HUMAN SECURITY AND JAPANESE FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS AFRICA

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background of the study

A fundamental change has taken place in the debate on international security since the end of the Cold War. The traditional concept of security has been generally viewed in the context of national, state-centric security in international relations. The end of the Cold War and the proliferation inter alia of civil wars and new forms of insecurity have brought forth the most prominent transformation of the concept of security. The state is no longer considered the guarantor of security to its people, and is now viewed as a possible security threat, most notably in developing countries (McCormack, 2005: 3). During the 21st century, the challenges that security poses to states have also become more complex. This is visible in how poverty and conflict in developing countries have been defined as important issues of international security and how the emphasis has shifted from state to human security (Human Security Now, 2003: 2).

Whether human security can be a new approach to security policy of a state has been one of the contentious themes in the discourse of how to perceive and cope with (new) diverse threats to the post-Cold War international community. The emergence of human security caused academic and policy communities to re-think and re-interpret the concept of security, and brought about the confusion, to some extent, in how to incorporate this new concept into existing foreign policy framework. Some governments just ignored or criticized the concept as it was too broad and inclusive of any kind of problems in the
world. The government of Japan has proactively promoted the concept of human security as an important policy idea for the 21st century.

According to the influential 1994 United Nations Human Development Report, in which the broad concept of human security was first articulated, human security consists of two main elements. Firstly, it refers to safety from chronic threats such as hunger, disease and repression. Secondly, human security refers to protection from sudden and hurtful disruptions in the patterns of daily life (UNDP Development Report, 1994: 23, 24). The following definition from the Human Security Now (2003: 4) report will be used: “Human security is to protect the vital core of all human lives in ways that enhances human freedoms and human fulfilment”.

The accelerating forces of globalization, which have made borders more porous to the movement of humans and goods, have brought forth new challenges, particularly as far as human security issues are concerned. These challenges include people facing economic and political insecurities with much greater intensity. Although affecting all countries, developing countries such as South Africa experience these challenges with much greater intensity. Globalization has also had an immense impact on how countries conduct their foreign relations, since they must respond to the changing nature of international relations and security parameters in a new security paradigm which has impacted decision making.

The foreign policy of one country towards another or region is also an expression of the needs and self-interest of the country, and how a country wants to achieve political or economic goals. Thomas (1999:1) argues: “In the current context of globalization, the inter-connections between the evolving global economy, the state as intermediary and the
human experience of security are important. The relationship between development and human security is central.”

In comparison to Japan’s relationship with other world regions, the political relationship between Africa, especially South Africa and Japan is relatively young. It gained newfound significance with the end of Apartheid and the increase in South-East political economic ties and initiatives focusing on development, for example Tokyo International Conference for African Development (TICAD). As Japan’s economic power increased and the range of its political concerns widened, Japan’s relationship with Africa gained new value (Kazuo, 2003: 58). The nature of the relationship between Japan and Africa has been primarily centered on development and aid programs such as the Official Development Assistance (ODA) and TICAD (Kazuo, 2003: 60).

Japan’s foreign policy framework roughly divides the goals of its foreign policy into two types. One is to realize rather direct national interests such as establishing good relationship with other countries or solving concrete issues or dispute. The other is to realize and maintain the order and norms of the international society to realize certain values that the country believes. In other words, the former type of foreign policy directly aims at realizing national interests, which often tends to bear interests in materialistic, concrete benefits (Yuuhi-Kaku, 1997). In the meantime, foreign policy to pursue the latter goal would not pursue short-term, direct interests, but it requires structural power, either hard or soft, to lead international society in a certain direction. (Nye, 1991:517)

As the tide turned in international politics, Japan needed to adjust and renovate its foreign policy architecture to respond to and take even further advantage of coping with emerging issues and new threats in the post-Cold War period. It was natural, in a sense, for the second
largest economy, or the largest donor at that time (now the fourth), to seek a more responsible role for global welfare and security, on top of regional peace and prosperity in Asia. The Japanese government has positioned the concept of human security as one of key perspectives of its foreign policy with a perspective on making the 21st Century a human-centered one. (MOFA, 2003:183)

1.2 Statement of the Problem

The challenges that human security has brought forth have had a large impact on how states conduct their foreign policies. This is because foreign aid and peacekeeping assistance can be considered as diplomatic tools used toward developing countries, as well as the means to pursue economic interests. Human security, and especially foreign aid or Official Development Assistance (ODA) influence countries’ foreign policies. This is either about how a developing country is affected by poverty and conflict as in the case of many African states, or whether a developed country such as Japan is in the position to provide assistance to improve the human security of the population of a country (or in the case of this study, a continent).

Japan is currently the fourth largest provider of ODA in the world, the United States being the world’s largest aid donor, followed by the United Kingdom and Germany respectively (Masaki, 2007). Problems such as internal wars, poverty and uprisings (which are usually considered as “African problems”) have been exacerbated by the progressive globalization of the world’s economy and the end of the Cold War. Issues concerning human security have thus been exceptionally significant in Japan’s relations with Africa, since Japan has used South Africa as an instrument to achieve better human security on the continent as well as on its own home front (Kazuo, 2003: 60). Therefore, this study also seeks to
establish the influence Japanese promotion of human security has had on its ODA to Africa. Furthermore, TICAD had played a key role in the Japanese foreign policy towards Africa, thus it is important in this study to identify the role TICAD has had in promoting human security and development in Africa.

In the Diplomatic Bluebook of 2016, the MOFA states that Japan currently follows a comprehensive approach to conflicts. This is because Japan believes that in order to resolve conflicts permanently and to lead affected regions and countries to sustainable reconstruction, it is necessary for the international community to unite in order to promote efforts at a consolidation of peace approach. Hence the study also seeks to explore the significance of human security goals in Japanese foreign policy towards the peacekeeping missions in Africa.

Thus, far in the field of international relations, our knowledge of the influence that the concept of human security has on the foreign policies of countries is limited. This is partly because it is still a relatively new concept and is considered as ambiguous. Many studies also only focus on the different components of a country’s foreign policy in terms of human security, and the various aspects that address problems related to human insecurity. An important part of the analysis is why Japan has chosen human security as its niche diplomacy in the new security order even though it is still considered as a middle-power in the international system. Given this, the broad research question of this study is in what ways has human security, both as a concept and principle, influenced Japan’s foreign policy towards Africa since 1998?
1.3 Research questions

i. How has human security influenced Japan’s foreign policy towards Africa?

ii. What is the influence of human security on Japanese Official Development Aid (ODA) in Africa?

iii. What has been the role of TICAD in promoting human security and development in Africa?

iv. What is the influence of human security on Japanese peacekeeping missions in Africa?

1.4 Research Objectives

The overall objective of this research is to explain how the concept of human security has influenced Japan’s foreign policy towards Africa. Specific objectives include:

i. To establish the influence of Japanese promotion of human security on Official Development Aid (ODA) in Africa.

ii. To evaluate the role of TICAD in promoting human security and development in Africa.

iii. To establish the influence of human security on Japanese peacekeeping missions in Africa.

1.5 Hypothesis

Human security as an influence on the Japanese foreign policy towards Africa.
1.6 Significance of the Study

The findings of this study may be of benefit the following stakeholders:

1.6.1 Policy Makers

The findings in this research could be of help to the Japanese policy makers, and could help improve the efficiency of ODA to Africa, provide a more coherent foreign policy for peacekeeping and peacebuilding, and increase the promotion of human security through TICAD.

1.6.3 Researchers and Scholars

The influence of human security on foreign policy in this research may be useful to other researchers and scholars in the field of international relations in both the academia and professional sectors providing a good stepping stone for further research and studies.

1.7 Scope and Limitations of the Study

The first important limitations are time and space, since this study must be completed within a certain time span and it is limited to a certain length. This thesis is also limited since not all aspects of human security can be covered in the scope of this study within different political and economic contexts, for example all countries within the Southern African Development Community (SADC).

Another important limitation is the fact that only Japan’s foreign policy to Africa will be analyzed in terms of how human security has influenced it. A further limitation is that not all African states that receive ODA from Japan can be discussed. Since the concept of
human security is relatively new, the literature on the subject is relatively limited, in
comparison to other areas of studies in IR, where a fuller body of knowledge exists.

A further important limitation is the fact that some literature is only available in Japanese
and not English, which is the primary language in which this study is conducted.

The analytical component of this study will only focus on Japan’s foreign policy on human
security since 1998 until recently, since the concept was only then recognized by the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA). The focus of the study will also solely be on Japan’s
foreign policy, and will not include a discussion of other influential Asian countries, for
example, China which is a major political and economic role player in Africa.

1.8 Definition of Terms

1. Human Security

There is no universal definition of human security. The influential conceptualization of
human security was published in the 1994 UNDP Human Development Report, an annual
publication of the UNDP that explained human security as the freedom from want and fear
(Paris, 2001: 89). In this study, human security can be understood as a state of existence,
in which the primary material needs are met, and therefore meaningful contribution and
participation in social life and communities can be realized. However, human security
cannot solely be understood as meeting just physical needs, freedom from predatory power
structures, whether they are global, national or local is also essential for human security.
Some indicators of human security include infrastructure, human resource, health and
education development.
2. Official Development Aid

This term refers to official development assistance and was coined by the Development Assistance Committee of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development to measure aid (Thomas, 1999: 3). In this study, ODA refers to the financial and technical assistance that Japan provides to African countries as part of economic cooperation.

3. Foreign Policy

The term foreign policy refers to the self-interest strategies chosen by the state to safeguard its national interests and to achieve goals within its international relations milieu (Fukushima, 1999). Therefore, in this study, Japanese foreign policy consists of the strategies used by Japan in her African relations. TICAD, ODA and peacekeeping missions are some of the Japanese foreign policy instruments towards Africa.

4. Peacekeeping Operation

A peacekeeping operation is led by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, and works to create the conditions for lasting peace in a country torn by conflict. A peacekeeping operation consists of military, police and civilian personnel, who work to deliver security, political and early peacebuilding support (MOFA, 2005). In the study, the term peacekeeping operation refers to the Japanese peacekeeping missions in African conflicts in terms of troops contribution and humanitarian ODA.
CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 Introduction

Official development assistance (ODA) is a key feature of Japan’s foreign policy to the developing world. However, the significance of Japanese ODA to African countries has been neglected by scholars in the past, since most of the emphasis has been placed on ODA to Asian countries. Over the last decade, Japan’s ODA policies have caused much controversy because of increasing aid cuts and domestic pressures for the transparency and effectiveness of ODA.

The aim of this chapter is to analyze the importance of ODA as a Japanese foreign policy tool, and more importantly how human security issues are addressed in Africa through the provision of ODA, to provide a background of the Japanese ODA and peacekeeping in Africa, and the general role TICAD plays in African development will be discussed. Towards the end of this chapter, the study will bring out the relationship between human security, peace keeping and peace building. This chapter will also explain the shift of Japanese foreign policy on peace keeping. Realism and human security approach will be the two theoretical approaches of this study.

2.2 Human Security

The literature on human security has grown considerably since the UNDP published the Human Development Report in 1994. This report included the various components that human security consists of, for example political and economic components. Although important in promoting further debate on human security, this report lacked a concrete
working definition for human security. Tuchman Mathews (1989) sensed the need for redefining security in a post-Cold war era of politics, and argued that global developments require a broader definition of national security to include resource, environmental and demographic issues. Paris (2001) followed a more critical approach towards the conceptualization of human security as a fixed definition and a paradigm shift in national security. He argued that human security needs to be redefined in order to be useful in research and policymaking, since scholars and analysts are not able to find consensus on exactly what human security entails.

