WHY HAS THE RESOLUTION OF THE RWANDA CIVIL WAR (GENOCIDE) BEEN MORE STABLE/ENDURING THAN THE BURUNDIAN CASE?

BY

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UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL UNIVERSITY - AFRICA

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UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL UNIVERSITY - AFRICA

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STUDENT DECLARATION

I, the undersigned declare that this is my original work and that it has not been submitted to any other College, Institution or University other than the United States International University for academic purposes.

Signed: ___________________________ Date: _____________________________

Samantha SINDAKA (643965)

This project has been presented for examination with my approval as the appointed supervisor.

Signed: ___________________________ Date: _____________________________

Project Supervisor: Dr Elijah MUNYI

Signed: ___________________________ Date: _____________________________

Dean, School of Humanities and social sciences
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to acknowledge Dr. Elijah MUNYI my project supervisor without whose scholarly support I would not have completed this study. I would also like to acknowledge my family in general for their financial and moral assistance in this study.
DEDICATION

It is with great humility that I dedicate this work to my parents.
ABSTRACT

Burundi and Rwanda, located in East-Central Africa, are two countries that have a lot in common. The most devastating similarity is that the two countries have both experienced violent civil wars resulting from the escalation of tensions between their main ethnic groups, the Tutsi and the Hutu. In the aftermath of the Rwandan genocide of 1994 and the Arusha agreement that ended the conflict in Burundi, the two countries initiated a series of processes aimed at establishing persistent peace. However, the two countries have become increasingly dissimilar with regard to the effectiveness of the conflict resolution processes to precipitate stability. Rwanda has been relatively stable and while Burundi experiences a lot of instability. This has raised questions about the effectiveness of the conflict resolution process adopted by either of the two countries.

The purpose of the study is to compare and contrast the conflict resolution processes in Rwanda and Burundi with an aim to conceptualize why the former has been more stable than the latter. Therefore, the study seeks to answer three fundamental questions, namely: What contextual issues in Rwanda and Burundi conflicts influenced the conflict resolution process in either country? How was the conflict resolution processes in Rwanda and Burundi different? Why has conflict resolution in Rwanda been more stable than that in Burundi?
## LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>GoR</td>
<td>Government of Rwanda</td>
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<tr>
<td>PCD</td>
<td><em>Parti Démocratique Chrétien</em></td>
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<tr>
<td>PDC</td>
<td><em>Parti Démocratique Chrétien</em></td>
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<tr>
<td>RPF/A</td>
<td>Rwandan Patriotic Front/Army</td>
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<td>UPRONA</td>
<td>Union Pour le Progress National</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

STUDENT DECLARATION ........................................................................................................... ii  
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ........................................................................................................... iii  
DEDICATION ............................................................................................................................ iv  
ABSTRACT ................................................................................................................................... v  
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ...................................................................................................... vi  
CHAPTER ONE ......................................................................................................................... 1  
1.0 INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................... 1  
1.1 Background of the Problem .............................................................................................. 1  
1.2 Statement of the Problem ................................................................................................ 5  
1.3 Purpose of the Study ......................................................................................................... 6  
1.4 Research Questions ......................................................................................................... 6  
1.5 Research Objectives ...................................................................................................... 7  
1.6 Justification of the Study ............................................................................................... 7  
1.7 Chapter Outline .............................................................................................................. 9  
CHAPTER TWO .......................................................................................................................... 11  
2.0 LITERATURE REVIEW .................................................................................................... 11  
2.1 Introduction .................................................................................................................... 11  
2.2 Empirical Review .......................................................................................................... 13  
2.3 Summary and Gaps to Fill ............................................................................................ 17  
2.4 Theoretical Framework ................................................................................................. 19  
2.5 Chapter Summary ......................................................................................................... 24  
CHAPTER THREE .................................................................................................................... 26  
3.0 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY ....................................................................................... 26  
3.1 Introduction ..................................................................................................................... 26  
3.2 The Epistemological Orientation .................................................................................... 26
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3.3 Research Design</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.4 Data Collection Methods</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.5 Data Analysis Methods</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.6 Ethical Issues</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.7 Limitations of the Study</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.8 Chapter Summary</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER FOUR</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.0 CONFLICT RESOLUTION PROCESSES IN RWANDA AND BURUNDI</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.1 Introduction</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.2 Leadership</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.3 Inclusivity</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.4 Prioritization of Underpinning Issues</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.5 Negotiations</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.6 Chapter Summary</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER FIVE</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.0 CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.1 Introduction</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.2 Summary of the Study</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.3 Discussion</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.4 Conclusion</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.5 Recommendation</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REFERENCES</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER ONE

1.0 INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background of the Problem

Burundi and Rwanda, located in East-Central Africa are two countries that have a lot in common (Chipoka, 2003). According Uvin (1999), the two countries have almost, if not similar ethnic composition in which between 85 and 90% of the entire population are ethnic Hutu, between 10 and 14% are Tutsi and about 1% are Twa. Furthermore, the two countries are almost replicas of each other with respect to the topography, the climate and the population density; Rwanda has the highest population density in Africa followed by Burundi (Naniwe-Kaburahe, 2008). The two are predominantly agro-based or agrarian economies, and are similar with respect to religion, language and history (Uvin, 1999).

However, the most devastating similarity is that the two countries have both experienced violent civil wars resulting from the escalation of tensions between the key ethnic groups, the Tutsi and the Hutu (Curtis, 2011; LeMon, 2010). The joint costs of the two wars in human lives were and have been phenomenal (Falch, 2010). The Rwandan genocide of 1994 is estimated to have resulted in the deaths of close to a million people while the conflict in Burundi, which happened in 1972 and from 1993 to 2003 resulted in the deaths of more than half a million people (Naniwe-Kaburahe, 2008). The two countries, with intervention and assistance of the international community initiated reconciliation and conflict resolution process that were meant to end the violence once and for all and return the countries to stability, tranquility and growth (Naniwe-Kaburahe, 2008).
Kelman (2010) contends that conflict resolution transcends the realist standpoint of national interests, and seeks responsive solutions to the needs of both or all parties to a conflict through a vigorous mutual problem-solving initiative. In such a sense, reconciliation is not abstracted from conflict resolution but is both an integral part of and a consequence of a successful component of conflict resolution (Curtis, 2011; Jeong, 2010). The success of the conflict resolution in Rwanda draws from the fact that it was comprehensive and resulted in the uprooting of the underlying causes of the conflict, something, which the process of conflict resolution in Burundi probably failed to achieve (Chipoka, 2003).

In Rwanda, the conflict resolution process was initiated in pre-genocide years when in 1993 the conflict parties agreed to a power-sharing deal of the Arusha accords. However, the existing Hutu power bloc perceived the power sharing deal with the principal political forces as impossible. It is supposedly for this reason that the genocide was systematically planned and executed methodically (Sommers & Uvin, 2013). According to Hatungimana, Theron and Popic (2008), the aim of unsettling the power balance in the country and avoiding the implementation of the Arusha Accords.

Consequently, power sharing in Rwanda can only be conceived as post-dating the genocide and involving the transformations and consultations that were initiated after the 1994 genocide (Prendergast & Smock, 1999b). Immediately after terminating the genocide, the Rwandan government led by the Rwandan Patriotic Front/Army (RPF/A) initiated a comprehensive conflict resolution process (Hatungimana, Theron & Popic, 2008). According Prendergast and Smock (1999b), the government initiated a considered political transition process that aimed at attaining ethnic parity in the cabinet as well as the regional governments.
According to Chipoka (2003), the domestic ownership of the conflict resolution process helps account for the success of the process in Rwanda. Indeed, the solutions to the conflict were homegrown and both the government and the Rwandan society were active stakeholders in the conflict resolution process. Besides, as Anastase (2012) has noted the process was a consultative process that encompassed all the stakeholders in the peace process; from the international community, through the national government to the local community members in the rural areas. In other words, Rwandan approach conflict resolution was not as a result of an internationally negotiated process but rather a responsive approach to the fundamental underpinning elements of the conflict.

The case of Burundi is deemed rather different. The Arusha Peace Agreement of 28 August, 2000 became the cornerstone or framework for conflict resolution in Burundi in the post-conflict period. While the process was primarily led by Africans, it was influenced by international actors. Western countries including the European Union (EU) supported the Arusha process and funded the negotiations. Prendergast and Smock (1999b) argue that in Burundi, conflict resolution was both an internal and external negotiation process involving both internal and external actors. The agreement encompassed various aspects of the conflict such as agreement’s regional and international guarantees and security arrangements. However, the inclusiveness of the Arusha Peace Agreement was in doubt as most parties to the conflict only signed with formal reservations while two active armed groups declined to sign.

Five key protocols were concluded, these include Protocol 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 (Curtis, 2003). Protocol 1, addressed the nature of the conflict, the problem of exclusion and genocide and suggested solutions to these. It proposed the establishment of a truth and reconciliation commission. According to Chipoka (2003), Protocol 2, addressed the issue of good
governance and democracy, defining the underpinning principles of transitional modalities and post-transition constitution. The Protocol provided for a transitional constitution that advised transitional power structure in which a Tutsi President and Hutu Vice-President would serve for the first 18 months, followed by reverse in which the country would have a Hutu President and Tutsi Vice-President for the next 18 months of the transition (Hatungimana, et al, 2008).

