-quarter of all civil wars since, 1945 have resumed with the same sides and the same issues after the initial war has ended for at least five years. It has further been noted that these renewed conflicts are more likely to last longer and they come back deadly than ever before.

It is from these facts that these study is important as it will serve to analyze what leads to recurrence of civil wars even after negotiated settlements. The analysis will bring out the unique factors that led to a successful settlement like in the case of Sierra Leone that can be applied in failed cases like Sudan.

The study may also be a referencing point for other scholars who want to understand what leads to recurrence of civil wars not only in Africa but around the globe. The study could be a source of secondary data to other scholars who want to conduct a related study and also policy makers can use the recommendations that I will give at the conclusion of this study to make informed decisions in cases of ending a civil war.

1.6 Literature Review

Literature on successful civil war settlement has been offered by many practitioners and scholars and recommendations given on the use of third party guarantor to enforce peace. However, Toft, (2010) argues that war ended in negotiation always ends up in the recurrence

of the war. She goes on to point out that for a successful civil war settlement, the tactic of the carrot and stick has to be used but maintain a balance so as to have a successful civil war settlement.

In this argument she goes on to suggest that war should be given a chance, as rebel victory seems to lead to a peaceful future. She captures the point that there is a strong relationship between rebel victory and postwar stability. This is in controversy of trying to end a civil war, as civil wars are known to be destructive and lead to massive loss of lives.

But Walter, (1997) agrees to some extent as she proposes that that ending and successfully resolving a civil war requires much more than negotiating bargain, but the rebels need to disarm their militia, integrate with the other warring fraction into a single state to create a new government capable of accommodating the interests of both parties, and build a nation with non-partisan Military force. Relinquishing power by rebel groups is something that the rebels hesitate to do. The state retains its own army and organizations therefore they retain their ability to defend themselves in the future. On the other hand, war combatants feel that is a luxury they can't take since it leaves them vulnerable therefore they are hesitant in the issue of disarmament.

Downes, (2004) argues that all groups in a civil war have to forsake their armies, which means they give up their ability to protect themselves and ensure that they enforce the terms of the agreement that was negotiated. This is so that they can unify the country moving forward. This argument again leads to the question of how sure the parties are that the other group will not cheat on the deal and attack when the rest are most vulnerable.

1.7 Theoretical Framework.

Miles and Huberman (1994) define a conceptual framework as a visual or written product, which explains, either graphically or in narrative form, the main things to be studied which are the key factors, concepts, or variables and the presumed relationships among them. NWW propose a conceptual framework for interpreting recorded human history. The use of the proposed patterns of human behavior will guide in interpreting some of the things human societies have done over the years.

This study will use New Conceptual Framework to develop an explanation on the interaction of the three human aspects which are political, social and economic and give a new institutional explanation on why some human patterns in the three aspects have gone on for millennia.

This explanation takes into account how human societies use institutions to limit violence. North in 1991 observed that it is institutions that frame human behavior but through organizations that people are able to carry out their complex social interaction (North, 1991)

Barbara F. Walters poses the question of why rivals of a same state in a civil war can't negotiate successfully and what the international society can do to help both sides of a conflict in order to end the civil war successfully. It is from these questions that BFW proposes her theory on how to design successful peace agreements and why negotiations break down.

The study will use BFW's theory to explain why negotiations break down. She says that the reason why negotiations fail is because the negotiation process is imperfect as the armed parties both follow their own negotiating tactics which eventually back fire. She goes on further to suggest that negotiations fail because combatants do not promise to abide by the

terms since there are no institutions and organizations that will enforce the terms of the agreement.

BFW proposes that the only time there is a successful negotiation is when there is a third party guarantor to enforce the terms of the agreement and help in the disarmament process. If disarmament done too early may have negative effects. I will use BFW's theory to understand why negotiated settlements lead to a recurrence of war and also her suggestion on how to carry out successful settlements. She suggests that for a peaceful settlement, peacekeeping forces must be committed on the promise to back up the resolve on use of force.

It is also important that all parties are assured of an actual say in the government of the day and power sharing agreement has been negotiated.

It therefore practical to employ the two theories since NWW's theory will provide the study with a historical framework on humans and BFW's theory will give an explanation on why settlements fail and how they ought to be designed.

1.8 Methodology.

The study will answer the question through the use of comparative case study and Documentary data analysis. Goodrick, (2014) defines a case study as an in-depth examination that is often undertaken of a single study, such a policy or a process. A comparative study covers two or more cases to bring out and offer an explanation why some programs or policies work and others fail. A comparative case study undertakes analysis and synthesis of patterns across the cases under observation to bring out the similarities and differences.

As a comparative case study is used to test hypotheses, the study will use the two cases of Liberia and Sierra Leone, to refute or support propositions given by the two theories, NWW

on recorded human history and BFW's proposition on why peace processes fail and how to design successful peace settlements.

The combination of the approach above and the following theories offers a challenge as although patterns do emerge, it is imperative to note that, important cultural and historical differences cause individuals, governments and rebel transactions to act in ways not predicted by the theories.

Monageng, (2006) defines documentary research as a systemic collection of data about a social phenomenon for the purpose of finding and seeking to understand the patterns and irregularities in it. He further notes that, since a research project is something that should be original, most students concern themselves with collecting new data that most students never think of re-analyzing existing data.

My main focus in this paper is to seek an explanation on why civil wars recur even after a peace settlement therefore the study will be looking for patterns and irregularities in the peace processes and post peace process of the cases provided. Therefore it will seek information from Journals and United Nations Reports.

1.9 structure of the Thesis.

This paper will have five chapters. Chapter one will be a general introduction outlining what the paper will be about and what method am going to use.

In chapter two, I will review literature that is available on settlement of civil wars, not forgetting review the theories and their proposals. I will review NWW New conceptual Framework for interpreting human history in order to see what patterns emerge in the human history that is relevant to this study. The second theory that I will review is BFW's theory on why civil wars recur and her proposal on how to design peace settlements that stick.

Chapter three will answer my research questions.

In chapter four I will provide the empirical analysis that provides illumination to the question.

I will also give detailed accounts of the peace processes of my case studies and use the evidence to interrogate my question.

Chapter five will be where I will look at what the data says about the theory, does it affirm its propositions or refute it? These are some of the questions I will be answering in this Chapter.

I will also in my conclusion, give new theoretical perspective and clarify how certain variables operate.

CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW

2.0 Introduction

The aim of this study is to seek an explanation on why civil wars recur even after peace settlements.

This chapter intends to review literature that is available on settlement of civil wars, not forgetting review the theories and their proposals. It will review NWW New conceptual Framework for interpreting human history in order to see what patterns emerge in the human history that is relevant to this study. The second theory that will be reviewed is BFW's theory on why civil wars recur and her proposal on how to design peace settlements that stick.

2.1 Third party guarantor in Peace Settlements.

Toft (2010), notes that there is a preferred way to end civil wars which is negotiation. This method of ending civil wars is recommended because the process uses third party resources, which is in form of economic incentives and good offices, to end violence.

The United Nations, in its Charter provides that the organization and its members shall maintain International peace and security, remove threats to peace and aggression. It is in this pursuit that the Charter provides for the following principle:

"All Members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered"
(Article 2, paragraph 3).

It furthermore, in Chapter VI (Pacific settlement of disputes), states that:

"The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a solution by

negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice."
(Article 33, paragraph 1)

Article 33 allows a country going through a civil war to employ a third party in the settlement of the conflict. Negotiation is important at a time when the warring factions cannot come to the bargaining table without an impartial negotiator. The potential costs of a raging war are greater and they pose a danger of a spillover which would affect State interests.

BFW (1997), notes that between 1940 and 1990, only 20% of civil wars ended at the bargaining table. Combatants in the civil wars chose to fight till the finish unless an outside power came in to negotiate a peace agreement. She further notes that if the third party agreed to enforce the terms of the Peace agreement, the negotiations always succeeded and if there was no third party guarantor the talks failed. A third party guarantor, ensures that the terms of the peace agreement are enforced and followed. At this point, each side of the warring factions are suspicious of the other side's intentions, after all, both sides were in a war where they killed with considerable skill. These problem of being uncertain regarding the other party on present and future intentions inhibits co-operation and poses security completion which may lead to a recurrence of war.

According to BFW, Mediators play at least three roles in a peace settlement.

The first is informational. Mediators can provide whatever information is missing, highlight the common interests, and encourage meaningful communication among the combatants so that they can locate a common middle ground.

They also play an important procedural role. Mediators arrange for interactions between the warring parties, this is because they can control the pace and formality of the meetings, and structure the agenda in a way that would keep the process focused on the issues. The third role is in somewhat coercive. Mediators are in a position to reward concessions made by the parties and punish stubbornness presented in order to make disagreement costly. These functions are aimed at helping both parties' breakthrough stalemates and both come up with agreeable terms.

Toft (2010) notes that even if negotiation is the preferred means of ending a civil war, the war is more likely to recur even after a peace agreement has been put in place. The third party guarantor should use a carrot and stick strategy to ensure the terms of the agreement are enforced. Instead of emphasizing on the benefits of co-operation, punishment should also be emphasized should either of the parties fail to reach their end of the bargain.

A country's consent to a third party guarantor does not guarantee success of the process. The wars in Angola (1975-2002) continued despite of many peace agreements while in a country like Rwanda genocide occurred after a peace agreement that was signed in Arusha.(Doyle and Sambanis 2006).

Lack of proper implementation can undermine even the best of agreements. On the other hand, even the successfully implemented operations faced challenges. In a country like Cambodia, the United Nations took up a peace operation, the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia, but soon after 1993, there were cases of armed resistance and the country suffered a coup in 1997. The international community intervened in East Timor and took temporary sovereignty. The country became independent following the intervention (Doyle and Sambanis 2006).

2.2 Institutions in Peace Settlements.

There seems to be an understanding that institutions matter in a divided society as they address relations between the warring parties. (De Juan, 2012) There are specific institutional arrangements that have been seen to lower the risk of conflicts.

Downes (2010) notes that functioning of an institution that is designed to enforce the peace agreement is affected by the uncertainty of the adversary's future intentions. Both the state and rebellious groups remain uncertain on how the political institutions will work, and there is distrust on whether both parties will abide to the rules of the game.

According to De Juan (2012), a country after a civil war will have weak institutions and these same institutions are expected to prevent rapid grab for power and enforce the terms of the peace agreement. In as far as the citizens of the country understand that institutions cannot be developed overnight, the trick is for democracy to last long enough to ensure that the process of getting strong institutions occur.

Institutions and elections may be effective but after a long time when rules and practices become routine (Walter 1999). At this period, suspension of democracy should not be easy as the groups in the country would need guarantee that they will not be eliminated from power. Suspicion from either parties would undermine the success of the peace settlement. There is the fear that the state side could use its resources and position to undermine the formulation of policies and institutions that would be impartial.

Institutions are now playing a role of power-dividing institution where it limits the scope of government authority and establish a system of checks and balances to manage the interest of the competing groups within a country (Hoddie, 2014). The aspect of creating power-dividing institutions as a means of bringing civil wars to an end includes commitments by the

government and rebel groups, this was used in 2014 peace settlement in the Philippines. This role is important in case the state wants to use its institutions to further their interests and abandon those of the other warring faction.

This strategy ensures that a democracy will not serve a majority and forget the minority. It serves to reassure the other party that is not in government that their interests will be protected within the democratic state. Fearon and Laitin (2003) found that institutions have an impact on civil wars. They found out that the regime type, affected the stability of a country. Regimes such as semi democracies are more likely to experience internal conflicts as compared to democracies and autocracies. Institutions allow inclusiveness of the people and therefore limit the opportunities for using violence.

Institutions increase the success of a peace settlement since they allow solving of commitment problems between groups that signed the peace agreement. Institutions have an impact on whether a war will be terminated and also if there will be a recurrence of a civil war. Therefore the ideal peacekeeping institution is hard to formulate because there are many factors affecting the likelihood of the success.

Goldstein (2012) notes that at the end of the cold war, there was increased peace within countries which can be attributed to international institutions. Despite facing numerous challenges, the International Institutions have had a positive impact on maintaining stability after termination of a war and in ensuring there is no recurrence of the same war.

2.3 Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Process in peace settlement.

In a bid to ensure there is a smooth transition from war to peace, one of the exercises that is carried out is Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (Banholzer 2014). Rebels can be a cause of destabilization and that can trigger another war if they decide not to go along with

the peace process. The rebels are expected to be integrated back into civilian life as part of the peace process.

Wohl and Sambanis (2010) found a correlation between DDR process and a successful peace process. They note that since the 1990s there was a significant decline in the number of armed conflicts as there was a rapid increase in the DDR programs.

The United Nations, provides for in the Post Conflict Stabilization, Peace building and Recovery Framework, a summary on why integration of combatants is important. It summarizes:

“Ex-combatants, especially when they are young, may have become a ‘lost generation’, having been deprived of education, employment and training during the period, suffering war trauma, becoming addicted to alcohol and drugs, and dependent on weapons and violence as the only means to make their way in the world. When they lose their military livelihood, they are likely to experience difficulties in adapting to civilian life. Male ex-combatants may engage in anti-social behavior within their families and communities, contributing to an increase in economic and social – especially sexual – violence.”

It is from this imminent threat that the ex-combatants pose that DDR programs have been designed to facilitate a transition from being fighters to becoming civilians and reduce whatever incentive they may have to take up arms again.

According to the United States Institute for peace special report of 2010, DDR process has been successful in countries after a civil war when it was done hand in hand with Security Sector Reforms. In Liberia, there was a civil war that lasted for fourteen years. After the war there was the usual question on what to do with the ex-combatants who were still walking the streets with weapons in hand, so as to ensure that the peace lasted. The United Nations

Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) was mandated with the role of DDR so as to ensure all parties adhered to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) which was signed in 2003. The DDR program in Liberia was able to disarm and demobilize over 100,000 ex-fighters, with 11,000 being child soldiers. UNMIL also took up the responsibility for the Security Sector Reforms which included all security organizations made up of civilians, such as the Liberian National Police. At the same time, the United States took up the responsibility of demobilizing and reintegrating Liberia's armed forces soon after the Ministry of Defense was reconstituted.

Liberia having linked DDR-SSR programs was a success as they reintegrated many ex-combatants. 13,500 ex-soldiers who belonged to legacy Armed Forces of Liberia, were demobilized and they were able to apply and were readmitted to security that was newly created.

Although no previous study shows whether DDR process is dependent on regime type, Matveeva (2012) describes that the absence of a government that is accountable and transparent hinders the process. Kingma and Grebroworld (1998) emphasize that the absence of a legal system or any other peaceful conflict-solving mechanism can lead to a failure in the DDR process. The danger in such a scenario is that even the smallest of disputes might result in the recurrence of the conflict.