The most complete recent document on the issue of human security is the Human Security Now report (2009) issued by the United Nations Commission on Human Security. This report addressed the most prominent human security issues such as poverty, disease and violent conflict which are relevant in the context of African development. In this report, many African case studies are also presented. The argument of this report is that immediate actions need to be taken in order to promote human security across the globe and in developing countries, where people are facing severe insecurities in their daily lives.

Muloongo, Kibasomba and Kariri (2005) provide case studies of seven countries in Southern Africa in which human security issues such as violent conflict and poverty have a tremendous negative impact on the development of these seven Southern African states. A point of departure of this book is that human security is gathering momentum as a new measure of global security. The key argument is that in the context of the seven different case studies, human insecurity takes on many forms and influences countries in different ways. Thomas and Wilkins (1999) provide a useful introduction to the concept of human security and its role in the global economy as well as the challenges that globalization
brings to developing countries. They argue that security should be explored from a human perspective. The theoretical framework that this book is based upon is the human security approach. It also analyses the meaning of human security in the African context by referring to African states such as Sierra Leone and Rwanda. Although not from neo-realist perspective, in the Southern African context Solomon (1996, 2003) has contributed to the literature on human security with the emphasis on poverty and conflict.

2.3 Japan-Africa Relations

Since South Africa’s democratization in 1994, as well as the decolonization of the last dependent African states such as Namibia, the international community was forced to restructure their foreign policies towards Africa. This was done to improve political and diplomatic ties and to pursue economic interests. This has given rise to a significant growth in literature on Japan’s foreign policy towards Africa. Morikawa (1997) provides an important background on the nature of Japan’s foreign policy towards Africa, and sheds some light on its diplomatic relations with South Africa. The main arguments of this book on the relations between Japan and Africa, is that Japan’s foreign policy serves its economic interests in Africa, since it was the largest ODA donor on the continent for several years.

Sono (1993) provided a historical background on the ties between Japan and Africa. The book examines the nature of African - Japanese contacts from the mid-16th century until 1993 with the focus on trade, aid, and diplomacy. Ampiah (1997) focused specifically on Japan’s relations with South Africa as well as investment and aid to countries such as Nigeria and Tanzania. The book is an empirical analysis of the political, economic and diplomatic factors influencing Japan’s relations with African countries. An important
The argument of this book is that Japan has used South Africa as a strategic diplomatic tool to broaden its economic horizons in Africa. Alden and Hirano (2003) have contributed to the more recent literature on the economic and political relations between South Africa and Japan, and what implications these hold for their respective regions. The book also illustrates the challenges facing the partnership between Japan and Africa, and the influence of ODA and investment in Africa. However, there is no mention of human security and very little on issues concerning development, which is a fundamental part of Japan’s foreign policy towards Africa, and more specifically South Africa.

2.3.1 Political and Diplomatic Relations

Historical interaction between the Japanese and the African continent is a unique phenomenon that originated in the 1500s when slaves from Africa were carried by ship to Nagasaki. Between 1547 and 1885, Japanese and Africans were experiencing contacts of extraordinary dimensions since trade increased because of the dramatic increase in maritime expeditions. These relations continued for approximately 100 years, but the anti-Christian and anti-Western attitude of the shoguns led to a decrease in the number of foreigners. From 1868 to 1912, which is known as the Meiji era, slaves of African origin were brought back to Africa by North American vessels (Sono, 1993: 14).

The Japanese set foot on the African continent only in 1586, during their maritime journeys towards Europe. According to Aicardi de Saint Paul (2002) it was only from the 17th century that a true significant relation developed between the Empire of the Rising Sun, and the “Distant Continent”. Jan van Riebeeck, the founder of the Cape of Good Hope in 1652, was based in Nagasaki under the flag of the Dutch East India Company and was Japan’s partner in Africa. Since the Cape of Good Hope became a regular stopover for the
Japanese whilst sailing to Europe or South America, the African continent became a unique destination for Japanese traders (Aicardi de Saint Paul, 2002).

Japanese most recent Africa policy resides in its political economy of growth and economic recovery in the post-war period after World War II. Although Japan only regained its independence in 1952, its post-war Africa diplomacy dates back to September 1951, when Japan signed a peace treaty with the Allied Nations of the Western bloc. These states included South Africa, Egypt, Ethiopia, and Liberia. A security treaty was also concluded with the United States (US) (Morikawa, 1997: 52). The Yoshida Doctrine, named after the former Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru, opened the door for Japan’s economic development and the start of its economic diplomacy (Alden, 2002: 366). Japan’s relations with Africa followed the pattern of changes of the hegemonic powers, first Britain and then the US’s power shift in global politics (Ampiah, 1997: 34).

Japanese diplomacy was formally declared by its foreign office in 1957. Japan’s main diplomatic goals were to promote its prosperity, to ensure the country’s security and to become the world’s leading economic power. In Japan’s 1957 Blue Paper, later called the Diplomatic Bluebook, the Japanese government declared the following basic principles of its diplomacy which formed the core of Japanese global diplomatic pacifism and international cooperation:

i) adherence to the principles of the United Nations;

ii) close cooperation with the Western countries (especially the US); and

iii) solidarity with the Afro-Asian nations. (Sono, 1993: 108)
As Japanese economic power grew and its political concerns widened, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) came to grasp the importance of its diplomatic relations with Africa, especially Sub-Saharan Africa. Japan also realized the power and importance of the UN in a post-war international arena, and that African votes carried a significant weight in the UN (Kazuo, 2003: 58). However, it is important to note that Japan was never formally involved in the search for African colonies, only for raw materials. A significant historical weakness of Africa-Japan diplomatic ties has been the absence of a broad framework for Tokyo and Africa within which they could conduct diplomatic relations (Sono, 1993: 14, 127). Thus, it can be argued that Japan’s earlier ties with Africa were much more based on economic interests than any political gains or influence on the continent.

2.3.2 Economic Ties: Imports and Exports

The inter-war period in Africa was a time when Japan attempted to take a niche for itself from a region where it was politically excluded from, but one which was increasingly becoming a lifeline for the country’s weakened economy. In the 1930s, the term “economic diplomacy” was first used within government documents and the Japanese media to describe the process by which Japan wanted to gain greater access to European dominated markets in Africa (Kitagawa, 2003: 39).

Prior to the 1960s, Japanese trade relationship with Africa was extremely limited because of distance, lack of historical ties and a perceived cultural gap. When trade between Japan and South Africa commenced, Japan’s exports consisted mainly of textiles, especially silk and cotton fabrics. It later evolved to diversified products such as buttons, potteries and porcelains. One of the main contributing factors that led to an increase in trade between Japan and Africa was when the Japanese government established the Yawatu Iron and Steel
Works, which began production in 1901. Although it was at first established for military purposes, the Yatawu in time played a significant role in Africa. Two years after the establishment of the company, trade between Africa and Japan dramatically increased: the first decade of the 18th century saw Japanese imports from Africa increase to 26.8% and the country’s exports to Africa for the same period increased to 33%. Although these facts are important, Japan’s contact with Africa was still limited in the context of international trade, because Africa was under European rule (Sono, 1993:80).

Japanese imports from Africa began moderately with raw essential materials such as cotton, cotton seed and wool, but by 1930, imports diversified and products such as caustic soda and soda ash were also imported. Most of the trade before the 1960s was textiles that were exported to Africa, thus Southern Africa was not considered as important. During the 1960s there was more involvement because of yen loans to countries in West and East Africa (Sharp, 2003:103).

During the 1960s Japan faced two problems in its attempts to promote exports to Africa. The first was the serious trade imbalance in its own favour with its main African trading partners, Nigeria and Kenya. The second hurdle was the application of Article 35 of the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT) that imposed tariffs on Japanese goods in Africa and in particular in the Francophone countries. The only country in which Japan did not encounter trade problems was Zambia, because of the massive importation of copper from the country. However, elsewhere in Africa the trade imbalance was a serious issue. As a result, Tanzania, Kenya and Uganda imposed tough import restrictions on Japanese goods (Morikawa, 1997: 64, 65). Nevertheless, it was not until the 1970s,
particularly with the 1973 oil crisis that Japan’s interest in Africa began to develop. This was mainly due to Japan lacking energy resources (Alden, 2002: 367).

Since Japan was South Africa’s leading trading partner in Africa for numerous years, especially during Apartheid, it is necessary to provide a brief overview of the trade relationship between the two countries. Both countries realized that the other presented an economic lifeline: Japan desperately needed South Africa’s raw materials and South Africa required a market to export to because of the numerous economic sanctions against the country as well as its international isolation due to its Apartheid policies. The bilateral trade between the two countries was worth USD 762.9 million in 1972, by 1979 it reached USD 2.3 billion. By 1980, it had grown to USD 3.5 billion. At this stage, Japan was South Africa’s fourth largest trading partner after the US, Britain and Germany, and in 1981 it was already South Africa’s second largest trading partner. In 1987 Japan emerged as South Africa’s leading trading partner, and faced the difficulty of the sanctions debate (Ampiah, 1997: 67, 68).

2.4 The historical foundations of Japanese ODA

Over the last six decades, Japan has not only been a significant provider of aid, but also a recipient of foreign assistance. The country’s first involvement with aid was when it received aid after its economy had nearly collapsed following World War II (Akiko, 2000: 153). Sato (2005) argues that Japanese ODA can be divided into five stages for a historical framework: the beginning of the Japanese aid diplomacy up to the first oil crisis (1954-1973); from the first oil crisis until 1980; the rapid expansion of Japanese aid (1981-1988); the period when Japan became a prime donor (1989-2000); and the last stage – the period when the Japanese government faced a fundamental shift in aid policy.
According to Akira and Yasutami (1998: 141, 142) the origins of Japanese aid can be traced back to the country’s membership in the Colombo Plan in 1954 which was a system of regional cooperation to promote economic and social development in South and South-East Asia among member countries of the British Commonwealth. Following the Colombo Plan, Japan initiated its technical cooperation program. The focus with respect to economic cooperation was on export credits and reparations, thus the ODA component was rather weak (MOFA, 2016). The fact that ODA was almost exclusively directed at Asian countries is equally important (Sato, 2005). Japan’s ODA gradually increased during the 1960s, and by the 1970s it accelerated. During the oil crisis in the 1970s, structural adjustment loans became the global trend for aid activities (MOFA, 2016).

In 1989, Japan achieved the status as the world’s leading donor of ODA, and this continued throughout the 1990s. Japanese leaders also pledged to become better “aid citizens” by not only supporting economic development, but also social and political reforms in developing countries, including African countries. This was a significant foreign policy strategy of Japan to accentuate itself as an emerging middle-power. Japan’s new approach to aid was also welcomed by the members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), since Japanese aid aligned with the normative principles and qualitative standards of the OECD. The Japanese government only adopted a formal policy on developmental aid in June 1992, emphasizing human rights and democratization (Hook & Zhang, 1998: 1051).

Cornelisen (2004: 118) argues that the expansion of Japan’s aid program can be understood as the consequence of two factors: firstly, Japan’s rising economic importance was influenced by the immense pressure from the US for international burden sharing, and
Japan used its aid programs in such a manner to withstand this pressure from the US. Secondly, aid was a key element of Japan’s middle-powership which was increasing rapidly at that stage, along with the country’s heightened activism in multilateral organizations.