Chipoka (2003) observes that the Protocol 3, provided for peace and security for all Rwandese notwithstanding the fact that two rebel entities had declined to sign the deal. Protocol 4 addressed the issue of reconstruction and development while Protocol 5 guaranteed the implementation of the Arusha Agreement. In essence, therefore, the Arusha Peace Agreement conceived the Burundian conflict as a purely ethnic issue and aimed at attaining a negotiated transitional arrangement in which the ethnic groups would pursue their own interests (Anastase, 2012).

While the Rwandan reconciliation and conflict resolution process have been largely effective, going by the peace that has been witnessed in the country since the end of the genocide, Burundi has been unstable even after the supposed end of violent hostilities in 2005 (Chipoka, 2003). This is suggestive that there were elements of the conflict resolution process in the Rwandan case that was not replicated in while negotiating peace in Burundi (Falch, 2010).

This study seeks to find out why conflict resolution in Rwanda has been more stable and enduring than the conflict resolution in Burundi. It conceptualizes conflict resolution in the wide-ranging sense encompassing national approaches to identity politics, historical memory and commemoration. Conflict resolution is also conceived herein to incorporate aspects of
reconciliation such as transitional justice and government assistance to victims. However, most importantly, it encompasses the establishment of trust, the change of the relationship founded on reciprocity and common responsiveness, an agreement that addresses the basic needs and desires of all the parties (Kelman, 2010).

1.2 Statement of the Problem

According Uvin (1999), in the aftermath of the Rwandan genocide of 1994 and the Arusha agreement that ended the conflict in Burundi, the two countries initiated a serious of processes aimed at establishing persistent peace. The Rwandan conflict resolution comprised of focused initiatives that included political and constitutional reforms (Debeil & Terlinden, 2005). The process also included the quest for justice and reconciliation in which conventional conflict and dispute resolution mechanism as well as social reforms including the incorporation of the hitherto marginalized groups in the government (Naniwe-Kaburahe, 2008).

Similarly, Burundi initiated conflict resolution process with the similar aim of instituting persistent peace in the country (Prendergast & Smock, 1999a). The peace initiative in Burundi mainly comprised of the implementation of the directives of the Arusha Peace Agreement of August 28, 2000 and the associated protocols. Uvin (1999) asserts that these included the establishment of security, reconstruction of the war torn country, instituting democracy and good governance and equal incorporation of all the ethnic groups in the governing process. In essence, both Rwanda and Burundi resolved to take drastic actions to ensure sustainable peace and tranquility in aftermath of the conflicts.

However, while this event indicate that the conflict resolution process in Rwanda was more effective than the Burundian one, limited scholarly attention has been paid to the analyses has
gone to the assessment as to why this is the case (Uvin, 1999). In fact, while the certain elements of the conflict resolution in Rwanda can facilitate the attainment of an effective peace formula in Burundi, this has been ignored both by academicians and by stakeholders in the peace process in Burundi (Chipoka, 2003).

This study attempts to abridge this gap in literature by venturing into an area, which has been mostly overlooked. The study also endeavors to contribute to the literature relating the comparative assessment of the Rwandan and Burundian conflict resolution processes in the post-conflict period. Therefore, it is hoped the study will be crucial to stakeholders and policy makers in the peace process in the two countries as well to future researchers interested in studying the reconciliation and conflict resolution in Rwanda and Burundi from a comparative perspective.

1.3 Purpose of the Study

The purpose of the study is to compare and contrast the conflict resolution processes in Rwanda and Burundi with an aim to conceptualize why the former has been more stable than the latter.

1.4 Research Questions

1.4.1 What contextual issues in Rwanda and Burundi the conflicts influenced the conflict resolution process in either country?

1.4.2 How were the conflict resolutions processes in Rwanda and Burundi different?

1.4.3 Why has conflict resolution in Rwanda been more stable than that in Burundi?
1.5 Research Objectives

1.5.1 To assess whether there were any differences in the nature and context of the conflicts in Rwandan and Burundi;

1.5.2 To examine the conflict resolution processes in Rwanda and Burundi;

1.5.3 To determine why the conflict resolution in Rwanda has been more stable than that in Burundi;

1.6 Justification of the Study

The study is aimed at providing valuable information that may prove vital to the following stakeholders:

1.6.1 The Government and Policy Makers in Rwanda and Burundi

The study will be crucial to policymakers in both Rwanda and Burundi as it will assess the political contexts of the conflicts, the conflict resolution processes in both countries and the reason why conflict resolution in Rwanda has been stable. Therefore, the study will equip the respective policymakers with vital information that can facilitate the formulation, review and enhancement of the conflict resolution process in either country.

Through the study results, Burundian policymakers can evaluate their approach to conflict resolution and acknowledge the failures, and by reviewing the conflict resolution process in Rwanda, the Burundian officials can adopt a conflict resolution process that ensures stability. The Rwandan policymakers can evaluate the process of conflict resolution process in the country and acknowledge areas that may still need improvement.

1.6.2 The International Stakeholders
The current study will be of potential importance and relevance to the international stakeholders in the peace process in Rwanda and Burundi and the wider central African region. The United Nations (UN), the European Union and the United States among other are just some of the actors to whom the current study will be highly relevant. From the study results, these international actors will be able to gain information about the current political situation in the two countries.

The study will further provide information on the successes and failures of the conflict resolution processes in both countries and thereby facilitate the formulation of policy regarding how to engage the two countries. The study results regarding the successes and failures of the conflict resolution processes in both countries will further allow the international actors to know how to negotiate conflict resolution processes in the future.

1.6.3 The African Union (AU) and the regional countries

Regional actors especially the African Union (AU), the East African Community (EAC) and other regional organizations and countries will also benefit from the study. The study will equip these regional actors with vital information regarding the political status of the countries in the aftermath of the conflict resolution processes. The regional actors especially the AU will thus use the results of the study to formulate strategic policies on how to engage the two states and other states in Africa that are undergoing or that have undergone process of conflict resolution.

Certainly, a comparative assessment of the long-term outcomes of conflict resolution processes in Rwanda and Burundi will facilitate the appreciation of the underlying predictors of the Rwandan case and the postulation of the Rwandan success to other similar cases. Likewise, the study will indicate the reasons for the tumultuous case of conflict resolution in
Burundi and allow for the aversion of the same in the future or in other similar cases. Finally yet importantly, the study will facilitate the enhancement of how the regional actors negotiate conflict resolutions in the future especially with regard to defining the root causes and actors and how to address the underpinning conflictive issues.

1.6.4 Future Researchers

The study delves into an area that has seldom received academic attention, that is, a comparative assessment of conflict resolution in two post-conflict states. As such, the study will inspire academic interest in further comparative analyses in this hitherto ignored approach to assessing conflict resolution processes. Furthermore, the study provides relevant and highly important information regarding conflict resolution that can form part of the literature review phase for future academic research in this area. It also provides relevant background information to researchers who might be interested in assessing socio-political and economic issues in either of the two countries – Rwanda and Burundi.

1.7 Scope of the Study

The study focused on conflict resolution as a concept and took a comparative analyses of the conflict resolution processes in Rwanda and Burundi as case studies. The study adopted a qualitative approach to research and examined secondary sources of information including books, e-journals and peer reviewed journals to collect data whose interpretation would facilitate the answering of the three research questions of the study.

1.7 Chapter Outline

The Chapter has introduced the study. The chapter has thus presented the background of the study and stated the problem as well as the purpose of the study. The chapter has also
outlined the research questions and objectives that the study endeavored to address. Three research questions identified to be answered by the study are; were there any differences in the nature and context of the conflicts in Rwanda and Burundi? How was the conflict resolution processes in Rwanda and Burundi different? Why has conflict resolution in Rwanda been more stable than that in Burundi? The chapter has also indicated the significance of the study, the scope of the study and defined terms and concepts that were used throughout the study.

Chapter Two provides the empirical literature review, the summary and gaps to be filled by the study and the theoretical framework. As such, Chapter Two provides an empirical review of literature regarding the three research objectives. The literature to be reviewed relate to the following; whether there were any differences in the nature and context of the conflicts in Rwandan and Burundi. The conflict resolution processes in Rwanda and Burundi; and, why the conflict resolution in Rwanda has been more stable than that in Burundi. The empirical review will take a comparative approach. Chapter Five is the recap of the study. The chapter provides the summary of the study, the conclusions and recommendations.
CHAPTER TWO

2.0 LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 Introduction

This chapter reviews existing literature on the conflict and conflict resolution. The chapter aims to identify the issues in conflict, players in conflict and the parties and approaches to conflict resolution, which may help in the understanding of the conflict resolution processes in Rwanda and Burundi. The aim of the chapter is understand what scholars and existing literature says about the research questions and identifies gaps in literature that can further attest for the need for the current research. The chapter also provides the theoretical framework for the study.