DDR process that takes place under the supervision of an outside power is capable of achieving its mandate since the outside power takes the weapons without fear of consequences. Jennings (2007) notes that in a case like Liberia, The United Nations presence made all the difference. The ex-combatants are able to give their arms voluntarily to the UN peace keepers.

One of the ensuing debates between scholars is when the DDR process should begin. The point of divergence is whether a conflict must be already terminated for DDR to start or

whether DDR can be launched when the conflict is still ongoing. According to the International Peace Academy (2005), the DDR process in Congo-Brazzaville in 2005 started while the war was still ongoing and it was considered as a strategy that helped in confidence building which led to a Comprehensive Peace Agreement.

The other camp argues that peace is a pre-condition to a successful DDR process Banholzer (2014) found that DDR process that was implemented after a peace agreement and hostilities had ceased showed more success rates. DDR attempts in Angola when the war was ongoing failed.

Scholars in this camp argue that the DDR process initiated during war provides the combatants with a center for recruitment. Banholzer (2014) notes that there was a strong negative co-relation between implementation of DDR after termination and renewed onset of war. Therefore starting DDR after hostilities have stopped increases chances of success. In this case it is more suitable as a peace stabilizing tool not as a means to end war.

Getting the timing right is an aspect that civil war practitioners see as a major issue. There is no specified timing that is available to be used but some studies have shown that it may not be a great idea to start DDR when the fighting is ongoing. Therefore the question now is, after ceasefire, when should DDR process start?

Carames et al (2006) argue that starting DDR rapidly doesn't guarantee success. The lifespan between the end of a civil war and start of DDR differs from country to country. Taking too long again protracts the problem. Cox (1996) notes that if both parties and the peacekeepers take too long to commit, there might be an erosion of the mandate which will start an irreversible process.

2.4 Power Sharing after the Peace Settlement.

Ottaway (1995) argues that a successful transition from war to peace requires a power sharing agreement. She goes further to note that democratization is a disruptive process on its own because the rules in the political arena that have been set and consolidated in a democracy are missing immediately after a war. Therefore, when these rules are missing, there lacks checks and balances in the completion of the conflict parties. She therefore suggests that there should be long term national conferences that would prevent the destructive effects of democratization.

Hartzell (1999) argues that most institutionalized peace agreements that provide economic and political security for the conflict parties after elections are held are successfully implemented. She gives three different types of institutionalization. The first one is Proportional representation which is done after elections and is usually of the lowest degree. Second is administrative proportional representation which is based on a representative formula of the size of groups and is the medium degree. Third, is the division of political power in a federal system or granting the regional constitutes the highest degree in the institutionalization. She notes that the more the former warring factions disperse power among them, the more security is guaranteed among them and the higher the chances of a successful war to peace transition

In cases where there is a transition period, talks still continue in two main ways. First, there are efforts to bring the opposition groups who refused into the political process. Second, there is continued negotiation between the signatories of the agreement on the outstanding issues in the power sharing government. Transition governments can succeed in bringing the non-signatories by offering a share in power but only if their interests have changed (Papagianni, 2008).

Curtis (2007) notes that cohesion and discipline lacks amongst members of a power-sharing government which makes further negotiations difficult. Transition governments include people who have diverse and competing ideas where the purpose is to bring everyone together in the ruling structure to stop violence and conflict.

Walter (1997) suggests that groups that want to end a war through negotiations must relinquish power over conquered territory and create a central government. But she notes that groups are faced with a dilemma.

On one hand, each of the warring factions will demand power sharing as a price for peace and on the other hand each side knows that it is costly to tolerate a partner in government because each side will try to pursue different and competing policies. She further notes that the more political, military, and territorial power can be distributed, the more enforceable and credible promises to share power will be. Distributing the state power among the power rivals, helps reduce the uncertainties of early democratization in four ways. First, groups that control key ministries, such as the ministry of justice, or that share control of the prime minister ship, will have greater incentives to support a new democratic government. Second, splitting the military makes it very difficult for potential dictators to oppress or overpower other groups.

Third, allowing factions to maintain some regional autonomy offers them an important fallback position if they do lose control of the central government. Fourth, these guarantees help opponents to distinguish early in negotiations which groups are serious about sharing power and which are not. A group intent on setting up a one-party state would never agree to such a guaranteed division of power and influence.

2.5 Barbara F. Walter Theory.

Barbara F. Walters poses the question of why rivals of a same state in a civil war can't negotiate successfully and what the international society can do to help both sides of a conflict in order to end the civil war successfully. It is from these questions that BFW proposes her theory on how to design successful peace agreements and why negotiations break down.

2.5.1 BFW's Theory on Third party guarantor.

BFW carried out a study to test the hypothesis that successful negotiation to civil wars varied directly with the strength of an outside security guarantee. Third-party security guarantees in this case were defined as any implicit or explicit promise given by an outside power to protect adversaries during the treaty Implementation period (Walter, 1997).

From the study, she found out that once adversaries agreed to negotiate in every case where a third party stepped in, there was a successful settlement. Outside powers guaranteed Lebanon's agreement in 1958, the Dominican Republic's "Act of Dominican Reconciliation," the Riyadh Agreement in Lebanon (1976), the Addis Ababa Agreement in Sudan (1972), the Lancaster House Agreement in Zimbabwe (1979), and the Tela Agreement in Nicaragua (1989), and all brought peace (Walter, 1997).

Colombia and Yemen reached settlements without any outside guarantees, but then again these are the only two countries that the opposing sides could not carry out surprise attacks against each other. Many people have argued that adversaries should reach a bargain when the cost of continuing to fight becomes too high. These high costs are not enough to convince warring parties to sign a settlement without an assurance from outside. Eventually, it is the

outside security guarantees that have convinced adversaries to sign peace settlements. The relationship between security guarantees and settlement was clear (Walter, 1997).

Walter notes that it was more difficult, however, to determine if the strength of a guarantor affected the likelihood of success since settlements always succeeded when outside guarantees were offered. A closer analysis, revealed an interesting pattern.

Weak guarantees were generally offered in wars with very high costs and were usually offset by an all-encompassing internal power-sharing arrangements. On the other hand, Peace agreements that allowed the individual adversaries to retain as much independent strength as possible, which was in the form of political representation, veto powers, and a military balance in the national forces, did not require a strong external security guarantees in order to succeed.

Conversely, outside guarantees tended to be strongest in less bloody wars with low costs, and treaties with vague or undeveloped political arrangements. Peace agreements that included few political guarantees for future political participation (or only the promise of elections) and unequal representation of groups in the national army required the strongest external guarantees in order to succeed. In these cases, the belligerents seemed far less certain of their own abilities to deter renewed war. This inverse relationship between the strength of security guarantees (Walter, 1997).

Third party enforcement and verification after the treaty has been signed is critical for the success of the settlement. Another important concept is to rethink the resolution of the civil war in a three step process where combatants must make a choice to (1) initiate negotiations (2) compromise on goals and principles,(3) implement the terms the a treaty. Groups that agree to resolve the conflict by meeting at the negotiating table and those who manage to

resolve their grievances are still worried that their enemy will take advantage of them after they sign a peace agreement and begin the DDR process.

In the end, it is the implementation phase, that is long ignored by scholars, that is the most difficult to carry out and the reason so many negotiations are not successful. On the other hand how does a third party guarantor ensure that they are credible at the negotiating table? For a third party to be credible, they must fulfill at least three of the following conditions.

(1) The Outside party must have a self-interest that helps them uphold the promise. The self-interest ranges from colonial ties, economic ties, strategic interests or alliance loyalties that enhance the commitment to intervene in the conflict and it will also indicate the political will to persevere through to the implementation period.

(2) The guarantor must be willing to use force if and when necessary. Its military capacity must be sufficient enough to go head to head and punish the side that violates the terms of the treaty. An equal or greater force is important for any threat that may arise to effectively discourage cheating. (3) The third party guarantor should be able to indicate resolve. The third party can either station enough forces to deter aggression without having to ask for forces in case conflict breaks out. They can also create some form of military camp where forces can be stationed in strategic places such as borders, troop assembly areas or munition sites. The guarantors can get approval from home governments or organizations they are representing for further action in case conflict breaks out. These costly signals should give the state incentives to reveal their preferences and improve the credibility of their promises.

(Walter, 1997)

2.5.2 BFWs Theory on Institutions.

Walter (1997) argues that peace settlements fail because civil war opponents are asked to do what they consider to be the unthinkable at a time when there are no legal institutions or a legitimate government to enforce the terms of the agreement.

At a time when there are no institutions nor a legitimate government to enforce the terms of the agreement, the rebels and the state are expected to demobilize, disarm, and disengage their military forces so that they can now prepare for peace. Once the two sides put down their weapons there is no assurance that a future attack won't occur.

The negotiations fail because the parties cannot promise to abide by the terms of the agreement until there are credible institutions to enforce and implement the terms of the agreement and share a political power (Walter, 1997).

After a civil war, the country is in a state of anarchy, there is no government in place to ensure there is order, there is no police or judicial system to enforce terms of the agreement and the country is basically divided into independent armed camps. This situation puts the government and rebels in a dilemma. Walter (1997) gives a recommendation that the only way to prevent further bloodshed, the country must go through a transition in which neither of the parties encourages cooperation nor can they survive an attack.

Walter notes that Countries that are emerging from a civil war have deep societal divisions, their institutions are fragile and the temptation for exploitation is greater than in a state that is trying to democratize.

Therefore choosing the same institutions that were used to channel societal divisions will not be enough to convince the warring factions to sign and implement a peace agreement. Three

problems stand out in such a scenario. (1) Government institutions will be too weak immediately after the civil war to prevent any rapid grab for power and enforce what the opposition cannot enforce by themselves. In a study done by BFW, she notes that countries that were not democratic prior to the outbreak of the war, nor had a history of democratic rule or an established judiciary, the party that won the first elections after the civil war was expected to build the institutions guided by the terms of the signed peace agreement. She goes on to note that once in power the party could easily ignore the guidelines provided by the peace agreement and build institutions that appeared democratic on the outside but served their interests in the inside. (2) Even if really democratic institutions are established, the domestic groups cannot expect them to work overnight (Walter, 1997).

Walter notes that the trick for democracies to last long enough, the citizens of the country to become habitual with the values and norms and eventually internalize them. She goes on further to note that opponents of a civil war do not have the luxury to wait for institutions to start functioning because they are afraid the other opponent will grab state control.

2.5.3 BFW's Theory on Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration.

Walter (1997) argues that after a civil war, governments and rebels recognize the risk involved in compliance, therefore signing a treaty means that both sides sincerely want peace. The fact that each party understands the benefits to be gained by exploiting a peace treaty, both parties find it hard to trust the terms of the agreement therefore they retreat back to war.

Since incumbent governments and rebels cannot come up with an agreement that allows each side of the warring factions to maintain their status quo, should any party decide to cheat. Therefore co-operation leaves the parties vulnerable so they prefer to continue fighting that be in that condition (Walter 1997).

Resolving a civil war requires much more than reaching a bargain and then instituting a cease-fire. In order to be successful, peace settlement must consolidate the previously warring factions into a single state, create a new government capable of accommodating their interests, and build a new national, nonpartisan military force. This means that warring factions who want to settle their war off the battlefield must at some point demobilize, disengage, and disarm their separate militaries. They must then surrender whatever remaining power they have to a single administration, not necessarily their own (Walter 1997).

The importance for warring factions to consolidate power at a time when they can neither defend themselves against an attack nor rely on a central government to defend them greatly complicates their ability to cooperate. Therefore, by requiring demilitarization under the conditions of anarchy, civil war peace treaties promise to create security dilemmas in the reverse. As groups begin to disarm, they create an increasingly tense situation where the fewer arms they have, the more vulnerable they feel.

The more vulnerable they feel, the more sensitive they become to possible violations. And the more sensitive they become to violations, the less likely they are to fulfill their side of the bargain. The ultimate challenge facing civil war opponents at the negotiating table therefore is not simply how to stop the fighting, but how to design a settlement that convinces the groups to shed individual defenses and submit to the rules of a new political game at a time when no government or police force can either protect them or guarantee compliance (Walter 1997).

Although there are a number of implementation plans that can be designed to reduce vulnerability, the most important and impartial plan will be to demobilize partisan groups. According to Walter (1997) disarmament can be postponed and be carried out gradually in a reciprocal manner but is a step that cannot be avoided. Walter (2002) recommends that

demobilization can be broken down into a series of small steps where governments and rebels can observe the degree to which the other party is disbanding its army and meet its soldier to soldier, gun for gun. This plan would allow both parties to have a safe military transition and have long term peace.

Some scholars have raised the question of whether DDR process should be carried out by a third party. Walter (2002) argues that the presence of a powerful third party can help the parties overcome the problem of monitoring, observation and enforcing compliance.

She goes on to say that if the government and rebels can verify demobilization and faithfully monitor the process, then cheating would be detected and this would help induce compliance. A transparent process of military disengagement would help make combatants more confident that peace would prevail since there would no room for stockpiling of weapons and soldiers.

Walter (2002) also gives a recommendation in form of a strategy that would help ease the process of DDR.

She says that governments and rebels who want long term benefits of settlement but have short term incentives to cheat can tie their hands so as to demonstrate their desire for peace. For instance, the government can offer demobilization first without requiring the rebels to do so. Both the government and rebels can also place large sums of money in a bail bond. These strategies would help build confidence among the parties.

This strategy though, Walter (2002) notes that it is hard to implement especially in high risk and high-uncertain environment that exists after a settlement is signed. This is because, a tit-for-tat demobilization is only effective if combatants at this time can identify when there is no compliance and sanction behavior. Combatants after a war can do neither of that. Second,

Combatants have no resources to track the governments' armaments, therefore they can't monitor and verify the demobilization process. Finally, the use of costly signals of intent like bail bond, can only be used when groups are uncertain about their opponents readiness to cheat in DDR. When both sides have enough information about each other's intent, only then will there be co-operation in implementing the agreement (Walter, 2002).

2.5.4 BFW proposition for successful settlements

Walter (1997) admits that ending a civil war is usually difficult at a time when organization inertia, miscommunication and wishful thinking all work together against reconciliation and cooperation. It is from these observations that she gives the following proposals on how to design successful peace settlement.

First, she emphasizes on the role of a third party guarantor who will change the level of fear and insecurity that comes with implementation of the treaty. Parties cannot commit to implement a treaty that seems less attractive when implemented. However, third parties ensure that the groups are protected and the terms will be fulfilled. Third parties also guarantee that promises will be kept at least until the new government and a new national military is enforced. This way they can ensure that cheating does not happen and that it is costly than cooperating in the implementation of the peace process.