A significant difference that has been noted between ODA to Asian countries and ODA to Africa is that other than the Asian ODA which was in most part politically motivated, ODA to Africa was partly provided to serve Japanese economic interests (Amphiah, 1997: 56). However, Japanese policies towards Africa were systematically adjusted as it adopted the human security approach and humanitarian concerns also played a more decisive role.

2.5 Japanese - African ODA Policy

2.5.1 What is ODA?

Many forms of economic assistance to developing countries exist. What distinguishes ODA from other forms of aid is that its commitments are undertaken by governments with concessionary elements with much lower interest rates along with an extended repayment period for recipients. ODA is distinguished by the “grant element”, which is 100% in the case of ODA, whilst it is 0% in the case of a commercial loan with an interest rate. Aid cannot be labelled ODA unless the grant element is over 25% (Akiko, 2000: 153).

In sum, ODA can be classified in two ways: firstly, it can be classified as a grant or loan. This depends on whether it involves the repayment of the principal and paying interest. ODA can also be classified as being on a multilateral or bilateral basis. This depends on whether the flow of the funds is directed to a specific country or to an international organization (Akira & Yasutami, 1998: 163). In the case of Japan’s ODA to Africa, it has
mostly been bilateral. Akira and Yasutami (1998: 85, 86) provide the requirements for ODA which further distinguishes it from other forms of aid and official flows to recipients:

i. ODA must be administered by a government or government agency;

ii. it has the main objective of promoting the economic development and welfare of the developing world (military aid is not included); and

iii. ODA has conditions that do not impose an extensive repayment burden on developing countries.

Akira and Yasutami (1998: 165) also identified the three different forms of ODA namely grant aid, technical cooperation as well as government loans (yen loans). In the African context, Japanese ODA has mostly taken the form of grant aid and yen loans.

2.6 Human Security as an Important Element of Japanese Foreign Policy through ODA

The Japanese government has been faced with several different approaches to broaden the concept of human security in its foreign policy since the 1950s. The MOFA first adopted an explicitly UN centered diplomacy and later Japan participated in the Bandung Conference which promoted the concept of humanity in conditions of a bipolar struggle. Finally, Japan attempted to introduce the concept of comprehensive security by providing ODA and diplomatic moderation in its relations with states through the Middle East and Asia. In the African context, Japan has been relatively successful in terms of placing more emphasis on the concept of human security through its financial grants and technical assistance to several African countries (Gilson & Purvis, 2003: 193).
Japanese security policy is also firmly based on its security cooperation with the US, and has formulated its foreign policy goals according to the US example (Edström, 2003: 220). In terms of Japan’s objectives concerning ODA as an important part of its foreign policy, the ODA Charter specifies the objectives clearly in the first section. It restates the government’s commitment to support social and economic infrastructure development, human resource development, institution building in developing countries as well as addressing global issues such as HIV/AIDS, famine and poverty (Sunaga, 2004: 8).

Hook and Zhang (1998: 1052) argue that in terms of economic and political motives, two Japanese aid policy discourses can be identified, namely the MOFA and the MITI (Ministry of International Trade and Industry). These two discourses in Japan’s ODA administration can be summarized as follows: the MOFAs prominent goals in terms of ODA is the promotion of Japanese international diplomacy, the improvement of economic and social conditions in poor nations, implementing agencies such as the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) and the Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JIBC) through ODA loans, and lastly to have jurisdiction over UN agencies. In contrast to this, the MITI is focused on the promotion of Japanese economic interest through the expansion of trade and investment and to assist the development of environmental industries and implementing agencies such as JICA (Kawai & Takagi, 2004: 261).

In the context of post-Cold War politics, and Japan shortly becoming the world largest aid donor thereafter, the MOFA discourse has proved more successful in Japanese policy making concerning ODA. The key reason for this is that its emphasis on promoting the concept of human security and promoting development in developing countries, proved more relevant. This is because Japan has been under increasing pressure for the reform of
its aid policies. A second reason why the MOFA discourse is more appropriate is because Japanese recent foreign policy strategy in terms of providing ODA, also have important political goals in conjunction with economic interests. Thus, Japanese aspiring new role in global politics has also acquired the MOFA approach.

States have had different approaches in addressing the concept of human security through their foreign policies, because of its ambiguity. It was only in 1998 in a speech by former Prime Minister Obuchi in Hanoi that human security was established as a key element of Japan’s foreign policy (Edström, 2003: 212). There is a clear contrast between the Japanese and Canadian governments (both are considered as middle powers) understanding of the concept. Their foreign developmental initiatives have thus also differed as a result of this, we shall discuss this further in chapter 4. Human security can also be considered as a political leitmotif, which has provided a coherent normative framework for Japan’s foreign policy (Werthes & Boshold, 2006: 22, 24).

2.7 The Role of TICAD in Promoting Human Security and Development in Africa as part of Japanese Foreign Policy

The Tokyo International Conferences on African Development (TICAD) have been instrumental in Japanese – Africa policy in promoting development through the concept of human security by encouraging trade and investment to the continent. The significance of TICAD for this study is that it has been a complementary process to ODA for African countries. The TICAD process was launched in 1993 to promote policy dialogue on development between African leaders and development partners and is based on two dual principles: the ownership of African leaders in conjunction with international partnership (UNDP, 2003).
The different approaches adopted to deal with the key issues at the TICAD conferences have been South-South cooperation, human security and respect for African diversity (Diplomatic Bluebook, 2016: 123). In terms of TICAD and Japan’s Africa foreign policy, Lehman (2005: 423) notes that since the early 1990s, Japan has been the only developed country to consistently hold major international conferences focused on African development. This is significant since Japan only provides 10% of its ODA to Africa. It can thus be argued Japan’s strategy is to implement the new ODA Charter policies through TICAD in order to direct a new way forward for ODA to Africa, but also to secure its diplomatic and economic interests.

2.8 The Relationship between Human Security, Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding

Rose (2000: 123) defines peacekeeping as “activities that ensure international peace and security”. Sato (2005) argues that the concept of peacebuilding only became widely known with the publication of two related reports, the Agenda for Peace in 1992 and a report by former UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali. Both these concepts have a direct relationship with the concept of human security in that if international peace and security is threatened in any way, there will be an increase in human insecurity, whether in a certain region, continent or globally. During civil wars and conflict situations in African countries, very little human security exists for citizens since they are deprived from all the components that make up human security as defined by the 1994 UNDP report: economic security, food security, health security, environmental security, personal security, community security and political security. Thus, the argument can be made that there is an important relationship between peacekeeping, peacebuilding, and promoting the human security of the people of a specific country.
Failed African states which have suffered because of ongoing conflict, as noted by Solomon (2003: 1), have lost their ability to successfully govern, and in many instances, have become a serious threat to regional and global peace and stability. Ethnic conflicts, poverty and conflict over economic benefits, and the lack of governing functions to solve these issues, have formed the basis of many African conflicts. Thus, humanitarian aid in support of development, reconstruction and democratization through ODA as provided by Japan in the cases of Mozambique and Sudan can play an important role in resolving these conflicts. This can be done in addition to military and political methods employed by the UN Peacekeeping Operation (PKO) in conjunction with peace mediation and preventative diplomacy (MOFA, 2016).

The importance of ODA in peacekeeping operations can be explained by the human security approach, since it argues that the state is not the sole provider of security to its citizens, and that other actors can contribute to improve human security issues on foreign territory, for example NGOs. According to the human security approach it is also important to understand other issues i.e. conflict, that threaten human security.

The Human Security Now (2009: 33) report proposes the following policy measures to be followed by the international community when intervening in conflicts and contributing to peacekeeping operations in order to increase the human security of the civilians involved:

i. human security should be mainstreamed in the agendas of international, regional and national security;

ii. respect for the principles guiding humanitarian action is essential when developing comprehensive strategies linking the political, military and humanitarian dimensions of protecting people in conflict;
iii. upholding human rights and humanitarian law is essential in protecting and empowering people in conflict;
iv. concerted efforts are required to disarm people and fight crime;
v. violent conflict must be prevented and mitigated in collapsed states and contested territories, while fully upholding all rights; and
vi. the right of each person to a nationality should be respected, and measures are needed to ensure effective citizenship, a condition for attaining human security.

These measures indicate the importance of the relationship between peacekeeping and upholding certain principles to promote human security. It also signifies the subsequent awakening and realization on the part of civil society and the international community of the importance of non-state security threats that civilians face in conflict situations.

2.9 Japanese Foreign Policy on Peacekeeping: The Shift from Pacifism to an Advocate of Human Security

In the International Peacekeeping Law of 1992, Japanese forces or so-called Self-Defense Forces (SDFs) were allowed for the first time since 1945, to embark on foreign missions since the 1952 law (Article 9 of its Constitution) prohibited this. It also stipulated that Japan was not allowed to have military forces, which was interwoven within the fundamental anti-militarism political culture of Japan following the bloodshed of World War II (Zisk, 2001: 21, 22). Japanese foreign policy in terms of peacekeeping missions had been characterized by pacifism following World War II. Zisk (2001) defines pacifism as the belief that any violence, including war, is unjustifiable under any circumstances, and that all disputes should be settled by peaceful means. However, the last fifteen years have seen
a significant shift from pacifism to an increase in partaking in humanitarian operations, mostly in the form of technical assistance and logistical support.

The first important controversy since 1945 concerning Japanese military role in the international community came during the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990, when President George Bush Sr. recognized Japanese constitutional constraints, especially in terms of its ‘non-bloodshed’ policy towards conflict. Soeya (2005: 104) also argues that Japan’s steady progress to increase participation in international and human security issues, has to be understood in the context of the US-Japan alliance. Nevertheless, Japanese quest for a more significant role in global affairs led to a consensus developing among the public and politicians, that Japan should play a more active role in maintaining international peace and security (Ishizuka, 2005: 67, 68). Akiyama (2004: 6) also argues that the Japanese government needed to adjust its foreign policy architecture to respond to and take advantage of emerging issues and new threats in the post-Cold War period. In this regard, African conflict has provided an important diplomatic opportunity for the Japanese to promote human security.

Since the International Peace Cooperation Law was enacted in 1992, Japan has been increasingly more active and cooperating in peacekeeping missions, humanitarian relief operations and election monitoring activities through the UN (MOFA, 2015). This law was a result of the increasing international criticism of Japan’s security policy during the 1991 Gulf War. Consequently, the argument can be made that the Gulf War had a profound impact on Japanese foreign policy in terms of peacekeeping, and steered it into a new direction. An important question can be raised of Japan’s shift in roles from passive
observer to a more active contributor to peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations since the Gulf War.

Ishizuka (2005: 67) argues that the answer lies in a Liberalist paradigm, in terms of Japan being an advocate of human security. One can also argue that the MOFAs decision to not only make financial contributions to peacekeeping missions, but also a human contribution, with the focus on human security, can be explained by the human security approach. This is because Japan made the shift to recognize that civilians have human security needs during conflict. However, most importantly that conflict is one of the single most prominent threats to human security (Ishizuka, 2005: 67, 70).