2.1.1 Brief History of Burundi

After decades of German and subsequently Belgian colonial rule, Burundi achieved independence on 1 July 1962. Like its neighbors in the Great Lakes Region of Africa, colonialism scarred Burundi and its people with violence and divisions. These divisions at the political level divided Burundi’s two main ethnic groups, the majority Hutu and the Tutsi, producing conflicts over political and economic power further confused by clan and regional divisions within the ethnic groups. The violence that eventually ensued saw the assassination of a Prime Minister in 1965 and the first of a series of coups d'état by a Tutsi army captain in 1966. By the time that the country reached its first watershed moment in 1972, a pattern of Hutu revolts met with violent reprisals by the Tutsi-dominated army had become commonplace.

In response to a violent Hutu uprising that led to the deaths of large numbers of Tutsi
civilians, the army began massacring Hutu en masse for a period of around four months. The systematic targeting of Hutu, in particular the educated Hutu elite, is widely recognized to have constituted genocide. By the time the violence ended, thousands of Hutu had either been killed or had fled the country.

In the aftermath of the 1972 violence, Tutsi grip on power was consolidated. The UPRONA political party, though originally the multi-ethnic party of the hero of Burundi’s independence, Prince Louis Rwagasore, became the symbol of Tutsi hegemony and military rule in Burundi. A one-party violent state was maintained for two decades in spite of numerous coups. By the beginning of the 1990s a series of reforms were instituted in the face of growing international concern. These reforms led to the first multiparty elections in 1993 that saw the election of the first Hutu President, Melchior Ndadaye of the FRODEBU party.

In spite of the growing optimism in the country, Burundi was plunged into civil war just three months into Ndadaye’s tenure after his assassination in a failed coup attempt by a group of army officers. Violence perpetrated against Tutsi civilians in the immediate aftermath of his assassination has been referred to as genocide by a UN commission of inquiry. The widespread violence that followed, known locally as la crise, began as a conflict between Hutu rebels and the Tutsi-dominated security forces, but soon descended into chaos. After seven years of violence the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement was signed in 2000. The Arusha Agreement did not however bring an end to the civil war, as the two main rebel movements – the CNDD-FDD and the FNL – refused to sign.

A new transitional government nonetheless pushed ahead, eventually signing a ceasefire agreement with the CNDD-FDD and laying the foundations for democratic elections in 2005. Incumbent President, Pierre Nkurunziza was subsequently elected to the presidency as leader
of the CNDD-FDD, now converted to a political party under the terms of the ceasefire. The remaining rebel movement, the FNL, officially disarmed in 2009. Estimates of the number of persons killed during the civil war put the figure in the hundreds of thousands.

Today, Burundi remains one of the poorest countries in the world, beset by continued instabilities, widespread corruption, human rights abuses and deep historical divisions. The current political landscape remains dominated by the CNDD-FDD after Pierre Nkurunziza’s re-election in 2010 amid claims of violence and intimidation that led to the majority of opposition parties fleeing into exile.

2.2 Empirical Review

Conflict as conceived by Bercovitch, Kremenyuk and Zartman (2009) refers to a violent dispute or an incompatibility of standpoints and perspectives. In the human society, conflicts are ubiquitous and inevitable, as such it can be considered as intrinsic feature of human existence. As such, parties to a conflict can range from individuals, groups, organizations to sovereign states. Bercovititch, et al, (2009) contends that these kinds of actors are the stakeholders in a conflict as they initiate conflict, pursue and ultimately determine its outcome. The conflict resolution must therefore take cognizance of the various parties to a conflict and identify the needs and desires of each other parties for the process to be successful.

However, the identification of parties to a conflict is not at all a very easy and straightforward task. According to Jeong (2010), the one of the major tasks that the third parties to a conflict (people, groups, organization and states) that are trying to resolve a conflict is to appreciate and understand the systems and sub-systems that may be involved in the conflict. Furthermore, some parties to a conflict do operate as autonomous actors while other are
under the control of some other bigger and stronger units present within the state or outside the state (Haus, 2001). Therefore, it is apparent that parties to a conflict refer to a spectrum of actors from the individual, to the regional, through to the national up to the international agents. It may as well include the third parties that are themselves involved in trying to mitigate a conflict.

With the broad spectrum of the parties to a conflict also comes a conglomeration of issues which precipitate the conflict and which form a crucial dilemma to the third parties. Bercovitch, *et al* (2009) and Galtung (2000) have contended that conflicts are situations in which various parties hold and pursue incompatible or divergent goals, which in turn inspire their violent or irrational behavior. For many conflicts, identifying the precipitating issues presents a major dilemma for the third parties trying to solve it as these issues are not only diverse but are intricately reinforcing. It is not surprising therefore, that it has been determined that parties to a conflict even differ on the issues in a conflict. Haus (2001) contends that getting the parties to agree on what the conflict issues entails presents one of the vital turning points in the successful resolution of a conflict.

Generally, according to Kriesberg (2009), several precipitators or issue in conflicts have been identified including: resources, values, beliefs, ethnicity, nature of government, national honor, liberation conflicts, limited territory, national unification and imperialism. Kelman (2010) further points out that issue in conflict can also include; issues of sovereignty, issues of ideology, issues of religion or race as well as issues of survival. Currently, environmental issues have also increasingly gained ground as potential precipitators of conflicts.

Therefore, due to the diversities in the actors and the precipitators of conflict, conflict resolution is a serious undertaking, which involves several actors, the third parties in efforts
towards conflict resolution. Third parties often intervene in conflict to deescalate the hostilities and transform the conflict structure. According to Galtung (2000), third party entry into conflict permits the establishment of a different communication pattern. The third party filters and relays back the attitudes, behaviors and messages of the conflicting parties with the aim of deescalating the conflict (d’Estree, 2009).

However, ‘pure’ mediators are increasingly havebeen conventionally considered powerless in determining the outcome of a conflict. It argued that the more potentially successful third parties are those whose entry not only alters the communication structure but hugely impacts on if not altering the existing power balance between and among the parties. The third parties can alter the communication structure and the behaviors of the conflicting parties by effective use of negative and positive incentives (the carrot and stick option). The flipside the entry of a powerful third party is that it can disrupt the power balance and lead to further de-escalation of the conflict or may find itself become an integral part of the conflict.

Four critical issues are imperative in the third parties’ engagement in the resolution and settling of a conflict. According to Galtung (2000), these include prioritization, inclusivity, and the association between the local, national, regional as well as international-level leadership. Prioritization can be conceived as the mediators decision on issues that need to be settled fast to avert further conflict and loss of life (Wani, 2010). In fact, the mediators are often get caught up between the need to move the mediation forward or to dawdle it down depending on the underpinning issues of the conflict. Striking a balance between these contending issues is a delicate process, which demands prioritization of what is important contingent on the prevailing circumstances (Väyrynen, 1991). Therefore, the third parties especially the mediators must decide which issues warrant mediating on and settling in the peace agreement and which issues can be pushed forward to the post-agreement period.
According to Prendergast and Smock (1999a), the prioritization of issues is fundamental in determining the success of the conflict resolution process and the establishment of an enduring tranquility and peace that permits addressing of other finer issues. The sequencing of justice issue in conflict and post-conflict situation has a huge bearing on the establishment of enduring peace.

The second critical issue is inclusivity, which implies the inclusion of diverse actors in the conflict resolution process. The third parties involved in the conflict resolution process must take account of the various issues of priority as perceived by each party to the conflict. Furthermore, as Jeong (2010) notes while the convention practice of mediation has focused on the conflicting parties, it is increasingly important to include virtually all members of the society in the process.

It is contended that inclusivity establishes a feeling of ownership among the actors of the conflict resolution process and inspires the whole society effectively engage in the efforts aimed at establishing a lasting peace (McGarry & O’Leary, 1993). Recent debates regarding inclusivity in mediation and conflict resolution process have contended that inclusion of larger segments of the society facilitates the identification of issues in conflict and the determination of potentially effective ways of addressing the issues. An inclusive process provides the vital opportunity for various kinds of actors to participate in the process and facilitate the inclusion of various issues of importance to them in the process (Kriesberg, 2009).

Furthermore, inclusivity provides legitimacy to the process in addition to facilitating the inclusion of a wide perspective of issues in the agenda. However, inclusivity is an intricate undertaking and may take many forms including national and community dialogues that seek
to identify a central position. Moreover, inclusivity implies the establishment of linkage among various local, national, regional and international actors (Burton, 2009).

2.3 Summary and Gaps to Fill

The literatures reviewed indicate a discrepancy between the conflict resolution process, which has serious implications for the understanding, and analysis of the conflict resolution processes in Rwanda and that in Burundi. However, it is evident that not much scholarly attention has gone towards adopting a comparative assessment of conflict resolution processes in any two contexts. Furthermore, the literature review suggests that limited academic attention has gone to the assessment of the historical or underpinning precipitants of conflicts that may suggests why the discrepancy in the effectiveness of conflict resolution processes. Indeed, what is evident from the literature reviewed is that scholars have analyzed conflict and conflict resolution processes separately and have ignored possible and similarities and differences in the two contexts such as that in Burundi and Rwanda.