Second, free and fair elections are reliable as a means to democratize in the aftermath of a civil war. Elections can open up the political process to even the opposition groups which would be the first step to a peaceful reconstruction of a new legitimate government. Checks and balances should also be put in place to bind the government once it has been elected. Opposing sides should be willing to submit to elections and honor the results once the process has been completed.

Dividing up the state and distributing the parts of the state among the former rivals reduces the risks and uncertainties that come with early democratization in four ways. First, groups that control key ministries, such as the ministry of justice, or that share control of the prime minister have greater incentives to support a new democratic government. Second, dividing up the military makes it tremendously difficult for potential dictators to oppress or overpower other groups.

Third, allowing factions to maintain some regional sovereignty offers them an important fallback position if they do lose control of the central government. Fourth, these guarantees help opponents to distinguish early in negotiations which groups are serious about sharing power and which ones are not.

Third, Disarmament has a negative effect on the combatants' sense of security if it is too soon.

Allowing the warring factions to retain a bit of their ability to defend themselves even after their armies have been disbanded offers the groups some sense of security and serves as insurance against future oppression, in case the terms of the settlement do not materialize.

“BFW conducted a study on all civil wars, in the period 1940 to 1990, in order to study which features were at play in the successful settlements. Her findings had six implications:

First, the only peacekeeping type that helps the resolution of a war was one backed by a promise to use force. Second, an agreement will only be as effective as the political determination of its supporters, any hesitation from outside parties will undermine the enforcement operations. Third, the third party supporters need to be prepared to stay through the formation of the new national army and the new government. Fourth, in contrast to what one might assume, strict neutrality by the third party supporters does

not appear to be necessary. Fifth, Disarmament has a negative influence on the combatant's sense of security. Sixth, alternatives do exist to extensive and prolonged intervention; fewer third party troops is needed when all parties are assured an actual say in the new government and extensive internal power sharing agreements have been planned" (Walter 1997).

In conclusion, Walter, (1997) says that security guarantee is important but not enough, the warring factions must also desire peace for a peace settlement to work.

2.6. New Conceptual Framework for explaining human behavior.

The aspect that explains why some states achieve development and others remain poor can be attributed to complex ways that societies have structured human relationships through institutions that shape interactions in politics, religion and in the economy (North 1991)

NWW build their question of the role of institutions from North's (1991) observation that institutions frame all human behavior but it is through organizations that people carry out complex social interactions. To understand how humans have developed overtime, it is important to understand how institutions affect and shape the kind of organization necessary for sustainable human co-operation.

According to NWW (2010) the most important and powerful organization in any society is the state. The state is mandated with the role of providing social order in order to prevent and contain human violence. Sustaining this social order requires the development of a state organization that is capable of limiting violence, and that requires that political and economic systems work in concert.

NWW provide that societies have been ordered in three ways. The first social order dominated pre-recorded human history: the primitive social order is a kind of hunter-gatherer society.

The second social order has dominated the last 10,000 years, what amounts to recorded human history: limited access orders solve the problem of containing violence by political manipulation of the economic system to generate rents by limiting entry to provide social stability and order. Violence jeopardizes this rents, therefore individuals who receive rents have an incentive to suppress violence and to support the current regime. The third social order arose over the last 300 years: open access orders which sustain social order through political and economic competition rather than rent-creation. Open access orders are known to have developed in about two dozen countries, and all are both economically and politically developed.

2.6.1 Logic of the natural state.

Anthropological literature shows that primitive societies were extremely violent. The twentieth century proved to be the most bloody even though modern societies experience civil wars and some breakdown of order. Where there is a problem of social order, or re-establishing the same amidst chaos, every society should develop mechanisms to ensure order is restored.

Creation of a state by violence specialists is important but it is important to first understand what a state is, it is group of individuals who are pursuing a mix of individual but common goals through partially coordinated actions. The idea of a state playing the role of maximizing revenue as a single actor misses the important reality that a state is an organization. Second, forming a state provides a solution to the problem of limiting violence by way of convincing the most powerful members of state to make arrangements that see to the reduction of

potential gains from using violence. This form of state on the other hand does not influence the powerful to disarm or keep of threatening violence nor eliminate violence. How the relationships are structured within the members of the state is what limits violence.

The logic of the natural state implies that limited access is available, therefore there is operation of a limited access order. The natural state is held together, partly, by the threat of violence by coalition members. Due to change in conditions, there are possible configurations of the coalition allowing a different group to control the social order. To this end, violence and civil war are a potential outcome. The level of violence is reduced not eliminated therefore individuals within the elite must be conscious of a civil war possibility, this enables them to align themselves into groups with potential protectors.

According to North (1990) Institutions are the “rules of the game”. This is to say that Institutions are the patterns of interaction that govern and constrain the relationships of individuals. Defining the rules under which people should interact in any given society is very difficult. Institutions are a term that is difficult to define mostly because the rules that apply include written laws, formal social conventions, informal norms of behavior, and shared beliefs about the world.

These institutions structure how people should behave inform of beliefs and opinions that have been formed over the years.

This complexity of institutions allows it to formulate formal laws, informal norms of behavior, and the shared beliefs that individuals hold about the world. Individuals who share a common culture hold common ideas about how people behave. Culture forms an important part of human behavior that is passed on to generations through experience and education.

After a natural state has been created, violence specialists get to have a comparative advantage in providing third party enforcement for a variety of organizational forms. Allowing members of a state to form contractual organizations whose internal arrangements the state will enforce is one of the most valuable privilege can extend to its members of the elite (North *et al*, 2010)

Social order comprises the political, economic, cultural, religious, military, and educational systems. It is the social order that determines the characteristic organizational pattern of its constituent systems. The social orders are distinguished by their ability to create and maintain contractual organizations.

Rights and constitutional structures are enforced through a range of mechanisms, some being general and some being specific. The most general mechanism of enforcing these structures is the consensus condition (Weingast 1997, 2006).

The idea behind this is that when citizens have the ability to react in regard to constitutional transgressions, then the citizens can threaten those in power and those who seek to violate the rules. Therefore, incumbents require support from the citizens to survive, because coordinated reaction that withdraws support from rulers threatens their survival. Constitutions of open access orders create focal solutions to these coordination problems that help citizens react in concert.

On the other hand citizens cannot come up with reactions on their own, they need the help of intermediaries which are in form of organizations.

If the government violates a well understood constitutional rule, then the open access political constitutions can rely on the coordinated action of constituted authorities and citizens to detect and punish violations of the rule. The Punishment mechanisms are not self-enforcing,

this only means that, only members of the government can impose penalties for the violations of the constitutional rules as it happens in the natural state.

The public at large must also be capable of detecting and punishing unconstitutional behavior. This punishment is unlikely to arise through the uncoordinated actions of individuals acting as individuals, the costs of coordinating collective action are too high. Citizens, therefore need to have some bit of coordination.

2.6.2 Logic of Limited Access Order

In a primitive society there is very little specialization of what people want and in division of labor. The social order in this group experiences a high level of violence. With creation of larger social units, there is specialization and division of labor, but there are problems that are created: There emerges specialists in violence and the need to coordinate the social interactions within the larger group.

A limited Access Order is characterized by the need to create privileged access to valuable rights and activities which are enforced by the political and military elites within the state.

The Limited Access Order sometimes fails to put in place institutions that would support both private organizations. This doesn't mean that there is closed access, this came into place as a strategy on how societies can organize themselves as it came into place after the hunter gatherer society. Establishing a society that limits violence and fosters specialization and exchange requires the creation of incentives for groups to compete peacefully rather than fight most of the time. LAOs are the natural response of societies to the threat of internal or external violence, and so North *et al* (2009) call a limited access order a natural state.

A Limited Access Order controls violence by forming a dominant coalition that includes the groups that are known to have potential for violence. Since rents of the elite are reduced

when violence breaks out, this creates incentives for the elite to limit violence and create credibility when they commit to limit violence against each other. Sometimes they may fight but the cost of fighting discourages them.

Maintenance of the rents depends on stability of the coalition. The creation and distribution of rents therefore motivates the elites to be loyal to the system, this in turn protects rents, limits violence, and prevents disorder most of the time. These causal arrangements reflect the LAOs arrangements as a kind of social equilibrium where all the parts interact to sustain the social order. Rent-creation is seen to provide the glue that holds the coalition together, enabling elite groups to make credible commitments to one another to support the regime and to perform their functions.

Another important feature of a LAO is that it allows only certain groups to form organizations, such as corporations, labor unions, political parties, and organizations that make up the civil society. The limits to entry are needed because open entry would erode the rents that hold the order together and partly because open entry could enable opponents of the regime to organize and threaten it. While rents often result from the allocation of resources and economic privileges to particular groups and individuals, the control of organizations that perform specific social, political, or economic functions also generates rents and shapes the interests that hold the dominant coalition together.

Some of the LAOs have been successful, these are countries that are still under Authoritarian governments (North *et al* 2010). The elite in such countries manipulate the economy to produce rents, which in turn makes them more powerful and rich.

Limited access orders, over the last ten thousand years have been the option for human societies by default. The political and economic structure of LAOs has been termed as a natural state for it is the natural form of human society and the implications for development

policy are enormous. LAOs create political stability by use of rents which are created by manipulation of the economy. The result of this a modicum of social order, increase in specialization and division of labor, and economic growth.

There are three broad types of LAOs along a spectrum which are fragile, basic, and mature. In the fragile LAO, the dominant coalition cannot maintain itself in the case of internal and external violence. Some of the contemporary fragile LAOs include Haiti, DR Congo and several countries in the Sub-Saharan Africa. Among the powerful organizations and individuals that make up the coalition, there is an organization that is regarded as the country's government but it has no monopoly on violence.

The poorest people live in fragile LAOs where each group in the dominant coalition has access to violence. Violence is the principal determinant of distribution of rents and resources. In cases where the allocation of rents is not in alignment with the balance of power, the groups demand or fight for more. Due to the instability in the fragile LAOs, they have simple institutional structures for the government that cannot support private elite organizations. Individuals in these states perceive the potential benefits for better institutional structures but the inability to maintain the coalition over a long period creates a prevalent uncertainty about the outcomes and also prevents the individuals and organizations from reliably committing to observe rules in many possible circumstances. The effort to create a commitment between the fragile LAO and elites is threatened by their states' instability (North *et al*, 2012).

The middle or basic LAO societies have a variety of institutional arrangements. The establishment of a formal government makes the state and other government organizations the main durable organization.

In most cases the sanctioned organizations are in themselves elements of the state. In other cases like Bangladesh and Zambia, there are a variety of competitive clientelism. In such cases, there exists a dominant elite organization which could be military which allows other lower level groups to compete for rent collection and recognition although with no chance to grow stronger to challenge the dominant coalition. Access and denial of access is carried out through informal and selective enforcement of formal rules. The specialization and division of labor in the middle LAO state stems from its ability to build organizations like ministries, public enterprises, and banks so as to provide public and private goods for the dominant coalition includes handling trade, religion, tax collection, education and economic infrastructure.

Violence access in the middle LAO is dispersed among state organizations like the police, military and the secret security, they each have a way to get rents through monopoly, threat and corruption (North *et al*, 2012).

States that are Mature LAOs support a large variety of organizations in the state even outside the state. Each approved organization needs to have permission from the state to allow the ruling coalition to endure limited competition and create rents that will maintain the state. States in mature LAOs have durable institutional structures for the state which can support a large variety of elite organizations that exist even outside the state. As LAOs mature, there is a two-way relation between increasing the complexity and distinction of government organization and the parallel development of private organizations which are non-violent. Elite organizations which are independent are a source of economic development and their presence allows more complex organizations to mature in the state. In the absence of more complex institutions, independent organizations cannot survive. This is because private organizations act to protect their interest in the distinction and independence of public institutions such as courts and the central bank.

The governments' pledge to policies and institutions can be heightened to be more credible because the elite private organizations are in a place to punish the government economically if it deviates from its pledges. Mature LAOs are more resistant to shocks than fragile or basic LAOs. Institutions in a mature LAO, are durable therefore they are capable of lasting through the changes in the constituents of the dominant coalition. Although strong shocks have a way of causing breakdowns, mature LAOs do not face intermittent crises. The extent to which the mature LAO have more durable institutions is a matter of degree than of kind. (North *et al*, 2012).

Development within LAOs

Limited Access Orders are not static, they progress across the types of LAO. This is because their progress increases rents therefore the elites can make themselves better by managing to retain power while developing from a fragile to a basic LAO or from a basic to a mature LAO. But in most cases the LAO either stagnates or even regresses. The reason for this is because all LAOs are vulnerable to shocks from the inside and changes in the environment that include changes in prices, demographics and technology because they affect the power of the elites.

States that fell into extreme violence and instability, such as Mozambique in the civil war, all showed signs of regression for a time but recover initially to become authoritarian basic LAOs. States like Germany in the 1920s and 30s relapsed from being a mature LAO and on the doorstep of being an open access in 1913 to become a basic LAO under the Nazis. In summary, LAO's continually evolve while remaining within the logic of limited access. (North *et al*, 2012).

2.6.3 Logic of Open Access Order.

Open access order uses competition to provide social order. It is characterized by open access to organizational forms, which are Specific to contractual organizational forms that are open to all individuals who meet impersonal requirements. The political and economic institutions in OAO allows everyone to access specific contractual and organizations forms. From these, an array of organizations are formed to provide club-like public goods to their members.

OAOs are sustained by institutions that support open access to resources and completion. In this form of society Organization, the control of organized violence is mandated to the military and police forces.

These can be looked at in Weberian assumption which states that any given state has monopoly when it comes to the use of violence. As earlier mentioned, the military and police force are both consolidated under the control of the government organizations.

Societies in OAO allow their citizens to form organizations which they can use to pursue their goals and there is no discrimination if a citizen wants to start an economic or political organization, they have the freedom to choose. (North *et al*, 2010).

Open Access Order uses the aspect of impersonality to ensure that there is non-discrimination in the institutions and that everyone is treated the same. The organizations are not identified according to the individual members, as this would promote members who are not in the elite class. NWW (2009) note that since the aspect of impersonality in tis societies have an impact on completion, therefore they argue that the use of elections to determine if a country is democratic is flawed.

They use Dahl's concept of Polyarchy which states that for a democracy to work, elections must be in set in a competitive institutional setting that would give room for political completion.

Open Access Order maintains open access to economic, political and social organizations. The access to these organizations fuels competition in all systems and it is that completion that sustains the social order. Political and economic systems are closely connected in an open access order as it is in a limited access order only that in OAO it is at a deeper level. A competitive economy requires a state that maintains open access, defines property rights and enforces completion.