The International Peace Cooperation Law of 1992 included the five principles for the participation of a Japanese contingent in peacekeeping missions. These principles have been the center of controversy in Japan’s peacekeeping role via the UN, due to its restrictive nature:

i. agreement on the ceasefire shall have been reached among the parties to conflict;

ii. the parties to the conflict, including the territorial states, shall have given their consent to deployment of the peacekeeping force and Japanese participation in the force;

iii. the peacekeeping force shall maintain strict impartiality, not favoring any party to the conflict;

iv. should any of the above requirements cease to satisfy the Government of Japan, it may withdraw from the contingent; and

v. use of weaponry shall be limited to the minimum necessary to protect the lives of personnel etc.
In the context of African conflicts, these principles are not appropriate in their entirety: in terms of the first principle, it is usually only when a conflict nears the end when parties agree on a ceasefire, thus Japanese contribution would be minimal during the peacekeeping process. In many African conflicts, it is often the government and a liberation movement which are at war, therefore the likelihood of all the parties giving their consent to the deployment of forces within their borders are extremely small. Principle five is the most restrictive principle since weapons are exclusively used to protect personnel. The implication of this is that the SDF can never partake in any real peacekeeping force. An example of this restrictive nature will be provided in the case of Mozambique in chapter 4.

Japan is considered a middle-power in international relations because it is a wealthy country that exercises regional influence. Although it was considered as the second largest economy in the world after the US, it lacks the military power and diplomatic influence to be a true global power, and consequently its policies on peacekeeping are particularly interesting (Zisk, 2001: 22). Until the mid-1990s, Japanese involvement in Africa’s conflicts was limited to humanitarian assistance, mostly through the UN and the sharing of the financial burden of UN activities on the continent.

A key reason for Japan not initiating any diplomatic measures for conflict prevention and resolution, is that firstly, Japan did not have any vital interests in Africa, and secondly because it is not allowed to use military forces in international relations (Ochiai, 2001: 42). To compensate for this, Soni (1999) argues that Japan has chosen to follow the strategy of “niche diplomacy”, often employed by middle-powers. Niche diplomacy takes into consideration factors such as national interest and financial constraints. Middle-powers
such as Japan then advocate that countries should concentrate their resources in a specific area, in order to best generate returns, rather than trying to cover the entire field.

In this context, the concept of human security is relevant, since it is the Japanese chosen strategy of niche diplomacy and it does not involve partaking militarily in any UN missions. Despite this, Japan is still allowed to partake in humanitarian projects, which is also unique to its foreign policy since no other country has advocated the concept of human security as much as Japan has over the last decade. From a Structural Realism point of view, where the state is viewed as the primary provider of human security, Japanese behavior is explained by its need to secure a powerful position in global politics, by being a provider of security, in national, regional and international terms.

In the Diplomatic Bluebook of 2016, the MOFA states that Japan currently follows a comprehensive approach to conflicts. Japan believes that to resolve conflicts permanently and to lead affected regions and countries to sustainable reconstruction, it is necessary for the international community to unite in order to promote efforts at a consolidation of peace approach. This approach is composed of the following three stages:

i. promotion of peace processes;
ii. securing of domestic stability and security; and
iii. the restoration of the peaceful lives of people.

Taking these three stages into account, Japan still chooses to follow a ‘non-bloodshed’ approach by focusing on different aspects of human security, such as political and economic stability for people to live in a secure environment. To support these principles, Japan has used diplomatic means such as ODA to put forth efforts in conjunction with
organizations such as the UN, other member states and NGOs (Diplomatic Bluebook, 2016: 151). These initiatives in the cases of Mozambique and Sudan will be discussed in more depth in Chapter 4.

On the MOFAs website, its official foreign policy on peacekeeping is stipulated as follows:

Japan’s policy is to actively contribute to realizing the peace and stability of the international community. Based on past experiences and achievements, Japan will continue to coordinate with international organizations, other donor countries, the domestic private sector and NGO’s to develop human resources who will be able to perform on the ground (MOFA, 2016).

During recent years, the international community has recognized the importance of comprehensive conflict prevention and peacebuilding. These two terms do not only refer to conflict resolution and ending conflicts as such. It also includes the process of eliminating the causes of conflict, preventing it from worsening, promoting their early resolution, and avoiding their recurrence through achieving social stabilization and restoration following the conclusion of the peace agreement. Japan has thus far actively supported the consolidation of peace and nation building in various African countries (Diplomatic Bluebook, 2016: 152).

This study can contribute to an understudied aspect of the relations between Japan and Africa, by assessing the influence of human security on Japanese foreign policy towards Africa.

2.10 Theoretical Framework

The two theories adopted by this study are realism and human security approach. Within international relations (IR), the concept of human security has mostly been developed from
the vantage of two main theoretical perspectives. The first is an approach based on a Neo-Realist framework as in the work of Barry Buzan, which maintains an emphasis on the primacy of the state within a broadened conceptualization of human security. It is often referred to as the “new security thinking”.

The critical human security approach as in the work of Ken Booth (1994) which is rooted within the pluralist theory of international politics represents the other end in this discourse. This approach is based on a set of assumptions that attempt to dislodge the state as the primary referent of security, and places more emphasis on non-state actors (Naidoo, 2001). Booth also argues that redefining security requires that the concept should be broadened both horizontally and vertically (Solomon & Cilliers, 1996). Both theoretical approaches have been selected to provide a more complete discussion on the new security debate.

Realism has been selected to better comprehend the complex foreign policies and relations between Japan and Africa. Although there are many versions of realism in IR, they all share the following basic characteristics: firstly, the main actors in realism are states who want to secure their own survival and security. Secondly, the nature of the system in which states find themselves are anarchical, thus there is no central government that can control states. Thirdly, the ‘power security’ principle is the leading mode of interaction. Fourthly, although for some states defensive security is a primary goal, other states will become predators and force concessions from a weaker power. Lastly, internal politics and external politics are considered to be separate (Nicholson, 1998: 67, 68).

There is general consensus that the work of Kenneth Waltz has been the most influential work in the neo-realism spectrum. He introduced the notion of the structure of the international system. This is based on the assumption that states’ desire for security is
bound by the anarchic structure of the international system (Brown & Ainly, 2005: 44, 45). Structural realism which was originally developed by Waltz and further developed by Barry Buzan, Richard Little and Charles Jones, who are all respected authors in IR.

According to Buzan et al (1993: 10-13) there are three important elements that signifies structural realism as an extension of the realist tradition. Firstly, there is a continued insistence on the dominance of the political sphere. Secondly, the state is still considered as the most important actor in the international system. It must be emphasized that this does not close the theory to other units or actors, which is important for the context of this study. Other actors, for example, organizations such as the UN are also considered important.

Lastly, the close linkage between units and structure not only defines the continuity between structural realism and the traditional realist assumptions, but opens the way to a much more multi-sectoral system than that offered by neorealism. Buzan also argues that the militaristic approach to security that dominated the security discourse during the Cold War was ‘simple minded’ and led to the underdevelopment of the concept. Buzan includes political, economic and social perspectives of the international system, the state and the individual. Buzan’s analysis provides the most extensive contemporary examination of human security from a state-combined perspective (Naidoo, 2001).

In order to gain a better understanding of human security in the African continent and how this has influenced Japanese foreign policy towards Africa, the human security approach has also been selected. It involves a fundamental departure from the orthodox security analysis, in which the state is the primary object (Thomas, 1999: 1, 2). The primary focus of the human security approach is human beings. This approach has two strands: firstly, it makes the argument that since the end of the Cold War there has been a range of different
security threats, which cannot be dealt with militarily by sovereign states. Secondly, it involves a normative argument which suggests that the end of superpower conflict has allowed the international community and states to adjust their policies to ensure a better life for the individual.

The human security approach also redefines the relationship between the state and its citizens. Sovereignty is redefined from the inherent right of a state, since it is something that is granted by the international community on behalf of the citizens of that state (McCormack, 2005: 4, 16). An important argument of the human security approach is that the security discourse must be understood as part of the capitalist global economy as well as associated global structures. This is because it has an immensely important impact on how states conduct their foreign policies, since human security threats come from the global political economy, and must thus be addressed therein as well (Thomas, 1999: 1, 2). States are mainly viewed in as the problem in terms of not providing sufficient human security to its citizens. Nevertheless, states are the primary actors who can improve human security within its borders. The reason why both the human security approach and realism will be used in this study is to have a more balanced theoretical framework since each has its strengths and shortcomings.

2.11 Chapter Summary

This chapter provides an overview of the previous research on the objectives under study. The chapter entails a historical perspective that explains the earlier ties of the Japan-Africa relations and the historical foundations of the Japanese ODA that shaped up the Japanese policy for African development. It also includes a review of the human security concept and TICAD with their roles in the Japanese foreign policy towards Africa. This chapter
also explores the relationship between human security, peace keeping and peace building and Japanese foreign policy shift of peacekeeping from pacifism to an advocate of human security, concluding with a theoretical framework of realism and human security approach for this study.
CHAPTER THREE

METHODOLOGY

3.1 Introduction

This chapter explains the research design, study area and sources of data, data collection and analysis techniques.

3.2 Research Design

The study adopts a mixed design, that is both qualitative and quantitative methods. When analyzing statistical data of the Japanese Official Development Aid pattern towards Africa, quantitative methods have been used. Similarly, qualitative data obtained from secondary sources were used to demonstrate the link between Japanese foreign policy towards Africa human security.

3.3 Study Area and Sources of Data

The study was conducted in Nairobi, Kenya. The study sources of data include academic journal articles, publications, books, media reports and statistics derived from studies conducted by respected authors in the field of international relations.

3.4 Data Collection

Data has been collected from documentary sources. This includes published materials from both foreign policy experts and government sources, including the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs that provided this research with both qualitative data (policy framework, range of human security, TICAD objectives and the nature of peacekeeping operations in Africa) and quantitative data (aid amounts in USD) to achieve the study objectives.
3.5 Data Analysis

The research used content analysis that made replicable and valid inferences by interpreting and coding textual material. Through systematically evaluating texts (e.g., documents, oral communication, and publications), qualitative data was converted into quantitative data to establish a pattern of Japanese ODA towards African countries and the relevance of human security concept in the Japanese foreign policy.

The mean formula in descriptive statistics were also used to represent quantitative data into manageable forms of mean ODA figures. Transforming the data on Japanese ODA towards Africa into mean and cumulative levels and the mean Japanese ODA disbursements to Sudan peacekeeping operations. Data is presented in tables and graphs.
CHAPTER FOUR

RESULTS AND FINDINGS

4.1 Introduction

Over the last decade, Japanese ODA policies have caused much controversy because of increasing aid cuts and domestic pressures for the transparency and effectiveness of ODA. The aim of this chapter is to analyze the importance of ODA as a Japanese foreign policy tool, and more importantly how human security issues are addressed in Africa through the provision of ODA. Since the TICAD process provides a structural framework for development aid to Africa, the significance of all TICAD meetings and the general role TICAD plays in African development are discussed.