For instance, David Carment and Dane Rowlands (1998) in their article, “Three’s Company: Evaluating Third-Party Intervention in Intra-State Conflict” published in the Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 42, No. 5, pp. 572 – 599, have attempted to examine the issue but have also fallen in the trap of omission. The two authors, while taking a broader look at intrastate conflict resolution, have narrowed their analysis by using the game theory. Carment and Rowlands (1998) have thus focused on four aspects, mission’s intensity, the belligerents capability, the salience of the intervener and the gains the belligerents expect from continued fighting.

It is also worth mentioning that the general perspective adopted by the two authors does not do justice to the analysis of conflict resolution and Third-Party intervention in the settling of
African conflicts. Furthermore, the article does not attempt a comparison of the conflict resolution approaches adopted by two countries that are experiencing closely similar conditions such as Burundi and Rwanda.

Rene Lemarchand (1994) attempts to address the generalization of conflict resolution and third party engagement in conflict resolution evident in Carment and Rowland’s analyses by focusing on African states, especially Rwanda and Burundi. In his article, “Managing Transition Anarchies: Rwanda, Burundi, and South Africa in Comparative Perspective”, published in the Journal of Modern African Studies in 1994, Lemarchand compares Rwanda and Burundi on one side to South Africa with respect to the process of transition to democracy. The author contends that while South Africa has been successful in its transition to democracy, Rwanda and Burundi have however not fared well.

According to Lemarchand (1994), the structural, social and economic factors acted as enablers in the case of South Africa and disablers in Rwanda and Burundi case. However, he makes an important observation that three variables were critical in the processes both in South Africa and Rwanda and Burundi, namely; (i) the leadership quality, (ii) the nature of the give and takes of the transition (transition bargain), (iii) the attitude of the armed forces and, (iv) the character of opposition forces. Nonetheless, good as it is, Lemarchand’s comparative analysis fails to bring to fore other key variables of the conflict resolution process in Rwanda and Burundi. This pertinent issues include, the level of inclusivity (the extent to which the citizens have played a role in the conflict resolution in post conflict period), the manner in which issues core to the conflict have been prioritized in the two countries, the nature of the negotiations and leadership role in the process among others.
Analyses by Lemarchand (1994) as well as Carment and Rowland (1998) have indicated a literature gap over the assessment of the conflict resolution process in both Rwanda and Burundi. The latter is too general while the former overlooks several key themes that are central to the two countries and which should not be ignored. These discrepancies and oversights in existing literature provide the primary motivation for the current study.

The study seeks to contribute to the wider concept of conflict resolution by providing a contextual comparative assessment of conflict resolution processes in Rwanda and Burundi. It is hoped that such an approach will not only help conceptualize the potential successful approaches to conflict resolution but to help appreciate inherent challenges. The study will therefore contribute to the current literature on conflict resolution by assessing the underpinning reasons for the successes in Rwandan conflict resolution and the failures of Burundian conflict resolution that can be taken up by future policy makers and academicians.

2.4 Theoretical Framework

The issues of conflict or more precisely intrastate conflict as attracted a lot of scholarly attention (Jeong, 2010). Consequently, several theoretical perspectives have been developed in an attempt to conceptualize intrastate or civil conflicts, among the most perceptible theories of conflict are the Galtung’s model of conflict violence and peace, the conflict transformation theory and the escalation de-escalation theory.\(^1\)

Conflict transformation as concept is relatively new relative to other concepts covered by the peace and conflict studies. Conflict transformation theory holds that conflict transpires

\(^1\) There also the Hourglass model and the game theory; the former construes conflict resolution as comprising of a intricate association of the contingency elements that cause escalation and complementarity perspective that result in the de-escalation. The game theory, first conceived by John von Neumann and Oscar Morgenstern in their work, “theory of games and economic behavior” contends that the assumed and real compatibility and incompatibility of interests among or between players precipitate and de-escalate conflicts.
through four critical stages. According to Vayrynen (1991), the stages of conflict transformation in this sense include actor transformation, issues transformation, rule transformation and structural transformation. Actor transformation implies the internal change in relation to parties to a conflict and the emergence of new actors; issue transformation denotes the alteration in the political agenda and essence of the conflict. Lederach (2000) explains that rule transformation implies the alteration of the norms followed by parties to a conflict in interacting with each other and determines the limits of such relationships. Structural Transformation alludes to the alterations that occur in the system within which the conflicts are experienced.

Advocates of the conflict transformation theory contend that modern conflicts demand more than just the identification of win-win upshots and the reframing of positions. The intricacies of the relationships between and among the parties are embedded in the conflictual pattern of the relationships and may extend beyond the current site of the conflict. In this sense therefore, conflict transformation can be regarded as dealing with the transformation of the relationships, discourses and were possible the constitution of a society interested in the prolongation of conflict (Mial, 2013). The conflict transformation theory further contends that the conflict mitigation process should not be left only to the elites. It should rather include individuals belonging to the conflict parties, within the affected region or society as well as outsiders possessing the relevant resources all who perform a potentially crucial role in the long-term peace process (Galtung, 2000).

As such, it is apparent that the conflict transformation theory perceives conflict as a broad process, which incorporates various stakeholders who must play a critical role in ensuring the establishment of an enduring peace. Furthermore, the conflict transformation theory accentuates conflict resolution as a wide-ranging and comprehensive process entailing
supporting groups in a conflict context over the mediatory role of outsiders. According to Mial, 2013) conflict transformation also acknowledges that conflict transforms gradually through minute and major changes, as well as through specific steps taken by various actors or parties to a conflict.

The conflict transformation theory helps account for the Rwandan and Burundian conflicts. The two conflicts present a scenario in which conflict developed within several stages and with actors and issues changing as the conflict developed. The conflict resolution processes in both countries presented the alteration of the rules of interactions between the various conflicting parties in both cases. The resolution mechanisms also resulted in the alteration in the context of the structure or context in which the parties engaged each other.

Another critical theoretical perspective on conflict resolution is the human needs theory, which establishes a framework that emphasized human needs and perceives conflict as emanating from unrealized human needs. The notion that unmet human needs are core precipitant of conflict is widely is a widely accepted perspective in international relational especially with respect to peace and conflict resolution specialism. In both the Rwandan and Burundian cases, the parties particularly the non-state actors were convinced that their respective government had failed to address their needs, including access to power, economic resources and had accentuated and pursued the needs of other Hutu ethnic group(Jean-Pierre, 2003; Phil, 2010; Naniwe-Kabrahe, 2008).

The notion that unmet human needs are core precipitant of conflict is perception that is also shared by both Burton and Maslow (in Burton 2009) hold that needs, physiological and psychological as opposed interests leads to conflict as people struggle fulfill their needs. With reference, to Rwanda and Burundi, the unmet needs developed to a need for survival by
individuals and groups from the different ethnic groups and established a situation in which conflict was inevitable as each group pursued their interests using whatever means necessary (Uvin, 1999). Shelter, water and food are considered as key human needs within this theory Burton (2009) however added other needs including identity, security, personal development and recognition to these as potential precipitators of conflict.

Issues of political liberalization, participation and developmental needs occupy a peripheral position within this theory (Ikejiaku&Dauda, 2011). The failure of existing state infrastructure to address these needs is the primary source ethno-nationalist struggles (Burton, 2009). Burton (2009) submits that the human needs theory provides an insight into the field and potential issues of concern in conflict analysis and resolution. Certainly, the needs theory is crucial in understanding the underpinning precipitants of conflict, as well as the resolution and management of conflict in several situations in Africa (Ikejiaku&Dauda, 2011).

Another theoretical perspective, which may be of vital relevance as far as understanding conflict and resolving African conflicts, is the conflict transformation theory. In the late 1970s, Edward Azar, conceived the conflict transformation theory in a bid to conceptualize the types of intrastate wars that were beginning to be experienced in Africa (Wani, 2010). This theory was the first focused attempt to conceptualize the peculiarity of the ethno-political conflicts taking place in Africa. Therefore, this theory is reasonably pertinent for the appraisal of conflict in Rwandan and Burundi, which share common features with regard to cause, nature and implications. According to the conflict transformation theory, conflict resolution takes places in a transformative process involving relief, rehabilitation, resettlement and reconstruction including regaining humanity and pursuing reconciliation (Wani, 2010).
According to Curtis (2011), conflict resolution must incorporate conflict transformation as a prerequisite. Hence, the conflict transformation theory contends all the stakeholders in the conflict resolution must be integrated should be empowered to constructively deal with the precipitators of the conflict and establish strategies that will ensure the elimination of the causes of conflict (Jeong, 2010). Conflict transformation implies not only to the process but also to the structure of attaining intermittent peace and stability. The failure of the conflict resolution to embrace all the integral and underpinning factors in a conflict leads to resumption of violence (Stone, 2001). However, this theory has been criticized for being a separate venture to conflict resolution.