It also requires that the state is capable of providing the social infrastructure that sustains continually lived and sophisticated and complicated organizations. The thriving modern markets and business enterprises cannot outside the institutional framework that is provided by access policies. (North *et al*, 2010).

2.7 Conclusion.

The above looked at the available literature on the importance of institutions, third party guarantor and the DDR process in a peace settlement. The chapter went further to give literature on the explanations of the two theories that will be used in this study.

CHAPTER THREE

LIBERIA AND SIERRA LEONE CIVIL WARS

3.0 Introduction

This chapter will be looking at the distinguishing factors that made one case successful more than the other. The four underlying factors, which are Institutional capacity, the third party guarantor, The DDR process and power sharing pact will be examined keenly to see if there was any notable differences that led to the different outcomes of the Peace settlement.

It will rely on BFWs theory and Hirsch John, in his book *Sierra Leone: Diamonds and the struggle for Democracy* and The United Nations Report on the Sierra Leone civil war to analyze the Sierra Civil war and its settlement among other authors on the same. As for the Liberia case, It will rely on literature from Adebajo Adekeye in his book *Liberia Civil War: Nigeria, ECOMOG, and Regional security in West Africa*, Alao Abiodun in his book *The Burden of collective goodwill: International involvement in the Liberian civil war* and reports on The Liberia civil war from The International Crisis Group and The Advocates for human right.

According to BFW, third party guarantors play three critical roles namely informational, procedural and coercive. In the informational role, the third party guarantor supplies missing information, transmits messages, highlights common interests and encourages meaningful communication so that the warring factions find a middle ground. In the procedural role, the third party guarantor is tasked with arranging for interactions between the warring parties, controlling the pace and formality of the meetings and structuring the agenda so that the peace process is kept focused on the issues at hand.

In the coercive role, the third party guarantor can reward concessions that are made by the parties and also punish the parties who not enforce the agreement in order to make

disagreement costly. From these different tasks, this chapter will examine what role the third guarantor played in the peace process in both countries and what effect that had on the peace process.

In institutional capacity, this chapter will use the criteria of examining if the country had a functioning parliament and Judiciary that would help in the enforcement of the peace agreement. BFW states that peace settlements fail because civil war opponents are asked to do what they consider to be the unthinkable at a time when there are no legal institutions or a legitimate government to enforce the terms of the agreement and avoid rapid power grab.

DDR process is an exercise that is carried out to ensure there is a smooth transition from war to peace. Rebels can be a cause of destabilization and that can trigger another war if they decide not to go along with the peace process. The rebels are expected to be integrated back into civilian life as part of the peace process. BFW argues that the presence of a powerful third party can help the parties overcome the problem of monitoring, observation and enforcing compliance. This chapter will examine the success of the DDR process by looking at the whether there was a third party guarantor who enforced compliance. Banholzer (2014) notes that it is difficult to measure the success of the DDR process therefore it is assessed on whether the long term goal of attaining peace and stability in the country actually worked. Therefore in addition to a third party guarantor helping in the enforcement of DDR process, this chapter will also assess whether after the process was over, was there peace and stability in the country or a resumption of violence.

BFW states that resolving a civil war requires much more than signing a peace agreement and instituting a ceasefire. For a settlement to be successful, it must consolidate the warring factions into a new state, create a new government that can accommodate their interests and establish a new nation with a non-partisan military. In the last section of each case study, the chapter will look at the Negotiated Peace settlement and what the terms of the agreement were.

The main focus will be on the Power sharing pact where the study will focus on if the warring factions were included in the government that is both the government and the rebel factions and what success it had on the peace settlement.

3.1 Sierra Leone Civil War.

Sierra Leone is a small country that is surrounded by larger countries of Guinea and Liberia. The country attained its independence in 1961 from British colonizers, but even before the colonial era, Sierra Leon's history goes centuries back (Hirsch, 2001). West Africa was home to numerous waves of people migrating from North and East Africa, therefore fourteen ethnic groups that settled in Sierra Leone. From the fourteen ethnic groups that settled in Sierra Leon, three groups- the Mende, Temne and Limba were dominant (Hirsch, 2001).

In March 1991, a unit of a rebel group attacked Bomaru village in Eastern Sierra Leone. This was reported by government agencies as armed robbery. (Marda and Bangura, 2010) This however turned out to be the beginning of a ten year long brutal insurgency which claimed over fifty thousand lives and left millions of people displaced and incapacitated.

The fighters who consisted of exiled Sierra Leoneans, Liberians and Burkinabè crossed into Sierra Leone from Liberia with the aim of overthrowing The All Peoples Congress (APC) government which had ruled the country since 1968 (Zack-Williams, 2001).

A second front was opened in Pujehun District to the Southwest of Sierra Leone. In early April 1991, a communique was delivered announcing that the rebellion had been started by the Revolution United Front (RUF) which was led by ex- Sierra Leone army corporal named Foday Sankoh (Hirsch, 2001). The RUF set forth an agenda to fight government officials and their business associates who had plundered the resources of the country.

In 1996, the first Presidential elections were held in over a decade where Ahmed Tejan Kabbah became the new President. The priority of the new government was to find a way to restore peace in Sierra Leone. Eight months after Kabbah's inauguration, the Abidjan Agreement was signed with an on and off negotiation process. An observer in the process, RUF viewed the government side as being too legalistic while the government believed that the RUF was using the talks to buy time (Hirsch, 2001).

While the talks in Abidjan were going on, the war in Southern and Eastern Sierra Leone took a new turn that ultimately had a decisive bearing on the talks. Traditional hunters who were known as Kamajohs emerged as a new military force. Having come from a long tradition of self-defense of rural villagers, these forces had different names depending on the section of the country they fought. Their prominent leader, Chief Hinga Norman was appointed by Kabbah as the Deputy Defense Minister since he was a retired military officer. He had little confidence in the army therefore he mobilized the Kamajohs to help him defeat the RUF.

The Kamajohs followed RUF into the bush, they put the RUF into considerable pressure with significant casualties but no precise number was known as they buried their dead immediately they died (Hirsch, 2001).

In May 1997, the rebels managed to enter the capital. This was after a young major, Johnny Paul Koroma overthrew the government of the newly elected President, Ahmed Tejan Kabbah.

The Armed Forces Revolution Council (AFRC) therefore invited Foday Sankoh, the leader of the RUF, to form a people's army. The coup and the entrance of the rebels into the capital led to widespread violence and destruction. It is during this time that all prisons were emptied of all violent convicts who unleashed untold suffering on the civilian population (Zack-Williams, 2001).

Abdullah and Muana (1998) note that the RUF Army proved to be a good match for the ill equipped, undisciplined and highly politicized forces of the government, as they continued to capture large areas of the country, which included diamond rich areas in the Eastern province of Sierra Leone.

The important factor that was noted during the war was the use of child soldiers by both the RUF and its ally AFRC and on the other hand the government forces and their allies civil defense forces which included Kamajohs, Tamaboro, Gbethis and Kapras (Zack-Williams, 2001). Peter and Richards (1998) note that while some of these child fighters were recruited into the forces, many are those that joined voluntarily. Zack-Williams (2001) attributes this as a result of the rapture in intergeneration bargain where in less troubled times, one generation offers nurturing environment for the next.

Many arguments have been advanced on what exactly caused the conflict in Sierra Leone. Richards (2005) argues that the rebellion was formed as a result of alienation of intellectuals and the inability of the youth to acquire farm land. Rashid (2000) also attributes the causes of the conflict as a result of urban youth culture, University student radicalization and youth alienation.

Hirsch (2001) gives an economic dimension to the causes of the war in Sierra Leone. He argues that the economic power of the trade in diamonds has been a source of conflict even in other countries like Angola. He goes further to note that in Sierra Leone, the diamonds

financed the rebel movement of Foday Sankoh. The mining ministers agreed to provide mining concessions to various foreign entrepreneurs for large bribes and sometimes these entrepreneurs joined in the mining and smuggling of the diamonds. To escape the tax that was imposed by the government on legal diamond exports, they made use of porous borders like that of Liberia which was an easy route.

Sierra Leone in the mid-1990s produced \$300 to \$450 million worth of diamonds annually with a large percentage having been smuggled through Liberia and Cote d'Ivoire. As much as there might be varying views on the causes of the war, scholars do agree that the RUF became monstrously destructive and consumed by dazzling banditry.

Twenty three years of political authoritarianism and economic mismanagement by the APC had sapped the energy of the Sierra Leone people. By the beginning of the 1990s, the capital was in total darkness, as it had been transformed to an electricity free zone. Inflation had taken a hold of the economy with public officials going for months without salaries and the agricultural output was now being smuggled out of the country through the porous borders.

This economic crisis led to the implementation of Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs). The implementation of the SAPs led to devastating effects on the economy which resulted in unemployed, dilapidating infrastructure and cost-recovery strategy which had the most effect on women and girls (Zack-Williams, 1995). SAPs were designed to correct the macroeconomic imbalances but in Sierra Leone it weakened further the ability of the people to challenge who leaders who exploited them.

3.1.1 Institutional Situation in Sierra Leone.

Soon after independence, Sierra Leone came under the rule of the first Prime minister, Sir Milton Margai. He was the head of the Sierra Leone People's party (SLPP), though he

changed little of what the British had established, he was loved by the people as he sought to build a unified nation (Hirsch, 2001). Upon Milton's death in 1964, the pattern of corrupt politics began. This was only accelerated as Milton's brother, Albert, who took over leadership. He did not see the state as a stewardship in the public interest but viewed his position as a power base for personal gain.

In the 1967 general elections, Siaka Stevens won. He was a wily politician who quickly developed the ability to dominate Sierra Leone. This he did through bribery, flattery and intimidation. In his quest for a one party state, he silences the opposition with a series of allegations, trials and execution (Zack-Williams, 1985). Farnthorpe (2001) notes that instead of Stevens mobilizing the people for task of national development, he made them dependent on his loyal chiefs for local governance. District and urban councils were abolished in 1972, he replaced them with nominated members appointed by his government.

This policy had an effect on who were brought to the political center since there were no institutions, such as local governments where the people could learn and practice the act of local governance. It is during Stevens rule that thuggery was introduced in the body of politics in Sierra Leone. Young men organized themselves as political thugs whose main objective was to harass and torment politicians. This group of young people would later be transformed into cadres for the RUF rebellion.

Hirsch (2001) notes that Stevens rule was referred to as the "seventeen year plague of locusts". He corrupted and destroyed every state institution. Parliament's significance was gutted, judges were either bribed or intimidated, universities were starved of funds and the professionalism of the army was undermined. Before the war, the public sector system with all its institutions had been disintegrated to the point of collapse. During the war, amidst economic collapse, a civil society movement was formed. A coalition of citizen groups

pressed for elections to be held. Women's movement took the leading role and were followed by journalists, local council elders, paramount chiefs and academics.

At the time of the war, Parliament was not functional the remaining judges were owned by those in power. This shows that Sierra Leone emerged from the civil war with no institutions that would help in the implementation of the peace agreement. The Third party guarantor had to step up and fill in the gap of the institutions to ensure that the terms of the agreement were enforced.

3.1.2 Third Party intervention.

In 1994, the president of Sierra Leone wrote to the United Nations Secretary General formally requesting him to provide his good offices that would facilitate negotiations between the rebels and the government.

An exploratory mission was sent to Sierra Leone in December 1994 to initiate consultations. The mission became aware of the deteriorating state of the country from the three yearlong conflict (un.org).

From the findings of the mission, the secretary general appointed a special envoy in 1995. He appointed Mr. Berhanu Dinka from Ethiopia who would work with OAU and ECOWAS to try and negotiate a settlement that would end the conflict and bring back the civilian rule into the country (un.org).

When the peace talks began, The United Nations, ECOWAS and OAU (now AU) played an important informational and procedural role. The UN sent a mission to Sierra Leone that collected information that was later used to get the warring factions to come to a middle ground and negotiate for peace. The mediators arranged how the warring factions would meet and controlled the formality of the meeting to keep the peace process focused on its agenda.

Adebayo (2002) notes that the initial mandate of ECOWAS was to enforce an arms embargo and monitor the ceasefire but when the Nigerian fighters under ECOMOG were attacked, their mission changed to that of pushing out RUF. ECOMOG was highly relied upon for security. This altered its role from that of peacekeeping to being the protagonist. ECOMOG was unable to protect the capital when the RUF forces and AFRC Junta invaded and captured parts of it in January 1999. It is from the brutality of the attack that the conflicting parties and the international community realized that the war would not be won on the battlefield. Therefore both parties agreed to a peace summit in Lome (Francis, 2000).

UNAMSIL came in third in the third-party intervention in Sierra Leone. It played the coercive role as it's mandate was peacekeeping in Sierra Leone following the signing of the Lome Peace Accord in 1999.

Acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the peacekeeping forces were authorized "*to take necessary measures...to afford protection to civilians under imminent threat of physical violence*"

UNAMSIL was faced with several challenges in its quest to expand its areas of deployment to the North and East as the RUF kept confronting and attacking them in secluded areas (Hirsch 2001).

In May 2000, ECOMOG mandate had come to an end and it was leaving Sierra Leone. A major crisis erupted where Sankoh decided that the RUF could advance its agenda of intimidation and control of the diamond areas unhindered. The RUF was opposed to UNAMSIL deployment into the fields of Kono and Tongo, there it seized close to five hundred Kenyan and Zambian peacekeepers in remote locations in the North and East. In London, the Blair government decided to undertake a major military operation. The massive deployment included a broader objective. Seven hundred paratroopers arrived to restore

security in and around the capital and to bolster the morale of the UN peacekeepers. Seven Royal Navy warships with a fleet of helicopters and jet aircraft anchored offshore to provide logistic support and air combat capability (Hirsch 2001).

The United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) closed its operation in Sierra Leone in mid-2005. The mission came to a close four years after it was established in a country that was convulsed in a violent civil war. UNAMSIL was largely successful in fulfilling its mandate of overseeing the peace process and playing the coercive role where they were for peacekeeping and also in conjunction with the UK punished the stubbornness presented in order to make disagreement costly.

Some of the tasks of UNAMSIL included monitoring the ceasefire; overseeing national elections; disarming ex-combatants; training police and human rights monitors; facilitating the voluntary return and resettling of thousands of refugees and internally displaced persons; and assisting in the post-conflict recovery (un.org).

3.1.3 DDR process in Sierra Leone.

The Lome Agreement's thirty seven Chapters included a provision for demobilization, disarmament and reintegration into civil society of all combatants and eventually the transformation of RUF into a political party. Sankoh was offered Chairmanship of the commission with the status of the deputy President therefore he was only answerable to the president.

