INTRODUCTION

States are expected to maintain general harmony and satisfaction among the people, or generic peace, as well as to keep the peace, meaning law and order. Most states, however, tend to concentrate on keeping the peace at the expense of maintaining generic peace and result is often confrontations. This is particularly the case with fragile states, which, argues Eka Ikpe, lack the ‘capacity and resilience’ to protect themselves from various challenges. This means that they cannot protect citizens, absorb shocks and manage conflict without resorting to violence.

Fragility creates an environment for violence because of the perceived inability of security forces in a state to command trust. Such states become breeding grounds for illicit activities that compound their problems. If properly handled, the agitations can lead to reforms or semblances of reform as a way of keeping the peace, for it is the unheeded calls for reforms that lead to rebellions. When the point of rebellion has been reached, it means that the ruling elite would have lost legitimacy in the eyes of the ruled, who have transferred their loyalty to new groups or leaders. In the process, different types of militia and rebels emerge.
Militias and rebel groups tend to destabilise individual states and their regions and some have ext ra-continental ra mifications. They assume diferent t ypes o f responses. Both these groups challenge constituted authority, whether at the state, regional or international levels. Militias are organised and often armed groups that operate within a state and sometimes appear to be condoned. They generally do not challenge the legitimacy of the government. Rebel movements, however, do not consider the government to be legitimate and may aim at overthrowing it. Since rebels can transform into a larger issue that calls for solutions beyond the capacity of any single state, it calls for concerted effort within the region to resolve the conflict, on a regional or even continental basis.

Responses to militia and rebel movements, whether at a state, regional or international levels, vary according to the challenges they present. Responses include attempts at suppression, political accommodation through constitutional restructuring in the form of power-sharing. If unresolved, it could lead to state fragmentation and separation. Regional as well as continental players, worried about their complex interests, contribute to each of the responses.

STATE RESPONSES

State responses generally include suppression, creating counterinsurgency forces, constitutional restructuring and in vention. In t he case of f suppression, the state tries to destroy militias and rebel movements by mobilising all types of security apparatus in a show of force. The use of force is justified as the proper response of the state to internal enemies. Suppression becomes a law and order operation and a les son to other would-be troublemakers that the state has the capacity to act. In Kenya, for instance, Mwai Kibaki’s administration repeatedly tried to crush the Mungiki by arresting members and leaders in para military operations. Mungiki operations, however, appeared to decline only after its leader, Maina Njenga, was released from prison. Njenga then led his supporters to form a crusade for peace in which he advised his estimated five million followers to change their ways.6

At times, states en gage in deceptions and portray questionable behaviour as inevitable and in the best interests of the country.7 To deal with perceived threats, they encourage pro-government militias or even create counterforces to militias in the form of special units. In Sudan, the government initially discouraged Arab militias to counter the advances of the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA).8

In Uganda the government encouraged and trained the Arrow Boys and Amuka Boys supposedly to protect the citizens, while its soldiers were fighting Joseph Kony’s Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) in the north. This was in the hope that the government would be able to disarm the militia once the LRA had been defeated. In Rwanda the state helped to create the Interahamwe as a way of creating an assumed threat in the challenge posed by the Tutsi, but this seemingly lost control of the group.9 The danger is that such counterforces could embarrass those who start or condone them when they become uncontrollable and take the law into their own hands.10

Another type of response is to engage in constitutional restructuring, a socioeconomic and political redistribution mechanism to deal with two internal challenges. The first is the political differences among politicians and the second is the friction between the idea of state and the idea of nation. Accommodating political differences takes into account political interests of key players who have the proven ability to exercise influence on militias to disrupt or continue to disrupt the peace if they are not addressed. Of various options, all of them focusing on political control, power sharing has in creasingly become the accepted mode of constitutional restructuring.11 This is done by eating special positions to accommodate vocal leaders who influence militias, as happened in Kenya and Zimbabwe in 2008.12

The second type of constitutional restructuring takes into consideration the existing friction between the idea of a state and the idea of a nation by recommending different ways of splitting the state. One way is to create mini-states, operating provinces ad hoc, while maintaining their autonomy, while remaining subordinate to the national government. They also tend to compete with each other for national attention. Another way is to permit territories to secede from the state and become independent countries. Both types are found in conflicts in Ethiopia and constitutional restructuring.13 While states were free to secede in the reconstructed Ethiopian federal system after meeting laid-down stipulations, they still tend to compete for benefits from the national government.