In this chapter, the importance and nature of Japanese peacekeeping in Africa to promote human security, the role of Japan in multilateral organizations to promote peacekeeping and peacebuilding in Africa are discussed. Together with ODA, peacekeeping has been one of the most important pillars of Japanese – Africa policy to promote human security on the continent. ODA and peacekeeping also go hand in hand since most peacekeeping operations for humanitarian and technical assistance are funded by ODA. The reason for this is that peacekeeping has become increasingly important to Japan’s policy towards developing countries. This is mainly because the post-Cold War era has brought new types of conflicts which pose threats to human security. This has thus brought along a significant shift in Japanese foreign policy towards peacekeeping from pacifism to an advocate of human security.
4.2 Japanese ODA Policy for African Development

Throughout its aid policy Japan has emphasized agricultural, rural and human resources development. Japan’s has contributed to these different spectrums of development through technical assistance, emergency aid and crisis relief (Sono, 1993: 198). However, Japanese Cold War aid policy to Africa was mainly to serve its economic interests. In the late 1980s, Japan began to focus on poverty alleviation and meeting basic human needs in African countries, in conjunction with using aid as a strategic economic policy instrument. Thus, humanitarian concerns were carrying some weight in Japanese foreign policy objectives. Japan also began to use aid to encourage recipient countries to adopt positive approaches to democracy and good governance which promotes the concept of human security (Eyinla, 1999:413)

The MOFA announced its intention to revise the ODA Charter in December 2002. There were two principal reasons for this: first, to reshape Japanese ODA mandate to incorporate new ideas in terms of development since there were new challenges concerning global politics and economics following the end of the Cold War. Second, the government had to respond to domestic demands for a more solid ODA framework. A prominent feature of the new ODA policy making process was that several stakeholders such as political parties, intellectuals, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), business people and donor countries were included in dialogue. In August 2003, the Japanese government officially announced the reform of the ODA Charter. The main objective of the revised Charter is to “contribute to the peace and development of the international community, and thereby to help ensure Japanese own security and prosperity”. The Charter stated that the human security approach should be followed to address issues such as threats of conflict, natural
disasters and infectious diseases (MOFA, 2016). Figure 4.1 illustrates the importance of the different ODA policies and related projects.

Figure 4.1: Japanese ODA Policy Framework

The main function of the ODA charter as the top-level policy is to clarify the philosophies and principles of Japanese ODA. Second is the Medium-Term Policy on ODA, which is the guideline that lasts for three to five years. Next are the Country Assistance Programs, which provide the guidelines for implementing assistance for some recipient countries. Lastly, individual projects are used to ensure the efficient and effective implementation of ODA (Diplomatic Bluebook, 2016: 200).
4.2.1 ODA to African Countries

Japanese aid to Africa commenced in 1966 when the first government loan was made to Uganda (Sono, 1993: 1999). Aid payments followed shortly thereafter to Kenya, Nigeria and Tanzania. Until the late 1960s Africa still received only 1% of Japanese total aid and at the beginning of the 1970s less than 2% of all Japanese aid disbursements were directed to Africa. Nevertheless, ODA to Africa increased significantly from 1974 onwards. By 1980 10% of Japanese ODA budget was direct towards African countries (Cornelissen, 2004: 118).

When the Japanese Foreign Minister toured Ghana, Nigeria and Zaire in 1974, he announced that Tokyo would double African aid to 5.2% of its total aid. Japanese aid to Africa rose steadily to 18.9% in 1980 (Nester, 1991). From 1970 - 1980, bilateral aid to Africa increased nominally 27.5 times, whilst Japan’s national budget increased nominally only 5.3 times (Sato, 2005). Between 1983 and 1987 Japanese ODA doubled to Africa from US$ 286 million to US$ 593 million. How did Tokyo determine whom to provide ODA to up until the late 1980s? As its aid became increasingly united during this time, Japanese economic interests, especially natural resources played an important role in terms of where ODA was directed (Nester, 1991).

During the Cold War period, Japanese aid policy towards Africa was wholly devoted to three objectives as identified by Eyinla (1999: 413):

i. To complement and reinforce the United States geo-strategic and ideological framework of the US-Japan cooperative strategic aid policy;
ii. This strategic aid policy served as an instrument for access to raw and mineral sources and for expanding export markets; and

iii. In the late 1980s, aid became a strategic diplomatic tool for pacifying African states who criticized Japan for being South Africa’s largest trading partner during Apartheid.

Thus, it can also be argued that during the 1980s Japanese aid policy (specifically to sub-Saharan Africa) was directed exclusively towards serving two main foreign policy objectives. Firstly, Tokyo wanted to promote positive political ties both within the context of the Cold War and to increase bilateral relations. A second important foreign policy goal was to repair relations with sub-Saharan Africa (Eyinla, 1999: 422). Table 4.2 illustrates Japanese cumulative ODA flows to the top ten African recipients cumulative to 1998.

Table 4.2 Top 10 African Recipients of Japanese ODA from 1984 to 1998

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Amount (Unit: US$ Million)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>140.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>94.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>87.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
<td>81.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>75.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Sudan</td>
<td>61.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>45.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>37.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>30.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>27.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Morikawa (1997:85)*

According to Masaki (2007), Japan has played a highly significant role in Africa. Between 1984 and 1998 the cumulative growth in net ODA disbursements from Japan was more than any other OECD country (Tuman & Ayoub, 2004: 44). By the 1990s, Japanese ODA to Africa had risen to US$ 580 million, 15.2% of its total aid disbursements, and the launch
of the new ODA charter also had an important impact on ODA to the continent (Alden, 2002: 367). One of the most significant aid grants that was made in the 1990s was Japanese aid package of US$ 1.3 billion to South Africa in 1994 after the Apartheid era ended (Cornelissen, 2004: 123).

The 1990s proved to contain more difficulties for Japanese foreign policy makers considering ODA. Firstly, the East Asian financial crisis of 1997 led to significant aid reductions by Japan, and secondly Tokyo had to start to punish aid recipients for neglecting conditionalities (Cornelissen, 2004: 118). Japanese ODA to Africa in the 1990s was characterized by a “carrot-and-stick” approach, in terms of the aid recipient’s adherence to the principles of the ODA Charter (Eyinla, 1999: 424).

In 1993 and 1994, Sierra Leone, Zaire, Kenya, Malawi and Nigeria were identified as violators of the ODA principles. Equally important, towards the end of the 1990s, Japan faced increasing domestic economic difficulties, and in 1996 its aid disbursement was cut by 35%. In 2001, disbursements were again cut by 27% over the previous year, and in 2002 again reduced by 10%. These reductions were due to an ODA policy review by a committee appointed by Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto (Africa Recovery, 1997). Thus, it can be argued that Japanese aid approach has taken a significant turn from the 1980s where the focus was on increasing amounts of aid. Due to domestic pressure the focus is rather now on the effectiveness of aid (Cornelissen, 2004:124). Table 4.3 illustrates the flow of ODA to African countries from 1979-1998. Those countries in bold are the top 10 recipients for this period:
Table 4.3: Mean Levels of Net Japanese ODA to Africa 1979-1998

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Mean Amount (Unit: US$ Million)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benin</td>
<td>9.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Botswana</td>
<td>5.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burkina Faso</td>
<td>5.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>5.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cameroon</td>
<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central African Republic</td>
<td>11.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congo</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Egypt</strong></td>
<td><strong>150.6</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gabon</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gambia</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ghana</strong></td>
<td><strong>60.1</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea-Bissau</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ivory Coast</td>
<td>21.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Kenya</strong></td>
<td><strong>86.2</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lesotho</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Madagascar</strong></td>
<td><strong>25.3</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>14.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritania</td>
<td>14.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritius</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Morocco</strong></td>
<td><strong>29.6</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>16.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>20.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>8.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Senegal</strong></td>
<td><strong>34.5</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sudan</strong></td>
<td><strong>26.8</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swaziland</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Togo</td>
<td>7.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>11.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Zambia</strong></td>
<td><strong>51.1</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>22.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Tuman & Ayoub (2004)*

As discussed, a constant and sufficient supply of natural resources is vital to Japanese economy. Taking the trends of Japanese ODA disbursements discussed so far into account,
it can be argued that Japan disbursed ODA to African countries in the past in return of the most natural resources. If this is a valid claim one can expect Japan to regenerate their ODA to African oil exporters, for example Angola (Tuman & Ayoub, 2004: 45). In 2010, Japan regenerates ODA to Angola. However, Tuman and Ayoub’s prediction is partly true as seen in table 4.4. Japan actually regenerated ODA towards Angola, but the net ODA disbursement to Angola decreases from 2010 – 2014, this nullifies the Japanese ODA and oil interest relationship. If Japanese ODA determinant was her interest in natural resources, then African oil producing countries i.e. Nigeria, Angola and Algeria would have been the top recipients of Japanese ODA.

Table 4.4 Net ODA Disbursements to Angola

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Net Amount (Unit: US$ Million)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>37.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>11.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>13.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>15.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>8.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: MOFA (2016)

In a study on Japanese ODA to Africa, Tuman & Ayoub (2004: 43) also mentioned that humanitarian interests as measured by human rights, democracy and food insecurity were main determinants in Japanese aid strategy and decisions. Their study tested for the effects of these new variables, which has not been examined previously in quantitative aid literature on ODA to Africa. Their study forms a strong contrast to the argument of this thesis, that Japanese national interests are a key determining factor of Japanese ODA disbursements. Although humanitarian concerns do play an important role in Japan’s ODA
foreign policy, it is not the only decisive factor. Economic and diplomatic interests still also have an immense influence.

Japan has achieved the status of the world’s largest bilateral ODA provider from 1991 up until 2000, and is currently the fourth largest provider of aid in the world (Kawai & Takagi, 2004: 257). In terms of the current ODA trends in Africa, Tanzania is one of the main recipients of Japanese aid. Since 2001 Japan has increased ODA to the country by nearly 500%. The main projects that were funded with aid were power sectors, infrastructure developments, agriculture and education (Business Times Tanzania, 2004: 2).

Table 4.5 Japan – Africa ODA Pattern from 2010 - 2014

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Year/Net Amount (Unit: US$ Million)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>104.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>36.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>93.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
<td>80.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>119.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>62.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>71.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>70.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>46.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Sudan</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: MOFA (2015)

Reflecting serious fiscal strains, in FY 2014 Japan reduced the ODA budget allocation in its general account from the previous fiscal year (MOFA, 2015). During the budget formulation process, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe instructed that the government make comprehensive adjustments beyond official quotas and place allocation priority on maximizing the effectiveness of ODA. As a result, higher priority was placed on the
environment, social development, and technical cooperation, and on UN agency programs in humanitarian fields.

The following initiatives have been made possible in Japanese top ODA recipients: The One Village One Product program which has been sponsored in conjunction with the UNDP in Malawi and Ghana. The program promotes products unique to a specific region and aims to encourage people to use local resources and traditional techniques, thus revitalizing the region. In Kenya, Japan has provided support for enhancing the Forest Bureau’s capability to promote the use of community forestry as part of Japan supporting the Green Revolution to promote human security by funding projects that are essential to the economy. In Uganda, the New Rice for Africa (NERICA) program has been initiated which places emphasis on increasing rice production and rice cultivation technology in sub-Saharan African countries (MOFA, 2006). In terms of other Japanese aid related activities, the role of the Japan Overseas Cooperation is particularly salient in Africa (Sato, 2005). These activities indicate that Japan is focusing on promoting human security, since it is addressing humanitarian issues, which forms a strong contrast to its Africa policies during the Cold War.

Under the fiscal austerity, Japanese ODA budget continued to decline over the past decades, recording a cumulative reduction recording a cumulative reduction of 38% from the peak level of FY1997. Because of this trend, the United States (US) replaced Japan as top donor country in 2001 for the first time since 1991. More recently, the UK surpassed Japan to be the second largest donor (on a net disbursement basis). Figure 4.8 shows trends of net ODA from G7 (Now G8) Countries 1985–2006 (net disbursement basis).
4.3 The Range of Human Security Concept

Because of the ambiguity in the concept of human security, states have different approaches in addressing this concept in their foreign policies. Both Japan and Canada are considered as middle-powers, however Werthes and Boshold (2006) explain that there is a clear contrast between the Japanese and Canadian governments understanding of the concept of Human Security. Japan interprets human security as the freedom from want that results from human and sustainable development. However, Canada’s understanding of human security focuses on protection from security threats.