By December 1999, the disarmament process had not picked up with only 10,000 of the estimated 45,000 combatants showing up at the demobilization centers. These were mostly from the Sierra Leone Army. Sankoh openly endorsed the call by the government to disarm but his second in command, Sam Bockerie, who was still in the field, defiantly refused his

men to disarm. On December 24th 1999, Bockerie was given an “ECOWAS order” by Taylor and Obasanjo in a meeting in Monrovia where he was not to return to Sierra Leone until the disarmament process was completed and elections held. To this effect he was sent to exile for eighteen months. After UNAMSIL was established its mandate was expanded to include provision of security at key locations in and near the capital and at all disarmament sites. UNAMSIL faced several challenges in this task as in February 2000, RUF forces refused to show up at assigned disarmament locations and instead attacked small numbers of UNAMSIL troops at isolated locations (Hirsch, 2001).

Reintegration of former child soldiers or DDR for Children Afflicted with fighting Factions (CAFF), in the agency parlance, is the most popular type of post war programming for children. Under UNICEF, several international agencies took the task of DDR. Interim Care Centers (ICCs) were set up for immediate reception of demobilized children. The centers provided medical care as well as psychological programming (Shepler, 2007).

The DDR process in Sierra Leone went through three phases. BFW recommends that demobilization can be broken down into a series of small steps where governments and rebels can observe the degree to which the other party is disbanding its army Phase One began in 1998 after the Kabbah government was reinstated, at this time, the government of Sierra Leone and its supporters were strong militarily, given that the AFRC and RUF were in retreat (Zack-Williams, 1985).

DDR in this phase was an arrangement between the government of Sierra Leone, the UNDP, ECOMOG and the World Bank to appeal to individual insurgents to turn away from their defeated factions. The government established the National Committee for Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration which was mandated to coordinate a program of assistance to all ex-combatants, which included the demobilization and reintegration of AFRC, RUF and

CDF combatants, as well as providing assistance to child and disabled combatants. NCDDR was also mandated to implement the Training and Employment Program (TEP). President Kabbah was the chairman of the committee and there were no representatives from any of the insurgent groups.

Phase Two of the DDR process was a result of the Lome Peace Agreement. Its design and implementation reflected the weak military position of the government at the time it was signed.

This Phase of DDR included RUF representatives unlike in phase one. Both the Kabbah government and the UN courted RUF leadership to help with the DDR process to ensure their members' participation.

Most importantly, the NCDDR and UNAMSIL ran the reception centers for ex-combatants. UNAMSIL and NCDDR were a good third party security because unlike ECOMOG, they had not taken part in the fighting (Zack-Williams, 1985).

Phase three started later in 2000. It was an attempt to revive the DDR process that had been devastated by the events of May the same year. The RUF was very weak militarily at this time and had a more compliant leadership, headed by Issa Sesay, willing to fully negotiate for peace. The Abuja meetings called for a fast-tracked simultaneous disarmament of AFRC and RUF. This phase went on without further disruptions from outbreak of violence. For anyone to qualify for DDR, they had to be eighteen years of age with the ability to assemble and disassemble a gun.

When evaluated against two of its major objectives, which were disarmament and demobilization, DDR in Sierra Leone was successful.

The process ultimately disarmed and demobilized more than 70,000 combatants, a figure that was far higher than the estimated 45,000 at the onset of the process. Getting weapons out of the hands of the fighters, and dismantling military structures of armed groups, was a major contribution to the no resumption of armed violence in the country since 2002. Also there was no more eruption of violence after the exercise was over (Zack-Williams, 1985).

3.1.4 Power sharing in the Negotiated Settlement.

In 1998, ECOMOG forces were attacked by RUF and Junta. They in turn launched a military that collapsed and expelled Junta forces from Freetown. In the aftermath of the rebel attack, United Nations special representative Francis Okello, consulted West African states and started a series of diplomatic efforts to open up dialogue with the rebels (Hirsch, 2001)

The negotiations between the government and rebels started in May 1999 and in July both parties signed a Peace Agreement in Lome to end the hostilities which would enable formation of a government of national unity (Sierra-leon.org)

According to Article 37 of the Lome Peace Accord, the government was to enter into force immediately the two parties signed it. Articles 3 to 5 discusses the power sharing as follows:

The Government of Sierra Leone shall accord every opportunity to the RUF/SL to join a broad-based government of national unity through cabinet appointments. To that end:

- 1. The Chairmanship of the Board of the Commission for the Management of Strategic Resources, National Reconstruction and Development (CMRRD) as provided for in Article VII of the present Agreement shall be offered to the leader of the RUF/SL, Corporal Foday Sankoh. For this purpose he shall enjoy the status of Vice President and shall therefore be answerable only to the President of Sierra Leone.*

2. *The Government of Sierra Leone shall give ministerial positions to the RUF/SL in a moderately expanded cabinet of 18, bearing in mind that the interests of other political parties and civil society organizations should also be taken into account, as follows:*
 - *One of the senior cabinet appointments such as finance, foreign affairs and justice;*
 - *Three other cabinet positions.*
3. *In addition, the Government of Sierra Leone shall, in the same spirit, make available to the RUF/SL the following senior government positions: Four posts of Deputy Minister.*
4. *Within a period of fourteen days following the signing of the present Agreement, the necessary steps shall be taken by the Government of Sierra Leone to remove any legal impediments that may prevent RUF/SL members from holding cabinet and other positions.*

In addition, Articles 11 and 12 gave election dates and creation of a National Electoral Commission that with the help of the then OAU, UN, ECOWAS and the Commonwealth Nations would monitor the parliamentary and presidential elections in Sierra Leone. The transition government stayed in power until the country developed institutions that would oversee the elections. One of the contributing factors to non-resumption of the war in Sierra Leone is that, the country took its time before holding the elections by maintaining the transition government that included the warring factions for three years that is from May 1999 to when the elections were held for the first time in 2002.

3.2 The Liberian Civil War.

Liberia is considered as the oldest African country having been founded in 1847 by black settlers. The settlers started arriving in the West African Coast in 1822. Although the settlers made up only five percentage of the population, the coastal settlers established a political system that was nepotistic, corrupt that excluded and oppressed the main indigenous ethnic groups (Adebajo, 2002).

The settlers were referred to as Americans of African descent. They held a superior attitude that they gained from their years in slavery in the United States. They did not get integrated into African society but started imitating the way of life of the US. They viewed the native Liberians as primitive and uneducated therefore they alone could rule (Somah, 1995).

The Americo-Liberian rulers took control of the state and in 1931, they were reprimanded for recruiting native Liberians into Spanish plantations by the League of Nations. William Tubman who ruled 1944-1971 had a unification program to try and bridge the gap between settlers and the natives. He broadened political participation of Native Liberians and encouraged them to be proud of their culture, language and art. The one party state in Liberia ensured that the Americo-Liberians continued to rule. Despite Tubman's efforts at involving the Natives in the political system, they were still discriminated against in the civil service (Adebajo, 2002).

In 1971, William Tolbert succeeded Tubman after his death. Even though he was less charismatic than his predecessor, Tolbert continued with his reforms. In 1975, Liberian students in the United States called for political reforms, African socialism and a foreign policy towards the rest of Africa. They formed Progressive Alliance of Liberians (PAL). The movement, for justice in Africa (MOJA) mainly comprising of lecturers and students, was

another opposition group that was formed. Both opposition groups weakened Tolbert's regime (Adebajo, 2002)

In 1980, there were rumblings within the Liberian military which was after some army officers considered to be sympathetic to the opposition were arrested. There had been rumors of a coup even before the arrests were made. In April 1980, Master Sergeant Samuel Kanyon Doe, with the help of other sergeants and corporals assassinated Tolbert and announced their coup over the radio (Moran, 2008).

The 1980 coup by Samuel Doe ended the rule of Americo-Liberians that had lasted for 133 years. The Americo-Liberian rule was characterized by racial discrimination and prejudice. Doe's rule on the other hand was characterized by people who wanted to enrich themselves.

They bribed their way into contracts and siphoned-off funds that had been given as foreign aid to the new regime. When the coup occurred in 1980, people were filled with hope for the new regime. But by 1989, nine years of Doe's rule, there was only brutality to show for the years.

In December 1989, Charles Taylor came back to Liberia after fleeing for five years. He was the leader of the rebel army, the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL). His main objective was to start an uprising that would collapse the Doe government. He had previously served in that same government as a *de facto* Director in the General Services Agency (Huband, 1995).

The NPFL got a lot of support from Liberian ethnic groups which had endured the wrath of Samuel Doe after the 1985 attempted coup. When Taylor and NPFL entered Liberia, Samuel Doe sent Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) to Nimba County confront NPFL. The AFL was brutal which alienated the local people.

The rebels waged an ethnic war which pitted the Gio and Mano, who were victimized by Doe, against the Krahn who were sympathetic to Doe. These led to thousands of civilians being massacred on both sides while hundreds of the survivors fled their homes.

By June 1990, the rebels were laying siege to Monrovia. By now Doe was struggling to control the situation. He tried to broaden his political base by releasing political prisoners, unbanning political parties, increasing civil service salaries and promising free and fair elections in 1991. In August 1990, ECOWAS agreed to deploy ECOMOG and place it under Nigerian rule.

The mission was later expanded to include troops from non- ECOWAS countries like Tanzania. In September 1990, as Doe visited the ECOMOG headquarters, the rebels attacked Doe's army taking him captive. He was tortured before being killed where the execution was captured on videotape by the captors. (Ellis, 1999).

A series of peace making meetings were held in Bamako (1990), Lome (1991), and Yamoussoukro (1991) but all these conferences failed. United Liberation Movement for Democracy in Liberia was an armed group that was formed in 1991. It was under General Albert Karpah before it split into two; ULIMO-K, which was under Alhaji Kromah and ULIMO-J which was under Roosevelt John. ULIMO is alleged to have had support from some Nigerian ECOMOG personnel who provided them with intelligence and military support in turn they would get a percentage of the diamonds they had control over from Sierra Leone. ECOMOG applied sanctions on Taylor and took of Taylor's port of Buchanan. It is such pressure that drew Taylor to want to negotiate a Peace settlement. By June 1993, the three main factions, AFL, NPFL, and ULIMO agreed to a ceasefire in Cotonou. A transition government was to be put in place and scheduling of elections that would see to the return of a constitutional government (Ellis, 1999).

Although the Cotonou Peace Agreement failed, it marked a significant development in the war. It saw to the dissolution of Sawyer's interim government of National Unity where Liberian National Transitional Government was installed. NPFL and ULIMO were both represented. This gave the NPFL a stake in the National Government for the first time (Huband, 1995).

Renewed fighting broke out in May 1994 and continued to become more intense in the months of July and August. ECOMOG and UNOMIL members were captured and held hostage by some warring factions. The humanitarian situation in Liberia had deteriorated with 1.8 million Liberians in need of humanitarian assistance but humanitarian agencies could not reach the needy due to hostilities and insecurity under sustained military pressure. Taylor and the other warring factions signed another peace treaty in Akosombo in Ghana in August 1994.

The peace agreement was opposed by many civilians in Monrovia and the warlords who were not included in it. The security situation in Liberia was still poor, ECOMOG had a shortfall in funding and there was no will by the combatants to honor the agreement in order to end the war (Ellis, 1999).

In order to address Abuja's complain about not being consulted on the Akosombo peace process, the Nigerian Foreign Minister was invited to play a part in the Accra peace negotiations in November 1994. All war factions returned to Ghana to sign the Accra Agreement. The peace Agreement called for a ceasefire by December 28 1994, installation of a new council of state in two weeks, disarmament in four months, establishment of state havens, elections on 14 November 1995 and installation of the elected government by 1st January 1996.

However, problems arose and just two days before the ceasefire, fighting continued in central and Southern Liberia between NPFL and ULIMO-J (Adebajo, 2002).

In 1995, Charles Taylor arrived in Abuja to meet with the leader of ECOMOG. They both agreed to the fact that none would achieve anything without the help of the other. Therefore the Liberian interim President, David Kpomakpor called for a revision of the Accra Agreement and a possible return to the 1993 Cotonou Agreement. After the talks between the warring factions, The Abuja Agreement was signed in August 1995.

The peace agreement modified the Cotonou and Akosombo Agreements and clarified the Accra Agreement. A ceasefire was to be effected on 26 August, only seven days after signing of the agreement. After nine previous peace agreements failed, there was nationwide optimism that the Abuja Peace Agreement would bring peace. The warring factions agreed to disarmament and demobilization by 1997. Elections were held in 1997 where Charles Taylor won and his National Patriotic Party won against other candidates (Adebayo, 2002). Ellis (1999) notes that, after Taylor won the 1997 elections, the country was only safe enough for refugees to return home but the others leaders had to leave the country.

The second civil war.

When Charles Taylor was inaugurated in 1997, Liberia was still a fragile state from the seven year civil war. Basic necessities such as food and medical services were hard for many Liberians to access. In addition to these, there was continuation of human rights abuses and corruption. Despite the hope that the people in Taylor's government, he made very few efforts towards reconciliation and protecting human rights.

The human rights violations included torture and rape for anyone suspected to be in the opposition, use of child soldiers, extrajudicial killings and government critics were all

executed. As a result of this, a new rebel group arose to fight him (The advocates for Human Rights, 2005).

The new opposition entities were, Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) and Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL). LURD rebel group was consisted of Krahn and Mandingo combatants from the just ended civil war. It was supported by Guinea to remove Taylor from power. MODEL had broken away from LURD and it was receiving support from Cote d'Ivoire.

In September 2000, LURD launched an attack from Guinea into Lofa County. This offensive intensified things as Taylor continued to target suspected opposition members who were specifically supporters of LURD and MODEL. In August 2003, LURD led three major offensives against Monrovia. It was estimated that 300 to 1000 people lost their lives in the three attacks. MODEL took control of the Southern and Eastern parts of Liberia and was responsible for atrocities committed that included torture, forced labor, detention, killings, rape, looting of property and forced recruitment (The Advocates for Human Rights).

In June 2003, the warring factions signed a ceasefire agreement which was broken by LURD when it launched an attack in Monrovia. Due to international pressure, Charles Taylor agreed to leave Liberia and seek asylum in Nigeria in July 2003. In August, LURD, MODEL and Taylor's forces signed a Comprehensive Peace Accord in Accra and established an agreement to form a new transitional government. Gyude Bryant was elected to head the Transitional Government of Liberia which was inaugurated on October 14, 2003 (The Advocates for Human Rights, 2005).

3.2.1 Institutional Situation in Liberia.

Before the gradual descent of Liberia into civil war, the country presented great attraction to many other African countries. Having been founded in 1847, many Africans saw the country on the epitome of black man's independence and defiance of foreign rule (Sunday Tribune, 20th July 1997). Alao (1998) notes that with its resources like diamond, rubber and iron, the country had a buoyant economy that would cater for its population. The Americo-Liberian rule led to structural problems where the Liberian army was used as dumping ground for social misfits. Originally the Liberian army was formed as a frontier force that would help in tax collection.