A diferent type of response is to invite external intervention, which is an admission of defeat. Often it is the leaders of the ‘rebels’ who call for external intervention. In Liberia, for instance, critics of Samuel Doe, such as Taylor, stirred up foreign interest groups.14 However, when governments are desperate they, too, call for intervention. The transitional government in Somalia, unable to contain Al Shabaab, repeatedly called on Ethiopia to intervene in its north and southern provinces.15
Although Kenya did not intervene, Ethiopia and Uganda did in the name of the African Union.

**CLUSTERS OF CONFLICT AND REGIONAL RESPONSES**

The calls for intervention focus attention on the role of neighbours in a given region, particularly on the African continent. Political disputes among leaders that degenerate into disruption of the peace have garnered an assortment of regional responses. The presence of rival militias and rebel movements in a state or in the region makes intervention problematic, yet Africa, as a continent, has had to deal with numerous quasi-wars between states. Somalia had irredentist ambitions in Kenya, Ethiopia and Djibouti and supported rebels in those areas. Like Somalia, Sudan supported Eritrean secessionists against Ethiopia. Sudan and Libya supported rebellions in Chad with Libya's troops occupying the Aouzou Strip in northern Chad. Libya's Muammar Gaddafi did not consider artificial colonial boundaries an obstacle to his grand idea of unifying 'brothers and sisters' in Tunisia, Chad, Mali and Niger with Libya. Since in dependence in the 1960s, militias and rebel movements have been a source of concern to the African continent and the creation of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) was itself a response to this concern. The OAU had to deal with rebel movements that challenged, in the first place, the states as territorially constituted and, in the second, the legitimacy of governmental authorities. The response of the OAU was to discourage both types of challenges. It upheld the sanctity of colonial boundaries and thereby discouraged secessionist rebel movements. It also prohibited interference in the internal affairs of a sister state, which implied no support to those who challenged governmental legitimacy.

This position, however, did not stop member states from interfering in the internal affairs of others in encouraging disidence, and as a result there were numerous quasi-wars between states. Somalia had irredentist ambitions in Kenya, Ethiopia and Djibouti and supported rebels in those areas. Like Somalia, Sudan supported Eritrean secessionists against Ethiopia. Sudan and Libya supported rebellions in Chad with Libya's troops occupying the Aouzou Strip in northern Chad. Libya's Muammar Gaddafi did not consider artificial colonial boundaries an obstacle to his grand idea of unifying 'brothers and sisters' in Tunisia, Chad, Mali and Niger with Libya. Since in dependence in the 1960s, militias and rebel movements have been a source of concern to the African continent and the creation of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) was itself a response to this concern. The OAU had to deal with rebel movements that challenged, in the first place, the states as territorially constituted and, in the second, the legitimacy of governmental authorities. The response of the OAU was to discourage both types of challenges. It upheld the sanctity of colonial boundaries and thereby discouraged secessionist rebel movements. It also prohibited interference in the internal affairs of a sister state, which implied no support to those who challenged governmental legitimacy.

The OAU therefore eventually had to deal with the growth of militias and rebel movements that tended to destabilise regions and generate refugees. Security was a major concern and so member states attempted to prevent and resolve the disputes. The 1969 OAU convention on refugees requested that those offering asylum to refugees ensure that the latter ‘abstain from any subversive activities against any member state of the OAU’. In return, signatory states undertook ‘to prohibit refugees residing in their respective territories from attacking any state member of the OAU, by any activity likely to cause tension between member states, and in particular by use of arms, through the press, or by radio’. Despite these undertakings, disputes in one country spread to neighbours and led to the development of some four geographical clusters of conflict, namely the Mano River cluster, the Southern Africa cluster, the Great Lakes cluster, and the Horn of Africa cluster. In each cluster, militia and rebel activities that started in one country tended to spread to neighbours and become regional problems.