Johan Galtung developed Galtung’s model of conflict, violence and peace in the 1960s (Galtung, 2000). This model comprises both of the symmetric and asymmetric conflicts and perceives conflict as a triangle an intricate relationship between attitude, behavior and contradiction. Contradiction implies that the underpinning conflict situation encompassing assumed or actual incompatibility of interests between or among the conflicting parties (Jeong, 2010). The model contends that in a symmetric conflict, the clash of interests between or among parties defines the contradiction while in an asymmetric conflict the contradiction is contingent upon the interest and the incompatibility of interests.

According to Galtung (2000), the attitudes imply the emotive, cognitive and conative positive or negative acuity and misperceptions that the parties have of each other. However, as Stone (2011) observes, parties in a conflictual relationship often develop demeaning or degrading attitudes against each other. Behavior as construed with the Galtung’s model of conflict, violence and peace involves coercive or cooperative gestures that parties to a conflict mete out at each other. The model asserts that all three elements, attitude, behavior and violence are integral attributes of a full conflict (Stone, 2001; Jeong, 2010).
Wani (2010) explains that the escalation and de-escalation model contends that conflicts are dynamic, can transform rapidly and can develop over a long period before they erupt into violence. With reference to Burundi and Rwanda conflicts, it has been determined that the conflicts are rooted in the histories of the two countries and can be traced back to the pre-independence period (Brown, 1993). In Rwanda, the domination of power by the Tutsi royalty and the Tutsi domination of the public positions in the colonial governments are pointed out to have been the root of the conflict that erupted towards the country’s independence and persisted in the immediate post-independence epoch (Hintjens, 1999; Kuperman, 2000).

The process of conflict escalation is indeed quite intricate as new players with different interests can emerge at any time and further escalate the situation. For instance, as the case of Rwanda and Burundi indicate, internal power wrangles can transform the goals and tactics can complicate the situation (McGarry& O’Leary, 1993).

De-escalation can be an intricate process and can transpire in a similar way. Unexpected setbacks and breakthroughs can alter the dynamics with gains in one area of de-escalation being counterbalance by degenerations in other areas (Stone, 2001; Jeong, 2010). At the same time, third party players can influence progress in imperceptible ways (Jeong, 2010).

**2.5 Chapter Summary**

Chapter Two has provided the literature review. It has examined the different perspectives given by different scholars concerning Rwanda and Burundi political processes and the conflict resolution processes. The chapter has also identified the gaps in existing literature and approaches to conflict resolution that the study aims to address. The chapter has ended by
providing the theoretical framework for the study – locating the study within existing theory.

The next chapter will provide the research methodology for the study.

Chapter Three examines the following factors in respect to how they have influenced conflict resolution in Rwanda and Burundi, namely; Leadership; Inclusivity focusing on levels of inclusivity; Prioritization of issues raised by ethnic groups and Negotiations focusing on the role played by the parties to the conflict and especially the third parties. Chapter 4 elucidates on the reasons for the success of conflict resolution in Rwanda as compared to that in Burundi. In explaining the reasons for success in Rwanda, the chapter refers to findings regarding the factors highlighted in chapter three.
CHAPTER THREE

3.0 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

3.1 Introduction

Chapter Three of the study discusses the research methodology and procedures that the researcher employed in the course of the study. It describes the research design that the researcher used, the data collection methods and the data analysis methods. The chapter commences by providing the epistemological leaning of the study.

3.2 The Epistemological Orientation

The current study leans towards the constructivist approach to social research. According to Robson (2002) explains that within constructivism, the job of the researcher is to understand the multiple social constructions of knowledge and meaning. Blanche, Durrheim and Painter (2002) explain that the researcher uses the research methods, which tend to collect multiple perspectives.

Such methods include the review of existing literature and observations to collects various opinions that can help in understanding a phenomenon. The current study was constructivist-leaning since it does not assume a reality but rather assessed existing literature to collect multiple opinions and perspectives of the scholars and authors that have dealt with the assessment of the conflict resolution processes in Rwanda and Burundi.

3.3 Research Design

Research design is the general sketch or plan for an investigation (Kothari, 2005). The study sought to compare the conflict resolution processes in Rwanda and Burundi with an aim of
conceptualizing why the process in the former was more successful as compared to that in the latter.

3.4 Data Collection Methods

The study used documentary review approach to examine the relevant documentation including various policy documents by the Rwandan and Burundian governments as well as reports and may secondary sources as is apparent in the references page. The purpose of the documentary review was to collect and review published data and information on the topic of interest as a basis for further verification and comparison of the conflict resolution process in Rwanda and Burundi, and their impacts on the two countries. To complement the documentation, the researcher also acquired relevant information from the internet.

3.5 Data Analysis Methods

Data analysis implies the techniques means and approaches which the researcher conveniently selects and uses to make sense of or interpret the collected information. Kothari (2005) notes that various scholars have identified different ways of analyzing and data some of the most common in qualitative research are the logical, content and matrix approaches. For this study, the researcher used a combination of all these methods to ensure the accuracy of the interpretation of the data that was collected.

The application of the hybrid data collection and analysis method, including documentary review, content analysis and the matrix method permitted the acquisition of necessary data on the research problem. This was especially on leadership and leadership roles, inclusivity of the processes, the prioritization of issues, negotiations and the identification of the underpinning issues of the conflict which were central influencing factors as far as the success and failures of conflict resolution in both countries was concerned. Secondary
sources of information on speeches, actual policy, and behaviors of the leadership and stakeholders helped to account for the failures and successes of conflict resolution in Rwandan and Burundian conflict resolution processes.

3.6 Ethical Issues

The research process is an intricate and sensitive undertaking, which has the potential to impact differently on different stakeholders (Cooper & Schindler, 2003). The researcher must take special care to ensure that the research process and results do not affect any of the various stakeholders in a negative manner. Blanche, et al, (2002) explain that the both the researcher and the research stakeholders must be protected from possible negative consequences of the research.

For perceptible reasons therefore, the researcher in this case took special steps to ensure that the ethical standards of research were adhered to during the study. The researcher took the following measures to protect the research stakeholders, ensure professionalism and augment the validity of the study.

3.6.1 Ethical Issues Regarding the Researcher

Glessne and Peshkin (1992) contend that for the research to be of value, the research must be conducted with the aim of addressing some social, political or economic issue that research should not be conducted for personal gain. The current study was driven with the principle goal of comparing the conflict resolution processes in Rwanda and Burundi, which could facilitate the identification of critical issues and approaches that can facilitate conflict resolution in other conflict situations. The study was therefore aimed at improving the conflict resolution process in the two countries as well as other regional countries in which people are suffering due to adoption of ineffective conflict resolution strategies.
3.6.2 Ethical Issues Regarding the Research Process

Cooper and Schindler (2003), emphasize that research should be authentic and original. The two authors identify fraud and plagiarism as key issues central to ethical standards of research. Blanche, et al, (2002) and Kothari (2005) explain that plagiarism occurs when the researcher adopts the ideas and statements of previous scholars as their own without properly acknowledging them or when they improperly acknowledge the source of the ideas or statements they use. In this study, the researcher took great caution not to adopt or copy-paste the ideas and statements of other scholars. When ideas were borrowed, the researcher took special attention to ensure that the sources were correctly cited or acknowledged.

Additionally, the researcher correctly used the personal privileges, which had accrued to her as the researcher. The researcher endeavored to exercise integrity in the collection and the interpretation of research findings. The researcher acknowledged that the issue of conflict and conflict resolution are highly sensitive and important ones, which needed to be treated with great care and attention to detail during the study as misrepresentation of issues and facts could harm future conflict resolution processes.

3.7 Limitations of the Study

The limitations of the study were defined by the following parameters. The study focused on Rwanda and Burundi, particularly on the conflict resolution processes in the two countries. The study was mainly on qualitative research and exclusively used secondary sources of information. The flipside of the qualitative research is that the secondary sources used were not as current as the information generated through a survey study would be.

However, various sources were consulted to ensure that the information obtained was relevant enough. Furthermore, the secondary source of information are not factual in most
circumstances are they are affected by the biases of their authors. Again, through the consultation of various sources, the researcher ensured that the information obtained was as factual as could be realized through a qualitative study.

3.8 Chapter Summary

This chapter has highlighted and explained the methodology that the researcher used in the study. The chapter has provided the epistemological orientation of the study, describing the study as leaning towards the constructivist approach to social science research. The Chapter has also described the research design, the data collection methods and the methods that were used to analyze the data. The ethical considerations for the study have also been explained as well as the limitations of the study. The next chapter, Chapter Four examines and assesses the research results and findings regarding the three research questions.
CHAPTER FOUR

4.0 CONFLICT RESOLUTION PROCESSES IN RWANDA AND BURUNDI

4.1 Introduction

Chapter Four examines the following factors in respect to how they have influenced conflict resolution in Rwanda and Burundi, namely; Leadership; Inclusivity focusing on levels of inclusivity; Prioritization of issues raised by ethnic groups and Negotiations focusing on the role played by the parties to the conflict and especially the third parties. It elucidates on the reasons for the success of conflict resolution in Rwanda as compared to that in Burundi.