Source: OECD/DAC (Development Co-operation Report 2006, CRS online database)
As a counter argument of where Japan is located in the spectrum of human security, Gilson and Purvis (2003: 200) argues that Japan can be criticized for abusing the human security agenda by adopting a pragmatic political approach, whilst it has to face up to domestic and external pressures. Adopting the concept of human security as central to their foreign policy, has been a strategy since the mid-1990s, as well as the domestic pressure for the more efficient implementation of ODA.

In terms of explaining Japanese foreign policy behavior in the context of providing ODA with the emphasis on human security, neo-realists have claimed that states do not only seek power, but also national economic interests which are important for both their domestic and global security. In the case of Japan, neo-realists have argued that Japan employs its foreign aid policy as an instrument to strengthen its national economy. An example would be that ODA to Africa has been used to create export opportunities for Japanese MNCs, since it commenced in the 1960s (Tuman & Ayoub, 2004: 45). However, the neo-realist perspective only explains one of Japanese motives for providing ODA, since humanitarian concerns also play an important role as explained by the human security approach.

4.4 The TICAD Process: Goals for Human Development focusing on Human Security

4.4.1 TICAD I

The Tokyo Declaration on African Development was adopted and the importance of economic development was affirmed by all stakeholders. The conference was held in Tokyo in 1993, attended by 48 African state representatives. The aim of the first conference was to illustrate the interests and commitment of the international community to African self-help efforts for economic reconstruction (Morikawa, 1997: 203). In terms of the results of the conference, for the African side, it had more symbolism than economic substance because TICAD I only illustrated the donor countries intentions. They avoided any large-scale pledge of aid and emphasized the self-help principle and recommended SAPs for the rebuilding of African economies. Japan obtained direct diplomatic results from TICAD I - it displayed to the international community its willingness to play an important role in Africa. Although Japan would never admit to it, the conference created a positive climate for the country’s campaign for a permanent seat on the Security Council (Morikawa, 1997: 204-206).

4.4.2 TICAD II

TICAD II was held in 1998, where the Tokyo Agenda for Action (TAA), a comprehensive implementation agenda was adopted. The period between TICAD I and II represented a different financial and geo-strategic environment since the end of the Cold War presented new issues to countries that provided ODA, as well as the demands of the East Asian crisis, which is significant in the case of Japan (Lehman, 2005: 430). The prioritized areas for this conference were the following:
i. Social development: education, health, gender equity;

ii. Economic development: agriculture, industry, support for the private sector; and

iii. Foundations for development: good governance and conflict prevention.

(MOFA, 2003)

In terms of the successful implementation of the TICAD II goals, the emphasis was on realizing human-centered development based on the concept of human security. A plan was agreed at this conference to implement US$ 750 million over a five-year period to be able to meet the goals of the conference. Since the first goal of TICAD II was social development, it was also decided that US$ 2 billion would be disbursed to education sectors in low-income countries. The Basic Education for Growth Initiative (BEGIN) was then started for the education sectors of identified African countries.

Various other initiatives in Africa were also emphasized which was funded by the Trust Fund for Human Security through the UN and received financial support from the Japanese Government (MOFA, 1998). TICAD II was also important for Japan’s foreign policy because it provided the country with the confidence to initiate foreign policy endeavors or partnerships with other governments. In the African context, what made TICAD II significant for Africa is the fact that NEPAD was also brought into consideration and recognized for the first time by the MOFA (Lehman, 2005: 434). The most significant outcome of TICAD II was that the importance of human security was acknowledged in African development, and as a fundamental part of Japan’s foreign policy.
4.4.3 TICAD III

TICAD III was held on 29th September 2003 and the main agenda was peace and conflict resolution with the emphasis on human security. Other important themes that were discussed were governance, agricultural development, private sector development, infrastructure and human resources development focusing on education and health. Equally important, an explicit commitment was made to support NEPAD. The following extract of a speech by former Prime Minister Koizumi at the TICAD III conference illustrates Japan’s position on human security through the TICAD process:

Japan wishes to further dialogue with its African partners in order to address the question of how the people of Africa can become free from various threats against lives and human dignity including poverty, conflict and infectious diseases, in other words how Japan can contribute to human security and realize a society in which people can live with hope (TICAD, 2003).

TICAD III was a benchmark since 23 African heads of state attended, whereas in 1993 at the first conference only three attended (Katzenellenbogen, 2003: 3). Prime Minister Koizumi opened the conference by pledging US$ 1 billion to African countries which would be in the form of grant aid over five years (Inside Asia, 2003: 2). However, TICAD III was characterized by African delegates severely criticizing developed countries, especially Japan. This was because of earlier aid cuts to Africa. The developed world was also accused of lacking the political will to provide aid to Africa (Cornish, 2003: 1). South Africa played an important role at TICAD III, since President Thabo Mbeki courted for Japanese aid for Africa, as well as investment opportunities for Japanese businesses on the continent through the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) (DFA, 2002).
4.4.4 TICAD IV

TICAD IV was held in Tokyo on 28-30 May 2008. The main agenda was to strengthen the recent positive trends in Africa in both political and economic areas, concrete initiatives by the international community were discussed under the theme of: Towards a Vibrant Africa: Continent of Hope and Opportunity. Other important themes included to mobilize knowledge and resources of the international community in the core areas of: boosting Economic Growth, ensuring Human Security (includes achieving MDGs and consolidation of peace), and addressing environment/climate change issues.

4.4.5 TICAD V

Was held in Yokohama on June 1st - 3rd 2013. Under the basic concept of Hand in Hand with a More Dynamic Africa, active discussions took place on the direction of African development through the following themes, robust and sustainable economy, inclusive and resilient society and peace and stability. Reflecting the importance of growth led by the private sector, a dialogue with the private sector session for direct engagement between African leaders and representatives of Japanese private-sector was held for the first time at a TICAD plenary session.

4.4.6 TICAD VI

This is the most recent TICAD conference held on 27th August 2016 in Nairobi, Kenya. The main agenda was Advancing Africa’s sustainable Development agenda: TICAD Partnership for Shared Prosperity. Other important themes included promoting structural economic transformation through economic diversification and industrialization,
promoting resilient health systems for quality of life and promoting social stability for shared prosperity.

4.5 Consolidation of Peace Strategy

Japan has actively supported the consolidation of peace and nation building in various African countries (Diplomatic Bluebook, 2006: 152). The following diagram illustrates Japan’s assistance aiming toward consolidation of peace principles:

Figure 4.6: The Consolidation of Peace

Japanese assistance that aims toward consolidation of peace consists of the following three pillars:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Promotion of peace process</th>
<th>Securing of domestic stability and security</th>
<th>Humanitarian and reconstruction assistance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Through arbitration and mediation</td>
<td>• Through UN Peace Keeping Operations</td>
<td>• Assistance for the repatriation and resettlement of refugee’s and internally displaced persons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Assistance for election</td>
<td>• Establish domestic security system</td>
<td>• Restoration of lifelines (basic infrastructure)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Disposal of anti-personnel landmines</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Diplomatic Bluebook (2006)

The idea of consolidation of peace was announced in 2002 by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, which is based as illustrated above on the peace process of security, reconstruction and humanitarian assistance. Based on this concept, Japan has provided support during conflicts for election preparations, media support, the reconstruction of local communities
and infrastructure development (MOFA, 2016). The three pillars of the consolidation of peace that have been identified are first to assist the process from conflict to reconstruction: this would include implementing measures such as assistance to refugees, de-mining and electoral assistance. Subsequently, the conflict settlement functions of African regional organizations are to be enhanced. The third and last step is conflict prevention at grassroots level by promoting the efforts for broad-based conflict prevention through regional and civil society (MOFA, 1998).

If one considers the three pillars, the emphasis is placed on human security, especially on issues that people who live in war-affected countries face in their daily lives. For example, under pillar two the focus is on establishing a domestic security system, the disposal of landmines and under pillar three, projects include assistance to refugee’s and the restoration of lifelines. Although in pillar one, the promotion of the peace process is emphasized in terms of the parties that govern it and those who were at war, the focus remains on promoting human security.

In an attempt by the MOFA to create and maintain solidarity between Japan and Africa, and to implement the three pillars of the consolidation of peace, a central initiative has been identified. To promote efforts to ensure steps so that peace would not regress during conflict prevention and the consolidation of peace. The recent trends in Japanese foreign military deployment (for example Iraq) illustrates that Japanese foreign policy towards international security has come to include not only participation in the traditional UN peacekeeping missions, but also in coalition-type missions (Isozaki, 2005). The September 11 terrorist attacks have also without a doubt brought on policy changes for the Japanese. This is because the global security structure experienced the most important shift since the
end of the Cold War and US security policy changes have impacted the US-Japan security alliance.

4.6 Japanese Peacekeeping Involvement in African Conflicts

4.6.1 Mozambique

Mozambique as a state became independent from Portugal in 1975, after a prolonged divisive anti-colonial war fought by the Mozambique Liberation Movement (Frelimo). One of the core reasons for Mozambique’s conflict is the fact that when Portugal granted Mozambique its independence, no provision was made for democratic elections. In 1977, the opposition party, RENAMO was born and its leader proclaimed the Second War of Liberation which initiated the civil war (Thomashausen, 2003: 273, 276, 277). The UN intervened only in December 1992 with the peacekeeping operation ONUMOZ that lasted until December 1994 (Diplomatic Bluebook, 2016: 154-155). However, the simultaneous dismantling of guerrilla and government forces and the creating of a single army severely compromised the peace process. The 1992 Rome Peace Accord envisaged a 30,000 man strong national army which would be drawn from both former guerrilla fighters and government troops. This was nevertheless viewed with suspicion by all parties involved (Albrecht, 2000: 131).

Following the Cold War, within Southern Africa, Mozambique was one of the countries for which Japan had to renew its foreign policy due to the significant change that took place within the global security structure (Alden, 2003: 113). From 1984 onwards, three major historical events in Mozambique attracted Japanese attention:
i. The Famine campaign from 1984-1985 caused by RENAMO in which 100,000 people died;

ii. The Anti-Apartheid movement since 1988: The Apartheid government’s policies towards Mozambique; and

iii. The participation of ONUMOZ dispatching SDFs in 1993.

(Sato, 1994:105)

In May 1993, six soldiers of the Japanese Self-defense force (SDF) arrived in Maputo to participate in ONUMOZ, and this marked Japan’s third participation in an UN peacekeeping mission (MOFA, 1996). What is the significance of all of this? Firstly, these soldiers were the first contingent of a group of 53 members to be dispatched to Mozambique, and secondly it was the first military force in Japanese history ever stationed in Africa. However, the MOFA has been criticized for its lack of understanding of the context of the Mozambican war, Japan viewed the African continent as distant and unfamiliar. Japanese assistance to Mozambique was also seated in the self-help principle, which is an important characteristic of its ODA to Africa (Sato, 1994: 105-106). The MOFA viewed the dispatch of SDFs to Mozambique as an opportunity to demonstrate its initiative through its policy of a contribution to the international community, and equally important to show that it was worthy of a permanent seat on the Security Council (Ochiai, 2001: 41, 42).