### The Mano River cluster

The conflicts in West Africa revolved mainly around the Mano River and attracted their fair share of regional intervention. Although the Mano River cluster affected mostly Sierra Leone and Liberia, it disrupted Guinea and Côte d’Ivoire, too. Sierra Leone and Liberia are products of post-American revolution debates on the future of free blacks in North America. To start with, the English created Sierra Leone as a place to take blacks from Nova Scotia or slaves caught on the high seas rather than take them to Canada or Britain. The ‘returnees’ became the Krios, who dominated the indigenous population. Liberia was a product of inspiring slave revolt, the US did its best to find an alternative place for such people, and Liberia was forcibly acquired for that purpose. The blacks, who went to be free in West Africa, whether in Sierra Leone or Liberia, became members of the privileged class that tended to dominate the ‘natives’, which in turn created simmering resentments. When Doe, a Krahn rather than an Americo-Liberian, took power in 1980, he gained popularity for executing 13 Americo-Liberian officials from the previous government. He and his allies became known as the ‘Liberian Beach Party’.

Conflicts in Liberia and Sierra Leone erupted in the 1990s, starting with Liberia when Taylor launched his attack in December 1989, after mysteriously escaping from a Massachusetts jail, before spreading to neighbouring Sierra Leone. Taylor had widespread support in Liberia (including current President Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf, who demanded US$10 million) and was also supported by the international operators. After Taylor’s coalition of rebel forces pidly annihilated Doe’s forces by July 1990, he started fragmenting in order to find a more acceptable and seemingly threatened the rest of West Africa.

The regional response in West Africa was both diplomatic and military and had mixed results. The Economic Community of West Africa States (ECOWAS)
tried to intervene di plomatick y but fa il ed. EC OW AS, le d b y N igeria, t hen transformed itself into a militar y organ called ECOMOG t o intervene and restore peace in Liberia. Not all member countries were willing t o send troops and so ECOMOG seemed to become part of t he problem as other countries questioned N igeria’s role and activit ies. ECOMOG eventually helped t o settle t he Lib era n civil wa r by p romising T aylor imm unity f rom internationa l p rosecution an d asylum in Nigeria. N igeria’s foreign affairs minister, Oleyumi A deniji, asserted t hat the asylum was g iven ‘on h umanitarian g rounds in a r d t o s ave t he Lib erian people from fighting, in order to save the peace process’ and v oided t hat Nigeria would ‘not be harassed by anybody’ to hand over Taylor be ca use ‘that is not what a sovereign country w ould do’. Pointing out t hat if Nigeria reneged on the asylum, ‘nobody w ill r espect u s’, N igerian Pr esident O luz egun O basanjo in s isted t hat a sovereign country would ‘not be harassed by anybody’ to hand over Taylor because ‘that is not what a sovereign country would do’. Pointing out that if Nigeria reneged on the asylum, ‘nobody will respect us’, Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo insisted that a sovereign country would ‘not be harassed by anybody’ to hand over Taylor because ‘that is not what a sovereign country would do’. Pointing out that if Nigeria reneged on the asylum, ‘nobody will respect us’, Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo insisted that ‘nobody should be done to erode the credibility of Nigeria’.

The Impression created was that since the level of conflict in t he Mano River cluster declined, providing a safe haven to warlords might be a way for regions to end prolonged conflicts in t heir clusters. The type of response, however, was eroded in 2006, when President Obasekun Obasekan, a der pressure f rom US P resident George W Bush, reneged on Taylor’s asylum. By handing over Taylor, Obasanjo eroded the credibility of Nigeria, which then undermined Nigeria’s standing as a possible mediator in other conflicts.

**The Southern Africa cluster**

The response from rebel movements in the Southern Africa cluster had two racially opposed aspects. The first responses came from ‘white’ political entities trying to survive in the midst of a conflagration in Africa. These second was engendered by the attitudes and activities of ‘liberated’ African states in support of ‘freedom fighters’ in the remaining colonial states, namely Rhodesia, South Africa, South West Africa, Mozambique and Angola. The OAU expected every member to contribute financially according to ability, to assist such freedom fighters.

On their part, the racist regimes tried to put up a united front against what they believed was an affront to the Western way of life. This was particularly the case in the 1960s, when their allies sought to consolidate apartheid image by sponsoring a ‘third force’ in support of black-on-black violence within South Africa. The response from the African side of the racial equation was twofold. One, victims of colonialism and apartheid mounted guerrilla warfare against the regime and appealed for international help, starting with neighbouring African countries. Two, just as South Africa appeared to have the tacit support of the West, black South Africans fighting a partheid had been offered an asylum and support from African countries. These countries, however, were in a position to exploit the threat posed by South Africa. The threat to the economy and political stability of the Frontline states appeared to the threats posed by South Africa. This was to lessen the economic dependence of the Frontline states on South Africa, but SADC also aimed at coordinating its support for apartheid forces operating in their own countries. This objective changed when apartheid was defeated.