The Chapter develops a comparative assessment of the extent of inclusiveness of the Rwanda process vis-à-vis the Burundian one. Furthermore, the chapter argues that leadership in Rwanda has enhanced the success of conflict resolution in Rwanda by highlighting specific leadership roles that impacted on conflict resolution. The Chapter contends further that all the key stakeholders were part of the process in Rwanda while in Burundi only a few participated but even these participated half-heartedly.

4.2 Leadership

Leadership and the role an individual leader plays in the conflict are fundamental especially with regards to whether the conflict is resolved or persist. In both the Rwandan and Burundian it role of leadership in escalating and deescalating the conflict has been noted. The role that the leaders in the two countries played in the conflicts is perceptible in their stand and on various issues pertinent to the conflict. On August 4, 1993 the Rwandan President at the time, Juvenal Habyarimana and the chairperson of the RPF, Colonel Alexis Kanyarqenge
signed the Arusha Agreement halting the violence that had rocked the country, at least for provisionally.

The leadership’s role in halting the hostilities was pivotal but the role of the hardliners especially within the GoR threatened hopes for a lasting peace. Perhaps in this mindset, Kagame opined in 1992 “the best way to fight is protracted war, because the ultimate solution is political” Watson, 1992, p. 55). In the same note, Habyarimana stated concerning the Arusha Accords, “this is a key and decisive step…however…it will be necessary to change our behavior” (Scorgie, 2004, p. 71). The RPF chairman observed that, “peace only becomes an irreversible reality if the causes of war disappear or are disappearing…Today’s signing only marks a very important step in the process towards peace” (Scorgie, 2004, p. 71).

These statements by the leadership at the time are indeed suggestive of a concealed perception of the process by the two factions. Time has proved that the extent to which the leadership was really committed to a negotiated settlement was insignificant. Indeed, even as early as 1993, Colonel Bagosora of the Rwandan army had stated that “the extermination of the Tutsis would be the inevitable consequence […] of the implementation of the Arusha accord” (Gourevitch, 1998).

The role that the leadership in both Burundi and Rwanda played in the resolution of the conflict remains one of the most defining factors for the stability in the Rwanda as compared to Burundi. It has been noted that PierreNkurunziza was relatively less involved in the conflict resolution process often considering it his own personal project as compared to his Rwandan counterpart President Paul Kagame.

In the run-up to the 2004 Arusha Accords for instance, it is alleged that Nkurunziza did not negotiate for any seat or position during the negotiations since he considered the ethnic
quotas system suggested as baseless. On the contrary, Paul Kagame and his RPF had participated in the negotiations leading up to the 1993 Arusha Accords even though extremist and factional differences within the Government of Rwanda (GoR) derailed the process significantly. As opposed to Nkuruniziza who mainly perceived the Tutsi as a threat, Paul Kagame encouraged members of the Hutu ethnic community to contest for political positions and encouraged women to engage more in politics and in the public sphere (Powley, 2012).

4.3 Inclusivity

The concept on inclusivity or the idea of who needs to be included in the peace process is a fundamental one, having great implications for the attainment and sustainability of peace. Certainly, it is perceptible that the presence of enduring inclusive clauses in the peace process gives conflicting or warring parties enhanced levels of trust in the newly established institutions. Furthermore, the idea inclusivity diminishes the potential flashpoint of majority rule. Indeed, it is increasingly perceptible in ethnically heterogeneous societies that majority rule in results in the domination of one group over the others resulting in major conflicts (Tuner, 2013; Lemarchand, 2006)). It is therefore upon this basis that the conflict resolution process adopted in Rwanda and Burundi help in examining the success of the processes in the former as compared to that in the latter.

It has been observed that the transition process in Burundi was tumultuous involving an internationally brokered peace made through negotiations and compromises. The Burundian peace process involved several factions including government and rebel factions that only came to the negotiation table due to international pressure. Hence, the process was far from being inclusive to a great extent as several key stakeholders including women, the youth and the several rebel factions that emerged.
The Rwandan transition, as opposed to the Burundian transition has been direct and relatively inclusive. In the aftermath of the genocide, the Rwandan elite acknowledged exclusivity of the previous dispensation as having precipitated the devastating genocide. Despite having reservations for including Hutu elements in the post-genocide government, probably in line with the abortive 1993 accords, the RPF government initiated an extensive process that would bring virtually all stakeholders to the rebuilding of the new country. It is the inclusivity of the Rwandan conflict resolution process, which sets apart from that pursued by Burundi (Longma, 2012).

The Rwandan government appealed to all the stakeholders in the peace process including the women and that youth to actively participate in the peace process and the setting up of the new country. To do this, the government initiated both local and national processes that would ensure active participation of all individuals in the society including those in rural areas especially women and the youth. The issue of justice and reconciliation of the society was one, which needed to be prioritized in order to ascertain lasting peace.

The cultural conflict resolution processes including the Gacaca and the Ubunzi became very crucial in ascertaining inclusivity in the reconciliation process and the quest for peace (Mutisi, 2009). The cultural approaches or the local mechanisms for conflict resolution that were adopted include the Ubunzi(Mediators and conciliators), the Inyando(Solidarity camps), the Itorero and the ubusabane, but probably the most important as contends Longma (2012) was the Gacaca Court System or the ‘inkikogacaca’.2

The Gacaca courts which had been a traditional dispute resolution mechanisms was fundamental in the post-genocide reconciliation efforts in that it acted as an intermediary or a

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2Gacaca is pronounced “Ga – cha – cha” and literally meaning “lawn” or “grass” and mean justice delivered or acquired on the grass.
midway between the quest for justice and the desire for reconciliation by providing closure to victims. It must be acknowledged that women and the youth from across the ethnic divide participated as judges and mediators in the local process of conflict resolution and were therefore integral part of the process. Besides, the political participation of women from across the ethnic divide was also encouraged as a potentially effective means of achieving a lasting peace. Currently, women presentation to the Rwanda’s Low House of Parliament saw an unprecedented increase when women won an appalling 48.8% of the seats (Pawley, 2009).

The stalemate in Burundi among the different stakeholders and rebel factions left a negotiated deal as the only possible outcome. The grandstanding among the rebel factions, the intermittency of the civil war, the dilapidated infrastructure and economy meant that parties had to chart a common way forward. The realities of the Burundian conflict lead to the Arusha process, which resulted in the Arusha Accords of 2000 and the creation of a new constitution of 2004.

The 2004 Arusha Accords provided for a transitional government in which Major Pierre Buyoya, the incumbent and a Tutsi from the UPRONA would continue to serve as the president. Domitien Ndayizeya, a Hutu and a member of the FROMEDU was to serve as the vice president in the transitional government. It is conceivable therefore that the Burundian peace process perceived the conflict in as mainly political and pursued a political solution to the problem. Furthermore, the conflict was largely perceived as a power contest between the UPRONA and the FROMEDU while other possible crucial actors were considered insignificant and not included in the peace process. This certainly, impacted on the legitimacy of the agreement and shed light on the potential of the process sustainability of peace in Burundi.
With respect to the number of players or actors involved in the conflict resolution process in Rwanda, the process was by every means highly inclusive making it potentially stable and persistent (Anastase, 2012). Therefore, conflict resolution pursued through a negotiated compromise brokered by a third party is inherently unstable since it does to address the underlying issues but allows the parties to pursue their separate interests. This approach engenders the long-term commitment by the parties to the outcome of the conflict and their ability to transform the nature of their engagements.

Indeed, it is perceptible that the Arusha Agreement upon which the Burundian conflict resolution was centered was inherently weak. According to Curtis (2003), one of the greatest shortcomings of the agreement was overambitious and lacked comprehensiveness. The Arusha Agreement did not bring all combatants on board especially the two active rebel factions that failed to sign it and as such did not result in a ceasefire as these factions continued to fight. In fact, as Prendergast and Smock (1999) had observed even before the signing of the Arusha Agreement, the substantive negotiations provided the parties with an opportunity for posturing, procedural maneuvering and horse-trading with respect to future positions.

4.4 Prioritization of Underpinning Issues

Prioritization can be conceived as the mediator’s decision on issues that need to be settled fast so as to avert further conflict and loss of life (Wani, 2010). In fact, the mediators often get caught up between the need to move the mediation forward or to dawdle it down depending on the underpinning issues of the conflict. Striking a balance between these contending issues is a delicate process, which demands prioritization of what is important contingent on the prevailing circumstances (Väyrynen, 1991).
Therefore, the third parties especially the mediators must decide which issues warrant mediating on and settling in the peace agreement and which issues can be pushed forward to the post-agreement period. According to Prendergast and Smock (1999a), the prioritization of issues is fundamental in determining the success of the conflict resolution process and the establishment of an enduring tranquility and peace that permits addressing of other finer issues. The sequencing of justice issue in conflict and post-conflict situation has a huge bearing on the establishment of enduring peace.

The Arusha agreement demonstrated a profound misconception of the Burundian conflict by both the international and regional actors that mediated and supported the agreement (Anastase, 2012). Other than attaining substantive and comprehensive peace agreement both Nyerere and Mandela sought to strike a balance among the ethnic groups at the battleground, little attention was given to the settlement of and establishment of tranquility military cleavages within the army (Hatungimana, et al, 2008).