It comprised mostly of uneducated Liberians who when they took power after the 1980 coup, had no skills to manage the state. Alao (1998) goes to note that the 1980 coup brought into power low ranking soldiers who claimed they would carry out a revolution that would benefit the indigenous people. The constitutional government was abolished and in its place, a military Peoples Redemption Council (PRC) was declared the highest authority. For the first time in Doe's rule, Democratic institutions in Liberia were suspended.

He had a new constitution worked out that maintained the key democratic institutions but represented a second republic that recognized the indigenous population as "The People".

There was a Judiciary but it was not functional, the citizens did not follow the judicial process due to corruption and indiscipline that followed after Doe took over leadership.

The leaders allegedly took bribes from members of Tolbert's regime that were detained after the coup so that they could free them. The rule left the country with neither a prepared indigenous population that would lead or even any meaningful leadership. The economy had no framework that would ensure development and the society had no mechanism that would

enhance inter-group relations. The rule did not create a viable society nor bring forth a judiciary that would legitimately command peoples respect. The political institutions were weak and unrepresentative and structures of national defense could not be relied upon. Doe's ascension to power did little to correct this structural problems and instead the state began its ultimate collapse (Sawyer, 1987).

After the war, Liberia had neither a functional Judiciary nor Parliament. The judiciary was corrupt therefore it could not be relied upon to enforce the terms of the agreement in a non-partisan way. Parliament is part of the constitutional government that was abolished and in its place a military government took over (Sawyer, 1987).

During Charles Taylor tenure, there was little to no change as the civil society independence and effectiveness was destroyed. The most dangerous activists to the regime were driven out and those that remained opted out. At the time, civil society was not paying well and when Taylor gave out a gift in form of a Mercedes Benz, activists would not resist the gift in exchange for them opting out. Despite these efforts, there survived a civil society in Monrovia that consisted of mostly students, lawyers, and a few journalists (International Crisis Group, 2002).

The most important institution during this time was the Catholic Church in Liberia. It was the under the leadership of Bishop Michael Francis. He frequently spoke out critically on political issues and at the same time maintained impartiality and non-partisanship. The Catholic Church provided medical services and most of the schools therefore it was the only civil society institution that worked in the country (International Crisis Group, 2002).

3.2.2 Third Party Intervention

The first time Liberia came up for extensive discussion among leaders of ECOWAS was at a meeting in Gambia in May 1990. Upon insistence of Nigeria's former president Ibrahim Babangida, a standing mediation committee (SMC) of four members was set up. The members, Gambia, Ghana, Nigeria and Togo would mediate in the Liberian civil war, since they had no power to intervene militarily. The ministers of SMC met in July 1990 to discuss the modalities of a ceasefire agreement (Alao, 1998).

The ECOWAS chairman, General Abacha, wrote to the UN Secretary General requesting the United Nations to work with ECOWAS to provide with necessary assistance and support in the process leading up to the conduct of free and fair elections.

ECOWAS established a committee that would consult with UNOMIL on the election process in November 1996. The ministers from the SMC had no power to intervene militarily but they would play a mediatory role (Alao, 1998).

Before 1993 The UN took a secondary passive stand in the Liberian conflict. All this changed in the wake of Cotonou Agreement after ECOMOG was unable to coerce Taylor to submit so that the conflict would end. The UN appointed special representative Trevor Gordon Somers. The UN managed to get the warring parties around a negotiating table and the signing of the Cotonou Agreement.

United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL) was established which would act as ECOMOGs watchdog to placate Taylor. The United Nations played a role in the 1997 elections. It was UNOMILs job to certify that the election were free and fair (Walraven, 1999).

Liberia received third party intervention from ECOWAS and The United Nations. ECOWAS was the first third party that played the procedural role where it brought the warring factions to the negotiating table, its main mandate was to play the mediatory role. The military wing of ECOWAS, ECOMOG would play the coercive role to bring Charles Taylor to the bargaining table and also be the military backer in the country at the time of the peace process. UNOMIL stayed in Liberia after the peace agreement was signed to see to the enforcement of the peace agreement and observe the 1997 elections to ensure they were free and fair.

3.2.3 DDR Process in Liberia.

After the Abuja Agreement, there was a general assumption that disarmament was the key to success. Despite the progress that was made towards disarmament and demobilization under the Cotonou, Akosombo and Accra Accords.

It was the physical implementation of the Abuja Accord that guaranteed commitment and momentum that were lacking in the previous agreements (Alao, Mackinlay *et al*, 1999).

60, 000 armed fighters were earmarked for disarmament and demobilization. Achieving this number was seen to require a set of carefully planned steps where the roles played by different parties would be clearly outlined and proper coordination of tasks done by different players. A task force was set up in June 1995 whose mandate was to review operational concepts, plans and programs for the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process. The members of this task force were representatives of the government of Liberia, ECOMOG, UNOMIL, UNDP, Non-Governmental Organizations and donors (Alao, 1998).

The disarmament process started in November 1996, fighters were provided food rations and transport to chosen destinations in exchange for a serviceable weapon or 100 rounds of

ammunition. There was impressive scale of disarmament but there were signs that the warlords were keeping arms in reserve in case their electoral fortunes were dimmed.

Some local commanders discouraged disarmament and went ahead to punish officers who had disarmed without permission. The January 31st 1997 deadline was extended by one week to allow more fighters to come forward. General Malu showed that he was serious about disarmament and warned that any fighter found in possession of a weapon would be chased down like a criminal (Adebajo, 2002).

Under the second Abuja Accord of August 1995, ECOMOG was mandated to monitor the borders of Liberia at the main entry points by land, sea and air ensure that no arms are brought into the country. It was also mandated with assembling and disarming combatants of all factions, establish checkpoints to verify the movement of arms and assist in the return of refugees and internally displaced people.

UNOMIL was required to monitor and verify that the military provision of the Abuja Accord was implemented through deployment of military observes and emphasis on disarmament and demobilization. Each demobilization camp was expected to have representatives from the NDDC, UNOMIL, ECOMOG, the Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Office of the United Nations Department of Humanitarian organizations (UNDHA-HACO) and United Nations and non-governmental humanitarian organizations. The NDDC was in charge of pre-registration phase after which disarmament was undertaken by ECOMOG and verified by UNOMIL. ECOMOG would separate the ammunition and weapons and ensure their security (Alao, Mackinlay *et al*, 1999).

By February 9 1997, a total of 20,332 fighters were disarmed, this accounted for 61.6% of the projected 33,000 fighters. Those included 4306 child fighters below the age of 18. More than 9570 weapons and 1.2 million pieces of ammunition were collected. Despite these

remarkable numbers, UNOMIL feared there were pockets of armed fighters in Grand Kru and Maryland counties where it was inaccessible during the official disarmament period (Alao, 1998).

A number of factors accounted for the slow progress of the process. First, the fighters mistrusted each other. In Zwedru, the LPC, was reluctant to disarm because it knew that the NPFL was maintaining a group of fighters just outside the area. In Voinjama, the ULIMO-K voluntarily disarmed in September 1996 and was attacked by bandits shortly afterward. ULIMO-J complained that, in Tubmanburg, some fighters were attacked on returning to their villages following disarmament and demobilization. The possibility of being vulnerable to attack by other fighters led many to hold onto their weapons (Alao, Mackinlay *et al*, 1999).

Adebajo (2002) notes that even though there were some pockets of armed fighters that remained, success of the process was measured in that no ceasefire violations were reported between 12 January and 19 March 1997. Even after the disarmament period was over, another 132 fighters disarmed to ECOMOG in Grand Kru, Grand Gedeh and River Cess counties.

3.2.4 Power Sharing in the Negotiated Settlement.

The Abuja Accord was endorsed by the OAU (now AU) and the UN as it was viewed as the best framework that would bring everlasting peace to Liberia. ECOWAS reaffirmed the peace agreement as the only way to achieve a peaceful resolution to the civil war in Liberia, therefore, it was fully determined to implement the agreement (usip.org)

The Agreement amended and supplemented the Cotonou Accord, the Akosombo Agreement and its Accra Clarification. Article 1 of the Agreement declared a cease-fire and the cessation of hostilities effective at 12 o'clock midnight 26 August 1995.

The warring Parties agreed that during the transitional period leading to the inauguration of an elected government, the executive powers of the Republic of Liberia would be vested in a six-member Council of State to be composed as follows:

- a. *National Patriotic Front of Liberia, Mr. Charles Ghankay Taylor*
- b. *United Liberation Movement of Liberia for LTG. Alhaji G. V. Kromah*
- c. *Democracy (ULIMO) COALITION Dr. George E. S. Boley Sr.*
- d. *Liberian National Conference (LNC) Oscar Jaryee Quiah*
- e. *Chief Tamba Tailor*
- f. *Mr. Wilton Sankawolo*

The Chairman of the Council was Mr. Wilton Sankawolo. All other members of the Council were to be Vice-Chairmen of equal status. In case of permanent incapacitation a new Chairman, they would be appointed within the framework of the Economic Community of West

African States (ECOWAS) (usip.org).

General Roosevelt Johnson's wing of ULIMO (ULIMO-J) would occupy the following

Positions:

Ministries

1. *Minister of State for Presidential Affairs*
2. *Minister of Transport*
3. *Minister of Rural Development*
4. *Minister of State Without Portfolio*

Public corporations/autonomous agencies

1. *National Bank*
2. *Corporative Development Agencies (CDA)*

3. *Agricultural Industrial Training Board (AIIB)*

4. *Forestry Development Authority (FDA)*

All the warring factions got a stake in the new transition government that was formed in the peace talks. The transition government would be installed fourteen days after the signing of the agreement and have approximately the duration of twelve months since its installation. Holders of positions within the Transition government who wished to vie in the elections were required to vacate office three months before the elections but the chairman of the council would not vie for the first presidential elections.

This power sharing arrangement worked between the periods of the signing of the Peace Agreement in August 1997 to three months before the elections in 1997. With one side of Charles Taylor taking the leadership of the country, there were new rebel groups that came up to fight the government. ECOWAS, OAU (now AU) and the UN would monitor the operations of the Elections Commission leading up to the elections. In the agreement, there was also appointment of a Minister of Justice, this agreement attempted to reconstruct institutions and political Organizations in Liberia. (usip.org)

3.3 Conclusion.

This chapter has given the details of the civil wars in Sierra Leone and Liberia. It has also looked in detail at the institutional situations in both countries, the third party interventions, DDR processes and finally looked at the power sharing in the negotiated settlements.

CHAPTER FOUR

ANALYSIS

4.0 Introduction

In this chapter, I will attempt to discuss the findings of the two cases based on the four research questions:

1. What role did the third party guarantor play in the settlement?
2. Were there institutions in place that would guide the implementation of the peace agreement?
3. Was there recurrence of violence after DDR?
4. What were the terms of the agreement and did they capture interests of the both groups?

4.1 The institutions and their effect on the peace settlement.

BFW states that negotiations fail because the parties cannot promise to abide by the terms of the agreement until there are credible institutions to enforce and implement the terms of the agreement and share a political power. In Sierra Leone before the war, the public sector system with all its institutions had been disintegrated to the point of collapse. Siaka Stevens had corrupted and destroyed every state institution. Parliament's significance was gutted, judges were either bribed or intimidated, the elections in the country characterized by coercion and the professionalism of the army was undermined. In the post war period, the country had no institutions that would help in the enforcement of the agreement. But Sierra Leone disagrees with BFWs assumption the absence of institutions means a failed settlement since even in the absence of a functional judiciary and Parliament to enforce the terms of the agreement, the peace settlement was successful.

Sierra Leone was a Fragile LAO society that frequently had to renegotiate the balance of power. This was seen through the *coup de tats* that Sierra Leone experienced. The UN force that came in to assist Sierra Leone knew that the newly formed coalition would need policy advice in order to substitute for the lack of institutions and organizations.

BFW goes further to note that, even after a civil war truly democratic institutions were established, the domestic groups cannot expect them to be effective overnight. This assumption is given weight by the Sierra Leone case where the country had to wait from the time the Lome Agreement was signed in 1999 to 2002 when they could hold their first post-civil war elections. The independence of the civil society and the growth of a vibrant press were only experienced after the 2007 elections. The growth of these institutions has been slow but eventually they became effective.

In Liberia, BFWs assumption on credible institutions being the reason for a successful peace settlement is given weight. Before the war, the constitutional government of Liberia was suspended and in its place the Military Peoples Redemption Council (PRC) was declared the highest authority. The judicial process was dominated by corruption and indiscipline, the economy had no framework that would development and the society had no mechanism that would enhance inter-group relations. After the signing of the Abuja Peace Agreement in 1996, there were no institutions left that would see to the effective implementation of the agreement. Even after elections were held in 1997 and Charles Taylor took over, the civil society independence and effectiveness was destroyed. The most dangerous activists to the regime were driven out and those that remained were bought out by Charles Taylor. Before long the county fell back into another civil war.

BFW asserts that government institutions will be too weak in the post war period to prevent grab for power and enforce what the opposition can no longer enforce themselves. In most

cases, the party that won the first post-civil war election is the one that is expected to build these institutions based on guidelines that are provided by the peace agreement. But once in power, the party could ignore the guidelines and create institutions that appear democratic on the outside but are serving the party's interests on the inside. The Liberian case gives weight to this assumption. Charles Taylor won the 1997 elections which were the first after the war. He reneged on his pre-election promises of nation building. He created his own paramilitary force, he assumed leadership of the security force in Liberia. The most experienced rebels that swore allegiance to Taylor joined the security forces. This in turn led to indiscipline and lacked training. Many of the human rights violations were carried out by the security forces. Sierra Leone other hand disagrees with this assumption as they were able to face the issue of political succession in a way that had not been possible in almost fifty years. In 2007, the country conducted peaceful elections that were conducted in a free and fair manner. This led to the defeat of the leading Sierra Leone Peoples Party by the opposition, All People Congress. Even if opposition took over, Democracy continues to develop, civil society continues to assert its independence and a vibrant press returned to challenge political excess.

Sierra Leone case on the other hand, supports NWWs assumption that in a natural state incumbents require support from the citizens to survive. This is because coordinated reaction from the citizens who withdraw support from the rulers threatens their survival. The rights and constitutional structures of the citizens are enforced through a range of mechanisms. The most general mechanism of enforcing these rights is the consensus condition.