Between May 1993 and January 1995, Japan contributed to ONUMOZ by dispatching five people for headquarters service, forty-eight for transportation and coordination services and nineteen for election verification services over a period of eighteen months. In financial terms, Japan also contributed through the UNDP a total of US$ 1.6 million in 1999, this
included the assistance given to the Mine Clearance Project in the Gaza Province. The total cumulative cultural grant from 1975 until 2004 totaled at 120.2 million Yen (MOFA, 2015). In terms of peacebuilding and the focus on promoting human security, three teams of more than forty-five people were sent to the Golan Heights for road repairs, transportation and other administrative duties between February 1996 and August 1998 (Rose, 2000: 128).

Several practical difficulties were experienced by the SDF in ONUMOZ because of the fifth principle under the Japanese Peacekeeping Law, because weapons were only allowed to be used for self-defense. In one instance, the UN command feared that the political situation in the ONUMOZ mission could break down, and it was decided to prepare an emergency evacuation plan. According to the plan, the Japanese unit was ordered to take its turn in guarding the retreat. The SDF was forced to decline the order, because of the fifth principle. The entire plan had to be rewritten, much to the embarrassment of the supervising Japanese officers (Zisk, 2001: 28).

From a Structural Realism point of view, it can be argued that the Japanese did not send the SDF out of deep consideration or out of sympathy for the Mozambican people but rather because Japan was more concerned with its strategic position in the post–Cold War order, as well as its UN ambitions in terms of the Security Council (Sato, 1994: 100). An important criticism against Japan is the fact that its activities were mostly confined to logistics such as transport (Reliefweb, 2005). Nevertheless, Japanese peacekeeping assistance to ONUMOZ is highly significant because of the shift that it indicated in the MOFAs foreign policy towards peacekeeping.
Identity disputes and religion lies at the heart of Sudan’s ongoing civil war between the North and the South. Since its independence in 1956, the country has been caught up in a conflict in which more than 200,000 people have died, and more than 2 million have been displaced (Diplomatic Bluebook, 2006: 156, Sudan Tribune, 2007). Nantulya (2003: 105) argues that the complexity of the conflict situation in Sudan has contributed to the regional and international neglect of one of Africa’s longest and most devastating wars.

The main protagonists in this conflict are the successive Northern ruling elites and the Southern resistance forces. The key liberation movements are the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement and Army (SPLM/SPLA), as well as the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM). The Northern elite mainly view themselves as Arabic/Islamic, whilst those in the South are mainly Christians (2003: 105). According to the report Human Security Now, (2009: 29) in 2000 approximately only 60% of Sudan’s humanitarian needs were met by plights for humanitarian assistance to the international community.

The UN mission in Sudan (UNMIS) was dispatched in March 2005, since no former peace accords were successful (Diplomatic Bluebook, 2006: 155-156). A draft resolution called for a 10,000 strong peace force to back the peace accord (Reliefweb, 2005). The UN urged Japan to further participation in international peacekeeping operations, and requested that Japan take part in UNMIS. This was because of its continued ODA cuts to developing countries, in particular to Africa (Kyodo News International, 2005). Sudan, as in the case of Mozambique, has proven to be problematic for Japan’s foreign policy makers in the MOFA because it renounced the use of force after World War II. It has chosen to rather follow a path of technical assistance through ODA (ReliefWeb, 2005). In order to evade
the pressures from the UN for participation in UNMIS and the sending of SDFs in April 2005, Japan announced that it would provide financial support for the consolidation of peace in Sudan. US$ 100 million was promised and disbursed. In addition, US$ 10 million additional humanitarian assistance was disbursed. Table 4.7 illustrates Japan’s ODA disbursements to Sudan, based on the idea of consolidation of peace without partaking in the conflict, or sending SDFs:
### Table 4.7: Japan’s ODA Disbursements to Sudan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Project</th>
<th>Amount (Unit: US$ Million)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>April 2005</td>
<td>• Mine/UXO Survey, clearance, mine risk education</td>
<td>7.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Assistance to small-scale subsistence fishery</td>
<td>1.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Emergency Survey, Limited Mine Clearance and Explosive Ordnance Disposal in Darfur</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 2005</td>
<td>• Food aid for returning displaced persons to South Sudan and receiving local communities</td>
<td>0.93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Emergency provision of starter packs to returnees and vulnerable host communities in South Sudan</td>
<td>5.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Infectious diseases protection for children through UNICEF</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 2005</td>
<td>• Emergency road repair and mine clearance in South Sudan</td>
<td>9.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Return and reintegration of Sudanese refugees to Southern Sudan</td>
<td>5.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Humanitarian assistance for Sudanese IDP’s and Returnees in West Darfur</td>
<td>3.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Project for expansion of primary education in Southern Sudan</td>
<td>8.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Facilitating sustainable return of IDP’s in Sudan</td>
<td>4.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October/November 2005</td>
<td>• Food aid for displaced persons from Darfur in Sudan and Chad</td>
<td>4.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Grant aid for interim disarmament, demobilization and reintegration program</td>
<td>7.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 2006</td>
<td>• Emergency assistance for Hospital care program in Juba</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 2006</td>
<td>• Emergency assistance for supporting the AU’s initiatives concerning Darfur</td>
<td>8.67</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: MOFA (2006)
What the above table clearly illustrates is that through the principle of the consolidation of peace, Japan has implemented the three pillars as discussed earlier. This indicates a clear focus on human security, particularly if one considers that most of the initiatives in the above table are in the form of humanitarian assistance, specifically in terms of health care and food aid.

The projects in table 4.7 also imply that although Japan now focuses on promoting humanitarian issues such as health and refugee replacements through the concept of human security, the largest disbursements are still for projects involving technical assistance and infrastructure repair. Lastly, although Japan did contribute significantly in financial terms, it mostly worked through various NGOs. This includes UNICEF, the World Food Program (WFP) and international organizations such as the UN and the AU to do the groundwork in Sudan.

In July 2007, Japan announced that it was considering the possibility of dispatching SDFs to Darfur. This was in line with the planned launch of a joint peacekeeping operation by the UN and the AU. One of the key reasons why Japan changed its view on sending SDFs is because it was about host the G8 summit in 2008, and its Security Council ambitions still must be considered. Another reason why the Japanese have been hesitant to dispatch SDFs is because the conflict in Sudan does not meet Japanese five principles for partaking in peacekeeping operations in foreign countries, the principle of a cease-fire agreement by parties concerned (Sudan Tribune, 2007).
4.7 The Role of Japan in Multilateral Organizations to Promote Peacekeeping in Africa

4.7.1 United Nations

The fact that Japan only gained UN membership in 1956 means that up until the 1980s, Japan played a very low-key role in the organization (Rose, 2000: 122-124). This is very contradictory to the fact that Japan often proclaimed its adoption of UN-centered policy since it joined the UN (Ishizuka, 2005: 67). While becoming an economic power, and now with the fourth largest economy in the world, Japan has been a major financial contributor to the UN even though its participation and representation until the mid-1990s was extremely limited.

Japanese contribution to the UN’s peacekeeping efforts is a representation of its role in the organization: although Japanese membership to the UN implies that it partakes and assists in peacekeeping, Japanese contributions have remained financial in nature for mainly humanitarian assistance rather than deploying physical forces, as discussed in a previous section (Rose, 2000:122-124).

Japanese direct role in UN peacekeeping missions has been extremely limited, and the international community has continuously over the last decade called for Japan to expand this role through the UN. However, Japan has contributed immensely in advancing the concept of human security through the UN by promoting and establishing the UN Trust Fund for human security. This added significant strength to the capacity of the UN as a policy implementation system to advocate human security. The UNDP has also been an important forum through which Japan has contributed to development in peacekeeping
operations, funded by multilateral ODA. It portrays Japanese willingness to exercise active diplomacy via multilateral organizations for promoting its niche diplomacy, through the concept of human security (Akiyama, 2004: 13).

A key reason why Japanese human security approach has coordinated well with the UN as an organization, particularly in the context of peacekeeping is that the concept of human security has been an integral part of positive peace and especially provided peace movements in the 1980s with new direction. An Agenda for Peace by Boutros Boutros-Ghali furthered new thinking on human security, which also gained immense support from the MOFA (Peou, 2002). In June 2007, Japan was elected chair of the UN Peacebuilding Commission (MOFA, 2007). This is a clear indication that Japan still wishes to focus on peacebuilding rather than peacekeeping. Although it can be criticized for still not expanding its role in peacekeeping, Japan has at least adopted a leading role in UN peacebuilding.

Japanese participation in peacekeeping operations through the UN in Africa, has served its three most important foreign policy goals in a post-Cold War security structure:

i. Establishing itself as a global power, both in political and economic terms;

ii. Promoting its Security Council ambitions; and

iii. Creating its own niche diplomacy through promoting the concept of human security through its ODA to peacekeeping operations.

4.7.2 African Union

A fundamental part of Japanese foreign policy, under the principle of the consolidation of peace is its cooperation with international organizations to promote global peace and
security. As discussed, Japanese foreign policy is also multilateral in nature, especially in the context of its policies on peacekeeping. Although Japan has been participating in global conflict peace operations mainly through the UN, it has collaborated with the AU as a key partner whilst dealing with conflicts in Africa. The collaboration between the AU and Japan is a direct result of the TICAD process, which promotes partnership between Japan and Africa.

The AU has been the first recipient of Japanese assistance towards the efforts of African regional as well as sub-regional organizations for conflict response. Although the AU has been the main regional organization that Japan has supported in Africa, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) has also been a key player under the flag of the AU. Japan has assisted the efforts of the AU for conflict response in terms of financial and intellectual contributions. In 1994, Japan provided US$ 10 million to the AU through the UNDP which was Japan’s first financial contribution to AUs efforts for conflict response (Ochiai, 2001: 43, 44). Japan has also more recently provided the AU with US$ 19 million for efforts against the civil war in Darfur. UNMIS was high on the priority list of the AUs peacekeeping projects (Reuters, 2006). An example of Japan’s second type of assistance in terms of intellectual support was to host a high-level symposium on peace and conflict issues in order for the AU to exchange information and to further discussions on the topic with other regional organizations such as ECOWAS and SADC (Ochiai, 2001: 43, 44).

4.8 Chapter Summary

In this chapter, human security as an important element of Japanese ODA to Africa was discussed in the context of Japanese foreign policy goals. An overview of the TICAD goals,
and its significance in terms of ODA and human security since it indicated the most
significant shift in Japanese ODA policies, prior to the revision of the ODA Charter in
2003. What has been derived from this chapter by assessing the Japanese ODA patterns in
the African context is that it was mostly influenced by economic interests and diplomatic
considerations for a permanent seat on the Security Council. Japan has followed a different
approach than other developed countries, by focusing on human security to promote
development in Africa. In sum, the current focus of Japanese ODA is rather on quality than
quantity based on the concept of human security.

A review of the consolidation of peace approach, the important relationship between the
concept of human security and peacekeeping were also discussed, in the context of African
conflict. Japanese foreign policy on peacekeeping was analyzed, as many changes have
taken placed when it first deployed SDF forces in 1992. Finally, an overview of the role
Japan plays in multilateral organizations to promote peacekeeping and peacebuilding in
Africa through the United Nations and African Union.
CHAPTER FIVE

DISCUSSION, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 Introduction

This is the final chapter of this study. It consists of the summary, key findings, discussion, conclusion, recommendations and areas for further research.