Comparatively, Rwanda’s approach to reconciliation can be summed as maximum approach while that of Burundi can be perceived as a non-approach. The efficiency of the Rwandan conflict resolution lies in the fact that the entire process was homegrown. Kelman (2010) argues that a homegrown conflict resolution is more genuine and sustainable as both leaders and citizens feel more responsible to seeing to through.

The conflict was perceived as an ethnic-based conflict and as such, the remedy proposed in the Agreement was ethnic power sharing. However, as Hatungimana, et al (2008) the agreement overlooked several other cleavages in Burundi especially the power struggle within the parties such as that between President Domitien Ndayizeye and the Speaker of the National Assembly, Jean Minani and that between these two and Pierre Nkurunziza. The
agreement also ignored the cleavages within the Burundian Army and the underpinning socio-economic issues within the Burundian society. Perceptibly, conflict resolution in Burundi has not been enduring and stable because it was not as comprehensive as the Rwandan one, it overlooked vital aspects of the conflict. Another issue that can help account for the relative success of the Rwanda conflict resolution was the appreciation of the traditional conflict resolution mechanism and re-innovating them to fit the post-genocide needs. The cultural conflict resolution mechanisms in Rwanda, including the Ingando, Gacaca and the Ubunzi allowed for greater local ownership of the process. In fact, as Phil (2010), contends the Rwandan traditional approach proved effective mainly because it was innovation-driven as the Gacaca courts developed their localized and specialized structures to respond to both national and local-level justice needs. At the same time, Burundi however only experimented with the Bashingantatweas it was not binding (Anastase, 2012).

The Gacaca courts literally means “justice on the grass” and denotes Rwanda’s traditional form of administering justices (Staub, 2000, p. 369). At the center of the Gacaca systems is an emphasis on community restoration and reparations. The revival of the courts in the post genocide period is linked to the inadequacy of the formal justice system, which had been devastated, by the 1994 genocide and the wars that predated it. The backlog of the genocide related cases promoted the need for the creation of the need to expedite justice. Other than expediting justice, the courts allowed the administration of justice that was not punitive but allowed for the reconciliation of perpetrators and victims.

Anastase (2012) argues that the non-binding nature of the Burundian traditional approach to conflict resolution implies that unlike its equivalents in Rwanda, it was incapable of
addressing the underlying causes of conflict at the grassroots level. This certainly partly accounts for the fragility of conflict resolution in Burundi as compared to the Rwandan approach. Certainly, the traditional dispute resolution approaches add to the sustainability of the peace process but enhances local ownership of the process and establish conducive socio-cultural and political milieu for a shared social therapy (Anstase, 2012).

The traditional approaches to dispute resolution also facilitate the attainment of restorative justice, communal dialogue, reconciliation, community mobilization and tolerance all, which precipitate sustainable peace. The fact that the Rwanda society fully embraced this approach helps account for relative success of the conflict resolution in the country.

4.5 Negotiations

The 2004 Arusha Accords on Burundi were inherently problematic negatively impacting on its constancy in the long run. The Arusha Accord directed the swap to transitional governance to be initiated over a period of 18 months and which was to be followed by a general election after 3 years (Hatungimana, et al, 2008). Following the perception of the Burundian conflict as a political-ethnic struggle, government positions in the transition government was to be shared based on ethnic quotas in which the Hutu were to have 60% of the seats and the Tutsi were to have 40% of the seats. Again, no attention was given to other issues such as gender equality and women inclusion in the governance of the state. At the same time, the youths were not considered as an integral part of the peace process.

The Arusha Accords that was finally signed by the two warring factions in Rwanda was an intensive process but which was merely a smokescreen for political mechanizations that were in the offing. The Accords were the culmination of a deliberative negotiation between the Government of Rwanda (GoR) and the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) but would results in a
grandstanding between the GoR, the RPF and the other various factions that emerged. In fact, for the GoR, assuming a united front was impossible as it comprised of three separate factions, all accountable to different centers of power. These GoR factions included members of Habyarimana’s party, the MRND and the CDR as well as the opposition parties hindered the possibility of realizing a united front.

For the President Habyarimana and the GoR leadership, the Accords were merely necessary for stopping the war and enhancing the economy while the RPF were interested in bringing about change in the government. As such, it is perceptible that despite their participation in the Arusha negotiations, the representatives of the GoR and those of the RPF/A pursued different goals. This impacted negatively on the 1992 Arusha Accords to hold hence the outbreak of the 1994 genocide. Nonetheless, it must be pointed out that in the aftermath of the genocide, the socio-political situation in Rwanda permitted the attainment of constancy in the political process in a manner that was not the case in Burundi in the post-2004 Arusha Accords.

Fundamental components of conflict resolution that help account for its sustainability are local ownership of the process and domestication of international remedies, implementation guarantees including political commitment, comprehensiveness in the inclusion and participation of all players including the local communities, comprehensives in the apprehension of the underpinning elements of the conflict. According to Kelman (2010), an internationally negotiated conflict resolution often lacks these profound and fundamental elements and as such is often inelastic and fragile.

The case of negotiating conflict resolutions in both Rwanda and Burundi suggest that coherent internal politics are crucial for bargaining success. The current political
grandstanding in Burundi can be attributed to the abortive implementation of the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement signed in 2000. While the Accord can be construed as, having been and internationally engineered political compromise its appeal to the political leadership was in and has been matter of great contestation.

Furthermore, the lack of a precise political winner as was the case in Rwanda in the post-genocide period has left Burundi in a persistent power struggle among groups that negotiated the 2000 Arusha Accords. The continued grandstanding in Burundi way after the signing of the Accords can be attributed to the implication of the agreement, which virtually created many uncertainties of political and legal bearing. For instance, it can be contended that the Accords had a kind of supra-constitutional status, which obscured the political process in the country.

The Agreement being evidently a political agreement reached at by international and domestic cosignatories, it adopted several provisions having normative, law-making objectives and intentions. The extent to which the Agreement actually reflected the vision that the political elite held for the countries future is uncertain. However, certain is the fact, it is without the negotiated Agreement that the decision to permit the incumbent President Nkurunziza to run for a third term can be grounded. It should be recalled that in 2015, Burundi’s Constitutional Court held that “he who violates the major constitutional principles of the Arusha Agreement cannot pretend to respect the constitution” (Vandeginste, 2015, p. 3). This therefore implies that the Arusha Accords is presently just an outdated political elite ideal.

In fact, several problems emerged with the Arusha Accord. First, several key stakeholders especially the conflicting factions viewed the process as illegitimate probably due to the fact
that it emerged out of international pressure and did not have much faith in the process. The Arusha Peace Agreement of 28 August, 2004 became the cornerstone or framework for conflict resolution in Burundi in the post-conflict period. While the process was primarily led by Africans, it was influenced by international actors. Western countries including the European Union (EU) supported the Arusha process and funded the negotiations.

The factions groups in the Burundian process only signed the accord as a result of pressure from international backers of the process. Furthermore, the process led to the emergence of several factions struggling to benefit from the agreement. For instance, several Hutu rebel factions emerged and decided to join the process and the Tutsi parties got engaged in the process even without the support of the population resulting in legitimacy problems for the process.

It is not surprising therefore, that at least two rebel groups rejected the final agreement and continued to fight government forces (Tuner, 2013). The ultimate outcome therefore is that the Arusha Accords resulted in a peace agreement but not a ceasefire agreement, which is perceptible, the reason for the continued instability in the country. In Rwanda, the conflict resolution process was initiated in pre-genocide years when in 1993 the conflict parties agreed to a power-sharing deal of the Arusha accords. However, the existing Hutu power bloc perceived the power sharing deal with the principal political forces as impossible.

It is supposedly for this reason that the genocide was systematically planned and executed. The aim was alleged to have been the unsettling of the power balance in the country and avoiding the implementation of the Arusha Accords. In Rwanda, a negotiated deal had been developed in Arusha in 1993, however, it did not take off as planned having been impaired by “Hutu Power” – precipitating the genocide (Tuner, 2013, p.22). The accords created a
power-sharing government between the Hutu-dominated government and the Tutsi-dominated RPF.

As such, the Rwandan peace process cannot be perceived as emanating from a negotiated process but rather an extensive and inclusive national drive for reconciliation in the post-genocide period. For Rwanda, the absence of an externally imposed negotiated political deal presents a line of distinction between the peace process in Rwanda and that in Burundi, which can help, explain the constancy of the process in the former.

4.6 Chapter Summary

Chapter Four has examined how certain factors influenced conflict resolution in Rwanda and Burundi. The Chapter also has identified and explained the reasons for the success of the conflict resolution process in Rwanda in comparison to that in Burundi. The Chapter has examined the how leadership, inclusivity, the prioritization of conflict issues as well as negotiations have impacted on conflict resolution in Rwanda and Burundi. The chapter pointed to the differences in role of leaders and the political elite in Rwanda and Burundi, the differing levels of inclusivity in the two contexts, the distinctions in the prioritization of conflict issues and the role of the leadership in negotiation and implementation of the agreements.