Some of the arguments on the causes of the war include the alienation of the youth and intellectuals. The fact that the youth were unable to even acquire farmland was seen as an infringement into their constitutional rights. This then led the youth to join rebel movements in order to get back to those who threatened to violate the rules. The Liberian case also gives weight to this assumption as in 1997, the elections saw the citizens of Liberia give support to

Charles Taylor to become the president. The citizens expected in return, some change in their constitutional rights like access to medical services, food and upholding of human rights. Charles Taylor on the other hand, did little to reconcile the people and protect human rights. From this, the citizens formed a rebel group to oust Charles Taylor who threatened their rights.

The Sierra Leone case supports NWWs theory on development policies being hurtful to the LAOs. The implementation of Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) led to the devastating effect on the economy which resulted in unemployment, dilapidating infrastructure and cost-recovery strategy which affected women and girls more. The SAPs were meant to correct the macroeconomic imbalances but in Sierra Leone it weakened further the ability of the people to challenge the leaders who exploited them.

According to NWW, institutions are the rules of the game and the most important and powerful organizations in any society is the state. The state is mandated with the role of providing social order to prevent and contain human violence. Containing this social order requires the development of a state organization that is capable of limiting violence and that requires political and economic systems work in concert. The state organization in this case are institutions which define the patterns of interaction which govern and constrain relationships of individuals.

These institutions structure how people behave in form of beliefs and opinions that have been formed over the years. During the war in Sierra Leone, this assumption is proved right. The lack of institutions saw the rebels unleash untold suffering even on the civilian population. This is because there was no institutional structure that showed people how to behave. After the *coup de tat* and the rebels entered the capital, all the prisons were emptied of all violent convicts who carried out massive acts of violence on the civilian population. In the same

way, Liberia had no state organization that was capable of limiting violence. The judicial process was not followed, the country had no prepared indigenous population that would lead and the economy had no framework that would ensure development. When Charles Taylor was inaugurated in 1997, Liberia was still a fragile natural state from the seven year civil war. Basic necessities such as food and medical services were hard for many Liberians to access. In addition, there was continuation of human rights abuse and corruption. As a result of all these, there arose a new rebel group that fought the Charles Taylor Government.

NWW asserts that an important feature of a LAO is that only certain groups of people are allowed to form organizations whether corporate, labor or political organizations that make up the civil society. The limit to entry is seen as a tool to keep out opponents who might gain entry into the organization and threaten it. The LAO limit the problem of violence by using the political system to create and allocate rents that arise from the arrangements such as government contracts, land rights and monopolies on business activities. The Sierra Leone case supports this assumption as in one of the arguments brought forth as one of the major causes of the war was as a result of alienation of intellectuals and the inability of the youth to acquire farmland. In Liberia, the 1980 coup by Samuel Doe ended the rule of Americo-Liberians that had lasted for 133 years which was characterized by racial discrimination and prejudice.

Doe's rule on the other hand was characterized by people who wanted to enrich themselves. They bribed their way into contracts and siphoned-off funds that had been given as foreign aid to the new regime. When the coup occurred in 1980, people were filled with hope for the new regime. But by 1989, nine years of Doe's rule, there was only brutality to show for the years. In this case there were no arrangements made by the government to the people to limit the problem of violence. Instead, the same government was the one that inflicted suffering on the citizens.

NWW goes further to note that giving this incentives restrains violence because fighting reduces these rents.

A dominant coalition is formed in a natural state that includes the groups with potential for violence. The maintenance of rents depends on the coalition. This motivates the elite's loyalty to the system which provides some form of social equilibrium and all parts of the system interact to sustain social order. In Sierra Leone, rebels who crossed over from Liberia and Burkina Faso, came into the country with an aim to overthrow the All Peoples Congress government which had ruled the country since 1968. The government officials and their business associates had plundered the resources of the country. The youth, who had access to violence, joined these rebel groups since there was no organization in which they would receive incentives therefore they had no rents that would reduce due to the violence. This was the same case in Liberia where in December 1989, Charles Taylor came back to Liberia after fleeing for five years. He was the leader of the rebel army, the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL). His main objective was to start an uprising that would collapse the Doe government. He had previously served in that same government as a *de facto* Director in the General Services Agency.

In summary, both Sierra Leone and Liberia provide evidence to the importance of institutions and organizations in the settlement. In both cases, there was no institutional capacity that would see to the implementation of the Peace accord, therefore an organization, in form of a third party had to step up to offer guidance, economic aid and the will to enforce the agreement. The third party understood that the institutional capacity of Sierra Leone was not in place to enforce the agreement. The third party included ECOMOG, UNAMSIL and the UK. The success may have been attributed to the fact that the UN had brokered peace elsewhere and were aware of the severe problems with the political and judicial system. Although in this case, the primary role of the UN was to observe and give advice.

Liberia also supports this assumption in that it came out of a civil war with no institutional capacity to credibly commit to the terms of the agreement. After the 1997 elections, Charles Taylor after inauguration was not afraid of the repercussions if he failed to adhere to the accord. Therefore the unwillingness to enforce the peace treaty and the lack of institutional capacity led to the Liberian second civil war in 1999.

4.2 Third party guarantor and the effect on peace settlement.

BFW suggests that credible enforcement of a third party guarantor has a positive impact on the settlement. A close examination of ECOMOG's coercive role in Sierra Leone reveals that it helped establish a propitious atmosphere that resulted in the signing of the Lome Peace Accord between the government of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) rebels. BFW asserts that adversaries agree to negotiate in cases where a third party stepped in. ECOMOGs intervention in the Sierra Leone conflict was aimed at ending the brutal civil war that had resulted in the massive loss of lives and property.

ECOWAS representatives also played an important role in bringing the representatives of rebel group and the government to the bargaining table as they played the informational and procedural role. The United Nations sent special representative Francis Okello, who with consultations with West African countries started a series of diplomatic efforts to open up dialogue with the rebels which led to the signing of the Lome Agreement in 1999. In contrast, The Liberia case opposes BFW assumption that credible enforcement of a third party guarantor has a positive impact on the settlement. ECOWAS, in 1990, was put in Liberia to play the mediatory role, monitor ceasefire, constitute an electoral commission and observe elections to ensure they were free and fair.

ECOMOG would complement ECOWAS roles by providing military operations for the purpose of monitoring ceasefire and restoring law and order to create the necessary

conditions for free and fair elections. After the Abuja Peace Agreement was signed in 1995, ECOMOG became stronger and better focused to make Monrovia safe. UNOMIL was dispatched to monitor implementation of the accord. In the 1997 presidential elections, Charles Taylor defeated twelve other candidates to become the president of Liberia. International observers declared that the elections were free and fair but some human rights groups noted that the elections took place at a time when there was intimidation. Since ECOWAS had promised to leave the country when the elections took place as it was viewed that the elections was the only path to stability. Charles Taylor did not abide to his promise of nation building and this saw to the formation of a rebel group that saw the recurrence of the war.

The case however upholds BFWs assumption that the presence of a third party brings the warring factions to the negotiating table. ECOMOG pushed for talks in 1995 between the then president David Kpomakpor and Charles Taylor that were to be held in Abuja. This saw to the signing of the Abuja Peace Agreement.

Sierra Leone disagrees with BFWs statement that neutrality of the third party guarantor is of secondary importance. ECOMOG became part of the conflict as it launched a counteroffensive against the AFRC-RUF rebels after they attacked Nigerian troops. UNAMSIL also fought the rebels after they seized five hundred peacekeepers. Some scholars actually recognize that counteroffensives by ECOMOG and UNAMSIL weakened the rebels and defeated them on the battlefield therefore they acceded to the peace deal following which there was a successful implementation of substantial provisions of the Lome Peace Agreement that made it possible for the holding of the two successful democratic elections.

The Liberian case on the other hand gives weight to the statement by BFW that neutrality of the third party guarantor is of secondary importance. After the 1997 elections, the United

Nations established the first small peace building support office in Liberia to coordinate post war programs by the UN. The head of the office was criticized by Liberian civil society groups and the opposition for being close to and apologetic to the Charles Taylor government. Charles Taylor also accused ECOMOG of supporting some of his rivals in Sierra Leone. To this effect, he refused ECOMOG jets permission to use airfields in Liberia for missions into Sierra Leone. By the end of 1998, ECOMOG finally withdrew its peacekeeping troops from Liberia. The UN office in Liberia was seen to side with Charles Taylor therefore it wasn't trusted by the civil society and the opposition for implementation of the Abuja Peace Agreement.

ECOMOG was viewed by Charles Taylor as being in partnership with his rivals in Sierra Leone, this led to a difficult relationship between the third party guarantor and the president of Liberia where ECOMOG finally left Liberia and rebels started attacking villages which led to the second civil war. BFW goes on further to note that the third party guarantor helps in the implementation of the terms of a treaty. This assumption is given weight by the Sierra Leone case. The Lome Agreement led to a significantly strengthened United Nations presence in Sierra Leone. The Security Council voted on October 22, 1999 (Resolution 1270) that established the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) as a peacekeeping force of up to 6,000 troops including 260 unarmed observers. The mandate of UNAMSIL was expanded to include provision of security at disarmament sites. The United Nations Trust fund received 20 million pounds from the UK that would offer economic assistance in the implementation of the Lome Agreement. After the signing of the agreement, there was a lot of back and forth argument between the RUF principles, Foday Sankoh, and his second in command, Sam Bockarie that slowed the implementation of the peace agreement. ECOWAS intervened and gave Bockarie an order to go into exile for eighteen months until disarmament

was completed and elections held. ECOWAS, as a third party guarantor, stayed even after the signing of the treaty to ensure that the terms of the agreement are implemented.

BFW asserts that a third party guarantor playing the coercive role must be willing to use force if necessary to punish whichever side that violates the treaty. The Sierra Leone case confirms this assumption in that by May 2000, ECOMOG mandate had come to an end and it was leaving Sierra Leone. A major crisis erupted where Sankoh decided that the RUF could advance its agenda of intimidation and control of the diamond areas unhindered.

The RUF was opposed to UNAMSIL deployment into the fields of Kono and Tongo, there it seized close to five hundred Kenyan and Zambian peacekeepers in remote locations in the North and East. In London, the Blair government decided to undertake a major military operation. The massive deployment included a broader objective. Seven hundred paratroopers arrived to restore security in and around the capital and to bolster the morale of the UN peacekeepers. Seven Royal Navy warships with a fleet of helicopters and jet aircraft anchored offshore to provide logistic support and air combat capability. UK came out as a credible third party guarantor that had the capacity and willingness to use force, when the RUF wanted to go against the terms of the signed treaty.

ECOMOG presence in Sierra Leone confirms BFWs statement that a credible third party guarantor must have a self-interest which would allow the will of the third party to persevere. ECOMOG interest in Sierra Leone was economic due to the regional integration. Sierra Leone is part of West Africa regional integration therefore stability in the region would foster trade relations among the member states. It is this drive that saw the regional body push the rebels and the incumbents to the negotiating table and remain in the country to help in the implementation of the peace agreement. On the other hand, Liberia opposes this argument. ECOWAS countries committed to the 1976 protocol on non-aggression which refrained

members from committing, encouraging or condoning acts of violence. The ECOWAS mandate was economic through regional integration but later the organization found the link between economics and defense. A threat of aggression on a member state constituted to a threat and aggression to the community of ECOWAS. It is from these economic and defense link that ECOWAS intervened in Liberia to play a mediatory role.

According to BFWs assumption, self-interest of ECOWAS should have pushed ECOWAS to stay in Liberia to see to the full implementation of the Abuja Peace Agreement. ECOWAS and ECOMOG troops left Liberia in 1998, and in less than one year, in 1999, the second civil war broke out.

In summary, Sierra Leone upholds BFWs theory of a credible enforcement of a third party having a positive impact on the settlement. Liberia opposes this claim as even after third party enforcement, the country still went back to a civil war. Sierra Leone opposes the statement on neutrality as even after ECOMOG sided with the incumbents, there was a peaceful settlement in the end. On the other hand, In Liberia, ECOMOG taking sides was hurtful to the implementation of the Peace Agreement.

4.3 DDR process and its effect on the peace settlement.

BFW asserts that resolving a civil war requires much more than signing a peace agreement, it requires the warring factions to consolidate to form a government and at some point the warring factions will need to demobilize, disengage and disarm their militaries.

The Sierra Leone case gives weight to this assumption in that after the Lome Agreement was signed, DDR was one of the provisions provided for by the agreement. UNAMSIL was mandated with disarming ex-combatants and eventually transform the RUF into a political party. In the first days of the DDR process, only a few combatants showed up mostly from

the Sierra Leone Army, Sankoh openly endorsed the call by the government to disarm but his second in command, Sam Bockarie, was still in the field defiantly refusing his men to disarm.

On the other hand, Liberia opposes BFWs statement that resolving a civil war requires much more than signing a peace agreement and instituting a ceasefire. For a settlement to be successful, it must consolidate the warring factions into a single state, create a new government that can accommodate their interests and establish a new nation, non-partisan military force. Therefore, at some point in the warring factions will need to demobilize, disengage and disarm their militaries. After the Abuja Agreement, there was a general assumption that disarmament was the key to success. Despite the progress that was made towards disarmament and demobilization under the Cotonou, Akosombo and Accra accords, the implementation of Abuja Accord guaranteed commitment and momentum that were lacking in the previous agreements. The disarmament process started in 1996 all through to 1997. In that time a total of 20,332 soldiers were disarmed which accounted for 61.6% of the estimated 33,000 fighters. More than 9570 weapons and 1.2 million pieces of ammunition were collected. The success of the process was measured in that no ceasefire violations were reported in the period between January and March 1997. DDR process in Liberia was a success but still there was a resumption of the war in 1999.

Walter argues that the presence of a powerful third party can help the parties overcome the problem of monitoring, observation and enforcing compliance. The third party can help the parties change the level of fear and insecurity. Both the cases give weight to this assumption as during the first phase of DDR process in Sierra Leone, UNDP, ECOMOG and The World Bank came together to form an alliance that was intended to lure individuals from their defeated factions. ECOMOG was the main military backer in this phase of the DDR process.

In the second phase, The National Committee for Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (NCDDR) and UNAMSIL ran the reception centers for ex-combatants to participate in the DDR process. Phase three of the DDR process was also overseen by UNAMSIL. In Liberia, The National Disarmament and Demobilization Commission (NDDC) was in charge of the pre-registration phase. Disarmament was undertaken by ECOMOG and verified by UNOMIL. ECOMOG would then separate ammunition and weapons and ensure their security. Each demobilization camp was expected to have representatives from the NDDC, UNOMIL, ECOMOG, the Humanitarian Assistance Coordination office of the United Nations and Non-governmental Humanitarian Organizations. Even after the DDR period was over, another 132 fighters disarmed to ECOMOG. The presence of a third party in the DDR process and their coordination at different levels was seen as a positive effect on the implementation of the disarmament and reintegration process.