**The Great Lakes cluster**

Zimbabwe’s resident, R obert M ubuge, a long w ith UN S external s ecetary-General Kofi Annan a nd A U C ommission C hairman A pha O umar K onare, a s w ell a s t he
presidents of South Africa, Gabon, Mozambique, Nigeria, Namibia and Malawi, were witnesses to the 2004 declaration by the International Conference on Peace, Security, Democracy and Development in the Great Lakes region (ICGLR), which was signed in Dar-es-Salaam by heads of state. The ICGLR officials facilitated the arrest and transfer to relevant international tribunals the perpetrators of genocide and also committed themselves to preventing any direct or indirect support, delivery of arms or any other means of assistance to armed groups operating in the region. To prove it was serious, ICGLR officials facilitated the arrest and transfer to The Hague for trial by the International Criminal Court (ICC) of Jean-Pierre Bemba. To prove it was serious, ICGLR officials facilitated the arrest and transfer to relevant international tribunals the perpetrators of genocide and also committed themselves to preventing ‘any direct or indirect support, delivery of arms or any other means of assistance to armed groups operating in the region’. To prove it was serious, ICGLR officials facilitated the arrest and transfer to relevant international tribunals the perpetrators of genocide and also committed themselves to preventing ‘any direct or indirect support, delivery of arms or any other means of assistance to armed groups operating in the region’.

The D ar-es-Salaam Declaration was one of the regional responses to the crisis in eastern Zaire and, subsequently, in the Democratic Republic of Congo. The declaration stressed that member states should not be allowed to use their territories as bases for aggression and subversion against each other. They agreed to ‘neutralise, disarm, arrest and transfer to relevant international tribunals the perpetrators of genocide’ and also committed themselves to preventing ‘any direct or indirect support, delivery of arms or any other means of assistance to armed groups operating in the region’.

Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Tanzania, Uganda, Kenya, Rwanda, Republic of the Congo and Sudan. The declaration was signed in Dar-es-Salaam by presidents of 11 African countries (Angola, Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo, Tanzania, Uganda, Kenya, Rwanda, Republic of the Congo and Sudan). The declaration was signed in Dar-es-Salaam by presidents of 11 African countries (Angola, Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo, Tanzania, Uganda, Kenya, Rwanda, Republic of the Congo and Sudan). The declaration was signed in Dar-es-Salaam by presidents of 11 African countries (Angola, Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo, Tanzania, Uganda, Kenya, Rwanda, Republic of the Congo and Sudan).

By the late 1980s, Mobutu had become a regional embarrassment for other leaders in the Great Lakes cluster. Their response to the crisis in eastern Zaire was twofold, with countries united but then turning on each other. At first leaders – Paul Kagame of Rwanda, Yoweri Museveni of Uganda, Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe and José dos Santos of Angola – formed a temporary alliance to support a rebellion against Mobutu.

The second response led to the fragmentation of the alliance as others turned on each other. Each appeared bent on exploiting the natural wealth in the Congo and some became big exporters of minerals not found in their own countries. The allies started accusing each other of all sorts of things, and Kabila kicked Kagame’s men out of Kinshasa and then Museveni and Kagame turned on each other in the eastern Congo. State interests took centre stage. They all started using rebel movements that were identified with one country as opposed to the other, as proxies within the eastern Congo.

The Horn of Africa cluster

Some countries in the Great Lakes cluster are linked to the Horn of Africa cluster, which is characterised by multiple rebel movements from Tanzania. After ousting Amin in 1980, the rebels fragmented and Kenya’s effort to mediate was not successful. Eventually Yoweri Museveni’s National Resistance Army came to power in 1986. Museveni was helped by Rwandese rebels, called the Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF).