It has been found that leadership differences between the Rwandan and Burundian political elite, different levels of inclusivity in the conflict resolution in Rwandan and Burundi as well as the prioritization of conflict issues, impacted greatly on the peace process in the two countries. The Chapter has contended that the relative stability or constancy experienced in Rwanda as compared to Burundi was as a result of a comprehensive role played by the various stakeholders in the country.
CHAPTER FIVE

5.0 CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 Introduction

This chapter is the recap of the study. The chapter provides the summary of the study, the conclusions and recommendations.

5.2 Summary of the Study

The study sought to compare and contrast the conflict resolution processes in Rwanda and Burundi with an aim to conceptualize why the former has been more stable than the latter. It attempted to assess whether there were any differences in the nature and context of the conflicts in Rwandan and Burundi; to examine the conflict resolution processes in Rwanda and Burundi; and to determine why the conflict resolution in Rwanda has been more stable than that in Burundi;

The study used the following methodology; it was a qualitative research design focusing on the examination of existing literature sources to collect information that permitted the realization of the objectives of the study. The study was purely an explanatory study and sort to explain why the Rwandan conflict resolution was successful as compared to the approach to conflict resolution employed in Burundi. The technique used for data collection and were the background study and content analysis assessment respectively. These approaches were used to enhance the chances of collecting the relevant data that would permit the analysis of the Rwanda and Burundi conflict resolutions mechanisms.

The reliability of the information sources was achieved through an extensive assessment of existing literature and comparing scholars’ standpoints on issues of interest and then cross-
referencing the scholarly opinions with the opinions of other scholars regarding the issues of interest especially within the context of Rwanda and Burundi. The drawbacks and limitation of the qualitative research is that the secondary sources used were not as current as the information generated through a survey study would be.

The study found that there are certain similarities in the conflicts in Burundi and Rwanda. At the same time it found that there were pertinent contextual differences and in the two conflicts. The study found that the conflicts in Burundi and Rwanda could be differentiated on the basis of their origin and nature. The study has argued that while the conflict in Burundian can be attributed to access to scarce resources by different ethnic groups, that in Rwanda is attributable to ethnic tensions regarding discrepancies between the rich and the poor as well as ethnic-based regional and social imbalances. However, the struggle for political power along ethnic lines was evident in both countries and this also accounted to a marked extent to the conflict in the two countries.

The study found that the two countries had implemented conflict resolution processes to avert the conflict and to establish viable peace in the future. It has established that the conflict resolution process in Rwanda was way more successful as compared to the conflict resolution process in Burundi. The study has found that the conflict resolution process in Rwanda was more comprehensive than that in Burundi as it was mainly an internal process that involved all the actors including women and rural dwellers. The study established that the Rwandan conflict resolution process also effectively employed local conflict or dispute resolution mechanisms.

Hence, Rwandan process was a bottom-up process appreciated by the majority of the actors, enjoying great legitimacy domestically and abroad. On the contrary, the study found that the
Burundian process was a top-down process emanating from the international community rather than being domestically inspired and implemented. It was an elitist and a non-comprehensive process that was considered illegitimate by most of the actors and stakeholders in the process.

5.3 Discussion

Several scholars including Uvin, Kaburahe and Chipoka have alluded that the conflict witnessed in Burundi and Rwanda was ethnic in nature. Uvin (1999) in particular has contended that ethnic contestations between the ethnic elites of Hutu and Tutsi nationalities are the source of the conflict in each of the two countries. This assertion by Uvin supports the findings of the current study, which has also found a positive association between ethnic animosities and the conflict that has been witnessed in these countries. However, it can be argued as the study has found that leadership, especially the role played by leaders in instigating the violence. The radicalization of the masses along ethnic grounds

The study has also confirmed Chipoka’s sentiments that success of the conflict resolution in Rwanda draws from the fact that it was comprehensive and resulted in the uprooting of the underlying causes of the conflict, something which the process of conflict resolution in Burundi probably failed to achieve. The study has found the conflict resolution process in Rwanda to have been more comprehensive than the one in Burundi with respect to the inclusion of all important stakeholders.

The study findings have critical implications for conflict resolution theory and attendant resolutions. The cases reviewed do suggest that conflict develops under a multiplicity of intricate stages. This is in conformity with Galtung’s Human Needs theory, which conceptualizes conflict as emanating from unmet human needs proves relevant to the
conceptualization of the conflicts in Rwanda and Burundi. In fact, based on the findings of the current study, the stability in Rwanda can be explained by the realization, in post-genocide period of the needs and interests of all political groups.

Comparatively, the failure or the unsuccessfulness of the Burundian process as the study has found could be attributed to the failure of the process to realize the needs and interests of the population forcing them to go back to conflict. Indeed, in both the countries, the parties particularly the non-state actors were convinced that their respective government had failed to address their needs, including access to power, economic resources and had accentuated and pursued the needs of other Hutu ethnic group.

The conflicts in Rwanda and Burundi prove that the third parties do not always play a critical role in all conflict resolution situations. In fact, it does suggest that some conflict do not require the third parties at all. The current study has determined that the conflict resolution for Rwanda that was spearheaded by third parties in Arusha in 1993 was abortive since the conflicting parties had not joined the process. The Arusha Accords of 1993 on Rwanda and the 2000 Arusha Accords on Burundi can be perceived as a hand me down agreements dictated by the third parties.

Therefore, the Barbara Walter’s third parties theory of conflict resolution cannot help to effectively account conflict resolution in Rwanda and Burundi. The role of the third parties in the actual resolution Rwanda conflict or that in Burundi was largely insignificant. This suggests that externally negotiated peace agreements in which the third parties compel the conflicting faction to sign an agreement are less effective in solving ethnic-based conflicts. Thus while the third party intervention is critical in civil war situations, in the two cases
reviewed, it is perceptible that a more domestic bred conflict resolution was more effective in Rwanda and this could have helped the situation in Burundi had the leadership appreciated it.

5.4 Conclusion

5.4.1 Contextual Differences In Rwanda and Burundi the Conflicts

Despite the striking similarities between Rwanda and Burundi, there are certain contextual dissimilarities between the two with respect to the source sources of conflict. The Rwandan conflict could be attributed to the simmering ethnic tensions between its two largest ethnic groups the *Tutsi* and the *Hutu* since the run-up to the country’s independence. The conflict in Burundi on the other hand can be regarded as having emanated from the struggle for access to the countries limited resources. Thus, the conflict in Burundi only became an ethnic issue only through political manipulation of the individuals of their ethnicity. Nonetheless, the two conflicts can be considered as having emanated from competition for political power by ethnic elite. In fact, in both Rwanda and Burundi, the struggle for political control by the elites from the *Hutu* and *Tutsi* ethnic backgrounds resulted in their manipulation of their ethnic groups in to ethnic intolerance and conflict.

5.4.2 Differences in Conflict Resolution Processes in Rwanda and Burundi

The contextual differences in the Rwandan and Burundian conflicts necessitated different approaches to conflict resolution processes in the two countries. Rwanda adopted a more inborn approach that appreciated the inclusion of all the stakeholders including women, the rural communities and the youth in the conflict resolution process. This created a potential for the process to be successful and sustainable. However, the adoption of a foreign-instigated conflict resolution process in Burundi lacked legitimacy among the majority of actors and
created a potential for the process to be unsustainable, as resent events in the country have indicated.

5.4.3 Reasons of Stability of Conflict Resolution in Rwanda over that in Burundi

The conflict resolution mechanism in Rwanda as compared to that in Burundi has been relatively stable. The reason for the stability of the Rwandan conflict resolution process could be attributed to its comprehensiveness. The process in Rwanda, apart from engaging all the members of the Rwandan society also incorporated the use of conventional or cultural conflict resolution mechanisms. Therefore, local ownership of the process in addition to adoption cultural domestic processes ensured the attainment of not only of legitimacy of the process but its sustainability as well.

5.5 Recommendation

The following recommendations can be made at the backdrop of the findings of the study.

5.5.1 Recommendations for Improvement

The policymakers in Rwanda and Burundi should analyze the conflict resolution processes in their respective countries and determine how effective such processes have been. Policymakers in regional and international bodies including the African Union and the United Nations should appreciate the differences in the contextual differences in the conflicts in the two countries and define an effective conflict resolution process that embraces local concerns and cultural approaches.

In fact, the policymakers should borrow the example of the Rwandan approach and propose comprehensive approach to conflict resolution that incorporates all stakeholders however trivial they may appear. Policymakers and third parties in conflict resolution should
acknowledge that the chances of sustainable conflict resolution increases with how comprehensive the process is made to be.

5.5.2 Suggestions for Future Research

There is need for future researchers to conduct more studies and analyses of conflict resolution processes in Rwanda and Burundi. Such studies should be comparative in nature and should seek to establish the effectiveness of the approaches by identifying the successes and failures of each. To be more precise, future research can focus on just one of the three research questions of the current study and identify for instance how the contextual differences in the two conflicts can help account for the success and failures of the conflict resolution process in the two cases.
REFERENCES