BFW argues that disarmament has a negative effect on the combatants if it is done too soon. She notes that allowing warring factions to retain a bit of their ability to defend themselves can offer the groups some sense of security and serve as insurance against future oppression, in case the terms of the agreement do not materialize. In Sierra Leone, the first and second phases of the DDR were not successful because they were carried out too soon. The situation on the ground was not stable and ECOMOG seemed to be partisan in the war. In the second phase, there was no financial assistance and UNOMSIL lacked the enforcement capability that would convince the ex-combatants to give up their arms.

DDR was not successful until there were institutions that had been created, the stability on the ground improved and the third party supporter gained enforcement mechanism that would persuade the factions that they were secure. On the other hand, the Liberian case gives BFWs statement that that disarmament has a negative effect on the combatant's sense of security if

it is done too soon. In Liberia, DDR started in November 1996 just one year after the signing of the Abuja agreement. Although there was an impressive scale of disarmament there were signs that warlords were keeping arms in reserve in case their electoral fortunes were dimmed. There were also cases where the local commanders discouraged disarmament and even went ahead to punish the officers who had disarmed without permission. Some commanders who were still in the field were still reluctant to disarm. The fighters themselves mistrusted each other where some rebel groups like LPC was reluctant to disarm because it knew NPFL was maintaining a group of fighters in some areas. This fear of insecurity was heightened in September 1996 when ULIMO-K voluntarily disarmed but was attacked shortly after they left the disarmament centers. The possibility of being vulnerable to an attack by other fighters led to many of the warlords choosing to hide some of the weapons. I therefore find that if DDR process is done too early it has a negative influence on the combatant's sense of security because their personal gains are what are in their minds.

Both the cases agree with BFWs statement that demobilization can be broken into small steps that cannot be avoided. The DDR process in Sierra Leone was a success because it went through three phases that could not have been avoided by either of the warring factions. Phase one was carried out after reinstatement of president Kabbah which was an arrangement between UNDP, ECOMOG, and The World Bank. Phase two of DDR was after signing of the Lome Peace Agreement.

UNAMSIL ran the reception centers for ex-combatants since they had not been involved in the war. Phase three of the DDR process started after the Abuja meetings which came after the events in May 2000. Phase three did not face any interruption from further outbreak of violence. At the reintegration stage, ex-combatants received packages and registered for reintegration assistance which included training, skills and other educational programs that were provided in the communities where the combatants would return after demobilization.

The reinsertion package was supposed to be an incentive for ex-combatants so that they could return to their towns of origin. In Liberia, a task force was set up in June 1995 whose mandate was to review operational concepts, plans and programs for the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process. The members of this task force were representatives of the government of Liberia, ECOMOG, UNOMIL, UNDP, Non-Governmental Organizations and donors. DDR started in 1996 and there was no violence until the exercise was over in 1997.

In summary, the Sierra Leone case brings out the importance of DDR process in the successful settlement. Liberia, on the other hand opposes the hypothesis that a successful DDR process equals a successful peace settlement but it gives weight to the statement that a powerful third party guarantor is important in the DDR process to offer security to the ex-combatants. Both cases support this statement where Sierra Leone used UNAMSIL and in Liberia UNOMIL was the main military backer. In both cases, I find that disarmament has an impact on the combatant's sense of security at a time when their personal gains are still a priority.

4.4 Power sharing and its effect on the settlement.

BFW states that resolving a civil war requires much more than signing a peace agreement and instituting a ceasefire. For a settlement to be successful, it must consolidate the warring factions into a new state, create a new government that can accommodate their interests and establish a new nation with a non-partisan military. In Sierra Leone, The Lome Agreement gave provision to formation of a new government of National unity. The RUF was to be transformed into a political party to be able to join the mainstream into the democratic process. Members of the RUF were allowed to hold public office. Foday Sankoh was appointed to head the chairmanship of the Board of the Commission for the management of

strategic resources, National Reconstruction and Development. He would enjoy status of Vice President and would only be answerable to the President of Sierra Leone.

In May 2000, Foday Sankoh decided to go against the Lome Agreement. It wasn't until he was put away that the rest of the RUF members adhered to the terms of the Agreement. The power sharing pact worked to end the civil war until the institutions developed and democratic elections held in 2002. BFW further notes that the groups that end their war through negotiations must be ready to relinquish power and create a new central government. This statement is given weight by the Sierra Leone case in that Foday Sankoh, even after agreeing to the terms of the agreement did not relinquish power as a leader of the rebel group. He still had the rebels attack peacekeepers even though he was given position of vice president. The actions of the RUF may have taken Sierra Leone back to a civil war until Sankoh was arrested for trial that the rest of RUF adhered to the terms of the peace agreement.

On the other hand, Liberia Peace Agreement provided for a transition government that represented the Liberian factions, but the holders of the offices would vacate three months before the elections. In the period between the signing of the Abuja Agreement in 1995 and inauguration of Charles Taylor in 1997, there was no fighting in Liberia. The power sharing pact seemed to have been working in ending the hostilities in the country. Therefore, this case gives weight to BFWs statement that resolving a civil war requires the warring factions to consolidate and form a new government that can accommodate their interests and establish a new nation.

BFW goes on to note that free and fair elections are reliable as a means to democratize in the aftermath of a civil war. Elections can open up the political process to even the opposition

groups which would be the first step to a peaceful reconstruction of a new legitimate government. The Sierra Leone case gives weight to this assumption.

In 2002, Sierra Leone went to the ballots to vote. The incumbent president, Ahmed Tejan Kabbah, was re-elected in the first major elections after the completion of the disarmament process and the official declaration of the war ending in January, 2002. In the 2007, the second elections were held where the opposition party, All Peoples Congress (APC) won the presidential seat. As such, the elections were viewed as a landmark success which helped the country restore the legitimacy of the country's democratic process. The Liberia case opposes this assumption by BFW as after the 1997 elections, Charles Taylor who was in the opposition won the elections. Although international observers declared that the elections were fair, some human rights groups noted that the elections took place at a time when there was a general climate of intimidation since the rebel factions were still largely intact. Charles Taylor won the elections but reneged on his commitments to nation building.

He built his own paramilitary force and tortured or killed people who opposed him. Many experienced rebels who were loyal to Taylor joined the security forces. These were the people who were responsible for torture, assault, rape, beatings, burning civilians alive, extrajudicial killings, abduction and recruitment of child soldiers. The government abuses aggravated an already unstable situation where some rebel groups like ULIMO-K remained intact and carried out violent actions that were parallel to those of the government. By 2000, new rebel groups came up to fight the Charles Taylor government. In Liberia, instead of elections opening up the political process and acting as a means to democratize the country, they acted as a tool to fuel more violence and eventually led to another civil war. On the other hand, The Liberian Case supports BFWs statement that splitting the military makes it difficult for potential dictators to oppress or overpower the other groups in early democratization. After the 1997 elections, Charles Taylor created his own paramilitary force, the Anti-terrorist

Unit which he put under the command of his son. The most experienced reels who were loyal to Taylor joined the security forces. Taylor took up leadership of the security forces, SSS, Anti-terrorist Unit, The Armed Forces of Liberia and the Liberian National Police. Many of these forces lacked the necessary training and were undisciplined. The ATU was responsible for perpetrating human rights abuses against people who opposed Charles Taylor. All these happened two years after the signing of the Abuja Peace Agreement and was one of the major reasons why Liberia was thrown back into another civil war.

CHAPTER FIVE

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.0 Introduction

The following study was an attempt to find an explanation as to why civil wars recur even after a settlement has been signed. I was doing a comparative study of Sierra Leone and Liberia. Sierra Leone came out of a decade of war with a negotiated settlement and sixteen years on the war is yet to recur. Liberia on the other hand, signed a peace settlement in 1995 but in 1999 fighting started again plunging the country into another four years of war.

I chose two theories in my study which are Barbara F. Walter's theory on settling civil wars and North, Wallis & Weingast (NWW) New Conceptual Framework for recorded human history. I chose to use BFW's theory because her theory offers suggestions and tools that can be used by agents who are involved in peace building. BFW's theory is also an attempt to understand why violence recurs after a civil war and her practical guidelines on how to design better outcomes. I used NCF because it gives an explanation on the frequent eruptions of violence in the natural states and also give an explanation why development policies fail in the states.

5.1 Conclusion

Civil wars are a dominant type trend of in the world for the reason that the reason that they are difficult to end and also because they tend to recur even after a peace settlement has been signed.

There is a lot of literature on recurring civil war including BFW that has argued that certain countries are at a risk of the civil war recurrence because of their economic and political conditions. But as the study has shown, a country like Sierra Leone was able to escape the trap of conflict despite having the underlying conditions for civil war recurrence.

This study suggests that the civil wars that are possibly to recur are where the combatants cannot defeat each other nor can they implement a mutually agreed upon agreement. They are in a situation where they cannot reach any resolution on their own therefore they require an outside enforcer to help them in the peace process.

It is also evident from the study that the ability of the government to credibly commit to the peace agreement affects its ability to avoid a recurrence of the war. Governments that are led by a constitution and follow the rule of law are less likely to face a renewed eruption of violence. In Sierra Lone this was the case but in Liberia, Charles Taylor did not follow the rule of law therefore there was a recurrence of the war. In cases where there is limitation of the government to act outside the law that is stipulated makes the government a more attractive negotiating partner. This also gives the combatants an alternative way out of the war through peace negotiations.

This study suggests that over reliance on the promise of free and fair elections as a way to democratize the state that is emerging from a civil war appears to be a tricky road. This is because groups that recently fought each other both have the fear that the winner of the first elections will set up an authoritarian rule, ban the oppositions and even imprison the members of the opposition as was the case in Liberia. From this the combatants might refuse to take part in the negotiations and instead continue with the war. Therefore it is important for the third party enforcer to note that they should refrain from giving the promise of elections

but instead opt for some sort of democratic period in between the time of the signing of the agreement and the time the next elections.

The study also indicates the importance of a guarantor staying through the process. The guarantor should not just stay up to the signing of the peace agreement, but should stay to oversee the creation of a new government and creation of a new National Army. Intervention will not have the intended goal of facilitating a long term settlement if they are only involved up to signing of the treaty. The third guarantor should stay through the implementation of the agreement to enforce compliance. Negotiations should not be seen as a destination but a beginning of the peace process.

From the study, it is also evident that disarmament has a negative effect on the combatants if it is done too soon. Although BFW says that it is an important step towards attaining long term peace, it can also have the opposite effect on the peace process. In both cases, at first the combatants were reluctant to disarm but once they were reassured of their security they started showing up at the DDR sites. Allowing each side of the warring parties to retain observable weapons enhances their feelings of security and can give them motivation to follow through with the terms of the agreement.

The study reveals that some countries experience more frequent violent eruptions because of the rent allocation to limit violence. When the economic situation of the people changes, the citizens of these countries have to renegotiate the status quo which is done through the use of violence.

It is also important to note the importance of the coalition's ability to provide rents and privileges to the citizens. In both cases, incumbents require support from the citizens to survive. This is evident as the wars in this countries were caused by dissatisfaction of the citizens by the ruling elite.

Settlements have enormous potential to bring to an end suffering by civilians in war torn countries. Negotiation in these cases show that States and Organizations cannot stand conflict. Negotiations require the warring factions to compromise to attain peace which is a chance to establish a democratic state even after a war as there are fears of ending up with an authoritarian regime. Therefore instead of viewing negotiations as futile in attempting to bring the warring factions into a collaborative regime, it can also be an opportunity to create a democratic state.

Outside intervention has its good side and potentially a harmful side. The good side is that it can help bring to an end a bloody civil war if the intervening party is committed to enforcing the peace treaty and if the warring parties are committed to the settlement. On the other hand, if the outside intervention is non-military it may not achieve much. Although non-military intervention is more acceptable and more economically less costly, it may not achieve what it was intended to do as it can only provide a temporary solution to the war but doesn't address the underlying security threat. Rebuilding a stable community after a civil war requires security which can only be provided by the outside enforcer like United Nations peacekeeping forces. But they must be willing to commit to the necessary costs that come with these missions. The use of force by peacekeepers has emerged as a notable factor for a successful peace settlement. It is evident that the use of force appears to help end a war as unarmed peacekeepers and observers who have no military backing will have no positive effect on the negotiations and implementation of the peace process. In both cases, ECOMOG and the UK had to use force whenever the rebels tried to go against the terms of the agreement and in Sierra Leone this was successful as the rebels were defeated and had no alternative but to follow the terms of the agreement.

Finally, as BFW emphasizes, security guarantees are essential, but they are not an enough condition for a peace settlement. Guarantees on the other hand are unlikely to succeed especially in an ongoing war where combatants have no desire whatsoever to negotiate. States who are wishing to facilitate peace talks must wait until the groups themselves desire to have peace and are ready to negotiate, until then, there can be no positive effect on the peace settlement. It is also important to keep in mind that negotiated settlements are not always the least costly solutions to civil wars since victory of one side in war can bring a few casualties but it can also guarantee long term peace.

5.2 Recommendations

The peace process in both countries was focused on issues connected with the implementation of the peace agreements and how the peace agreements would be sustained. In Sierra Leone, the sustenance of the peace process was successful since there was no recurrence of the war but in Liberia, this was not the case. My recommendation in the employment of the BFW tools to other countries is that the peace building process should be framed more broadly where it connects the national with local and aim for a more inclusive peace agreement. This means that the civil war settlement should involve changes not only in the institutions but also in behavior and attitudes of everyone in the country and not only of the government and the rebel members. In this case, every member of the state will have a role to play in the peacebuilding of the country so as to have a more comprehensive peace rather than just containing the conflict for a period of time.

A sustained dialogue between the state and the citizens of the state on issues of power, politics and society as a whole can help bring sustained peace in a nation that is coming out of a civil war. Such a process is possible if it is developed and carried out with due care. An inclusive process of dialogue framed around developing shared set of visions for long term

peace, can build a consensus and also support the addressing of factors that caused the initial war a process that mostly goes unaddressed. This kind of dialogue can be carried out independent of the current short term political priorities but they could also constitute the constitution making process or its review process which follows soon after the peace settlement has begun to be implemented.

In terms of economic development, there should be profound diversification to alleviate poverty which is a major security threat. Securing food production should also take front row importance as a strategy for economic development. The focus of the peace agreements in both countries and in most of the peace agreements after a civil war focuses on issues of political power and building institutions but the peace agreement should also include economic development. Sierra Leone and eventually Liberia attained peace in their countries but their economic states did not improve. Liberia and Sierra Leone were both listed at the bottom of United Nations Development Program (UNDP) human development index (UNDP 2015). The objective of the economic development is to increasingly cater for the needs of the population especially at a time when there is high expectations of peace and the new state after the civil war.

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