Members of the RPF were Rwandese exiles, mostly from a Tutsi background, who were in conflict with Juvenal Habyarimana’s government. Under the umbrella of the Organisation of the African Union, the region tried to mediate between Habyarimana and the RPF at Arusha, Tanzania, and succeeded in getting the two sides to sign a power-sharing deal. Théodore Rugasa, there was a mass slaughter of the Tutsis. A government-sponsored militia, the Interahamwe, went on a rampage in 1994 and killed more than 800,000 people. The mass killings stopped when the RPF, operating from Uganda, took over control of the country and forced former government officials to flee. The Interahamwe militias were defeated in eastern Zaire, where they became a source of concern for the cluster.

The Interahamwe were defeated in eastern Zaire, where they became a source of concern for the cluster.
They suffer, notes Ruth Iyob, from a ‘crisis of identity, stemming from the contest for hegemony by Christianity and Islam and African and Arab civilisations’. At one time, Pan-Ethiopianism appeared to be the dominating influence in the region in competition with the Arab Muslim influence, which was expanding southwards. Both Ethiopia and Sudan stressed historical claims that pre-dated European conquests. These were complicated by the Somali vision of occupying one time, Pan-Ethiopianism appeared to be the dominating influence in the region in competition with the Arab Muslim influence, which was expanding southwards. Both Ethiopia and Sudan stressed historical claims that pre-dated European conquests. These were complicated by the Somali vision of occupying...
of African states should be shared with an external entity. Advocates of coups and arming rebel groups target mainly R obert M ugabe, t he ir m inist ‘ b ogeyman. Thus, James Kirchick of The New Republic begged outgoing US President George W Bush to enhance his legacy as a liberator by invading Zimbabwe in order to ‘liberate’ millions. And Paul Collier, claiming that military ‘coups’ in Africa are ‘progressive’, wanted the new US president, Barack Obama, to use ‘moral authority’ derived from his ‘African identity’ to help mount coups.

Congo is a good example of international response of f promoting and then dumping leaders. Soon after Congo became independent in 1960, Patrice Lumumba annoyed extra-continental forces with his nationalist policies on Congo. Immediately, interference from the US and Belgium, assisted by France, Britain and South Africa, plunged that country into chaos. They were supported by Congolese politicians who had little time for Lumumba’s political and economic nationalism. As a result, Joseph M obutu became president of Congo but after he outlived his usefulness, he became expendable. The effort to distance themselves from some of their own creations was partly because these countries considered that relying on individual leaders in a symbiotic relationship was in itself unreliable. The US, among others, started to shift positions and to abandon what former secretary of state, Henry Kissinger, termed ‘the essence of post-war American foreign policy’.

The French have a record of giving the second type of international response, namely intervention. Considered a ‘traditional gendarme’ in Africa, the French response has tended to be one of intervention either to ensure survival of its men in power or to depose them after they had outlived their usefulness. There were times, therefore, when the French used mercenaries who had little time for Lumumba’s political and economic nationalism. As a result, Joseph Mobutu became president of Congo but after he outlived his usefulness, he became expendable. The effort to distance themselves from some of their own creations was partly because these countries considered that relying on individual leaders in a symbiotic relationship was in itself unreliable. The US, among others, started to shift positions and to abandon what former secretary of state, Henry Kissinger, termed ‘the essence of post-war American foreign policy’.

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The third response is to try a multilateral approach to negotiated settlement in a perceived stalemate between governments and rebels. The Germans, preferring to side with the US and France, opt for coordinated responses from the West in stemming threats to EU from African Siries. They were not ‘conflict prevention’ measures to ensure ‘development’ at the grassroots level and to address ‘the root causes’ that give rise to the rebels. Where there is no possibility of a solution, the Germans consider the ‘exit option’ of leaving.

The fourth type is to engage in different types of intervention, directly or indirectly, and they find it difficult to refrain from total involvement, particularly of a military nature. After the disaster in Somalia, however, they tend to look for different ways of responding to threats to their interests and find allies among rebel movements and militias. Former American secretary of state, Condoleezza Rice, asserted in 2008 that the US was an ally of those governments with the arrest of leaders of rebel movements to be tried at The Hague by the ICC as a way of curbing ‘impunity’. Although the US refused to be a member of the ICC, it is active in referring African cases to international criminal tribunals. This has happened in Charles Taylor, who served as President of Liberia, where the leader supposedly destroys the country. Germans consider the situation as a way of ending and securing the country. Germans consider the situation as a way of ending and securing the country.
taken to trial at The Hague. Despite accusations of selective justice and targeting Africans, particularly when it picked on Sudan’s President Omar el-Bashir, and of ignoring perpetrators of atrocities in big powerful countries, the threat of being referred to the ICC has acquired international political currency in Africa as a warning to both rebel movements and most governments.