5.2 Summary

The main aspect under investigation in this study was in which human security, both as a concept and principle, has influenced Japanese foreign policy towards Africa since 1998. Key research goals included how the concept of human security has influenced foreign policy elements such as ODA and peacekeeping. The study also focused on how human security as a political principle and goal of Japan’s foreign policy has affected the relations between itself and Africa.

In Chapter Two, a historical overview was given of Japanese relationship with Africa. The main purpose of this chapter was to provide a historical perspective that explains the earlier ties of the Japan-Africa relations and the historical foundations of the Japanese ODA that shaped up the Japanese policy for African development. The importance of ODA in Japan’s foreign policy towards Africa was discussed. It was also shown that the concept of human security subsequently influenced Japanese foreign policy concerning ODA following the end of the Cold War. Chapter Three discussed the methodological approach of this study, clearly explained the study adopted a mixed design using secondary sources of data.
Chapter Four provided an analysis and data of how human security has influenced Japanese changing security role after the Cold War in its participation in United Nations-led peacekeeping operations (PKOs). The initiation of the TICAD altered this to some degree. The purpose of this chapter was to analyze a specific Japanese activity in the new security paradigm where the state is no longer considered as the sole provider of security for its people. Equally important was to discern how Japan has adjusted to a new security approach since the International Peacekeeping Law was passed by the Diet in 1992.

5.3 Key Findings

The following aspects were highlighted concerning the history of Japanese relations with Africa: the end of the Cold War encouraged a new political relationship between Japan and Africa. This was due to the shift from a bipolar to multipolar security order which presented Japan with new diplomatic challenges. Although prior to this noteworthy economic relation had existed for more than three decades, economic activity between Japan and Africa was still limited. Japanese trade relationship with South Africa also formed the core of its relationship with Africa.

Adem (2001) summarized Japanese post-Cold War policy towards Africa appropriately when he argues that it should be understood as a function of interplay between economic power and asymmetric interdependence on the one hand and culture and diplomacy on the other. The latter aspect has posed many difficulties for the two key policymaking ministries of the Japanese government in terms of presenting a coherent foreign policy towards peacekeeping. This has been largely because the MOFA and the MITI have different economic and diplomatic interests at heart.
The most significant events that indicated a shift in Japanese foreign policy by introducing the concept of human security: firstly, the 1994 UNDP report had an immense influence on the MOFA, since Japan recognized the importance of human insecurities being addressed. The second TICAD meeting in 1998 is also relevant since the concept of human security was officially acknowledged as being central to African development. The revision of the ODA Charter in 2003 also indicated a significant policy shift, and human security was much more accentuated and accepted by the various government departments. The MOFA had the greatest influence in creating policies to promote human security.

The second aspect that emerged is that the key reason for Japan adopting the consolidation of peace policy to conflict was to avoid direct participation in peacekeeping, and rather chose to contribute to peacebuilding. The latter, it was contended, suits Japanese current foreign policy on security, which is without a doubt characterized by pacifism, as was illustrated through the Sudan case study. No conclusive findings were reached on Japan’s foreign policy on human security policies globally, since only African case studies were used. A study, in which international peacekeeping operations globally are assessed and how efforts to promote human security have influenced Japanese foreign policy, would be more complete in this regard. This was beyond the scope of this study.

5.4 Discussion

5.4.1 Challenges of Japanese ODA

Japanese ODA policy has been under critical review for three key reasons. First, the fiscal crisis is forcing the government to cut expenditures that are not deemed necessary. Now that many donors i.e. the U.S., UK and Canada are bolstering aid to achieve the United
Nations targets of 0.7 percent of GNI (Gross National Income) to support the realization of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), it is important for Japan to reverse the current declining trend and demonstrate its firm commitment to development assistance.

Secondly, the Japanese public is also experiencing aid fatigue. Domestic constituency for development assistance is weak, and amid fiscal austerity and widening income disparity within Japan, the public feels that the budget should be spent on services that benefit them more directly. So, views are divided over why and for what Japan should give foreign aid. The results of the latest opinion polls conducted by the Cabinet Secretariat (2007) show that a declining share of the public actively supports Japanese engagement in foreign aid. The share of those who responded that Japan should increase the ODA budget dropped from around 40 percent in the early 1990s to 23% in 2006. In contrast, those who responded that Japan should decrease or stop ODA increased to around 25% in 2006, compared to less than 10% in the early 1990s.

The third reason for increased scrutiny of the ODA policy is that Japan has not effectively communicated with external stakeholders. Japanese failure to articulate its ODA vision in global debates has contributed to this shortfall. Despite its past efforts in deepening mutual understanding between Japan and the Western aid community, Japan continues to feel a gap between mainstream development thinking and the East Asian development experience, which is widely regarded as a success story and to which Japan itself made significant contributions through aid, trade, and investment.
5.4.2 Direction of Japanese ODA

The G8 summits are providing an important platform for Japan to put African development on the global agenda where eight of the world’s most powerful nations meet annually to discuss political economic issues. Japan has been considered the leader in promoting Africa’s issues in terms of debt cancellation and providing assistance in the form of grant aid for development. The G8 summits have also formed an important partnership with the TICAD process and NEPAD in pursuing mutual goals for African development. Among the former G7 creditors, Japan has provided the largest amount of bilateral loans to the 40 most heavily indebted countries, although its view on debt cancellation has differed from the other members of the G7 (Lehman, 2005: 434).

At the Gleneagles Summit in July 2005, the leaders of the G8 agreed to increase aid for developing countries by US$ 50 billion. Prime Minister Koizumi also pledged to boost US$ 10 billion of Japanese aid between 2005 and 2009. Although the G8 leaders initially agreed to the full debt cancellation for 14 African countries, Japan argued that cancellation would bring about moral hazards among recipient countries. After much discussion, Japan later compromised with the other member states. The debt debate reflects the confrontation over the method of development preferred by key donors (Sato, 2005).

The 2007 G8 summit was held in Germany with African development as a key issue on the agenda (Rwamutega, 2007). Nishikawa (2007) argues that Japan, acting as the chair was expected to ensure that African issues receive adequate attention. However, the 2007 summit was met with widespread criticism for being a forum to promote capitalism to the benefit of developed countries. For future G8 and TICAD summits to be more successful, it is imperative that Japan combines its efforts with joint objectives for African
development. An increased emphasis should be on promoting the concept of human security for more coherence in its own foreign policy.

5.5 Conclusion

The trends of Japanese ODA patterns from the 1960s until the late 1980s, Japanese ODA disbursements were primarily directed to African countries where Japan had the most economic interests. For example, Kenya, Tanzania and Zambia which are rich in natural resources vital to the Japanese economy tended to receive larger volumes of aid. Concerning ODA patterns from the 1990s diplomatic concerns such as its Security Council ambitions, and creating its own niche diplomacy as a middle power in the new multipolar security order have been key foreign policy goals.

Although Japan has been one of the main contributors of ODA to Africa following the Cold War, the fact that it made out only a small percentage of its ODA budget, implies that it only provided enough to serve certain economic and diplomatic interests as mentioned, and not purely out of humanitarian concerns. Nevertheless, this currently plays a larger role because of the MOFAs focus on human security. Since the late 1990s, with the inception of human security as part of Japanese – African foreign policy, Japan has directed its ODA for humanitarian projects to address human insecurities such as poverty, health, conflict and education.

As a middle power, it is clear from analyzing Japanese foreign policy that it has selected human security for its niche diplomacy in the security realm. What has also emerged throughout this study is that the overriding diplomatic concern for Japan has been its
Security Council ambitions: a key reason why much political interest has been shown to Africa is because the African bloc carries such a large vote in the UN.

Since the purpose of this study was to analyze the impact of the concept of human security on Japanese foreign policy, Japan’s role in PKOs in Africa was discussed in chapter four. The fact that Japan has adopted a human security approach towards conflict, to make up for the pacifist nature of its foreign policy towards PKO’s since World War II supports the argument that human security is central to its Africa policy. This is mainly because it suits Japanese non-violence approach. This has also formed part of Japanese niche diplomacy, since it is addressing some of Africa’s most prominent problems in a manner distinct from other developed countries (for example the United States of America).

The two theoretical perspectives of the new security paradigm, structural realism (based on neo-realism) and the human security approach have been discussed in the context of this study. Both proved useful in explaining Japanese rationale for providing ODA to Africa, as well as why human security has formed such an important part of the country’s foreign policy. structural realism has provided the framework for explaining Japan disbursing ODA to African countries where it had the greatest economic interests, as well as its more current diplomatic ventures. An example of this would be former Prime Minister Mori’s tour of Africa in 2001 when only a selected few African states were visited – those most important to Japan in economic and diplomatic terms. On the other side of the spectrum, the human security approach aided this study in analyzing Japanese humanitarian approach in terms of the type of projects where ODA is directed as well as the funding of peacebuilding initiatives.
However, structural realism has seemed to prove more relevant in explaining Japanese motives for providing ODA, and more specifically to which countries it has been disbursed to. On the other hand, the human security approach has been more useful in explaining the importance of human security in Japanese approach to developing countries. In this study both theoretical perspectives have therefore proved equally useful in understanding different trends and patterns in Japanese – African foreign policy.

5.6 Recommendations

1. Improving the efficiency of ODA to Africa

In Chapter Two and Four it has been argued that the effectiveness of Japanese ODA to Africa has improved over the last four years, mostly because of the revised Charter in 2003 with the new focus on the quality of ODA rather than the quantity. However, because of domestic pressures from the public on the MOFA, resulting in political tension between this ministry and the MITI, the continued successful drafting and implementing of ODA policies to Africa has been hampered.

Under these two ministries, a first recommendation is that organizations central to ODA policymaking such as the Japanese Overseas Cooperation, the International Cooperation Bureau, JICA and the JIBC, and their efforts should be coordinated and integrated for more coherent ODA policymaking and implementation in Africa. Nevertheless, to ensure that ODA is disbursed to African countries where ODA is needed most, for example healthcare, more intensive country specific research should be conducted on the specific needs of certain African countries which do receive ODA from all the organizations.
2. A more coherent foreign policy for peacekeeping and peacebuilding

As argued in Chapter Two and Four, Japan’s chosen policy of the consolidation of peace has directed all the focus to peacebuilding activities, rather than peacekeeping. Although this approach has proven to be successful, it has not erased all the criticisms from the international community, calling for Japan to develop a more active approach to peacekeeping. Thus, although Japan has been avoiding this at all costs, it will need to develop a more coherent foreign policy on peacekeeping that fits into the context of its renewed security role, whilst promoting the concept of human security. This concept can be used in all its foreign policies for increased consistency, especially concerning security and issues of conflict.

3. Increasing the promotion of human security through TICAD

Although the TICAD process has emphasized the importance of human security as part of its policies for African development, there is room for improvement. More attention should be given to promoting human security through the various initiatives that are undertaken by TICAD. One measure that can be embarked on is to enhance the cooperation between TICAD and NEPAD with human security as a common goal. As discussed, there are various criticisms against the past three TICAD conferences in terms of its effectiveness. For Japan to make TICAD VII more successful; aid donors, African recipients, and civil society have should play a more active role in creating measures to promote African development.
5.7 Areas for Further Research

A further investigation of the indicators of human security in Africa that will measure the impact of Japanese foreign policy tools on human security in African countries. Additional attention could also be given to Japanese foreign policy in terms of peacebuilding and how the MOFA is formulating these policies. A comparative study of TICAD and NEPAD, and the impact these organizations have had on African human security.
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