From the above, it is clear that there is a grey area in ext ra-continental responses and that they are affected by perceived interests. There are times when they encourage rebel movements to destabilise leaders of target states without direct intervention. Sometimes they intervene directly and impose a person of their choice as the new ruler on a given state. They also put pressure on the parties in conflict to negotiate and reach power-sharing settlements. Most recently, they have used the ICC to give political warnings to leaders of both regimes and rebel movements.

CONCLUSION

The response to the presence of militias and rebel movements in any place and at any level is determined by the interests being advanced and protected. At the state level, the government response can take the form of repressing accommodation to the wishes of some of the militias and rebel movements, or succumbing to pressure and getting out or agreeing to decapacitate the state. Some militia are sponsored by influential people in governments, others are co opted after being established and perhaps being hard to control, and they are generally used to co operate with rebel movements. There are rebel movements who aspire to power irrespective of how it is achieved. If the state is weak, it surrenders power to the rebels or opts for a power-sharing deal. In most cases, the state tends to respond by suppressing the rebellion and trying to deny it legitimacy or eventually cutting a deal on an aspect of autonomy or even separation.

States in a region worry about growing instability in an area within the region. This is because these activities often underpin human insecurity and state crises in Africa. From the above, it is clear that there is a great variety in extra-continental responses and that they are affected by perceived interests. There are times when they encourage rebel movements to destabilise leaders of target states without direct intervention. Sometimes they intervene directly and impose a person of their choice as the new ruler on a given state. They also put pressure on the parties in conflict to negotiate and reach power-sharing settlements. Most recently, they have used the ICC to give political warnings to leaders of both regimes and rebel movements.

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On the regional front, there have been limited successes in terms of settlement but not of resolution of conflicts. In part, the seeming success in the Mano River cluster was due to the strong action taken by ECOMOG, led by Nigeria, as well as the support of extra-continental forces, a lthough the number entries in involved were extremely weak. In the Horn of Africa, IGAD produced settlements in Somalia, which quickly floundered, and in Sudan, which is still holding. In the G reat Lakes cluster, the response if the Great Lakes is to pressure the parties concerned to settle through power-sharing de aling. In t he D emocratic R epublic of C ongo (DRC), b ut t his wa s undermined by competing country and ‘international’ interests. In the Southern Africa cluster, the region intervened to settle an acrimonious political dispute in Zimbabwe that affected the area, by brokering a power-sharing deal.

Power sharing is often an external imposition either by regional neighbours or by ext ra-continental forces. Th e re sponse f rom ext ra-continental forces, a ll driven by their own interests, va ry, b ut t here i s t he tendency t o s upport r ebel movements plotting to oust target regimes or to strengthen leaders of such regimes against the rebels. Protection for such leaders is withdrawn once they outlive their value. A t t imes, t he support t ak es t he form o f unilaterally supporting leaders of regimes or rebel movements when it suits their interests. In the process, they help to create instability by aiding rebel movements and even sponsoring coups against regimes they do not like or restore the peace by assisting in settling disputes in prolonged conflicts.

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INTRODUCTION

Activities of armed non-state groups (ANSGs) have had devastating consequences for civilian populations as well as the infrastructure that supports their welfare. The African adage that ‘when two elephants fight, it is the grass that suffers’ is true of armed conflicts, for civilians are not only strategic targets but also bear the brunt of the consequences. African battle spaces are characterised by young boys carrying weapons taller than they, government forces and armed groups violating international humanitarian and human rights laws with impunity, terrified and massively displaced civilians, and carcasses of destroyed homes and infrastructure.

ANSGs are not uniquely or exclusively an African phenomenon, for they are common in many political systems, including advanced societies such as the United States (Michigan Militia Corps), Canada (Front de Libération du Québec, Quebec Liberation Front, FLQ), Italy (Brigate Rosse, Red Brigades, BR) and Spain/France (Basque nationalists). What is unique to Africa is the alarming level of loss of human life and destruction of property that militant and rebel groups cause, the longevity of some of these groups, and...

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